History for ready reference, Volume 5, Tunnage to Zyp and Supplement (part 5 of 11)

History for ready reference, Volume 5, Tunnage to Zyp and Supplement (part 5 of 11)

"When McClellan crossed the Chickahominy it was thought he would advance immediately upon Richmond. This expectation was disappointed, however, for instead of advancing he began to fortify his position. The right wing rested on the Chickahominy a little below New Bridge, and the left extended to the White Oak Swamp, embracing a front of about four miles, nearly parallel with that of the Confederates. The opposing lines were separated by an interval but little exceeding a mile, but each was obscured from the other's view by the intervening forest. The picket-lines were often within close musket-range of each other. … The strength of the Confederate force was always greatly overestimated by McClellan, and his frequent and urgent calls for reinforcements exposed his want of confidence in his own strength. General Lee [who took command of the Confederate army June 1, General Johnston being disabled], knowing this uneasy, insecure feeling of his antagonist, and McDowell's force, which had always been a thorn in his side, being about this time withdrawn from Fredericksburg for the support of Banks and Shields in the Valley, prepared … to assume the offensive. He conceived the bold plan of crossing the Chickahominy, and, attacking the Federal right wing, to force it back and seize McClellan's line of communication with his base of operations. This plan being successfully executed, the Federal general would be compelled to save his army as best he could by retreat. Preparatory to the execution of this plan General J. E. B. Stuart was ordered to make a reconnoissance in the rear of the Federal position. This officer, with a force of about 1,000 cavalry, executed his instructions with great boldness and success. He made the entire circuit of the Federal army and gained much important information, … captured many prisoners and destroyed Federal stores to the value of $7,000,000. … His design being confirmed by Stuart's successful reconnoissance, Lee proceeded to organize a force requisite for the accomplishment of his proposed enterprise. The troops that could be conveniently spared from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia were ordered to Richmond. … At the same time General Jackson was ordered to withdraw secretly from the Valley and proceed with such expedition as would enable him to reach Hanover Junction by the afternoon of the 25th of June. In order to mask his designs from the Federals, Lee directed Whiting's division and Lawton's brigade to proceed to Staunton, apparently with the view of reinforcing Jackson, but really under orders to return immediately and join that general on the 25th at Hanover Junction. This movement further strengthened McClellan in his opinion of Lee's vastly superior force, and completely blinded him in regard to the real intentions of that general. General Lee determined to attack the Federal right wing on the morning of the 26th of June."

A. L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, page 169.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (June-July: Virginia). The Peninsular Campaign: The Seven Days Battle and Retreat. Mechanicsville. Gaines' Mill. Savage Station. Glendale.' Malvern Hill.

"Since the battle of Fair Oaks the Second Corps (Sumner) had remained on the right bank of the Chickahominy, where it had been followed in the month of June by the Sixth Corps (Franklin). So that only the Fifth Corps (Porter) remained on the left bank, recently reënforced by McCall's division. All the efforts of the enemy were made there, and there the great seven days' contest commenced. On the 26th of June, A. P. Hill, preceding Jackson by twenty-four hours, endeavored to force the passage of Beaver Dam Creek, defended by the Pennsylvanians under McCall. He was repulsed with considerable loss on the Mechanicsville road. But, during the night, Porter was compelled to fall back to a position more tenable against a force become much superior to his own, Jackson and Longstreet having united against his lines. On the 27th, then, the Fifth Corps, with about 25,000 men, was assailed by 70,000 Confederates on Gaines' Mill Heights, and defended itself there obstinately, until our own cavalry came fatally to the enemy's aid. Unskilfully handled and roughly repulsed, it fell back in disorder on our lines, where it put everything into confusion, artillery and infantry. The Confederates, coming on at the charge, finished the overthrow, and the Fifth Corps would have been destroyed if the coming of the night had not enabled our decimated troops to cross to the right bank of the Chickahominy, destroying the bridges behind them. [This battle, called Gaines' Mill by the Federals, was named Cold Harbor, or Chickahominy, by the Rebels.] … As soon as Porter had crossed safely on the 28th, the general retreat commenced. Keyes crossed White Oak swamp first, and took position to protect the passage of the immense army trains and the great herds of cattle. Then, on the 29th, after having repulsed a cavalry attack, he continued his way towards the James, where he arrived on the 30th, at the same time that Porter reached Haxall's Landing. Much less favored, the three other corps suspended their march only to fight and ceased to fight only to march. But all this was done without any general system, in the absence of superior supervision, and of orders in accordance with circumstances. On the 29th the enemy crossed the Chickahominy to unite all his force on the right bank; Franklin advised Sumner, and the two, acting together, fell back on Savage Station, where they took up position, with the intention, aided by Heintzelman, of repelling the dangerous attack which menaced them. But Heintzelman, adhering to his general instructions, after destroying the material of the railroad, the provisions, munitions of war, arms and baggage that there was neither time nor means of carrying away, hastened to cross White Oak swamp, uncovering Sumner's left. The latter learned of the retreat of the Third Corps only from a furious attack by the enemy on the very side which he believed protected by Heintzelman. He did not the less sustain the shock with an unshakable solidity, and fought all the afternoon with four divisions without being broken at any point. {3471} The enemy, worn out by the useless attacks, retired at nightfall. Then only did he receive any news from McClellan; under the form of an order to Sumner to fall back, along with Franklin, to the other side of White Oak swamp, abandoning our general hospitals at Savage Station, and the 2,500 sick and wounded in them. On the Morning of the 30th, Jackson presented himself, to cross the swamp after us. He found the bridge destroyed, and endeavored to force a passage at several points. He was everywhere repulsed and kept in check the whole day by the obstinate resistance of Franklin, while farther on, towards the James, Longstreet was held by Heintzelman and McCall, who prevented him from cutting our army in two at Glendale. This was not done without hard fighting. The Confederates, arriving by the New Market road at a right angle to the Quaker road, which was our line of march, struck, in the first place, the Pennsylvania reserves, broke their line, outflanking it on the right and on the left, captured a battery of artillery, and pushed resolutely on through that dangerous breach. They then struck Hooker's division, which threw them obliquely on Sumner's Corps. Soon afterward, Kearney occupied the vacant space, and, as on the evening before, the sun set with the rebels unsuccessful. [This day's battle is variously named after Glendale, New Market, Frazier's Farm, and Nelson's Farm.] But, the same evening, Franklin, left without orders, and seeing his position was becoming more and more dangerous, abandoned White Oak swamp and fell back towards the James. At that news, which was promptly sent to him from several directions, Heintzelman sent in vain to headquarters to ask for instructions. Left to his own devices, he concluded that the wisest course was to follow the retrograde movement, and retreated with his corps. Sumner still remained, and, seeing himself left alone and without support, he decided, in his turn, to do as the others had done. On the morning of the 31st, he arrived on the Malvern Heights, where the three corps, the Second, Third, and Sixth, found themselves united, not, as has been benevolently said, by the wise combinations of General McClellan, but by the fortunate inspiration of the commanders, who had received no orders to that effect. 'At daylight,' said General Sumner, in his testimony before the Congressional committee, 'I called on General McClellan, on the banks of the James. He told me that he had intended that the army should hold the position it had the night before, and that no order for retreat had been sent; but that, since the rest of the army had fallen back, he was glad that I had done the same.' It was found that the plateau of Malvern Hill was admirably formed for a defensive position. General Humphreys, of the corps of topographical engineers, was ordered to examine the position, and he traced a formidable line with the left resting at Haxall's Landing on the James, where it was protected by the gun-boats, while the right was thrown back on some fields covered with thick woods, and cut up by marshy streams. The summits and slopes of the plateau were bristling with cannon, sweeping the plain over the heads of our infantry deployed in front of them. In that position, the army awaited a last attack. The enemy played there his last card, and lost the game. … He tried his fortune and gave battle July 1. On every point his columns were thrown back in disorder, crushed in every attack by the double fire of artillery and infantry. Dash was not enough now. On this occasion, the enemy was compelled to acknowledge himself beaten and incapable of pursuing us any further. But our men were slow to believe in success. On receiving the order, a few hours later, after night had put an end to the contest, to retire to Harrison's Landing, they naturally concluded that we were not strong enough to hold out long against the enemy. … Worn out by fatigue and fighting, exhausted by privations and by vigils, discouraged, and suspecting that it was not fortune alone that had betrayed them, they dragged themselves along without order … during that last night march, which had all the character of a rout."

R. de Trobriand, Four Years with the Army of the Potomac, chapter 13.

"If McClellan deserves sharp criticism for not having sooner made up his mind, and still more for his failure to discover and use the absence of the Confederates in his front, where his advance in mass, according to General Magruder's officially expressed opinion, 'would have insured his success, and the occupation of the works about Richmond, and consequently the city,' his character as a commander never shone so brightly as in the hour of disaster and danger, when Porter's wing was driven in upon his centre. The ill-success of his campaign as a whole has caused his conduct at this crisis to be done scant justice to. But there is no military reputation in the world which would not be increased by the manner in which that retreat to the James was conducted from the moment it began."

C. C. Chesney, Essays in Military Biog., page 114.

ALSO IN: W. Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, chapters 12-17.

A. S. Webb, Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 3: The Peninsula, chapter 9.

_F. J. Porter, W. B. Franklin, D. H. Hill, and others, The Seven Days' Fighting (Battles and Leaders, volume 2)._

G. B. McClellan, Complete Report, part 2.

Official Records, series 1, volume 11, parts. 1-2.

_Report of Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War (Senate Reports, 37th Congress, 3d session, volume 2, part 1)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (June-October: Tennessee-Kentucky). Ineffective dispersion of Western armies. Failure to secure Chattanooga and Vicksburg. Bragg's invasion of Kentucky. The race for Louisville. Battle of Perryville. End of Buell's campaign.

"We left the Federals in possession of Corinth and Memphis, the army of Beauregard disappearing in the depths of semi-tropical forests where the Tombigbee takes its source, and Montgomery's ships lying at the bottom of the Mississippi.

See, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (APRIL-MAY: TENNESSEE-MISSISSIPPI) and (JUNE: ON THE MISSISSIPPI).

The part to be played by the Federal fleets was fully laid out; Farragut, by ascending the river, and Davis, by descending it, were to endeavor to join hands and destroy all the obstacles which still obstructed its course. What, in the mean time, was the large army encamped at Corinth going to do? It had allowed Beauregard to escape at the very moment when it felt sure of crushing him; but it could yet strike some decisive blows either to eastward or westward, the Confederates being nowhere sufficiently numerous to make any strong opposition. {3472} Eastward, Mitchell had forced open the way to Chattanooga and approached the gap which opens south-east of that town, before which, at a subsequent period, so much blood was shed at the battles of Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge. He was master of the passes of the Tennessee, and the Federals, stationed at Corinth, could reach Chattanooga much more speedily than their adversary encamped at Tupelo. They might probably conquer by the same stroke the whole upper course of the river which waters this town. Westward, the Federals could sweep both sides of the Mississippi, cause all the Confederate works which defended them to fall, and perhaps prevent the enemy from erecting the formidable citadels of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the capture of which, at a later period, cost so dear. … Everything … was in favor of prompt and vigorous action. But Halleck divided his army, and, notwithstanding the resources he had at his disposal, allowed his adversaries to forestall him everywhere. … The army of the Ohio left Corinth on the 10th of June, and Buell was ordered to proceed with it in the direction of Chattanooga, where Mitchell was beginning to be sorely pressed; but this movement was slowly executed. Sherman, at the head of his own division and that of Hurlbut, proceeded toward Memphis, dropping detachments of troops as far as Holly Springs to cover his left flank. The rebuilding of the Mobile Railway, which had been completely destroyed by the enemy, was a considerable undertaking. Begun on the 9th of June, it was only finished on the 26th. The Confederates had profited by this delay. The new general-in-chief, Braxton Bragg [who had superseded Beauregard], had boldly divided his army and abandoned the position of Tupelo, which Halleck still believed him to occupy. He had determined to cover at once the two points we have already indicated as being of the greatest importance for the future of the war, Chattanooga and Vicksburg. He proceeded toward the first with all the old army of Johnston, consisting of the corps of Hardee and Polk, as rapidly as the difficulties of communication in that portion of the Southern States allowed. He had the merit and good fortune to reach Chattanooga before Buell. It was not too soon, for a few days previous, the 7th of June, the Federal General Negley, with his single brigade and some cannon, had nearly taken possession of this city by surprise. Bragg found it of great advantage to transfer the war to the vicinity of Chattanooga. Master of this position, indeed, he could menace either Tennessee or Kentucky, Nashville or Louisville and wrest from the Federals all the conquests they had achieved during the last few months by taking them in rear. He was also drawing near Virginia."

Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 2, book 2, chapter 3.

"Halleck soon leaves for Washington to assume supreme control of the Union forces from the War Department. Grant is left in command of the Army of the Tennessee, Buell of the Army of the Ohio, Pope of the Army of the Mississippi. Everyone is without definite instructions; there is no one head; and the Western armies are practically put upon the defensive. Rosecrans succeeds Pope, who is transferred to Virginia, and to Grant's lot now fall the armies of the Mississippi and Tennessee, 42,000 effectives, with which to keep open his communications with Buell and guard the railroad from Memphis to Decatur. While Grant and Sherman devote their energies to the line of the Mississippi, Buell is ordered to regain East Tennessee, where the loyal population is in extreme suffering. Mitchell's [General O. M. Mitchell] capture of Huntsville [in Alabama, which he surprised, by a remarkable forced march, from Nashville, in April], and some hundred miles of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which he had held, together with all territory north of the Tennessee river, had been full of possibilities. Had he but received the authority, he might readily have anticipated Bragg in taking possession of Chattanooga, and have saved much subsequent blood and treasure. For this town is the key to that entire strategic field. … Buell supposed that Bragg would attempt to turn his right in order to obtain possession of Nashville. He therefore concentrated the bulk of his force at Murfreesboro. Thomas, then commanding a wing of the Army of the Ohio, whose military intuitions were as keen as his judgment was reliable, … was shrewd enough to recognize Bragg's crossing of the Tennessee river as a threat to invade Kentucky. Not so Buell, to his sorrow. By a sudden movement, Bragg steals a march around Buell's left, through the Sequatchie Valley [August 28], and marches straight toward Louisville, while Kirby Smith turns Cumberland Gap, defeats Nelson at Richmond, and makes for Cincinnati. … Thoroughly alarmed, as is also the country, Buell at once swings his left in pursuit of Bragg, while he endeavors to retain his grasp on Nashville with his right. Bragg has the shorter line and the start. But he is delayed a day or two [September 16-17] by the capture of Mumfordsville, and by scattering his forces instead of pushing home. This is a serious fault on Bragg's part. He fairly holds success in his hand, but forfeits it by this delay. After some rapid marching and manœuvring, Buell enters Louisville just ahead of his opponent. The authorities in Washington have lost all confidence in Buell. He is summarily relieved from command and Thomas appointed to succeed him. But this magnanimous soldier, though far from always agreeing with the methods of his chief, declines the proffered honor, and, at his earnest solicitation, Buell is reinstated. The Army of the Ohio marches out to meet Bragg, with Thomas second in command. Bragg expects to defend the line of the Kentucky and Duck rivers, but divides his forces, leaving Kirby Smith near Frankfort. Buell makes a demonstration upon Bragg's communications. After some cautious feeling, Buell comes upon Hardee with only 15,000 men, at Perryville, where, had he at once attacked, he could have punished Bragg severely for this division. But, owing to lack of water, one-half of Buell's army is distant from the field, and he in turn pays the penalty of lack of concentration. Polk joins Hardee, and the latter [October 8] falls heavily upon McCook, who holds Buell's left, and bears him back. But he cannot break the Union centre; and after a stubborn conflict Bragg retires, leaving to our forces the field. Our left has not been engaged. The loss is nearly 5,000 men on either side, a quarter of the numbers actually engaged. On being followed up, Bragg retreats through Cumberland Gap, and leaves Kentucky and Tennessee once more in our possession. His retreat ends only at Chattanooga. {3473} What Bragg expected to obtain in Kentucky was a vast accession of recruits and horses, as did Lee in Maryland. Both fell short of their calculations, though Bragg carried off a goodly train of supplies. Forgetful of what he had really done, the South was bitter in its criticism of Bragg's failure to hold Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky. … Halleck now insists that Buell shall undertake a campaign in East Tennessee, still occupied by the enemy. But Buell alleges the utter impossibility of subsisting his troops so far from the railroad; and again concentrates at Nashville. Here he is relieved [October 30] and General Rosecrans is appointed to the command."

T. A. Dodge, Bird's-Eye View of Our Civil War, chapter 15.

ALSO IN: _D. C. Buell, J. Wheeler, and others, The Perryville Campaign (Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

T. B. Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, chapters 12-15 (volume 1).

_J. B. Fry, Operations of the Army under Buell._

Official Records, series 1, volume 16.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July). Three hundred thousand more.

On the 2d of July, 1862, the President issued his proclamation calling for 300,000 volunteers.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July). Land-grant for agricultural and mechanical Colleges.

See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1862.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July). Prescription of the Ironclad Oath. See IRONCLAD OATH.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July). The fitting out of the Rebel cruiser, Alabama, at Liverpool.

See ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1862-1864.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July). Confiscation of the property of rebels, giving freedom to their slaves.

Immediately on the assembling of Congress at its regular session in December, 1861, "Mr. Trumbull of Illinois introduced a bill, providing that the slaves of all who had taken up arms against the United States should 'become forever thereafter free, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.' … On the 25th of February it came up for general debate, which was very extended. … Divergences of views, even among those who had been most prominent and pronounced in their antislavery action, and the general drift of the discussion, seemed to preclude any reasonable hope of agreement upon any motion or measure then before the Senate. It was therefore moved by Mr. Clark of New Hampshire to refer the whole matter, the original bill, and all motions, amendments, and substitutes, to a select committee. This, too, gave rise to a sharp debate. … The motion was carried by a vote of 24 to 14; and the committee, consisting of Clark, Collamer, Trumbull, Cowan, Wilson, Harris, Sherman, Henderson, and Willey, was appointed. Mr. Trumbull declining, Mr. Harlan was appointed in his place. The committee reported 'a bill to suppress insurrection, and punish treason and rebellion'; and on the 16th of May it came up for consideration. Its main provision was that at any time after the passage of the act, the President might issue his proclamation that the slaves of persons found, 30 days after the issuing of the proclamation, in arms against the government, will be free, any law or custom to the contrary; that no slave escaping from his master shall be given up, unless the claimant proves he has not given aid or comfort to the Rebellion; and that the President shall be authorized to employ persons of African descent for the suppression of the Rebellion. … The bill was further debated, but did not reach a vote. In the House a substantially similar course was pursued. On the first day of the regular session Mr. Eliot of Massachusetts introduced a resolution confiscating the property and freeing the slaves of those engaged in the Rebellion. It did not, however, come up for consideration till the close of the following week. … A motion was finally made and carried to refer the whole subject to a select committee of seven, consisting of Olin, Eliot, Noell, Hutchins, Mallory, Beaman, and Cobb. Mr. Olin was excused, and Mr. Sedgwick of New York was appointed in his place. On the 14th of May Mr. Eliot from the committee reported two bills,—the one confiscating Rebel property, and the other freeing the slaves of Rebels,—and opened the debate on 'the twin measures of confiscation and emancipation.' … On the 26th of May Mr. Eliot closed the debate, and the two bills he had reported from the special committee were brought to a vote. The first, or that providing for the confiscation of Rebel property, was passed by a strong majority. The second, or that freeing the slaves of Rebels, coming up for action, the first business was the disposal of the several amendments that had been offered. The amendments having all been voted down, the original bill was lost by a vote of 74 to 78. That vote was, however, reconsidered and the bill was recommitted. On the 18th of June Mr. Eliot moved a substitute for the bill reported by the committee, which was accepted by the House, and the bill, as thus amended, was passed by a vote of 82 to 54. The gist of this bill consisted in the provision, that all slaves of persons found in rebellion 60 days after the President shall issue his proclamation should be free; and the President should appoint commissioners to carry its provisions into effect. The House confiscation bill was taken up in the Senate on the 23d of June. An amendment was moved by Mr. Clark combining confiscation and emancipation. The amendment was sharply debated, but was adopted on the 28th. The bill as amended was adopted by a vote of 28 to 13. The bill as thus amended was taken up in the House on the 3d of July, and the House non-concurred in the Senate's amendment. … A committee of conference was appointed, which reported, on the 11th, in substance the Senate amendment. The report was accepted by both bodies, … and the President gave it his approval on the 17th. It provided that all slaves of Rebels coming into the possession or under the protection of the government should be deemed captives of war, and made free; that fugitive slaves should not be surrendered; that no person engaged in the military or naval service should render fugitives on pain of being dismissed from the service; and that the President might employ persons of the African race for the suppression of the Rebellion in such manner as he might deem best."

H. Wilson, History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America, volume 3, chapter 25.

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, volume 1, pages 373-377.

E. McPherson, Political History of the United States during the Rebellion, pages 196-203.

{3474}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July-August: Virginia). The end of the Peninsular Campaign. The army at Harrison's Landing. Results of the Seven Days fighting. Withdrawal from the Peninsula.

"On reaching Harrison's Landing there were scarcely 50,000 men in the ranks, but on the 4th of July, when the corps commanders made their reports, it was found that the net losses of the army since the 20th of June amounted to 15,249 men, of whom 1,582 had been killed, 7,700 wounded, and 5,958 missing. This last figure comprised, besides prisoners, all the soldiers who had been left on the field of battle, whose fate, whether killed or wounded, could not be ascertained; to this number may be added, without exaggeration, 6,000 sick or lame who had gone to the hospital in consequence of the excessive fatigues of the preceding days. McClellan therefore found himself with about 84,000 men under arms, not counting those who had just joined him. The losses of Lee's army during the seven days amounted to 20,000 men, to which number must also be added at least 5,000 rendered unfit for active service by the same causes which had operated with his adversaries; this army, therefore, had undergone a diminution of 25,000 men. This was more than one-fourth of its effective force on the 26th of June. An interlude was to follow this great struggle. While McClellan was fortifying himself at Harrison's Landing, Lee, hampered like himself by the difficulty of subsisting his army, was obliged to fall back as far as the environs of Richmond. … In the estimation of those who did not allow themselves to be troubled by foolish alarms and were not blinded by party prejudices, McClellan's situation was far from bad. … Planted on the James, McClellan could, either by ascending this river or by seizing upon Petersburg, strike much deadlier blows at Richmond than when his army lay across the Chickahominy, far from any water communication. Such was the position of the two armies about the 7th of July. On this day the steamer coming from Fortress Monroe landed a passenger at Harrison's Landing, whose dress, as simple as his manners, did not at first attract any attention, but in whom people soon recognized President Lincoln. He had come to consult with the commander of the army of the Potomac about the measures to be adopted under those grave circumstances. … On the occasion of his interview with McClellan at Harrison's Landing, the latter had so thoroughly demonstrated the importance of that position that [the President] went back fully determined to allow the chief of the army of the Potomac full freedom of action. But General Halleck … claimed for himself, as commander-in-chief [lately so appointed], the exclusive direction of all the armies in the field, and Mr. Lincoln, conscious of his own incompetency, submitted to this new authority." Measures taken during July for placing the army of the Potomac again upon the offensive were altered on the 3d of August, when Halleck gave orders to McClellan to transfer his army with all possible expedition to Aquia Creek, on the Potomac, for the support of General Pope and the Army of Virginia.

Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 2, book 1, chapter 4 and book 3, chapter 1.

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 5, chapter 24.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July-August: Virginia). The beginning of Pope's campaign: Cedar Mountain, or Cedar Run.

