The Philosophy of Human Nature, containing a complete History of Human Interests. To which is added, an Essay on the origin of Evil

Preface

. In explanation of the following Treatise, it may be said, that moral science may be divided into two parts : 1st, The theory of Evidence. ; 2dly, The theory of Morality, or of human interests. The former of these subjects has already been sufficiently dis cussed ; and the present Treatise is an at tempt to give a new view of the latter. Chap. I, as the title expresses, is mere ly introductory ; and contains general ob servations on Philosophy, or a theory of reasoning. The Reader must not be dis couraged by the abstruseness of this Chap ter, as he will find the Work less abstruse as he proceeds. Chapter II, after an at tempt to prove the difference between mind and matter, contains an enumeration of the most distinguishing phenomena of the former. This Chapter, which was a necessary foundation to the system, the Author flatters himself, will be found valuable from its completeness, and, he trusts, not devoid

PREFACE.

. IV of novelty. The Chapter on Self-love forms the only complete theory on that subject with which the Author is acquainted ; and, as far as he can discover, contains no por tion of that abstruseness which is so little congenial to the taste of the Readers of the present day. The Chapter on Variety is the keystone of the system, and will be found to explain all human interests. The arrangement, adopted with regard to the subordinate parts of the Work, may appear singular; but it was necessary for the purpose of putting every thing in its proper place, and shewing how secondary principles are connected with primary. The Author has only farther to observe, that if he did not conceive the present Work to contain a system, in no small de gree, both new and interesting, he should not have troubled the World with a Meta physical Treatise. Stonehaven, ") 20M March, 1815. J THE CONTENTS.

Part I. Chap

I. Introduction,.^v»~~.~.~.w»»~~.~»»%»»»v»»»~.~9 II. The Mind. Sect. I. Not a general quality of Matter,34 II. Nor a relation of material qua- I lllcS) V4iV4.V%»\f>\\\MHV\-.\V->WW1T -t III. Of the difficulty of conceiving the nature of the union between the Mind and Body, arising from the extreme difference of their qualities,„~57 IV. Of the sympathy between the Mind and the Body,.Wv.~~74 III. Self-love. Sect. I. Themotiveof all human actions,88 II. Of Morality, 94 III. Of those causes which diversify Self-love, 1 29 Sect. 1. Prudence,~~~.».~..,»~130 2. Taste, ~ 138 IV. Of Sympathy, 157 IV. The Senses. Sect. 1. Feeling, „ ;_1?0 II. Tasting, ~.~~~~.«^,^ 174 III. Seeing, 177 IV. Hearing, v. 181 V. Smelling, 189 VI. The sense of Beauty, 191 VII. Beauty, 191 V. The Passions. Sect. I. Love,., — „«. 200 IL Hatred, *,«.»„ ~~~ VI THE CONTENTS.

CHAP. V. The Passions continued. III. Joy, 204 IV. Grief, .~~205 V. Anger,w^v«»»~.~»»»»~*~4~''4-208 VI. Fear,~»~^»»~.^~4~-"»»~210 VII. Pity, — 215 VIII. Envy, 217 IX. Vanity, „~~220 X. Modesty, ~~- 223 XI. Admiration,~~~.~~~~~~225 XII. Hope, ~ 227 XIII. Disappointment, ~~»»~~-~ 228 XIV. Despair, 229 XV. Laughter, 230 XVI. Secondary Passions, ,*v%~~233

Part II. Chap

VI. Variety. Sect. I. The Source of all Pleasure, — 237 II. But of Pain when carried to excess, »~»...»,..^-.~»~~,~«,.~.247 Sect 1. Happiness, ~~„.,,,~.~256 2. Sensibility, 262 3. Bravery, 8 III, Oblivion necessary to re-create Novelty, 301 4. Originality, ~~~ 301 IV. Of Hope, or the degrees of probability necessary to constitute Enjoyment, 317 5. Sublimity, 321

