The Italian Volunteers and Lombard Rifle Brigade, being an authentic narrative of the organization, adventures, and final disbanding of these corps in 1848-49 ... Translated from the edition published at Turin in 1849. To which are added original letters and important historical documents...

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'NIK SIEGE OF R 0 M K PLAN OF Till. SECOH& A.SSAIHiT. , -50th of JunelQ4_9,_.pa_t..,mtb-Mon_.n(] L0MD0N, PUBLISHED BY I.ONliHAN _ I:" THE ITALIAN VOLUNTEERS AND LOMBARD RIFLE BRIGADE, BEING AN* AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE OF THE ORGANIZATION, ADVENTURES, AND FINAL DISBANDING OP THESE CORPS, IN 1848-49. BY EMILIO DANDOLO. . . . . Ah su gli estinti Non sorge fiore, ove non sia d' umane Lodi onorato e d* amoroso pianto ! Foscolo. Translated from the Edition published at Turin in 1849. TO WHICH ARE ADDED ORIGINAL LETTERS AND IMPORTANT HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE LATE ITALIAN MOVEMENT OF REFORM. LONDON: LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS. 1851. London : Spottiswoodes and Shaw, New-street- Square. gtutijor's Unification. TO THE MEMORY OF ENRICO DANDOLO, LUCIANO MANARA, AND EMILIO MORISINI, WHO FELL IN THE DEFENCE OP ROME.

In these times, when the most extraordinary events press one upon another with strange rapidity, and the future looks dark and big with tempests, I hardly know whether these unstudied pages, alike devoid of exaggeration or flattery, and dictated by a sense of justice alone, will be favourably received by the public. I hesitated and doubted much before giving them to the light, not only from a consciousness of my inexperience as an author, but from the fear of being judged presumptuous in calling the attention of others to details which frequently assume the impress of a personal narrative. I was induced, however, to overcome my natural timidity by the kind encouragement which I met with from many whom I consulted on this subject, and, above all, by the desire of lending my assistance, as far as my small means would permit, to those who A VI are sincerely desirous of finding out the truth in the midst of the confusion and obscurity of a period replete with dark and mysterious events.

I had accidentally been placed in such circumstances as to be able frequently to form a clear and precise judgment respecting various occurrences, which, for others, were either of dubious character, or liable to be falsely interpreted. From early in timacy and habits of friendship I was like a brother to the late Luciano Manara ; for about a year I was his adjutant and secretary for military affairs, and, above all, his inseparable companion in the reverses which led him at last to the tomb : I had, therefore, the means of viewing, in their true light, the perplex ing changes of events in which he and his comrades were so lamentably entangled and ruined. Without any interested views or regard to party feeling, I have felt, in publishing this brief narrative, that I was paying the last tribute due to the memory of my friends ; and, though far from confident in the merits of the style, I hope, nevertheless, to meet with some indulgence for the sake of the spirit of justice which it has been my constant endeavour to preserve throughout.

Appendix

. Letter addressed to the Translator - - - 291 Historical Notes and Documents - - - THE ITALIAN VOLUNTEERS. INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. OBSERVATIONS ON THE LATE ITALIAN MOVEMENT OF REFORM. Convinced how deeply important it is to the inte rests of Italy that the public mind of England should appreciate the sentiments and motives of those, who, counting not the cost, have sought the regeneration of their unhappy country, it is with much earnestness that the writer of these introductory pages seizes the occasion to do justice to his fellow-countrymen, and to their cause. Nor would he wish a fairer field than this, or better company than that of the honest soldier whose narrative now appears in the English language. Its unaffected style, its candour, and plain manly sense will sufficiently commend the work to the reader's favourable opinion.

But as the narrative chiefly relates * B to the part taken by the Volunteers in the Italian Wal es Independence, and may rather be said to be a well delineated biography of a few of the most distinguished leaders of one of the free corps, it appears desirable to offer a few preliminary observations respecting the other elements which co-operated in fixing the final destinies of Italy, such as the political' action of our different governments existing at that time, — the influence of foreign policy, — the general state of public opinion ; for we hope thus to furnish the reader of Signor Dandolo's narrative with some, at least, of the materials essential to forming a correct judgment of a cause, which, in the days of its triumph, as in those of its defeat, has engaged the anxious attention of statesmen, and the warmest sympathies of the civilised world.