"While Lee and McClellan were resting, important events were taking place at Washington and in Northern Virginia. The Federal administration, satisfied of the impolicy of the separate departments and independent commands which they had organized in that region, had determined to unite under one leader the three armies of Banks, Fremont, and McDowell, which Jackson had beaten or baffled in succession. … Their united armies were henceforth to be styled the Army of Virginia, while McClellan's forces continued to be known as the Army of the Potomac. General John Pope, whose deeds and still more his dispatches in the West, had given him some reputation, was called to Washington and placed at the head of the new army. General Pope was assigned to command on the 26th of June. … The unification of these commands under Pope was followed by another and still more important change of the same kind. The dissatisfaction of the Federal administration with General McClellan had been steadily growing for many months. This officer's caution often exposed him, and sometimes not unjustly, to the charge of timidity. … No doubt other causes, such as his moderation and his conservative political views, rendered him distasteful to the progressive radicals who at this time predominated in Mr. Lincoln's cabinet; but it must be confessed that McClellan's military conduct was not such as to inspire confidence or diminish antagonisms, and it, alone, is sufficient to account for the manner in which he was treated by his government. … After the Seven Days' Battles, the Federal government called General Halleck from the West … and placed him in chief command of the armies of the United States, the position from which McClellan had been deposed in March. The order assigning General Halleck was dated July 11, but the latter did not arrive in Washington and enter upon his duties until Ju]y 23. By this appointment it was designed to give a common head to the two armies in Virginia, and insure the cooperation of McClellan and Pope. The first great question that presented itself to Halleck was, what to do with McClellan's forces, and on the day after assuming command he left Washington to visit this army. The visit seems to have satisfied him of the propriety of withdrawing the Army of the Potomac at once from the Peninsula, and of placing it on the line of the Rappahannock. … During the month of Ju]y, while McClellan was resting at Westover, General Pope, though in Washington, was not idle. Having devoted some days to the reorganization and equipment of his command, he directed the concentration of the mass of his forces at the eastern base of the Blue Ridge Mountains in Rappahannock County, from which position he could cover the approach to Washington, or threaten the flank of any columns going toward the Shenandoah Valley, while he prepared for an aggressive campaign. … General Lee on July 13 ordered Jackson with the veteran troops of his own and Ewell's division to Gordonsville to oppose Pope's advance. The force thus sent numbered about 11,000 men. Robertson's brigade of cavalry, which was already in Pope's front, added 1,000 or 1,200 more. General Lee remained with some 65,000 men between McClellan and Richmond. General Jackson reached the vicinity of Gordonsville on July 19. His arrival was opportune. The Federal reconnoitring parties had already advanced through Culpeper to the Rapidan, and on July 14 Banks had been ordered to send forward all his cavalry under Hatch to seize Gordonsville."

William Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, chapter 20.

{3475}

"After ascertaining that the enemy were in large force under General Pope … Jackson applied to General Lee for reinforcements. The division of A. P. Hill was immediately sent to him, and, with this accession to his small army, Jackson had no intention of remaining idle or of awaiting an attack from so powerful a foe, but determined to strike a blow himself before the enemy had time to concentrate all their forces. He therefore advanced towards them on the 7th of August. Before taking this step, it was observed that he was much in prayer, but this was his custom previous to every battle. … Pope's army was gathering in all its strength at Culpepper Court-House, and on the 9th of August Jackson's little army came in contact with his advance-guard about six miles from the Court-House, on the borders of a little stream called Cedar Run. Here hostilities began by a furious cannonade on both sides, lasting two hours, when, about five o'clock in the afternoon, the infantry of both armies became hotly engaged. The conflict was fierce and stubborn, but the overwhelming numbers of the enemy swept down with such impetuosity that the weaker party were forced to yield, and it looked as if it were doomed to destruction. Ewell, Early, A. P. Hill, Winder, and other commanders all fought their bravest and best—the gallant Winder receiving a mortal wound—and still they were pressed back. 'It was at this fearful moment,' says his late chief-of-staff, Dr. Dabney, 'that the genius of the storm reared his head, and in an instant the tide was turned, Jackson appeared in the mid-torrent of the highway, … he drew his own sword (the first time in the war), and shouted to the broken troops with a voice which pealed higher than the roar of battle: "Rally, brave men, and press forward! Your general will lead you! Jackson will lead you† Follow me!" This appeal was not in vain, and the Federals, startled by this unexpected rally, were driven from the field. They afterwards made an attempt to retrieve the fortunes of the day, which they had so nearly won, by an assault from a magnificent body of cavalry, but even this was repelled, and the troopers driven in full retreat.' … This battle of Cedar Run [called Cedar Mountain by the Unionists] Jackson himself pronounced the most successful of his exploits. … In this battle the Confederates had between eighteen and twenty thousand men engaged, while the Federals, according to their own returns, had thirty-two thousand. Jackson, however, had one incalculable advantage over the enemy, which he gained by his promptitude in seizing and holding Slaughter's Mountain—an elevation which commanded all the surrounding plains, and enabled him to overlook the whole scene of action. … It was to the advantage of this position as well as the bravery of his troops that he was indebted for his complete success. By this victory Pope received such a blow that he was deterred from making another advance until he could gather reinforcements. Burnside's corps was withdrawn from North Carolina and sent on to Culpepper Court-House, and it was believed that McClellan's remaining forces would be recalled from James River and sent also to swell the ranks of the grand 'Army of Virginia,' as the command of Pope was called. At all events, General Lee was convinced that McClellan was incapable of further aggression, and that the most effective way to dislodge him from the Peninsula was to threaten Washington! He therefore determined to move his army from Richmond to Gordonsville. He began his march on the 13th, and four days after, on the 17th, McClellan evacuated the Peninsula and removed his troops to the Potomac." Pope's army was withdrawn behind the Rappahannock. "General Lee now ordered Jackson to cross the Rappahannock high up, and by a forced march go to Manassas and get in Pope's rear. Other divisions were sent to Pope's front, and the two hostile armies marched along on either side of the stream, opening fire upon each other whenever the opportunity offered. Jackson continued his march up stream until he reached Warrenton Springs, on the 22d, where he found the bridge destroyed, but he passed Early's brigade over on a mill-dam, and took possession of the Springs. Before other troops could be crossed to his support, a sudden and heavy rainfall swelled the river so as to render it impassable, and Early was thus cut off from his friends and surrounded by the enemy. His situation was one of extreme peril, but he managed to conceal his troops in the woods, and hold his foes at bay with artillery, until Jackson had constructed a temporary bridge, and by the dawn of the morning of the 24th the gallant Early, with his command, had recrossed the river without the loss of a man. While a fierce artillery duel was going on across the river between A. P. Hill and the enemy, Jackson left the river-bank a few miles, and marched to the village of Jeffersonton. He was thus lost sight of by the Federals, and to Longstreet was given the task of amusing Pope by the appearance of a crossing at Warrenton Springs. Jackson was now preparing to obey Lee's order to separate himself from the rest of the army, pass around Pope to the westward, and place his corps between him and Washington at Manassas Junction.

Mrs. M. A. Jackson, Life and letters of General Thomas J. Jackson, chapter 17.

ALSO IN: G. H. Gordon. History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia, chapters 1-3.

W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, Popular History of the United States, volume 4, chapter 19.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July-September: Missouri-Arkansas). Warfare with the Rebel Guerrillas.

"Since the autumn of 1861, General J. M. Schofield, Lyon's second at the battle of Wilson's Creek, had been in command of the militia of Missouri, and in June, 1862, that State was erected into a separate military district, with Schofield at its head. He was vigilant and active; but when Curtis withdrew to the Mississippi, and left Arkansas and Southern Missouri open to the operations of guerrilla bands, then numerous in the western part of the former State, he found his forces inadequate to keep down the secessionists in his district. When Price crossed the Mississippi, early in May, he sent back large numbers of Missourians to recruit guerrilla bands for active service during, the summer, and these, at the middle of July, were very numerous in the interior, and were preparing to seize important points in the State. To meet the danger, Schofield obtained authority from the Governor to organize all the militia of the State. {3476} This drew a sharp dividing line between the loyal and disloyal inhabitants. He soon had 50,000 names on his rolls, of whom nearly 20,000 were ready for effective service at the close of July, when the failure of the campaign against Richmond so encouraged the secessionists in Missouri that it was very difficult to keep them in check. Schofield's army of volunteers and militia was scattered over Missouri in six divisions, and for two months a desperate and sanguinary guerrilla warfare was carried on in the bosom of that Commonwealth, the chief theater being northward of the Missouri River, in McNeill's division, where insurgent bands under leaders like Poindexter, Porter, Cobb, and others, about 5,000 strong, were very active." They were also aided by incursions from Arkansas, under Hughes, Coffey and other leaders. The encounters were many and fierce. At Kirksville, August 6, and Chariton River, four days later, the loyal forces achieved considerable victories; at Independence (which was captured) August 11, and at Lone Jack, about the same time, they suffered defeat. These were the principal engagements of the month. With the cooperation of General Blunt, commanding in Kansas, the Arkansas invasion was driven back. Missouri was now somewhat relieved, but the Confederates were gathering in force in Arkansas, where they were joined by conscripts from Southern Missouri and a large number of troops from Texas. Their entire number was estimated to be 50,000 at the middle of September, with General T. C. Hindman in chief command. … So threatening was this gathering that Schofield took the field in person, and General Curtis succeeded him in command of the District of Missouri." Schofield's vanguard, under General Salomon, encountered the enemy at Newtonia, September 30, and was defeated; but the Confederates retreated before the united forces of Schofield and Blunt and "were chased about 30 miles into Arkansas."

B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the Civil War, volume 2, chapter 20.

ALSO IN: Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 2, book 4, chapter 3.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (August). Draft of Militia for nine months.

By proclamation, August 4, the President ordered a draft of 300,000 militia, for nine months service unless sooner discharged.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (August). President Lincoln's "policy" explained to Horace Greeley.

"Executive Mansion, Washington, August 22, 1862. Hon. Horace Greeley. Dear Sir: I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself through the New York 'Tribune.' If there be in it any statements or assumptions of fact which I may know to be erroneous, I do not, now and here, controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not, now and here, argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend whose heart I have always supposed to be right. As to the policy I 'seem to be pursuing,' as you say, I have not meant to leave anyone in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be the Union as it was.' If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free. Yours, A. Lincoln."

Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, page 227-228.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (August: Virginia.) General Pope's campaign: Stonewall Jackson's movement into the rear of the Federal Army.

"By the capture of Pope's papers [effected in a raid of Stuart's cavalry to the Federal rear] Lee gained an accurate knowledge of the situation of the Federal army. Acting on it, he ordered Jackson to advance his corps to Jeffersonton and secure the bridge over the Rappahannock at Warrenton Springs. … Jackson, on arriving at Jeffersonton in the afternoon of the 22d, found that the bridge on the Warrenton turnpike had been destroyed by the Federals. … On the 23d Lee ordered Longstreet's corps to follow Jackson and mass in the vicinity of Jeffersonton. The headquarters of the army was also moved to that place. … General Longstreet made a feint on the position of Warrenton on the morning of the 24th, under cover of which Jackson's corps was withdrawn from the front to the vicinity of the road from Jeffersonton to the upper fords of the Rappahannock. Jackson was then directed to make preparations to turn the Federal position and seize their communications about Manassas Junction. Longstreet continued his cannonade at intervals throughout the day, to which the Federals replied with increasing vigor, showing that Pope was massing his army in Lee's front. It was the object of Lee to hold Pope in his present position by deluding him with the belief that it was his intention to force a passage of the river at that point, until Jackson by a flank movement could gain his rear. Longstreet, on the morning of the 25th, resumed his cannonade with increased energy, and at the same time made a display of infantry above and below the bridge. Jackson then, moved up the river to a ford eight miles above; crossing at that point and turning eastward, by a rapid march he reached the vicinity of Salem. Having made a march of 25 miles, he bivouacked for the night. Stuart's cavalry covered his right flank, the movement being masked by the natural features of the country. The next morning at dawn the march was resumed by the route through Thoroughfare Gap. The cavalry, moving well to the right, passed around the west end of Bull Run Mountain and joined the infantry at the village of Gainesville, a few miles from the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. {3477} Pressing forward, still keeping the cavalry well to the right, Jackson struck the railroad at Bristoe Station late in the afternoon, where he captured two empty trains going east. After dark he sent a detachment under Stuart to secure Manassas Junction, the main depot of supplies of the Federal army. The cavalry moved upon the flanks of this position, while the infantry, commanded by Trimble, assaulted the works in front and carried them with insignificant loss, capturing two batteries of light artillery with their horses and a detachment of 300 men, besides an immense amount of army supplies. The next morning, after effectually destroying the railroad at Bristoe, Jackson … moved his main body to Manassas, where he allowed his troops a few hours to refresh themselves upon the abundant stores that had been captured. About 12 o'clock the sound of artillery in the direction of Bristoe announced the Federal advance. Not having transportation to remove the captured supplies, Jackson directed his men to take what they could carry off, and ordered the rest to be destroyed. General Ewell, having repulsed the advance of two Federal columns [at Bristoe Station], rejoined Jackson at Manassas. The destruction of the captured stores having been completed, Jackson retired with his whole force to Bull Run, and took a position for the night, a part of his troops resting on the battle-field of the previous year. Pope, … upon learning that Jackson was in his rear, … immediately abandoned his position on the Rappahannock and proceeded with al despatch to intercept him before he could be reinforced by Lee. His advance having been arrested on the 27th by Ewell, he did not proceed beyond Bristoe that day. Lee on the 26th withdrew Longstreet's corps from its position in front of Warrenton Springs, covering the withdrawal by a small rear-guard and artillery, and directed it to follow Jackson by the route he had taken the day before. … The corps bivouacked for the night in the vicinity of Salem. On the morning of the succeeding day, the 27th, a messenger appeared bringing the important and cheering news of the success of Jackson at Bristoe and Manassas. … Thoroughfare Gap was reached about noon of the 28th. It was quickly found to be occupied by a Federal force. Some slight attempt was made to dislodge the enemy, but without success, as their position proved too strong, and it seemed as if the movement of the Confederate army in that direction was destined to be seriously interfered with. Meanwhile, nothing further had been heard from Jackson, and there was a natural anxiety in regard to his position and possible peril. … Under these critical circumstances General Lee made every effort to find some available route over the mountains," and had already succeeded in doing so when his adversary saved him further trouble. "Pope … had ordered McDowell to retire from the Gap and join him to aid in the anticipated crushing of Jackson. McDowell did so, leaving Rickett's division to hold the Gap. In evident ignorance of the vicinity of Longstreet's corps, this force was also withdrawn during the night, and on the morning of the 29th Lee found the Gap unoccupied, and at once marched through at the head of Longstreet's column. … Pope had unknowingly favored the advance of the Confederate commander. His removal of McDowell from his position had been a tactical error of such magnitude that it could not well be retrieved. … The cannonade at the Gap on the 28th had informed Jackson of Lee's proximity. He at once took a position north of the Warrenton turnpike, his left resting on Bull Run. … About three o'clock the Federals bore down in heavy force upon Ewell and Taliaferro, who maintained their positions with admirable firmness, repelling attack after attack until night. The loss on both sides was considerable. … Jackson, with barely 20,000 men, now found himself confronted by the greater part of the Federal army. Any commander with less firmness would have sought safety in retreat. But having heard the Confederate guns at Thoroughfare Gap, he knew that Lee would join him the next day. Therefore he determined to hold his position at all hazards. By the morning of the 29th … Hood's division had reached the south side of the mountain, and early in the day was joined by the remainder of Longstreet's corps, by way of the open Gap. While these important movements were in progress, Pope had resumed his attack upon Jackson. … On the arrival of Lee, Pope discontinued his attack, and retired to the position which the year before had been the scene of the famous battle of Bull Run, or Manassas."

A. L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, chapter 11.

ALSO IN: _R. L. Dabney, Life and Campaigns of General Thomas J. Jackson._

G. H. Gordon, History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia, chapters 4-10.

_W. B. Taliaferro, Jackson's Raid around Pope (Battles and Leader, volume 2, pages 501-511)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (August-September: Virginia). The end of General Pope's campaign: Groveton. Second Bull Run. Chantilly.

"By contradictory orders and the useless marches and counter-marches they involved, Pope's opportunity was thrown away, and instead of fighting Jackson's corps alone, it was the entire army of Lee with which he had to deal,—this, too, with his forces very much out of position, and he himself ignorant both of his own situation and that of the enemy. When, towards noon [August 29], Pope, coming from Centreville, reached the field near Groveton, he found the situation as follows: Heintzelman's two divisions, under Hooker and Kearney, on the right, in front and west of the Sudley Springs road; Reno and Sigel holding the centre,—Sigel's line being extended a short distance south of the Warrenton turnpike; Reynolds with his division on the left. But the commander was ignorant of the whereabouts of both Porter and McDowell, and he knew not that Longstreet had joined Jackson! The troops had been considerably cut up by the brisk skirmishing that had been going on all morning. An artillery contest had also been waged all forenoon between the opposing lines; but it was at long range and of no effect. The position of the troops in front of Jackson's intrenched line was one that promised very little success for a direct attack, and especially for a partial attack. Nevertheless, at three o'clock, Pope ordered Hooker to assault. The attempt was so unpromising that that officer remonstrated against it; but the order being imperative, he made a very determined attack with his division," and was driven back. {3478} "Too late for united action, Kearney was sent to Hooker's assistance, and he also suffered repulse. Meanwhile, Pope had learnt the position of Porter's command, and, at half-past four in the afternoon, sent orders to that officer to assail the enemy's right flank and rear,—Pope erroneously believing the right flank of Jackson, near Groveton, to be the right of the Confederate line. Towards six, when he thought Porter should be coming into action, he directed Heintzelman and Reno to assault the enemy's left. The attack was made with vigor, especially by Kearney," but the enemy brought up heavy reserves and repelled the assault. "Turning now to the left, where Porter was to have assailed the Confederate left [right], it appears that the order which Pope sent at half-past four did not reach Porter till about dusk. He then made dispositions for attack, but it was too late. It is, however, more than doubtful that, even had the order been received in time, any thing but repulse would have resulted from its execution. … Contrary to Pope's opinion, he [Porter] had then, and had had since noon, Longstreet's entire corps before him. So, as firing now died away in the darkling woods on the right, a pause was put for the day to the chaos and confusion of this mismanaged battle [known as the battle of Groveton], in which many thousand men had fallen on the Union side. It would have been judicious for General Pope, in the then condition of his army, to have that night withdrawn across Bull Run and taken position at Centreville, or even within the fortifications of Washington. By doing so he would have united with the corps of Franklin and Sumner, then between Washington and Centreville. … With untimely obstinacy, Pope determined to remain and again try the issue of battle. To utilize Porter's corps, he drew it over from the isolated position it had held the previous day to the Warrenton road. … Now, by one of those curious conjunctures which sometimes occur in battle, it so was that the opposing commanders had that day formed each the same resolution: Pope had determined to attack Lee's left flank, and Lee had determined to attack Pope's left flank. And thus it came about that when Heintzelman pushed forward to feel the enemy's left, the refusal of that flank by Lee, and his withdrawal of troops to his right for the purpose of making his contemplated attack on Pope's left, gave the impression that the Confederates were retreating up the Warrenton turnpike towards Gainesville. … Pope … telegraphed to Washington that the enemy was 'retreating to the mountains,'—a dispatch which, flashed throughout the land, gave the people a few hours, at least, of unmixed pleasure. To take advantage of the supposed 'retreat' of Lee, Pope ordered McDowell with three corps—Porter's in the advance—to follow up rapidly on the Warrenton turnpike, and 'press the enemy vigorously during the whole day.' But no sooner were the troops put in motion to make this pursuit of a supposed flying foe, than the Confederates, hitherto concealed in the forest in front of Porter, uncovered themselves." The result of this misdirected movement was a fatal check, Porter's troops being fearfully cut up and driven back. "Jackson immediately took up the pursuit, and was joined by a general advance of the whole Confederate line—Longstreet extending his right so as, if possible, to cut off the retreat of the Union forces." In this attempt, however, he was foiled, and "under cover of the darkness the wearied troops retired across Bull Run, by the stone bridge, and took position on the heights of Centreville. Owing to the obscurity of the night, and the uncertainty of the fords of Bull Run, Lee attempted no pursuit." The engagement of this day is called the Second Battle of Bull Run, or the Second Battle of Manassas, as it was named by the Confederate victors. "At Centreville, Pope united with the corps of Franklin and Sumner, and he remained there during the whole of the 31st. But Lee had now yet given up the pursuit. Leaving Longstreet on the battle-field, he sent Jackson by a detour on Pope's right, to strike the Little River turnpike, and by that route to Fairfax Courthouse; to intercept, if possible, Pope's retreat to Washington. Jackson's march was much retarded by a heavy storm that commenced the day before and still continued. Pope, meantime, fell back to positions covering Fairfax Courthouse and Germantown; and on the evening of the 1st of September, Jackson struck his right, posted at Ox Hill." The short but severe action which then occurred (called the battle of Chantilly) was indecisive. Jackson's attack was repelled, but the repulse cost the lives of two excellent officers of high rank and reputation, Generals Kearney and Stevens, besides many men. "On the following day, September 2d, the army was, by order of General Halleck, drawn back within the lines of Washington."

W. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, pages 184-193.

"The Second Battle of Bull Hun … was a severe defeat for General Pope; but it was nothing else. It was not a rout, nor anything like a rout. … Lee claims to have captured in these engagements 30 pieces of artillery and 7,000 unwounded prisoners."

J. C. Ropes, The Army under Pope (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 4), chapters 8-11.

ALSO IN: G. H. Gordon, History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia, chapters 11-13.

_The Virginia Campaign of General Pope (Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers, volume 2)._

_J. Pope, The Second Battle of Bull Run (Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 449-494)._

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 12, part 2._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September: Maryland). Lee's first invasion: His cold reception and disappointment.

"The defeat of General Pope opened the way for movements not contemplated, probably, by General Lee, when he marched from Richmond. … He accordingly determined to advance into Maryland—the fortifications in front of Washington, and the interposition of the Potomac, a broad stream easily defended, rendering a movement in that direction unpromising. On the 3d of September, therefore, and without waiting to rest his army, which was greatly fatigued with the nearly continuous marching and fighting since it had left the Rapidan, General Lee moved toward Leesburg, crossed his forces near that place, and to the music of the bands playing the popular air, 'Maryland, my Maryland,' advanced to Frederick City, which he occupied on the 7th of September. Lee's object in invading Maryland has been the subject of much discussion. … It can only be said that General Lee, doubtless, left the future to decide his ultimate movements; meanwhile he had a distinct and clearly-defined aim, which he states in plain words. {3479} His object was to draw the Federal forces out of Virginia. … The condition of affairs in Maryland, General Lee says, 'encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington Government to retain all its available force to provide for contingencies which its course toward the people of that State gave it reason to apprehend,' and to cross the Potomac 'might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their liberty.' It may be said, in summing up on this point, that Lee expected volunteers to enroll themselves under his standard, tempted to do so by the hope of throwing off the yoke of the Federal Government, and the army certainly shared this expectation. The identity of sentiment generally between the people of the States of Maryland and Virginia, and their strong social ties in the past, rendered this anticipation reasonable, and the feeling of the country at the result afterward was extremely bitter. Such were the first designs of Lee; his ultimate aim seems as clear. By advancing into Maryland and threatening Baltimore and Washington, he knew that he would force the enemy to withdraw all their troops from the south bank of the Potomac, where they menaced the Confederate communications with Richmond; when this was accomplished, as it clearly would be, his design was, to cross the Maryland extension of the Blue Ridge, called there the South Mountain, advance by way of Hagerstown into the Cumberland Valley, and, by thus forcing the enemy to follow him, draw them to a distance from their base of supplies, while his own communications would remain open by way of the Shenandoah Valley. … The Southern army was concentrated in the neighborhood of Frederick City by the 7th of September, and on the next day General Lee Issued an address to the people of Maryland. … This address, couched in terms of such dignity, had little effect upon the people. Either their sentiment in favor of the Union was too strong, or they found nothing in the condition Of affairs to encourage their Southern feelings. A large Federal force was known to be advancing; Lee's army, in tatters, and almost without supplies, presented a very uninviting appearance to recruits, and few joined his standard, the population in general remaining hostile or neutral. … Lee soon discovered that he must look solely to his own men for success in his future movements. He faced that conviction courageously; and, without uttering a word of comment, or indulging in any species of crimination against the people of Maryland, resolutely commenced his movements looking to the capture of Harper's Ferry and the invasion of Pennsylvania."

