Campaigns in Virginia, Maryland, etc. etc. ... Second edition [of 'A Military View of Recent Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland'], revised and enlarged

Front matter

CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, etc. etc. CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, etc. etc. HY Capt. C. C. CHESNEY, R.E., PROFESSOR OF MILITARY HISTORY, STAFF COLLEGE. VOLUME THE SECOND. (CONTINUING THE HISTORY TO THE END OF THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR). WITH MAPS. LONDON: SMITH, ELDER AND CO., 65, C0RNHLLL. 1865. [ The right of Truncation is reserved.] CONTENTS. CUAP. PAGR Preface vii J. Lee's Invasion of Pennsylvania (1863) 1 II. Gettysburg. — The First and Second Days 40 III. Gettysburg. — The Closing Day 80 IV. Lee's Retreat to the Eapidan 109 V. Longstreet at Chattanooga 149 VI. The Campaign of Knoxville 182 VII. Lee and Meade in East Virginia 196 VILT. Spring Operations.— Dahlgren's Paid

Preface

TO THE SECOND VOLUME. The Author's former work having been received by both press and public with a kindness which far exceeded his utmost hopes, he has been induced to republish it in a more complete form, and to continue the history in the present volume. As before, the thread followed is that of the events connected with the defence of Richmond ; and the western opera tions have been noticed only where they directly concern the armies so long opposed in Virginia. A portion of the matter was prepared for pub lication in a periodical : but this has been revised throughout; and the latter part is either wholly rewritten, or entirely new. This volume has been purposely closed at the definite period which separates the campaigns now taking place from those preceding, in order that

PREFACE.

. VIII nothing might be written without such full informa tion from both sides being obtained, as might justify the author's trust that it will be found to be — if nothing else — a clear and impartial narrative. The author has been charged by more than one critic with a leaning to the Confederate cause. To such he can only reply that his honest endeavour has been to give fairly from all available sources the course of military events, and to exclude politics wholly from his history, save where they have had a positive influence in the operations in the field. Staff College, Sandhurst, 22nd November, 1864. CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, etc. etc. VOLUME II.

Chapter I. Lee's Invasion Of Pennsylvania

(1863). The previous failures of Pope and Burnside had doubtless in some measure accustomed the North to the disappointment of any hopes raised by the advance of the army of the Potomac. Probably, also, the fact that Hooker, after once halting about Chancellorsville, had not attempted to telegraph any advantage, prepared the minds of his countrymen for the news of his retreat. It is certain that Lee's reputation was now so established in the States against which he fought, that the wildest newspaper 1 n. ■1 CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA, ETC. assertions of his being surprised and out-manœuvred were received with much doubt : and it was only, therefore, when intelligence arrived that Sedgwick had stormed the famous works on Marye's Hill, that the more sanguine spirits of the North believed the new campaign to be a great success, and the war about to be ended at a blow.

This news was almost instantly followed by revelations of the entirely defensive attitude assumed by Hooker after the flank attack of Jackson. Then came that of Sedgwick's disastrous defeat, and finally of Hooker's recrossing the river to recover a safe position ; and hope was changed into a general fear that the Federal host would be unable to maintain itself in face of the victorious foe, and be driven back — perhaps in rout as entire as Pope's — upon the capital. The Government shared fully in this first impression ; and partly supposing that Lee was strong enough for some such movement, partly to assuage the present panic, they ordered Heintzelman to lead the mass of troops gathered round Washington to Hooker's aid. It was, however, so soon discovered that the Confederates made no movement in pursuit, that this order was never carried out.

In fact, Lee at no time seems to have entertained any such purpose. With his army reduced to about 40,000 combatants, and his trusted lieutenant, Jackson, removed from his side by mortal hurt, he judged it safer to await reinforcements than to attempt to press the beaten enemy. To follow Hooker across by a flank movement was not difficult of itself; but could only lead — should that commander in any degree recover his head, and show his wonted courage — to an attack, or series of attacks, upon an army more than double Lee's own in numbers, in defensive positions chosen by the Federals. Even his late successes had had in the midst of them a considerable check (that mentioned as occurring on the morning after Jackson's wound), which showed that any rash course might lead to disaster. It was suggested, indeed, that a sudden crossing towards the right, near Fredericksburg, might not improbably cause Hooker to draw in his left, and lay bare the depot at Acquia Creek.

