The Story of the Highland Brigade in the Crimea. Founded on letters written, during ... 1854 1855, and 1856, by Lt. Col. A. Sterling, a Staff Officer who was there

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THE HIGHLAND BRIGADE IN THE CRIMEA THE STORY OF THR HIGHLAND BRIGADE IN THE CRIMEA FOUNDED ON LETTERS WRITTEN DURING THE YEARS 1854, 1855, and 1856 BT Likut.Colo.ne1j ANTHONY STERLING A STAFF OFFICER WHO WAR THERE KEMIN&TON & COMPANY, LIMITED LONDON: 15, KING STREET, COVENT GARDEN AND SYDNEY 189.-) All Ilii/hts Reserved INTRODUCTORY. These Letters were written from Turkey and the Crimea, during the years 1854-5-6. Lieut-Colonel Anthony Sterling, afterwards Sir An thony Sterling, K.C.B., served practically throughout the War, and on his return he privately printed some copies of his homeward correspondence, for distribu tion to his friends, and to a few selected libraries. On his death, more than 20 years ago, he desired, by his will, that the book should be published. At that time, the executor considered too many personal feelings would be wronged by the writer's stringent criticisms, but in the interval, nearly all those who were responsible for the avoidable Crimean disasters have passed away, and now the publication may serve as a salutary record of the mismanagement that has too frequently attended military expeditions from this country.

The mistakes of the English Government during the bitter struggle in the Peninsula, in the early stages of the Waterloo Campaign, and in the Crimean War, have had their counterparts in later years at the Cape, and on the Nile. Some of the evils that the writer has strongly marked have met their doom. We hope that only few remain. The Editor.

Preface

. "While in Turkey and in the Crimea my time was too much occupied to permit my attempting to keep a regular register of events ; these Letters were generally written in the night, at hours stolen from sleep. There has been so much spoken and written, there have been so many " Inquiries," that the subject of the Crimean War may be considered to be rather threadbare. However, the nation has been so excited on this subject, and has, after all, had so little satisfaction to its curiosity, that I decided, when I lwd looked over what Letters it was possible to recover, that I would put them together, and present to my friends a picture of what was passing in the mind of a working officer of that Crimean army, the subject of so much praise and blame, for which so man}- tears have been shed, and on which so much national sympathy has been expended.

It will appear, on perusing this work, that occasionally personal remarks have been made, which in truth I have en deavoured, as much as possible, consistently with the matter in hand, to modify ; and where I thought the original phrases were tinged with anything of an unjust asperity, I have ex punged them. Still, I am sensible that many persons will be annoyed by my remarks ; tor which I am sincerely sorry. There is, however, nothing set down here which I do not consider to be perfectly true ; and if the people of England wish to have that truth — a wish which has been continually expressed by them — here it is, in a form of minute detail not hitherto attempted, and touching on parts of our military system which have escaped the ken of Commissioners.

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. X There are two subjects to which it appears to me that the national attention should be directed in case of another war being undertaken. One of these is the manner in which our Press affects our military affairs ; and the other, the manner in which the system prevailing in the Regiments of Guards has acted upon, the interests and efficiency of the rest of the British army. As to the Press, in these Letters I found many angry passages (which have been excised) evidently brought forth by the constant stream of attacks and sarcasms directed against us, day after day, in the columns of the newspapers, which reached the camp twice a week with very great regularity. The newspaper press of England was required by the nation to supply perpetual information about military move ments, and perpetual gossip about the routine in the camp.

The gentlemen sent for that purpose did supply all this, to the best of theirability ; but, unfortunately, the British people could not receive this information and this gossip without providing it also for the use of the enemy and for the amusement and astonishment of our Continental neighbours. The English, as a nation, are peculiarly insensible to ridicule ; and not being naturally a military people, they appear not to have comprehended the feeling of many officers, whose professional pride was hurt by a public expose of. all our blunderings and sufferings, which was, no doubt, translated into Russian for the benefit of the Russian army ; these statements, of course, encouraged the enemy. It never seemed to strike the public as rather monstrous, that a gentleman should be permitted to reside in camp, and to draw rations, while his pen was em ployed in attacking Lord Raglan's military conduct, and in laying open the whole army to the ridicule of the universe.

