The Campaign of 1815; or, a narrative of the military operations which took place in France and Belgium during the Hundred Days, etc

Front matter

s< des principales^ ) qui ont ni lieu ) ) c u I. .hi, I, ii ', mi,/ lli.l,/,,;,,, .,;,, ii,;;i,/l/l//.,i,t!;.;1'i::,;: ■*» THE CAMPAIGN OF MDCCCXV; OR, A NARRATIVE OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM DURING THE HUNDRED DAYS. WRITTEN AT ST. HELENA GENERAL GOURGAUD. Illustrated with a Map of the principal Theatre of the War. Tout ce que peut faire un grand homme d'etat et un grand capitaine, Annibal le fit pour sauver la patrie : n'ayant pu porter Scipion a la paix, il donna une bataille od la fortune sembla prender plaisir a confondre son liability, son experience, et son bon sens. Carthage recut la paix, non d'un ennemi, mais d'un maitre. Montesquieu. LONDON: PRINTED FOR JAMES RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY. 1818. CHARLES WOOD, Printer, Toppin's Court, Fleet Street, London.

PREFACE, I'he Emperor Napoleon having been pleased to communicate to me his opinion on the principal events of the Campaign of mdcccxv, I have, in writing the follow ing Narrative, availed myself of that favourable circumstance, and also of my own recollections of the great catastrophe* of which I was an eyewitness* I have read a great number of publica tions on the same subject, since I returned to Europe ; but most of the authors ap pear to have been governed by anger or animosity, and others to have been blinded by overweening national partialities : few a

Preface

. IV have studied to give a true picture of the events as they occurred. Error often repeated assumes at last the appearance of reality ; but being in this instance possessed of the means of removing it, I feel that a longer silence on my part would be inexcusable. No other reason could have overcome my repugnance to expose myself to literary criticism. Writing as a military man, I have only alluded to political events in order to ex plain how it happened, that a single battle sufficed to subjugate the French nation, governed by the first Captain of modern times. It is not for me to attempt to dis cuss these great questions : — Has the battle of Waterloo consolidated or shaken every throne ? — Has it secured the tranquillity of Europe or undermined all its foundations ? Time will determine. The Public will find in this Work a

PREFACE.

. V 1> simple but faithful recital of facts ; the military reader, the information necessary to enable him to estimate the faults which were committed, and the talents which were unfolded ; the French, a new proof, that, notwithstanding their misfortunes, their warlike reputation was not tarnished in the field of Waterloo. Perhaps the ministers of the powers hostile to France will tremble on perceiving the danger they incurred, and how nearly all their plans and projects had been de feated. Every thing depended on a single battle; and what general can be certain of success ? Cæsar, after twenty years of victory, was at Munda, as in his first battle, compelled to run all the chances of fortune. Chance has far less influence on the operations which precede and lead to a battle ; and by them all the superiority of a General is established. Thus we find VI

PREFACE.

. Napoleon, with an army alarmingly inferior in numbers, met his enemy, in this fatal campaign, with almost equal forces on every point of contest. By his ability alone he everywhere established an equilibrium : the enemy, surprised in his cantonments, with his troops scattered over a circuit of twenty leagues, was compelled to engage before his forces were united ; and finally, to fight the last battle in a position in which his total ruin was inevitable had he been beaten. All the probabilities of victory were in favour of the French. The combinations were excellent, and every event appeared to have been provided for : but what can the greatest genius perform against destiny? Napoleon was conquered ****** Melancholy example of human vicissi tude ! Fortune, which had formerly been so propitious, seemed now to take a de light in crushing him. Betrayed by the

PREFACE.

. VII men, on whom he had the best right to rely, abandoned by those whom he had loaded with favours, he left France. He expected, that his greatest enemy would be the most generous ******* ************** * * Ah ! Napoleon, why didst thou not die at Waterloo ! t~ CONTENTS. Chapter I. — Situation of the Armies of the Powers leagued against France .... 1 Chap. II. — Situation of the French Armies in April, May, and June. Preparations for Defence 5 Chap. III. — The Emperor determines to assume the offensive, and to enter Belgium. His reasons for adopting this course .... 23 Chap. IV. — Disposable French Army. Passage of the Sambre 33 Chap. V. — Battle of Ligny 55 Chap. VI.— Battle of Waterloo 75 Chap. VII. — Observations on the Battle of Waterloo 119 Chap. VIII. — Residts of the Battle. Losses sustained by the French and by the hostile Armies^ Head Quarters at Laon.

