The History of the Navy of the United States of America

Front matter

COIMODOM Lotidon, TuJiUjhed. by fi..Bcndey. 1S3$. THE HISTORY OF THE NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. BY J. FENIMORE COOPER, ESQ. & AUTHOR OF " THE PILOT," " THE RED ROVER," " THE WATER WITCH," &C. IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. I. LONDON: RICHARD BENTLEY, NEW BURLINGTON STREET, in ©rUmarg to P?cr JtJajcjstg. 1839. THIS WORK, AN IMPERFECT RECORD OF THE SERVICES, PRIVATIONS, HAZARDS, AND SUFFERINGS OF THEMSELVES AND THEIR PREDECESSORS, IS OFFERED, AS A TRIBUTE OF PROFOUND RESPECT, TO THE OFFICERS OF THE NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES INTLI'DING THOSE OF THE MARINE CORPS, BY ONE, WHO IS FULLY SENSIBLE OF ALL THEIR CLAIM8 ON THE REPUBLIC FOR GRATITUDE AND PROTECTION.

Preface

. While biographies of naval men are usually replete with interest, on account of the hazards and stirring incidents of the sea, few general records of nautical events have been found to attract attention, beyond the value that is attached to naked facts. If such has been the case with most of the histories of even the marine of Great Britain, a service that admits of the unity and interest belonging to the operations of fleets, still more may it be looked for in the records of the isolated and simpler incidents of a navy like that of the United States. The difficulty of overcoming this great obstacle has been foreseen from the commencement of this Work, and some attempts, that are connected with the arrangements of the subject, have been made to obviate it. The writer is far from flattering himself with entire success, for a history of detached combats is, in truth, a series of VI

PREFACE.

. episodes, the mind scarcely becoming concentrated on one, when it is required to give its attention to another, while the connecting materials, according to the ordinary practice, are merely a dry detail of documents. In order to overcome, in some measure, this be setting difficulty, as little reference as possible is made to documents, in the body of the Work. The first, and great desideratum of history, is truth ; the second, just reflections on it. If the difficulty of obtaining truth for the more important leading events of the world be universally admitted, this difficulty is increased when the subject, by its essential character, requires an infinity of detail. Battles, whether by sea or land, are never seen by the contending parties from the same point of view, and their descriptions are usually more conflicting than any other portions of history.

Of course, a Work that contains little more than a narrative of combats, is peculiarly liable to errors. Great anxiety has been felt to remove, as much as possible, this objection from the present book ; and, while some mistakes doubtless exist, the writer trusts his honest endeavours have not been altogether useless. That there are many omissions is highly probable, but in no instance can he reproach himself with the commission of intentional faults of any kind. Authorities being of so much moment to the

PREFACE.

. VII historian, it was intended to quote them, but it was soon found that it would require nearly as much room to cite these names, and all the minute circumstances by means of which information has been gleaned, as to relate the events themselves. It is hoped that the best authorities have been consulted, and many officers of the highest rank and reputation have consented to add their oral information to that which was to be obtained from official reports, public documents, and other sources. To the officers above alluded to, the writer wishes to make his public acknowledgments, for the liberality, patience, and clearness with which they have favoured him with their explanations. Witnesses of what they have related, their accounts have been given with a caution, modesty, and fairness that lend a double value to their authority.

Much liberal assistance has also been received from the Department, and from the eminent citizen at its head. To James E. De Kay, M.D., the writer is under peculiar obligations, for the friendly and handsome manner in which he put at the disposal of the latter many notes taken with care, which have proved of the greatest service in the course of the investigations. To the library of the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia, the writer is equally indebted for much valuable and interesting matter, and he would be wanting in sensi-

PREFACE.

. bility were he not publicly to express his gratitude for the generous manner in which its stores of information have been thrown open to him. To the City Library of Philadelphia, also, though established on a principle that allowed him more claim to ask for aid, he is under great obligations, its shelves usually supplying the required authorities when other sources have failed. He desires also to mention his obligations to the Naval Chronicle of Mr. Goldsborough , in which book he has found much accurate and useful matter. Some of the greatest writers of the age have im paired the dignity of their works, by permitting the peculiarities of style that have embellished their lighter labours, to lessen the severity of manner that more properly distinguishes narratives of truth. This danger has been foreseen in the present instance, though the nature of the subject, which seldom rises to the level of general history, offers a constant temptation to offend.