As a friend of mine remarked, " If the British nation chooses to have its army governed by the newspapers, the result must be, that by degrees all the officers who reflect will, as it be comes possible, get out of the service. No army can succeed with such spies in its camp. No General can command when his character and conduct is canvassed openly by editors, and while their remarks upon both are sown broadcast among the soldiers. 1 do not believe that the outcry in the papers did any good. There is no doubt in my mind that the evils complained of would have been remedied as soon as possible,

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. XI whether the newspapers had taken up the question or not. If the correspondents had been really competent judges, they, who were with the army, and who had nothing else to do, ought to have discovered the detects and published their opinions long before the mischief which occurred in January, 1855, had risen to such a pitch as to excite all England, and to fill the swelling heart of the people with pity ami indignation. It is to be considered now what has been tin* result of such an outcry. Names were brought forward ; hut as far as 1 can see there has been no conviction arrived at. except that our military system was a bad one ; while it remains doubtful whether the fatal blots have been hit. or even noticed. It is known, however, that Gortschakoff had an officer employed in doing nothing else than collating the English newspapers, and that he considered The Times equal to half-a-dozen good spies.

Still the editors congratulate themselves on the >;ood they have done, and honourable gentlemen admit the same. Folly on every side. As my friend says : " It is really provoking tlie practical English nation should be so stupid as to insist on yivin<;- the best in formation to their deadly enemy." With respect to the accuracy of the intelligence so supplied, we know* from the character of the gentlemen employed that it was as accurate as they could make it, considering that they had small access to officers of rank, and that the position of such officers its were well-informed was one which rendered it impossible, or at least exceedingly improper, for them to <jive information. 1 maintain, that although usually the facts published in the papers were correct, yet still there was a considerable exaggeration on many occasions, and also a misrepresentation, no doubt unintended, of the general tone of feeling in the army.

The most remarkable blunder made by the Government at home was in not appointing Sir Colin < 'ampbell to command when Lord Raglan died. Long after that event the newspapers continued to attack and to sap Sir Colin's military reputation, assisted by letters from officers circulated in the London fashionable coteries. If ihe corres pondents had been competent judges of military merit, they would have joined in turning public attention to the great qualities of this officer, and in pointing him out to the nation

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. as the man whom they should look to. Even now it probably is not understood that the insult offered to the most distin guished soldier and to the most skilful General now serving in the Queen's Army, by placing over his head to command him a junior officer, who hail no claims and no experience, is a part of our military system — viz. the warrant which established promotion by selection tor merit — was the very measure which made it possible to accomplish such an act of ingratitude and of folly. It may be granted that tlie editors acted as well as they could, and that they believed conscien tiously that they were performing a public duty by their writings. Military officers usually do not think it becoming to write to the newspapers accounts of the war they are engaged in. I. myself, was applied to by one of the most respectable of the magazines to write for it before I joined the army in the East : but I declined, purely on this ground.

That I had the power both of writing and of observing will be seen in this collection of Letters. The double rank held by officers of the Brigade of Guards was found to lie detrimental to the Service. Had each Brigade taken its tour of duty, as a unit, the difficulties would not have arisen : but, detached parties having been ordered from different Regiments, the extra rank of the Guards' Officers frequently put them in command of older and more experienced officers : friction and dissatisfaction constantly arose When Sir Colin Campbell was sent up to the siege with his Division — in the middle of June 1855 — he found this system of detachments existing, and of course he had no power to alter it ; but he did make a demonstration, for at the same period the Division of the French army commanded by General Canrobert came to the siege, and took the trenches immediately on the right of our attack.

In the French army the trench duty was taken by Divisions ; and General < 'anrobert, who had been Commander-in-Chief, took himself his turn of the trenches every third day. One of his two Brigades took the advanced trench, and the other was in reserve — alternately. This was the Division which afterwards stormed the Malakoff. When Sir Colin Campbell found this, he also took his turn in the trenches, instead of detailing a brigadier. He did so three times ; but the example was

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. XIII deemed contagious, and an order came out directing the Generals of Division to remain in their camps in reserve, with the cooks. I do not know the precise date of this order ; for the printed general orders which I had were all destroyed when my hut was burned down. But I perceive that in one of my Letters it is mentioned that, in August, there were then in the army a Commander-in-Chief, a Chief of the Staff, three Generals of Division, and three Generals of Brigade, all Guardsmen* — total eight ; and only twelve of the Line. Now I think it surprising that seme of these gentlemen, who had all been brought up together in the same corps, did not suggest to the Commander-in-Chief the propriety of imitating the French, who sent into the trenches a Division complete, with its General, its Brigadiers, and every Staff Officer, as well as the Lieutenant-Colonels, Majors, Captains, and subalterns of each regiment.