But even this could not be done without either dividing Lee's small force, and exposing the divisions crossing over to be over whelmed, or by stripping wholly his line on the south side, and so revealing his weakness. He contented himself, therefore, with husbanding his force for more far-reaching designs than these. Each week would, if such designs were approved by the Richmond Government, do much to equalize the opposing armies. For not only were the rest of 1 — Longstreet's corps, and the missing cavalry, at no great distance ; but he was fully aware — and this was one of the most powerful reasons for the delay which he resolved on— that Hooker's late defeat would inevitably lead to the stripping of the baffled army by the whole amount of the many two-year battalions that were in it, most of whom could claim their dis charge within the next fortnight at the farthest.

To this reduction of the Federal strength was to be added that of a number of regiments of volunteers raised under a special call in the preceding autumn for nine months' service : for at that time the Lincoln Government had known fully neither the difficulty of the task they had before them, nor the evil economy of carrying on such a war with repeated supplies of raw recruits, trained but to be disbanded. A very great part of the army of the Potomac would thus melt away of itself, while President Davis could at pleasure reinforce his general with a considerable body of serviceable troops ; so that the latter might soon hope to assume the offensive with force sufficient to carry out some decisive operation. The war press of the North had taken so large a share in forcing General Hooker into his present position of trust, that he was not wholly abandoned by it at once on his defeat being known.

It was only when the details lately laid before the reader came gradually to light, that men became aware how entirely all moral firmness and judgment had failed him in the hour of need ; causing his host to succumb to a force which, in numerical strength, was so remarkably the less. Then indeed the public voice sounded loud against him, and his few firmer supporters became ready to join the cry if he should fail to speedily recover his reputation. In the cabinet at Washington his true measure had been long since taken by some of the President's advisers, and an earnest effort was now made by these to bring M'Clellan again into command. But Lincoln and Stanton still had hopes of their general, whose cam paign, though indeed a huge failure, was yet of a different character from that bloody tragedy of Burn side's, which had brought the latter's short command to a swift inglorious end.

They resolved, therefore, that Hooker should be permitted a further trial ; and, beyond some personal compliments of the President to General Sickles, no one concerned in the late battles was marked out for special praise or blame. While the army of the Potomac was thus paralyzed by the effects of its late defeats, and by the rapid diminution of its numbers, the opposing force of Lee, lying apparently not less idle in its old position at Fredericksburg, was reinforced gradually and steadily throughout the month of May ; for the Confederate president and his general had resolved to change the defensive attitude of the last nine months into an 'active invasion of the North. Longstreet came back to his post at the side of Lee, who had felt his absence keenly, especially since Jackson fell : and not even that peerless soldier worked out his chief's designs with more entire trust and earnestness than he who now returned.

Indeed, the mutual regard of commander and lieutenant was a household word in the Confederate camp, and men wondered that they had been even for a time divided when the shock of battle was, as lately, expected. With Long street came the veteran divisions of Pickett and Hood, which had left the army in the spring, and the army of Virginia was raised by these, and addi tions of new regiments, to about 75,000 men. These were divided, in a more completely systematic way than hitherto, into three corps of nearly equal strength ; for the arrangement which we have seen prevailing up to this time, of two unequal corps d'arme'e under Jackson and Longstreet, had arisen almost by accident in the circumstances of the moment, and been continued from unwillingness to interfere with the special arrangements of those generals, rather than from its fitness for the general purposes of the war.

