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History of the later Roman Commonwealth, from the end of the Second Punic War to the death of Julius Cæsar; and of the reign of Augustus: with a life of Trajan ... Republished from 'The Encyclopædia Metropolitana.'

Thomas Arnold · 1845 · Scanned text

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Author
Thomas Arnold
Language
English
Published
1845
Length
157,418 words · about 11 h 1 min
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10 reader sections
Text
Scanned text, read from page scans by OCR; may contain errors
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Public Domain Mark 1.0

 

Contents (10)
  1. Front matter about 1 min
  2. Preface about 1 min
  3. Chapter I. Sketch Of The External Advancement Of The Roman Empire From about 1 h 7 min
  4. Chapter II about 32 min
  5. Chapter III about 34 min
  6. Chapter IV about 45 min
  7. Part I. Lucius Cornelius Sylla about 46 min
  8. Part II. Lucius Cornelius Sylla about 1 h 27 min
  9. Chapter VII about 1 h 58 min
  10. Chapter VIII about 3 h 51 min

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Front matter

HISTORY OF THE LATER ROMAN COMMONWEALTH. LONDON : gilbert and rivington, printers, st. John's square. HISTORY OE THE LATER ROMAN COMMONWEALTH, FROM THE END OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR TO THE DEATH OF JULIUS CÆSAR; AND OF THE REIGN OF AUGUSTUS: WITH A LIFE OF TRAJAN. BY THOMAS ARNOLD, D.D., LATE REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, HEAD MASTER OF RUGBY SCHOOL, AND MEMBER OF THE ARCHÆOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF ROME. REPUBLISHED FROM " THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA." VOL. L LONDON: B. FELLOWES ; F. AND J. RIVINGTON ; E. HODGSON ; G. LAWFORD ; J. M RICHARDSON ; J. BAIN ; AND S. HODGSON : ALSO, J. H. PARKER, OXFORD AND J. AND J. J. DEIGHTON, CAMERIDGE. 1845.

Preface

. These Volumes contain a republication of the portion of Roman History contributed by Dr. Arnold to the " Encyclopædia Metropolitana," between the years 1823 and 1827. It is scarcely necessary to remark, that if his life had been prolonged, his great growth in know ledge and ability would have given a new character and a much higher value to this portion of the History of Rome. It is, however, believed that these Articles form a valuable part of our literature, and are not unworthy of accompanying those Volumes, which were the fruit of matured years. They will carry on the reader through a long and important era, from the close of the Second Punic War to the final establishment of the Empire under Augustus, and will furnish him with a con secutive narrative of the events of this period.

PREFACE.

. VI The text is such as the Author left it, with the exception that a few trifling inaccuracies of detail have been corrected. What seemed to be errors of a more general character have been untouched. Some, and amongst them, those respecting the Agrarian laws, will be found corrected in Dr. Arnold's History of the Earlier Periods ; whilst the alteration of the text would have been an act of unwarrantable liberty, and would have destroyed much of the psychological interest which must belong to a comparison of the earlier with the later productions of any eminent writer. The references to the original authorities have been all examined and verified. Dr. Arnold broke off, after the Life of Augustus, his contributions to the continuous series of Roman History in the Encyclopædia. He subsequently composed the Life of Trajan for that Work. It is reprinted in these Volumes. BONAMY PRICE. Rugby, July 31, 1845. CONTENTS OP VOLUME I.

Chapter I. Sketch Of The External Advancement Of The Roman Empire From

THE END OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR TO THE INVASION OF THE CIMBRI. FROM A.U.C. 553, B.C. 201, TO A.U.C. 652, B.C. 102. There are certain portions of the history of manchap. kind, in which military operations assume a character > J" ■ of such predominant importance, that the historian is bound to assign to them the principal place in his narrative. At other times there may be long and bloody wars, by which great changes have been produced in the state of the world, which yet deserve no more than the most cursory notice ; whilst our main attention is bestowed on the progress of society, the rise of literature, or the origin and struggles of do mestic factions. The period to be comprised in this sketch belongs to this latter class : it was full of VOL. I. B FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR. wars ; it was marked by decisive victories and exten sive conquests; yet its military history is totally uninteresting, from the great inequality of force between the Romans and their several enemies ; and from the scarcity of those signal displays of valour and ability, which have, on other occasions, thrown lustre on the resistance of the humblest power.