Appendix

. The Origin of Evil,^,*,^^^.,^,.^.^^^*..*..^.*,*.^^,^,! FART I. Wrilo£oj%> OF HUMAN NATURE; CONTAINING A COMPLETE THEORY or HUMAN INTERESTS; TO which is avoid, AN ESSAY ON THE ORIGIN OF EVIL. CHAP. I. Introduction. Those general causes which actuate nature, denominated principles, whether moral or physical, operate with undeviating uniform ity. However much the force of one may be diminished or diverted by the opposition of another, each preserves its original nature unchanged until it be entirely destroyed. The purpose of philosophy is to analyze and simplify nature ; to reduce the huge mass and endless diversity of the particular events and objects which it contains to a few principles, to which aU may be refer A red ; and to recognise and detect the same principle under every form, and in every variety of combination.

Hence every thing will become distinct ; demonstration, discrimination, and argument, will be simple and easy ; and knowledge will acquire per fection. Principled are few ; but particulars and cases infinite. A perfect knowledge, there fore, of the few principles which move the machinery of nature is far preferable to the most enlarged experience of thelong est life. By it, we learn the precise force and value of each event ; and have the certainty of demonstration instead of that doubtful knowledge of futurity which can be derived from experience alone. When the parts of any piece of machinery are thrown together in confusion, the eye cannot com prehend it, nor the mind form an idea of its purpose. But when every wheel is put in its proper place, the use of each is imme diately perceived.

From an inspection of their combined movements, we acquire a conception of their mutual dependance as far superior to that which could be derived from individual inspection, or the result produced, as demonstration is preferable to conjecture. The modern method of philosophising is to prefer the examination of facts to the constructing of systems. But, as the importance of the knowledge of facts depends upon drawing the proper inference, a perfect knowledge of them, if they are not systematized, is of no value. The universal approbation of experiment can, therefore, surely mean no more than that we should begin the construction of system with the examination of fact, and that its perfection will ultimately depend upon the accuracy of our knowledge of particulars. It is absurd to make a distinction between theoretical and experimental philosophy.

To draw general inferences from experience is to conclude from experiment ; and to form theories from experiment, is to reason from experience. There is no difference between the principle or manner of reasoning in one case and in the other, but merely a difference of means or experience. Difference of correctness of data will no A2 doubt have a corresponding effect on ac curacy of conclusion. But as much de pends upon the correctness of the mind as upon that of its information. More erroneous conclusions have not, perhaps, been drawn in theoretical than in experimental philosophy. We have seen numberless ex periments absurdly made, and numberless conclusions absurdly drawn, from them. They deceive themselves, therefore, who trust to experiment alone for that which should be the joint produce of reasoning and experience.

No species of philosophy, it is to be thought, will ever be invented which will supersede the necessity of mental exertion, of reasoning and comparison. In every employment of the mind, the just ness of its conclusions will chiefly depend on the expansion of its view, and the accuracy of its discrimination.* To ren- * This is proved by the circumstance of some persons having attained a just conclusion by hypothesis; while others have drawn erroneous inferences from experiment. In all reasoning, natural sagacity is of the first importance. There are indeed, a multitude of facts established by experiment or experience, the proper arrangement of which we are daily em ployed to discover. der philosophy perfect, theory must be conj oined with experiment. He who studies only particulars adds little to the facility of his reasoning ; but he who understands a general principle can solve many particu lars by it*, it Nature is a compound of principles or general causes^ wh ich, from mutual connection and intercourse, are mixed and thrown together in every mode of variety.

Principles resemble lines drawn from different points, intersecting each other in every possible direction. Each angle of intersection forms a particular ; and particulars form different connections, and relations with regard to each other. As each angle becomes, to a spectator placed at it, a point of view, it is easy to pass from one to another, to form arbitrary lines, and to perceive a partial connection between opposite principles, by that relation which is formed by their intercourse alone. Each principle is crossed, separated, and divided, by another. If the parts, therefore, of one principle in tervene between those of another, its con nection seems, to persons who see but a A3 part, to be dissolved, and the whole to be one confusion of jarring particulars. It is seldom that the same principle can be combined twice with another in the same manner, or that two cases can be found en^ tirely parallel.