Orders dispatched to the other Armies 133, b CONTENTS. X Chap. IX. — Movements of Marshal Grouchy's Corps. It joins the Army at Laon ,...., 141 t Chap. X. — Military Resources, which France still possessed, after the Battle . 145 Chap. XI. — Arrival of the Emveror at Paris. Revolt of the Chambers. Only three Courses remain for the Emperors adoption. The reasons which determined his choice. He abdicates ..., 151 Chap. XII. — The Emperor, having abdicated, the Anglo-Belgic and Prussian Armies imprudently advance upon Paris. This manœuvre, ivhich ought to have led to their ruin, proved completely successfid ; . \6\

Appendix

. No. I. — Position of the Army on the 1 4th. 167 No. II. — Order of Movement 172 No. III. — Table shoiving the composition and force of the French Army destined to act in Flanders, on the \bth of June, to follow CONTENTS. XI No. IV. — Table showing the Corps under the immediate command of the Emperor, on the l6th of June, 1815. Those which were engaged, and the losses they sustained . . . . ibid. No. V. — Table showing the Corps under the command of Marshal Ney, on the l6th of June, 1815; those which were engaged, and the losses they sustained ibid. No. VI. — Table showing approximatively the amount of the Anglo-Belgic Army, under the command of the Duke of Wellington, on the \4th of June 1815 ibid. No. VII. — Letter from the Duke of Wellington to Earl Bathurst, his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for the War Department ..., 181 No, VIII. — letter from the Duke of Wellington to Earl Bathurst 192 No. IX. — Official Report of the Operations of the Prussian Army of the Lower Rhine 196 No. X. — Reports from his Royal Highness the Prince of Orange to his Majesty the King of the Netherlands CONTENTS.

No. XI. — Marshal De Grouchy s Account of the Affair at Wavres 216 No. XII. — Letter from Prince Bernard of Saxe Weimar to his Father 220 No. XIII. — NapoleorCs Declaration to the French People 224 No. XIV. — Napoleon, to the brave Soldiers of the Army before Paris 225 No. XV. — Military Convention 227 No. XVI. — Attestation given to General Gourgaud by the Captain of the Bellerophon 23 1 No. XVII. — Protest of the Emperor Napoleon 233 CAMPAIGN or MDCCCXV.

Chapter I

Situation of the Armies of the Powers leagued against France. In the month of April, 1815, the Russian armies were beyond the Niemen, and those of Prussia and Austria were partly on the peace establishment : most of the Prussian corps had passed the Elbe, and a part of the Austrian army was still in the kingdom of Naples ; the English had the greater part of their troops in America. It was therefore calculated, that the armies of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England could not be completed to one hundred and fifty thousand men each, which was the force these powers were bound to E STATE AND SITUATION OF ■2 furnish by the treaty of April, and marched to the frontiers of France before the end of July. As the force of the English army, including the Hanoverians, was to be only eighty thousand men, the British government had to pay subsidies for seventy thousand additional troops.

The corps of Holland, Nassau, Denmark, Saxony, Hesse, Baden, and Wirtembergh, were so distributed, that part served to com plete the English contingent, and the rest to reinforce the armies of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Spain, having formed no part of the leauge, acted separately. She had declared war against France, but such was her internal situation, that there was little to be apprehended from the hostile disposition of her court. Portugal, though at war with France, declined to furnish any contingent to the coalition ; and Sweden, having obtained what she want ed, namely Norway, also withheld her aid. The allied forces began to march to wards the frontiers of France in the month of May : meanwhile the English and Prus sian armies, which had remained in Bel- THE ALLIED ARMIES. 3 gium, were in perpetual alarm.