The importance of having a large number of officers present with the men in the trenches was immense ; for the soldiers were almost all young, some of them not three months from their homes ; and the example of officers was very necessary for them. When in a division one of the brigades is a Brigade of Guards, detachment duty is only taken by the other brigade. This was unfolded to us in Bulgaria, where the Highland Brigade furnished a detachment of two Companies to head quarters ; and when Sir Colin Campbell applied to have it relieved, he heard the remarkable fact, that the Guards did not take that sort of duty. Having explained as well as I can, how the example of the Guards is likely to act upon and to spread through the army to the detriment of discipline, I will just mention the point of the tremendous privilege, that every ensign in the Guards is * Simpson.

Barnard. Bentinck. Rokeby. Craufurd. Ridley. Codrington. Windham. Lord Rokeby was apppointed to command the ist Division 13th August, 1855* . . . Colonel Ridley (a Guardsman) to 2nd Brigade, ist Division, (Line Brigade) 13th August, 1855. Colonel Drummond (a Guardsman) to Brigade of Guards, nth August, i855* The latter was superseded in this command by General Craufurd, also a Guardsman 29th October, 1855.

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. XIV a Lieutenant, ipso facto, in the army, every Lieutenant a Captain, and every Captain a Lieutenant-Colonel. The sufferings of the army were at one time ver}' great, and it is now decided to lay them on the system ; and that 1 think, is the most generous and most manly view to take of the case. Let us try to do better next time. But, in order to show that sufferings are not unusual in war, I will here print some extracts from an interesting old letter in my possession, dated New York, 20th November, 1780, written by Lieutenant Colin Campbell, of the 74th Highlanders, who was afterwards killed by the Red Indians. He had been engaged to my grandmother ; and his letter has thus been preserved. "New York, 20th November, 1780. * * * "I embarked about the beginning of June last at Charlestown for this place with his Excellency General Clinton, the British Light Infantry, the Hessian Yaggers, the British and Hessian Grenadiers, the 42d Regiment, Queen's Rangers, etc., amounting to 5,000 men, in transports convoyed by Admiral Arbuthnot.

We had fine weather and an agreeable passage. Whenever we landed here, I was obliged (on the 21st of June) to get a billet and retire to sick quarters in this town, where I have remained ever since. I informed Kitty in my letter above mentioned that I had a violent attack of the fever and ague about the conclusion of the siege of Charlestown. I was twice cured of it in South Carolina, once in the passage from thence hither : and I have had so many relapses since, that I have been cured no less than nine times in all of the same disorder in the course of this season ; three times of a flux, two of them bloody ; and, to conclude the catalogue of my calamities, I am now lately recovered of a smart high fever, which lasted only ten or twelve days. I was so harassed with the continual returns of these different ailments, that you can easily believe I had been at one par ticular time extremely reduced ; but neither my doctor, my self, or my friends ever despaired of my recover)' ; and since the cold weather has set in, I have recruited so fast that I might already join the battalion and do duty with them, which at present is_ very easy, as they have gone into winter quarters at Bedford, in Long Island, about a mile aud a half from the

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. XV village of Brooklyn, immediately opposite to this town, which gives the names to the ferry from thence to Long Island. I remain here only a few days longer, till my health and strength are perfectly established, which I may say is already the case. I would not consent that any of my friends who wrote to Isla should mention my being sick till I had it in my power to inform you of my perfect recovery ; it could answer no purpose but to make you uneasy. I flatter myself that my friends still entertain so much regard for me that the knowledge of such an event would give them a little concern. I did not wish to put any of them to the trial ; it would be an ungenerous experiment. Though I had the misfortune of being very much indisposed both last year and this for a long series of time, I cannot help congratulating myself on the uncommon good luck of its happening at times when the Light Infantry, and consequently the whole army here, were quite unemployed and disengaged from field service.

The campaign (1779) was short, and ended early in August. It was not till our army was ordered within our lines at King's Bridge that I was taken ill (as I formerly wrote home). The embarkation for South Carolina occasioned the first move ment of our troops. I got well in time enough to accompany them, and not much sooner. I never was better than during that very fatiguing expedition, and till about the end of the siege of Charlestown ; but in traversing the woods of that country for six or eight weeks, without bed, tent, or any other cover than a great-coat against the cold dew and sometimes frosts of the nights, or against the excessive rains or scorch ing heat of the days in that climate ; and for near six weeks more at the siege lying in the open air, except the last fort night only, at which time we got tents, and then, as well as before, twenty-four hours on duty in the trenches for every forty-eight hours we were off duty, whether cold, hot, wet, or dr)-, all of which we frequently experienced in the extreme before we were relieved — this was too much for most con stitutions to Lear unhurt : mine I confess, was not proof against it, as I have already informed you.