To those, therefore, whose views are contracted, one principle, when found joined with a different, is entirely new, each fact seems distinrt from another, and nature appears an infinite variety. Such persons must acquire a large stock of ex^ perience before they can be qualified to de cide upon any subject ; and after that is attained, their reasoning must still be but very imperfect, The wheels of nature, in order to accom plish and complete its movements, are op posed to each other. Although the whole system of things moves in perfect harmony, each particular contradicts and acts against another. Qualities are, therefore, as dif ferent as varieties of relation are frequent. If two persons happen to be placed at a distance from each other, with an object intervening, that object stands in different respects, and bears on contrary points of the compass, towards each.

It is the same with regard to good and evil. The same event which destroys one person may en rich another, and that wind which is a moderate and useful breeze on one coast may be a destructive storm on the opposite. A skilful rhetorician, at whatever point of view he open, can easily pass from one angle of intercourse, or partial connection, of different principles to another. With the hand of a juggler, he can change the state of objects, and reverse the nature of interests. His purpose is not to convince, but to deceive, and to obtain the same end from the influence of passion as from the conviction of reason. He endeavours to raise an interest in his hearers, to make men animate particulars, spectators become combatants, judges parties, and to induce the mind to change the neutrality of reason for the heat of passion.

It is in the power of a rhetorician to place the imagination of those who can conceive only one particular in whatever situation he pleases. But those who can view the whole relation of the parts of any principle, or set of ob- A jects, are beyond the reach of his art, with out the prejudice of situation, free from passion, and engaged in no contest on either side ; but are left fully to perceive, and calmly to decide, their difference. He who can conceive but a portion of any subject must have very confused ideas concerning it. To be able to form a just opinion of the nature and value of individual objects, we must have a view of the whole extent of their connections. The purpose of declamation is to inflame the passions, and influence the instincts of the body ; and those who submit to its im pression are unconsciously determined to the end for which it is used.

Passion depends upon every difference of temper, every casual circumstance, and every variety of combination in nature. He, therefore, who is determined by passion is right only by accident. All the power of declamation arises from imperfect similitude and unnatural association ; for there is nothing so high that it cannot be degraded, nor any thing so low that it cannot be exalted by the insidiousness of false analogy.* By such means, any character can be stripped of its good qualities, or ornamented with others which do not belong to it ; or the consequences of any action may be represented as the most dangerous and destructive, or as the most useful and beneficial, whether it be essen tially so or not. When those who do not know the precise effect of any cause, and who are un able to trace that cause distinctly from all others, find it united with a different, they take such connection for a continuation of the principle with which they commenc ed. Weak minds are so dazzled by every incidental intercourse which one principle forms with another, that they can make no distinction between them.

Hence, in at tempting to generalize, they, at length. draw every idea, by the power of assimila tion, into the same focus, and, from one * False analogy is when things, which agree in one respect or quality, are united in another in which they do not agree. But as that which is good becomes bad by excess, and that which is bad good by moderation, exaggeration, the heightening or depressing of qualities, or in short giving wrong names to things, is the chief instrument of declamation. cause, account for every phenomenon in nature. But not a less frequent source of false reasoning is, to consider the variations of the same principle as contradictions. It is very natural for a person who has no idea of principles to take generosity for want of self-love ; for, without an extensive view, no one can believe that two contrary actions could proceed from the same motive.

But all errors of judgment arise merely from want of comprehension. The ideas of a small mind are easily disordered, and put into confusion. Among those who can view but a limited portion of things, it is nowise uncommon to mistake the principle of decision, and determine according to some quality which has only an incidental connection with the distinction to be made. The greater number of parts into which any thing is divided, each of these parts must be the less. But if a weak or ignorant person were asked whether one fourth or one sixth is the greater, it might reasonably be expected that, because six is greater than four, the answer would be one sixth. Without an enlarged sphere of reflection, it is impossible to conceive distinct ideas. Ignorant persons and remiss think ers join heterogeneous and distinguish re lated qualities, merely as they find them accidentally associated or casually separat ed. Hence nothing contributes so much to the facility of our reasoning, and to its conviction upon others, as the arrangement of things in the order of their natural de pendance.

