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An explanation of Moral Rights ... as opposed to the erroneous idea of Natural Rights

George Giles Vincent · 1830 · Scanned text

68,126 words · about 4 h 46 min to read

Period artwork: Interior of the Bodleian Library, 1845
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Scanned text — may contain errors · original scans are not available here · view the original source

Licence: PDM · British Library Digitised Books dataset db14 (doi 10.21250/db14) marks the OCR texts CC Public Domain Mark 1.0 (c. 1510-c. 1900 publications); text+metadata JSONL release doi 10.23636/r7w6-zy15 is CC0 1.0. Public Domain Mark is a status label, not a new copyright licence. · Digitised by the British Library (with Microsoft). Text: British Library Digitised Books, CC Public Domain Mark 1.0.

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About this book

Author
George Giles Vincent
Language
English
Published
1830
Length
68,126 words · about 4 h 46 min
Sections
2 reader sections
Text
Scanned text, read from page scans by OCR; may contain errors
Rights
Public Domain Mark 1.0

 

Contents (2)
  1. Preface about 9 min
  2. Introduction about 4 h 37 min

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Preface

. In offering another work on the subject of Morals, some apology is felt due in respect of the former, that it did not contain the explanations here given, and which are requisite for the better understand ing the subject ; as it is hoped the present work will prove, in the explanation contained in it. In proceeding to the original consideration of the subject, a great difficulty was found in the want of a defined meaning of the terms " moral " and "morality." That having been supplied in a manner considered sufficient for the purpose of affording a definite idea of the subject ; and the principle of all human action or morals being adduced in the good or benefit of man ; the present explanation was not then entered into ; and it may be admitted that those views and considerations of the subject were not sufficiently matured, which are now given.

Explaining however the term " moral " and adducing the principle of all human action ; the author seeing its application and the importance resulting, deemed it not right to with- VI hold publishing; and publishing, deemed it not right to omit the conduct to be observed by men in conformity with the principle as adduced : otherwise the subjects (the public) whose service Avas intended, were left without this direction, in what Avas conformable with the principle, and a wrong direction of men's minds, might have been the result. However right, what was done appeared to be in the reflections which gave rise to the work, and right this certainly was in its object, and as far as it went, the author is most ready to confess his disappointment in the success of his labours. Not, he intreats the reader, to think so much on ac count of his, the author's own credit, or fame, or of his time, or of his exertions, which latter have not been small ; but that the benefit has not been produced which was intended, by calling the at tention of others to the subject.

The impressing on the world, of the importance of the principle, namely, that of the Avelfare and happiness of men, as the authority for all human proceedings ; and the duly applying Avhich, and shewing how it operates, to induce the moral conduct of men, appears to the author the Avay in which a right knowledge or understanding of morals can be arrived at, and the improvement of men proceed in a regular and scientific manner ; which however slow, or gradual the degrees of its workings may be, can only through such means certainly, and permanently, be accomplishable. lhe author in this reflection, his own labours far from regretting, feels, that without that had been bestowed by him upon the subject which he has, he never could have arrived at that consider ation of the subject by which he now attempts, and hopes most confidently he may have succeed ed in, to lay the foundation of improvement in the condition of men ; by the explanation of moral rights as to their origin or authority, and the moral obligations or duties of men.

By which as men may see the true nature of these, they will the more value and regard morals, as the means of effecting all human good: and that errors, failings, prejudices, and ignorance in this respect, which may have stood in the way of the better acting, and conduct of men for that great end and object, may by degrees be dissipated ; and in fine, the improvement of the condition of man ren dered by it. On what has now been done, the author will say no more, that he may not anticipate his work; but will refer the reader to what he may find in this book. He only requests that whoever takes up the work will read the whole before he judges; and he feels assured it will be found and acknow ledged, that every thing virtuous and good is most satisfactorily sustained, and nought otherwise. The present work may be considered as a whole of itself, without reference to the former work ; unless for the satisfaction of the reader, or the curious in enquiry, or those wishing to possess both volumes as containing what has been said by the author previously upon morals in his former volume.

A sufficient definition of the subject, it has been considered has been made in the present volume to give a correct idea of it to the reader, of what is referred to ; and what is therefore the subject matter of consideration : and probably as more concise, and in a more easy and familiar manner, better than has been done on the former occasion (or useful purposes ; as more free from complexity of statements, which may confuse and perplex the reader. It may also be mentioned, that some matters are mentioned in the former volume, that have not been thought necessary to introduce here un der the proposed explanation. In the former volume, four subjects are referred to as general heads for the consideration of morals. One of these has been omitted in the present volume, as not considered necessarily forming an original subject, that alluded to which has been omitted is comprised under the head of promises, agreements, contracts, and engagements, and the like, and what has generally been termed, faith between men ; but which latter term in fact applies to all good.

