A Military View of Recent Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland ... With maps

Front matter

RECENT CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND. a London-Published by Smith Elder L C° 65 . Cammll A MILITARY VIEW OP RECENT CAMPAIGNS IX VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND. BY Capt. C. C. CHESNEY, R.E., PROFESSOR OF MILITARY HISTORY, SANDHURST COLLEGE WITH MAPS. LONDON: SMITH, ELDER AND CO., 65, COKNHILL. M.DCCC.LXIII. [ Tlie right os Translation is reserved.] H.E.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE. UNDER WHOSE DIRECTION THE iTUDY OF MILITARY HISTORY HAS FIRST BEEN ŒTB INTO THE EDUCATION" OF THE BRITISH OFFTCEF. THIS LITTLE WORK IB WITH HIS EOYAL HIGHNESS's GRACIOUS I MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED BY THE AUTHOR " CONTENTS. CHAP. PAGE I. The Theatre of War _ 1 IL The Armies aud their Leaders 13 Isl. M'Clellan's Advance on Richmond by the Peninsula 22 IV. Retreat op M'Clellan 59 V. Pope's Campaign in Virginia 76 VI. The Invasion of Maryland and Fall of Harper's Ferry 101 VII.

Battle of Antietam. — Lee retreats into Vir ginia 1 1 ~ VIIL The Fourth Invasion of Virginia. — M'Cllllan superseded 138 IX. Burnside's Change of Base 158 X. Fredericksburg _ 170 Postscript. — Chancellorsville 198 b

Introduction

. This book is not offered to the Public as a complete history of the campaigns of which it treats. The Author would consider the task of composing such a work to be greatly beyond his powers, even were it possible for him to have gathered already the neces sary material. But there is a peculiarity accompanying the whole progress of the American civil war, which enables it to be discussed in a way that no other such contest has been. For every phase of its greater events — at least of those occurring near the two capitals — has been witnessed and described by numerous observers of different nations, and of every class of opinion. And it is believed to be possible, whilst the subject is yet of present interest, to collect from existing sources such a narrative as shall put before the general reader all the really important matter, without wearying him

INTRODUCTION.

. X with unnecessary details concerning unknown per sonages and doubtful events. For this purpose, research has been made into numerous periodicals of France, England, Germany, and America, for the accounts given by eye-witnesses of the different operations here treated of. The Author has endeavoured to eliminate from these with care the colouring given by the passion of the day, or by extravagance of writing; so as to produce some thing as nearly approaching to a reliable history as the means afford. Such sourcesmust necessarily abound in errors, but these he hopes will be here found corrected : for he has been favoured with numerous private communications from persons who have been spectators of portions of the war, or have had relatives actively engaged in it. He has also, by the kindness of some of them, had access to valuable correspondence bearing on its leading features down to the end of 1862.

In the last section — that on the operations in April and May, 1863, which has been written since the former portion went to the press — there has of necessity not been sufficient time to make the same close inquiries as to less certain points. The Author requests that this circumstance may be admitted as an apology for any minor inaccuracy that may

INTRODUCTION.

. XI be found in it : and he would take this opportunity of expressing his sincere thanks to the friends who have given him their help in gathering the mate rials for this, and assisted him essentially in pre paring the former chapters. The account here offered of M'Clellan's peninsular campaign is based upon the well-known and highly interesting work attributed to the French Princes. But that work leans (as is most natural) to the Federal side somewhat too strongly. The Author has had the advantage of correcting it in certain parts from the details furnished him by a friend, who went through all the same scenes as an im partial observer. He has also consulted some Con federate sources not available when the French account was written. In reviewing the conduct of the different generals, under particular circumstances, it has been endea voured to avoid all mere theorizing, and to support the remarks made upon them by illustrations drawn from the behaviour, under like conditions, of re cognized masters of the military art.

Without some such attempt to form a judgment, it is believed no critical account of any modern cam paign would be of much value to the non -professional reader.

INTRODUCTION.

. It is hoped that the accompanying sketches may enable any one, who is not provided with a better map, to follow the leading operations step by step. They have been prepared solely with reference to the work, and, for the purpose of clearness, all features of the country, but those actually needful, have been omitted. RECENT CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND.

Chapter I. The Theatre Of War

The inquiring reader of military history will usually find most pleasure and profit in studying campaigns and battles conducted by the great masters of the art of war. In their achievements he may trace not only the great principles of the art itself, but also see how wonderfully natural genius and matured judgment have varied their application under different circumstances. To follow closely the strategy of Napoleon — to trace out the tactical details of the battles of Hannibal — not only adds to our stock of knowledge, and exercises our critical powers ; but it gratifies, as we rise to fuller comprehension of the workings of those great intellects, that craving for fit objects for hero-worship which is among the most universal of the passions our nature feels. Yet there is no great operation of war but carries its lessons with it ; and the last year's struggle around Richmond and Washington, even with our present imperfect knowledge of its details, presents an interesting subject for reflection.