It would be impossible to offer a more apt defini tion of the Italian Volunteers of 1848, than that which has been given by Signor Dandolo : " they were composed of the flower and of the dregs of society ;" nothing, therefore, can be more various, more multiform, more easily eluding minute observation than these free corps, which differ from regi ments of the line, as much as the free action of the will differs from passive obedience and blind sub mission. An almost miraculous concurrence of events united for a time the most heterogeneous ele ments in one single idea, and brought these different forces, some of which were powerful even in their individual actions, to combine for one common end. No sooner had the standard of Italian independence been reared on the walls of Milan, than Borne, Naples, Tuscany, Sardinia, Romagna, and the Lom bardo-Venetian Provinces sent out thousands of combatants.

Generous youths of noble birth, with minds tempered by manly studies, — men of mature age, distinguished in science and the arts, — laborious and brave mechanics, flew to arms, exultingly confi dent in their cause which had been blessed by a Pontiff, revered as the liberator of Italy ; and at the same time they drew after them a portion of the worst classes of townspeople, who had been reared in idleness, ignorance, and vice, and who impelled by a vain spirit of imitation, by the desire of gain, or by a propensity for a vagrant and adventurous life, enlisted themselves among the real champions of national freedom. As long as this singular asso ciation was elevated and maintained by the enthusiasm which a noble and generous sentiment trans fused through the whole mass, — as long as victory attended it, and the hardships, fatigues, and sacrifices inseparable from a serious and decisive war, had not B come to dissolve it, — as long as party spirit, provincial animosities, ambition, and mistrust, had not poisoned (as too soon, alas, they did) the sources of public feeling, so long did it appear to have raised the people of Italy to the level of their ancient virtues.

The revolution of Milan, the brave defence of Vicenza *, Treviso, Brescia, Bologna, Venice, and Rome, were due to volunteers; nor could such a species of defence have been achieved by any but volunteers. We ought not to forget, in judging of the Italian war of independence, that the majority of the people had long been unused to military habits ; if we except the States forming the two extremities of the Peninsula, all the remainder of Italy had either no regular troops, or they were in small numbers, ill disciplined, and unprepared for entering the field. The war, therefore, which the Italian volunteers made against Austria, was precisely that which alone was possible under existing circum stances. Buoyed up by the enthusiasm of the moment, they could do neither more nor less than they did, that is, carry on a war of barricades in cities, and of guerillas, outside the walls of these ; for were they not without determined plan, without * See Appendix, Vicenza, Note A. discipline, as well as without competent leaders ? thus giving rise to a warfare replete with heroic actions and individual sacrifices, but too truly without effect against a numerous well-trained army, strengthened by the advantages of superior natural positions and impregnable fortresses, and, above all, conducted by brave veteran persevering chiefs, whose orders were blindly and implicitly obeyed.

What we have said of the volunteers of 1848, as confronted with the Austrian troops, may, if we look to the definitive result, be said of the standing armies likewise, and of the political influence of the Italian Governments during the war. The Sardinian army was patient, disciplined, loyal, brave, and well-trained in certain arms ; but it did not possess a general whose genius might have in sured victory, or who had resolution and promptitude enough to follow up a first success : it was essentially defective as to numbers ; was often in want of pro visions ; it never had correct information as to the enemies' movements, and its own were neither plan ned nor executed with sufficient rapidity or precision ; nor could it resist the discouragement produced by the first reverses, being in a great proportion com posed of married men and fathers of families.* * This observation refers to the reserve, called in the Pied- B Political interests were constantly associated with the plans of the campaign, perplexing the movements of the army, and weakening it in presence of the enemy, who, following the simplest method of war, remained concentrated in their fortifications and awaited reinforcements from Vienna and the whole of Germany, in order to fall successfully on inferior and detached forces, and put them to the rout one by one.

