A vindication of Dr. Paley's theory of morals from the principal objections of Mr. D. Stewart; Mr. Gisborne; Dr. Pearson; and Dr. T. Brown. With an appendix, containing strictures on some remarks of Dr. Whateley

Front matter

VINDICATION in DR. PALEY'S THEORY OF MORALS. LONDON: IEOTSON AND PALMER, PRINTERS, SAVOY STREET, STRAND. A VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S THEORY OF MORALS FROM THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIONS OF MR. DUGALD STEWART; MR. GISBORNE; DR. PEARSON ; AND DR. THOMAS BROWN. WITH AN APPENDIX, CONTAINING STRICTURES ON SOME REMARKS OF DR. WHATELY, PRINCIPAL OF ST. ALBAN'S HALL, OXFORD. BY THE REV. LATHAM WAINE WRIGHT, M.A..F.S.A. OF EMMANUEL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, RECTOR OF GREAT BRICKHILL, BUCKINGHAMSHIRE, AND MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LITERATURE. 4c. Cognitis autem rerum finibus, cum intellegitur quit sit et bonomm extremum et malorum, invents vitæ via est conformatioque omnium omciorum. Est igitur quo quidque referatur ; ex quo id quod domes expetunt, beate vivendi ratio inveniri et comparari potest. Cicero de Finibus, L. V. e. 6.

LONDON : J. HATCHARD AND SON, 187, PICCADILLY. 1830. TO THE RIGHT REVEREND CHARLES RICHARD SUMNER, D. D. LORD BISHOP OF WINCHESTER, fye. fye. fye. THE FOLLOWING PAGES, IN DEFENCE OF ONE OF THE FIRST WRITERS OF THE ACE, AIIE INSCRIBED WITH SENTIMENTS OF UNFEIGNED RESPECT, BY HIS LOBDSHir's MOST OBEDIENT AND FAITHFUL SERVANT, THE AUTHOR.

ADVERTISEMENT.

Preface

. XII the assertion might be readily admitted. But if, on the contrary, a dispassionate investigation of the powers and operations of the human mind constitutes, as it now more usually does, and as it always ought to do, the legitimate object of that science, the neglect into which it is said to have fallen would afford ample cause for the expression of regret. But the truth is, that if we advert to the various publications that ■ have appeared in our own language within no great length of time on the im portant topics which it embraces, we shall find that this department of knowledge has not been so much disregarded, as many have allowed themselves to suppose. No writer of eminence, perhaps, has contributed more than Mr. Dugald Stewart, by the peculiar attractions of his style, and the almost uni form correctness of his taste, to revive the attention of the thinking part of the pub-

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. XIII lie to rational inquiries relative to the mental faculties, and to the practicable means by which they may be more suc cessfully cultivated. But there is another circumstance, which, though not so pro minent as to have obtained general notice, must yet be allowed to possess no small share of influence with regard to the point in ques tion. As long as Locke's " Essay on the Human Understanding" shall continue to be made use of as a text-book in the public examinations at Cambridge for a bachelor's degree, (and what other work has yet appeared which, taken as a whole, is en titled to occupy its place ?) we have no tri fling security that the study of intellectual philosophy can never become entirely obso lete in this country. That it should not be so much encouraged in the recent plans for affording instruction to the uneducated orders of the

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. XIV community, can occasion neither surprise nor censure. The different branches of natural science, especially those connected with the mechanical arts, together with the biographical sketches of men whose merit has raised them to distinction, are not only better suited to their comprehen sion, but are more likely to be advantageous to them in the laborious occupations which they are destined to pursue. But since this is not the case with those whose station in society affords them leisure and oppor tunity for making more extensive attain ments, the philosophy of the human mind ought to hold a prominent station in that liberal course of studies which no man in polished society can now entirely neglect without incurring disgrace. Besides the other numerous arguments in favour of this pursuit, there is one which the purpose of the present publication leads me more par-