It is difficult, indeed, to analyze any cause, or to separate one principle from o thers, and to produce it pure and unmixed. The mind may be led away by slight con nections, and often its conclusions may de viate so far from the principle with which it commenced as to have no resemblance to it. But if certainty of deduction and readiness of decision are to be attained, it can only be by extensive classification. A mind which traverses merely the sur face of things, meets, at every step, with ob jects seemingly different. To it all nature appears a confused mass. While such must compare event with event, and watch the continual change of facts, to obtain an imperfect knowledge of the nature of things ; that which penetrates farther sees all the machinery of nature, and perceives the wheels which produce every motion.

He who knows that all virtue is utility, can distinguish between virtuous and vicious actions at a glance ; he who knows that all evidence is derived from experience, as no set of facts can be so equally balanced that one side will not preponderate, finds no hesitation in determining his belief; and he who knows that all actions proceed from self-love, is at no loss to account for every variety of human conduct. But he who is acquainted with these principles only in the more immediate form of facts, has his knowledge and reasoning interrupted by the most confined barrier, and must be contented to wait, with patience, until the mysteries of futurity unfold themselves* without being able to form even a conjecture concerning them. Shall we, therefore, continually talk of virtue and vice, truth and falsehood, taste and insensibility, with out knowing what they are ? or are these the Deities of our reasoning powers, the in comprehensibility of which must oblige us to remain in contented ignorance of them ? are they principles so original as to be in capable of definition or analysis ? or is our knowledge so complete that it cannot be extended ?

How despicable is that indolence of mind which induces us to make others reason for us, which renders it necessary to support our opinions by the authority of a great name without thinking for ourselves, or producing arguments of our own ; which compels us to subject our judgments to the dictates of men rather than the deci sions of reason, and to the laws of custom rather than to the principles of nature ! Such conduct resembles that of children who accomplish the calculations of arith metic without understanding the rules by which they are performed. Abstract knowledge uniformly operates as an addition to certainty, and never op poses common ideas. Every mind must be, to some degree, extended ; and no other limits can be fixed to our reasoning powers than the extent of our knowledge. The advocates for common sense are neces sitated to fix the boundaries of the mate rials of reasoning some where.

But what must be the rule of their conclusions, if it be not reason ? and what the conclusion of reason, if it be not the extent of our know ledge ? Reason, in this, as well as in every other case, is our only guide, and can chuse no other data for its operations than those within the extent of our comprehension. It is absurd to make a distinction be tween the philosopher and the man. Every person thinks in some degree ; and a philosopher is only a thinker on a more extensive scale than other men. Common sense is a part of the most abstracted phi losophy. Every true system is but an ar rangement of connected facts ; and no ab stract philosophy which is just, although indeed it may sometimes have the appear ance of being contrary to what is called common sense, will, in reality, be more than an addition to it.

But a person would be incapable of pushing his discoveries farther than the lowest of mankind, if he did not leave common sense, and rise above com-* mon ideas. By making those opinions* which antiquity or custom has established among men, the rules of thinking, when once an error is committed, it may be per petuated from one generation to another, and mankind may, in this manner, continue in deception to the latest ages. It is im possible that Sir Isaac Kewton could have excelled other men, or made those discov eries which have raised his name to so great a height of fame, had he made common sense and common opinion the principles of his reasoning, and had he not soared a bove the world and the prejudices of man kind.* But as he was a natural philoso pher no sect was alarmed for the conse quences of his philosophy, and all concur red in applauding the discoveries which he made.