I may also declare that for ten weeks after landing in South Carolina the 11th February last, I had neither my clothes or side-arms off, except while shifting, or never lay down to sleep without my fuzee stretched alongside of me, or within my arms, ready to

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. start up with it to the first sound of the bugle horn, which the Light Infantry used instead of a drum. It resembled a huntsman's horn, and by different notes, easily distinguished, loudly expresses the different words of command, to be heard at two miles distance ; twelve or fifteen of them together make the most lofty warlike music in the world. With these I have known the whole Light Infantry roused at one o'clock in the morning on a sudden alarm, formed, and ready for action within the short space of three minutes from the time of their being in a profound sleep after a fatiguing march ; and to the honour of these brave fellows be it told, not one man of a company in the whole battalion missing. The pleasure, the happiness of being on actual service with such delightful fellows is inexpressible.

Toil and hardships alongst with them lose those names, and are softened into agreeable amusements. A man's constitution may not always be equal to support a variety of such diversions often repeated ; but his inclination can never fail him. Some time after our arrival from the southward in this province, it was known that a small squadron of French ships of the line, with 4,000 or 5,000 men, had taken possession of Rhode Island. It seemed to be the resolution both of Admiral Arbuthnot and of General Clinton, with the fleet here, and with a considerable part of the army, to make a vigorous attack upon them and their rebel allies in that post. Our fleet sailed directly, and are still stationed in view of that place. The troops designed for this service also embarked ; the Light Infantry were a part of them ; but I was so ill of the fever and ague I could not attempt to leave my sick quarters, and for the first time had the mortification to be left behind when the battalions of Light Infantry were going upon any expedition.

But kind Providence favoured me beyond my expectations. I heard in a few days that the expedition was countermanded, and that the troops had disembarked. I supposed it was for the good of the service, or it would not have happened so ; and I could not help being extremely well pleased. Now, God be praised ! I am able to accompany them wherever they go, if their first movement should take place to-morrow ; and I have had such a thorough seasoning last year and this one, both to the northward and southward of this extensive continent, that I have reason to hope that the severest ser-

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. XVII vice or the most intemperate climate cannot hurt me during the continuance of this war." * * * At this period (1780), there were not, I suppose, means of communicating so easily home as we have now, and the Press had not such a circulation as to spread alarm and despair over the whole country. We have now arrived at a new order of things, which we cannot alter ; and I have said so much about the Press, in the hope that in future wars, the correspondents will be considerate of the consequences of their communications, and that during the military operations they will refrain, and endeavour to restrain the curiosity of their readers, from insisting on so much publicity to our disasters, if we should, unfortunately, have any ; and, above, all, that they will look to the danger of attacking the conduct of a General while at the head of his army, and conducting operations in the field.

I have said enough to show that I myself am a military re former. There is now a new plan, I am told, nearly ready, whereby it will be secured that all the officers of the army shall be educated for their profession. This is a step in the right direction. Many years ago — more than twenty years ago — I had occasion to wait upon Lord Fitzroy Somerset, afterwards Lord Raglan : he was then Military Secretary. Lord Fitzroy was a very clever man, and one of the most polite and urbane gentlemen in Europe. In the course of conversation, I took the opportunity of stating to his Lord ship that the officers of the English Army required to be educated. He differed with me altogether on this point, and said they were sufficiently examined before they got their commissions. As I knew more than one who could not write a decent letter, I stuck to my opinion, and Lord Fitzroy got rather angry'and dismissed me.

Who can say how much might have been accomplished during these twenty years if I had then been listened to ? I have lived to see an order that all officers shall be examined for their commissions and for their promotions ; it has indeed been hitherto very imperfectly carried out. I believe that his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, the present Commander-in-Chief, is impressed with the necessity of educating the officers, and of forwarding many army reforms ; but he will require to be backed by public opinion.

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. XVIII Routine must ever rule in offices and among heads of de partments, who cannot help feeling a disinclination to change. Besides which, there are questions which do not precisely come under the head of education, not strictly under that ot reform. The very existing regulations require to be more faithfully attended to. The officers, besides being instructed must be forced to work ; and the whole tone of the army must undergo a complete change before this ugly, dull word, " work," will be looked upon as the mainstay of the profession. It is not flaunting about in a red coat which makes the officer ; it is an earnest attention to very minute and tire some details connected with the soldier's welfare. Truly, there is a mighty field for reform, on which many a contest will take place before the reform itself will be attained.