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. XV ticularly to notice, and that is, the close alliance which subsists between the intel lectual and the moral part of our nature. Without some acquaintance with the struc ture and operations of the human under standing, we cannot investigate with suc cess the source and complex nature of the different emotions and passions in which our actions originate, nor the influence of those moral causes and motives by which the character of individuals is invariably framed. The paramount importance of the knowledge to be derived from the study of ethics will, in the present age, scarcely be disputed; and though no one in a country where the Christian faith is professed, can be entirely ignorant of the practical pre cepts which are to regulate his conduct, yet the theoretic part also, comprising the origin, the criterion, and the obligation of virtue, merits the diligent examination of

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. XVI all those whose circumstances enable them to receive a more finished education. It is obvious therefore, that he will come best prepared for studying this branch of the subject, whose mind has been previously imbued with the principles of intellectual philosophy. Whatever defects may be discovered in the execution, the design of the following pages is to vindicate a theory of morals which has not only been misapprehended by those who have viewed it superficially, but has even been condemned by men of undisputed sagacity, who have unfortu nately been too much absorbed in the con templation of its weaker points, to be able to estimate the solidity of the basis on which it rests. I trust, however, that in this attempt to answer the arguments of Dr. Paley's opponents, I have not violated the rules of candour and courtesy, nor been

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. XVII deficient in avowing that deference which must at all times be due to those who have enlightened and adorned society by their talents and virtues. Though I cannot be supposed to regard with any high degree of approbation the great aim of Mr. Stewart in his metaphysical writings, which was to defend and illustrate the doctrines of Dr. Reid, I still conceive that his works have been pro ductive of no small advantage in subduing, by the beauties and the eloquence of his composition, the prejudices of many of those who had before felt an almost insuperable aversion to approach any subject of abstract speculation. But, independently of all theo retic peculiarities, there are many parts of his writings which, while they display the happy facility of the author, in divesting i-econdite questions of their repulsive form, are replete with observations of the highest b

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. practical utility. His chapters on the as sociation of ideas, on the faculties of me mory and imagination, together with his discussions relative to the process of in ductive reasoning, might be pointed out as abundantly sufficient to verify this remark ; and the extensive information which he possessed in the various departments of science and literature has communicated to the topics of his inquiry a degree of interest, of which the generality of stu dents would have thought them to be alto gether unsusceptible. The majority of Mr. Gisborne's works are too well known to the public, to require any allusion, and the wide circulation which some of them have obtained, is at once an indication of the esteem in which they are held, and of their tendency to improve the manners of society. But I cannot help thinking that his treatise on the " Prin-

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. XIX ciples of Moral Philosophy" but little corresponds with the character which it received from Mr. Stewart, and may be deemed as the least successful in establish ing his conclusions, of any of his publications, with perhaps one exception.— Dr. Pearson was, -I believe, better known as an author in that illustrious University where he held a conspicuous station, than to the world at large ; and distinguished as he was, by his sound understanding, and his rational and candid manner of ex amining ethical questions, we can only regret that incidental circumstances should have rendered his works less extensively beneficial than they otherwise would have been, if we may be allowed to judge from the intrinsic merit which they undoubtedly possess. Of Dr. Brown it is impossible not to speak in terms of high admiration. His b

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. XX acuteness in reasoning, his freedom from undue attachment to any pre-established system, the warmth of his imagination, his fertile powers of language, and the amiable spirit that breathes through every page, all combine to conciliate the reader's attention, and to inspire him with an ardent wish to become better acquainted with the subject of discussion. And even when they fail in producing conviction, they leave an impression on the mind in the highest degree favourable to the talents and worth of the accomplished author. By far the greatest benefit, however, effected by his metaphysical labours, has resulted from his opposition to that part of Dr. Reid's system, which at once places an effectual barrier against all rigid and extended disquisition, by pronouncing facts to be ultimate when there is sufficient evidence that they are not so, and by assign-

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. XXI ing to various operations of the mind distinct and peculiar faculties, when they may, in truth, be traced to one common source. It was by contending for the free use of analysis, -and by successfully exercising it in his own writings, that Dr. Brown was enabled to accomplish more perhaps thau any single philosopher since the time of Locke, (for the vibrations of Hartley have scarcely an advocate remaining,) in extending our knowledge of the mental faculties, or, in his own more accurate language, of " the mind existing in certain states." This remark is, however, chiefly applicable to his examination of the intellectual powers; for in the ethical part of the system he has developed, his views are by no means so enlarged, nor is his mode of reasoning, on many points, either luminous or conclusive. The declamation in which he 'is some-

PREFACE.

