Napoleon and the Grand Army in Russia; or, a critical examination of the work of Count Ph. de Segur

Front matter

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE WORK OF COUNT PH. DE SEGUR. LONDON : PRINTED BY O. SCHULZE, 13, POLAND STREET. NAPOLEON AND THE GRAND ARMY IN RUSSIA, OR A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE WORK OF COUNT PH. DE SEGUR, ii-, GENERAL GOURGAUD, LATE PRINCIPAL ORDERLY OFFICER AND Al D-DE-f.A JN1 F TO THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. •< Render to Cesar the things that are Cesar's." LONDON : MARTIN BOSSANGE AND Co., 14, GREAT MARLBOROUGH STREET; AND G. B. WH1TTTAKER, AVE MARIA LANE. 1825.

ADVERTISEMENT.

. Four editions of the work we are about to examine have already appeared, and our remarks upon it, though long since prepared, are only now emerging from the port-folio. Why has theit publication been so long delayed ? and why are they published now ? To these enquiries, which the reader may not unreasonably make, we will reply in a few words. The size of Mr. de Segur's work, its high price, the portraits and embellishments which have been successively added to it, seemed to warrant the belief that its circulation would be confined to a class of readers who, by their acquaintance with the men and facts treated of, would be enabled to judge of it correctly for themselves. We had re marked also, that those journals which had spoken of it in the most nattering terms, had examined it chiefly in a literary point of view : that they com pared it to the fictions of the illustrious Scotchman ; that, in reading the History of the Grand Army, a

Book I. Chapter

I. The author of the pretended History of Napo leon and of the Grand Army commences by a se rious error, and a gratuitous supposition. " The Emperor had, by the treaty of Tilsit " attacked the honor and the interest of Russia." If Count de Segur had read this treaty, he would have seen that never was victory less abused. Russia had been thrown back upon her own territory, part of whose inhabitants had hailed our approach. She issued from a disastrous contest, a greater and a more powerful nation than at its commencement ; to the moderation of the Emperor Napoleon she was indebted for the glory of having re-established a kingdom of Prus sia after it had entirely disappeared. In what way then had the honor of Russia received a blow from the treaty of Tilsit ? b

BOOK I

As to her interests, she judged rightly that they would suffer by the adoption of the continental system ; but she also judged that the continental system was the only means of forcing a peace upon England ; and as the interest of Russia was in a peace, upon this interest she rested her stipu lations at Tilsit. " I am no less the enemy of England than you are," was the expression of Alexander to Napoleon, when he entered the bark on the Niemen. This feeling instantly brought the two sovereigns together; and the peace was concluded. " France had alienated from herself the nations " of Europe by her conquests, and the monarchs " by her revolution and her new dynasty." Italy, Belgium, the Rhenish provinces enjoyed the benefits of her administration ; the inhabitants of those countries still feel an attachment to what has been left untouched by the policy of their so vereigns.

With respect to the revolution, it was not the act of Napoleon. He had reconciled the monarchs to its results ; this could never have been achiev ed by the republic. The Emperor and the new dynasty had calmed the fears they entertained of the destruction of the monarchical system in Europe, a destruction which the republic had proclaimed. This and the following assertion, that France could no longer look forward to have friends, but merely subjects, have for a tendencv to 2 B establish, at the very outset, that Napoleon could rest his power upon nothing short of universal dominion ; a false imputation (be it said by the way, and once for all) the injustice of which has already been partly attested by the experience of the last ten years, and by the working of time that moderates the violence of the passions, and removes all obscurity from truth.

We begin to blush at being the echo of foreign cabinets who have designedly filled Europe with their clamors against the ambition of Napoleon, because he used every means at his command towards de fending and securing France against their own ambition, a duty which the revolution had be queathed to him. The Emperor had recourse to war for the purpose of forcing a peace upon Eng land ; and England, in order to keep up the war, excited against him the continental sovereigns. Subsidized by her gold, they became her mere instruments. Was Napoleon to remain upon the defensive with means inadequate to repel the attack ? In so doing he would have betrayed the national hopes, and compromised the glory and the prosperity that had been confided to his safeguard. Wield ing as a man of genius the resources which France placed at his disposal, he triumphed over her enemies, who could not forgive his having raised her to so elevated a rank, though they concealed their resentment under an exterior of submission. In order to secure the future welfare of the nation;

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it became necessary for Napoleon to obtain the pledges of peace, and the means of effecting inter changes on the occurrence of that event, whilst he deprived his enemies of the power of annoying him. " Napoleon had so much difficulty in con " cealing this gigantic project (of universal mo " narchy), that hints of it began to escape him in " all directions." There is much of the imposing in the descrip tion of the immense preparations called for by so gigantic an undertaking; but no period is as signed for its being carried into effect. A con clusion might be drawn from this, that Russia had until then felt perfectly secure, in the faithful performance on her own part of the conditions of the treaty, and experienced no anticipation of the storm which was gathering around her ; whereas it is established, by the admission of Colonel Bou tourlin, aid-de-camp to the Emperor Alexander, in his History of the Campaign of 1812, that Rus sia was the first to make preparations for war.* * " Austria did not stir ; Prussia no longer existed ; the " Swedes too weak to afford their allies any assistance, could " with difficulty maintain themselves in Stralsund.