The almost constant reverses of the Northern army must have had their corresponding causes, we may safely assert. Nor are these far to seek : for we find on their side a divided command opposed to unity of action ; masses of men in arms, without military esprit or discipline, meeting an army entitled to the name, by the subordinate spirit, as well as by the valour, of its soldiers ; loud threats and idle bluster, encountered by calm firmness and steadfast endurance ; finally, a contempt for the principles of war on the one hand, against a marked use of them on the other. This contempt, as will be hereafter seen, was loudly avowed by one of the Federal commanders as the true course to act upon : and it is interesting to observe that he soon found a practical application of those principles by bis oppo nent, was the means of ruining himself, and driving his army in disgrace to take refuge behind the in trenchments of Washington, there to seek some more competent and less boastful leader.

A clear and succinct account of the opening of the American war, and the first operations, — those in Virginia being confined chiefly to the disastrous battle of Bull's Run, and the total repulse of the first advance of the Northerners on Richmond — was given to the public in a lecture delivered at the United Service Institution by Major Miller, V.C., and since published, both in the proceedings of the Institution and separately. To this the reader is referred for the details of that part of the conflict. For the purpose of making our narrative clear, let us discard from our view the numerous mixed expedi tions on the inland waters and on various parts of the Southern coast, as well as the guerilla warfare of the Border States, and the more important, yet desultory, struggle waged by the armies on the borders of Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi ; and keep our attention on the operations conducted for the attack and defence of the Southern capital, which have been of the most vital interest as concerns the prospects of the Confederacy, and have chiefly attracted the notice of European observers.

The three objects originally laid out for the Northern forces to achieve, being, as is now well known, (1) to blockade the sea coast of the Confede racy and prevent trade ; (2) to open and keep com mand of the navigation of the Western rivers ; and (3) to drive the Southern Government from its chosen seat at Richmond; and the two former having been in great part accomplished, it is the object of the present narrative to show why the Federals had, up to the end of 1862, made no more progress in the one remaining than on the unlucky day of July, 1861, when they were first advancing from Washington, under the command of M'Dowall, against the position of Manasses. The theatre of that part of the war we have to follow should be examined with some attention. It lies between the Atlantic and the Alleghany Moun tains, a steep chain rising to the height of 4,000 feet ; and which, after roughly dividing North Carolina from Tennessee, enters Virginia, and passes through that old and historic state, forming a rugged backbone to it, crossed by a few very bad roads only, so that the two sections of the State are completely separated.

Thence the chain is continued through a narrow part of the border State of Maryland, and loses itself in Pennsylvania. The division of Eastern and Western Virginia is not more complete geographically than it is in social and political feebng, for the majority of the inhabitants of the latter section, a race of com paratively recent settlers, incline to the cause of the North ; whilst East Virginia, with which we have had to deal, is known as the very heart of the aristocratic element of the Southern States. But these two sections, taken strictly, do not comprise the whole of Virginia. Parallel to the Alleghanies, at a distance of about sixty miles to the east, run the Blue Moun tains, a similar but lesser chain. The long valley enclosed by these two ranges, and drained by the river Shenandoah, is remarkable for its picturesque beauty, being much broken by lesser ridges, and was, until war brought ruin on its thriving farmers, as noted for its agricultural wealth.

The inhabitants, descended from emigrants of an early date, have shown throughout the struggle a strong sympathy for the Southern cause. Eastern Virginia is separated from Maryland by that important river the Potomac, which, descending from the Alleghanies, and flowing in a generally south-eastern direction, separates the Blue Moun tains from their continuation in Maryland and Penn sylvania, known as the South Mountain, and finally loses itself in the waters of Chesapeake Bay. On its way it receives the Shenandoah at Harper's Ferry, and a number of other much less important streams from the Virginia side, one of the last being the famous Bull's Run, or Occocquan. The Shenandoah, it should be remarked, is of con siderable size through much of its course, and, as it flows between deep banks, and from the nature of the country round it is liable to sudden and violent floods, it forms a very serious obstacle to an army operating across the valley.