J. E. Cooke, Life of Robert E. Lee, part 5, chapters 1-2.

ALSO IN: A. L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, chapter 12.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September: Maryland). Lee's first invasion: Harper's Ferry. South Mountain. Antietam.

"On the 2d of September the President went to General McClellan's house in Washington, asked him to take command again of the Army of the Potomac, in which Pope's army had now been merged, and verbally authorized him to do so at once. The first thing that McClellan wanted was the withdrawal of Miles's force, 11,000 men, from Harper's Ferry—where, he said, it was useless and helpless—and its addition to his own force. All authorities agree that in this he was obviously and unquestionably right; but the marplot hand of Halleck intervened, and Miles was ordered to hold the place. Halleck's principal reason appeared to be a reluctance to abandon a place where so much expense had been laid out. Miles, a worthy subordinate for such a chief, interpreted Halleck's orders with absolute literalness, and remained in the town, instead of holding it by placing his force on the heights that command it. As soon as it was known that Lee was in Maryland, McClellan set his army in motion northward, to cover Washington and Baltimore and find an opportunity for a decisive battle. He arrived with his advance in Frederick on the 12th, and met with a reception in striking contrast to that accorded to the army that had left the town two days before. … But this flattering reception was not the best fortune that befell the Union army in Frederick. On his arrival in the town General McClellan came into possession of a copy of General Lee's order, dated three days before, in which the whole campaign was laid out. … General Lee had taken it for granted that Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry would be evacuated at his approach (as they should have been); and when he found they were not, he had so far changed or suspended the plan with which he set out as to send back a large part of his army to capture those places and not leave a hostile force in his rear." This was easily accomplished by Jackson and McLaws, the latter of whom took possession of the heights commanding the town, where Miles waited to be trapped. "A bombardment the next day compelled a surrender when Jackson was about to attack. General Miles was mortally wounded by one of the last shots. About 11,000 men were included in the capitulation, with 73 guns. … Jackson, leaving the arrangements for the sur·render to A. P. Hill, hurried with the greater part of his force to rejoin Lee, and reached Sharpsburg on the morning of the 16th. The range known as the South Mountain, which is a continuation of the Blue Ridge north of the Potomac, is about 1,000 feet high. The two principal gaps are Turner's and Crampton's, each about 400 feet high, with the hills towering 600 feet above it. When McClellan learned the plans of the Confederate commander, he set his army in motion to thwart them. He ordered Franklin's corps to pass through Crampton's Gap and press on to relieve Harper's Ferry; the corps of Reno and Hooker, under command of Burnside, he moved to Turner's Gap. The movement was quick for McClellan, but not quite quick enough for the emergency. He might have passed through the Gaps on the 13th with little or no opposition, and would then have had his whole army between Lee's divided forces, and could hardly have failed to defeat them disastrously and perhaps conclusively. But he did not arrive at the passes till the morning of the 14th; and by that time Lee had learned of his movement and recalled Hill and Longstreet, from Boonsboro and beyond, to defend Turner's Gap, while he ordered McLaws to look out for Crampton's. … There was stubborn and bloody fighting all day, with the Union forces slowly but constantly gaining ground, and at dark the field was won," at both the passes. The two engagements were called the battle of South Mountain by the Federals, the Battle of Boonsboro by the Confederates. {3480} At Turner's Gap there was a loss of about 1,500 on each side, and 1,500 Confederates were made prisoners; at Crampton's Gap, the loss in killed and wounded was some 500 on each side, with 400 Confederate prisoners taken. The Union army had forced the passage of the mountains, but Lee had gained time to unite his scattered forces. "He withdrew across the Antietam, and took up a position on high ground between that stream and the village of Sharpsburg. … Lee now had his army together and strongly posted. But it had been so reduced by losses in battle and straggling that it numbered but little over 40,000 combatants. … McClellan had somewhat over 70,000 men. … The ground occupied by the Confederate army, with both flanks resting on the Potomac, and the Antietam flowing in front, was advantageous. The creek was crossed by four stone bridges and a ford, and all except the northernmost bridge were strongly guarded. The land was occupied by meadows, cornfields, and patches of forest, and was much broken by outcropping ledges. McClellan only reconnoitered the position on the 15th. On the 16th he developed his plan of attack, which was simply to throw his right wing across the Antietam by the upper and unguarded bridge, assail the Confederate left, and when this had sufficiently engaged the enemy's attention and drawn his strength to that flank, to force the bridges and cross with his left and centre. … All day long an artillery duel was kept up. … It was late in the afternoon when Hooker's corps crossed by the upper bridge, advanced through the woods, and struck the left flank, which was held by two brigades of Hood's men. Scarcely more than a skirmish ensued, when darkness came on, and the lines rested for the night where they were." At sunrise, next morning, Hooker assaulted Jackson and was seriously wounded in the fighting which followed. Sumner's corps finally joined in the attack, and all the forenoon the battle was desperate in that part of the field. "But while this great struggle was in progress on McClellan's right, his centre and left, under Porter und Burnside, did not make any movement to assist. At noon Franklin arrived from Crampton's Gap, and was sent over to help Hooker and Sumner, being just in time to check a new advance by more troops brought over from the Confederate right. At eight o'clock in the morning Burnside had been ordered to carry the bridge in his front, cross the stream, and attack the Confederate right. But, though commanded and urged repeatedly, it was one o'clock before he succeeded in doing this, and two more precious hours passed away before he had carried the ridge commanding Sharpsburg and captured the Confederate battery there. Then came up the last division of Lee's forces (A. P. Hill's) from Harper's Ferry, 2,000 strong, united with the other forces on his left, and drove Burnside from the crest and re-took the battery. Here ended the battle; not because the day was closed, or any apparent victory had been achieved, but because both sides had been so severely punished that neither was inclined to resume the fight. Every man of Lee's force had been actively engaged, but not more than two thirds of McClellan's. The reason why the Confederate army was not annihilated or captured must be plain to any intelligent reader. … General McClellan reported his entire loss at 12,469, of whom 2,010 were killed. General Lee reported his total loss in the Maryland battles as 1,567 killed and 8,724 wounded, saying nothing of the missing; but the figures given by his division commanders foot up 1,842 killed, 9,399 wounded, and 2,292 missing—total 13,533. … Nothing was done on the 18th, and when McClellan determined to renew the attack on the 19th, he found that his enemy had withdrawn from the field and crossed to Virginia by the ford at Shepherdstown. The National commander reported the capture of more than 6,000 prisoners, 13 guns, and 39 battle-flags, and that he had not lost a gun or a color. As he was also in possession of the field … and had rendered Lee's invasion fruitless of anything but the prisoners carried off from Harper's Ferry, the victory was his."

R. Johnson, Short History of the War of Secession, chapter 12.

ALSO IN: _F. W. Palfrey, The Antietam and Fredericksburg (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 5)._

Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 2, book 3, chapter 4.

F. A. Walker, History of the Second Army Corps, chapter 4.

A. Woodbury, Burnside and the 9th. Army Corps, part 2, chapters 2-3.

Official Records, series 1, volume 19.

G. B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, chapters 33-38.

_D. H. Hill, J. D. Cox, J. Longstreet, and others, Lee's Invasion of Maryland (Battles and Leaders, volume 2)._

W. Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, chapters 37-48.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September). President Lincoln's Preliminary Proclamation of Emancipation, and the attitude of Northern parties on the Slavery question.

Abraham Lincoln "believed that without the Union permanent liberty for either race on this continent would be impossible. And because of this belief, he was reluctant, perhaps more reluctant than most of his associates, to strike slavery with the sword. For many months, the passionate appeals of millions of his associates seemed not to move him. He listened to all the phases of the discussion, and stated in language clearer and stronger than any opponent had used, the dangers, the difficulties, and the possible futility of the act. In reference to its practical wisdom, Congress, the Cabinet, and the country were divided. Several of his generals had proclaimed the freedom of slaves within the limits of their commands. The President revoked their proclamations. His first Secretary of War had inserted a paragraph in his annual report advocating a similar policy. The President suppressed it. On the 19th of August, 1862, Horace Greeley published a letter addressed to the President, entitled 'The Prayer of Twenty Millions,' in which he said, 'On the face of this wide earth, Mr. President, there is not one disinterested, determined, intelligent champion of the Union cause who does not feel that all attempts to put down the rebellion and at the same time uphold its inciting cause are preposterous and futile.' To this the President responded in that ever memorable reply of August 22, in which he said:—'If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or to destroy slavery. {3481} If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it. If I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it,—and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe that what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I believe doing more will help the cause.' Thus, against all importunities on the one hand and remonstrances on the other, he took the mighty question to his own heart, and, during the long months of that terrible battle-summer, wrestled with it alone. But at length he realized the saving truth, that great unsettled questions have no pity for the repose of nations. On the 22d of September, he summoned his Cabinet to announce his conclusion. It was my good fortune, on that same day, and a few hours after the meeting, to hear, from the lips of one who participated, the story of the scene. As the chiefs of the Executive Departments came in, one by one, they found the President reading a favorite chapter from a popular humorist. He was lightening the weight of the great burden which rested upon his spirit. He finished the chapter, reading it aloud. And here I quote, from the published Journal of the late Chief Justice, an entry, written immediately after the meeting, and bearing unmistakable evidence that it is almost a literal transcript of Lincoln's words: 'The President then took a graver tone and said: "Gentlemen I have, as you are aware, thought a great deal about the relation of this war to slavery; and you all remember that, several weeks ago, I read to you an order I had prepared upon the subject, which, on account of objections made by some of you, was not issued. Ever since then my mind has been much occupied with this subject, and I have thought all along that the time for acting on it might probably come. I think the time has come now. I wish it was a better time. I wish that we were in a better condition. The action of the army against the rebels has not been quite what I should have best liked. But they have been driven out of Maryland, and Pennsylvania is no longer in danger of invasion. When the rebel army was at Frederick, I determined as soon as it should be driven out of Maryland to issue a proclamation of emancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I said nothing to any one, but I made a promise to myself and (hesitating a little) to my Maker. The rebel army is now driven out, and I am going to fulfil that promise. I have got you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish your advice about the main matter, for that I have determined for myself. This I say without intending anything but respect for any one of you. But I already know the views of each on this question. They have been heretofore expressed, and I have considered them as thoroughly and carefully as I can. What I have written is that which my reflections have determined me to say. If there is anything in the expressions I use, or in any minor matter which any of you thinks had best be changed, I shall be glad to receive your suggestions. One other observation I will make, I know very well that many others might, in this matter as in others, do better than I can; and if I was satisfied that the public confidence was more fully possessed by any one of them than by me, and knew of any constitutional way in which he could be put in my place, he should have it. I would gladly yield it to him. But though I believe I have not so much of the confidence of the people as I had some time since, I do not know that, all things considered, any other person has more; and, however this may be, there is no way in which I can have any other man put where I am. I am here. I must do the best I can and bear the responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to take." The President then proceeded to read his Emancipation Proclamation, making remarks on the several parts as he went on, and showing that he had fully considered the subject in all the lights under which it had been presented to him.' The Proclamation was amended in a few matters of detail. It was signed and published that day."

J. A. Garfield, Works, volume 2, pages 538-540.

"I was alone with Mr. Lincoln more than two hours of the Sunday next after Pope's defeat in August, 1802. That was the darkest day of the sad years of the war. … When the business to which I had been summoned by the President was over—strange business for the time: the appointment of assessors and collectors of internal revenue—he was kind enough to ask my opinion as to the command of the army. The way was thus opened for conversation, and for me to say at the end that I thought our success depended upon the emancipation of the slaves. To this he said: 'You would not have it done now, would you? Must we not wait for something like a victory?' This was the second and most explicit intimation to me of his purpose in regard to slavery. In the preceding July or early in August, at an interview upon business connected with my official duties, he said, 'Let me read two letters,' and taking them from a pigeon-hole over his table he proceeded at once to do what he had proposed. I have not seen the letters in print. His correspondent was a gentleman in Louisiana, who claimed to be a Union man. He tendered his advice to the President in regard to the reorganization of that State, and he labored zealous]y to impress upon him the dangers and evils of emancipation. The reply of the President is only important from the fact that when he came to that part of his correspondent's letter he used this expression: 'You must not expect me to give up this government without playing my last card.' Emancipation was his last card. He waited for the time when two facts or events should coincide. Mr. Lincoln was as devoted to the Constitution as was ever Mr. Webster. In his view, a military necessity was the only ground on which the overthrow of slavery in the States could be justified. Next, he waited for a public sentiment in the loyal States not only demanding emancipation but giving full assurance that the act would be sustained to the end. As for himself, I cannot doubt that he had contemplated the policy of emancipation for many months, and anticipated the time when he should adopt it."

G. S. Boutwell, Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln by Distinguished Men of his Time, pages 123-125.

{3482}

"It was after all efforts for voluntary emancipation by the states interested, with pecuniary aid from the national treasury, had failed [that the President determined to decree emancipation in the rebellious states by a military order]. To Mr. Seward and myself the President communicated his purpose, and asked our views, on the 13th of July 1862. It was the day succeeding his last unsuccessful and hopeless conference with the representatives in Congress from the border slave states, at a gloomy period of our affairs, just after the reverses of our armies under McClellan before Richmond. The time, be said, had arrived when we must determine whether the slave element should be for or against us. Mr. Seward … was appalled and not prepared for this decisive step, when Mr. Lincoln made known to us that he contemplated, by an executive order, to emancipate the slaves. Startled with so broad and radical a proposition, he informed the President that the consequences of such an act were so momentous that he was not prepared to advise on the subject without further reflection. … While Mr. Seward hesitated and had the subject under consideration, the President deliberately prepared his preliminary proclamation, which met the approval, or at least the acquiescence, of the whole Cabinet, though there were phases of opinion not entirely in accord with the proceedings. Mr. Blair, an original emancipationist, and committed to the principle, thought the time to issue the order inopportune, and Mr. Bates desired that the deportation of the colored race should be coincident with emancipation. Aware that there were shades of difference among his counsellors, and hesitation and doubt with some, in view of the vast responsibility and its consequences, the President devised his own scheme, held himself alone accountable for the act, and, unaided and unassisted, prepared each of the proclamations of freedom."

G. Welles, Lincoln and Seward, pages 210-212.

The preliminary or monitory Proclamation of Emancipation, issued on the 22d of September, 1862, was as follows:

"'I. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relations between the United States and each of the States and the people thereof, in which States that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed. That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure, tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all the slave States, so-called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which States may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, the immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent, with their consent, upon this continent or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the governments existing there, will be continued. That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom. That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States, or parts of States if any, in which the people thereof, respectively, shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall, on that day, be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections, wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.' Then, after reciting the language of 'An act to make an additional article of war,' approved March 13, 1862, and also sections 9 and 10 of the Confiscation Act, approved July 17, 1862, and enjoining their enforcement upon all persons in the military and naval service, the proclamation concludes: 'And I do hereby enjoin upon and order all persons engaged in the military and naval service of the United States to observe, obey, and enforce, within their respective spheres of service, the acts and sections above recited. And the Executive will, in due time, recommend that all citizens of the United States, who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the rebellion, shall, upon the restoration of the constitutional relations between the United States and the people, if that relation shall have been suspended or disturbed, be compensated for all losses by acts of the United States, including the loss of slaves.'"

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 6, chapters 6 and 8.

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, volume 1, chapter 20.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September-October: Mississippi). Union successes under Grant. Iuka and Corinth.

"In July, Pope was ordered to Virginia, and on the 17th of that month Halleck was assigned to the command of all the armies, superseding McClellan. He repaired at once to Washington, and Grant was directed to establish his headquarters at Corinth. Grant's jurisdiction was not, however, enlarged by the promotion of Halleck: on the contrary, the new general-in-chief first offered the command of the Army of the Tennessee to Colonel Robert Allen, a quarter-master, who declined it, whereupon it was allowed to remain under Grant. He was, however, left somewhat more independent than while Halleck had heen immediately present in the field. Four divisions of his army (including Thomas's command), were within the next two months ordered to Buell, who was stretching out slowly, like a huge, unwieldy snake, from Eastport to Decatur, and from Decatur towards Chattanooga. This subtraction put Grant entirely on the defensive. He had possession of Corinth, the strategic point, but was obliged to hold the railroads from that place and Bolivar, north to Columbus, which last, on account of the low water in the Tennessee, he had made his base of supplies. … He remained himself eight weeks at Corinth, narrowly watching the enemy, who, commanded by Van Dorn and Price, harassed and threatened him continually.

{3483}

During this time, he directed the strengthening and remodelling of the fortifications of Corinth. … New works, closer to the town, were … erected. … Van Dorn at last determined to move part of his force (under Price), east of Grant, apparently with a view to crossing the Tennessee and reënforcing Bragg in the Kentucky campaign. Grant notified Halleck of the probability of such a movement, and of his intention to prevent it. … On the 13th [of September], Price advanced from the south and seized Iuka, 21 miles east of Corinth. … Grant had called in his forces some days before to the vicinity of Corinth, had repeatedly cautioned all his commanders to hold their troops in readiness, and when the enemy's cavalry moved towards Iuka, and cut the railroad and telegraph wires between that place and Burnsville, seven miles to the westward, Grant began his operations. Price was at Iuka, and Van Dorn four days off, to the southwest, threatening Corinth. Grant's object was to destroy Price, before the two could concentrate, and then to get back to Corinth and protect it against Van Dorn. He accordingly ordered Brigadier-General Rosecrans, whose troops were posted south of Corinth, to move by way of Renzi, along the south side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and attack Iuka from that direction; while Major-General Ord, with a force brought hurriedly from Bolivar and Jackson, was to push towards Burnsville, and from there take roads on the north side of the railroad, attacking Iuka from that quarter. Ord had 8,000 men, and Rosecrans reported 9,000, a greater force combined than Price had, according to Grant's estimate." Rosecrans's movement was delayed, and he was attacked (September 19) in heavy force as he neared Iuka, Ord's advance having been held back waiting for him. He kept his ground, but lost in the action a battery of artillery, besides 736 men, killed and wounded. That night the enemy retreated from Iuka, over a road which Rosecrans was expected to occupy, but did not. "By the battle of Iuka, the enemy was simply checked in his plans, not seriously crippled in his force. Price moved around by a circuitous route and joined Van Dorn, and the same state of affairs continued which had annoyed Grant for so many weeks. He put Rosecrans in command at Corinth, and Ord at Bolivar, and on the 23d of September removed his own headquarters to Jackson, from which point he could communicate more readily with all points of his district, including Memphis and Cairo. The rebels were in force at La Grange and Ripley. … At last it was rendered certain … that Corinth was to be the place of attack. Grant thereupon directed Rosecrans to call in his forces, and sent Brigadier-General McPherson to his support from Jackson, with a brigade of troops." He also "hurried Ord and Hurlbut by way of Pocahontas from Bolivar, 44 miles away, to be ready to strike Van Dorn in flank or rear, as he advanced, and at least to create a diversion, if they could not get into the town. On the 2d of October the rebel array, under Van Dorn, Price, Lovell, Villepigue, and Rust, appeared in front of Corinth. … On the 3d the fighting began in earnest. Rosecrans had about 19,000 men, and the enemy had collected 38,000 for this important movement, which was to determine the possession of northern Mississippi and West Tennessee. Rosecrans pushed out about five miles, towards Chewalla, Grant having ordered him to attack, if opportunity offered; but the enemy began the fight, and, on the afternoon of the 3d, the battle turned in favor of Van Dorn. Rosecrans was driven back to his defences on the north side of Corinth, and it was now found how important was the labor bestowed on these fortifications, by Grant's order, a month previous. The enemy was checked until morning; but, early on the 4th, the whole rebel army, flushed with the success of the day before, assaulted the works. The fighting was fierce; the rebels charging almost into the town, when an unexpected fire from the forts drove them back in confusion. Again and again, they advanced to the works, but each time were received with a determination equal to their own. Once, the national troops came near giving way entirely, but Rosecrans rallied them in person, and the rebels were finally repulsed before noon, with a loss admitted by themselves to be double that of Rosecrans. The national loss was 315 killed, 1,812 wounded, and 232 prisoners and missing. Rosecrans reported the rebel dead at 1,423, and took 2,225 prisoners. … The repulse was complete, by 11 o'clock in the morning, but unfortunately was not followed up by Rosecrans, till the next day. The rebels, however, started off in haste and disorder immediately after the fight; and on the 5th, while in full retreat, were struck in flank, as Grant had planned, by Hurlbut and Ord, and the disaster was rendered final. This occurred early on the morning of the 5th, at the crossing of the Hatchie river, about ten miles from Corinth. … A battery of artillery and several hundred men were captured, and the advance was dispersed or drowned. … Had Rosecrans moved promptly the day before, he would have come up in the rear of Van Dorn, either as he was fighting Ord, or while attempting to pass this defile [six miles up the stream, where Van Dorn finally made his crossing]. In either event, the destruction of the rebels must have been complete. … These two fights relieved the command of West Tennessee from all immediate danger."

A. Badeau, Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, volume 1, chapter 4.

"Satisfied that the enemy was retreating [on the 4th], I ordered Sullivan's command to push him with a heavy skirmish line, and to keep constantly feeling them. I rode along the lines of the commands, told them that, having been moving and fighting for three days and two nights, I knew they required rest, but that they could not rest longer than was absolutely necessary. I directed them to proceed to their camps, provide five days' rations, take some needed rest, and be ready early next morning for the pursuit."

_W. S. Rosecrans, The Battle of Corinth (Battles and Leaders, volume 2), page 753._

{3484}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September-December: Missouri-Arkansas). Social demoralizations of the Civil War. Battle of Prairie Grove.

"The dispersion and suppression of the guerrilla bands [in Missouri] did not serve wholly to terminate local disturbances and offenses. The restraints of a common public opinion no longer existed. Neighborhood good-will had become changed to neighborhood hatred and feud. Men took advantage of the license of war to settle personal grudges by all the violations of law, varying from petty theft to assassination; and parallel with this thirst for private revenge was the cupidity which turned crime into a source of private gain. … A rearrangement of military command appears in an order of the President under date of September 19, 1862, directing that Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and the bordering Indian Territory should constitute a new department to be called the Department of the Missouri, to be commanded by Major-General Samuel R. Curtis. … This new arrangement served to change the relative positions of Schofield and Curtis. The former, gathering what troops he could, took the field in a campaign towards Southwest Missouri to meet the expected invasion from Arkansas, while the latter, recalled from a short leave of absence, came to St. Louis (September 24, 1862) to take up his headquarters and assume the general administration of the new Department of the Missouri. … The difficulties in the military situation had grown primarily out of the error of Halleck … in postponing the opening of the Mississippi River. When, in the spring and summer of 1862, Halleck abandoned all thought of pursuing that prime and comprehensive object, and left Vicksburg to grow up into an almost impregnable Confederate citadel, he blighted the possibility of successful Union campaigns on both sides of the great river. … From the midsummer of 1862, therefore, until the fall of Vicksburg in midsummer of 1863, military campaigning in the trans-Mississippi country ceases to have any general significance. … The only action of importance which marks the military administration of Curtis was the battle of Prairie Grove in the northwest corner of Arkansas, where on the 7th of December the detachments respectively commanded by the Union generals James G. Blunt (who had been hovering all summer along the border of Kansas) and Francis J. Herron, who, finding Blunt pressed by the enemy coming northward with a view of entering Missouri, advanced by forced marches from near Springfield and formed a junction with Blunt just in the nick of time to defeat the Confederates under General Hindman. The losses on each side were about equal, and on the day following the engagement the Confederates retreated southward across the protecting barrier of the Boston Mountains. It was in a diminished degree a repetition of the battle of Pea Ridge, fought in the preceding March within 20 or 30 miles of the same place. … So effectually did this engagement serve to scatter the rebel forces that Schofield reported January 31, 1863, 'There is no considerable force of the enemy north of the Arkansas River; indeed I believe they have all gone or are going, as rapidly as possible, to Vicksburg. Ten thousand infantry and artillery can be spared from Southern Missouri and Northern Arkansas.'"