Besides, except the " Fragments" of Polybius, we have no political nor military history of these times, the authority of which can be relied on with any satisfaction, for the detail of events. No more then will be here attempted, than briefly to trace the suc cession of the Roman conquests, and to notice the causes which rendered them so unbroken and so universal. CHAP. I. No sooner was the second Punic war ended than the senate of Rome determined to crush the power of Philip, king of Macedon. He had joined Hannibal in the most critical period of the late war, when the destruction of Rome seemed inevitable ; he was the most considerable potentate in the countries neigh bouring to Italy on the east ; and the fame of his armies, derived from the conquests of Alexander, was not yet extinguished.

These were considerations sufficient to point him out as the next object of hostility to the Roman arms ; and although peace had been concluded with him two or three years before, yet the grounds of a new quarrel were soon U.C. 553. J B.C. 201. First Mace donian war. P According to Niebuhr, Vol. cephale 556, Livy havinomade » IV. 232, this date should be 552, error of one year.— Ed f and that for the battle of Cyno- ' BATTLE OF CYNOCEPHALE. 3 discovered. He2 was accused of having attacked the chap. Athenians and some others of the allies of Rome ; ' — '- — ' and of having sent some Macedonian soldiers to the assistance of Hannibal in Africa. A Roman army was instantly sent over into Greece, and a Roman fleet co-operated with the naval force of Attalus, king of Pergamus, and the Rhodians ; these powers, together with the Ætolians, being constantly enemies to Macedon, and the present war being undertaken by the Romans chiefly, as was pretended, on their account.

The barbarous3 tribes on the north and west of Macedonia were also led, by the temptation of plunder, to join the confederacy ; and their irrup tions served to distract the councils and the forces of Philip. Yet, under all these disadvantages, he main- Battle of tained the contest with great vigour for three years ; phaie, till being defeated in a general action at Cynocephale no 197. in Thessaly, and his whole country, exhausted as it already was by the war, being now exposed to invasion, he was reduced to accept peace on such terms as the Romans thought proper to dictate. These, as usual, tended to cripple the power of the vanquished party, and at the same time to increase the reputation of the Romans, by appearing more favourable to their allies than to themselves. Philip was 4 obliged to give up every Greek city that he possessed beyond the limits of Macedonia, both in Europe and in Asia ; a stipulation which deprived him of Thessaly, Achæa, Phthiotis, Perrhæbia, and Magnesia, and particularly = Livy, XXX. 42 ; XXXI. 5. 4 Polybius, XVIII. 27, et seq. 3 Livy, XXXI. 28. 38. 41, &c. 17, and XVII. 2.

B WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT. chap. 0f trie three important towns of Corinth, Chalcis, and ' ' — Demetrias, which he used to call the fetters of Greece. All these states were declared free and independent; except that the Romans (pretending that Antiochus, king of Syria, threatened the safety of Greece) retained, for the present, the strong places of Chalcis and Demetrias5 in their own hands. Philip was forced also to satisfy the several demands of Attalus, of the Rhodians, and of the other allies of Rome, except of the Ætolians, whom it was now the policy of the Romans to humble ; as the depression of Philip had left them the principal power in Greece. In addition to these sacrifices, he was to surrender almost the whole of his navy, and to pay to Rome a thousand talents. Immediately 6 after the conclusion of this treaty followed the memorable scene at the Isthmian games, where it was announced to all the multitude assembled on that occasion, that the Romans be stowed entire freedom upon all those states of Greece which had been subject to the kings of Macedon.

The Greeks, unable to read the future, and having as yet had no experience of the ambition of Rome, received this act with the warmest gratitude ; and seemed to acknowledge the Romans in the character which they assumed, of protectors and deliverers of Greece. War with The kingdom of Macedon being now humbled Antiochus -i the Great, there was no one in a condition to dispute the power B.C.' 19'i [5 Polybius, XVIII. 28.— Ed.] 6 Polybius, XVIII. 29, et seq. WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT. 5 of the Romans in Greece, except Antiochus, king of chap. Syria. This prince had lately 7 enlarged his dominions ' — r — ' by reducing those cities on the coast of Asia Minor, which, in the course of the many wars between the successors of Alexander, had been gained by the kings of Egypt. He now professed his intention of crossing into Europe, and re-uniting to his empire those cities and parts of Thrace which had been conquered from Lysimachus by one of his predecessors ; and which had since been wrested from the crown of Syria by the kings of Egypt and Macedon.