England, " placed in difficult circumstances, did not seem disposed to " carry on the war with activity. These considerations induced " the Emperor of Russia to urge a reconciliation with the ene " my. The famous interview upon the Niemen terminated in " the treaty of peace signed at Tilsit." (Page 21 of the first volume of the Military History of the Russian Campaign in 1812, by Colonel Boutourlin, aid-de-camp of his Majesty tbe After having dwelt upon the necessity of an alliance with Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and Turkey, Mr.de Segur goes on to say : Austria voluntarily entered into his plans ; she however did not act blindly. She plunged into them with Emperor of Russia, Paris, 1824.) " The Emperor Alexander " could not but be aware of the spirit that guided those dispo " sitions (of the treaty of Tilsit) ; but in the unfortunate cir " cumstances in which Europe was involved, it behoved him at " all hazards to avoid a war.

The essential object was to gain " the necessary time for preparing to maintain with due effect " a struggle, which it was well known might recommence at a " future period." (Vol. i. page 24.) " The sacrifices which the treaty of Presburg bad exacted " from Austria were too oppressive to be patiently borne by the " cabinet of Vienna. But the disorganized state of her armies, " an unavoidable consequence of the repeated checks they had " suffered, had until then prevented her from attempting torea_ " lize the plans which she secretly cherished. The Emperor " Napoleon was sincere in his wish of avoiding a fresh war that " would have operated as an untoward diversion in Spain. But " all the steps which he took to bring about a reconciliation " were considered by the Austrians as an avowal of his weak " ness.

She (Russia) could not refuse her aid to France, with " out an open violation of the engagements entered into with " that empire, the sacredness of which had received from Na " poleon no infraction. Supposing, however, that the cabinet " of St. Petersburgh, waving those moral considerations for the " sake of the highest political objects, had decided upon giving " its support to Austria, it could not have accomplished it more " effectually, owing to the distance of its armies then engaged " with the affairs of Sweden and of Turkey." (Vol. i.pages35, 36, and 37.) "The indications of a coldness that began to " shew itself in the intercourse between France and Russia

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the hope of aggrandizing herself.* This was not owing to vague promises, but in consequence of a treaty signed on the 14th of March, 1812. Aus tria had long felt uneasy at the enormous increase " could not escape the Emperor Alexander's penetration, sa) He " felt that the alliance concluded at Tilsit and cemented at Er " furth, being no longer conducive to Napoleon's interests, "would not be of long duration. From that time he applied " himself to organizing in secret every means of defence which " the immense resources of his extensive dominions enabled " him to dispose of, in order to maintain a struggle, &c." (Vol.i. page 4.5.) " The cabinet of St. Petersburgh did not disguise from itself " that under these circumstances it ought to use every means of " compelling the Turks to make peace, in order to direct her " undivided exertions to a war on the western frontier of the " empire."

(Vol. i. page 46.) (a) The only indications of coldness alluded to by Colonel Boutourlin, consist, as he pretends, in the circumstance that Napoleon had felt shocked at the difficulties thrown, at St. Petersburgh, in the way of his marriage with one of the grand duchesses, and anxiously sought an opportunity to revenge himself, by making the Emperor Alexander feel all the weight of his overwhelming power. He alledges no other indication * " We sought it (the alliance of Austria with France), and " have reflected well before bringing it to a conclusion." (Mr. deMetternich's expressions to Mr. Otto, quoted in the dispatch from this ambassador to the minister for Foreign Affairs, dated Vienna, the 1 5th of February, i813.) " The Emperor Alexander thought it necessary to assume a " defensive attitude without further delay, by collecting the " greater part of his forces upon the western frontier of his em " pire.