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 6, chapter 18.

ALSO IN: _W. Baxter, Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove._

O. J. Victor, History of the Southern Rebellion, division 10, chapter 4 (volume 3).

W. Britton, Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border, chapter 1.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (October-December: Virginia). The final removal of McClellan. Burnside at Fredericksburg.

"Both armies … felt the need of some repose; and, glad to be freed from each other's presence, they rested on their arms—the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley, in the vicinity of Winchester, and the army of the Potomac near the scene of its late exploits, amid the picturesque hills and vales of Southwestern Maryland. The movement from Washington into Maryland to meet Lee's invasion was defensive in its purpose, though it assumed the character of a defensive-offensive campaign. Now that this had been accomplished and Lee driven across the frontier, it remained to organize on an adequate scale the means of a renewal of grand offensive operations directed at the Confederate army and towards Richmond. The completion of this work, including the furnishing of transportation, clothing, supplies, etc., required upwards of a month, and during this period no military movement occurred, with the exception of a raid into Pennsylvania by Stuart. About the middle of October, that enterprising officer, with twelve or fifteen hundred troopers, crossed the Potomac above Williamsport, passed through Maryland, penetrated Pennsylvania, occupied Chambersburg, where he burnt considerable government stores, and after making the entire circuit of the Union army, recrossed the Potomac below the mouth of the Monocacy. He was all the way closely pursued by Pleasonton with 800 cavalry. … On the recrossing of the Potomac by Lee after Antietam, McClellan hastened to seize the débouehé of the Shenandoah Valley, by the possession of Harper's Ferry. … At first McClellan contemplated pushing his advance against Lee directly down the Shenandoah Valley, as he found that, by the adoption of the line east of the Blue Ridge, his antagonist, finding the door open, would again cross to Maryland. But this danger being removed by the oncoming of the season of high-water in the Potomac, McClellan determined to operate by the east side of the Blue Ridge, and on the 26th his advance crossed the Potomac by a ponton-bridge at Berlin, five miles below Harper's Ferry. By the 2d November the entire army had crossed at that point. Advancing due southward towards Warrenton, he masked the movement by guarding the passes of the Blue Ridge, and by threatening to issue through these, he compelled Lee to retain Jackson in the Valley. With such success was this movement managed, that on reaching Warrenton on the 9th, while Lee had sent half of his army forward to Culpepper to oppose McClellan's advance in that direction, the other half was still west of the Blue Ridge, scattered up and down the Valley, and separated from the other moiety by at least two days' march. McClellan's next projected move was to strike across obliquely westward and interpose between the severed divisions of the Confederate force; but this step he was prevented from taking by his sudden removal from the command of the Army of the Potomac, while on the march to Warrenton. Late on the night of November 7th, amidst a heavy snow-storm, General Buckingham, arriving post-haste from Washington, reached the tent of General McClellan at Rectortown. He was the bearer of the following dispatch, which he handed to General McClellan: … 'By direction of the President of the United States, it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take the command of that army.' … It chanced that General Burnside was at the moment with him in his tent. {3485} Opening the dispatch and reading it, without a change of countenance or of voice, McClellan passed over the paper to his successor, saying, as he did so: 'Well, Burnside, you are to command the army.' Thus ended the career of McClellan as head of the Army of the Potomac. … The moment chosen was an inopportune and an ungracious one; for never had McClellan acted with such vigor and rapidity-never had he shown so much confidence in himself or the army in him. And it is a notable fact that not only was the whole body of the army—rank and file as well his officers—enthusiastic in their affection for his person, but that the very general appointed as his successor was the strongest opponent of his removal."

_W. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, chapter 6, sections 2-3. _

"It is dangerous to shift commanders on the eve of battle, and our cavalry had already engaged the Confederates'; it is more dangerous to change the plans of troops moving in the vicinity of the enemy. But as if impelled to do some new thing … the new commander of the Army of the Potomac determined upon a flank movement by his left on the north of the river towards Fredericksburg. … Only by movements equally wary and rapid, as well as by sure means of crossing the river, could Burnside's manœuvre possibly succeed. In this last element he counted on Halleck, and, of course, failed. The promised pontoons did not, and could scarcely have been expected to come. Arrived at Fredericksburg Burnside still might have crossed by the fords, for the water was low. And once in possession of the heights beyond the city he could afford to wait. But, slower than even his predecessor, Burnside sat down at Falmouth, on the north side of the river, while Lee, having learned of his movement, by forced marches concentrated his army on the opposite bank, and prepared to erect impregnable defences in his front. … Before Burnside got ready to take any active steps, Marye's Heights, back of Fredericksburg, had been crowned by a triple line of works, and Lee had brought together nearly 90,000 troops to man them. Two canals and a stone wall in front of the left, as well as open, sloping ground on both flanks, served to retain an attacking party for a long period under fire. To assault these works in front was simple madness. To turn them below necessitated the crossing of a wide and now swollen river, in the face of a powerful enemy in his immediate front. … To turn them above was practicable, but it was a confessed return to McClellan's plan. Burnside chose the first. Preparations foe crossing were begun. The better part of three days [December 11-13] was consumed in throwing the bridges and putting over the two Grand Divisions of Franklin and Sumner, all of which was accomplished under fire. But Lee was by no means unwilling to meet the Army of the Potomac after this fashion. Such another happy prospect for him was not apt soon again to occur. He did not dispute the crossing in force. Burnside's one chance in a hundred lay in a concentrated assault sharply pushed home before the enemy could oppose an equal force. But in lieu of one well-sustained attack, or of two quite simultaneous, Burnside frittered away this single chance by putting in Franklin on the left and Sumner on the right, without concerted action." Both assaults were bloodily repulsed. "Hooker is ordered across. Under protest, and yet Hooker lacked not stomach for a fight, he obeys the useless order, and leads his men into the slaughter pen. … All is in vain. Even the Army of the Potomac cannot do the impossible. The defeated troops are huddled into Fredericksburg, and gradually withdrawn across the river. Burnside was insane enough to wish to repeat the assault next day. But the counsels of his officers prevailed on him to desist. No such useless slaughter, with the exception, perhaps, of Cold Harbor, occurred during our war, and 13,000 men paid the penalty. The enemy's loss was but one in three of ours."

T. A. Dodge, Bird's-Eye View of Our Civil War, chapter 21.

ALSO IN: A. Woodbury, Burnside and the Ninth Army Corps, part 2, chapters 4-8.

F. A. Walker, History of the Second Army Corps, chapters 5-6.

B. P. Poore, Life of Burnside, chapters 18-19.

Official Records, series 1, volume 21.

_J. Longstreet, D. N. Couch, and others, Burnside at Fredericksburg, (Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

_F. W. Palfrey, The Antietam and Fredericksburg (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 5), pages 129-135._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (December: On the Mississippi). The second attempt against Vicksburg. General Sherman and Admiral Porter. Miscarriage of Grant's plans.

"Rear-Admiral Porter took command of the Mississippi squadron in October, 1862. … Up to this time the gun-boats had, strictly speaking, been under the control of the Army, but now all this was changed, and the Mississippi Squadron, like all the other naval forces, was brought directly under the supervision of the Secretary of the Navy. … The new arrangement left the commander of the squadron at liberty to undertake any expedition he thought proper, and he was not in the least hampered by any instructions from the Navy Department. … Before Admiral Porter left Washington he was informed by the President that General McClernand had been ordered to raise an Army at Springfield, Illinois, to prosecute the siege of Vicksburg. The President expressed the hope that the rear-admiral would co-operate heartily with General McClernand in the operations to be carried on. But as Vicksburg never would have been taken if it had depended on General McClernand's raising an Army sufficient for the purpose, the Admiral, immediately on his arrival at Cairo, sent a message to General Grant, at Holly Springs, Mississippi, informing him of McClernand's intention; that he, Porter, had assumed command of the Mississippi Squadron, and was ready to cooperate with the Army on every occasion where the services of the Navy could be useful. A few days afterwards General Grant arrived at Cairo and proposed an expedition against Vicksburg, and asking the rear-admiral, if he could furnish a sufficient force of gun-boats, to accompany it. Grant's plan was to embark Sherman from Memphis, where he then was, with 30,000 soldiers, to be joined at Helena, Arkansas, by 10,000 more. Grant himself would march from Holly Springs with some 60,000 men upon Granada. General Pemberton would naturally march from Vicksburg to stop Grant at Granada, until reinforcements could be thrown into Vicksburg from the south, and while Pemberton was thus absent with the greater part of his Army, Sherman and Porter could get possession of the defences of Vicksburg. {3486} General Grant having been informed that the gun-boats would be ready to move at short notice, and having sent orders to Sherman to put his troops aboard the transports as soon as the gun-boats arrived in Memphis, returned immediately to Holly Springs to carry out his part of the programme. … The expedition from Memphis got away early in December, 1862. Commander Walke, in the 'Carondelet,' being sent ahead with [three iron-clads and two so-called 'tin-clads'] … to clear the Yazoo River of torpedoes and cover the landing of Sherman's Army when it should arrive. This arduous and perilous service was well performed," but one of the iron-clads engaged in it, the Cairo, was sunk by a torpedo. "General Sherman moved his transports to a point on the river called Chickasaw Bayou without the loss of a man from torpedoes or sharpshooters, his landing [December 27] being covered in every direction by the gunboats. Sherman first made a feint on Haines' Bluff, as if to attack the works, and then landed at Chickasaw Bayou. Owing to the late heavy rains he found the roads to Vicksburg heights almost impassable, and when he attempted to advance with his Army he was headed off by innumerable bayous, which had to be bridged, or corduroy roads built around them. It was killing work. Even at this time Vicksburg had been fortified at every point, and its only approaches by land led through dense swamps or over boggy open ground, where heavy guns were placed, so as to mow down an advancing Army. A general has seldom had so difficult a task assigned him, and there was little chance of Sherman's succeeding unless Pemberton had drawn off nearly all his forces to oppose Grant's advance on Granada. … Sherman and his Army overcame everything and at last reached terra firma. In the meanwhile the Navy was doing what it could to help the Army. … Grant had left Holly Springs with a large Army at the time he had appointed, merely with the design of drawing Pemberton from Vicksburg and thus helping Sherman in his attack on that place. … Grant moved towards Granada, and everything looked well; but the Confederate General, Earl Van Dorn, dashed into Holly Springs, 28 miles in the rear of the Union Army, capturing the garrison and all their stores. At the same time General Forrest pushed his cavalry into West Tennessee, cutting the railroad to Columbus at several points between that place and Jackson. … Due precautions had been taken to prevent this mishap by leaving a strong force behind at Holly Springs, but the commanding officer was not on the alert and his capture was a complete surprise. In this raid of the Confederates a million dollars' worth of stores were destroyed. Under the circumstances it was impossible for Grant to continue his march on Granada, which Pemberton perceiving, the latter returned to Vicksburg in time to assist in Sherman's repulse. … Sherman made all his arrangements to attack the enemy's works on the 20th of December, 1862, and the assault took place early on that day. One division succeeded in occupying the batteries on the heights, and hoped shortly to reach those commanding the city of Vicksburg, but the division that was to follow the advance was behind time and the opportunity was lost. A portion of Pemberton's Army had returned from Granada just in time to overwhelm and drive back the small force that had gained the hills. … The enemy did not follow, being satisfied with driving our troops from the heights, and there was nothing left for Sherman to do but to get his Army safely back to the transports."

D. D. Porter, Naval History of the Civil War, chapter 24.

ALSO IN: S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin, Sherman and his Campaigns, chapter 7.

W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, volume 1, chapter 11.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862-1863 (December-January: Tennessee). Bragg and Rosecrans. The Battle of Stone River, or Murfreesborough.

"The Confederate government was greatly disappointed with the issue of Bragg's campaign. Scarcely had he reached Chattanooga when he was ordered to move northward again. Rosecrans, on assuming command of Buell's army, … concentrated his forces at Nashville, and there accumulated large supplies. … Bragg had already reached Murfreesborough on his second northward march from Chattanooga. Rosecrans had given out that it was his intention to take up his winter quarters at Nashville, and Bragg, supposing that this would be the case, sent out strong detachments of cavalry under Morgan and Forrest, the former being ordered to break Rosecrans's communications. As it was about the season of Christmas, Murfreesborough was the scene of much gayety … and the giddy Confederates danced on floors carpeted with the American flag. Suddenly, on the 26th of December, Rosecrans moved. His march commenced in a heavy min. The Confederate outposts retired before his advance, the pressure upon them being so vigorous that they had not time to destroy the bridges on the Jefferson and Murfreesborough turnpikes. On the 30th, Bragg, finding he was about to be assailed, had concentrated his army a couple of miles in front of Murfreesborough. The position of the national army, which was 43,000 strong on the evening of that day, was on the west side of Stone River, a sluggish stream fringed with cedar brakes, and here flowing in a north-northwesterly course. The line ranged nearly north and south, and was three or four miles in length. Crittenden was on its left, with three divisions. Wood, Vancleve, Palmer; Thomas in the centre, with two divisions, Negley and Rousseau, the latter in reserve; McCook on the right with three, Sheridan, Davis, Johnson. The left wing touched the river. … Bragg's army, 62,000, stood between Rosecrans and Murfreesborough. … Breckinridge's division formed his right, in his centre, under Polk, were two divisions, those of Withers and Cheatham; on his left, under Hardee, two divisions, Cleburne and McCown. The river separated Breckinridge from the rest of the Confederate army. Rosecrans had concentrated two thirds of his force on his left. His intention was that his right wing, standing on the defensive, should simply hold its ground; but his extreme left, the divisions of Wood and Vancleve, crossing Stone River, should assail Breckinridge's division, exposed there, and seize the heights. … On his part, also, Bragg had determined to take the offensive. … Both intended to strike with the left, and therefore both massed their force on that wing. … In the dawn of the last day of the year (1862), while Rosecrans's left was rapidly crossing Stone River to make its expected attack, Bragg, with his left, had already anticipated him. Coming out of a fog which had settled on the battle-field, he fell furiously upon Johnson's division, and so unexpectedly that two of its batteries were taken before a gun could be fired. {3487} The Confederate success was decisive. Johnson's division, which was on the extreme national right, was instantly swept away. Davis, who stood next, was assailed in front and on his uncovered flank. He made a stout resistance, but the shock was too great; he was compelled to give way, with the loss of many guns. And now the triumphant Confederate left, the centre also coming into play, rushed upon the next division—but that was commanded by Sheridan. Rosecrans's aggressive movement was already paralyzed; nay, more, it had to be abandoned. He had to withdraw his left for the purpose of saving his right and defending his communications. He must establish a new line. The possibility of doing this—the fate of the battle—rested on Sheridan." He held his ground for an hour, until "the cartridge-boxes of his men were empty. The time had come when even Sheridan must fall back. But, if he had not powder, he had steel. The fixed bayonets of his reserve brigade covered him, and he retired, unconquered and unshaken, out of the cedar thicket toward the Nashville road. In this memorable and most glorious resistance he had lost 1,630 men. 'Here's all that are left,' he said to Rosecrans, whom he had saved and now met. After Sheridan had been pushed back, there was nothing for Negley but to follow. … Meantime, on a knoll in the plain to which these divisions had receded, Rosecrans had massed his artillery. He was forming a new line, in which the army would face southwestwardly, with the Nashville turnpike on its rear." Against this new line the Confederates dashed themselves, desperately but vainly, four times that day, and were repelled with horrible slaughter. "Bragg, unwilling to be foiled, now brought Breckinridge, who had hitherto been untouched, across the river to make a final attempt on Rosecrans's left flank with 7,000 fresh men. His first attack was repulsed; he made a second; it shared the same fate. So stood affairs when night came, … the closing night of 1862. On New Year's Day nothing was done; the two armies, breathless with their death-struggle, stood looking at each other. On January 2d Rosecrans was found, not retreating, but busily engaged in trying to carry out his original plan. He had made his position impregnable; he had thrown a force across Stone River, and, as he at first intended, was getting ready to crown with artillery the heights beyond the east bank. Hereupon Bragg brought Breckinridge back to his old position, ordering him to drive the enemy across the river—a task which that officer bravely tried, but only imperfectly accomplished, for the artillery on the opposite bank tore his division to pieces. In twenty minutes he lost 2,000 men. A violent storm prevented the renewal of the battle on the 3d. On that night Bragg, despairing of success, withdrew from Murfreesborough, retreating to Tullahoma. … In these dreadful battles the Confederates lost 14,700 men. On the national side there were killed 1,553, wounded more than 7,000, prisoners more than 3,000; more than one third of its artillery and a large portion of its train were taken. The losses were about one fourth of each army. Henceforth the Confederates abandoned all thought of crossing the Ohio River."

J. W. Draper, History of the American Civil War, chapter 53 (volume 2).

"The enemy in retiring did not fall back very far—only behind Duck River to Shelbyville and Tullahoma—and but little endeavor was made to follow him. Indeed, we were not in condition to pursue, even if it had been the intention at the outset of the campaign. … The victory quieted the fears of the West and Northwest, destroyed the hopes of the secession element in Kentucky, renewed the drooping spirits of the East Tennesseans, and demoralized the disunionists in Middle Tennessee; yet it was a negative victory so far as concerned the result on the battle-field. Rosecrans seems to have planned the battle with the idea that the enemy would continue passive, remain entirely on the defensive, and that it was necessary only to push forward our left in order to force the evacuation of Murfreesboro'. … Had Bragg followed up with the spirit which characterized its beginning the successful attack by Hardee on our right wing—and there seems no reason why he should not have done so—the army of Rosecrans still might have got back to Nashville, but it would have been depleted and demoralized."

P. H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, volume 1, chapters 12-14.

ALSO IN: _A. F. Stevenson, Battle of Stone's River._

T. B. Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, chapters 16-17 (volume 1).

Official Records, series 1, volume 20.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (January). The final Proclamation of Emancipation.

The immediate practical effect of the warning Proclamation of Emancipation issued by President Lincoln on the 22d of September, 1862, "did, perhaps, more nearly answer the apprehensions of the President than the expectations of those most clamorous for it. It did, as charged, very much 'unite the South and divide the North.' The cry of 'the perversion of the war for the Union into a war for the negro' became the Democratic watchword, and was sounded everywhere with only too disastrous effect, as was plainly revealed by the fall elections with their large Democratic gains and Republican losses. Indeed, it was the opinion of Mr. Greeley that, could there have been a vote taken at that time on the naked issue, a large majority would have pronounced against emancipation. But Mr. Lincoln did not falter. Notwithstanding these discouraging votes at the North, and the refusal of any Southern State to avail itself of the proffered immunity and aid of his Proclamation of September, he proceeded, at the close of the hundred days of grace allowed by it, to issue his second and absolute Proclamation, making all the slaves of the Rebel States and parts of States forever and irreversibly free." It was in the following words:

"Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to wit: 'That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any state, or designated part of a state, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom. {3488} That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the states and parts of states, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any state, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States, by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such state shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such state, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.' Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States, in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days from the day first above mentioned, order and designate, as the states and parts of states wherein the people thereof respectively are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit: Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre Bonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the city of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Ann, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted parts are for the present left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued. And, by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated states and parts of states are and henceforward shall be free; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free, to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defense; and I recommend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages. And I further declare and make known that such persons of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the United States, to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service. And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the eighty-seventh. Abraham Lincoln. By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State."

"Though the immediate effects of the Proclamation might not have answered all that was expected of it, it was not many months before its happy influences became manifest. Its tendency from the first was to unify and consolidate the antislavery and Christian sentiment of the land, to give dignity and consistency to the conflict. … It strengthened, too, the cause immensely with other nations, secured the sympathy and moral support of Christendom, and diminished, if it did not entirely remove, the danger of foreign intervention."

H. Wilson, History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, volume 3, chapter 28.

"Fame is due Mr. Lincoln, not alone because he decreed emancipation, but because events so shaped themselves under his guidance as to render the conception practical and the decree successful. Among the agencies he employed none proved more admirable or more powerful than this two-edged sword of the final proclamation, blending sentiment with force, leaguing liberty with Union, filling the voting armies at home and the fighting armies in the field. In the light of history we can see that by this edict Mr. Lincoln gave slavery its vital thrust, its mortal wound. It was the word of decision, the judgment without appeal, the sentence of doom."

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln. volume 6, chapter 19.

ALSO IN: O. J. Victor, History of the Southern Rebellion, division 10, chapter 9 (volume 3).

W. P. and F. J. Garrison, William Lloyd Garrison, volume 4. chapters 3-4.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (January: Arkansas). The capture of Arkansas Post, or Fort Hindman.

Sherman withdrew his troops from the attempt against Vicksburg on the 2d of January, and on the 4th he relinquished the command to General McClernand, who had come down the river with orders to assume it. On that same day "the expedition sailed on the same transports that had brought them from Vicksburg, convoyed by Admiral Porter's fleet of gunboats, to attack Fort Hindman, commonly known as Arkansas Post, an old French settlement situated on the left or north bank of the Arkansas River, 50 miles from its mouth and 117 below Little Rock. … The expedition moved up the White River through the cut-off which unites its waters with those of the Arkansas, up the latter stream to Notrib's farm, three miles below Fort Hindman. … By noon on the 10th the landing was completed, and the troops were on the march to invest the post. … The gunboats opened a terrific fire upon the enemy during the afternoon, to distract his attention. By nightfall the troops were in position." Next morning a combined attack began, which the garrison endured until 4 o'clock P. M. when the white flag was raised. "Our entire loss in killed was 129; in wounded, 831; and in missing, 17; total, 977. … By the surrender there fell into our hands 5,000 men. … After sending the prisoners to St. Louis, having destroyed the defences and all buildings used for military purposes, on the 15th of January the troops re-embarked on the transports and proceeded to Napoleon, Arkansas, whence on the 17th … they returned to Milliken's Bend."

S. M. Bowman and R B. Irwin, Sherman and his Campaigns, chapters 7-8.

{3489}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (January-April: Virginia). Command given to Hooker. President Lincoln's Letter to him. Demoralized state of the Army of the Potomac, and its improvement.