On a careful examination of our regiments, there will be found generally a specious outward show, but which, when thoroughly looked into, will prove to be only a mask for con stant and provoking idleness, and disregard of the most essential portions of their interior economy. Many of the officers know nothing, or next to nothing, of their profession, or even of the first rudiments of drill. The provisions of the Circular Memorandum of the 4th July, 1851, have been a dead letter, even as to military instruction ; and no machinery has existed, till this year (1857) for carrying out the educa tional parts of that memorandum. In order to induce the younger officers to pay attention to this instruction, it will be advisable that the examination pre vious to promotion should be made a bond fide test of the officer's knowledge, which it certainly has not been hitherto, at least, in all cases ; as I lately met a Lieutenant who did not know the length of a pace, or the number of paces taken per minute in quick time ; who, in short, knew nothing at all.

Of course, his examination for pro motion to Captain, which he had passed, must have been a mere pretence ; such officers should be kept at drill and in struction till they are able to pass a strict examination ; and should they, after a fixed period, fail to make themselves com petent, it is to be considered that the matters upon which they are required to be thoroughly informed are of such a nature, that they may be comprehended by anyone who can comprehend anything ; and that being the case, a persevering

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. XIX disregard of instruction may justly, in the end, entail on the officer guilty of it the penalty of losing the commission, which he did not think it worth while to qualify himself for holding. The fact is, that her Majesty's regulations are as nearly perfect as any code we can hope to see ; the real difficulty is, to have them strictly and faithfully attended to. For the most part, our young officers do not obey the regu lations with real zeal, as if they took an interest in the performance of the duty ; their main endeavour seems to be to avoid trouble ; they do just enough to save their con sciences, and to be able to say that they performed their task, caring not how badly, or with how little benefit to the service. These officers require to be taught that they hold their com missions for the good of the service ; that they are placed in the army to be made a convenience of, and to instruct them selves with a view to their becoming fit to be worked for the advantage of their men.

Those who read these pages, if they judge aright, will per ceive that the writer was writing the truth ; that his object has been to give honest information, and to assist as far as he could the amelioration of onr army, by explaining in simple language many matters which must otherwise remain dark to unmilitary persons. For this object he has ventured to make statements which may expose him to the animosity of the most powerful people in the country. His only aim has been the hope of doing some good, and of improving the profession to which he belongs, and which he loves. The people who sent so many Commissioners to the Crimea, where they were of no use whatever, should be thankful for the endeavour. With respect to the Commissariat, which has been sufficiently abused, I have to say, that whenever and wherever a really good Commissariat officer was met with, he was always treated with respect — and there were many such sent into the army ; but there were others as bad as the first were good.

The gentlemen who held the superior situations, such as Mr. Drake, Mr. Carpenter, and Mr. Young, were, I am certain, both liked and respected by everyone who knew them, or who had to transact business with them. As a friend of mine remarks, with great truth : " The Commissariat is the stomach of the armv. Without XX

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. it, or with an inefficient one, the Line and the Artillery (the limbs) are worthless. Therefore, it ought to be the aim of every sensible officer to support the Commissary, to claim for him aid and respect, instead of running him down. With the Commissariat there should be included all the non-com batant branches of the service. At present, it is the fashion for fighting men to sneer at these, as if they were troublesome servants, unendowed with the pluck on which they, the fight ing men, build up their claims to honour and reward. Now there is no reason why a Commissary should not have as much courage as a Lieutenant of the Line ; and there is very good reason why he should be better educated. In fact, he ought, for the efficiency of the public service, to be the best animal of the two."

So says my friend, and so say I. But it is to be remarked, that if there were sundry unprofitable Lieutenants, so there were also unprofitable Commissaries ; and there did not exist equal means of keeping them in order. Why, I have known a Commissary accuse a regiment of being troublesome be cause they objected to his unsound wares ; and I have known a Commissary threaten a Quartermaster who refused his meat, that he would not show him any favour again. Favour from a Commissary ! The very idea is disgraceful. To favour one, he must rob another. What we wanted with our army was not merely accomplished accountants, but also a number of young, active, skilful underlings, provided with butchers and drovers, not picked out of the regiments but belonging to the Commissariat Corps. The Commissaries invariably com plained that they could procure no men of this sort on whom they could rely, except from the army.