A division which had remained in Old Finland, ever " since the last war with Sweden, received orders to march " upon the Dwina. The army of the Danube, which, at the end " of 1810, was nine divisions strong, was reduced to four diviof the Russian power, and had caused represen tations to be made at St. Petersburgh on the sub- " sions ; the remaining five were marched upon the Upper " Dniester." (Vol. i. pages 56 and 57.) •* On the day following the signature of the treaty with Prus " sia, Napoleon sent it to St. Petersburgh, with the proposal of " combining their united endeavors in order to remove the " grounds of the misunderstanding between them." . "It was too well understood by the Emperor Alexander that " the avowed grievances rested only upon objects of an acces " sory nature ; but that the real grounds of the misunderstand " ing which divided the two empires, could only be removed by " a recourse to arms."

(Vol. i. page 71.) " The Emperor Alexander instantly quitted St. Petersburgh, " and repaired to Wilna, at which place the head-quarters of "the grand army were established; he also sent orders to " Prince Kourakin, the Russian ambassador at Paris, to make " known to the French government that the preservation of " Prussia, and its independence of all political compact directed " against Russia, were the more indispensable to the interests " of the Emperor Alexander, as a solid and permanent good " understanding with France could only be established upon " the basis of there being between her and Russia a neutral " country which would not be under the occupation of the troops " of either power ; that the basis therefore of all negotiation " was to be the formal engagement for an entire evacuation of " the Prussian States, and of all the fortresses in that country, " whatever might have been the period or the grounds of their " occupation by French or allied troops.

Russia further de " manded the reduction of the garrison of Dantzig to the footing ' ' on which k stood previously to the 1 st January, 1811." (Vol. i. page 72 and 73.) •' Previonsly to his departure for Dresden, Napoleon had sent " his aid-de-camp, General Count Narbonne to Wilna with pro " posals of peace. The answer he brought back to Dresden

BOOK I

ject of the armaments on her frontiers ; but Rus sia had taken her determination ; the remon strances were not attended to. Austria dissatisfied, entered into a treaty of alliance with Napoleon ; and foreseeing the possibility that the result of the war might bring about the re-establishment of Poland, she demanded the Illyrian provinces as an indemnity for Gallicia ; this was conceded to her. By the same treaty Austria engaged to furnish thirty thousand men. According to Mr. de Segur she clandestinely prepared prudent instructions for their guidance. When a fact of this nature is stated, some proof should be exhibited ; but there exists no other than his bare assertion. The Austrian general may have been instructed to keep as near as possible to Austrian Poland. What would have become of those prudent in structions, if actuated by a feeling of mistrust so foreign to his nature, Napoleon had brought " was, that the Emperor of Russia referred entirely to the com " munications made at Paris by his ambassador, and that he " could only consent to treat upon those preliminary conditions."

(Vol. i. pages 74 and 75.) " The brilliant fetes given on this occasion (the meeting at " Dresden), continued until the return of Mr. de Narbonne from " Wilna. On the following day, 17 (29) May, Napoleon left " Dresden, and took the road to Thorn, where he arrived the " 24th of the same month (5 June). He resolved not to delay " the campaign any longer, in order not to waste away in fruit " less negotiations the most favorable season for military operations." (Vol. i. pages 76 and 77.) into Russia the corps of prince Schwartzenberg, and left the Polish army in Poland ? No other engagement was entered into than that the Austrian corps should not be divided, and that it should remain under the orders of its own generals, though acknowledging absolute obedience to the immediate orders of the Emperor Napoleon.

If a fault was committed in leaving this corps too independent and too near its own frontiers, it was the effect of generosity and of confidence. The same fault might be urged in regard to Prussia ; it proceeded from a kindred principle. " The success of the war in no degree depended " on the cession of Gallicia, or the difficulties " arising from the Austrian jealousy of that pos " session ; Napoleon, consequently, might, on his " entrance into Wilna, have publicly proclaimed " the liberation of the whole of Poland, instead of " betraying the expectations of her people, as " tonishing and rendering them indifferent by ex " pressions of wavering import. There was no necessity for obviating Austrian jealousy, since the treaty was a formal one, and since Austria had never given a more complete assent.

In case the kingdom of Poland should have been re-established, Austria willingly ceded a considerable portion of Gallicia, with the view of recovering Illyria. The first of these provinces was an acquisition which was the ground of self reproach to her. Illyria, on the contrary, was an

BOOK I

ancient hereditary country, the loss of which had given to Austria deep regret ; this wound was, at all times, fresh to her. Napoleon, faithful to his treaties, could only claim Gallicia in the event of the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland as a consequence of the war, in other words, on the conclusion of a peace. He would have been wanting to Austria his ally, who had already felt alarm at seeing an ambassador to the confedera tion of Poland, if, atthe commencement of the war, he had given a sanction, by his expressions, to the re-establishment of that kingdom, an act which would have occasioned the insurrection and for cible re-union of Austrian Gallicia. He was far from temporising, when he allowed the nature of things to take its course, and equally so from yielding to the wishes of the Poles, and saying : the kingdom of Poland exists ; this would have been equivalent to an acknowledgment of that kingdom.