Longstreet naturally held the first corps, which was composed of troops hitherto forming part of his old command. The divisions were those of McLaws, Pickett, and Hood ; and the two latter generals, with their men, were justly proud of former achievements, and somewhat jealous, it may be, of the new laurels which the rest of the army had won in their absence without their aid. The second corps, composed of Jackson's old troops, was entrusted to Ewell, whom the dying wish of their late commander raised to this high charge, and to the rank of lieutenant - general bestowed with it. He had accompanied the hero throughout every step of his brilliant career in the previous year, until he fell, severely wounded, at the battle of Manasses. Scarcely yet recovered from the effects of amputation, and unable, from the loss of a leg high up, to keep a firm seat on horseback, he was known to be possessed by a consuming energy which would in a great measure supply the place of the physical power he could never wholly regain.

His divisions were those of Early, Rodes, and that containing the ' Stonewall ' soldiers, now under Edward Johnson, an officer distinguished in the early war in western Virginia, but who had been removed by wounds received in Jackson's repulse of Fremont, and had not seen so much field service on a large scale as those among whom he now was placed. No one in the army but felt that the third corps, with the corresponding * rank, was rightly bestowed on General A. Hill, whose name had been noted in every affair of importance from the Chickahominy to Chancellorsville. Under him were the divisions of Anderson, Pender, and Heth. The latter was composed almost entirely of raw regiments of con scripts from the Carolinas, troops of very different calibre from those which formed at least the bulk of the other divisions of the army.

This re-organization being completed, and the * The Southerners in their army ranks have followed nearly the somewhat complicated division of the English. Their brigades and divisions are, however, commanded indifferently by brigadier and major-generals, whilst the rank of lieutenant-general has been reserved for the commander of a corps. Lee, Johnston, and Beau regard early in the war received the rank of full general, one which the French army has no equivalent for, though it is recognized in our service and those of the German powers. The Federals have not adopted any rank above that of major-general, except in the case of Scott, and later of Grant, made lieutenant-generals by special Act of Congress. It is to be observed, however, that they have a wide distinction in the commissions of volunteer generals, which expire soon after the war, and those of the regular forces.

Many of their commanders only hold the former. Dix, M'Clellan, Banks, and Fremont are the highest on the list of the latter. divisions as fully equipped as might be — their con dition as to transport of food and ammunition, and care of the wounded, being indeed very much superior to that which Lee's army had known at any previous time — the first days of June found their general preparing to launch upon his great adventure. Some of the motives which led to the invasion of Pennsylvania lay upon the surface. The hotter spirits of the South had long been chafing at the strictly defensive policy adopted since Lee abandoned Maryland in the previous September ; and to carry the war into one of the richest of the Northern States would not only gratify them, but might bring about the more solid result of alienating support from Lincoln's government at home and abroad, by showing it incapable of protecting even that portion of the Union which was entirely faithful to it.

It would also supply, even if made but with temporary success, the present needs of the soldiery, to keep whom in anything like comfort had sorely tried the Confederate Government of late, owing to a general deficiency of provisions throughout their states, too long accus tomed to rely on the cornfields of Ohio and Illinois. Further ; if Hooker, in his attempts to cover his capital, exposed himself to defeat (and the uncertain, yet self-confident character he bore made this appear probable enough), he would naturally be driven back to the shelter of the Washington lines, and leave the country to his north open to the Confederates ; or, retreating himself to cover it, would isolate the capital, and expose it to investment and assault. This latter defect of the Federal position at Wash ington is indeed worth noting, for it is a pregnant example of the evil which may arise in war from the situation of a capital being fixed too close to a disputed frontier ; thus rendering necessary the subordination of the strategy of the war to the security of a city.

But President Davis had other causes more secret, and yet more pressing than these, for desiring an advance of a decided character on the part of Lee. Reference has been partially made to the most urgent of them, which was the difficulty of supplying the army with provisions until the harvest should be gathered in. The rations had been curtailed at various times, especially in the matter of meat, of which the troops had at intervals been served with only one quarter of the liberal allowance originally given. The other armies of the Confederacy were yet worse off, and Bragg's force in Tennessee could, in consequence, be scarcely kept together, whilst that intended for the relief of Vicksburg, from this and other difficulties, could not be assembled at all. The ill-success of the operations of the Confederate generals in this last quarter formed another motive — urgent in itself, yet unrevealed to the many — for attempting some striking movement, such as might result in a success so brilliant as to compensate for a great expected disaster.