The Neapolitan army, which, by occupying the Venetian province, could alone have prevented the arrival of Austrian reinforcements and thus have insured us the victory, was recalled at the most critical moment. The causes of this fatal recall are well known : the army of the king of Naples could not be expected to fight for the glory of another Sovereign, and Ferdinand, while apparently on the point of losing Sicily, and menaced in his own king dom, naturally denied his troops to Charles Albert, for the conquest of Lombardy. Pius IX., the successor of the universally de tested Gregory, opened a reign, which Europe was accustomed to consider as the constant incarnation of an ignorant and superstitious despotism, with an montese language " Provincial!," whom General Bava, in his " Military Operations of the Lombard Campaign," designates as armed peasants, " contadini armati." act of clemency and promises of political reforms ; and whether from the effect of this unlooked-for contrast, or the gratification of a desire which had preyed for years on this population, or still more, perhaps, from the hope universally entertained by believing minds of realising at length the union of faith and liberty — Pius IX. became the symbol of Italian regeneration.

It was not long, however, before the war with Austria broke out, and the words which proceeded from the Vatican after the Austrian occupation of the town of Ferara, had no small share in arousing the animosity of the Italians, and calling them to arms. But the court of Rome, and the whole complex mechanism of that mon strous government, had not melted away at the first decree of Pius IX. The Pontiff soon found that he could not grant a constitution to his people, or maintain it when granted, and that he could not make war with Austria more than witli any other state ; and thus, at the first trial, another and most powerful moral support was withdrawn from the Italian movement of 1848. The states of Central Italy which were weakly governed, without troops, with an inexperienced and excitable population, who had no idea of political authority except that derived from the action of a B demoralised and discredited police, entered eagerly into the new reforms ; but, in the sequel, they served only to accelerate the Italian movement, without contributing efficaciously to its defence ; they became a ready field for disordered passions, and a cradle for the political sects whose suspicions and animosities they helped to disseminate.

Elated by the successes of the "five days," the Milanese believed that they had conquered Austria. Tbe prolongation of the Provisional Government, while it flattered the self-love of Milan, did not equally satisfy the other provinces ; it was composed of men unused to state affairs, some of whom were remarkable for exaggerated opinions, whilst others were better known for the conflict which they had maintained in the " Municipal Councils " or " Pro vincial Congregations " against Austrian oppressions ; and thus as the controlling power was wanting in compactness, it was necessarily weak and undecided in action. The Mazzinian sect, which had many partisans in tbe Lombard Universities, had therefore leisure to organise itself in Milan, and while pro claiming exclusive devotion to the cause of Italian unity and freedom, aspired nevertheless to arrive at power by means of a republic.

Meanwhile the insidious arts of vile and corrupt Austrian agents, never ceased to foment these elements of discord, produced perpetual tumults at Milan, and prevented the immediate union of Piedmont, which Charles Albert had unfortunately hesitated to insure on his first entry into Lombardy. A series of vacillations, mutual distrust, and scandals, rendered this union unpopular among the majority of the Lombards, so that when finally called to give their vote for the fusion, they were indifferent to it, or but little dis posed to support a measure, which was presented to them under such unfavourable auspices. Hence it was also, that Lombardy, notwithstanding great and laudable sacrifices in men and money, never furnished really efficient aid to the Piedmontese army ; and to these sources may be traced the atrocious calumnies which were directed against that army and its magnanimous king.

In the meanwhile the Genoese members of the Turin ministry, carried away by a wild ambition of territorial aggrandisement, and by fantastic schemes of Italian unity, were far from inspiring the other states and princes of Italy with confidence ; they never indeed really desired to enter into a league with them, and to this they were still more averse, when the early successes of the war seemed to hold out a hope of their being able to realise their projects. Thus the foreign policy of that ministry may be reckoned among the causes of our greatest cala mities. In 1847 Italy was advancing in the path of gradual reforms, and in the formation of a commercial and political league between the different states of the Peninsula; in the early months of 1848 she was precipitated into a great political revolution, and into a war with Austria ; the enormous disproportion which exists between the events of these two periods, extends to the means which she possessed for bringing them to a favourable issue.