But Napoleon's object was not only to remove from his ally every ground of uneasiness ; peace was the aim of war. He would have compromised this aim, had he taken a determination which would have rendered peace impos sible. The author shortly after quotes certain expressions of the Emperor possessing this tendency ; it was needless therefore for him to seek elsewhere the grounds of his opinion. The Emperor, generally speaking, feared no thing so much as pledging his future actions, be cause none knew better the importance of allow- CHAPTER s. ing events to grow to maturity ; one of the most signal features in his policy was to be always in readiness to take advantage of events at the moment of their occurrence. Mr. de Segur makes it a reproach to Napoleon that he " neglected to clear the southern Polish " provinces of the feeble hostile armies which " kept the patriotism of their inhabitants in " check."

Could it have been his wish that the Emperor, with all the Russian forces in his front, had ex tended his right into Podolia, where the Russians were engaged against the Turks ? This inadver tency is too striking to require a serious comment. There is as little correctness in the following sententious reflection, that " such is the weakness " of great men, that they are always led by imita " tion either of others or of themselves." Observation on the contrary, had hitherto de monstrated that what stamps the character of great men, is the resource of their genius, and that inexhaustible fecundity which always furnishes them with fresh means, either for extricating themselves out of difficulties, or for securing a rapid success. The author adds in support of his sentence, that " Napoleon committed himself to the fortune " of battles ; that he expected every thing from "victory; that instead of sacrificing every thing " to obtain victory, it was by that he looked to " obtain every thing ; that he made use of it as a " means, when it ought to have been his end."

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We will not follow Mr. de Segur in the de velopment of this singular opinion which he has sufficient difficulty in presenting in a clear light. We will ask him, however, whether at Wilna, when the sword was drawn, it was not necessary to commit the event to the fate of battles, and whether in war there is any other arbiter of fate than victory ? What was it necessary to sacrifice in order to secure this victory ? To sacrifice every thing is a very vague idea. Does the author well know what he wishes to say? Let him explain himself. Did he wish for a sacrifice of the time which was requisite to complete the insurrection of Poland ? He ought to have said so ; and since he reasons upon such important events, it behoved him to examine why Napoleon decided to attempt the accomplishment of his expedition in a single year, instead of effecting it in two campaigns.

The question is a serious one. It did not even strike the author's mind. '' Success would have probably crowned the " expedition, if the premature decline of his health " had left to the physical constitution of this " great man all the vigour which his mind still " retained." The excellent health enjoyed by the Emperor at this period could never be doubted for a moment. Independently of the time he gave to business, he bestowed four or five hours in the day to the chase, to reviewing the troops, &c. How are we to qualify this caution on the part of the author, who, fearful of openly attacking the genius of Napoleon, sup-

Chapter I

poses a premature decline of his health, as his own justification for ascribing faults to this great man which he had never committed ? He stretches his hero upon the bed of Procustus ; and contrary to the custom of historians who delight in ele vating the subject of their history, he detracts from the merit of his own hero, places him in faulty, or ridiculous situations, and with the view no doubt of lowering whilst he excuses him, he afterwards pleads illness in his favor. Is this done also in order to acquit the authors of his premature death? Napoleon exhibited in the campaign of Russia as much superiority and activity as he afterwards displayed in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. His constitution must have been very strong, since it was able to withstand during six years the pains of Prometheus.

There are few men possessed of the capacity, the courage, and the time requisite for judging of things as they are and by their effects. It is thought much easier to adhere to received notions. Mr. de Segur who was favored on the one hand with those natural qualities which are particu larly inherents in our variable character, and on the other by the influence of a name which his father has illustrated by his talents and by the ex alted function confided to him, has determined to write two volumes respecting the Emperor, well assured that the very title of the work would recommend it to many. Those who read with due reflection have easily discovered that he took

BOOK I

for the basis of his system a course entirely at va riance with that of writers who have declared themselves the open enemies of Napoleon. With the help of a few oratorical precautions, which he uses as a shelter from the observations of all par ties, he began by laying down that all the faults of the Emperor had their origin in his habitual state of ill health.