Now these matters are merely practical measures or means, and are not original or chief objects. The subject, therefore, of promises, agreements, contracts, or engagements is omitted, and left to the ordinary means by which the illustration of their use and benefit, or good, are acquired in practice in life ; and the good, or necessity of them for good, is sufficiently obvious, and evident, than to render it necessary in a work, being an explanation of the subject itself to which they are merely subservient, to enter upon, by way of explanation or exposition of their use and advantage. Or, however necessary or useful the consideration of them may be, their explanation and inculcation in more particular discussions, when treating of or detailing particular matters relating to the sub ject, are left for such occasion.

If any apology is necessary for having intro duced the subjects in the former volume under general heads, as being not required, on the ground that it may lead to mistakes, the using or referring to them out of place ; the author trusts it to be not of any great importance, since he be lieves their being out of place is all the fault to be complained of. The author however is free to confess, they are in point of order wrongly intro duced. As such it was an error. He ascribes the mistake he was led into to have arisen from the manner and importance in which they have been mentioned by other authors, who have con sidered them, and made them the chief subjects of their explanation ; and which most certainly served to direct the author's attention to them as leading subjects for heads to classify the great and chief matters of morals.

To which chief matters the author confines himself, for the purpose of general explanation and instruction, as a system ; or for the science of morals. An observation, however, may be here made, as generally applying to most authors, that no stronger instance can be given of the deficiency of the science of morals, than is done by their supporting and maintaining morals by the pre cept, which they do by these explanations of the X precepts, as the most important matter for moral instruction ; whilst the authority of moral rights, and the moral obligations or duties of men, are comparatively neglected or unknown. It may be complained of, the very short statement given in this work, and therefore its supposed inefficiency for its object. As the brief compass in which so important a subject is contained as the subject of this work, can never, it maybe considered with some, be sufficient for the object proposed ; and that a Avork that is to give the explanation of morals, as to the authority of men's rights, and their obligations or duties, should occupy more attention, both of the author, and of those to be instructed, than so short a statement apparently should require ; and the observations to be made would, as a matter in consequence, extend over many more pages.

To this it is answered, that the reflections of the author upon the subject have been of no mean extent, either as to the time it has occupied him to consider it, or the intenseness of his application in his considerations upon it ; and that, that which is to convey to men the knowledge requisite in regard to the authority of their moral rights and duties, ought not to be of an elaborate or extended form. The one would be difficult of gaining the common attention of men, and of their comprehension ; and the other would fatigue and trouble them too much to look at it, or to enquire into it ; or rather would dis hearten and repel them from reading and studying it : and whatever is to be efficient in use, for ge neral instruction, must necessarily be short, or confined to a small compass, and clear and con vincing at the time, or it will not do for general purposes of instructing the multitude, and of ready use.

Moreover, the purpose intended here is only to give the authority to men for their moral direction. The particular matters, or acts moral, must be left more to practical instruction at first, and next to education, and monitory lec ture, to explain the practice, and precept, and shew their moral agreement and utility. It is the base, or foundation, or authority for the moral rights and the moral duties that is wanting in ex planation, in regard of that men all feel, and more or less accord with in practice, from necessity and experience. And without this explanation is given, and men are set right, they may be always wandering, and which in morals, and ideas, and estimations in regard to which they can only be considered as doing to the present time. The books, disputes, and arguments of the literary world on this subject shew this ; and the various ideas, and prejudices, and general ignorance of yarious people and nations, are further proof.

But what is required to set them right in the beginning is of small compass, and necessarily must be as a foundation or authority from which all they know and feel practically, as has been before said, is more or less based or governed. But it requires to be explained or made evident to their mind in a reasonable way, that they can clearly see and comprehend this, and then they may know better Avhat will be consistent with, or conformable to this, and with their true interests. The matter to be explained may be comprised in very few words itself, as it appears to the au thor; for nothing more seems wanting than the explanation of the moral authority of men's rights, and of the obligation to do good ; and which is the gist of the business here attempted. Of course some introductory explanation is required, and observations will be requisite to explain why this is done, and wherefore thought necessary ; but which it is considered will only illustrate the subject, better prepare men's minds for the consi deration of it, and render them more satisfied of the requisiteness, and of its use, and of the benefit that must be resulting, and which can only be morally effected through moral means.

The author is only apprehensive that what he has done is too voluminous, for he is no ways so for its shortness, if he has sufficiently clearly ex pressed himself. The simplest or plainest modes are always best for the attainment of any point or object ; and this obvious maxim will hold good in morals, or human happiness — the object of morals, as in all other cases ; and with this observation he proceeds to the proposed work. G. G. V. CONTENTS. Page Introduction xiii Explanation of Moral Rights, generally I Consideration of Personal Rights 72 Consideration of Rights to Things, or Property 91 Consideration of Rights in relation to Government or Law.. ERRATA. Page 28, top line, " it exists on other ground", read " it exists on no other ground ". Page 41, second line, " or principle or moral rectitude", read " or principle of moral rectitude ". Page 150, twenty-seventh line, " to them", read " to that".

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