But the Romans having now brought their war with Philip to an end, resolved at once to stop the progress of Antiochus ; and their ambassadors, who found him at Lysimachia, required him to restore every place that he had taken from Ptolemy, king of Egypt, and to leave those cities independent, which, having lately belonged to Philip, were now destined by the Romans to enjoy their liberty. Antiochus replied, that the Romans had no more concern in the affairs of Asia than he had in those of Italy ; and the ambassadors departed without gaining their demands. In this state of things, the Ætolians \ who were now totally alienated from the Romans, in consequence of the neglect with which they had been treated in arranging the terms of the peace with Philip, eagerly solicited the king of Syria to enter Greece, encouraging him to hope, that, with their assistance, he might destroy the influence of Rome in that country 7 Polybius, XVIII. 32, 33, and s Livy, XXXV. 12. 33. 43, &c. Livy, XXXIII. 19.38.

WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT. altogether. He accordingly crossed over with a small force, and was admitted, through the intrigues of the Ætolians, and the disposition of the inhabitants, into several places of importance ; but 9 the Achæans and Eumenes, who had lately succeeded Attalus on the throne of Pergamus, declared against him, and their forces occupied Chalcis, in Eubœa, to secure it from his attacks. Philip, king of Macedon, also decided on taking part with the Romans ; yet, notwithstanding, Antiochus succeeded in reducing Chalcis, and the whole of Eubœa, and won besides several cities in Thessaly. He returned to Chalcis to pass the winter; and the consul, Manius Acilius Glabrio, arriving in Epirus in the ensuing spring, and having marched thence into Macedonia to concert measures with Philip, and afterwards having advanced into Thessaly, Antiochus took post at the famous pass of Thermopylæ to oppose his further progress.

He was easily dislodged, however, by the Romans ; and that with such severe loss, that he thought it prudent at once to abandon Greece, and to return to Asia by sea from Chalcis, leaving the Ætolians to bear, as they best could, the whole weight of the Roman vengeance. CHAP. I. \ . i , They were accordingly attacked by the consul, Manius Acilius 10, and, after seeing some of their towns taken, they implored and obtained an armistice for a certain period, in order to allow them time to send ambassadors to Rome. But the demands of the 9 Livy, XXXV. 50,51 ; XXXVI. w Livy, XXXVI. 22-35. 14, et seq. BATTLE OF MAGNESIA. senate being more exorbitant than they could yet chap. bring themselves to accept, the war was again re- ' — ■■- newed, and Manius n was actively employed in besieging Amphissa, when the arrival of his succes sor, L. Cornelius Scipio, afforded the Ætolians another respite.

The new consul, who was wholly bent on crossing over into Asia, to finish the war with Antiochus, was easily persuaded to grant the Æto lians a truce for six months : and their affairs were in so desperate a state, that even this doubtful favour seemed to them most acceptable. Having thus freed himself from the possible danger of leaving an enemy in his rear, L. Scipio set forward for the Hellespont 12, accompanied by his brother, the famous Scipio Africanus, who acted under him as his lieutenant. The march of the army was facili tated to the utmost by Philip, king of Macedon ; who seems vainly to have hoped that by a faithful and zealous observance of the treaty of peace, he might soften the remorseless ambition of the Romans. A naval victory, won by the Roman fleet, ensured the safety of the passage into Asia ; and Antiochus'3, dis trusting his own strength, abandoned the sea coast, and concentrated his army near Magnesia and Thyatira.

Here he was attacked by the Romans, and Battle of Magnesia, totally defeated. Sardis and several other places suru.c. 564. rendered immediately after the battle; and Antiochus, completely11 panic-struck, sent ambassadors to the consul and his brother, soliciting peace on their own Polybius, XXI. l,2,&c. 13 Livy, XXXVII. 30,31. 38, et seq. Livy, XXXVII. 1.7. u Polybius, XXI. 13, &c. BATTLE OF MAGNESIA. chap, terms. He was ordered accordingly to resign his — .; — ' pretensions to any dominion whatever in Europe, and to cede every thing that he possessed in Asia westward of Mount Taurus; to pay fifteen thousand talents to the Romans within twelve years, to reim burse them for the expenses of the war ; to pay to Eumenes, king of Pergamus, four hundred talents in money, and a certain quantity of corn, which he had engaged by treaty to pay to the late king Attalus ; to give up Hannibal and some other individuals who were obnoxious to the Romans ; and to give twenty hostages immediately, as a pledge of his sincerity, to be selected at the pleasure of the consul.

