Cassell's History of the War between France and Germany

Front matter

CASSELL'S HISTORY OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR AT GRAVELOTTE. CASSELL'S HISTORY OF THE WAR BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY 1870— 1871 Volume 1 CASSELL and COMPANY Limited LONDON PARIS 6- MELBOURNE 1894 ALL EIGHTS RESERVED INDEX. Ablis, Burning of, 369. Absurdities, Revolutionary, 364. Aeronauts, Seizure of, 352. Agencies, Funds and, 233. Alliance projected between France and Denmark, 23. Alsace, Prussians establishing themselves in, 136. Ambert, General, dismissal of, 202. Amiens, Capitulation of, 538. Amnesty, Prussian, 17. Anarchy, Symptoms of, 345. Andelys, Prussian proceedings at, 393. Anniversary, a Revolutionary, 344. Aosta, Duke of, Candidature of for Spanish Crown, 437. Arc, a new Joan of, 347. Ardennes, Scenery of, 82. Armies, Arrival on Frontier of Prussian, 15. Character of New French, 353, 354.

Formation of German Covering, 512. Forward movement of German, 526. Four New French, 353. ■ — : — of the West, German plan for resisting, 514. Progress of German, 142, 143. Relative Condition of French and German, 329. Relative Position of French and German at the close Bazaine, Departure from Metz of, 309. Desertions from Army of, 281. Emperor resigns command of Army to, 38 Execration of, 322. Germans communicated with by, 254. Holds out at Metz, Why, 237. Proclamation of, 256. Protest by brother of, 313. Threatening the life of, 302. Bazeilles, Burning of, 95. Contest near, 86. Beaune-la-Rolande, Battle of, 529. Beauvais, Seizure of, 200. Belfort, Investment of, 490. Situation and strength of, 490. Belgium, Entry of French and German troops into, 109. New Treaty to secure independence of, 14.

Belleville Battalion, Cowardice of, 567. Bellevue, F.mperor and King of Prussia meet at Chateau, 104. Benedetti, King of Prussia and, at Ems, 8. Berlin, Entry of Trophies into, 82. Reception of French Prisoners at, 57. Rejoicings at, n6. Bernstorff, Count, Correspondence between Lord Granville and, 52. Bismarck, Count, 3. Chaudordy, Count, replied to by, 221. Circular denning Position of, 161. Conversation between Mr. Malet and, 333. Map of Germany and, 407. Napoleon's Estimate of, 342. Napoleon Visits, at Donchery, 99. Observations on the Campaign by, 92. Real Designs of, 333. Remarks of on Armistice proposed by Lord Granville, of November, 521. Armistice, Lord Granville interposes for an, 449. Arms, Want of, 362. Army, Address of Citizens and National Guards to Metz, 289. Augmentation of Prussian after 1866, 71.

Chapter I

First Causes of the Franco-German War — Ancient Antagonism of the Celtic and Teutonic Races — The Wars between France and Prussia in the Time of Napoleon I. — Development of the Idea of German Unity — The Austro- Prussian War of 1866 and its Results - French Jealousy and Attempts at a Rectification of Frontiers — The French and Prussian Military Systems — The Emperor Napoleon III. and Count Bismarck— The Prince of Hohenzollern and his Candidature for the Spanish Crown — Opposition of the French Government — Rapid Growth of the War Feeling — Negotiations — Interview of M. Benedetti with the King of Prussia at Ems — Rupture between France and Prussia— Enthusiastic Demonstrations in both Countries — Statements of the Emperor and the King — Adhesion of the South German States to the Cause of Prussia — Despatch of French Troops to the Frontier — Departure of the Emperor for the Seat of War — Effect of the Outbreak of War on Opinion in England —Alleged Secret Treaty between France and Prussia — Explanations of the Two Powers — New Treaty for Securing the Independence of Belgium.