. times too fond of indulging, and the re petition of the same arguments and reflec tions, when uncalled for by any peculiar difficulty in the case, are defects which we can readily pardon. But there is one fault of greater magnitude which is oc casionally conspicuous in some of his writings, and against which the nature of the subject renders the exercise of cau tion doubly incumbent. The want of per spicuity, to which I here allude, most as suredly cannot be attributed, as in the case of Aristotle, to his leaving too much to the perspicacity of his readers from the brevity of his style. It principally arises, as I conceive, from his propensity to refinement when reasoning on abstruse points, and to the construction of his protracted sentences, often interrupted by qualifying clauses and rhetorical allusions. Fortu nately it occurs more frequently in his less

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. XXIII known treatise on Cause and Effect, than in the work which constitutes his principal claim to celebrity. Whatever Dr. Brown's defects may be, there cannot be a doubt that they are greatly outweighed by his solid, not less than by his brilliant, qualities ; and he must ever be regarded as ex hibiting a striking example of the union of a sound judgment with a glowing ima gination. With all his excellences, how ever, there is some reason to apprehend that it will be reserved for another genera tion to do justice to his character as a philosopher, and to be fully sensible, I will not say of the discoveries, as some of his enthusiastic admirers have done, but at all events, of the essential improvements he has introduced into the science of mind. And that this apprehension is far from being altogether groundless is but too apparent, from the comparative neglect

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. XXIV which he has experienced in his own country, as well as from the fact, that while the writings of Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart have been translated, or accu rately studied by authors so distinguished among the French as M. Royer Collard, (the patriotic President of the Chamber of Deputies,) M. Jouffroy, and the still more celebrated Victor Cousin, no similar notice has been taken of Dr. Brown's works. But whatever popularity the speculative tenets of M. Cousin may have obtained at Paris, there are very few, I believe, in this king dom, who, with the slightest knowledge of their nature, would entertain a momen tary wish of seeing them form part of our English philosophy. For the freedom with which I have criti cised the remarks of Dr Whately, I feel convinced that he will not conceive any apology to be called for by the occasion.

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. XXV It is sufficiently evident from the general spirit and tone of his writings, that he is not to be classed in the number of those who are deterred by the narrow-minded notions of a particular party, or by a blind predilection for any favourite theory, from dispassionately examining the arguments of their opponents, or from relinquishing a long cherished opinion when discovered to be fallacious. Were the same liberality of sentiment, and the same temperate zeal usually conspicuous in his discussion of controversial topics, more prevalent among the leading members of every denomina tion of religion, the great doctrines of Christianity would be better understood, and the merits of our own Church less frequently called in question. Amidst the facilities which are daily increasing for imparting to all classes of the community information of the highest

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. XXVI value, and the measures now pursuing for ameliorating the public taste, we need not despair of seeing the intellectual and ethical branches of science regain that elevated station which they are entitled to hold, and receive that assiduous and extensive culture which can alone render them subservient to the practical purposes of civil society. For my own part, I entertain not the slightest doubt that the progress of know ledge will eventually prove to be the pro gress of general happiness. The spirit of investigation, no longer confined to the student's chamber, is now traversing the busy haunts of men, eager for the dis covery of truth, and the detection of error. The weak may be alarmed, and the bigot ed may oppose : but they will find it too late to indulge the faintest hope of pro hibiting the flight of ignorance and torpor

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. XXVII which so long oppressed the human under standing. Unless objections can be devised far different in their nature from any which have hitherto been urged, it requires no in spiration of prophecy to foretel that the ef forts which may hereafter be employed to obstruct the diffusion of mental improvement will be found, in the result, to be uttei'ly powerless. This improvement may at inter vals, perhaps, be retarded in its career by the prejudices of one party and the interested motives of another; but to put a final stop to its advancement, to fix the boundary beyond which it cannot pass, none but the most infatuated can for a moment imagine it to be possible. As well might the royal Dane have expected that the utterance of his feeble mandate would stem the influx of the ocean's tide. CONTENTS.