They ex pected every moment to be attacked, and were not in a situation to maintain them selves in that country. Wellington, who was at Vienna, and Blucher, who was at Berlin, proceeded in all haste to Brussels. Antwerp and Ostend were, during the whole of the month of May, encumbered with troops arriving from England ; and, in the beginning of June, the Duke of Wellington had under his command more than one hundred thousand men including the troops of Belgium, Holland, Nassau, and Brunswick. Blucher, at the same date, had, including the Saxon troops, an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men. The eighty thousand, which were wanting to complete the two contingents, were expected by the month of July. There were forty thousand men, belonging to the Austrian army, posted along the Rhine, and in front of the lines of the Queich ; these consisted chiefly of troops of the German confederation.

The Austrian troops were on their march for the Rhine, in order to penetrate into France by mount Cenis and the Simplon. b STATE OF THE ALLIED ARMIES. 4 The Russian forces were still at a distance from the French frontiers. Thus France was to be attacked in the course of July by six hundred thousand enemies ; but, at the beginning of June, only the armies of Generals Blucher and Wellington could be considered as prepared for action. After deducting the troops, which it was necessary they should leave in their fortresses, they presented a disposable force of two hundred thousand men on the frontiers.

Chapter II

Situation of the French Armies in April, May, and June. Preparations for Defence. The Emperor arrived at Paris on the 20th of March. The three coloured flag was not hoisted in Marseilles before the 12th of April, and the Duke of Angouleme did not embark until the 16th of the same month. The country, in fact, was not completely pacified, and in all respects placed under the authority of the Imperial Government until the beginning of May. France had then one hundred and five regiments of infantry, three of which were in the colonies : some had three battalions organized, but in general they had only two. The average effective number of each regiment was nine hundred men ; of these only about six hundred per regiment were actually under arms, and could be brought into the field. The whole of the in fantry however might be estimated at ninety ■b STATE AND SITUATION OF thousand men.

The engineer corps, formed into three fine regiments, amounted to between five and six thousand men. There were eight regiments of foot, and four of horse artillery ; the strength of the former regiments was about fifteen hun dred men, the latter had at most one hun dred mounted cannoniers. The train bat talions had been merged in other corps ; scarcely any thing but their skeletons remained, and they had a very small number of draught horses. The corps of artillery and engineers were however, as to their personal composition, sufficient for the greatest armies ; and with respect to their arms and equipments, notwithstanding the great loss which had been sustained by the cession of the equipages of artillery in Antwerp, Wesel, Mentz, and Alexandria, there still remained the means of supply ing all the losses that might be sustained in several campaigns.

There were, in the magazines, about one hundred and fifty thousand new muskets, in addition to the pieces in the hands of the soldiers, and those furnished to the national guard ; and there existed besides three hundred thousand pieces, consisting either of mus kets kept in reserve, or to be repaired. The cavalry was in a most wretched state. Reduced to fifty-seven regiments (two of carabineers, twelve of cuirassiers, thirty of dragoons and chasseurs, and se ven of hussars), not fourteen thousand men could be mounted. The number of men was indeed much more considerable, but the necessary horses, saddles, and equipments were wanting. The two regi ments of carabineers had only eighty horses each ready to take the field. All the regiments, and their depots, could at the most only supply a total of sixteen or seventeen thousand horses.

During the whole of the year 1814, the clothing of the troops, some privileged regiments excepted, had been completely neglected. The army was almost naked ; the manufactories, which had been esta blished for supplying it, were broken up, and there was not a yard of cloth in the magazines. So low had the military situation of France been reduced, that, in the month of April, it would have been scarcely poss STATE AND SITUATION OF sible to assemble an army of one hundred thousand men, a force barely sufficient to supply garrisons for our fortresses. Nothing remained disposable to form an army for the field. The Emperor restored to the regiments the numbers to which they had given celebrity in so many battles. Third, fourth, and fifth battalions were re-created in each regiment, and thus employment was given to the half pay officers.