Many tributaries reach the Potomac from the Maryland side : the most im portant of these for us to note being the Monocacy, which passes by Frederic City, the capital of the State ; and Antietam Creek, now of such historic note. Both of these rise in the hilly district of central Pennsylvania — a tract of country formed by the northern spurs of the Alleghanies and other attendant ridges— and flow nearly due south; the former to the east, the latter to the west of the South Mountain. The Potomac is navigable for vessels of light draught up to Washington, and the chief port on it is Alexandria, a small town on the southern bank. This place, though on the oppo site side to the capital, and also lower down the stream, is near enough to it to have been made the proper terminus for the railroad, which, before the war, was the main artery of communication from Washington, through Eastern Virginia, to Rich mond, and thence on to the more southern Atlantic States.

The Blue Ridge and the hills adjacent give rise to numerous streams, which make their way, on the west side, of course, into the Shenandoah, but on the east converge into certain main rivers which flow across Eastern Virginia into the Chesapeake. Of these the most noteworthy are the Rappahannock, navigable nearly up to Fredericsburg, an old Virginian town, and the chief place on it ; and the James, fifty miles farther south, on the northern bank of which, and nearly at the head of its navigation, is Richmond. The lower or tidal part of this latter is wide and deep ; and not many miles to its north, a large and long creek, forming an outlet for the Pamunkey and some lesser streams, and running in a parallel direction, under the name of York River, leaves a remarkable peninsula between itself and the James.

This peninsula begins about forty miles east of Richmond, is about fifty long, and varies from twenty to a much lesser breadth in places. At its seaward extremity lies Fort Monroe, a strong place held by the Federals since the war first began, and looking into Hampton Roads, where the James meets the sea. Here also ends the Elizabeth River, a very few miles up which is the naval arsenal of Norfolk, for many months held by the Southerners. It is not merely the direction of the rivers in Eastern Virginia which impedes an army advancing from Washington on Richmond ; but the nature of the country — which is of a very undulating surface, of a heavy soil, sparsely populated according to European ideas, and broken by large masses of virgin forest — presents other difficulties of a most formidable nature.

Add to these, that the roads, so called, are not made roads in the accepted sense of the term, but mere tracks over the surface, sure to be rendered impass able by rainy weather, combined with any considerable amount of traffic; and it would seem that the mere transport, by their means, of an army of magnitude, even if unopposed, over the 150 miles which lie between the two capitals, would be a physical impos sibility, save under the condition of the very finest weather being secured for the whole period of the operation. The rashest general whom the Lincoln Cabinet could have selected would scarcely have pro posed to attempt the advance, except in reHance on the supply of his army by railroad communication. As the railroads of this part of America have ad vanced to a degree of usefulness and completeness, far out of proportion, to judge by a European standard, to that of the ordinary roads, so in the late campaigns their importance has been most remarkably shown.

Let us here examine the course of those most available for purposes of offence and defence as regards the rival capitals ; premising generally, that American railroads are usually of a very rough and ready description as compared with European ones ; are composed of single lines with occasional sidings, and rude uninclosed stations ; have much timber-work in the more difficult parts ; and are, therefore, easily broken up, and also easily restored. Mention has been already made of a main line from Washington southwards. This, under the name of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, leaves the latter town on the Potomac with a south-westerly course, passing no place of importance for its whole length to Orange Courthouse, which is just south of the Rappahannock. Continued beyond this to Gordonsville, it there meets the Virginia Central Railroad coming from the west by Staunton in the Upper Shenandoah valley, which carries it into Rich mond by making a southern bend for the last twenty miles of its course.

A second communication between the rival capitals is by descending the Potomac to Acquia Creek, whence a straight line of seventy miles, running due south, and crossing the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, conducts direct to Rich mond. A short straight line leads east from Richmond to the Pamunkey at Whitehouse, whence there is a free communication seawards for small vessels by the York River. To the south of Rich mond traffic is conducted from the city not only by James River, but by two railroads, one running southwards by Petersburg and Weldon along the coast line of the Carolinas, and the other more westerly, by Lynchburg, in the direction of East Tennessee. The lower part of the Shenandoah valley is entered either from Harper's Ferry, whence a railroad leads to Winchester, the chief town of the northern por tion ; or from the Alexandria line, whence a branch, turning off at a junction about twenty-five miles from Washington, is led with much engineering skill over the Blue Ridge by the pass called Manasses Gap, first crossing an outlying range of high hills, called in this part the Bull's Run Mountain, by Thorough fare Gap.