Chapter II

We run rapidly over the commencement of this very obscure chapter, and over the reflections which the author ascribes to the Emperor, con cerning the policy of Prussia with regard to the French republic ; we will, nevertheless, examine this subject. "Whenever he (Napoleon) followed with " his finger the traces of the Prussian fron " tiers upon the map, he felt angry at seeing them " still so extensive, and * exclaimed : Is it pos " sible that I have left this man so large a ter " ritory ?" * As Mr. de Segur always aims at creating an effect, it has appeared to him that the word to exclaim is more sounding than the ordinary expression, has said, said; he therefore makes a constant use of it throughout his work. Who can have given this information to Mr. de Segur ? where has he learnt it ? The marechal des-logis of the palace was not in the Emperor's confidence; he never entered his closet.

Had he sometimes heard Napoleon conversing about So vereigns, he would have learnt that he never used such unbecoming expressions towards them ; that he never said of a crowned head: that man. This expression is indeed of common use in certain societies, when they allude to the Emperor Na poleon. The application he makes of it to the King of Prussia is no doubt the effect of recollection. This prince driven beyond the Elbe, with his estates bordering upon the Baltic, as far as the mouth of the Niemen, was vulnerable in every direction, and it cannot be discovered how he could be an object of Napoleon's envy. " This aversion to a mild and pacific monarch " was surprising. It is worth while to examine " the cause of it." If the King of Prussia was always inclined to wards peace, he was equally prepared to make war.

Napoleon knew this ; he felt therefore but little confidence in this prince, though he had no aversion to him. The author however points out two causes of aversion ; the one was the refusal given by Louis XVIII. to the proposals made to him through the intervention of the King of Prussia. In 1803, the Prussian cabinet felt that the withdrawing the princes of the house of Bour bon from their existing situation would be con-

BOOK I

■ ducive to the repose of Europe. With this view he took upon himself to send instructions to Mr. Meyer, the president of the regency of Warsaw, in which city Count de Lille then resided. This prince returned to the proposal in question a noble reply, which is known to every one. How could Napoleon have felt resentment at a proceeding that had not originated with him, to which he had given his consent out of mere deference to his ally, and which, at any rate, could in no man ner compromise his authority, since there was not any question as to his rights to the crown of France ? Napoleon, however, attached but little importance to that negotiation ; the love of Frenchmen and the national interests appeared to him sufficient for the consolidation of his power. With respect to the other cause, the remon strances of Prussia on the arrestation of Mr. Rumboldt; this agent, as well as Messrs. Wick ham, Drake, Spencer, Smith, etc., availed himself of his character of British Resident in the Hans Towns, in order to foment conspiracies against the first consul.

Napoleon had nobly proclaimed his indignation at the violation of the rights of nations in the persons of Irish refugees, who were delivered up by the senate of Hamburgh. He shewed his regard for the same right, of nations, by consenting to restore a diplomatic agent to liberty, at the solicitation of the King of Prussia The proceeding of this monarch, in no manner at variance with the acknowledged principles of the Emperor, could afford no ground of enmity. If it were not well known that aversion never had the smallest share in the policy of a man so gifted as Napoleon, one might ascribe this feeling to two very different causes; the projects and en gagements of Prussia previously to the battle of Austerlitz, and the aggression of that power in 1806. But Mr. de Segur, who writes a history, appears ignorant of all this.

" At the beginning of 1805, however, Russia, " Austria, and England, made ineffectual attempts " to engage Frederick into their third coalition " against France." A third coalition took place. England per suaded Russia aud Austria to join in it. Her object was to drive the French from Germany and Italy, to restore Piedmont to the King of Sar dinia, and to deprive France of her allies. The means of the coalition appeared gigantic ; five hundred thousand men and immense fleets were to support those pretensions which vanished before the sun of Austerlitz. Thus was dissolved the third coalition, three months after its formation ; Austria was compelled to sign a peace ; and to the generosity of the conqueror, the Emperor Alex ander was indebted for the safety of the remains of his army. Prussia, who by the treaty of Berlin signed a few months previously to the battle of Austerlitz, had taken part in the league, was indebted to the c

BOOK I

talent of Haugwitz her minister, for an offensive and defensive alliance concluded with France. " The possession of Hanover at first tempted " Frederick ; but when the treaty was to be " signed, shame caused him to hesitate. Napo " leon had no idea of such timid policy." :i What," said he, " does this monarch dare neither to make " peace or war, etc. ?" Seeing the Emperor only when he crossed the ante -room, and only hearing him occasionally in his public audiences, does the author draw from his imagination or from his re collection the expressions which he attributes to him ? If, from recollection, they must have been used in public ; and this was not, the case. " It is asserted that at the same time there were " persons, either treacherous or deceived, who " persuaded Frederick that Napoleon was obliged " to shew himself of a pacific disposition, because " that warrior was averse to war ; they added that " he was perfidiously treating for peace with Eng " land, on the terms of restoring Hanover, which " he was to take back from Prussia."