A middle course has been adopted, which it is hoped, while some defects of execution may probably be detected, will be found on the whole to be suited to a recital of facts, in the familiar form that, in a measure, the incidents have demanded. Without some concessions to details, sufficient interest could not have been secured. It will be seen that some vessels are rated in this work differently from what the public has been accus-

PREFACE.

. IX tomed to consider accurate. Every mode of rating is liable to some objections, and nothing is more fal lacious than to estimate the power of a ship by the number of her guns. Two great elements of force enter into the composition of a vessel of war: the ability to annoy, and the ability to endure. A ship of one thousand tons burthen, armed with one heavy gun, might resist for a long time a dozen vessels of thirty tons, each armed with the same species of gun. This advantage would arise from the greater ability of the large vessel to endure. On the other hand, the same ship, armed with one heavy gun, would probably capture a similar vessel armed with twenty very light guns, her ability to annoy being the greatest. A thirty-two, according to the old mode of rating, carries twenty-six twelves on her gun-deck, and a thirty-six carries twenty-six eighteens on her gun-deck, both vessels often possessing the same armaments on their quarter-decks and forecastles.

Here are two ships of the same number of guns, but of very unequal force, the one being a twelve-pounder frigate, and the other an eighteen-pounder frigate. With a view to give an accurate idea of comparative forces, the old English mode of rating has been carried through the American navy in this Work, in order to make one vessel properly compare with another. Thus the New York frigate was properly called a thirty-six, while the Adams was X

PREFACE.

. improperly called a thirty-two, her true rate having been that of a twenty-eight, &c. Some apparent discrepancies, however, will be seen in this book. The Enterprise, for instance, is at first called a twelve, and subsequently a fourteen. The difference is owing to alterations in the piercing of the vessel, and in the nature of her armament, as this schooner underwent repairs. Other small vessels were similarly altered. With these few explanations, a task that has long been meditated, but which, after all, has been hurriedly accomplished, is submitted to the world, with quite as much apprehension as hope. May, 1839.

Introduction

. As, in a single life, man passes through the several stages of his physical and moral existence from in fancy to age, so will the American of the present gene ration witness the advance of his country, from the feeblenesss, doubt, and caution of a state of conscious weakness, to the healthfulness and vigour of strength. So rapid, however, have been the transitions, that opinion has not kept pace with the facts of the coun try. Thus it is, that even American statesmen rea son on the policy of the republic, after the man ner of their youth, in apparent ignorance of all the important changes that have occurred within the last forty years ; for, to adapt the argument to the level of circumstances, in a country like America, requires a mind of incessant activity, and one accustomed to reason in advance, rather than in the rear of events.

In no great interest connected with the welfare of the United States are these truths more apparent, than in all that relates to the Navy. While those who have

INTRODUCTION.

. XII reflected have clearly foreseen that the republic must assert its place in the scale of nations, defend its territory, and maintain its rights, principally by means of a powerful marine, all are compelled to acknowledge that the growth of this branch of the public service has been slow, uncertain, and marked by a policy as timid as it has been fluctuating. Three several times did the national legislature authorise the construction of vessels of force, before they were built ; and they were finally put into the water at a period when they could not be rendered available against an enemy. Thirty years since, the opinion that there was some thing unsuited to American policy in the employment of two-decked ships, appears to have been as general in the country as it was erroneous. Because the na tion had recently been too feeble to employ agencies that implied so much force, it was secretly fancied that the obstacles were permanent.

In other words, opinion had not kept an even pace with facts. It has long been confessed that America possessed every qualification for the creation of a powerful navy, but men and money. The necessary skill, the re quired aptitude for sea service, and the other requisites, have always been admitted ; but it has been asserted that neither the finances nor the population would allow of the drain on their resoures that is unavoidably connected with a strong marine. The two defi ciencies, if they actually existed, would certainly be fatal. In the years 1812, 1813, and 1814, the republic of the United States expended considerably more

INTRODUCTION.

. XIII than 50,000,000 dollars on its current military ope rations, without reference to the large sums that were subsequently paid on the same account. This war lasted but two years and eight months, and during the first season its operations were very limited. Thus 30,000,000 dollars more were paid on account of military charges, in the two years of peace that immediately succeeded, making a total of 80,000,000. It is known that even this large sum falls materially short of the truth. During the same five years, the money expended on the Navy amounted to only 30,000,000 dollars, although the peculiar nature of the service on the lakes involved an enormous and an unusual expenditure, and a war with Algiers occurred, during which the country maintained afloat a much larger force than it had ever previously employed.