Great allowance ought to be given to ab stract theories. Distant causes must una voidably be very different from common * Nothing is mor e contrary to common sense than the motion and convexity of the Earth, or that men are capable of standing with their feet opposite to ours. events, and the ideas formed on them con trary to familiar opinions. As first impres sions cannot extend far, they can form proof only with regard to each other. But general principles and familiar ideas undoubtedly have a relative dependance ; and when the connection is traced, it produces mutu al elucidation. Every additional acquisition of knowledge tends to confirm that which we already know, as the more points light is reflected from, the more its force is increased. While, therefore, abstract ideas are consistent with common, they undoubtedly add to the strength of each other.* The farther our view is extended, the better we become acquainted with the sit uation f of objects within its compass ; the more extensive our knowledge is, the more convincing must be our reasoning, and the more satisfactory our conclusions.

A per son who sees but a part, can have only a partial idea ; and as facts arising from the * As all abstract ideas are, in other words, only enlarged views, those who argue against them praise ignorance. + All reasoning regards only situation or relation. same principle are often contradictory, two antagonists, who do not reason upon prin ciples, may wage the war of disputation to eternity, without the one gaining any per ceivable superiority over the other. But the greatest error to which the advocates for common sense are liable is, that, where they do not perceive the cause of any event, they imagine that it has happened without one. Nothing is, therefore, more frequent than to hear causeless events contended for, by those who live without enquiry, and rest in contented ignorance. From the same source of error, may be traced many superstitions ; judicial astro logy, fabulous predictions, omens, and all those fancies which haunt the imagination of the ignorant.

Every principle extends over all nature, and, by mutual commixture, every one, in a manner, partakes of another. Now, as there must be some degree of similarity where there is connection, the same danger of running principles into each other may arise from their too great extension, as that which is occasioned by arbitrarily uniting B them when found in casual association. Theory has two laws — conjunction and separation. All false reasoning arises from un iting heterogeneous, or separating homoge neous, things. In the construction of the ory, as great attention ought to be paid to distinguish the parts of different principles, as to unite the different parts of the same principle. The effects of the most distant causes, when far extended, may have some degree of similarity. Hence, to account for the phœnomena of one principle by an other to which it has only a remote simili tude is a common error among theorists.

It should therefore always form a presumption against the truth of any hypo thesis, when slight causes are represented as producing great effects. Nothing, in deed, discovers a greater deficiency of men tal energy than the conduct of those who imagine that philosophy consists in refine ment, and who are not contented with any hypothesis of their own forming unless the causes from which they deduce their con clusions be too slender to support them. The principle of electricity pervades every body ; and an electrician may ascribe to it every effect which is produced in nature. Heat is diffused through all things ; and a person devoted to that subject may assert that heat is the primum mobile of Nature. All nature is in motion ; and an atheist may imagine motion a sufficient Deity. All nature is, at one time or another, in a state of organization ; and all things may, there fore, be said to be produced by organization.

Matter is known to us only by its qualities : all nature assumes certain appearances and faces ; and a physiognomist may, therefore, conclude that physiognomy is the first principle in nature. That all these principles exist is certain ; but wliy should one be greater than an other ? or why should it be allowed to as sume superiority, and hold others in sub jection ? The vanity of man is also a principle from which may be accounted for his giving the preference to whatever belongs to himself, his raising himself above other men, and his own hypothesis above all nature. One cause can produce only one effect, B2 however much varied that effect may be by its different connections, relations, and va rieties of intercourse with those of other principles. We ought not, therefore, to al low our parental fondness for our own pro ductions and discoveries to betray us into the attempt of accounting, from one principle, for all the variety of events and ap pearances in nature.

Sometimes effects may run parallel without having any con nection, or may be perfectly similar when proceeding from different causes.* Hence, in all reasoning, it is as necessary to sepa rate, as to unite, things. It is as necessary, in the tracing of a principle, to preserve distinction as to generalize at all ; for if this caution be neglected, the mind easily be gins, but does not perceive where to stop, till, at last, it confounds principles, and turns every thing into a disorder much more difficult to be overcome, and which is a greater obstacle to the discovery of truth, than that which arises from particu- * Cold, sometimes, produces the effect of heat. By freezing, it expands liquids. Water also, sometimes, produces the effect of. fire. By union with lime, it occasions combustion. larizing, or the method of reasoning by single facts.