We must seek for the first causes of the Franco- German war in very remote times, and among in fluences far removed from those by which the present generation is surrounded. The history of the an tagonism between Celt and Teuton is nearly, if not quite, as old as the history of Christianity. The two great races of north-western Europe have been in collision for ages over a large extent of territory ; and, by some remarkable ethnological law, it gene rally happens that the Teuton is the victor. This animosity has been exhibited in a striking degree between the French and German peoples. Both powerful, haughty, and warlike, they have always been prone to dissension, and quick to seek in open hostilities the assuagement of their mutual jealousy. Occupying neighbouring lands, they have unfortunately possessed no clearly-defined natural boundaries, such as might be in themselves actual barriers against mutual cupidity or aggressiveness.

The two races are less separated than confused and mixed along the boundary line — a circumstance which has given constant occasion for disputes, for A [i855. 2 conquests, for annexations, and for re-annexations. Towards Italy and towards Spain, France is boldly defined and as effectually guarded ; but towards Germany she has no such advantages. The frontier provinces have accordingly changed masters several times, as the fortunes of war or the stratagems of diplomacy favoured one great Power or the other ; and the result has been a mongrel race and a mixed dialect, endless heartburnings and perpetual incentives to war. The chief object of contention is the possession of the Rhine. The Germans have always maintained that this is solely a German river. The French, on their part, have long coveted the left bank of that noble stream as their frontier towards the east.

We, who are completely en circled by the sea, are hardly capable of sym pathising with the anxieties and aspirations of Powers whose limitations are weak, wavering, and uncertain ; and for this reason we sometimes attribute to simple greed what may spring from an instinct of self-defence. strength of Prussia, and the successful issue of the war with Denmark which resulted in the seizure of Schleswig-Holstein in 1864 — a war in which Prussia was certainly the prime agent, though acting in conjunction with Austria — intensified the French feeling of antagonism ; and when the brief struggle between Austria and Prussia, in 1866, terminated in the utter discomfiture of the former, and the creation of a powerful North German Confederation under the absolute sway of the latter, who also retained undivided possession of the Danish Duchies, the rage and mortification of France nearly pre cipitated a collision.

The Emperor Napoleon would probably have gone to war at once, but that he knew his armies were not in a condition to cope with the conquerors of Sadowa. He would not have had to wait long for a pretext. By the Treaty of Prague, concluded between Austria and Prussia on the termination of the war of 1866, it was agreed by Prussia, at the desire of France, that the new German Confederation, which was to replace the former Bund meeting at Frankfort, was only to include the German States north of the river Main, the other States being at liberty, if they pleased, to form a South German Confederation. In a few months, however, Prussia came to an agreement with the South German Governments for effecting certain unifications in matters of commerce, taxa tion, and other details ; and, what was more im portant, concluded conventions with those Govern ments, obliging them to adopt any quarrel of Prussia's arising out of recent events, and to place military contingents of great strength at the absolute disposal of the Prussian monarch.

This was certainly an evasion, if not a positive infraction, of the Treaty of Prague. It created general dissatisfac tion in France, and all men saw that the Emperoi had been outwitted by Count Bismarck, and that the military supremacy of the country was im perilled. The undertaking to restore to Denmark the northern part of Schleswig, the population of which is undoubtedly much more Scandinavian than German, had also been disregarded. Not to penetrate too deeply into first principles, however, we may say that the more immediate cause of ill-feeling between France and Germany is to be found in the conquest of Prussia by the great Napoleon in 1806, and in the part subsequently taken by the Northern Power in effecting the downfall of that potentate. Henceforth there were bitter memories between the two countries — memories of recent date, and incapable of being softened or moderated.

France lost no opportunity of taunting Germany with the humiliation which Buonaparte had caused her to endure ; and Germany retorted with allusions to the victory of Leipzig and the occupation of Paris. Korner, and Arndt, and numerous other German poets, composed fervid songs, breathing the national hatred against the French; and when, in 1841, France evinced a disposition to go to war with Prussia, Arndt wrote a war-song, in which occurs a passage foreshadowing some of the features of 1870 : — - " My own Fatherland, my brave Germany, on ! We'll sing them a terrible strain, Of what ages ago their vile policy won — To these public excuses for a rupture, had the Emperor chosen to avail himself of them, others oi a private nature might probably have been added. It is very generally believed that, in the interview which took place at Biarritz between the French Emperor and Count Bismarck, shortly before the war of 1866, an understanding was come to with reference to territorial compensation, in some direction, being granted to France in case the struggle with Austria should result in the material aggrandisement of Prussia.