The Federal general Grant had some weeks earlier begun a series of manœuvres superior both in conception and execution to any yet undertaken by the other Northern leaders. Landing with a large force suddenly, and with but little opposition, at a point of the Mississippi considerably below Vicksburg, he threw himself, by a rapid march and the temporary abandonment of his communications, upon the line of railroad connecting that town with the state capital, Jackson, and conveying all its supplies to the former. The suddenness and audacity of the enterprise carried with them complete success. General J. Johnston, scarcely recovered from his severe injuries at Fair Oaks, was just upon the way to Jackson with a view to collect a force sufficient to check any such inland movement of Grant's, and to protect the rear of Pemberton and his garrison at Vicksburg.

But the few indifferent troops which he commanded were entirely unequal to the encounter of the Federal army of 50,000 well-equipped men, and they were driven off with loss in the action that followed, and thus severed from Pemberton, who had led his forces out from his stronghold in the vain hope of effecting a junction with them. Grant had now no difficulty in compelling Pemberton to retreat with loss on Vicksburg, and shutting him into the lines of that place, while, by extending his right to the Yazoo, a considerable river which flows into the Mississippi just above, he came at once into communication with the fleet of Admiral Porter, and opened a new line of supply for the investing force. This march upon Vicksburg (which occupied from the 2nd to the 19th May in execution) may well rank with any strategical achievement of the war.

It showed plainly that Grant's former success at Fort Donnel son was no mere accident, and that he well deserved the early high reputation which it gave him, forfeited partly as that had been by an excess of confidence which led him to expose his command to surprise, and well nigh destruction, at Pittsburg Landing. Pemberton preferred rather to defend his post than to attend to the order he received from his superior, soon after their separation, to abandon it, and save the garrison by a hasty evacuation. On the other hand, Grant's means and dispositions were such as soon to deprive the Confederates of any choice in the matter; and they being once securely hemmed in between a well-supplied increasing army and fleet, the reduction of the place became but a matter of time, unless Johnston should succeed in relieving it.

The means needful for such an undertaking the latter soon found were not within the reach of the powers conferred on him by his commission as general commanding in the west. About 30,000 raw troops, destitute of the chief accessories of an army, were all he could collect in the direction required. Neither recruits, provisions, nor ammunition were forthcoming in Mississippi, and the Richmond government, sorely pressed by the necessity of maintaining the railroads in their eastern states, had suffered those in Johnston's new department to fall out of repair and be stripped of their stock ; so that the transport requisite for concentrating forces from a distance was entirely wanting to his hand. His difficulties were of course fully known to President Davis, and though they might not be too soon made public, and the weak points of the Con federacy betrayed, that statesman could see scarce any hope of the relief of the beleaguered place.

He had, therefore, now to steel himself against the expected blow of its surrender ; and this blow was all the more heavy, as he himself had not long since publicly announced his sense of the paramount importance of maintaining free from Federal conquest the works both of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson, an intrenched post lower down ; and the latter would doubtless fall to General Banks — who had advanced from New Orleans against it — as soon as the more important stronghold yielded to Grant. It would require a striking success indeed on the part of Lee to give the South an equivalent for such a loss as this, and for the consequent opening of the Mississippi to Northern vessels. Neither President nor general entertained any idea of the possibility of conquering and holding permanently a portion of the free states.

Their means were insufficient for so vast and distant an undertaking. But in the necessity of gathering sup plies of food, and the hope of reaping advantage from some mistake of the Federals in their attempts to cover both Washington and Baltimore with Hooker's reduced army, and thus counterbalancing the ill-success in the west, were reasons amply sufficient to urge them on to carry out their project. The strategical design for its accomplishment devolved solely upon Lee ; and, as one important element of success was the carrying of his army into the north as intact as possible, he decided to move round Hooker's by a wide flank march. To dis lodge the latter from his front by direct passage of the river was an idea never entertained, as involving an expenditure of time and strength fatal to his own ultimate purpose : and as the Federal left rested on the Potomac, the movement must needs be made by their right.