This line having entered the valley and reached a place called Front Royal, turns southward as far as the town of Mount Jackson, crossing on its way the north and south forks of the Shenandoah by considerable bridges. There is a short raiboad from Alexandria along the southern bank of the Potomac in the direction of Harper's Ferry, but carried no farther than the town of Leesburg, where it meets the northern end of the Blue Ridge. Running nearly along what was the line of separation of the hostile territories in the earlier part of the war, it appears to have been little if at all used, and may be left out of our view. A single railroad forms the approach from the work to Washington, after the traveller going southwards has reached the city of Baltimore. A branch from this line to Annapolis, on the higher part of the Chesapeake, was the only means, other than the waters of the Potomac, that the Northerners had of reaching their capital, and the base of their future operations, during the brief space at the beginning of the war, when the mob of Baltimore interfered with the passage of the volunteer regiments from New England through that city to Washington.

Hence the necessity for that strong military occupation of this important point, which the Federal forces have ever since maintained. From Baltimore the northern traffic is carried by two main lines of railroad. A third line, the Balti more and Ohio, leaves the city for the west ; passes near Frederic, the official capital of Maryland ; thence makes for the Potomac, which it meets at a place called Point of Rocks ; continues up the northern bank of the river to Harper's Ferry, where it crosses, and sends off the Winchester branch, already men tioned, up the Shenandoah valley ; then follows up the line of the Potomac, making its way to the sources of that stream, and through the Alleghany Mountains into the great central State of Ohio. Any one point of this great artery occupied by the Southerners, necessarily interrupts all direct communication between Washington and the middle States.

Having thus examined the features of the country in which the late campaigns were carried on, and the communications likely to be available for the use of the hostile commanders, it remains to consider briefly the composition and character of the forces on either side, and their bearings on the events that have occurred.

Chapter II. The Armies And Their Leaders

Raised by the application of the volunteer* principle in its widest sense, and from among a people whose traditions of war naturally caused them to put perfect faith in it, the Northern army has, by its uniform ill-success, thrown some degree of undeserved dis credit on that principle. Many of those who have criticised the disasters of 1862, suffered by the rapidly extemporized Federal forces, forget that the whole army of Great Britain is essentially an army of volunteers. Voluntary enbstment by bounty cannot of itself be the vice which has caused these disasters, * It may be observed that the remarks here apply solely to the raising of armies for general service to the State. It is not the place to discuss the value of those bodies organized specially for purposes of defence. But the writer has had some personal knowledge of the system of French National Guards in the days of the Citizen King, and later of that of the American militia in time of peace, and of the Prussian reserves, and can safely assert that our present splendid body of volunteers is, in all points that make efficiency, infinitely the superior of any of these. for no one has ever asserted the English recruit to be in any way inferior, as raw material, to the con script of the Continent.

The fact is that the principle we are commenting on was shamefully abused when the Federal army was raised. A mass of locally formed battalions, got together by the exertions of the petty political leaders of districts, officered by men in no way superior to those they commanded, the commissions being bestowed by the State governors through their creatures as the price of party support, — the Federal army contained in its every company the seeds of envy, discontent, and insubordination. The higher commissions to the rank of brigadier-general were lavished at first in a way still more surprisirlg on some of the most incompetent of those who left the store and counting-house for the new and popular trade. No liberal scale of bounty or pay, no national enthusiasm, no energy in the Government, could supply the place of that respect for their leaders, and that ready following out of superior orders which was here wholly wanting, and without which an army is but an armed and dangerous mob.

Add to this vice of original formation, that the endeavour was made in the beginning to organize and employ a force of such battalions as these without any general staff — that is, without any general directing power,- — and we have the elements, if there be any truth in history, of certain failure in any attempt at offensive movements. Indeed, up to the present time, though defeat has forced on many improvements (as a certain examination* of the officers appointed), and time has been given amply sufficient for perfect training, the army has not emerged from the consequences of these first errors. These, and the democratic spirit general throughout the ranks, make the Federal forces un trustworthy in the field to a degree quite astonishing to those who know the individual fitness of the mass of American recruits for the service of war.

To go back to a special period. In March, 1862, we find an army of 130,000 of these volunteers as sembled round Washington, under General M'Clellan. This officer, like most of those distinguished on either side for any practical efficiency in this war, had enjoyed a full theoretical training in the Westpoint Academy, the maintenance of which, in a very com plete condition, has long been a marked exception to the niggardly dealings of the United States with their * An examination of the officers of State regiments by a regular board was instituted by Congress in the spring of 1862. Loose as the system of working this in practice is, its introduction caused a perceptible improvement. In M'Clellan's peninsular army alone 110 of the most ignorant officers were at once got rid of when the order for the examination was received ! regular forces.