When qualities are tar extend ed, the connection between them is too slight to be regarded, or the distinction too small to be perceived. As, therefore, gen eralizing has a natural tendency to annihi late distinction, there is a point at which we must stop to prevent the utter destruc^ tion of every principle and all fact. But to account for one effect from one cause, is entirely different from accounting for all effects from one cause. Although ideas too general may be sometimes adopt* ed, general ideas are not, on that account, to be rejected. An idea camiot, in reality, be too general, nor any system too extensive, if it be just ; and it is only when, by one unnatural union of things, a false simi larity between them is continued, that mis takes in systematical reasoning arise. It is certain that causes and events are connected, that nature is linked together in the same chain, and that^ an impulse which affects one part will extend its influ ence over all.

By viewing the whole, we are able to estimate the value of a part ; B.S and by estimating each part, we obtain an idea of the whole. By proceeding from one remark to another, we ultimately reach a truth which we could never attain from one single remark or idea. Common events furnish no great strength of argument with regard to their original cause. There must be the same dissimilarity between the first and the second as there is distance. Custom is often considered a sufficient criterion of good and evil ; but custom can be a rule only in familiar cases, where it is not necessary that reason should decide. The most general opinion forms the principle of common sense ; but common sense can be allowed to impose no law upon that which is uncommon. The sentiment of ridicule arises from generality or fashion, and the common sense of one country often forms a subject of entertainment to an individual of another ; for the same reason that a coxcomb laughs at a philosopher — because they are different from each other.

But where all are the same, or where each is but the copy of an other, common opinion is but as a single opinion. Hence truth is seldom determin ed by majority. The accuracy of the judgment uniformly depends upon the expanse of the mind; but the bulk of mankind, on whom the la bour of managing the business of the world falls, have not leisure for speculative cor rectness. As the affairs of life require act ivity and dispatch, the greater part of man kind must be governed by habit and imita tion. But general ideas are not, therefore, to be despised. There can be no doubt, that, although they are not seen, yet they are felt by the mass of mankind, that they reach all the transactions of life, and give industry its proper application. Whatever improves our rational faculties, or enlarges the expansion of our minds, in creases our importance in the scale of ex istence, and tends to render every part of our conduct more correct, and better ad apted to the end of our being, Knowledge can never be possessed without being useful.

In nature there is a universal inter course. What we acquire upon one subject, we, in some measure, acquire upon another. B4 Any high degree of science, or intimate acquaintance with principles, is not, per haps, absolutely necessary to common purposes; but certainly, as we extend our views, we simplify our conduct. Before the discovery of the magnet, sailors found their way in the ocean with difficulty and danger, but since that event the art of navi gation has acquired certainty as well as safety. What the compass is to the sailor, principles are to all men. Without a know ledge of general causes, our ideas of things must always be confused, and our pursuits unstable and indeterminate. As, again, all causes are linked together in the same chain, it is to be expected that the mind of an acute man, by incessantly fixing itself on one set of objects, will trace any phœnomenon, if within nature, to its source.

Beyond nature, or the limits of our know ledge and experience, we cannot go. Those, therefore, who lay down imaginary data to themselves, and attempt to account for the formation of the world, or to render conceivable the boundaries of space, are the abstruse reasoners who are properly the objects of contempt. By such wild under takings, they forfeit every claim to the protection of reason, and ought to be given up to the tribunal of common sense, and punished with every torture of ridicule. CHAP. II. The Mind. Neither the intellectual faculties of man, nor his means of knowledge are infinite. It, therefore, leads only to scepticism to inquire for infinite proof of any thing. In the common affairs of life, we must be sa tisfied with knowing the nature of things by their consequences. Even when we inquire into any thing in a more abstract ed manner, we are under the necessity of judging of essence by qualities.