The country between this extremity of their position and the Blue Ridge afforded suffi cient room for the manœuvre, as Lee's subsequent operation* in the autumn, as well as that against Pope, plainly proved. But he was so anxious to avoid being drawn prematurely into an engagement, and to carry on his march without interruption, that he resolved upon transporting the whole of his army into the Shenandoah Valley, and issuing forth from its mouth. The retreat he had effected in the autumn by the same line showed how securely this might be done, provided the gaps, or passes, were properly occupied. The prospect of surprising General Milroy and his detached force before they could retire from the valley, and the certainty that the Con- * Vide chap. vi. of this volume, where the operation referred to is detailed.

CAMPAIGNS LN VIRGINIA, ETC. federates having once moved to the west side of the Blue Mountain, Hooker would, to the last, be kept in uncertainty as to whether their real design was to cross the ridge to fall upon his right, or the Potomac to pass into Maryland, were minor yet important inducements to the course now chosen. On the 3rd of June operations began by a steady movement of Longstreet's corps, followed by Ewell's, along the country between the Rapidan and Rappa hannock towards Culpepper. As Hooker's front, ever since his late defeat, had been along the line of the latter river, the cavalry of Stuart was disposed at the various passages to mask the march as far as possible. Whilst it was yet in progress Hooker's report from the outposts made him aware that his enemy was changing his position.

Desirous to ascertain the truth, he caused pontoon bridges to be thrown across at the point below Fredericksburg, used by Burnside's left in the December preceding, and two divisions were passed over on the 5th. But Lee had left his third corps to occupy the position he had so long defended, and perceiving that it was still held by a strong force the Federals made no advance. On the 9th, for a similar purpose, General Pleasanton (who had once more succeeded to the command of the Federal cavalry, Stoneman's health having failed him Sfastxh to .show the advance os' KWFJLL into fHmsvdvaniH ( marked/ dutn ) also the simultaneous cxaimikaunn d'tJio Ai-uncs of LEE and MEADE <xi CKTTYSBUKO o„tlK- J&fe^J863 . i'ubli.sli'-H bv Sxnitl under his late exertions) was directed to make a reconnaissance in force at Hooker's extreme right.

With Gregg's and Buford's cavalry divisions, supported afterwards by two brigades of infantry, he crossed the river at Kelly's Ford, and at another above it, called Beverley, surprising and driving in the Confederate outposts with some loss. Stuart soon met him with W. Lee's brigade, and a series of skirmishes followed, of the undecided character prevalent wherever cavalry take to using their fire-arms. For some time the Federals were unable to unite their two columns ; but having once done so they drove Stuart, although reinforced, some miles to the rear, and Lee was compelled to order up Hood's division in haste to support him. This movement obliged Pleasanton to retreat in turn, and he fell back on Beverley Ford : but being pressed closely by the enemy, he did not succeed in recrossing without some loss, his columns becoming separated on the way, and that under Buford (which had formed the right in the advance) being nearly cut off.

The Con federates captured three guns and several hundred prisoners; but their advantage was paid for in the person of General W. Lee,* who was severely wounded * See p. 119 for an account of the capture of this general, who was not exchanged until the following summer. ir. in the action — an event subsequently turned by the Federals to special account. By this time Lee had assembled his two leading corps round Culpepper, and next day, the loth, he despatched Ewell on his march into the valley by Chester Gap and Front Royal, with directions to surprise Milroy if possible, and to sweep the Federals from it. Many of the soldiers of this corps, as well as its chief, had served in Jackson's brilliant cam paign over the same ground, and the spirit of the rest was such as to show them emulous of the fame then won ; whilst in Milroy — whom Federal writers acknowledge to be one of the worst specimens of the politically-raised generals of the war — they had a foe inferior in all ways to Banks.

