Letters from the Army in the Crimea, written during the years 1854, 1855, & 1856, by a staff-officer who was there (Captain Sterling)

Front matter

LETTEES FEOM THE CEIMEA CORRIGENDA. PACK viii line 18 from top, for " 1854 " read " 1855" Add to foot-note as follows : — xvii / "Lord Rokeby was appointed to Command) ,„ , ,„CE [ 1st Division j- 13 Aug. 1855. \ Colonel Ridley (a Guardsman) to 2nd Bri-> ... . 1Q_. J gade, 1st Division, (Line Brigade) J la Aug' i°oi' \ Colonel Drummond (a Guardsman) to Bii-) ,, . ,„». j gade of Guards | II Aug. 185o. / The latter was superseded in this Command) „„ n .,,-_ „ by General Craufurd, also a Guardsman.]" 2J UCL l*ib' In the note for " Crawford " read " Craufurd" 4 Hue 10 from top, for "waning Crescent" read "pale waning" 15 line 4 from top, for " baggage, animals " read "baggage-animals" 36 line 23 from top, for " known " read " know" 81 line 14 from top, for " faits " read " fait" 143 a/(er "fired a shot" the words "Fourth Division" should be introduced, as on the next page. 174 line 19 from top, for " Cossack" read "body" In the following line, for " latter gentry " read " Cossacks" 401 in the note, for " Crawford " read " Craufurd" and add to note " see note at page xvii of Preface." , . .-■.« .if

Preface

. While in Turkey and in the Crimea my time was too much occupied to permit my attempting to keep a regular register of events ; these Letters were generally written in the night, at hours stolen from sleep. There has been so much spoken and written, there have been so man)' " Inquiries," that the subject of the Crimean War may be considered to be rather threadbare. However, the nation has been so excited on this subject, and has, after all, had so little satisfaction to its curiosity, that I decided, when I had looked over what Letters it was possible to recover, that I would put them together, and present to my friends a picture of what was passing in the mind of a working Officer of that Crimean Army, the subject of so much praise and blame, for which so many tears have been shed, and on which so much national sympathy has been expended. It will appear, on perusing this work, that oc casionally personal remarks have been made, which a

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. VI in truth I have endeavoured as much as possible, consistently with the matter in hand, to modify ; and where I thought the original phrases were tinged with any thing of an unjust asperity, I have expunged them. Still I am sensible that many persons will be annoyed by my remarks ; for which I am sincerely sorry. There is, however, nothing set down here which I do not consider to be perfectly true ; and if the people of England wish to have that truth, — a wish winch has been continuasiy expressed by them, — here it is, in a form of mmute detail not hitherto attempted, and touching on parts of our military system which have escaped the ken of Commissioners. There are two subjects to which it appears to me that the national attention should be directed in case of another war being undertaken.

One of these is the manner in which our Press affects our military affairs ; and the other, the manner in which the system prevailing in the regiments of Guards has acted upon, and wisi act upon, the mterests and efficiency of the rest of the British Army. As to the Press, in these Letters I found many angry passages (which have been excised), evidently brought forth by the constant stream of attacks and sarcasm? directed against us, day after day, in the columns of the newspapers,

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. VII which reached the camp twice a week with very great regularity. The newspaper press of England was required by the nation to supply perpetual information about military movements, and perpetual gossip about the routine in the camp. The gentlemen sent for that purpose did supply all this, to the best of their ability ; but unfortunately the British people could not receive this information and this gossip without providing it also for the use of the enemy and for the amusement and astonishment of our continental neighbours. The English, as a nation, are peculiarly insensible to ridicule ; and not being naturally a misitary people, they appear not to have comprehended the feeling of many officers, whose professional pride was hurt by a pubsic expose" of all our blunders and sufferings, which was no doubt translated into Russian for the benefit of the Russian Army ; these statements of course encouraged the enemy.

It never seemed to strike the public as rather monstrous, that a gentleman should be permitted to reside in camp, and to draw rations, while his pen was employed in attacking Lord Raglan's misitary conduct, and in laying open the whole Army to the ridicule of the universe. As a friend of mine remarked : "If the British nation chooses to have its Army governed by

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. VIII the newspapers, the result must be, that by de grees all the officers who reflect will, as it becomes possible, get out of the service. No army can succeed with such spies in its camp. No general can command when his character and con duct are canvassed openly by editors, and while their remarks upon both are sown broadcast amonothe soldiers. I do not believe that the outcry in the papers did any good. There is no doubt in my mind that the evsis complained of would have been remedied as soon as possible, whether the newspapers had taken up the question or not. IT the correspondents had been really competent judges, they, who were with the Army, and who had nothing else to do, ought to have discovered the defects and published their opinions long before the mischief which occurred in January ' 1854 had risen to such a pitch as to excite all England, and to fill the swresiing heart of the people with pity and indignation."