If any such promise was ever made by the Prussian Minister, it was Of Strasburg, and Metz, and Lorraine. They shall hand it all back to the uttermost mite, Since for life or for death they compel us to fight. So shout, ' To the Rhine, cross the river, advance 1 AU Germany, on, into France !' "* It was in the period following the French invasion of 1806 that the idea of German unity first became a passion in the hearts of all Germans who desired to be considered patriotic. This idea was an ad ditional stimulant to French jealousy, and all parties in France agreed in opposing it. The increasing • Translation in the Quarterly Review for October, 1870. 1868.1 JEALOUSIES BETWEEN THE RIVAL NATIONS. 3 certainly broken; for when the Emperor, in August, 1866, sought to obtain from Prussia a certain portion of the Rhenish lands which France actually possessed in the time of the first Napoleon, but ot which she was deprived by the treaties of T815, the reply was that any rectification of fron tiers was totally inadmissible.

The organisation of the Prussian or North German army is thus described by a military critic in the Quarterly Review of October, 1870 : — " The population numbers about thirty millions. The number of recruits annually raised by conscription is 100,000 ; or one to every 300 of the population. The age of conscription is twenty. The period of military service is twelve years, divided into three portions of three, four, and five years respectively; three years being passed by the recruit with the colours of a regular regiment ; the next four years in the regimental reserve ; and the final period of five years in the Landwehr or militia of his district, after which he is enrolled in the Landsturm, or service for home defence in case ot invasion. All men who attain the age of conscription in any one year, and are not drawn for the army, are exempt from military service except in case of war.

The regiments of the regular -army during peace are, on the breaking out of war, raised to double their number by recalling an equal number of men from the reserve ; and each reserve man so recalled returns not merely to the same battalion. but even to the very same company in which he had passed the first three years of his military life." It will be seen that the effect of these provisions was to create a nation of disciplined soldiers. In the spring of 1867 a difference arose between France and Prussia on the subject of the Prussian occupation of Luxemburg, which was admitted by Count Bismarck himself to have no legal basis after the dissolution of the old German Bund ; and the two countries were on the very brink of war, when terms of accommodation were agreed to at the Conference held in London.

Both Count Bismarck and the Emperor Napoleon had cause to desire a postponement of hostilities. The former wished to consolidate the union of the North German States, to overcome the lingering jealousy of the South, and to introduce still further im provements into the military system of the country; the latter knew that it was imperative to augment and reorganise his army. Early in 1868 a Bill was carried through the French Chambers (not, however, without considerable opposition and some modifications), which raised the forces, nominally, to 800,000 men. To these were added some 400,000 National Guards Mobile. The term of service was increased from seven years, according to the settlement of 1832, to nine years, or nine years and a half counting from the period when the recruit is first marked for service.

The rate of recruiting per annum was fixed at 100,000 men, selected by conscription ; the proportion of which to the population was about one to every 370. The nine years of service were divided, as regards 70,000 of the 100,000, between five years passed under the regimental colours, and four years in a general reserve, called the second reserve. The remaining 30,000 were enrolled into the first reserve, and were not required to perform any military service during peace, except five months' drill in each of the first two years. At the commencement of a war, however, they were to be the first taken to bring up the regular regiments to their proper war strength. The National Guards Mobile were to continue in arms for five years, and to undergo a moderate amount of drilling ; and in war time they were to be employed in garrison duty, in guarding* communications, or in furnishing reinforcements to the field army.