These terms were accepted by Antiochus, and hostilities ceased therefore on both sides. Ambassadors were then sent to Rome by Antiochus, to procure a ratification of the peace from the senate and people ; and by Eumenes, the Rhodians, and almost every state within the limits ceded by the vanquished king, to court the favour of the new arbiters of the fate of Asia, and to gain for themselves as large a share as possible of the spoils of the Syrian monarchy. After the several embassies had received an audience of the senate, the peace with Antiochus was ratified, and ten commissioners15 were appointed to settle all disputed points in Asia ; with these general instructions, that all the dominions ceded by the king of Syria to the Romans should be given to Eumenes, with the exception of Lycia and part of Caria, which were bestowed on 15 Polybius, XXII. 7.

DEFEAT OF THE GALATIANS. the Rhodians, and those Greek cities which had paid chap. tribute to Antiochus, and which were now declared ' — <. — independent. But before these commissioners arrived in Asia, the Roman arms had been employed in another successful war. Cn. Manlius16 Vulso, who succeeded L. Scipio in the consulship, and in the command of the army in Asia Minor, anxious to dis tinguish himself by some conquest, had attacked the Galatians, or Asiatic Gauls, on the pretence that they had furnished assistance to Antiochus ; and, after Defeat of the Oaia several engagements, had obliged the different tribes tians. to sue for peace. Their ambassadors came to him towards the close of the winter to receive his answer ; and about the same time Eumenes and the ten com missioners arrived from Rome.

A definitive treaty of peace was then concluded with Antiochus, in which, besides the concessions formerly mentioned, he agreed to give up almost the whole of his navy, and all his elephants, and not to make war in Europe, or in the islands of the Ægean. The Galatians, having been already plundered to the utmost during the war, were only warned to con fine themselves within their own limits, and not to molest the kingdom of Eumenes; and Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, who had also given assistance to Antiochus, was obliged to deprecate the anger of Rome by the payment of six hundred talents ; half of which, however, was afterwards remitted to him at the intercession of Eumenes. This last prince 16 Polybius, XXII. 16. 24, et seq. Livy, XXXVIII. 12, et seq. CONQUEST OF ÆTOLIA. chap, received a great increase of territory, both in Asia ' — -s — ' and in Europe; and, together with the commonwealth of Rhodes, was in appearance the greatest gainer from the victory of the Romans.

However, in the mere act of giving away kingdoms at her discretion, Rome plainly declared the pre-eminence of her own power : and she soon after showed, that she could resume her gifts as easily as she had made them, whenever the conduct of her allies began to excite her jealousy. Conquest of It has been already mentioned, that L. Scipio, when marching towards Asia, granted a truce for six months to the Ætolians ; but as they could not yet be induced to surrender at discretion to the mercy of the Romans, the war was again renewed, and M. Fulvius Nobilior17, the colleague of Cn. Manlius in the consulship, crossed over into Greece to complete their subjugation. He first laid siege to Ambracia, which was vigorously defended ; but the Ætolians, now convinced of their inability to maintain the contest, sued for peace through the intercession of the Rhodians and Athenians ; and terms were at length granted them, which besides diminishing their territorv, and obliging them to pay a sum of money, reduced them to a state of entire dependence on Rome, by obliging them to follow the Romans in all their wars, and to acknowledge and obey the power and sovereignty of Rome.

Their fate excites the less compassion, when we remember that they first invited the Romans into " Livy, XXXVII. 49 ; XXXVIII. 3, et seq. Polybius, XXII. 9 et seq. INTRIGUES OF PHILIP. Greece ; and that their faithless and ambitious policy chap. had mainly contributed to prevent the union of the ' — * — ' Greeks in one powerful state, which might have been able long to maintain its independence against every enemy. Eleven years had not passed since the conclusion of }"tris"C9 of the last war with Macedon, when it became apparent that another was likely to commence. In the late war with Antiochus, Philip, as has been seen, sided with the Romans ; and thus took from the king of Syria the towns of Ænus and Maronea, and some other towns and fortresses on the coast of Thrace ; and from the Ætolians, several cities which they had occupied in Thessaly and Perrhæbia.