It is to be considered now what has been the result of such an outcry. Names were brought forward ; but as far as I can see there has been no conviction arrived at, except that our military system was a bad one ; while it remains doubtful whether the fatal blots have been hit, or even noticed. It is known, however, that

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. IX Gortschakoff had an officer employed in doing nothing else than collating the English newspapers, and that he considered the Times equal to half a dozen good spies. StiU the editors congratulate themselves on the good they have done, and honour able gentlemen admit the same. Fosiy on every side. As my friend says : " It is really provoking that the practical English nation should be so stupid as to insist on giving the best information to their deadly enemy." With respect to the accuracy of the inteUi gonce so suppsied, we know from the character of the gentlemen employed that it was as accu rate as they could make it, considering that they had small access to officers of rank, and that the position of "such officers as were well-informed was one which rendered it impossible, or at least exceedmgly improper, for them to give information.

What I mean to maintain is, that although usually the facts published in the papers were correct, yet stisi there was a considerable exaggeration on many occasions, and also a misrepresentation, no doubt unintended, of the general tone of feeling in the Army. The most remarkable blunder made by the Government at home was in not appointing Sir Colin Campbell to command when Lord Raglan died. Long after that event the newspapers con-

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. X tinued to attack and to sap Sir Colin's military reputation, assisted by tetters from officers circu lated in the London fashionable coteries. If the correspondents had been competent judges of mili tary merit, they would have joined in turning public attention to the great quasities of this officer, and in pointing him out to the nation as the man whom they should look to. Even nowT it probably is not understood that the insult offered to the most distinguished soldier and to the most skilful general now serving in the Queen's Army, by placing over his head to command him a junior officer, who had no claims and no experience, is a part of our military system. In fact, that the latest improvement in that system, — viz. the warrant which established promotion by selection for merit, — was the very measure which made it possible to accomplish such an act of ingratitude and of folly.

It may be granted that the editors acted as well as they could, and that they believed conscientiously that they were performing a public duty by their writings. Military officers usually do not think it becoming to write to the newspapers accounts of the T» ar they are engaged in. I myself was applied to by one of the most respectable of the magazines to write for it before I joined the Army ; but I declined, purely on tins ground. That I had the

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. XI power both of writing and of observing will be seen in this collection of Letters. With respect to the regiments of her Majesty's Guards, when employed with an army in the field, it is difficult to say all that might and that ought to be said. In the first place, it may be objected that any reflection on the existing system of that corps is improper, as touching the Queen's Majesty. In reply, I can say that any thing I have written or may write on this subject is not intended to suggest any infringement of her Majesty's preroga tive, or any diminishment of the splendour of her throne. The officers of the Guards wiU naturally be very much displeased with a person who brings forward tins question ; but I mean nothing per sonal to those gentlemen : as a body they are the finest possible assembly of young gasiant English men, — the very pick and flower of the nation.

But I am nevertheless bound to state my grave and deliberate opinion that their privileges are not just, and that it is unwise that they should consume to exist on their present footing. I consider that the presence, of a brigade of Guards with an army in the field is a serious inconvenience, and that, from the nature of their system, and the method by which they carry on duty, their presence with

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. XII the Army tends to diminish its efficiency. If I can show this to be the ease, it wiU then be time for the Queen and the British people to consider whe ther it might not be advisable to modify the system on which the Guards are formed. The difficulty of showing this to a military reader would be small ; but for the information of civsiians there is rather a longer explanation to be gone into. If the Guards were always to remain in London or at Windsor, performing merely home duties, so far as the Army is immediately concerned it might appear that their existence and their privsieges are equally matters of indifference. But they do not always remain in London ; on the contrary, when war breaks out any where, except in the Colonies or in India, the Guards are always sent ; and it is one of their just subjects for boasting, that wherever there arc battles, there will the Guards be present.