Chapter I

Remarks on the selection of Paley 's " Moral Philosophy," as a text-book, in the public examinations at Cambridge. — The first objections here considered, are contained in Vol. II. of Mr. Dugald Stewart's " Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind." — His complaint that efficient are often confounded with final causes, by ethical writers, and particularly by Dr. Paley, answered. — The principle of general expediency, or utility, as inculcated by Paley, misapprehended by Mr. Stewart, who in this case neglects the distinction between the criterion and the obligation of virtue. — The necessity of general rules explained by Paley, and that these rules ought to be founded on expediency. — Individuals very rarely called upon to calculate the general conse- CONTENTS. XXX quences of their actions, notwithstanding Mr. Stewart's assertion ; but when they are, utility their best guide.— The objections contained in Mr. Stewart's " Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man" next con sidered. — He contends for an intuitive moral sense. — His remarks on the difference between duty and in terest. — His proofs of an original conscience derived from the universality of its existence, and from the early period of life at which it appears. — Paley does not deny the distinctions contended for, but accounts for them in a different way, which renders an innate or an intuitive conscience unnecessary. — Mr. Stewart's abstract ideas of virtue and obligation. — Right and wrong, he maintains, are simple ideas incapable of being defined. — The notions of Dean Sherlock and Abp.

King, respecting the nature of virtue, very similar to those of Paley. — The opinions of Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart with regard to ultimate facts, and their discouragement of deep investigation censured . . . page 1

Chapter II

The arguments contained in Mr. Gisborne's " Prin ciples of Moral and Political Philosophy," declared by Mr. Stewart to be unanswerable. — Mr. Gisborne's own theory examined, and shown to be fraught with the CONTENTS. XXXI same difficulties as those alleged against Paley's. — The objections to the former often greater than those urged against the latter. — The former also more liable to the charge of selfishness. — Mr. Gisborne, as well as Mr. Stewart, condemns Paley's system for allowing of ex ceptions to the rules of morality. — Several cases ad duced, in which such exceptions are clearly justifiable. — Examples of the same to be found in Scripture. — Mr. Gisborne's inconsistency in this particular. — A striking example of such an exception, afforded by Mr. G. in the case of the West Indian slaves. — The exceptions to general rules, defended by Paley, upon the same principles as the rules themselves, viz. be cause in particular instances they produce the greatest quantity of good . . . . page 47

Chapter III

Dr. Pearson's objections considered. — His objection to Paley's definition of virtue admitted to be just ; but, as the latter writer adopts the threefold division of the moral duties, no mistake can arise from the de finition. — Pearson's own definition of virtue objectionable. — Two other definitions stated, more exempt from defects than the former. — The question, whether an action is right because it is commanded by the Deitv, CONTENTS. or whether he commands it because it is right, briefly considered. — Dr. Pearson's opinion respecting the foun dation of virtue.— Denies that there is any rule, or criterion, universally applicable. — His ideas respecting moral obligation. — This he maintains refers to the principle of virtue, and has no connexion with the motive. — He is by no means clear on this point. — That obligation and motive coincide, the opinion of numerous moralists. — That nothing can oblige a moral agent which is not in sdme way or other necessary to his hap piness, the opinion of Bishop Law, Puffendorf, Bishop Cumberland, and many other writers. — Dr. Pearson insists that obligation arises from a principle of duty, which, when examined, differs but little from the former opinion. — His singular assertion that right and wrong cannot be applied to motives, examined. — Paley's definition of obligation defended. — Shown to be consistent with Pearson's, in which it is derived from the will of God. — The latter writer agrees, that the true motive to the practice of virtue is individual happiness, but thinks that Paley ought to have included the happiness of the present, ' as well as that of the future. — The latter moralist, however, shown to be consistent on that point.— The question briefly considered, whether Re gulus, Mutius, the Decii, &c. were morally obliged to perform the heroic deeds recorded of them, and in what the obligation could consist. . page CONTENTS.