All, who were on furlough, were recalled, all old soldiers were summoned to rejoin their colours, and the conscription of 1815 was called out. Two hundred battalions of chasseurs and grenadiers of the national guard were raised, which presented a force of one hundred and twenty thousand men. These battalions, immediately on being formed, without waiting for clothing or arms, were marched to the fortresses they were to garrison. There they were armed, and their organization rendered complete. Measures were taken for clothing them, but that could not be fully accomplished be fore July or August. All the fortresses and the coasts were put in a proper state of defence with the greatest promptitude. Six thousand cannoniers were organized for the defence of the coasts. Twenty regiments of marine infantry, each consisting of two battalions, and recruited with sailors, who had served in the navy, were ordered to be raised.

They were formed by the department of the marine, and their officers were captains, lieutenants, and ensignes de vaisseau. These regiments assembled at Cherbourg, Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon. They were destined to guard our coasts, ports, and naval establishments, and it was calculated that one half of their number might, in the course of August, be applied to reinforce the army in active service. Twenty battalions were formed of retired officers and ' soldiers, and assembled in places of strength to instruct the national guards, superintend the service, and encourage the inhabitants. They were stationed in Marseilles, Bourdeaux, and other great towns, where they were thought useful for electrifying the public spirit. All the regi mental depots were moved into the intet rior, in the directions of Paris and Lyons.

STATE AND SITUATION OF 10 The reorganization of the cavalry presented many obstacles. Contracts were made for horses, and they were raised by levies on the departments. The excellent plan was also adopted of drafting twelve thousand horses from the gendar merie, and paying down their price to the gendarmes, who remounted themselves in a fortnight. In this way the army obtained a great number of horses, ready trained for service. The infantry of the imperial guard was doubled, and its cavalry tripled. Its artillery, which had been disbanded, was reorganised, and consisted of one hun dred and twenty pieces of cannon, with their horses. The equipments for the bridge department, the engineers, and the commissariat, were prepared. Neither the Emperor, the ministry, nor the nation could be reproached with any delay.

Every thing was done as it were by en chantment, and by the beginning of June the whole of the army of the line was ready to act on the offensive. All our great establishments and all our fortresses were guarded by numerous and picked battalions of the national guard in pay. At this period the number of infantry amounted to two hundred and fifty thousand, but only one hundred and twenty thousand of them were clothed, equipped, and disposable. The remainder could only be got ready in the course of June, July, and August. The number of mounted cavalry was fifty thousand, of which only thirty thousand were in a state to take the field ; the remainder were ex pected to be prepared successively in the course of the same months. The artillery already consisted of between six and se ven hundred pieces of cannon, with their horses, and a double supply of accoutre ments.

There was a sufficient number of excellent cannoniers to serve them, inde pendently of the artillery companies of the line, distributed through all our fortresses. Upon the whole, there was an army of more than three hundred and fifty thou sand effective troops, one hundred and eighty thousand of whom were ready for active service, and one hundred and sixty thousand remained in the fortresses. Fi nally, arrangements were made for a new STATE AND SITUATION OF 12 levy and armament of three hundred thousand men. The proposition was to be brought forward in the chambers about the end of June, and the men thus raised would have been successively disposable in August and September*. The numerous armouries established in Paris produced one thousand five hundred muskets per day, and were to furnish between three and four thousand before the 12th of July.

It required some time to train the cabinet makers of the Fauxbourg St. Antoine to the mounting of guns, and render them ready at work so new to them. The arms furnished by these workshops consisted of muskets entirely new, old muskets repaired, and others fitted up from pieces which had been laid up in reserve. All the manufactories of arms in the em pire doubled their supply. Muskets of different sorts were allowed to be received. * FORCE IN JUNE:— Iijfantby : tWQ hundred and fifty thousand, of whon\ one hundred and twenty thousand were fit for active service. Cavalry : fifty thousand ; fit for active service, thirty thousand. Artillery: from six to seven hundred pieces of cannon. Mounting plates, far more simple than the ordinary kind, were invented ; and all the workers in copper, watchmakers, chis selers, &c. made them as well as the best platers.