The system laid down for the government of the Army requires that the most minute details of the interior economy in a company shall be personasiy done by the captain and his subalterns. In the Guards all the captains are substantive sieutenant colonels : they do no company duty, except stand ing at the heads of their companies at the field days in Hyde Park. They often live away in the country, and come up on driU-days. They are on

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. XIII leave about eight months in the year. All the company duty done by officers of the Guards is done by the subalterns ; and the discipline of each regiment of Guards is maintained by the com manding officer, his adjutant, and the sergeants. From this statement it is evident that the military education of an officer of the Guards does not put him in contact with his men, and that he has not the opportunity of acquiring a knowledge of the interior economy, which the regulations require that aU captains of the Line shall have, and which they are compeUed to have by a strict command ing officer, and by the general officers who inspect them. If a lieutenant-colonel of the Line were to exchange with a captain and lieutenant-colonel of the Guards, as sometimes happens, he would be surprised to find, that though nominally command ing a company, he would be asiowed to have little or nothing to do with its management.

The public may from this explanation perceive that from youth upwards the habits of officers of the Guards must lead them to suppose that the officers should be spared as much as possible. I therefore consider that any officer who has spent the first fourteen or fifteen years of his life in the Guards is likely to have imbibed a fixed idea that the officers should be spared ; and as he has seen the com-

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. panies of the Guards managed without the assist ance of the captain, so he will naturally feel that it is a hardship to call on any captains to meddle with such -work. Early custom will prevent him from seeing the propriety of what is an estabsished maxim in the opinion of the best practical soldiers, viz. that the sergeants should be made responsible for nothing, and that the whole onus should be thrown on the officers, who should never leave their men, whether on fatigue or under arms ; and that every captain should have all the particulars concerning each soldier in his company at his fingers' ends. Where a brigade of Guards takes the field, it forms part of a division ; this division is provided with an assistant -adjutant general; and each of the two brigades composing it has a brigade-major.

In the Crimea I was brigade-major to the brigade which was in the same division with the Guards, and I was afterwards assistant-adjutant-general to the division of which the Guards formed one brigade. I mention this to show that I had an opportunity of seeing something of the working of such a division. When an army advances to battle, in the brigade of Guards, as in aU other brigades, each captain, although a lieutenant -colonel, inarches

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. XV at the head of his company ; but in the trenches, in our army, it was not so. In the Line, when a captain is a brevet-major, or a brevet-sieutcnant colonel, he receives 2s. a day extra pay. He does asi his company work, and besides that is liable to do duty as a field-officer. It is not so in the Guards. AU the captains are lieutenant-colonels, and they are put on the roster of field-officers. No captain of the Guards took trench duty at the head of his company — he went in as a field-officer ; in stead of being in the trenches every third day, he only went in about once a fortnight, and then as a field-officer. The result of this was, that the lieutenants and ensigns of the Guards, who had rank respectively of captains and lieutenants, had to do all the duty done in regiments of the Line by the whole of the captains, lieutenants, and ensigns of each regiment; so that these officers were overworked.

The duty of the trenches was taken by detachments ; a certain number of men, in proportion to the strength of the division, was sent into the trenches with officers, that is, captains and subalterns, in the proportion of two officers to every hundred men. When the companies were weak, if all the officers had gone with their companies, the pro portion would probably have been two officers to

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. thirty or forty men ; which it would have been impossible for the Guards to furnish, as none of their captains were really captains ; they were all lieutenant-colonels. This I imagine to have been the cause of so anomalous and objectionable a manner of taking trench duty. When Sir Colin Campbell was sent up to the siege with his division, — in the middle of June 1855, — he found this system existing, and of course he had no power to alter it ; but he did make a demonstration, for at the same period the division of the French Army comm'anddcl by General Canrobert came to the siege, and took the trenches immediately on the right of our attack. In the French Army the trench duty was taken by divisions ; and General Canrobert, who had been Commander - in - Chief, took himself his turn of the trenches every third day.