XXXIII

Chapter IV

The objections of Dr. Brown examined.

His principal charge against Paley is the selfishness of his theory, which he regards as more deserving of censure, than any other modification of the selfish system. — Paley vindicated from this aspersion. — His theory as remote from selfishness, as far as the present life is considered, as any other with the highest pretensions, and even with regard to the next life, as soon as a habit of virtuous conduct is established, it becomes perfectly disinterested. — But this state of perfection scarcely ever attainable in the present world, nor is it required. — If the motive arising from the prospect of a future state of happiness be regarded as selfish, then is Christianity the most selfish religion in the world. — Our Saviour and his Apostles constantly enforce their precepts by this sanction. — In the Gospels and in the Epistles a perpetual reference to a future retribution. — Several passages quoted in proof of this assertion. — Dr. Brown's own theory, when strictly examined, shown to be selfish. — According to him, the feelings of approbation or disapprobation constitute both the criterion and the obligation of virtue. — The dilemma to which he is reduced by this theory- — The idea of making virtue its own reward visionary in our C CONTENTS. present condition. — Some objections in the Quarterly Review relative to Paley's theory briefly noticed.— They chiefly relate to the origin of our moral sentiments. — The proofs of an innate conscience derived from the feelings and conduct of the uneducated classes shown to be deceptive. — The examples adduced by the reviewer from the instantaneous expressions of approba tion among the Hindoos, and among the lower orders at a theatre, not to be depended upon. — Warburton's notions on the subject. — Recapitulation of the argument, and Conclusion ..... page 112

Appendix

. In a note contained in Dr. Whatley's Logic on the meaning of the term reason, Paley charged with denying that man is possessed of a moral faculty, or the power of distinguishing right from wrong. — This accusation shown to be groundless. — Paley denies that this faculty is either instinctive or intuitive, and dis putes the common arguments in favour of an innate conscience. — The existence of such a power he fully admits, but he maintains that it is acquired by education, discipline, imitation, and the associating prin ciple. Asserted by Dr. W., that Paley's principle CONTENTS.

XXXV is equally applicable to brutes. — This statement shown to be erroneous. — Discipline quite as necessary for forming the human character as in training some of the lower orders of animals for the use of man. — Two citations from Archbishop King to show that his opinions on the nature of virtue were similar to Paley's. — Remarks on King's " Origin of Evil," and Bishop Law's notes annexed to the English translation. — On Dr. Whately's re-publication of the Archbishop's " Discourse on Predestination." — On the pernicious tendency of the peculiar doctrine of analogy there in culcated. — That view of the subject leads to erroneous conceptions of the divine attributes, and highly favourable to the system of Calvinism. — The doctrine of analogy defended by Archbishop King, encouraged by a few modern divines, in order to remove the difficulty of reconciling the divine fore-knowledge with man's free-will. — In Dr. Whately's second Ap pendix to the " Discourse" he censures the " Natural Theology" of Archdeacon Paley for not deriving the proof of the moral attributes of the Divine Being, from the similar qualities existing in man. — Paley vindicated in this particular If the exclusion of metaphysical arguments had not been intended, a regular answer ought to have been given by the author to Hume's sophistry respecting the nature of causation, as more import- CONTENTS. ant than the omission alleged by Dr. W. — Passages from Mr. Dugald Stewart, showing how widely he differs from the latter author on the subject of analogy. — A striking instance of inconsistency in Dr. Whately's censure of Paley . . . page 171 ERRATA.

Page 13, line 9 from the bottom, for ciol, read cioe. 77 • — 5, for the revelation, read revelation. 121, — 3, for done, read done, in the French quotation. 14o, — omitted in the margin, a reference to the Quarterly Review, No. 76. 152, — 1 from the bottom, for eternal condition, read external circumstances. VINDICATION, SsC.