In addition, the greatest part of this expenditure was the cost of new constructions. It follows, that America expended nearly two dollars on her army, and its military operations, in the war of 1812, for every dollar expended on her navy, including the expense of building most of the costly vessels of the service. Had the fact been precisely reversed, it is probable that the proportions required by true policy would have been better observed, and there can be but little doubt that the country would have reaped the advantage ; for no serious invasion of America will ever be attempted in the face of a strong fleet, after the country shall be provided with docks and arsenals, by means of which accidental reverses can be remedied. By dividing the large sum expended on the army and navy, be-

INTRODUCTION.

. XIV tween the years 1812 and 1816, inclusively, 40,000,000 dollars would have fallen to the share of each branch of the service, which would have given 8,000,000 dollars a year to the navy. This sum would be amply sufficient to maintain a force of twenty sail of the line, with a suitable number of small vessels to cruise in company. Against such a fleet no European could have attempted an invasion of a coast so distant from its own resources. This is an outline of the facts of 1812. Those of the present day in no degree impair the principle, though the introduction of steam may modify its application. Nor can it be objected that these state ments are liable to the deductions which practice is usually found to make in estimates, since they are, in truth, results and not premises. The only departure from a known fact, is to transfer a portion of the actual current expenditure of the country, a quarter of a century since, from one branch of its public service to another.

It may be taken as a rule, that wherever there is money, men will not be wanting. But the govern ment of the United States has never resorted to the most obvious means of manning a large marine. Until the effort shall be properly made, it is weak to assume the impossibility of the measure. The num ber of actual seamen necessary in a large ship is much smaller than is commonly supposed, and it is probable that there was not a moment, during the year 1814, when the public and private armed vessels of the country did not contain people enough of all

INTRODUCTION.

. XV sorts, with a proper addition of landsmen, to man a fleet of sufficient strength to have swept the Ame rican seas. The impressed American seamen, who were put into the prisons of England after the declaration of war in 1812, would of themselves have furnished nearly all the petty officers and seamen of ten sail of the line ; and had only those ten sail of the line existed a few years previously, it is probable that not one of these men would have been the subject of the out rage by which he was deprived of liberty. Whenever the government of the United States shall be engaged in a war with any great naval power, and shall see fit to withhold commissions from privateers, granting, at the same time, the proceeds of all prizes to the officers and men of their public cruisers, it will be found that adventurers will not be wanting.

In the contest of 1812 the vessels of war were directed to destroy the ships they took, because the enemy was known so closely to infest the coast, that it was almost impossible to get a prize in, whereas a strong force would put an end to all sorts of blockades. Most of the prizes taken by Capt. Porter in the Pacific, and which made the attempt to get to America, tra versed the immense distance between Valparaiso, or the Marquesas, and the American coast, in safety, to fall into the hands of their enemy, when a few days' or a few hours' run from port. It should be remembered, that in political measures, as in all other interests of life, weakness is the parent of misfortune, while the results of energy and force are in an arithmetical proportion to their means. There can be no

INTRODUCTION.

. reasoning more unsound, than to assume that the con sequences of a defective policy are to be taken as the premises of a wise policy. A careful review of these facts and principles must satisfy all who study the subject, that the United States of America have never resorted to the means necessary to develope, or even, in a limited sense, to employ, their own naval resources. As a consequence, they have never yet enjoyed the advantage of possessing a powerful marine in a time of war, nor have felt its influence in sustaining their negotia tions, and in supporting their national rights, in a time of peace. Hitherto, the ships of America have done little more than show the world what the republic might do with its energies duly directed, and its resources properly developed, by demonstrating the national aptitude for this species of warfare.

But the probationary period of the American marine is passing away, and the body of the people are begin ning to look forward to the appearance of their fleets on the ocean. It is no longer thought there is an unfitness in the republic's possessing heavy ships ; and the opinion of the country, in this as in othenrespects, is slowly rising to the level of its wants. Still many lingering prejudices remain in the public mind, in connexion with this all-important subject, and some that threaten the service with serious injury. Of these the most prominent are, the mode in which the active vessels are employed ; a neglect of the means of cre ating seamen for the public service ; the fact that there is no force in commission on the American

INTRODUCTION.