"General Burnside retired from a position he had never sought, to the satisfaction, and, be it said to his credit, with the warm personal regard of all. Sumner, whom the weight of years had robbed of strength, but not of gallantry, was relieved at his own request; Franklin was shelved. Hooker thus became senior general officer, and succeeded to the command. No man enjoyed a more enviable reputation in the Army of the Potomac. … His commands so far had been limited; and he had a frank, manly way of winning the hearts of his soldiers. He was in constant motion about the army while it lay in camp; his appearance always attracted attention; and he was as well known to almost every regiment as its own commander. He was a representative man. … Nothing shows more curiously a weak spot in Hooker's character than the odd pride he took in Mr. Lincoln's somewhat equivocal letter to him at the time of his appointment: … 'I have placed you [wrote the President] at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course, I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself; which is a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that, during General Burnside's command of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother-officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain success can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done or will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now, beware of rashness! Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward, and give us victories!' … Hooker was appointed Jan. 26, 1863; and Burnside, with a few earnest words, took leave of the army. The troops received their new chief with a heartiness and confidence which, since McClellan's re-instatement, had not been equalled. Hooker was to all the soul and embodiment of the growth and history of this weather-beaten Army of the Potomac. And the salutary changes he at once began to make,—for Hooker never lacked the power of organization—were accepted with alacrity; and a spirit of cheerful willingness succeeded speedily to what had been almost a defiant obedience. The army was in a lamentably low state of efficiency. Politics mingled with camp duties; and the disaffection of officers and men, coupled with an entire lack of confidence in the ability of the Army of the Potomac to accomplish anything, were pronounced. Desertions occurred at the rate of 200 a day. … Hooker states that he found 2,922 officers, and 81,964 enlisted men, entered as absent on the rolls of the army, a large proportion from causes unknown. Sharp and efficient measures were at once adopted, which speedily checked this alarming depletion of the ranks. … The testimony of all general officers of the Army of the Potomac concurs in awarding the highest praise to Hooker for the manner in which he improved the condition of the troops during the three months he was in command prior to Chancellorsville. … On the 30th of April the Army of the Potomac, exclusive of provost-guard, consisted of about 130,000 men under the colors,—'for duty equipped,' according to the morning report. … While the Army of the Potomac lay about Falmouth [opposite Fredericksburg], awaiting orders to move, Lee occupied the heights south of the Rappahannock, from Banks's Ford above to Port Royal (or Skenker's Neck), below Fredericksburg, a line some 15 miles in length as the crow flies. … Lee's forces numbered about 60,000 men, for duty."

T. A. Dodge, The Campaign of Chancellorsville, chapters 3-4.

ALSO IN: F. A. Walker, History of the 2nd Army Corps, chapter 7.

R. De Trobriand, Four Years with the Army of the Potomac, chapter 20.

[Image: Map of Vicksburg and Vicinity.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (January-April: On the Mississippi). Grant's Campaign against Vicksburg. Futile operations of the first four months.

"General Grant took personal command of the movement against Vicksburg on the 30th of January, 1863. … The first plan made was to dig a canal across the neck of land, or peninsula in front of Vicksburg,—below the city,—at a point where the isthmus was only a mile and a fifth in width. This had been begun before General Grant's arrival. If a canal could have been made large enough for large steamboats, then no matter how strong were the fortifications of Vicksburg, the boats would pass through, far away from their fire. So a canal ten feet wide and six deep was made here, in the hope that the freshets of the river would widen it, and so make it large enough for large steamers. But very little came of the canal. When the river did rise, it would not flow where it was meant to do. It flooded the camps of the workmen. Meanwhile the Rebels had made new batteries below it. Thus ended plan number one. Another similar plan, to open a route by Lake Providence and Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the Washita and Red River, did not succeed better. The canals attempted here were both on the west of the river. A very bold attempt was made on the east side, by what was known as the Yazoo Pass, into the Tallahatchee and Yazoo River. The expeditions sent out by this route would come out above Vicksburg; but it was hoped that thus the Rebel gunboats on the Yazoo River might be destroyed. If a practicable route were made here, the whole army could be moved to Haine's Bluff,—above Vicksburg,—an upland region very desirable for occupation. {3491} But nothing came of this movement, though some hard work and some hard fighting were done in it. What resulted of importance was, that the troops found their way into the granary from which Vicksburg had been fed; and in the resistance, many of the Rebels were destroyed. In such attempts February and March passed away. Meanwhile Admiral Farragut, of the navy, ran by the Rebel batteries at Port Hudson, so that he communicated with Grant below Vicksburg,—and Grant could communicate with General Banks, who was trying to do at Port Hudson what Grant was trying to do above. The distance from Vicksburg to Port Hudson is about 120 miles in a straight line, and more than twice that by the crooked river. Grant now determined to pass the city of Vicksburg on the west side of the river by marching his army by land—with the help of boats on some bayous if possible—from Milliken's Bend, which is twenty miles above Vicksburg, to New Carthage, which is about as far below. At his request Admiral Porter sent seven of his iron-clads, with three steamers and ten barges, down the river, past the Rebel batteries. They were well laden with forage and supplies. The crews of all but one refused to go. But volunteers from the army offered, enough to man a hundred vessels had they been needed. On a dark night of the 16th of April, led by Admiral Porter, they steamed down, with the barges in tow. They turned the bend without being noticed. Then the first batteries opened on them. The Rebels set fire to houses so as to light up the scene; and from the ships the crews could see the men at the batteries and in the streets of Vicksburg. Though every vessel was hit, all got by, except the Henry Clay steamer. Finding she was sinking, her commander cut off the barge he was towing, which drifted safely down, and, soon after, the vessel herself took fire. The crew escaped in their boats,—the vessel blazed up and lighted up all around. At last, however, after the boats had been under fire two hours and forty minutes, the whole fleet except the Henry Clay arrived safely below the batteries. Grant had thus secured, not only forage and stores, but the means of transportation. On the 26th of April five more vessels passed successfully, one being lost as before. Grant was now strong enough to cross the Mississippi River. His army had to march seventy miles on the west side by muddy roads, scarcely above the river line. He feared he might have to go as far down as a little town called Rodney for a good landing-place on the east side. But a friendly negro man, who knew the country, brought in information that there was a good road inland from Bruinsburg,—and so it proved. Grand Gulf, on the river, where the Rebels had a post, was still between Grant and Bruinsburg. Porter attacked it with his gunboats, and Grant was ready to land 10,000 troops to storm the place if the batteries were silenced. But Porter did not succeed. Grant therefore marched his troops down on the west side of the river. Porter ran by Grand Gulf with transports in the night, and, on the morning of the 30th of April, Grant crossed the river with 10,000 men. They did not carry a tent nor a wagon. General Grant and his staff went without their horses. It was said afterwards that his whole baggage was a toothbrush! Other divisions followed, and on the 3d of May he left the river, and marched, not directly on Vicksburg, but more inland, to cut off all communication with that city. His army took three days' rations with them, and relied principally for provisions on the stores in the rich country through which they marched."

E. E. Hale, Stories of War told by Soldiers, chapter 7.

ALSO IN: _F. V. Greene, The Mississippi (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 8), chapter 4._

U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, volume 1, chapters 31-32.

_G. W. Brown, The Mississippi Squadron and the Siege of Vicksburg (Personal Recollections of the War: New York Com. L. L. of the United States)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D.1863(February-April: Tennessee). Engagements at Dover and Franklin.

"In February [on the 3d], General Wheeler, Bragg's chief of Cavalry, tried to capture Fort Donaldson, so as to stop the navigation of the Cumberland River, by which some of Rosecrans's supplies came in steamboats to Nashville. The fort had not been repaired after its capture by Grant, but the Village of Dover near it had been fortified, and it was then held by Colonel A. C. Harding with about 600 men. The Union men fought bravely, and in the evening the gunboat Fair Play came up and opened a fire on the Confederates which drove them away in confusion, with a loss of more than 500 men. Harding's loss was 126. Early in March, General Van Dorn appeared near Franklin [a little below Nashville] with a large force of mounted men. Colonel Colburn, of the 33d Indiana, moved Southward from Franklin with 2,700 men. Van Dorn and Forrest met him, and after a fight of several hours [March 5] Colburn had to surrender with 1,300 of his men."

J. D. Champlin, Jr., Young Folks' History of the War for the Union, chapter 31.

"Sheridan, with his division, and about 1,800 cavalry, under Colonel Minty, first swept down toward Shelbyville, and then around toward Franklin, skirmishing in several places with detachments of Van Dorn's and Forrest's men. In a sharp fight at Thompson's Station, he captured some of the force which encountered Colburn. He finally drove Van Dorn beyond the Duck River, and then returned to Murfreesboro', with a loss during his ten days' ride and skirmishing of only five men killed and five wounded. His gain was nearly 100 prisoners. On the 18th of March, Colonel A. S. Hall, with a little over 1,400 men, moved eastward from Murfreesboro' to surprise a Confederate camp at Gainesville. He was unexpectedly met by some of Morgan's cavalry, when he fell back to Milton, twelve miles northeast of Murfreesboro' and took a strong position on Vaught's Hill. There he was attacked by 2,000 men, led by Morgan in person. With the aid of Harris's Battery skilfully worked, Hall repulsed the foe after a struggle of about three hours. Morgan lost between 300 and 400 men killed and wounded. Among the latter was himself. Hall's loss was 55 men, of whom only 6 were killed. Early in April, General Granger, then in command at Franklin, with nearly 5,000 troops, was satisfied that a heavy force under Van Dorn was about to attack him. He was then constructing a fort (which afterwards bore his name), but only two siege-guns and two rifled cannon, belonging to an Ohio battery, were mounted upon it. {3492} The fort … completely commanded the approaches to Franklin. … On the 10th, Van Dorn, with an estimated force of 9,000 mounted men and two regiments of foot, pressed rapidly forward along the Columbia and Lewisburg turnpikes, and fell upon Granger's front. The guns from the fort opened destructively upon the assailants, and their attack was manfully met by Granger's troops. Van Dorn soon found himself in a perilous situation, for Stanley [commanding cavalry] came up and struck him a heavy blow on the flank. Smith [with cavalry] was ordered forward to support Stanley, and Baird's troops were_thrown across the river to engage in the fight. The Confederates were routed at all points on Granger's front, with a heavy Joss in killed and wounded, and about 500 prisoners. Van Dorn then turned his whole force upon Stanley before Smith reached him, and with his overwhelming numbers pushed him back and recovered most of the captured men. By this means Van Dorn extricated himself from his perilous position, and, abandoning his attempt to capture Franklin, he retired to Spring Hill, with a loss of about three hundred men in killed, wounded and prisoners. The Union loss was about 37 killed, wounded and missing."

B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the Civil War, volume 3, chapter 4.

ALSO IN: T. B. Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, chapter 18, (volume 1).

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 23._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (March). The Conscription Act.

"The Rebel Congress having long since passed [April 16, 1862] a conscription act whereby all the "White males in the Confederacy between the ages of 18 and 35 were placed at the disposal of their Executive, while all those already in the service, though they had enlisted and been accepted for specific terms of one or two years, were held to serve through the war, our Congress was constrained to follow afar off in the footsteps of the enemy; since our ranks, [after] our heavy losses in the bloody struggles of 1862, were filled by volunteers too slowly for the exigencies of the service. The act providing 'for the enrollment of the National forces' was among the last passed [March 3, 1863] by the XXXVIIth Congress prior to its dissolution. It provided for the enrollment, by Federal provost-marshals and enrolling officers, of all able-bodied male citizens (not Whites only), including aliens who had declared their intention to become naturalized, between the ages of 18 and 45—those between 20 and 35 to constitute the first class; all others the second class—from which the President was authorized, from and after July 1, to make drafts at his discretion of persons to serve in the National armies for not more than three years; anyone drafted and not reporting for service to be considered and treated as a deserter. A commutation of $300 was to be received in lieu of such service: and there were exemptions provided of certain heads of Executive Departments; Federal judges; Governors of States; the only son of a widow, or of an aged and infirm father, dependent on that son's labor for support; the father of dependent motherless children under 12 years of age, or the only adult brother of such children, being orphans; or the residue of a family which has already two members in the service, &c., &c. The passage and execution of this act inevitably intensified and made active the spirit of opposition to the War. Those who detested every form of 'coercion' save the coercion of the Republic by the Rebels, with those who especially detested the National effort under its present aspects as 'a war not for the Union, but for the Negro,' were aroused by it to a more determined and active opposition. The bill passed the House by Yeas 115, Nays 49—the division being so nearly as might be, a party one—while in the Senate a motion by Mr. Bayard that it be indefinitely postponed was supported by 11 Yeas (all Democrats) to 35 Nays: consisting of every Republican present, with Messrs. McDougall, of California, Harding and Nesmith of Oregon. The bill then passed without a call of the Yeas and Nays."

H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 2, chapter 21.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April: South Carolina). The naval attack on Charleston. Repulse of the Monitors.

"The engagements in which turret iron-clads had been concerned had given to the government and the public a high opinion of their offensive and defensive qualities. It seemed as if nothing could withstand the blow of their heavy shot, and no projectile penetrate their invulnerable turrets. It was supposed that a fleet of such ships could without difficulty force a passage through Charleston Harbor, in spite of its numerous defenses, and, appearing before the city, compel its surrender. … On the 7th of April [1863] Admiral Dupont made the experiment. He had seven Ericsson Monitors, the frigate Ironsides, partially iron-clad, and a frailer iron-clad, the Keokuk, constructed on a plan differing from that of the Monitors. His intention was to disregard the batteries on Morris's Island, attack the northwest face of Sumter, and force his way up to the city. His fleet had 32 guns; the opposing forts, in the aggregate, 300. At noon on that day the signal was given to weigh anchor. The Weehawken, a Monitor, took the lead. She had a raft-like contrivance attached to her bows, for the purpose of removing obstructions and exploding torpedoes. This occasioned some delay at the outset, through its interference with her movements. On her way up she exploded a torpedo, which, though it lifted her a little, did no damage. At 2.10 P, M. she encountered obstructions extending across the harbor from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter; beyond these, piles were seen extending from James's Island to the Middle Ground. At 2.50 P. M. the guns of Fort Moultrie opened upon her, followed shortly after by all the batteries on Sullivan's Island, Morris's Island, and Fort Sumter. Not being able to pass the obstructions, the Weehawken, and subsequently other Monitors, the Passaic, Nahant, etc., were obliged to turn, which threw the line into confusion, as the other vessels, advancing, approached. This was particularly the case with the flag-ship Ironsides, which became entangled with the Monitors, and could not bring her batteries to bear upon Fort Sumter without risk of firing into them; she was obliged, on her way up, to anchor twice to avoid going ashore, on one of these occasions in consequence of having come into collision with two of the Monitors. The plan of the Confederates was, by means of obstructions, to detain the ships, while a concentrated fire was poured upon them in this the 'first circle,' as it was termed. {3493} Two other still more powerful circles of fire must be passed before the city could be reached. While in the centre of the first circle, it was apparent that the Monitors were at a fearful disadvantage. The forts and earth-works were armed with heavy guns of the best construction. No ship was exposed to the severest fire of the enemy for more than forty minutes, yet in that brief period time of the ironclads were wholly or partially disabled. In these forty minutes the battle was substantially over, the question settled. The Keokuk was struck 99 times, of which 19 were under her water-line. She was in a sinking condition. She had been able to return only three shots. The Passaic was struck 27 times; her turret was jammed, and could not for some time be turned. The Nahant was most seriously damaged; her turret was jammed, her captain wounded, her quarter-master killed by a bolt which flew off and struck him on the head. Many of the bolts of both turret and pilot-house were thus broken; the latter became nearly untenable in consequence of the nuts and ends flying across it. All the other Monitors had received damages more or less severe. The mailed frigate Ironsides had lost one port shutter, her bow was penetrated by a red-hot shot. The damage inflicted on Fort Sumter was comparatively insignificant. It was Dupont's belief that, had the iron-clads been in action half an hour longer, they would all have been disabled. 'To my regret,' he says, 'I soon became convinced of the utter impracticability of taking the city of Charleston by the force under my command.' … The iron-clad fleet had therefore been unable to pass the first line of obstructions, or to get out of 'the first circle of fire.' The slowness of its fire was no match for the rapidity and weight of that of the forts. The iron-clads were able to fire only 139 times from the 14 guns they could bring into action; the forts, from 76 guns, fired 2,209 times. The projectiles they used were wrought-iron bolts, some of them tipped with steel, solid shot, shells, of which 40 were filled with melted cast-iron, others with incendiary composition. The total amount of cannon-powder used by the forts was 21,093 pounds. The government, thus satisfied that its iron-clad fleet was insufficient for the forcing of Charleston Harbor and the capture of the city, now changed its purposes, restricting its attempts to a more complete blockade, the detention of a large confederate force in the vicinity by continually threatening military operations, and the destruction of Fort Sumter for the sake of a moral effect."

J. W. Draper, History of the American Civil War, chapter 72 (volume 3).

ALSO IN: D. D. Porter, Naval History of the War, chapter 33.

C. B. Boynton, History of the Navy during the Rebellion, volume 2, chapter 33.

W. C. Church, Life of Ericsson, chapter 21 (volume 2).

A. Roman, Military Operations of General Beauregard, chapter 30 (volume 2).

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 14._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April-May: Virginia). Hooker's disastrous movement. Chancellorsville. Stonewall Jackson's last flank movement.

"Being now [April 28] fully prepared for active operations, Hooker determined to take the initiative by moving on the left of his opponent's position. By careful study of Lee's position he correctly concluded that his left was his most vulnerable point. In order to mask his real design he sent forward a force of 10,000 cavalry under General Stoneman to operate upon Lee's lines of communication with Richmond, and sent Sedgwick with a force of 30,000 men still further to mask his movement. Stoneman crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford on the 29th, and Sedgwick appeared on the 28th on the heights below Fredericksburg. These preparatory measures having been taken, Hooker proceeded to the execution of his plan. Swinton, after a picturesque description of the passage of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, tells us 'that on the afternoon of the 30th of April four corps of the Federal army had gained the position of Chancellorsville, where Hooker at the same time established his headquarters.' Chancellorsville is situated ten miles southwest of Fredericksburg. It is not, as its name implies, a town or village, but simply a farm-house with its usual appendages, situated at the edge of a small field surrounded by a dense thicket of second growth, which sprang up after the primeval forest had been cut to furnish fuel to a neighboring furnace. This thicket extends for miles in every direction, and its wild aspect very properly suggests its name, The Wilderness. The intersection of several important roads gives it the semblance of strategic importance, while in reality a more unfavorable place for military operations could not well be found. Hooker, however, seemed well pleased with his acquisition, for on reaching Chancellorsville on Thursday night he issued an order to the troops in which he announced that 'the enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out from behind his defences and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him.' … General Lee was fully aware of the preparations that were being made by his adversary, but calmly awaited the complete development of his plans before exerting his strength to oppose him. … On the 28th … Lee ordered Jackson to concentrate his whole corps in the immediate vicinity of Fredericksburg. Early on the morning of the 29th Sedgwick crossed the Rappahannock below the mouth of Deep Run, but made no other aggressive movement on that day or the day following. On the night of the 30th, Lee was informed of Hooker's arrival at Chancellorsville. He had been previously informed of Stoneman's movements against his line of operations by General Stuart, and was now satisfied that the main attack of the enemy would come from the direction of Chancellorsville. Therefore on the morning of the 1st of May he made the necessary preparations to meet it. Accompanied by his staff, he took a position on a height where one of his batteries overlooked the Rappahannock. He there observed carefully the position of Sedgwick, while waiting for information from the direction of Chancellorsville. … Very soon the sound of cannon indicated that the work had begun. At the same time couriers arrived from Stuart and Anderson informing the general that the enemy were advancing on the old turnpike, the plank road, and on the river roads, and asking for reinforcements. McLaws was immediately ordered to the support of Anderson, and shortly after Jackson was ordered to follow with three of his divisions, leaving … a force of about 9,000 men and 45 pieces of artillery in observation of Sedgwick. When Jackson joined McLaws and Anderson a lively skirmish was in progress, in which he immediately participated. {3494} When General Lee arrived he found the Federals were being driven back to Chancellorsville. At the close of the afternoon they had retired within their lines. General Lee occupied the ridge about three-quarters of a mile south-east and south of Chancellorsville. The opposing armies were hidden from each other by the intervening thicket of brushwood. … It was obvious that the Federal position was too formidable to be attacked in front with any hope of success; therefore Lee proceeded to devise a plan by which the position of Hooker might be turned and a point of attack gained from which no danger was apprehended by the Federal commander. … The execution of a movement so much in accordance with his genius and inclination was assigned to General Jackson. … At dawn on the morning of the 2d, Jackson's corps, 22,000 strong, was in motion, and while it was making one of the most famous flank movements on record, General Lee, with the divisions of Anderson and McLaws, with 20 pieces of artillery, a force not exceeding 12,000 men, occupied the position he had assumed the previous evening, and General Hooker, with 90,000 men, lay behind his breastworks awaiting the Confederate attack. … After making a circuitous march of 15 miles, Jackson reached a point on the Orange Courthouse road three miles in the rear of Chancellorsville. Had Hooker possessed a handful of cavalry equal in spirit to the 'Virginia horsemen' under W. H. F. Lee that neutralized Stoneman's ten thousand, he might have escaped the peril that now awaited him. On the arrival of Jackson on the plank road, Fitz Lee, who had covered his movement with his brigade of cavalry, conducted him to a position from which he obtained a view of the enemy, which disclosed the following scene: 'Below and but a few hundred yards distant ran the Federal line of battle. There was the line of defence, with abatis in front, and long lines of stacked arms in rear. … The soldiers were in groups in the rear, laughing, chatting, and smoking, probably engaged here and there in games of cards and other amusements indulged in while feeling safe and comfortable, awaiting orders. In the rear of them were other parties driving up and butchering beeves.' Returning from this point of observation, Jackson proceeded to make his dispositions of attack, which by six o'clock were completed. … Howard's corps was first assailed. This corps, being surprised, was panic-stricken and fled precipitately, and in its flight communicated the panic to the troops through which it passed. Jackson's forces followed, routing line after line, until arrested by the close of day. The rout of the Federal army was fast becoming general, and it was only saved from entire defeat by the interposition of night. When compelled to halt Jackson remarked that with one more hour of daylight he could have completed the destruction of the Federal army. This, the most famous of all Jackson's brilliant achievements, closed his military career. After his troops had halted, and while the lines were being adjusted, he rode forward with several of his staff to reconnoitre the Federal position." The party were mistaken by some of their own men for Federal horsemen and received a volley which struck down Stonewall Jackson. He was wounded in both arms by three bullets, and died from the effects eight days afterward. "Early on the morning of the 3d the attack was resumed by the Confederates with great vigor. Hooker, taking advantage of the night, had restored order in his army and strengthened his position; his troops regained courage and contested the field with great stubbornness until ten o'clock when they yielded at every point and rapidly retreated … within the strong line of defences which had been previously constructed to cover the road to the United States Ford. … While the operations above described were in progress at Chancellorsville, General Early, by skilful manœuvring, had detained Sedgwick at Fredericksburg until the 3d, when that general, by a determined advance, forced back Early, carried Marye's Heights, and proceeded toward Chancellorsville. The condition of affairs was communicated to General Lee during the fore·noon. Wilcox's brigade, then at Banks's Ford, was ordered to intercept Sedgwick and retard his advance, while McLaws's division was ordered to support him. Wilcox on reaching Salem Church, six miles from Chancellorsville, encountered the Federal advance, and after a sharp conflict he repulsed it with loss. The success of Wilcox delayed Sedgwick until Anderson and McLaws could come up. The premeditated attack on Hooker being thus interrupted, Lee, on the forenoon of the 4th, repaired to the neighborhood of Fredericksburg. A combined attack was then directed to be made by Early on the rear, while McLaws and Anderson bore down upon the front. The battle was hotly contested during the afternoon, in which the forces of Sedgwick were defeated, and were only saved from destruction by a night-passage across the Rappahannock at Banks's Ford. On the 5th Lee collected his forces at Chancellorsville to give the 'coup de grace' to Hooker, but that general, under cover of a dark and stormy night, effected his retreat beyond the Rappahannock at the United States Ford."

A. L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, chapter 14.

The Federal loss at Chancellorsville, in killed and wounded, was 12,197; missing 5,000; total, 17,197. Confederate loss, killed and wounded, 10,266; missing 2,753; total, 13,019.

_A. Doubleday, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 6), chapter 8._

ALSO IN: _T. A. Dodge, Campaign of Chancellorsville._

W. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, chapter 8.

_D. N. Couch, O. O. Howard, and others, Chancellorsville (Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 7, chapter 4.

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 25._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April-May: Mississippi). Grierson's Raid.