One of his two brigades took the advanced trench, and the other was in reserve — alternately. This was the division which afterwards stormed the Malakoff. When Sir Colin Campbell found this, he also took his turn in the trenches, instead of detailing a brigadier. He did so three times ; but the example was deemed contagious, and an order came out directing the generals of division to remain in their camps in reserve, with the cooks. I do not know the precise date of this

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. XVII order ; for the printed general orders which I had were all destroyed when my hut was burned down. But I perceive that in one of my Letters it is men tioned that, in August, there were then in the Army a commander-in-chief, a chief of the Staff, three generals of division, and three generals of brigade, all Guardsmen,* — total eight ; and only twelve of the Line. Now I think it surprising that some of these gentlemen, wTho had all been brought up together in the same corps, did not suggest to the Com mander-in-Chief the propriety of imitating the French, who sent into the trenches a division complete, wTith its general, its brigadiers, and every staff-officer, as weU as the lieutenant - colonels, majors, captains, and subalterns of each regiment. The importance of having a large number of officers present with the men in the trenches was immense ; for the soldiers were almost all young, some of them not three months from their homes ; and the example of officers was very necessary for them.

When in a division one of the brigades is a brigade of Guards, detachment duty is only taken • Simpson. Bentinck. Cra^rd. - Barnard. Rokeby. Ridley. Codrington. VVindham.

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. by the other brigade. This was unfolded to us in Bulgaria, where the Highland Brigade furnished a detachment of two companies to head quarters ; and when Sir Colin Campbell applied to have it relieved, he heard the remarkable fact, that the Guards did not take that sort of duty. Having explained, as well as I can, how the example of the Guards is likely to act upon and to spread through the Army to the detriment of discipline, I wisi just touch upon the point of the tremendous privsiege, that every ensign in the Guards is a lieutenant, ipso facto, in the Army, every sieutenant a captain, and every captain a lieutenant-colonel. I will here introduce a Letter on this subject, which my friend A. wrote to Lord from the Crimea, and which enters very fully into the question. " Camp before Sebastopol, 8tb April, 1S56.

" A printed memorandum, signed by Colonel James Lindsay, of the Grenadier Guards, has been circulating here among the commanding officers of regiments of the Line ; it is a sort of commen tary on the Memorial lately presented by the officers of the Guards on the subject of their promotion. Colonel Lindsay does not advert to the fact, that

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. XIX petitioning at aU is a breach of military discipline. Had the officers of the Line petitioned, — as they might well have done, — with a view to their being put on a footing of equasity with the Guards, they would have been immediately caUed mutinous, and would have been punished for such a combination. The prayer of the Guards Memorial having been refused, Colonel Lindsay, by this memorandum upon it, is doing worse than petitioning ; for he is agitating after a -refusal, which is a most unmili tary proceeding. Colonel Lindsay begins by ad mitting that the former arrangement was unjust, and that the new one had for its object to repair this injustice. He only complains that it does this too effectually ; he thinks that all the captains and lieutenant-colonels of the Guards, wdio had served three years in that rank at the period fixed by authority for the introduction of the new system, should have been made fuU colonels, as were those officers of the Line who had commanded regiments for that length of time — taking no account of the different degrees of military knowledge possessed by men who had commanded battasions of the Line, compared with that of those who had' only commanded companies of the Guards. He talks of the higher price of commissions in the Guards; but he does not mention what XX

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. the difference of the price is ; that, in the rank of lieutenant -colonel, I beg to record; it is just 2601., — no such mighty matter, considering that their pay is much larger than that of lieutenant colonels commanding battalions of the Line, and that the officers * of the Guards, on an average, which I once struck, attain that position in about fourteen years ; while the average in the Line was twenty-five years. I have no books or documents here ; but the averages I quote I remember were struck from a Blue-book which contained the average length of service completed by officers of the Guards and of the Line before they got command of battalions ; the average length of time before the Guards officers became captains and lieutenant - colonels was omitted ; but I thought it of consequence, and found it to be about fourteen years.

The average, if taken now, after this active war, will, I suppose, be lower in both services ; some young officers of the Guards have lately be come captains in their regiments, and lieutenant colonels in the Army, in seven or eight years' service. Colonel Lindsay does not take any account of the bad climate, and the banishment to the Colo nies, which is the lot of the Line ; in fact, he calls

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. XXI out that the Guards have a right to a vested in justice. I, who have served in the Crimea and in the trenches with the Guards, have seen the con sequences of this rank of lieutenant-colonel being held by the captains of the Guards. These officers, instead of doing captains' duty, were put on the roster of field-officers : they were senior in rank to all majors of the Line; and I have seen a youth of eight years' service detailed to com mand 2000 men in the trenches for twenty-four hours, and before such an enemy as the Russians. This practice became so notoriously improper, that the commanding officer of the brigade of Guards was obliged to break the roster, and put older officers on duty out of their turn ; which is quite contrary to the custom of the service. The real remedy is to take away from the Guards the absurd and monstrous privilege of holding the rank of lieutenant-colonel while they are in reality only captains, and captains of companies for the discipline of which they are not responsible.