The Mobile Guards, however, were not called out for training until the early days of the war; and hence, when they were most wanted, they were found of little use, for lack of knowledge. Such were the military systems existing in France and Prussia at the commencement of the year 1870. The two men who, respectively, had the direction of these stupendous powers, and could precipitate them into war, or restrain them within the bounds of peace, were the Emperor Napoleon and Count Bismarck ; for the King of Prussia must be regarded as practically subordinate to his able and ambitious Minister. The Emperor had for many years been regarded as the arbiter of Continental Europe. He had humbled Russia in 1856; he had conquered Austria in 1859; by a series of brilliant victories, comprised within a few weeks, he had contributed largely to the emancipation of Italy, and he was for some time described as the champion of oppressed nationalities.

Belonging to a new dynasty, and being the child 01 popular suffrages, he always presented himself to the world as a democratic instead of a divine right sovereign. It cannot be denied that for many years he had the support of the immense majority of the French people, however much the literary classes, and the artisans of Paris and other large towns, were disinclined to forget the violence and illegality of the coup d'Stat. The people, in the widest sense of the term, had given him a bill of indemnity for the irregularity of that act, and it was not without warrant that Louis Napoleon spoke to Europe in [Jan., 1870. 4 too. The elections of the early summer had shown an immense increase in the demand for reform. while, at the same time, the easy suppression of the attempts at revolution in Paris had proved that the bases of the Empire were yet firm and unassail able.

The installation of the Liberal Government of M. Emile Olhvier on the 2nd of January, 1870, looked like the commencement of a new era, of a very different nature to that which we have seen. One of the conditions of M. Ollivier was that there should be no German war. 'the name of France. The period of his greatest prosperity and influence was from 1854 to 1863. • France flourished at home, and was universally respected abroad. The wars in the Crimea, Italy, and China, restored to her that high rank as a military power which had been prejudiced since the days of Waterloo; and the development of •wealth m the. country itself, consequent on the apparent security of the social state, made the Empire popular with all but a minority. Some disappointment, however, was created in 1863 by the Emperor withholding from war with Russia, on behalf of the insurgent Poles — -an abstention which is said to have been caused by his inability to get England to join him.

Again, in 1S64, he somewhat compromised his fame by declining to help the Danes against Austria and Prussia ; but it was not until the German war of 1866, and the utter ruin of his Mexican project in 1867, that any serious inroad was made on the security of Louis Napoleon's position as the leader of the French people. In the one case it was evident that he had been baffled and defied. In the other, his armies stood before men's eyes as incapable of contending against the semi-savage hordes of Mexico, and as retiring from the New World at the somewhat peremptory requisition of the President of the United States. It was equally clear, moreover, that the unfortunate Archduke Maximilian had been abandoned in the terrible position into which he had been brought by the French Emperor himself; and when the conse quent insanity of the Archduchess, and the ultimate military execution of her husband, became known, ■it is no wonder that Frenchmen felt ashamed, re morseful, and angry, and that the reputation of Louis Napoleon received a wound from which it never recovered.

The progress of time was also showing more and more clearly every year the ■defects of the Imperial system. Opposition was becoming marked and wide-spread, and the old supporters of the Empire were dying one by one. The Emperor had wisely conciliated the reasonable members of the Liberal party by a series of Voluntary reforms, which, beginning cautiously in 1860, terminated in the really radical changes of September, 1869, by which the Sovereign divested himself of most of his dictatorial attributes, and established, with some limitations, what is generally understood by Parliamentary Government. Doubt less, one of the motives for this transformation was the falling health of the Emperor, and his natural desire to lighten the responsibilities of his son and heir when the time should come for his assuming the reins of power.

But there were other reasons For some years before the breaking out of the war of 1870, Count Bismarck had been regarded as the only formidable rival of the French Emperor. He passed the early period of his life in the army, and afterwards, in the Diet of the province of Saxony, distinguished himself by his opposition to Liberal ideas. In 185 1 he was appointed to the Frankfort Legation, and subsequently represented Prussia at the courts of Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Paris. It was not until September, 1862, that he reached the height of power by becoming President of the Prussian Council, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The King was at that time engaged in a struggle with Parliament with reference to the military administration ; and Bismarck supported the arbitrary designs of his master with such energy, ability, and determination, that he made them completely successful against the strenuous opposition of the Chambers, which he browbeat and insulted to an extent that has had few parallels in history.