. XVII coast ; the substitution of money for pride and self respect, as the aim of military men ; and the im pairing of discipline and lessening the deference for the justice of the state, by the denial of rank. Under the present system of employing the public vessels, none of the peculiar experience that belongs to the higher objects of the profession is obtained. While ships may be likened to regiments, as regards the necessity of manœuvring together, there is one important feature in which they are totally dissimilar. It may be pretty safely thought that one disciplined regiment will march as far, endure as much, and occupy its station as certainly as another, but no such calculation can be made on ships. The latter are machines, and their qualities may be improved by human ingenuity, when their imperfections have been ascertained by experiment.

Intelligent comparisons are the first step in this species of improvement. It will be clear to the dullest mind, that the evolutions of a fleet, and, in a greater or less degree, its success, must be dependent on the qualities of its poorest vessels ; since its best cannot abandon their less fortunate consorts to the enemy. The naval his tory of the world abounds with instances, in which the efforts of the first sea captains of their respective ages have been frustrated by the defects of a portion of the ships under their command. To keep a number of vessels in compact order, to cause them to preserve their weatherly position in gales and adverse winds, and to bring them all as near as possible up to the standard that shall be formed by the most judicious vol. i. h

INTRODUCTION.

. and careful commander, is one of the highest aims of naval experience. On the success of such efforts depend the results of naval evolutions more frequently than on any dexterity in fighting guns. An efficient fleet can no more be formed without practice in squadrons, than an efficient army without evolutions in brigades. By not keeping ships in squadrons, there will also be less emulation, and consequently less improvement. Under the present system, three principal stations are maintained ; two in the Atlantic, and one in the Mediterranean. On neither of these stations would the presence of a vessel larger than a sloop of war be necessary on ordinary occasions, provided a force of heavy ships could periodically and unexpectedly appear on all. It is seldom that a single ship of the line is required on any service, and it is certain that a solitary two-decked vessel could have no great in fluence on those important interests which it is the practice of the rest of Christendom to refer to the agencies of fleets.

By putting in commission six or eight two-decked ships, and by causing them to appear, from time to time, on all the more important stations this side of the two great southern capes, the country, at no material additional cost, would obtain the several objects of practice in fleets, of comparative trials of the qualities of the most important class of vessels in the navy, of a higher state of discipline, and of a vast im prevement in the habits of subordination on the part of commanders, a defect that all experience shows is peculiar to the desultory mode of service now in use

INTRODUCTION.

. XIX and which has produced more naval disasters in the world, than probably any other one cause. In a word, the principal ends of a navy can no more be obtained by the services of single ships, than wars can be de cided by armies cut up into battalions. Small vessels are as indispensable for lower schools of practice, as company drills in an army ; but squadrons alone can produce the highest class of officers, the steadiest discipline, or the desired objects. In addition to this neglect of accustoming the ser vice to the use of the particular sort of force necessary to render a marine effective for great ends, the history of the world cannot probably supply a parallel to that forgetfulness which the American government has manifested of all the known incentives of human exertions, in the management of the navy.

A portion of the inducements, that, under other forms of government, are freely used for this purpose, under a system like that of the United States, are necessarily with held, as they are believed to be opposed to the govern ing principles of the institutions. To this class of incentives belong-- all those rewards that are connected with personal and hereditary social rank. That the jiower to confer honours of this nature, is a vast in crease to the influence of a government, is incontro vertible ; and in discarding it for objects that are thought to be of still greater importance, the utmost care should be taken not to neglect its substitutes. The man who, refusing to adopt remedies that he believes unsuited to his constitution, is discreet, be comes careless and culpable when he carries his sysb2

INTRODUCTION.

. XX tem so far as to forget to look for others to supply their places. Next to personal reputation, military rank is the highest stimulus of a military life. Its possession enters into all the day-dreams of the young aspirant for fame and honours, is inseparable from self-respect, and is indissolubly connected with discipline. With these indisputable truths in full view, they who have had the care of graduating and regulating this im portant interest, for the American marine, have simply selected that part of the system of the mother country that did not conflict with popular institutions, without adverting to its fitness for the peculiar state of things to which it was to be applied. This was like rejecting the heart of the fruit because it was unhealthy, and carefully preserving the rind.

But a few explanations will render our meaning more clear. The nature of the English government is no secret. A territorial aristocracy, promotion, in both the army and the navy, is the inevitable fruit of favour, or of personal power. In the army, the mode of purchasino rank has been adopted, by means of which the affluent are at all times enabled to secure the most desirable stations for their children ; but, professional knowledge being indispensable to a sea-officer, a different plan was introduced into the marine. According to this system, the name of a boy was entered on the books of a ship, and after he had been thus rated a certain num ber of years, it was competent for the admiralty to raise him, at pleasure, as high as the rank of captain when his career became more regular. As this rank

INTRODUCTION.