Reporting to headquarters at Washington, on the 5th of May, 1863, General Hurlbut, commanding at Memphis, Tennessee, said: "As the spring opened, I was daily more and more impressed with the feasibility of a plan, long entertained, of pushing a flying column of cavalry through the length of Mississippi, cutting the Southern Railroad. By consent and approval of General Grant, I prepared a system of movements along my entire line from Memphis to Corinth for the purpose of covering this cavalry dash. At the same time General Rosecrans proposed to me to cover a movement of 1,800 cavalry from Tuscumbia down into Alabama and Georgia. {3495} This did not interfere with my plan, but simply required extra force to be developed from Corinth. Delays incident to combined movements, especially from separate commands, kept his expeditionary column back for six days. I commenced the movement from Corinth on the 15th [April]. … On the 17th, Colonel B. H. Grierson, Sixth Illinois Cavalry, with his own regiment, the Seventh Illinois, and Second Iowa, moved from La Grange, by way of Pontotoc, with orders, after passing Pontotoc, to proceed straight down, throwing one regiment to the left toward Okolona, and to push for and destroy the Chunkey River Bridge and any others they could reach, and either return, or proceed to Baton Rouge, as might be found advisable. On the same day, April 17, a column of infantry 1,500 strong, and one battery, moved by railroad from La Grange to Coldwater, with orders to push rapidly between Coldwater and the Tallahatchee, and take Chalmers in flank and rear while attacked in front by three regiments, a battery, and 200 cavalry from Memphis, which left here on the 18th. I considered that the effect of these movements would be to puzzle the enemy and withdraw his force from the central line, which has proven to be correct. … Grierson, on the 19th, detached the Second Iowa below Pontotoc, which fought its way gallantly back to La Grange and came home well mounted. The main cavalry column (Sixth and Seventh Illinois) proceeded, without loss or engagement, to Newton, on the Southern Mississippi Railroad, and there destroyed bridges." Colonel Grierson, in his own full report of the remarkable expedition thus set on foot, after narrating the proceedings of his command until it struck Newton Station, on the 24th of April, continues: "From captured mails and information obtained by my scouts, I knew that large forces had been sent out to intercept our return, and having instructions from Major-General Hurlbut and Brigadier-General Smith to move in any direction from this point which, in my judgment, would be best for the safety of my command and the success of the expedition, I at once decided to move south, in order to secure the necessary rest and food for men and horses, and then return to La Grange through Alabama, or make for Baton Rouge, as I might hereafter deem best. … After resting about three hours, we moved south to Garlandville. At this point we found the citizens, many of them venerable with age, armed with shot-guns and organized to resist our approach. As the advance entered the town, these citizens fired upon them and wounded one of our men. We charged upon them and captured several. After disarming them, we showed them the folly of their actions, and released them. Without an exception they acknowledged their mistake, and declared that they had been grossly deceived as to our real character. One volunteered his services as guide, and upon leaving us declared that hereafter his prayers should be for the Union Army. I mention this as a sample of the feeling which exists, and the good effect which our presence produced among the people in the country through which we passed. Hundreds who are skulking and hiding out to avoid conscription, only await the presence of our arms to sustain them, when they will rise up and declare their principles; and thousands who have been deceived, upon the vindication of our cause would immediately return to loyalty." It was not until the 2d of May that Grierson and his small force reached the Union lines at Baton Rouge. The total accomplishments of the expedition—aside from the important revelation it made of the condition of things in that region of the Confederacy—are summed up in the Colonel's report as follows: "During the expedition we killed and wounded about 100 of the enemy, captured and paroled over 500 prisoners, many of them officers, destroyed between 50 and 60 miles of railroad and telegraph, captured and destroyed over 3,000 stand of arms, and other army stores and Government property to an immense amount; we also captured 1,000 horses and mules. Our loss during the entire journey was 3 killed, 7 wounded, 5 left on the route sick; the sergeant-major and surgeon of the Seventh Illinois left with Lieutenant-Colonel Blackburn, and 9 men missing, supposed to have straggled. We marched over 600 miles in less than sixteen days. The last twenty-eight hours we marched 76 miles, had four engagements with the enemy, and forded the Comite River, which was deep enough to swim many of the horses. During this time the men and horses were without food or rest. Much of the country through which we passed was almost entirely destitute of forage and provisions, and it was but seldom that we obtained over one meal per day. Many of the inhabitants must undoubtedly suffer for want of the necessaries of life, which have reached most fabulous prices."

Official Records, series 1, volume 24, part 1, pages 520-529.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April-July: On the Mississippi). Grant's Campaign against Vicksburg. The final operations. His personal account of the siege and capture.

"April 30th was spent in transporting troops across the river [to Bruinsburg]. The troops were moved out towards Port Gibson as fast as they were landed. On the 1st of May the advance met the enemy under Bowen about four miles west of Port Gibson, where quite a severe battle was fought, resulting in the defeat of the enemy, who were driven from the field. On May 2d our troops moved into Port Gibson, and, finding that the bridges over Bayou Pierre were destroyed, spent the balance of the day in rebuilding and crossing them, and marching to the North Fork, where we encamped for the night. During the night we rebuilt the bridge across the North Fork, which had also been destroyed, and the next day (the 3d) pushed on, and, after considerable skirmishing, reached the Big Black, near Hankinson's Ferry, and the Mississippi at Grand Gulf. … Here I [General Grant] … received a letter from Banks stating that he could not be at Port Hudson [which Grant had intended to join Banks in attacking, before he turned against Vicksburg] for some days, and then, with an army of only 15,000 men. As I did not regard this force of as much value as the time which would be lost in waiting for it, I determined to move on to Vicksburg. The 4th, 5th, and 6th of May were spent in reconnoitering towards Vicksburg, and also in crossing Sherman's troops over to Grand Gulf. On the 7th, Sherman having joined the main body of the army, the troops across the Big Black were withdrawn, and the movement was commenced to get in position on the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad so as to attack Vicksburg from the rear. This occupied the army from the 7th to the 12th, when our position was near Fourteen Mile creek, Raymond being our right flank, our left resting on the Big Black. {3496} To obtain this position we fought the battle of Raymond, where Logan's and Crocker's divisions of McPherson's corps defeated the Confederates under General Gregg, driving him back on Jackson; Sherman and McClernand both having some skirmishing where they crossed Fourteen Mile creek. As the army under Pemberton was on my left flank, and that under General Joseph E. Johnston on my right at Jackson, I determined to move the army rapidly on Jackson, capturing and destroying that place as a military depot; then turn west and destroy the army under Pemberton, or drive it back into Vicksburg. The 13th was spent in making the first of these moves. On the 14th Jackson was attacked with Sherman's and McPherson's corps. The place was taken, and all supplies that could be of service to the enemy were destroyed, as well as the railroad bridge. On the 15th the troops were faced to the west and marched towards Pemberton, who was near Edwards's Station. The next day, the 16th, we met the enemy at Champion's Hill, and, after a hard-fought battle, defeated and drove him back towards Vicksburg, capturing 18 guns and nearly 3,000 men. This was the hardest-fought battle of the campaign. On the 17th we reached the Big Black, where we found the enemy intrenched. After a battle of two or three hours' duration we succeeded in carrying their works by storm, capturing much artillery and about 1,200 men. … We crossed on the morning of the 18th, and the outworks of Vicksburg were reached before night, the army taking position in their front. On the 19th there was continuous skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better positions. … At two o'clock I ordered an assault. It resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our troops, where they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy, and the siege of Vicksburg began. … Most of the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations issued by the commissary. They had had an abundance of food, however, but had begun to feel the want of bread. … By the night of the 21st full rations were issued to all the troops. … I now determined on a second assault. … The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten o'clock A. M. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in position. All the corps commanders set their time by mine, so that all might open the engagement at the same minute. The attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy … but at no place were we able to enter. … As soon as it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and had been obliged to remain there for security all day were withdrawn, and thus ended the last assault on Vicksburg. A regular siege was now determined upon. … The Union force that had crossed the Mississippi river up to this time was less than 43,000 men. … The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on the roads between these places, quite 60,000 men. … My line was more than 15 miles long, extending from Haines's Bluff to Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton. The line of the enemy was about seven. In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton and Jackson in our rear, who was being constantly reënforced, we required a second line of defense, facing the other way. I had not troops enough under my command to man this. General Halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked for reinforcements, forwarded them with all possible dispatch. … Johnston … abstained from making an assault on us, because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without accomplishing any result. We were strong enough to have taken the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take any risk of loosing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston." The siege was of six weeks' duration, ending on the memorable 4th of July with the surrender of Pemberton and 31,000 men, who were released on parole. "Our men were no sooner inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize, We had had full rations from the time the siege commenced to the close. The enemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last. I myself saw our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to those whom they had so recently been engaged in starving out."

_U. S. Grant, The Siege of Vicksburg (Century Magazine, September, 1885)._

ALSO IN: U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, volume 1, chapters 31-30.

_The Vicksburg Year (Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

J. E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations, chapters 6-8.

_F. V. Greene, The Mississippi (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 8), chapters 5-6._

W. Swinton, Twelve Decisive Battles of the War, chapter 7.

W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, volume 1, chapter 12.

Official Records, series 1, volume 24.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (May-June). The arrest of Vallandigham. President Lincoln to the Copperheads.

"The man whose name became unfortunately pre-eminent for disloyalty at this time was Clement L. Vallandigham, a Democrat, of Ohio. General Burnside was placed in command of the Department of the Ohio, March 25, 1863, and having for the moment no Confederates to deal with, he turned his attention to the Copperheads, whom he regarded with even greater animosity. His Order No. 38, issued on April 13, … warned persons with treasonable tongues that, unless they should keep that little member in order, they might expect either to suffer death as traitors, or to be sent southward within the lines of 'their friends.' Now Mr. Vallandigham had been a member of Congress since 1856; … he was the popular and rising leader of the Copperhead wing of the Democracy. Such was his position that it would have been ignominious for him to allow any Union general to put a military gag in his mouth. Nor did he. On the contrary he made speeches which at that time might well have made Unionists mad with rage, and which still seem to have gone far beyond the limit of disloyalty which any government could safely tolerate. Therefore on May 4 he was arrested by a company of soldiers, brought to Cincinnati, and thrown into jail. His friends gathered in anger, and a riot was narrowly avoided. At once, by order of General Burnside, he was tried by a military commission. He was charged with 'publicly expressing sympathy for those in arms against the government of the United States, and declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the Government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion.' … {3497} The evidence conclusively sustained the indictment, and the officers promptly pronounced him guilty, whereupon he was sentenced by Burnside to confinement in Fort Warren. … The Democrats throughout the North, rapidly surveying the situation, seized the opportunity which perhaps had been too inconsiderately given them. The country rang with plausible outcries and high sounding oratory concerning military usurpation, violation of the Constitution, and stifling freedom of speech. … Mr. Lincoln only showed that he felt the pressure of the criticism and denunciation by commuting the sentence, and directing that Vallandigham should be released from confinement and sent within the Confederate lines,—which was, indeed, a very shrewd and clever move, and much better than the imprisonment. Accordingly the quasi rebel was tendered to and accepted by a Confederate picket, on May 25. He protested vehemently, declared his loyalty, and insisted that his character was that of a prisoner of war. But the Confederates, who had no objection whatsoever to his peculiar methods of demonstrating 'loyalty' to their opponents, insisted upon treating him as a friend, the victim of an enemy common to themselves and him; and instead of exchanging him as a prisoner, they facilitated his passage through the blockade on his way to Canada. There he arrived in safety, and thence issued sundry manifestoes to the Democracy. On June 11 the Democratic Convention of Ohio nominated him as their candidate for governor, and it seems that for a while they really expected to elect him. … On May 16 a monster meeting of 'the Democrats of New York' was told by Governor Seymour that the question was: 'whether this war is waged to put down rebellion at the South, or to destroy free institutions at the North.' Excited by such instigation, the audience passed sundry damnatory resolutions and sent them to the President. Upon receiving these Mr. Lincoln felt that he must come down into the arena, without regard to official conventionality. On June 12 he replied by a full presentation of the case, from his point of view. He had once more to do the same thing in response to another address of like character which was sent to him on June 11 by the Democratic State Convention of Ohio."

J. T. Morse, Abraham Lincoln, volume 2, chapter 6.

To the New York Democrats, Mr. Lincoln said: "It is asserted in substance, that Mr. Vallandigham was, by a military commander, seized and tried 'for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting in criticism of the course of the administration, and in condemnation of the military orders of the general.' Now, if there be no mistake about this, if this assertion is the truth and the whole truth, if there was no other reason for the arrest, then I concede that the arrest was wrong. But the arrest, as I understand, was made for a very different reason. Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility to the war on the part of the Union; and his arrest was made because he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising of troops, to encourage desertions from the army, and to leave the rebellion without an adequate military force to suppress it. He was not arrested because he was damaging the political prospects of the administration or the personal interests of the commanding general, but because he was damaging the army, upon the existence of which the life of the nation depends. He was warring upon the military, and this gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging the military power of the country, then his arrest was made on mistake of fact, which I would be glad to correct on reasonably satisfactory evidence. I understand the meeting whose resolutions I am considering to be in favor of suppressing the rebellion by military force—by armies. Long experience has shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertion shall be punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires, and the law and the Constitution sanction, this punishment. Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting, and there working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked administration of a contemptible government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that, in such a case, to silence the agitator and save the boy is not only constitutional, but withal a great mercy. If I be wrong on this question of constitutional power, my error lies in believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires them, which would not be constitutional when, in absence of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does not require them: in other words, that the Constitution is not in its application in all respects the same in cases of rebellion or invasion involving the public safety, as it is in times of profound peace and public security. The Constitution itself makes the distinction, and I can no more be persuaded that the government can constitutionally take no strong measures in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man because it can be shown to not be good food for a well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended by the meeting, that the American people will by means of military arrests during the rebellion lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial by jury, and habeas corpus throughout the indefinite peaceful future which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life. In giving the resolutions that earnest consideration which you request of me, I cannot overlook the fact that the meeting speak as 'Democrats.' Nor can I, with full respect for their known intelligence, and the fairly presumed deliberation with which they prepared their resolutions, be permitted to suppose that this occurred by accident, or in any way other than that they preferred to designate themselves 'Democrats' rather than 'American citizens.' {3498} In this time of national peril I would have preferred to meet you upon a level one step higher than any party platform, because I am sure that from such more elevated position we could do better battle for the country we all love than we possibly can from those lower ones where, from the force of habit, the prejudices of the past, and selfish hopes of the future, we are sure to expend much of our ingenuity and strength in finding fault with and aiming blows at each other. But since you have denied me this, I will yet be thankful for the country's sake that not all Democrats have done so. He on whose discretionary judgment Mr. Vallandigham was arrested and tried is a Democrat, having no old party affinity with me, and the judge who rejected the constitutional view expressed in these resolutions, by refusing to discharge Mr. Vallandigham on habeas corpus is a Democrat of better days than these, having received his judicial mantle at the hands of President Jackson. And still more, of all those Democrats who are nobly exposing their lives and shedding their blood on the battle-field, I have learned that many approve the course taken with Mr. Vallandigham, while I have not heard of a single one condemning it. I cannot assert that there are none such."

Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, pages 849-350.

To the Ohio Democrats, the President wrote as follows; "You claim, as I understand, that according to my own position in the Albany response, Mr. Vallandigham should be released; and this because, as you claim, he has not damaged the military service by discouraging enlistments, encouraging desertions or otherwise; and that if he had he should have been turned over to the civil authorities under the recent acts of Congress. I certainly do not know that Mr. Vallandigham has specifically and by direct language advised against enlistments and in favor of desertion and resistance to drafting. We all know that combinations, armed in some instances, to resist the arrest of deserters began several months ago; that more recently the like has appeared in resistance to the enrolment preparatory to a draft; and that quite a number of assassinations have occurred from the same animus. These had to be met by military force, and this again has led to bloodshed and death. And now, under a sense of responsibility more weighty and enduring than any which is merely official, I solemnly declare my belief that this hindrance of the military, including maiming and murder, is due to the course in which Mr. Vallandigham has been engaged in a greater degree than to any other cause; and it is due to him personally in a greater degree than to any other one man. These things have been notorious, known to all, and of course known to Mr. Vallandigham. Perhaps I would not be wrong to say they originated with his special friends and adherents. With perfect knowledge of them, he has frequently if not constantly made speeches in Congress and before popular assemblies; and if it can be shown that, with these things staring him in the face, he has ever uttered a word of rebuke or counsel against them, it will be a fact greatly in his favor with me, and one of which is yet I am totally ignorant. When it is known that the whole burden of his speeches has been to stir up men against the prosecution of the war, and that in the midst of resistance to it he has not been known in any instance to counsel against such resistance, it is next to impossible to repel the inference that he has counseled directly in favor of it. With all this before their eyes, the convention you represent have nominated Mr. Vallandigham for governor of Ohio, and both they and you have declared the purpose to sustain the National Union by all constitutional means. But of course they and you in common reserve to yourselves to decide what are constitutional means; and, unlike the Albany meeting, you omit to state or intimate that in your opinion an army is a constitutional means of saving the Union against a rebellion, or even to intimate that you are conscious of an existing rebellion being in progress with the avowed object of destroying that very Union. At the same time your nominee for governor, in whose behalf you appeal, is known to you and to the world to declare against the use of an army to suppress the rebellion. Your own attitude, therefore, encourages desertion, resistance to the draft, and the like, because it teaches those who incline to desert and to escape the draft to believe it is your purpose to protect them, and to hope that you will become strong enough to do so. After a short personal intercourse with you, gentlemen of the committee, I cannot say I think you desire this effect to follow your attitude; but I assure you that both friends and enemies of the Union look upon it in this light. It is a substantial hope, and by consequence a real strength to the enemy. If it is a false hope and one which you would willingly dispel, I will make the way exceedingly easy. I send you duplicates of this letter in order that you, or a majority of you, may, if you choose, indorse your names upon one of them and return it thus indorsed to me with the understanding that those signing are thereby committed to the following propositions and to nothing else;

1. That there is now a rebellion in the United States, the object and tendency of which is to destroy the National Union; and that, in your opinion, an army and navy are constitutional means for suppressing that rebellion;

2. That no one of you will do anything which, in his own judgment, will tend to hinder the increase, or favor the decrease, or lessen the efficiency of the army or navy while engaged in the effort to suppress that rebellion; and

3. That each of you will, in his sphere, do all he can to have the officers, soldiers, and seamen of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress the rebellion, paid, fed, clad, and otherwise well provided for and supported.

And with the further understanding that upon receiving the letter and names thus indorsed, I will cause them to be published, which publication shall be, within itself, a revocation of the order in relation to Mr. Vallandigham. It will not escape observation that I consent to the release of Mr. Vallandigham upon terms not embracing any pledge from him or from others as to what he will or will not do. I do this because he is not present to speak for himself, or to authorize others to speak for him; and because I should expect that on his returning he would not put himself practically in antagonism with the position of his friends. But I do it chiefly because I thereby prevail on other influential gentlemen of Ohio to so define their position as to be of immense value to the army—thus more than compensating for the consequences of any mistake in allowing Mr. Vallandigham to return; so that, on the whole, the public safety will not have suffered by it. Still, in regard to Mr. Vallandigham and all others, I must hereafter, as heretofore, do so much as the public safety may seem to require. I have the honor to be respectfully yours."

Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, page 362-363.

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, . Abraham Lincoln, volume 7, chapter 12.

{3499}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (May-July: On the Mississippi). Siege and Capture of Port Hudson. The clear opening of the great River.

"About the middle of May all the available force near the river was concentrated at Baton Rouge, to assist in the attack on Port Hudson. Thence Generals Augur and Sherman moved to the south and east of that position, to cooperate with General Banks. From Simmesport General Banks moved his army to invest Port Hudson. … It was on the 21st of May that General Banks landed, and on the next day a junction was effected with the advance of Major-General Augur and Brigadier-General Sherman. … On the 25th, the enemy was compelled to abandon his first line of works. On the next day General Weitzel's brigade, which had covered the rear in the march from Alexandria, arrived, and on the morning of the 27th a general assault was made on the fortifications. Port Hudson, or Hickey's Landing, as it was called some years ago, is situated on a bend in the Mississippi river, about 22 miles above Baton Rouge, and 147 above New Orleans." It was strongly fortified and well defended by Colonel Frank Gardner. The artillery of General Banks opened fire on the 27th, and at ten o'clock the same day an assault was made, in which the colored soldiers showed much firmness and bravery. The assault failed and the losses in it were heavy. "A bombardment of the position had been made by the fleet under Admiral Farragut, for a week previous to this assault. Reconnoissances had discovered that the defences were very strong, consisting of several lines of intrenchments and rifle pits, with abatis of heavy trees felled in every direction. The upper batteries on the river were attacked by the Hartford and Albatross, which had run the blockade, and the lower by the Monongahela, Richmond, Genesee, and Essex. On the 14th of June, after a bombardment of several days, another assault on Port Hudson was made. … All the assaulting columns were compelled to fall back under the deadly fire of the enemy, and the fighting finally ceased about 11 o'clock in the morning. The loss of General Banks was nearly 700 in killed and wounded. … After these two attempts to reduce Port Hudson by a land assault, on the 27th of May and 14th of June, the purpose to make another was given up by General Banks, until he had fully invested the place by a series of irresistible approaches. He was thus engaged in pushing forward his works when Vicksburg was surrendered. Information of this surrender was sent to General Banks, and it was made the occasion for firing salutes and a general excitement in his camp, which attracted the attention of the enemy, to whom the surrender was communicated. General Gardner, upon receiving the information, sent by flag of truce, about midnight of the 7th, the following note to General Banks: … 'Having received information from your troops that Vicksburg has been surrendered, I make this communication to request you to give me the official assurance whether this is true or not, and if true, I ask for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to the consideration of terms for surrendering this position.'"

W. J. Tenney, Military and Naval History of the Rebellion, chapter 29.

ALSO IN: _F. V. Greene, The Mississippi (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 8), chapter 7._

_R. B. Irwin, Port Hudson (Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

R. B. Irwin, History of the 19th Army Corps, chapters 15-18.

_Official Records, Series 1, volume. 26._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June). Call for Six-Months Men.

A call for 100,000 men to serve six months, for the repulse of the invasion of Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, and Ohio, was issued June 15.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June: Virginia). Lee's second movement of invasion and the inducements to it. Northern invitation and Southern clamor. The Southern view.