Accordingly the con quest was a swift and easy one. The advance was formed by the brigade of cavalry under Jenkins (formerly W. Jones's), which was now attached to Ewell's command; and was flanked by a parallel movement of Imboden on the Western Virginia border. Rodes's division led the infantry, aud moved on Berryville, a village south-east of Winchester; whilst Early took the direct route to the town, and Johnson diverged to the west, in order to sweep round it and intercept retreat. Jackson himself could scarcely have pushed his men more rapidly over the seventy miles of bad road, which had to be traversed from Culpepper ; and Milroy was completely surprised. Apparently he had considered that his sole duty in the lower valley was to make the secessionist inhabitants feel the weight of the Federal rod as severely as possible, and he certainly showed none of the energy and foresight by which Butler had partly redeemed his severity at New Orleans.

He had taken no precautions to obtain by advanced posts, pushed up the Shenandoah, the information which the people on its banks would certainly not furnish for any reason save fear ; and the enemy's cavalry were within two hours' ride of his head-quarters at Winchester before he knew of their approach. This was on the afternoon of the 13th, and a slight skirmish ensued that evening; but Ewell refrained from pressing the Federals severely until Rodes should have driven in their detached force (2,000 men under M'Reynolds) from Berryville, and John son begun his flank move on the other side. Next day the Confederate net was tightening round the alarmed Milroy. His troops from Berry ville arrived in the afternoon, closely followed by Rodes's skirmishers ; and Colonel Mulligan, who lay with a brigade at Martinsburg, finding a first attempt to reach his chief at Winchester interrupted by John- 2-2 son's advance, retreated precipitately on Harper's Ferry.

A strong series of intrenchments had been thrown up in a commanding position about a mile to the north of Winchester, and into these Milroy and his 7,000 troops withdrew in the later part of the 14th, without any attempt of Ewell's to prevent their retreat thus far ; for he was anxious to spare the much suffering town the horrors of another fight. About 5 p.m. Ewell directed an attack upon a detached work, to the west and within gun-shot of the main redoubt held by the Federals. The assault was made by Hayes's Irish * brigade of Early's division with a gallantry freely acknowledged by northern eye-witnesses, and was entirely successful. The result was the enclosure of the Federals in a single large work for the night, in a most dispirited condition, and with the enemy occupying all the neighbouring points favourable to a close investment and general assault next day.

That night Milroy, after a brief * It has been remarkable throughout the war, that the Irish of all classes resident in the South have adopted the Confederate cause with the greatest ardour. Yet there were very few slave-owners among them. But as Dicey has acutely observed, in his well-known work on the Federal States, " It would be as absurd to assert that the slavery cause was only maintained in the South by the 400,000 holders of slaves, as to say that there were no supporters of the peerage in England but the thousand members or so of the nobility themselves." consultation with his brigadiers, determined to escape under cover of the darkness, and at least to save his own neck, which he knew his recent conduct in the valley had much endangered. At 2 a.m. — ere Ewell had decided to attack — the Federals moved out towards Martinsburg, but soon encountered Johnson, who had just arrived to intercept that line of retreat.

A confused skirmish followed, and Milroy succeeded in effecting his own escape to Harper's Ferry with 1,600 of his command ; but he had left in the hands of the Con federates 4,000 prisoners, a great quantity of stores, and all his artillery, consisting of three field-batteries and some heavy guns. Ewell now ordered his cavalry to make a demonstration towards Harper's Ferry, as if he were about to attack that place : but he directed his infantry towards the Potomac, through Martinsburg, and crossed on the 22nd at Williamsport and Shepherds town. His instructions were to move into Penn sylvania by way of Hagerstown, without further delay than such as was necessary to clear the valley of all Federal troops, and to gather up the spoils left by them in their flight. Returning to the Rappahannock, we find Hooker, about the 14th, quitting his position on that river.