Chapter I

Of the Objections advanced by Mr. Dugald Stewart. It is unquestionably a matter of no trifling consequence to the general interests of education, that the merits of every work which has been adopted as a text-book in either of our two most ancient and influential Uni versities, should be scrupulously weighed, and that the objections to which it may have given rise should be impartially scru tinized. For some years past, and, indeed, ever since the return of peace, it is well known that both of these venerable insti tutions have been crowded with under graduates, and that at Cambridge in par- B VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S ticular, the number of students has been so much augmented, as to impose the necessity of extending its collegiate buildings. In the latter University, the work which has long been selected on the subject of Ethics, in the principal annual examination for a Bachelor's degree, is one which, with all its celebrity, and all its extensive circu lation in the remotest parts of the kingdom, has yet incurred the severe censure of many eminent writers, and has even been charged with inculcating doctrines not a little pre judicial to the interests of virtue.

But notwithstanding the accusations which have been thus urged against Dr. Paley's "Prin ciples of Moral and Political Philosophy," it would be difficult to point out a publication which has suffered less from frequent opposition, or which has hitherto better sustained its character in the estimation of the public. We have, at all events, a right to infer that the learned body, by whom so decided a preference has been shown for this treatise, cannot possibly regard the principles which it maintains as unfit to be inculcated on the minds of the young, though it cannot but excite some degree of surprise that no champion from that quar ter should have hitherto stood forward in its defence, and that it should have been so long exposed to accusation and obloquy, without any effort to repel their effects.

It is not my intention, however, in the following pages, to enter into an examination of the whole work. On the present occasion, I have confined myself to the consideration of what is usually termed the theory of morals, comprehending the origin of our moral sentiments, together with the foundation, the criterion, and the obligation of virtue ; and after the severity of censure which has been indulged against the opinions of that eminent moralist on these par ticular points, I need scarcely apologize for offering a few i*emarks in justification of the choice which has been made by a body of men, not less deserving of admiration for their liberality, than distinguished by their achievements in learning and science. Of the numerous writers who have exb VINDICATION OF OR. PALEY S pressed their strong disapprobation of the theory which is advocated by Archdeacon Paley, it will be sufficient to notice the more eminent ; and if it can be shown that the latter have failed in substantiating their charges, it will be needless to indulge any solicitude respecting the others.

Mr. Du gald Stewart, Mr. Gisborne, Dr. Pearson, the late Master of Sidney College, Cam bridge, and Dr. Thomas Brown, the late able professor of Moral Philosophy at Edin burgh, have all decidedly censured the opi nions of our great moralist, though they materially differ from each other in the arguments they have advanced. The first remarks of Mr. Dugald Stewart, immediately connected with the subject be fore us, occur in the second volume of his " Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind," where he strongly reprobates the practice of confounding efficient with final causes, and cites the authority of Dr. Adam Smith to show the danger with which it is more particularly attended in treating of Ethics. Of this erroneous mode of reasoning, he considers Dr. Paley's work on Moral Philosophy as affording a striking example ; and in confirmation of this opinion, he has cited two passages, which, from their apparent tendency, have also excited the animadversion of other authors.* But he has not examined the purport of these passages in connexion with the context, nor does he appear to have recollected that the most un just inferences are frequently deduced from insulated expressions, which have not always been weighed by the author with sufficient attention. f To me it appears evident, how ever, that in the application of his remarks respecting the confusion of efficient with final causes to Dr. Paley, and in his reason ing against general expediency as the principle of moral obligation, he has greatly misapprehended the nature and extent of the real doctrine which that moralist has inculcated. * Stewart's Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. — Vol. II. c. iv. s. 6. f Paley's Mor. & Polit.

Phil. Vol. I. p 70. (5th Edit.) and Vol. II. p. 411. I cannot help thinking, also, that Mr. Stewart is chargeable with some degree of unfairness in placing Dr. Paley in the same class of moralists with Hume and Godwin, and thus associating one of the most power ful advocates of Christianity, with two of its most insidious and determined enemies, because they appear to agree in regarding utility as the principle which renders virtue obligatory on mankind. I say appear to agree ; for if no other distinction could be discovered between writers, who, in reality, possess so little in common with each other, it would be quite sufficient to point out the difference of meaning affixed by these two parties to the same term. In the one case, utilitv is considered as the sole obligation ; in the other, as the rule or standard, to which we are to refer, when ever the rectitude of an action becomes doubtful.