Insufficient military forces, without a commander of genius ; — governments not even allied to each other by a formal treaty, actuated, henceforward, by the ambitions, jealousies and interests of their individual states, more than by the desire of ensuring the triumph of a cause, in which they could not easily measure their own particular advantage ; — popular passions run wild in the midst of newly acquired and but slightly guarded liberties, offering, therefore, a free field for the manœuvres of all classes of republicans, encouraged as these were, by the example and influence of France : such were the conditions in which Italy was placed in the middle of 1848, when the war with Austria was at its height, and which led to the fatal result, inevitable as it now appears to us, who can calmly consider all the circumstances which led to it.

Were there, then, no true, no just reasons for the Italian movement of 1847 ? Were the forces which animated that movement utterly powerless ? Was the whole of Europe labouring under some imagina tive illusion when it hailed the glorious spectacle of a free, independent Italy, rising in renovated life, led on by her princes, blessed by the Pontiff, and conse crated by the generous blood of so many heroes ? Nothing could be more ignorant, more false than such a supposition. The whole of Europe is aware that the necessity of political reforms had been felt in all the States of Italy, previous to the year 1847. Already had all the princes of Italy, more or less gloriously, more or less spontaneously, set out in tbe way of progress, encouraged by the counsels of the English and French governments ; and it would be neither the last nor least valid argument in confirmation of the necessity which impelled the Italian States to intro duce these reforms, that the Conclave of Cardinals had unanimously and unexpectedly elected Mastai as Pope, solely because he was believed not to be averse to progress, and to the spirit of the times.

In the municipal and provincial councils, in the universities, in the scientific congresses, in the agricultural meet ings, in the literature, in the periodical press, every where, one all-prevailing want was felt, was de manded by universal consent, — it was that of granting a larger and more suitable degree of freedom for the development of public opinion, and of admitting to a more or less direct action in the government, the representatives of those classes who, by their learn ing, wealth, virtues, and birth, seem naturally called upon to conduct the destinies of society, and with out whose support it has become impossible to govern with wisdom and justice. The number and power of the leaders of public opinion, formed at the school of the representative governments of England and France, had among us, as elsewhere, been gradually increasing; here, as elsewhere, their influence weighed upon the governments, inducing them to follow the example of other free nations, and to establish in the different Italian States such fundamental political institutions as were best adapted to each, being modi fied with a due regard to their several characteristic distinctions founded on their traditions, ancient habits, and geographical conformation.

We will not here repeat the well-known story of the extraordinary and unforeseen events which suc ceeded each other in 1848, threatening the overthrow of the greatest states in Europe. It is necessary, however, to recall to mind the manner in which at that time the Austrian government in Lombardy re pelled all attempts at reform in the provinces subject to its rule, repressed by brute force every throb of national sentiment, offended by gratuitous and inso lent provocations that Pontiff and prince who was then the polar star of Italy, and only seemed intent on deepening a hatred which Austria had constantly kept alive, and increased, and never by a single act had been either able or willing to diminish. The Italian leaders of reform in 1847 expected nothing from Austria except that she should leave a free in dependent action to the different governments in their internal relations with their respective popula tions ; and that she should not oppose herself to the granting of certain concessions, which the times had rendered inevitable, and which were demanded by the increased influence of civilised Europe.

For the sake of the general peace of Italy, these leaders were also desirous that Austria should undertake similar reforms in the Lombardo-Venetian Provinces, and that, entering with these provinces into the Italian family, she might, in as far only as her Italian pos sessions entitled her, have formed a part of that con federation, which appeared to them the easiest and wisest mode of promoting the interests of a great people, and of satisfying that sentiment of nationality which, far from being extinguished among us, is in delibly impressed on this people by their language, by their history, by the hand of God himself. This sentiment was aroused to redoubled strength by the breath of renewed freedom, and by the unjust pro vocations of foreign oppression ; none better than Austria herself can tell how dearly she has paid and still pays for the blind and obstinate resistance which was then opposed to the most moderate and reasonable desires.* In 1847, the liberal and moderate party of which we have defined the ten dencies, both as regards the internal political constitution of their country, and its nationality, was not a sect ; on the contrary, as in all other countries arrived at a certain degree of political maturity, it represented the most efficient, the most constant, the most vital force of society ; and as such its influence prevailed in the councils of state, in the municipal assemblies, in the literature, and in the public opinion of Italy.