All these places, at the conclusion of the war, he proposed to retain in his possession ; but on one side, Eumenes laid claim18 to the towns of Thrace, insisting that the Romans had given to him that portion of the territories conquered from Antiochus ; and on the other, the Thessalians and Perrhæbians demanded the restoration of the cities taken possession of by Philip in their country, urging that the Ætolians had un justly seized them, and that on their expulsion, they ought to revert to their original and rightful owners. The senate, as usual, appointed commissioners to hear and to decide on this question ; and sentence was given, as might have been expected, against the pretensions of Philip. He had no intention, how ever, to yield without resistance ; but not being yet '" Polybius, XXII I. 6. 11.

Livy, XXXIX. 23, et seq. ACCESSION OF PERSEUS. chap, prepared for war, he sought to gain time by sending « — ; — - his son Demetrius l9 to Rome to plead his cause. This prince had formerly been one of the hostages given by his father for his faithful execution of the terms of the last treaty with the Romans ; and he had then so won the favour of many of the Roman nobility, that Philip trusted much to the influence he might possess on the present occasion. Nor was he disappointed ; for Demetrius was sent back with renewed expressions of the kindness entertained for him by the senate, and 20 with a promise, that out of regard for him, a fresh commission should be appointed to reconsider the points in dispute between Philip and his opponents. Yet the new commission confirmed the judgment of the former one ; and Philip was obliged to withdraw his garrisons from all the contested towns both in Thrace and Thessaly : nor did the favour shown by the Romans to Deme trius produce any other result than his destruction.

A suspicion arose that he aspired to succeed to the throne, through their support, to the exclusion of Tragical end his elder brother Perseus. This produced an open ot his son, x x Demetrius, enmity between the brothers ; and after many mutual accusations of each other, Philip, it is said21, was in duced to order the death of Demetrius by poison : but, according to the Roman writers, being after wards convinced of his innocence, he intended to deprive Perseus of the succession, in abhorrence of pecrcseesu^on of bis treachery towards his brother. He died, how- 19 Polybius, XXIII. 14. 20 Polybius, XXIV. 2. 6. 21 Livy, XL. 24. 55, 5G. SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR. ever, before his intentions could be carried into effect, chap. and Perseus ascended the throne without difficulty. u^PsT^-" This account of the private affairs of the royal family q£'i«'2 of Macedon, as it relates to matters not likely to be known with certainty by the public, and as it comes to us from writers disposed to believe every calumny against Perseus, merits very little attention.

It is only known, that the Romans were disposed, from the very beginning of his reign, to regard the new king of Macedon with aversion ; and that he, fore seeing that a war in defence of the independence of his crown would soon be inevitable, took every method of rendering himself popular in Greece, and of strengthening the internal resources of his kingdom. The Romans alleged 22, as the causes of their Second m* ccdonian quarrel with Perseus, that he had made war on some war. of their allies ; that he had endeavoured to draw away others to a connexion with himself, incompa tible with their duty to Rome ; and that he had hired assassins to make an attempt on the life of king Eumenes, when returning from Rome, whither he had gone to instigate the senate to declare war against Macedon. In answer23 to these charges, Perseus replied, that his hostilities with the allies of Rome were purely defensive : and the charge of in tended assassination he strongly and flatly denied.

With regard to his endeavouring to seduce the allies of Rome from their fidelity, he is made by Livy to 23 Livy, XLII. 41. 22 Livy, XL 11. 30. 40. SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR. chap, refer to a former justification of himself on that 1 — .— point, which is not at present to be found in Livy's history. However, it is evident that the Romans were determined on war, and that the king of Macedon took every step, consistent with the independence of his crown, to avoid it. Although the Romans u had accused him of making great military preparations in time of peace, and he was, in fact, in a far better condition to commence immediate hostilities than they were, yet he lost the opportunity thus afforded him, from his anxious desire to nego tiate with the enemy; and when he was actually driven to take up arms25, and had gained some advantage over the consul Licinius, he instantly renewed his26 offers of peace, consenting to the same terms which his father bad only submitted to after his total defeat at Cynocephale.