"The defeat of General Hooker at Chancellorsville was the turning-point of the war, and for the first time there was apparently a possibility of inducing the Federal Government to relinquish its opposition to the establishment of a separate authority in the South. The idea of the formation of a Southern Confederacy, distinct from the old Union, had, up to this time, been repudiated by the authorities at Washington as a thing utterly out of the question; but the defeat of the Federal arms in the two great battles of the Rappahannock had caused the most determined opponents of separation to doubt whether the South could be coerced to return to the Union; and, what was equally or more important, the proclamations of President Lincoln, declaring the slaves of the South free, and placing the United States virtually under martial law, aroused a violent clamor from the great Democratic party of the North, who loudly asserted that all constitutional liberty was disappearing. This combination of non-success in military affairs and usurpation by the Government emboldened the advocates of peace to speak out plainly, and utter their protest against the continuance of the struggle, which they declared had only resulted in the prostration of all the liberties of the country. Journals and periodicals, violently denunciatory of the course pursued by the Government, all at once made their appearance in New York and elsewhere. A peace convention was called to meet in Philadelphia. … On all sides the advocates of peace on the basis of separation were heard raising their importunate voices. … The plan of moving the Southern army northward, with the view of invading the Federal territory, seems to have been the result of many circumstances. The country [Southern] was elated with the two great victories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and the people were clamorous for active operations against an enemy who seemed powerless to stand the pressure of Southern steel. The army, which had been largely augmented by the return of absentees to its ranks, new levies, and the recall of Longstreet's two divisions from Suffolk, shared the general enthusiasm; and thus a very heavy pressure was brought to bear upon the authorities and on General Lee, in favor of a forward movement, which, it was supposed, would terminate in a signal victory and a treaty of peace. Lee yielded to this view of things rather than urged it. … Another important consideration was the question of supplies. … More than ever before, these supplies were now needed; and when General Lee sent, in May or June, a requisition for rations to Richmond, the commissary-general is said to have endorsed upon the paper, 'If General Lee wishes rations, let him seek them in Pennsylvania.' {3500} The considerations here stated were the main inducements for that great movement northward which followed the battle of Chancellorsville. … Throughout the month of May, Lee was busily engaged in organizing and equipping his forces for the decisive advance. Experience had now dictated many alterations and improvements in the army. It was divided into three 'corps d'armée,' each consisting of three divisions, and commanded by an officer with the rank of lieutenant-general. Longstreet remained at the head of his former corps. Ewell succeeded Jackson in command of 'Jackson's old corps', and A. P. Hill was assigned to a third corps made up of portions of the two others. … On the last day of May, General Lee had the satisfaction of finding himself in command of a well-equipped and admirably-officered army of 68,352 bayonets, and nearly 10,000 cavalry and artillery—in all, about 80,000 men. … Lee began his movement northward on the 3d day of June, just one month after the battle of Chancellorsville. … Pursuing his design of manœuvring the Federal army out of Virginia, without coming to action, Lee first sent forward one division of Longstreet's corps in the direction of Culpepper, another then followed, and, on the 4th and 5th of June, Ewell's entire corps was sent in the same direction—A. P. Hill remaining behind on the south bank of the Rappahannock, near Fredericksburg, to watch the enemy there, and bar the road to Richmond. These movements became speedily known to General Hooker, whose army lay north of the river near that point, and on the 5th he laid a pontoon just below Fredericksburg, and crossed about a corps to the south bank, opposite Hill. This threatening demonstration, however, was not suffered by Lee to arrest his own movements. … He continued the withdrawal of his troops, by way of Culpepper, in the direction of the Shenandoah Valley." On the morning of the 9th of June, "two divisions of Federal cavalry, supported by two brigades of 'picked infantry,' were sent across the river at Kelly's and Beverley's Fords, east of the court-house, to beat up the quarters of Stuart and find what was going on in the Southern camps. The most extensive cavalry fight [known as the battle of Brandy Station, or the battle of Fleetwood], probably, of the whole war, followed. … This reconnoisance in force … had no other result than the discovery of the fact that Lee had infantry in Culpepper. … This attempt of the enemy to penetrate his designs had not induced General Lee to interrupt the movement of his infantry toward the Shenandoah Valley. The Federal corps sent across the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, still remained facing General Hill, and, two days after the Fleetwood fight, General Hooker moved up the river with his main body, advancing the Third Corps to a point near Beverley's Ford. But these movements were disregarded by Lee. On the same day Ewell's corps moved rapidly toward Chester Gap, passed through that defile in the mountain, pushed on by way of Front Royal, and reached Winchester on the evening of the 13th, having in three days marched 70 miles. The position of the Southern army now exposed it to very serious danger, and at first sight seemed to indicate a deficiency of soldiership in the general commanding it. In face of an enemy whose force was at least equal to his own, Lee had extended his line until it stretched over a distance of about 100 miles. … When intelligence now reached Washington that the head of Lee's column was approaching the Upper Potomac, while the rear was south of the Rappahannock, the President wrote to General Hooker: 'If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg, and the tail of it on the plank road, between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere—could you not break him?' … It would seem that nothing could have been plainer than the good policy of an attack upon Hill at Fredericksburg, which would certainly have checked Lee's movement by recalling Longstreet from Culpepper, and Ewell from the Valley. But … instead of reënforcing the corps sent across at Fredericksburg and attacking Hill, General Hooker withdrew the corps, on the 13th, to the north bank of the river, got his forces together, and began to fall back toward Manassas."

J. E. Cooke, Life of General Robert E. Lee, part 6, chapters 9-12.

ALSO IN: H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 2, chapter 21.

W. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, chapter 9.

[Image: Map of the Battlefield of Gettysburg. July 1-3, 1863.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June-July: Pennsylvania). Lee's Invasion. The Battle of Gettysburg.

"Hooker started toward Washington. Ewell gained possession of Winchester and Martinsburg, but not of Harper's Ferry. There is a rocky and thickly wooded range of heights called the Bull Run Mountains, running from Leesburg south. As Hooker had not occupied them but was farther to the East, Lee desired to do so, for it would give him a strong position on Hooker's flank and bring him (Lee) very near to Washington. He therefore directed his cavalry to reconnoiter in that direction. Stuart's reconnoitering party met the Union cavalry at Aldie, and after a hard battle retreated. A series of cavalry combats ensued, ending in the retreat of Stuart's cavalry behind the Blue Ridge. Hooker was strongly posted east of the Bull Run range and could not be attacked with much chance of success. As Lee could not well remain inactive or retreat, he resolved to invade Pennsylvania. This was a hazardous enterprise, for Hooker might intervene between him and Richmond. Stuart's cavalry was left to prevent this catastrophe by guarding the passes in the Blue Ridge. Stuart was also directed to harass Hooker and attack his rear should he attempt to cross the Potomac in pursuit of Lee. Lee reached Chambersburg with Longstreet's and Hill's corps. Ewell's corps was in advance at Carlisle [June 27] and York," and advance bodies of cavalry were threatening Harrisburg. The militia of Pennsylvania, New York and Maryland were called out in force, but arms and ammunition for them were inadequate. "On June 28th, Hooker determined to send Slocum's corps and the garrison of Harper's Ferry—the latter about 10,000 strong—to operate against Lee's rear. This was an excellent plan, but Hooker's superior, General Halleck, refused to allow him to remove the troops from Harper's Ferry; and Hooker said if he could not manage the campaign in his own way, he preferred to give up the command of the army." {3502} He was accordingly relieved and the command was given to Major-General George G. Meade, of the Fifth Corps. Meantime (June 25-27) the Union army had crossed the Potomac and advanced to Frederick, Maryland. "On June 28th, Lee learned from a scout that the Union army was in his rear and that his communication with Richmond was seriously endangered. … In this emergency he concluded to threaten Baltimore. As a preliminary measure, he directed his entire army to move on Gettysburg. This he hoped would induce Meade to concentrate in his front and leave his rear free; which was precisely what Meade did do. … Under the impression that Lee's army was spread out along the Susquehanna from Carlisle to York, Meade threw out his own forces fan-shaped to march in that direction. … The Union corps were marching on and getting farther apart, while the enemy were concentrating. The advance of Hill's corps, on the morning of July 1st, struck Buford's division of Union cavalry a short distance to the west of Gettysburg, and in spite of a stout resistance forced it slowly back towards the town. The First Corps at this time was five miles south of Gettysburg. General Reynolds went to the support of Buford with the nearest division of the First Corps—Wadsworth's—and directed that the others follow. While forming his line of battle he was killed. General Howard succeeded to the command of the field, but did not issue any orders to the First Corps until the afternoon. In the meantime General Doubleday continued the contest, captured a great part of the forces that had assailed him, and cleared his immediate front of all enemies. Before the Eleventh Corps came up the enemy could have walked right over the small force opposed to them, but owing to the absence of Stuart's cavalry [which, not crossing the Potomac to follow Lee until the 27th, had undertaken a long raid around the Union forces, and did not succeed in joining the main body of the Confederates until July 2d] they had not been kept informed as to the movements Meade was making, and fearing that the whole Union army was concentrated in their front they were overcautious. There was now a lull in the battle for about an hour. The remainder of the First Corps came up and was followed soon after by the Eleventh Corps under General Schurz. About the same time the Confederate corps of General Ewell arrived and made a junction with that of Hill. General Howard assumed command of the Union forces. Repeated attacks were now made against the First Corps by Ewell from the north and Hill from the west; but the Confederate charges were successfully repulsed. … Ewell's attack also struck the Eleventh Corps on the right and front with great force. … General Meade, when he heard of Reynold's death, was 14 miles from Gettysburg at Taneytown, preparing to form line of battle along Pipe Creek. He at once sent General Hancock forward with orders to assume command of the field. Hancock, perceiving that Cemetery Ridge [about half a mile south of Gettysburg] was an admirable position for a defensive battle, determined to hold it if possible. This was not an easy thing to do, for the enemy were in overwhelming force, and the feeble remnants of the First and Eleventh Corps were not in a condition to make a prolonged resistance. … Hancock directed Doubleday to send a force to Culp's Hill on the right, while he instructed Buford to parade up and down on the extreme left with his cavalry. The enemy were thus led to suppose that the Union line was a long one and had been heavily reënforced. As the losses on both sides had been tremendous, probably not exceeded for the same number of troops during the war, the enemy hesitated to advance, particularly as some movements of Kilpatrick's cavalry seemed to threaten their rear. They therefore deferred action until Meade concentrated the next day. On General Hancock's recommendation General Meade ordered his entire army to Gettysburg. By dusk part of the Third Corps had arrived, and soon after the Twelfth Corps and the Second Corps were close at hand. … Most of the troops, though worn out with hard marching, arrived by midday of July 2d. The Sixth Corps had 34 miles to march and came later in the afternoon. … The attack as ordered by General Lee was to begin with Longstreet on the right and be made 'en échelon.' That is, as soon as Longstreet was fairly engaged, Hill's corps was to take up the fight and go in, and as soon as Hill was fairly engaged, Ewell's corps on the right was to attack. The object was to keep the whole Union line in a turmoil at once, and prevent reënforcements going from any corps not engaged to another that was fighting; but Hill did not act until Longstreet's fight was over, and Ewell did not act until Hill had been repulsed. … The enemy … failed in every attack against Meade's main line, with the exception of that portion south of Culp's Hill. Elated by the fact that he had made a lodgement there, Ewell determined to hold on at all hazards and sent heavy reënforcements during the night to aid Johnson to make an attack in the morning. … So ended the battle of the second day. At day dawn [July 3] General Warren, acting for General Meade, established a cordon of troops and batteries which drove Johnson out of his position on the right. … Lee having failed in his attacks both on Meade's left and right had to decide at once whether he would give up the contest and retreat, or make another attempt to force the Union line. As he had been reënforced by Stuart's cavalry, and as a fresh division under Pickett was available, he determined to try to pierce the left center of the Union army and disperse the force opposed to him. To this end he directed Longstreet to form a strong column of attack to be composed of Pickett's division and Pettigrew's division and two brigades of Pender's division, under Trimble, of Hill's corps. To create confusion and prevent General Meade from sending reënforcements to the menaced point, Stuart was ordered to ride around the right of the Union army and make an attack in rear. And still more to facilitate the attack 135 guns were to concentrate their fire against the Union center and disperse the forces assembled there. About 1 P. M. the terrific cannonade began and lasted for two hours, by which time the Confederate ammunition was nearly exhausted. … Stuart's cavalry attack proved abortive, for it was met and frustrated by two brigades of Gregg's cavalry aided by Custer's brigade, after a severe battle, which was hotly contested on both sides. Stuart's further progress was checked and he was forced to retreat. … Pickett formed his great column of attack and came forward as soon as the fire from the Union batteries slackened." {3503} Fresh guns had, however, been brought into position and swept the ground over which Pickett moved. His charge, one of the most desperately determined of the whole war, was heroically met by Gibbon's division of the Second Corps and by part of the First Corps, under the personal direction of General Hancock, who was severely wounded in the terrible conflict. Pickett was forced to retreat with the survivors of his onslaught, and "the whole plain was soon covered with fugitives; but, as no pursuit was ordered, General Lee in person succeeded in rallying them and in re-forming the line of battle. The next day, July 4th, General Lee drew back his flanks and at evening began his retreat by two routes—the main body on the direct road to Williamsport through the mountains, the other via Chambersburg, the latter including the immense train of the wounded. Gregg's division (except Huey's brigade) was sent in pursuit by way of Chambersburg, but the enemy had too much the start to render the chase effective. Kilpatrick, however, got in front of the main body on the direct route and, after a midnight battle at Monterey, fought during a terrific thunder storm, succeeded in making sad havoc of Ewell's trains. … Lee concentrated his army in the vicinity of Williamsport, but as French had destroyed his pontoon bridge, and as the Potomac had risen, he was unable to cross. He therefore fortified his position. Meade did not follow Lee directly, but went around by way of Frederick. After considerable delay the Union army again confronted that of Lee and were about—under orders from President Lincoln-to make an attack, when Lee slipped away on the night of July 14th to the Virginia side of the Potomac. This ended the campaign of Gettysburg. The Union loss was 3,072 killed, 14,497 wounded, 5,434 missing=Total, 23,003. The Confederate loss was 2,592 killed, 12,709 wounded, 5,150 missing=Total, 20,451."

_A. Doubleday, Gettysburg made plain (with 29 maps)._

ALSO IN: _A. Doubleday, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 6, part 2)._

_J. Longstreet, H. J. Hunt and others, Gettysburg (Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

F. A. Walker, History of the Second Army Corps, chapter 8.

A. L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, chapter 15.

Comte de Paris, History of the American Civil War, volume 3, book 3, chapter 4.

D. X. Junkin and F. H. Norton, Life of General Hancock, chapters 11-13.

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 27._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June-July: Tennessee). The Tullahoma campaign.

"During the first six months of the year 1863 the Army of the Cumberland remained at Murfreesboro' and was comparatively inactive. The troops were employed in the construction of elaborate fortifications and in divers minor operations with defensive or tentative objects. … Late in June the Army of the Cumberland advanced against its old enemy, the Confederate Army of the Tennessee, then holding the line of Duck River. In this movement the Fourteenth Corps [General Thomas] was in the centre, its appropriate place, and drove the enemy from Hoover's Gap and from several positions in front of that gap. General McCook [Twentieth Corps] on the right had a severe combat at Liberty Gap, but finally pressed the enemy from the hills. General Crittenden [Twenty-first Corps] on the left did not meet much opposition. When Bragg's army had been driven from its defensive line on Duck River, General Rosecrans moved his army towards Manchester, and regarding this movement as indicating either an attack upon his position at Tullahoma, or the interruption of his communications, Bragg fell back from that place. He did not consider himself strong enough to meet Rosecrans in battle, and he consequently retreated first to the Cumberland Mountains, and, soon after, across the Tennessee River to Chattanooga. The Tullahoma campaign was begun on the 23d of June and terminated on the 4th of July. The enemy fought at the gaps of the mountains, but the defense on the whole was feeble. The result was the possession by the Army of the Cumberland of the region from Murfreesboro' to Bridgeport, Alabama. At the close of the campaign the army advanced to the northern base of the Cumberland Mountains, and there halted to make preparations for a campaign south of the Tennessee River."

T. B. Van Horne, Life of General George H. Thomas, chapter 5.

ALSO IN: T. B. Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, chapter 19 (volume 1).

_H. M. Cist, The Army of the Cumberland (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 7)._

P. H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, volume 1, chapter 14.

_D. S. Stanley, The Tullahoma Campaign (Sketches of War History, Ohio Commandery L. L. of the United States, volume 3)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July: On the Mississippi). The Defence of Helena.

"One of the most brilliant of the minor victories of the war was gained at Helena, Arkansas, on the west bank of the Mississippi, on the 4th of July, General Holmes [Confederate] had asked and received permission to take that place, in the middle of June, and had mustered for that purpose an army of nearly 10,000 men. The garrison of Helena consisted of a division of the Thirteenth Corps and a brigade of cavalry numbering in all 4000 men, commanded by Major-General B. M. Prentiss. Holmes felt so sure of victory that he doubtless selected the 4th of July for his attack in a mere spirit of bravado. He assaulted at daylight with converging columns, two of which made considerable impression upon the outworks, but never reached the town. The defense of the Union troops was singularly skilful and energetic, and, after a few hours of fighting, Holmes, finding himself utterly defeated, retired at half-past ten. The little army of Prentiss was, of course, too small to pursue. The last Confederate attempt to hold the Mississippi River thus ended in a complete and most humiliating repulse."

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 7, chapter 11.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July: Mississippi). The capture and destruction of Jackson.

When Vicksburg surrendered, Johnston was hovering in the rear of Grant's army, and Sherman was watching his movements. On the very day the surrender was completed the latter marched rapidly upon Jackson, with 50,000 men, Johnston retreating before him. The city was invested on the 10th, and defended by the Confederates until the night of the 16th when they evacuated with haste. General Sherman, writing to Admiral Porter on the 19th of July, said: "We … have 500 prisoners, are still pursuing and breaking railroads, so that the good folks of Jackson will not soon again hear the favorite locomotive whistle. {3504} The enemy burned nearly all the handsome dwellings round about the town because they gave us shelter or to light up the ground to prevent night attacks. He also set fire to a chief block of stores in which were commissary supplies, and our men, in spite of guards, have widened the circle of fire, so that Jackson, once the pride and boast of Mississippi, is now a ruined town. State-house, Governor's mansion, and some fine dwellings, well within the lines of intrenchments, remain untouched. I have been and am yet employed in breaking up the railroad 40 miles north and 60 south; also 10 miles east. My 10-miles break west, of last May, is still untouched, so that Jackson ceases to be a place for the enemy to collect stores and men."

Official Records, series 1, volume 24, part 3, page 531.

ALSO IN: J. E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations, chapter 8.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July: Kentucky). John Morgan's Raid into Ohio and Indiana.

"The most famous raid of this time was that made in July by John Morgan across the Ohio River. General Buckner was then in East Tennessee, near the borders of Kentucky, getting ready to make another dash toward Louisville, and Morgan went ahead to prepare the way. He crossed the Cumberland River into Kentucky with about 3,000 mounted men, sacked Columbia, captured Lebanon with 400 prisoners, and rode on through Bardstown to Brandenburg on the Ohio River, plundering and destroying as he went. Many Kentuckians had joined him on the way, and he then had 4,000 men and ten pieces of artillery. The advance of Rosecrans's army just at that time prevented Buckner from joining him, and Morgan determined to cross into Indiana. There were two gunboats in the river, but he kept them off with his artillery while his men crossed on two captured steamboats. Morgan then rode through Indiana toward Cincinnati fighting home guards, tearing up railroads, burning bridges and mills and capturing much property. The whole State was aroused by the danger, and thousands of armed men started after the bold riders. Morgan became alarmed, and after passing around Cincinnati, almost within sight of its steeples, turned toward the Ohio to cross again into Kentucky. A large Union force was following, others were advancing on his flanks, and gunboats and steamboats filled with armed men were moving up the river to cut him off. The people aided the pursuers all they could by cutting down trees and barricading the roads to stop Morgan's march. He was so delayed by these and other things that he did not reach the Ohio until July 19th. He hoped to cross at a place called Buffington Ford, but the Union men were upon him and he had to turn and fight. After a severe battle, in which the Union troops were helped by gunboats which cut off the raiders from crossing the ford, about 800 of Morgan's men surrendered, and the rest, with Morgan himself, fled up the river fourteen miles to Bellville, where they tried to cross by swimming their horses. About 300 men had succeeded in getting over when the gunboats came up and opened fire on them. A fearful scene ensued, for it was a struggle of life and death. … Some got across, some were shot and some drowned. Morgan was not among the fortunate ones who escaped. With about 200 men he fled further up the river to New Lisbon, where he was surrounded and forced to surrender. This was a wonderful raid, but it did not do the Confederate cause any good. A large part of the property destroyed was private property, and this roused the anger of all the people of the Border States. … Morgan and some of his officers were sent to Columbus and confined in the penitentiary, from which he and six others escaped in the following November by making a hole through the bottom of their cell and digging a tunnel under the foundations of the building."

J. D. Champlin Jr., Young Folk's History of the War for the Union, chapter 31.

ALSO IN: B. W. Duke, History of Morgan's Cavalry, chapters 14-15.

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 23._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July: New York). The Draft Riots.

See NEW YORK (CITY): A. D. 1863.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July: South Carolina). The lodgement on Morris Island, and the assault on Fort Wagner.

After Du Pont's attack upon the forts in Charleston harbor "the Confederates enjoyed two months of undisturbed leisure for the construction and strengthening of their works, though all this time the matter of a new essay at the reduction of Sumter occupied more than its proper share of the attention of the Government.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (APRIL: South CAROLINA).

The forces in the Department of the South were not sufficient to undertake a siege of Charleston by land, and the exigencies of the more important campaigns going forward in Virginia, Tennessee and Mississippi prevented their being reenforced. It was resolved, therefore, to restrict operations to the harbor and the islands immediately adjoining, and Admiral John A. Dahlgren—after the death of Admiral Foote, who had been designated for the purpose—and General Q. A. Gillmore were charged with the command of the military and naval forces engaged. … Admiral Dahlgren … assumed command on the 6th of July. Gillmore had already been on the ground some three weeks, and had nearly completed his preparations for a descent upon Morris Island, when Dahlgren arrived. The admiral, without a moment's delay, entered into the plans of the general, and within forty-eight hours collected his scattered monitors and steamed away to the harbor of Charleston. Morris Island is a low strip of sandy beach, which lies to the south of Charleston and, with Sullivan's Island to the north, guards the entrance to the harbor, the two stretching out to sea like the open jaws of an alligator. They are each about three and a half miles long, separated from the mainland on the north, and from the high ground of James Island on the south, by miry and impracticable marshes stretching a distance of two or three miles. Their inner ends are a little less than four miles from the Charleston wharves, with Fort Sumter lying midway. Gillmore resolved to make his attack from Folly Island, which lies on the coast directly south of Morris, which it greatly resembles in conformation, and from which it is separated by Light House Inlet. It was occupied by a brigade under General Israel Vogdes, who had fortified the southern end of it, controlling the waters of Stono harbor and the approaches of James Island. {3505} There was a heavy growth of underbrush at both ends of the island; taking advantage of this, Vogdes, under Gillmore's direction, constructed ten powerful batteries near its southern extremity, completely masked from the enemy's view; their purpose being to operate against the enemy's guns near the landing place, to protect the debarkation of the troops, and to cover their retreat in case of necessity. Most of this work was done at night, and all of it as silently as possible. … Alfred H. Terry's division of 4,000 and George C. Strong's brigade of 2,500 were quietly brought together on Folly Island, and on the afternoon of the 8th of July the former force was sent up the Stono to make a demonstration against James Island, while Strong's brigade was ordered to descend upon Morris Island at daybreak of the 9th. Colonel T. W. Higginson of the First South Carolina Volunteers, colored, was ordered at the same time to cut the railroad between Charleston and Savannah; a duty in which General Gillmore says he 'signally failed.' The others punctually performed the tasks assigned them. Terry's feint against Stono was so imposing as to be taken for the real attack, by Beauregard, who hastily gathered together a considerable force to resist him, and paid little attention to the serious movement on the beach." The Confederate troops on Morris Island, taken by surprise, were "speedily driven out of all their batteries south of Wagner, and abandoned to Gillmore three-fourths of the island, with 11 pieces of heavy ordnance. The next day he ordered Strong's brigade to assault Fort Wagner, an attempt which failed, with slight loss on each side. On the 16th Terry was attacked by a superior force on James Island, and although he repulsed the enemy with the assistance of the gunboats which accompanied him, he was recalled to Fol]y Island, the purpose of his demonstration having been accomplished. Although General Gillmore had as yet no conception of the enormous strength of Fort Wagner, the assault and repulse of the 11th of July convinced him that it could not be carried offhand. He therefore determined, on consultation with Admiral Dahlgren, to establish counter-batteries against it, hoping with the combined fire of these and the gunboats to dismount the guns of the work and so shake its defense as to carry it by a determined assault. The preparations were made with great energy, and by the morning of the 18th, exactly one week after the first assault, General Gillmore was ready for the second." The batteries and the fleet opened fire on the fort at noon of July 18th; its defenders were soon driven from the parapets, and "in the course of the afternoon the whole work seemed to be beaten out of shape"; but, being constructed of fine quartz sand, it had suffered damage only in appearance. At twilight, the storming party, headed by Colonel Robert G. Shaw and his Fifty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment of colored troops, made a most brave and resolute assault, actually climbing the parapet of the fort, but only to leave 1500 dead, dying and wounded upon its treacherous sands. The heroic young Colonel Shaw fell dead among the foremost men; General Strong, Colonel Chatfield and Colonel Putnam were killed or mortally wounded; General Truman Seymour was wounded severely, and many other excellent officers were in the lists of the slain or the sadly disabled. "The death of Colonel Shaw was widely lamented, not only because of his personal worth, but because he had become in a certain sense the representative of the best strain of New England anti-slavery sentiment. The Confederates recognized this representative character by their treatment of his corpse, replying to a request of his friends for his remains, that they 'had buried him under a layer of his niggers.'"