Colonel Lindsay says nothmg about this rank qualifying the captains in the Guards to hold certain staff-appointments, which lead, in three years, to the rank of full colonel ; while sieute nant-colonels commanding battalions of the Line cannot hold them without going on half-pay ; and b

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. XXII he overlooked the condition of this Army,* in which there are at present three battalions of the Guards, and about fifty battalions of the Line, out of which the Guards furnish the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of the Staff, the general officers commanding two divisions and two brigades ; total, six general officers, besides numerous other staff-appointments. They also furnished the previous Commander - in - Chief. There are seven battalions of the Guards altogether, and they have about 80 officers of or above the rank of lieutenant - colonel ; while the whole 112 battalions of the Line have not, at the outside, more than about 190. A common rule-of-three sum will show that the proper proportion which seven battalions of the Guards ought to have would be only twelve officers of this rank.

These 80 field-officers compete with the 190 of the Line for all staff-appointments, and with the greater success, because so many officers of the Guards are highly connected, and are known to the authorities from their being always in London ; besides which the Guards form a clique, — they are banded to gether by the strongest ties of self-interest and personal friendship ; and, from their wide-spread * viz. (ho Army in the Crimea.

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. XXIII relations with the all-powerful British aristocracy and plutocracy, they compose a very formidable political body, combining as one man in defence of their privileges, and blinded by habit to the injustice of their possessing any such advantages. As to Colonel Lindsay's second point, viz. that, from the average he goes upon, the future lieutenant - colonels of the Guards will have to serve ten years at least as captains and lieutenant colonels before they become full colonels, I am contented to hear that is the case. They will become captains and lieutenant-colonels in about fourteen years ; ten more will make them full colonels : total, twenty - four years' service ; • — whereas the lieutenant-colonels of the Lino will, on an average, only obtain the rank of lieutenant colonel after twenty -five years' service, after which they must serve three years to become full colonels: total, twenty -eight years' service, all over the world; while the officers of the Guards will have spent their time, when not on leave, or on active service before the enemy, in parading at St. James's or Windsor.

If I could hope to bring the case fusiy and clearly, and in a popular form, before the nation, I should consider that I had laid the axe to the root of this enormity. It will not bear looking

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. into. The Guards have committed an act of folly in preferring their petition. The difficulty is the want of a soldier in the House who knows the details and the working of the system ; one who at the same time has the ear of the House, and who does not care for court favour. An attack on the Guards will be construed, however unjustly, into an attack on the Queen, as it certainly is one on the aristocracy." The sufferings of the Army were at one time very great, and it is now decided to lay them on the system ; and that, I think, is the most gener ous and most manly view to take of the case. Let us try to do better next time. But, in order to show that sufferings are not unusual in war, I will here print some extracts from an interesting old letter in my possession, dated New York, 20th November 1780, written by Lieutenant Cosin Campbell, of the 74th Highlanders, who was after wards killed by the Red Indians.

He had been engaged to my grandmother ; and his Letter has thus been preserved. "New York, 20th November 1780, * * * " I embarked about the beginning of June last at Charlestown for this place with his Excellency General Clinton, the British Light

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. XXV Infantry, the Hessian Yaggers, the • British and Hessian Grenadiers, the 42d Regiment, Queen's Rangers, &c, amounting to 5000 men, in trans ports convoyed by Admiral Arbuthnot. We had fine weather and an agreeable passage. Whenever we landed here, I was obliged (on the 21st of June) to get a billet and retire to sick quarters in this town, where I have remained ever since. I informed Kitty in my letter above mentioned that I had a violent attack of the fever and ague about the conclusion of the siege of Charlestown. I was twice cured of it in South Carolina, once in the passage from thence hither; and I have had so many relapses since, that I have been cured no less than nine times in all of the same disorder in the course of this season ; three times of a flux, two of them bloody ; and, to conclude the catalogue of my calamities, I am now lately recovered of a smart high fever, which lasted only ten or twelve days.

I was so harassed with the continual returns of these different ailments, that you can easily believe I had been at one particular time extremely reduced ; but neither my doctor, myself, or my friends ever despaired of my recovery ; and since the cold weather has set in, I have recruited so fast that I might already join the battalion and do duty with them, which at present is very easy,