. XXI of captain, however, afforded most of the opportunities for acquiring reputation and money, it was the first great object of all aspirants, and it suited the policy of such a form of government to make the inter mediate steps, between the condition of probation, and that when the officer obtained his permanent relative rank for life, as few as possible. Thus were found in the British navy but two commissions between the midshipman and the captain ; that of a lieutenant, and that of a master and commander. When the narrow political system under which these probationary ranks were established was in full activity, the sons of men of influence often passed through the stations of lieutenant and master commandant in two or three years. Nothing was more common than to find captains in command of frigates, who had served but eight or ten vears in the navy, with lieutenants to take care of their ships, who had passed double the time under that one commission alone.

Although this system, so far as the regulation of the ranks is concerned, was adopted entire into the American service, nothing can be more unsuited to our state of society, to policy, and to the actual wants of the navy. For many years, all the promotions of the American marine were limited to three ! Even at this day, with full experience of the evils of a system of incentives so meagre, and of a concentration of rank so destructive of self-respect and discipline, the life of the American naval officer is cheered by only four promotions, two of which are little more than the changes that nature herself demands, by transferring

INTRODUCTION.

. XXII the officer from the duty of a boy, to duty more be coming a man. He who lives without the inspiriting view of prefer ment constantly before his eyes, literally lives without hope, and necessarily without ambition. It is a sin gular fact, that in a country where so many social consequences of the last importance are justly traced to the elasticity of a hope of advancement that is de nied to no American, this cruel neglect should have been manifested to the interests and character of a branch of the public service which all admit to be of the last importance. As events are stronger than the human will, the evil consequences of this indifference to the feelings and rights of the navy are easily to be traced ; facts having forced from the government sub stitutes for the legitimate incentives of military life, that are dangerous to the military character.

Money has been made to supply the place of ambition, and a new pay-bill is thought to be a sufficient corrective of all the evils of a great moral neglect, and of a most crying injustice ! It is time that America began to think for herself on a subject as important as that of her marine, and to frame a system of discipline and incentives, of re sources and practice, better suited to her political, so cial, and moral condition, than the factitious and ex clusive state of things which has so long served her for a model. Personal influence availing nothing in procuring promotion in the American marine, all its officers are obliged to pass through the same stages of probationary service, and, with the exception of the

INTRODUCTION.

. XXIII cases in which the expediency of rewarding success prevails, each individual is compelled to pass an equal portion of his life in the same rank. A wise policy would impress the government with the importance of adding as many stimulants to this period of professional life as comport with convenience ; but an ex amination of facts will show that, while practice has exacted concessions to necessity, the opportunity of adding the incentives of promotion has been strangely neglected. Thus it is that we find the lower ranks of the service separated in practice, by stations un known to the laws, while the commission is withheld from the individual who temporarily performs the duty. It is not easy fully to impress on the minds of civi lians the immense results that are dependent on a due division of military rank.

The commission, which re presents the power of the state, in a short time becomes the substitute for personal qualities, and produces that prompt and nearly passive obedience which are in dispensable to the success of military movements. The common man, or the officer, who at any moment is required to risk his life under the orders of another, has need to strengthen his habits of submission by all the auxiliaries which human ingenuity can devise, without injustice. To prevent a resort to abject dread, nations have introduced the substitute of respect. Equa lity of rank is uniformly destructive of subordination, and it should be one of the aims of a wise adminis tration of the navy, to place in the ship as many dif ferent grades of officers as may comport with sim-

INTRODUCTION.

. XXIV plicity and convenience. A regiment has always six, and sometimes seven distinct classes of commissioned officers, in its fighting department ; and there is no reason why a ship should not be equally well protected against the evils of insubordination, though it is usual to limit the number to three. The moral effect of a frequent recurrence of pro motions, also, is incalculable. Each step is an incen tive to exertion and improvement, and a corrector of habits. When young men, in particular, are con demned to pass fifteen or twenty years in the same rank, the spirit grows weary, the character loses its elasticity, the ambition is deadened, and the duty that, with a proper attention to these details, might be rendered attractive, becomes monotonous and discou raging. By minute divisions of rank, those personal sensibilities which are apt to seek relief in personal quarrels, are assuaged by the habitual deference that is paid to the commission.