The most open and unprincipled ambition in modern times, would hardly dare to avow such an answer as that made by the Roman general, to a proposal so conciliatory. He replied, that Perseus must submit himself to the dis cretion of the senate, and allow it to decide on the state of Macedon, as it should think proper. In other words, the time was now come, when the Romans, in their career of conquest, had reached the kingdom of Philip and Alexander, and nothing could induce them to delay, far less to renounce, their re solution of sacrificing it to their lawless and systematic ambition. 24 Livy, XLII. 43. 26 Livy, XLII. 47. 26 Polybius, XXVII. 8. SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR. 15 This refusal to negotiate after a defeat, was a general maxim of Roman policy, and has often been extolled as a proof of heroic magnanimity.

It should rather be considered as a direct outrage on the honour and independence of all other nations, which ought, in justice, to have put the people who pro fessed it, out of the pale of all friendly relations with mankind. In a moment of madness, the French Convention, in 1794, passed a decree, that the garrisons of the four fortresses on the northern frontier, then in the possession of the allies, should be put to the sword, if they did not surrender within twenty four hours after they were summoned. To this de cree, a notice of which accompanied the summons of the besieging general, the Austrian governor of Le Quesnoy nobly replied, " No one nation has a right to decree the dishonour of another : I shall maintain my post so as to deserve the esteem of my master, and even that of the French people themselves."

In like manner, a refusal to make peace except on their submission, was to decree the dishonour of every other nation : nor had Rome any right to in sist, that whatever were the events of a war, it should only be terminated on such conditions as should make her enemy the inferior party. Had other nations acted on the same principle, every war must necessarily have been a war of extermination ; and thus the pride of one people would have multiplied infinitely the sufferings of the human race, and have reduced mankind to a state of worse than savage fero city. The avowal of such a maxim, in short, placed CHAP. I. BATTLE OF PYDNA. chap. Rome in a condition of actual hostility with the ' — J — > whole world ; and would have justified all nations in uniting together for the purpose of forcing a solemn and practical renunciation of it ; or, in case of a refusal, of extirpating utterly the Roman people, as the common enemies of the peace and honour of mankind.

After the refusal of the consul Licinius to negotiate with Perseus, the war was protracted for two years more without any decisive success ; the Roman officers who were employed in it displaying little ability or enterprise, and disgracing themselves by flagrant27 acts of extortion and oppression towards their allies. At last, L. Æmilius Paullus, son of the consul who was killed at Cannæ, and himself inheriting his father's reputation for wisdom and valour, was chosen consul ; and the province of Macedonia falling to his share, he took every method to bring the war to a successful issue. Great care was c8 observed in the appointment of the officers who were to serve under him ; and when he arrived in Greece and took the command, he greatly reformed the discipline of the army, and brought it into a high state Battle of of order and activity.

His exertions were soon re- E&dofthe warded by the battle of Pydna, of the details of Macedon. which we have only the account of Plutarch, but the b.c' 168.' event is abundantly known. The Macedonian armv OL 153 1 was totally destroyed ; the cities of the kingdom successively surrendered to the conquerors ; and 27 Livy, XLIII. 4, 5, 6, &c. 28 Livy, XLIV. 21.34. CONDUCT OF ROME TO HER ALLIES. 17 Perseus himself shortly after gave himself up to chap. the consul's mercy. He was taken to Rome with ' — J — ' his family, to adorn the triumph of Æmilius ; and, according to Paterculus, died about four years after wards at Alba 29, which was assigned as the place of his confinement. His principal nobility, and every man 30 who had ever held any office under him, were ordered to transport themselves into Italy, on pain of death, lest they should disturb the new settlement of their country.

Macedonia was then divided into four districts ; each of which was to be under a republican government. Half the tribute formerly paid to the king, was henceforward to be paid to the Romans, who also appropriated to themselves the produce of all the gold and silver mines of the kingdom. The inhabitants were forbidden to fell timber for ship-building; and all intermarriages and sales of land between the people of the several districts were forbidden. With these marks of real slavery, they were left, for the present, nominally free; and Macedonia was riot yet reduced to the form of a Roman province. It is curious to observe, how, after every succes- Conduct of , . , , Rome to sive conquest, the Romans altered their behaviour her allies. 20 Vid. Veil. Patercul. I. 11. — and there having offended the sol- But it would be nearer the truth diers who guarded him, they, in to say, that Perseus was murdered revenge, harassed him night and by the Romans ; for after having day, and never allowed him to suffered such cruel treatment in sleep till he expired under their the dungeon to which he was at persecutions. — Vid.

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