Enlightened Europe applauded this revival imbued with old Italian wisdom, which seemed to have gone astray since the disasters of 1789. Religion lent its * See Appendix, Milan, Note B. beneficent aid to harmonise this political movement. Love for the Sovereigns, and respect for authority, regained fresh life from the pure source of public gratitude, and thus, without a single drop of blood shed, without a tear being wrung from a single eye, among the embraces of brotherly kindness, and uni versal charity, a pacific revolution was being accomplished in Italy, which would assuredly have raised her once more to her rank among the nations. Let us only recall to our minds the state of Europe in 1847, before it was unhappily shaken to the very foundations by the revolution of February, — let us refer to the official documents of England and France since published, — and we shall be obliged to confess the reality of the Italian movement, its prospect of successful issue, and the profound good sense which guided the men who promoted it.

The republican sects, the young Italy, the Italy one and independent, existed then, only in the dreams of exiles, in the fever of ambition, in the hallucina tions of an anti- Italian mysticism; and the natural good sense of our population, never suffered itself to be misled into this labyrinth of illusions. The leaders of Italian reforms, more sincerely devoted to the glory of their country, and more truly Italian than the exiles of London, understood then, as they still do, that our national sentiment is not a thing which requires to be created afresh ; that this sentiment had existed, and ever would continue to exist superior to any foreign domination which might seek to suffocate it. Far from believing that the political constitution of Italy should be grounded on the destruction of its provincial traditions, interests, and celebrities, by an unnatural and violent fusion, they considered, as they still do, that the constitution best adapted for Italy was that of a confederative organisation which would leave to the different allied States the liberty and power of developing separately, and of availing; themselves of the common forces better to secure the independence of each.

The leaders of Italian reform do not attempt to convert Italy into an imitation of France, either monarchical or republican ; they do not urge their country out of its natural course, with the view of forming one of those unwieldy and pernicious political concentrations which Europe on all sides is seeking to dissolve ; but on the contrary they desire its progress and consolidation in that way for which Providence has in a peculiar manner adapted it. They know that the sentiment of Italian nationality is not confined to the possession of imposing military forces, of a vast administrative centralisa tion, or of an uniform political individuality, but on the contrary, that it is eternally founded on the proud consciousness of the civilisation which Italy has more than once created and diffused over the whole world, on her undisputed and indestructible supremacy of genius, and on her unrivalled standing in art, science, and letters.

What influence the republican movements, the appeals to the populace, and the Constituent Assem blies, have had in the conflict with Austria, has been already shown by events : and when partisans of particular political sects attempt to prove that the forces brought into action were rendered inefficient by the indifference of the moderate party, or by the bad faith of the Sovereigns who undertook the war, their assertions only show their entire ignorance of the people whose cause they pretend to espouse ; they deceive themselves, and not a few of them deceive others. No one in their senses could attribute the catastrophe of February, the revolution of Vienna, or the commotions of the whole of Germany, to the Italian governments of 1847, and to the moderate party which public opinion had called to the direction of Italian affairs in the early months of 1848.* * The constitution of Naples was granted the 29th of Jan., 1848; that of Sardinia 5th of Feb., 1848; of Tuscany, 17th of Feb., 1848; of Rome, 14th March, 1848.

C When, in that almost universal disorder, which menaced the very existence of the Austrian Empire, the Lombards rose in arms, hailing the propitious moment for shaking off a yoke become doubly in supportable from the blind opposition of the govern ment to those reforms which had been conceded to the other Italian provinces ; when, in consequence of the revolution of Milan, the whole of Italy flocked to the succour of that province, and united in making war with Austria, the rest of Europe justly laid the responsibility of that struggle on Austria itself, which for thirty-two years had laboured to procure the hatred of Italians, * — and not on the liberal party of Italy, which, preoccupied with the internal organisation of the country, and not fully prepared to enter the lists with so powerful an enemy, would willingly have avoided, or at least postponed, the rupture.