Brought hastily into command of the Northern army after the disaster of Bull's Run ; reaping the advantage of the panic of those days in large powers and strong support from the terrified Government ; in the prime of life, and having had (during his appointment as military commissioner in the Crimea) some previous knowledge of the difficul ties of a great war ; the new general was as likely as any other man available to carry out the allotted task of welding together, and leading to victory, the rude mass of volunteers placed under him. And he developed a considerable talent for the organizing branch of his art. Not being required (as was his un lucky predecessor M'Dowall,) to manage a large army without any assistance but that of two aides-de-camp, be had formed a regular imitation of the divisional system of a modern European army, to which were added by degrees the needful adjuncts of mibtary, commissariat, and medical staffs, transport corps, and such like.

More than this, he had attracted to him self, in a very striking degree, the confidence and affection of his soldiery — so completely so, that these clung to him through his most evil fortunes. Un happily, whilst these things were being done, the necessary delays had roused the impatience of the Northern press, and this, reacting on the Cabinet, had gradually diminished the influence of the general with the Government, at the very time when it was essen tial to success that harmony should be fully maintained. In this rising want of confidence in the leader chosen by themselves, and the interference of the Cabinet with his plans in consequence, were the elements of great disasters to come. For the rest, though scarcely past the rudimentary drills, and quite untrained in real field movements, the troops were well equipped and clothed, and were accompanied by a very formidable artillery.

It must be added, that the staff was as yet inadequate in number and skill to their duties ; and that, owing greatly to the neglect of riding exercise in the Northern States, the cavalry were few and bad beyond any precedent in so large an army. The Southern army covering Richmond against the expected advance of M'Clellan was scarcely half his strength, and inferior by far in equipment. In common with the other Confederate forces, it had been formed originally of State volunteer regiments, by a process not very dissimilar to that which was employed in the North. But from the very first the South had enjoyed the special advantage, derived from her aristocratically composed society, of a class of men accustomed to command and lead others. •2 These gave her officers whom the privates could respect; and her Government, more far-seeing and more powerful than that of the Federals, soon succeeded in securing the whole commissioning of the army above the rank of second lieutenant, and thus founding an improved military organization.

To this a stringent Conscription Bill being added, a supply of soldiers was secured without that enormous expenditure of bounties employed in the North. The spirit of the men was excellent, for the prestige of victory from the autumn was united with the patriotic feeling roused by the loud threats of their enemies ; and these were aided by a confidence in their generals, who were nearly all distinguished pupils of Westpoint. That college, and some of a more private character maintained by certain of the States, had always been more frequented by Southerners than by the sons of the more commercial North, and the cause of Secession now reaped great benefit from this difference of taste. More than 300 old eleves of Westpoint, and many more from State military colleges, took up arms at once for the cause of Secession, and greatly assisted the construction of the new army and its military establishments.

The immense exertions of officers, formerly in the United States' Artillery, were gra dually supplying the deficiencies in that arm. In cavalry the Confederates were better off than their opponents, for the South had preserved the practice of horsemanship, and many of her better class were well mounted. In this arm, so much needed the previous year to complete the victory of Bull's Run, they had organized a considerable force, and a leader, Stuart, had been found for them from among the younger officers of Westpoint training, who seems to have been most perfectly qualified to carry the useful ness of light troops of that branch to the utmost limit : his recent services, in covering his own army and harassing the enemy's, have earned him a fore most name in the list of cavalry leaders. General Joseph Johnson * commanded the Southern army of Virginia.

A man of mature age, like his namesake (also of the old cavalry service) who led the Confederates in the West till he fell at Pitts burg, and much older than his opponent M'Clellan, he had served originally in the Engineers,# but left that branch of the army for the Dragoons, and had attained the rank of lieutenant-colonel when the war broke out. His former service in Mexico, and his well-known high character as a scientific soldier, had placed him in an important command from the very * This general's name is spelt Johnson in the present despatches of the Confederate War Department, but stands as Johnston in the old United States' Army List. first. He it was who brought from the Shenan doah Valley the troops who arrived through Manasses Gap in time to turn the struggle at Bull's Run into a complete victory.

He soon after succeeded Beau regard, his former junior in the old service, and under whom he had cheerfully acted in the battle, in the charge of the forces who were still to threaten Washington and guard Richmond. Uniting in a remarkable degree the ardour and activity of youth to the matured judgment of sixty years, he fully justified the sagacity of the Government which had chosen him for their most important command. He had an army of about 60,000 men under his immediate control, most of which had been lying in the old position in front of Manasses Gap Junction ever since the Southerners had abandoned their posts close to Washington to fall back nearer to their supplies. There were also detached forces in the Shenandoah Valley, on the peninsula near Richmond, about the dockyard of Norfolk, and on the coasts of North Carolina.