The reorganisation of the army having been effected in accordance with the ideas of the King and his Minister, the wars with Denmark and Austria followed in due course. The name of Bismarck became famous as that of the most powerful, the most arbitrary, the most subtle, and the most successful, of European statesmen ; and it appeared but too likely that he and the French Emperor would come into collision. Of King William I. of Prussia it is sufficient to say that when he assumed the crown on the 18th of October, 1861, he spoke of himself as ruling "by the favour of God, and no one else ;" that he was a man of strong religious feeling, of the some what Puritan North German order; that he was always inclined to arbitrary ideas of government; and that, as a young officer, he was present with the Prussian army of occupation in Paris in 1815.

When the war of 1870 commenced, the King of Prussia was seventy-three years of age, the Emperor Napoleon sixty-two, and Count Bismarck fifty-five. The position of the two nations towards one another may be concisely defined. The one was an Empire long compacted into a unity of great July, 1870.] THE SPANISH CROWN. 5 strength and equal renown; the other was an aggregation of separate States, possessing a very homogeneous population, but otherwise loosely and precariously held together. It will be seen what effect the chances of war had upon both these Powers. in London, informed the new Minister of the same fact, adding that a great indignity had been offered to France, and that the Emperor was deter mined not to allow the project to be carried out. The news of this contemplated arrangement was first rumoured in Paris on the 4th of July, and it immediately created considerable excitement.

On the 5th, the Council of Spanish Ministers formally and unanimously resolved to offer the crown to the Prince. On the 6th, the Duke de Gramont, the then French Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated in the Corps Legislatif, in answer to a question, that the Government did not believe that respect for the rights of a neighbouring people obliged them to suffer a foreign Power, " by placing a Prince upon the throne of Charles V., to disturb the European equilibrium to their disadvantage, and thus to imperil the interests and the honour of France." The Duke's speech was violent and in judicious in its tone, and certainly went far towards committing the nation to a hostile policy, and pro voking the antagonism of Germany. It is not easy to see how the election of the Prince of Hohen zollern to a merely ceremonious throne, under a constitution which secured all real power to* the Legislative Body, could have augmented the influence of Prussia, or imperilled that of France.

The argument commonly advanced by Frenchmen, that France is weakly guarded towards Prussia, and that, in consideration of the growing strength of that Power, and its known aggressiveness, some greater protection is needed, has certainly more force and applicability. The standing irritation between France and Prussia was perpetually inflamed by the violent writing of the press of both countries ; but the plebiscitum of May, 1870, by which Louis Napo leon sought a popular ratification of his constitutional changes, was recommended to the suffrages of the peasantry and trading classes by the argu ment that a more Liberal Government would strengthen the hands of the Emperor in the maintenance of peace. The immense majority which was obtained on the affirmative side showed the preponderating disinclination to war.

It is indeed probable that Napoleon III. had at that time no hostile designs. We have seen that the Mobile National Guards were not called out by him ; and the progress of the war soon showed that his army was far from a state of preparation. He had but recently effected some small reductions, and had proposed to Prussia, but without success, a mutual disarming. It should be added, however, that France continued to manufacture chassepots and mitrailleuses at a great rate. The intentions or anticipations of King William are more un certain. In che months of May and June, 1870, he had met the Emperor of Russia at Ems. Count Bismarck and Baron Brunow were present at these interviews, and it has been supposed by some that a scheme for provoking France into war was then determined on. Of this, however, there is no proof.

It must be admitted that there are some facts which do not tell to the credit of Prussia. As far back as March, 1869 (as we learn from the official despatch of the Duke de Gramont, issued, on the 2 ist of July, 1870, to the diplomatic representatives of France in foreign countries), the idea of placing a prince of the House of Hohenzollern on the throne of Spain was mentioned to M. Benedetti, the French Ambassador at Berlin, who was immediately in structed to inform Count Bismarck that France would never allow a Prussian prince to reign beyond the Pyrenees. The Count is said to have replied that the French Government had no reason to feel uneasy about a combination which he himself regarded as impracticable ; and it is added that when, subsequently, M. Benedetti showed some incredulity, and pressed for further assurances, the Under secretary for War at Berlin, in the temporary absence of Count Bismarck, pledged his word of honour that the Prince of Hohenzollern was not, and could not become, a serious candidate for the crown of Spain.