Besides this kind of manufac ture, the works for stamped plates had been re-established. All these resources united left no ground for uneasiness on this important object. The defence of the fortresses being pro vided for, Paris and Lyons were chosen as grand centres of resistance. Four hun dred field pieces, and three hundred of large calibre were assembled at Paris. At Lyons there was an equipage of one hundred pieces of large calibre, and one hundred of field artillery. Two immense depots of am munition of every kind were formed in these cities. A great number of artillery officers of the armj*' and navy, and several battalions belonging to these two services were exclusively attached to the depots. Several companies of volunteer artillery were also formed in these cities. The defence of Paris was entrusted to twelve legions of the national guard, forming thirty thousand men, embodied, and PREPARATIONS Ii perfectly well armed ; and fifteen thousand federals, who were named tirailleurs of the national guard.

The latter were workmen, most of whom had served in the army. They were commanded by officers of the line ; and, for the defence of the city, these tirailleurs were equal to troops of the- Kne. The defence of Lyons, with respect to troops, depended on the national guard, which had been completed to ten thousand men ; but orders had been given for the formation of several battalions of tirail leurs, after the manner of those of Paris. A plan of fortification was adopted for both these cities, and the greatest acti vity was employed in executing it. At Paris, the works were begun by fortifying the heights of Montmartre, and all the ground from the Butte Chaumont and the cemetery of the Pere Lachaise to the Bar rier of the Throne. All these heights were occupied by a series of works laid down by General Haxo of the engineers.

The village of St. Denis was fortified, and sur rounded with inundations. The canal, already two-thirds formed, was completed and a communication opened between the canal of the Ourcq and the Seine at St. Denis. Half moons were constructed to cover the bridges which crossed the canal. The earth dug out of the canal of St. Denis was thrown on both banks, so as to form a rampart on the left bank, and a kind of covered way on the right bank. On the road, which leads from the Barrier of the Throne to Vincennes, there was con structed a kind of double entrenchment, extending to within half gunshot of the castle : this completely flanked the works of the cemetery of Lachaise on the left, and on the right those which had been thrown up in the park of Bercy. This work was easily formed, for the road is high, has a command of the environs, and is supported by two good walls, built with stone.

At the extremity of this double entrenchment there was erected a strong redoubt, which crossed its fire with that of Vincennes, and was even flanked by the latter. All these works were completed, palisaded, and armed by the beginning of June. The works were also traced out on the S. Id PREPARATIONS left of the Seine, and at this period a great number Of labourers were employed in constructing them. The boundary line on this side of the river is only one third of that on the right bank, and the works on the left bank were to be terminated before the 15th of July : this would have completed the whole circuit of the defensive works of Paris. On the right bank, the right and left of the line rested on the Seine, at St. Denis and behind Vincennes. On the left bank, its right and left also rested on the river, the one near Bicetre, the other in front of-the barrier of Grenelle.

The line of defence afterwards followed the right bank of the Seine opposite to Sevres, St. Cloud, Neuilly, and joined St. Denis. Orders had been given for the formation of a second line, which it was intended should be appuied on the right of the Seine as high as the barrier of Grenelle, comprehend the heights of TE toile, and finally rest its right on Mont martre, which was already in the first line. Works closed at the gorge were to be constructed in the rear of those of the Butte Chaumont and the cemetery of Lachaise, in order to protect the troops if the first entrenchments should be forced. This plan, besides, secured to the besieged the possession of the last summits of those heights. It was calculated, that the latter works would be terminated before the 1st of August. The park of artillery destined for the service ot the right bank was established at Vincennes, and that for the left bank at the Invalids.

In distributing the cannon, with respect to calibre, the right bank had six, twelve, and twenty-four pounders ; the left bank four, eight, sixteen, and twenty-four pounders ; and the works were so constructed, that field artillery could everywhere be placed in battery. One hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, with their horses, were organized, and ready to move on any point which might be menaced. The fortifications of Soissons, Laon, and Chateau Thiery had been re-established, as forming part of the great system of the defence of the capital. At Lyons a bridge-head was constructed at the Broteaux, a drawbridge at the Pont IS PREPARATIONS de la Guillotiere, and the circumvallation between the Rhone and the Saone was re established, as well as that on the right bank of the Saone by the heights of Pierre-en cise.