Austria, then, having by a long series of insults and provoca tions flung down the gauntlet of defiance to all the friends of constitutional freedom throughout the world, surely no arguments are required to prove that, on our part, the reasons for undertaking the war were just ; and, at any rate, events have shown that the moment for declaring it was favourable. The forces which on the first impulse the Italians brought into the field, were not insufficient ; it was not the greater bravery or skill of the Austrians, who were then flying in confusion from Milan, that prevented the strongest fortress of Lombardy * from falling into our hands, but a fatal concurrence of circum stances, which no forethought or experience could have averted : two or three times during the campaign of 1848, decisive victory was wanting to the Italian arms from accidental causes which prove neither science nor military superiority in the conquerors ; and it was the consciousness of this which induced the cabinet of Vienna to offer the largest conditions of peace, and that more than once, during the early part of the campaign.

While reverting to the unequal warfare in which Italy was then engaged, it cannot be forgotten that republican France, which this time, also, had in terrupted and misled our pacific renovation, could find no other opportunity for exerting its powerful influence in our behalf during the war, than, after the defeat of Charles Albert, that of re-establishing in Rome the ecclesiastical government, which was the worst and the most detested of all the governments that had existed previously to the year 1847. The French republic, — which stirred up at Milan the * See Appendix, Milan. Note B. c popular aversion to the king of Piedmont, and con stantly opposed the formation of the kingdoms of Upper Italy, — which fomented disunion at Venice, — which refused in September 1848 to grant the succour requested by Pius IX., — which might have prevented the dissolution of Central Italy, and would possibly have changed the fortune of the second campaign, — that same republic (posterity will scarcely believe it ! ) came beneath the walls of Rome to ex tinguish tbe last breath of that Italian freedom, which its influence alone had perverted and cor rupted.

The profound subversion of political principles generated by the blasting influence of the French revolution, the Pope's fatal desertion of the national cause, and the defeat of the royal army, were events unhappily connected with each other, which, by arrest ing the Italian movement of reform, laid bare the already bleeding bosom of Italy to the attacks of furious demagogues, and to the empoisoned darts of suspicion, of sectarian animosity, and of freshly awakened municipal jealousies. The liberal and moderate party, overcome by events for which they were in nowise responsible, weighed down by the disasters of the Italian arms, and not yet internally organised, neither having had the time or quiet necessary for founding the new political edifice, were here, as elsewhere, driven out of the field by ambitious and unprincipled agitators, by men who, but for the accumulated calamities of the country, would never, we may believe, have ventured to brave the opinion of the public.

The great masses of the population, taken as it were by surprise, remained inert spectators of these changes, and placed no confidence in these governments, as suddenly as unexpectedly called into being, and which were directed by unexperienced leaders, of loose morals and irreligious principles, and prepared for the management of public affairs in the clandes tine haunts of conspiracy, or among the illusions of prolonged exile. In short, the democratical go vernments gave real satisfaction to none but the retrogrades, who hailed them as forerunners of Austrian restoration ; their internal administration was defective and injurious ; they completely ex hausted the finances, did nothing for the national wai-, and converted the enthusiasm and sympathy of other great nations for Italy into pity or contempt.

Until conquered by Austria at Novara, by France at Rome, and overturned by popular indignation at Florence, they proved, by the sad experience of those c who were their willing or unwilling victims, that they had done nothing during their short reign but increase the agitation of the public mind, add fuel to the jealousies, suspicions, and animosities of party spirit, rivet the chains of Italy with fresh foreign oppressions, and render the work of Italian regeneration slower and more laborious. We trust that these few observations will have shown the reasonableness and justice with which tbe leaders of the liberal party acted in 1847, when they undertook tbe political reforms imperiously demanded by public opinion, conceded by the sovereigns of Italy, and sanctioned by the example of the Pontiff: we have also shown how, from causes independent of this party, superior to the forces at its disposal, and contrary to its desires, the Italian movement was thrown into the bands of demagogues, and lost the support of the princes, the approval of the Church, and the sympathies of civilised Europe.