To this statement, it is true, a At the commencement of July, 1870, the pros pects of war, which had long harassed the repose of Europe, seemed to have faded away. A pro found peacefulness had apparently settled upon the nations ; and on Lord Granville succeeding to the Foreign Office on the death of Lord Clarendon, he was told by Mr. Hammond, the permanent Under-Secretary — a gentleman of long and large experience — that he had never seen so great a lull in foreign affairs, and that he knew of no important question with which his Lordship would have to deal. This was about four o'clock in the after noon of Tuesday, the 5th of July. Two hours later, Lord Granville received a telegram stating that the crown of Spain, rendered vacant by the revolution of September, 1868, had been offered to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, who had signified his readiness to accept it.

On the follow ing day, M. de Lavalette, the French Ambassador [July, 1870. CASSELL'S ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE WAR. 6 It is to be feared that very little can be said for either France or Prussia in the conduct of the negotiations preceding the outbreak of hostilities. The manner of France was peremptory and arro gant ; the explanations of Prussia were evasive and insincere. The Berlin Government at first denied that it had had any concern in the matter ; but the King afterwards admitted to M. Benedetti that he denial was given by Count Bismarck and by Baron Thiele, the Under-Secretary for War ; but the denial was of a somewhat evasive and guarded character, apparently not covering the whole period in ques tion ; and the Duke de Gramont reiterated his original statement, at the same time quoting from a despatch of M. Benedetti, written at the time, in which the assertion of Baron Thiele was specifically WILLIAM I., KING OF TRUSSIA, IN 1870. reported.

It would therefore appear that Prussia knew that the elevation of a Prussian prince to the throne of Spain would lead to war with France ; yet it is certain that the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern had the secret support of King William and his Prime Minister.* The Prince who gave rise to this terrible convulsion was the eldest son of the Prince of Hohenzol lern-Sigmaringen, who, some twenty years before, had abdicated his sovereign rights in favour of his relative, the King of Prussia. The son was married to the sister of the King of Portugal, and was thirty five years of age at the commencement of the war. * See Appendix i., Vol. II., p. 537, " The Origin of the War." had authorised the candidature — not as King, but in his private capacity as head of the House of Hohenzollern, though he acknowledged that he had kept Count Bismarck informed of the various phases of the negotiations.

When Prince Leopold was advised by his father to decline the offer of the Spanish crown, the King approved of this course, but again only in his private capacity. The Prince withdrew ; but there had been so much secresy in the candidature, and there was now so much appearance of subterfuge in the mode of renouncing it, that France, with some show of reason, though in a questionable manner, required of the King, on I the 13th, to promise that, if the candidature were PRUSSIAN UHIAN CASSELL'S ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE WAR. [July, 1870. 8 rather tartly repudiated by the Foreign Minister, who told the House not to heed the gossip of the lobbies. The -result of the interview on the 13th between the Prussian monarch and M. Benedetti effected a great change in public sentiment. When M. Ollivier made his statement to the Corps Le'gis latif on the 15th of July, and concluded with words which were tantamount to a declaration of war (the formal declaration was not made at Berlin until the 19th), a scene of immense excitement ensued.

The great majority of the members frantically applauded the Minister, and denounced the conduct of the King of Prussia and of Count Bismarck. In the Senate, the Ministerial state ment was received with cries of " No more words, but action !" and an^ adjournment immediately took place. There was some discussion, however, in the Lower House. A Bill for a credit of fifty millions was voted on the demand of M. Ollivier ; but M. Thiers made a long speech, in which, not withstanding his strong anti-Prussian feelings, he condemned the proceedings of the Government, and expressed the opinion that King William had made every concession that could fairly be expected of him. He was followed by some Opposition members of great eminence, and a minority of 84 voted against the credit, which, however, found 159 supporters.