The part included between the Saone and the Rhone, which is considered as the true point of attack, was strengthened by the construction of a number of good field works on the heights. These works being finished, it was resolved to occupy, as long as possible, the Faubourg de la Guillotiere, by covering it with a series of redoubts — a plan to which the nature of the ground was very favourable. By the beginning of June, all the troops of the empire were formed into seven army-corps, four corps of ob servation, and a body called the army of La Vendee. The first army-corps was at Lille. It consisted of sixteen regiments of infantry and three of cavalry, forming four divisions of infantry and one of cavalry ; in all eighteen thousand foot and fifteen hun dred horse, under the command of Gene ral Erlong.

The second corps, which was Composed in a similar manner, and of a nearly equal force, occupied Valenciennes, under the orders of General Reille. The third, commanded by General Vandamme-, was at Mesieres ; it had only three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry. The fourth corps, which was commanded by General Gerard, was at Metz, and garri soned the Moselle; its composition was similar to that of the third, but it had one regiment less, and the troops were inferior. The fifth corps, which had General Rapp for its chief, was in Alsace ; it had three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry. The sixth, commanded by General Lobau, consisted of nine regiments of infantry and three of cavalry ; it occupied Laon, but the fourth regiment of each division was in La Vendee. The seventh corps, which was at Chambery, under the command of Marshal Suchet, was formed of two divisions of infantry, one of cavalry, and two divisions of the national guard of Dauphiny and the Lyonese.

The corps of observation of the Var, commanded by Marshal Brune, had three regiments of infantry PREPARATIONS 20 and one of cavalry. Genertl Lecourbc commanded, at Befort, a coi ps of obser vation, consisting of three regiments of infantry and three of cavahy. He was supported by a great number of battalions of the paid national guard of Franche Comte. He had to watch Basle and Hu ninguen, and to defend the Jura. Two corps of observation, one at Bourdeaux under General Clausel, the other at Tou louse, under General Decaen, had three regiments of infantry and one of cavalry in each of those towns, and they were re inforced by all the levies of the national guard of Languedoc under pay ; but it was found necessary to detach one regiment from each of them. These, two regi ments were sent to La Vendee.

The army of La Vendee, commanded by General Lamarque, comprehended eight regiments of infantry of the line, two of the young guard, two of cavalry, and ten squadrons of gendarmerie, part infantry and part cavalry, forming more than three thousand gendarmes. In all the different army-corps, the average force of each regiment of infantry amounted to eleven or twelve hundred men under arms ; and the force of the cavalry regiments to four or five hun dred. Of the t wo hundred battalions of national guards organised and under pay, thirty were destined to form a reserve of infantry on the Loire. The reserve of cavalry consisted of four corps, each of two divisions, and each division having three regiments, which made about three thousand horses to every corps. They were cantoned between the Aisne, the Meuse, and the Sambre.

The first, commanded by General Pajol, consisted of light ca valry. The second, under the orders of General Excelmans, was composed of dra goons. The third and fourth corps, com manded by Generals Milhaut and Keller man, were entirely cuirassiers. The artillery of each corps consisted of a battery of eight pieces of cannon for each division of infantry, a horse battery of six pieces of cannon for each division pf cavalry, and a reserve battery of PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE. eight twelve pounders to each army^ corps. Such was the military situation of France in June.

Chapter III

The Emperor determines to assume the Offensive, and to enter Belgium. Plis Reasons for adopting this Course. Militatiy men had formed various opinions respecting the plan of operations, which it would be most advisable to follow. Some wished, that at the end of April the Emperor should have entered Belgium, beaten and dispersed the English army, and armed the population of the country, of whose disposition no doubt could be entertained. The fact is, that in April, and the beginning of May, France would have had to oppose only one hundred thousand enemies in Belgium, instead of the two hundred thousand who were there in June ; and that too whilst the imprudent attack, which the King of Naples had just made upon the Austrian troops, di rected the whole attention of Austria to wards Italy. This plan would certainly PROPOSED PLANS 24 have been the best of all, had it been practicable; but before the commence ment of hostilities it was necessary to arm and provision the strong places, and to levy the battalions of the national guard which were to garrison them, and thus ren der disposable the troops of the line to form the army.