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 7, chapter 15.

ALSO IN: _T. W. Higginson, Army Life in a Black Regiment._

G. W. Williams, History of the Negro Troops, chapter 9.

M. V. Dahlgren, Memoirs of John A. Dahlgren, chapter 14.

A. Roman, Military Operations of General Beauregard, chapter 31 (volume 2).

D. Ammen, The Navy in the Civil War, volume 2: The Atlantic Coast, chapter 7.

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 28._

L. F. Emilio, History of the 54th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers, chapters. 4-5.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July-November: Virginia). Meade and Lee on the Rapidan. Bristoe Station. Rappahannock Station. Kelly's Ford. Mine Run.

The 18th of July found the whole army of General Meade once more on the Virginia side of the Potomac. "His plan for the pursuit of Lee was not unlike that of McClellan a year before, but although he displayed much greater expedition and energy in the execution of it than were shown by his predecessor, the results, through no fault of his own, were unimportant. General French, who had taken no part in the battle of Gettysburg, had been placed in command of the Third Corps; he was an old officer of the regular army, excellent in drill, in routine, and all the every-day details of the service, but utterly unfit for an enterprise requiring great audacity and celerity. He was assigned upon this expedition to the duty of throwing his corps through Manassas Gap and attacking the flank of the enemy as he moved southward by Front Royal. Meade succeeded in getting French into the Gap in time to have broken the rebel army in two; but when he attacked, it was in so inefficient a Manner, and with so small a portion of his force, that the day was wasted and the enemy made their way down the Valley to the lower gaps. This failure was a source of deep mortification to General Meade. … The pursuit of the enemy was not continued further. … The months of August and September were a period of repose for the Army of the Potomac. It was in fact in no condition to undertake active operations; a considerable body of troops had been taken from Meade for service in South Carolina, and a strong detachment had been sent to the City of New York for the purpose of enforcing the draft there. General Lee had retired behind the Rapidan for several weeks of rest; neither army was ready at that time to attack the other." Early in September Longstreet's Corps was detached from Lee's army and sent west to strengthen Bragg at Chattanooga, and in the latter part of the same month about 13,000 men (Eleventh and Twelfth Corps) were taken from Meade and sent, under Hooker's command, to the same scene of pending conflict. "But, even with this reduction of his command, after the return of the troops detached to the North, Meade found himself with an army of about 68,000 men; and, knowing this force to be somewhat superior to that of the enemy, he resolved to cross the Rapidan and attack him; but again, as so often happened in the history of the contending armies in Virginia, Lee had formed the project of a similar enterprise, and began its execution a day or two in advance. He had learned of the departure of two corps for the West." On the 9th of October "he began a flanking movement to the right of the Union line."

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 8, chapter 9.

{3506}

"Conceiving that the Confederates would move by the Warrenton pike, in order to cross Bull Run and get possession of Centreville—thus to interpose between the Federal army and Washington—Meade retired as speedily as possible. He had, in reality, the start in the race, notwithstanding the day's loss in the return movement. … On the morning of the 14th, Lee advanced from Warrenton in two columns, but not by the 'pike.' The left, under Hill, moving by the turnpike to New Baltimore, was ordered to strike the railroad at Bristoe Station; the right column, under Ewell, taking a more easterly route, was directed to effect a junction at the same point. When Hill approached Bristoe, Meade's army, with the exception of Warren's corps, had passed that point. As the head of this column came up, the 5th Corps, under General Sykes, had just crossed Broad Run. Hill at once formed a line of battle to attack the rear of that corps, when Warren came up, and, by a bold onset, drove the enemy back, securing 450 prisoners and 5 guns. The National army, having won the race for position, and obtained possession of the heights of Centreville, Lee's movement was at an end, and he had but to retire to his old line again … and, on the 18th, began his retrograde movement. The following day Meade commenced pursuit, with the intention of attacking the enemy on his retreat, but did not overtake him, being detained by a heavy ruin storm, which so raised Bull Run as to render it unfordable. … On the 7th of November the whole army was put in motion toward the Rappahannock, along which river the enemy was in position at Rappahannock Station and Kelly's Ford. In two columns Meade advanced toward these points. General French, commanding the left wing—composed of the 1st, 2d and 3d Corps—was directed to cross at Kelly's Ford, while the right wing—comprising the 5th and 6th Corps, under General Sedgwick—marched upon Rappahannock Station. The 3d Corps, under Birney, led the advance on Kelly's Ford. Reaching that point, without waiting for pontoons, Birney crossed his own division by wading, carried the rifle-pits, captured 500 prisoners and prevented the enemy re-enforcing their troops at the Ford, by means of batteries which he planted on the hills that commanded the crossing. At the same time the right wing was contending against more formidable obstacles at Rappahannock Station. Early's division of Ewell's corps occupied a series of works on the north side of the river. … Gaining a good position, commanding the fort from the rear, Sedgwick planted his guns and opened a fierce cannonade upon the enemy's several batteries. Under cover of this fire, the temporary works were assaulted and carried at the bayonet's point. Over 1,500 prisoners, 4 guns and 8 standards were captured. Sedgwick's loss was about 300 in killed and wounded. The right column now crossed the river without opposition, and, uniting with French's forces, advanced to Brandy Station. November 8th was lost in getting forward the trains, and in reconnoitering. Under cover of that night Lee withdrew across the Rapidan. Taking position between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, Meade remained quietly and undisturbed for two weeks. Finding Lee indisposed for action, the Federal leader resolved once more to try and bring on a general engagement. … The Confederate army having gone into winter quarters, was located over a wide extent of country. … This separation of the enemy's corps, led Meade to hope, that, by crossing the lower fords of the Rapidan, and advancing rapidly on the plank and turnpike roads to Orange, C. H., he could concentrate his army against Ewell's corps, cripple or destroy it, and then be able to turn upon Hill, and in this way break Lee's army in detail." But delays occurred which "frustrated the object of the movement; … disclosed Meade's intention to the enemy, who at once concentrated his entire force behind Mine Run, having also time given for additional entrenchments along the menaced points. The enemy's position was found to be exceedingly strong by nature, and further perfected by the skill of busy hands. … In front was Mine Run, a shallow stream, but difficult to cross on account of its steep banks, the marshy nature of the ground, and the dense undergrowth with which it was flanked. … 'In view of the season of the year [said General Meade in his subsequent report], the impossibility of moving from that place if there came on even a couple of days of rain; having failed in my first plan, which was to attack the enemy before they could concentrate; and then having failed in my plan to attack them after they had concentrated, in the manner which I have related, I concluded that, under the circumstances, it was impossible for me to do anything more.' And this was the end of a movement, which, like Hooker's advance to flank Fredericksburg, opened with fair promise of success, and, like that advance, was a failure from incidents which the situation permitted rather than asserted."

O. J. Victor, History of the Southern Rebellion, division 12, chapter 1 (volume 4).

ALSO IN: W. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, chapter 10.

J. E. Cooke, Life of General Robert E. Lee, part 7.

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 29._

_A. A. Humphreys, From Gettysburg to the Rapidan._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (August: Missouri-Kansas). Quantrell's guerrilla raid. The sacking and burning of Lawrence.

"Since the fall of Vicksburg many rebel soldiers had returned from Arkansas to their homes in Western Missouri, and under the secret orders so frequently sent from commanders in the South into that State, the guerrilla bands along the Kansas border suddenly grew in numbers and audacity. Though the whole region was patrolled almost day and night by Union detachments and scouts, a daring leader named Quantrell, who had been for some weeks threatening various Kansas towns, assembled a band of 300 picked and well-mounted followers at a place of rendezvous near the line, about sunset of August 20. His object being divined, half a dozen Union detachments from different points started in chase of him; but skilfully eluding all of them by an eccentric march, Quantrell crossed the State line, and, reaching the open prairie country, where roads were unnecessary, pushed directly for Lawrence, Kansas. {3507} … This town was 40 miles in the interior, and had no reason to apprehend an attack, and though it could have assembled several hundred men under arms in half an hour, its inhabitants had no dream of danger when the marauders entered the place at sunrise of August 21. Quantrell stationed detachments to prevent any assembling or concentration of the citizens, and then began a scene of pillage, arson and massacre too horrible to relate. Stores and banks were robbed, 185 buildings burned, and from 150 to 200 inhabitants murdered with a cold-blooded fiendishness which seems impossible to believe of Americans. The direful work occupied but three or four hours, when the perpetrators remounted their horses and departed. Though they managed their retreat with such skill as to avoid a general encounter, the pursuit was so hot that in several skirmishes, and by cutting off stragglers and laggards, 100 or more of the band were killed. The sudden calamity raised excitement on the Kansas border to almost a frenzy."

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 8, page 211.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (August-September: Tennessee). Burnside's deliverance of East Tennessee. The Union Army in Knoxville.

"Ever since the Federals had become masters of Kentucky they had projected all expedition into East Tennessee. … Early In the year 1862 the Federals had taken the defile of Cumberland Gap, the principal door to East Tennessee; but drawn into the pursuit of their adversaries in other directions, they had very wisely renounced proceeding beyond the gap, and shortly thereafter the Confederates had retaken the defile. In 1863 the role of liberator of East Tennessee was reserved for General Burnside: it was an honorable compensation accorded to the unfortunate but gallant soldier vanquished at Fredericksburg. Two divisions of the Ninth Corps designated to undertake this campaign having been, on June 4th, sent to the aid of Grant, it became necessary to commence new preparations. The scattered troops in Kentucky, several regiments recruited in that State or composed of refugees from East Tennessee, and a part of the fresh levies made in Ohio and Indiana, formed the Twenty-third Corps, under the orders of General Hartsuff. At the end of June … this little army was in readiness to move, when Morgan started on his raid [and Burnside's troops were sent in the pursuit]. Six weeks were lost. It was the beginning of August. The Ninth Corps was coming back from Vicksburg. But the men, worn out by the climate, had need of rest. Burnside could not wait for them." He set out upon his movement into East Tennessee with about 20,000 men, leaving Camp Nelson, near Lexington, on the 16th of August. The Confederate General Buckner opposed him with an equal number, including 3000 under General Fraser at Cumberland Gap. Instead of attempting to force the passage of the gap, Burnside "determined to make a flank movement around the defile, by traversing more to the south, in the State of Tennessee, the high table-land which on that side bears the designation of Cumberland plateau. The roads which Burnside would have to cross were long and difficult to travel, and that portion of the country was little known, besides being bare of resources; but the very difficult character of the roads warranted the belief that the Confederates would be illy prepared for defence in that region. No precaution was neglected to ensure the success of this laborious and perilous march," and the success achieved was perfect. "One can understand with what joy the Federals, after eleven days of toilsome march, entered the rich valley, a kind of promised land, which stretched out before them. Public rumor had greatly exaggerated their numbers. … Bragg, fearing with reason lest by its flanking movements it [the division which Burnside led in person] should separate him from Buckner and then fall upon Chattanooga, had sent his lieutenant an order to evacuate Knoxville." Buckner withdrew and Burnside made a triumphal entry into Knoxville on the 3d of September. "According to the testimony of eye-witnesses, the joy of the people was beyond description. Innumerable Federal flags which had been preserved in secret were displayed at the windows." Frazer, who had not been withdrawn from Cumberland Gap, found himself entrapped, when, on the 9th of September, Burnside appeared before his works, and he surrendered without a shot.

Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 4, book 1, chapter 2.

ALSO IN: A. Woodbury, Burnside and the 9th Army Corps, part 3, chapters 4-5.

T. W. Humes, The Loyal Mountaineers of East Tennessee, chapter 13.

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 30, part 2._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (August-September: Tennessee). Rosecrans's advance to Chattanooga. Evacuation of the place by the Confederates. Battle of Chickamauga.

"The seizure and occupation of the strategic point Chattanooga was an essential part of the campaign by the national forces against the Confederates. The Atlantic portion of the Southern States is separated from the Mississippi Valley by majestic folds of the earth's surface, constituting the Appalachian Ranges. These folds run, in a general manner, parallel to each other, and at intervals are crossed by transverse depressions or gaps. Such passages or gateways are therefore of great commercial, political and military importance. Chattanooga, which in the Cherokee language means 'The Hawk's Nest,' is a little town seated in one of these transverse depressions, through which the Tennessee River and a system of railroads pass. … From the region of Chattanooga the earth-folds range in a southwesterly direction. Enumerating such of them as are of interest on the present occasion, they are from west to east as follows: Raccoon or Sand Mountain, Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge, Pigeon Mountain, Chickamauga Hills. … Chattanooga Valley … through which runs a stream of the same name, is formed on the west by Lookout Mountain, here about 2,400 feet high, and on the east by Missionary Ridge, so called because Catholic Missionaries had established, many years ago, churches and schools upon it among the Cherokee Indians. From the summit of Lookout Mountain portions of not fewer than six States may be seen." In his Tullahoma campaign) Rosecrans, in July, had compelled Bragg and the Confederate army, by skilful flanking movements, to fan back to Chattanooga.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1863 (June-July: Tennessee).

{3508}

He had ever since been urged from Washington to pursue his attack and dislodge the enemy from the mountains. But he delayed further movements for a month, repairing his railroad communications, asking for reinforcements, and waiting for corn to ripen for food and forage. When he advanced, it was to turn the left of Bragg's position at Chattanooga, and "reach his rear between Dalton and Atlanta. To do this, he had to cross the Tennessee River below Chattanooga, and then pass the three or four successive mountain ridges. … Rosecrans reached the Tennessee River on the evening of the 20th of August, and shelled Chattanooga from the heights on the north bank on the 21st. Bridges were thrown over the river at Caperton's Ferry, mouth of Battle Creek, and Shell Mound, and the army, except the cavalry, safely crossed in face of the enemy. By the 8th of September" the several movements planned for Thomas, McCook and Crittenden were successfully accomplished, and Chattanooga was abandoned by the Confederates. "Thus the first object of Rosecrans's campaign was accomplished: the important strategic point Chattanooga was obtained. … Rosecrans, believing himself perfectly secure in Chattanooga, and being convinced that Bragg was fleeing southward, did nothing to fortify himself. Taking measures to pursue his antagonist, he directed Crittenden to leave one brigade at Chattanooga as a garrison, and with the rest move forward to Ringgold. Thomas was to march to Lafayette, and McCook upon Alpine and Summer Creek. But Bragg, so far from continuing, had stopped his retreat—he was concentrating at Lafayette. He had received, or was on the point of receiving, the powerful re-enforcements directed to join him. He was strictly ordered to check the farther advance of the Army of the Cumberland. … Rosecrans had separated three corps of his army by mountain ridges and by distances greater than those intervening between each of them and the enemy. Bragg had concentrated opposite his centre, and was holding such a position that he could attack any of them with overwhelming numbers. He had caused deserters and citizens to go into Rosecrans's lines to confirm him in the impression that the Confederates were in rapid retreat. … On the 11th of September, Crittenden, not stopping to fortify Chattanooga, pushed on toward Ringgold to cut off Buckner, who he had heard was coming from East Tennessee to the support of Bragg. Finding that Buckner had already passed, he turned toward Lafayette to follow him, going up the east side of the Chickamauga, but meeting a steadily increasing resistance he took alarm, and fell back across that stream at Lee and Gordon's Mills. The forces he had encountered were Cheatham's and Walker's divisions. Thomas, who had now discovered Bragg's position, directed McCook, who was advancing on Rome, to fall back instantly and connect with him. Rosecrans's troops had thus become scattered along an extended line from Lee and Gordon's Mills to Alpine, a space of about forty miles. By the 17th they were brought more within supporting distance, and on the morning of the 18th a concentration was begun toward Crawfish Spring, but it was slowly executed. At this time the two armies were confronting each other on the opposite banks of the Chickamauga, a stream which, rising at the junction of Missionary Ridge and Pigeon Mountain … empties into the beautiful Tennessee River above Chattanooga. In the Indian tongue Chickamauga means 'The Stagnant Stream,' 'The River of Death'—a name, as we shall soon find, of ominous import. Rosecrans was on the west bank of the Chickamauga. … On the 18th his right was … at Gordon's Mills, his left near the road across from Rossville. Bragg's intention was to flank this left and interpose between it and Chattanooga. … On the 18th Longstreet's troops were arriving from Virginia, and Bragg was ready. … The battle of Chickamauga commenced on the morning of the 19th." Bragg's flanking movement, executed under General Polk, and directed against the left of Rosecrans's line, where Thomas had command, did not succeed. "The centre was then assailed and pressed back, but, having been re-enforced, it recovered its ground. Night came, and the battle was thus far indecisive. … The night was spent in preparation. Thomas constructed abatis and breastworks before his lines. … Bragg was still determined to flank the national left, and intervene between it and Chattanooga. He had ordered Polk to begin the battle as soon as it was light enough to see," but Polk delayed and it was not until 10 o'clock that "Breckenridge's division, followed by Cleburne's, advanced against the breastworks of Thomas, which were mostly in Cleburne's front. Cleburne moved directly upon them, Breckenridge swinging round to flank them. With so much energy were these attacks made, that Thomas had to send repeatedly to Rosecrans for help. The Confederates had been gaining ground, but with these re-enforcements Thomas succeeded in driving back Cleburne with very great loss, and even in advancing on the right of Breckenridge." But, presently, by some blunder in the giving or construing of an order, one division—that of General "Wood—was withdrawn from Rosecrans line and posted uselessly in the rear. "By this unfortunate mistake a gap was opened in the line of battle, of which Hindman, of Longstreet's corps, took instant advantage, and, striking Davis in flank and rear, threw his whole division into confusion. … That break in the line was never repaired. Longstreet's masses charged with such terrible energy that it was impossible to check them. The national right and centre were dispersed, flying toward Rossville and Chattanooga. Sheridan, however, at length succeeded in rallying a considerable portion of his division, and managed to reach Thomas. On Thomas, who, in allusion to these events, is often called 'The Rock of Chickamauga.' the weight of the battle now fell. Everything depended on his firmness. … In the flight of the right and part of the centre from the field, Rosecrans, McCook and Crittenden were enveloped and carried away. … Rosecrans … went to Chattanooga, and thence telegraphed to Washington that his army had been beaten. Thomas still remained immovable in his position," and at a critical moment he was saved from a movement into his rear, by General Gorden Granger, who pushed to the front with some reserves. "Night came, and the Confederates were still unable to shake him. But, as most of the army had retreated to Chattanooga, he now deliberately fell back to Rossville. … The dead and wounded he left in the hands of the enemy. On the 21st he offered battle again, and that night withdrew into the defences of Chattanooga."

J. W. Draper, History of the American Civil War, chapter 67, volume 3.

{3509}

"During the heavy fighting of the 20th, Thomas was the only general officer on the field of rank above a division commander. … Well was he called the 'Rock of Chickamauga,' … There is nothing finer in history than Thomas at Chickamauga. All things considered, the battle of Chickamauga, for the forces engaged, was the hardest fought and the bloodiest battle of the Rebellion. … The largest number of troops Rosecrans had of all arms on the field during the two days' fighting was 55,000 effective men. … Rosecrans's losses aggregated killed, 1,687; wounded, 9,394; missing, 5,255. Total loss, 16,336. Bragg, during the battle, when his entire five corps were engaged, had about 70,000 effective troops in line. … His losses, in part estimated, were 2,673 killed, 16,274 wounded, and 2,003 missing, a total of 20,950. A full report of the rebel losses was never made."

_H. M. Cist, The Army of the Cumberland (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 7), chapters 11-12._

ALSO IN: Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 4, book 1, chapters 2-6.

T. B. Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, volume 1, chapter 20.

T. B. Van Horne, Life of Major-General George H. Thomas, chapters 6-7.

W. B. Hazen, Narrative of Military Service, chapters 8-9.

_D. H. Hill, E. Opdycke, and others, Chickamauga (Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 30._

P. H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, volume 1, chapter 15.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (August-October: Arkansas-Missouri). The breaking of Confederate authority in Arkansas. Occupation of Little Rock by national forces. Rebel raids into Missouri.

"After the surrender of Vicksburg, the Federal General Steele was sent to Helena, with a considerable force, and instructed to form a junction with General Davidson, who was moving south from Missouri, by way of Crowley's Ridge, west of the St. Francis, and with the combined force drive the Confederates south of the Arkansas River. Having effected this junction and established his depot and hospitals at Duvall's Bluff, on the White River, General Steele, on the 1st of August, advanced against the Confederate army, which fell back toward Little Rock. After several successful skirmishes, he reached the Arkansas River, and threw part of his force upon the south side, to threaten the Confederate communications with Arkadelphia, their depot of supplies, and flank their position at Little Rock. General Marmaduke was sent out with a cavalry force to beat the Federals back, but was completely routed. Seeing what must be the inevitable result of this movement of General Steele, the Confederate General Holmes destroyed what property he could, and after a slight resistance retreated with his army in great disorder, pursued by the Federal cavalry, and on the 10th of September General Steele, with the Federal army, entered the capital of Arkansas. His entire losses in killed, wounded and missing, in this whole movement, did not exceed 100. He captured 1,000 prisoners, and such public property as the Confederates had not time to destroy. The Federal cavalry continued to press the retreating Confederates southward; but a small force, which had eluded pursuit and moved eastward, attacked the Federal garrison at Pine Bluff, on the Arkansas, south of Little Rock, hoping to recapture it and thus cripple the Federals and break their communications. The attempt, which was made on the 28th of October, was repulsed with decided loss on the part of the confederates, and the same day the Federal cavalry occupied Arkadelphia, and the Confederates retreated toward the Red River. This completely restored Arkansas to the Federal authority, except a small district in the extreme southwest, and the region of Northwest Arkansas, over which the guerrilla and other irregular troops of the Confederates continued to roam, in their plundering excursions into Missouri, Kansas, and the Indian Territory. Some of these were conducted on a large scale. … The Confederate General Cabell, collecting together as many of the guerrillas and Indians as possible, and some of the routed troops driven from Little Rock and its vicinity, started with a force variously estimated at from 4,000 to 10,000, in the latter part of September, from the Choctaw settlements of the Indian Territory, crossed the Arkansas River east of Fort Smith, and, on the 1st of October, a detachment of his troops, under General Shelby, joined Coffee at Crooked Prairie, Missouri, intending to make a raid into Southwestern Missouri. This combined force, numbering 2,000 or 2,500 men, penetrated as far as the Missouri River at Booneville, but were pursued by the Missouri militia, and finally brought to a stand about eight miles southwest of Arrow Rock, on the evening of the 12th of October. General E. B. Brown who commanded the Federal troops, fought them till dark that evening, and during the night, having detached a small force to attack them in the rear, renewed the battle the next morning at eight A. M. After a sharp contest they fled, completely routed and broken up, with a loss of several hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners. They were pursued to the Arkansas line and prisoners gleaned all the way. … With these last convulsive throes, the active existence of the Confederate authority in Arkansas died out. On the 12th of November a meeting was held at Little Rock, to consult on measures for the restoration of the State to the Union, and was succeeded by others in different parts of the State."

W. J. Tenney, Military and Naval History of the Rebellion, chapter 36.

ALSO IN: Comte de Paris, History of the Civile war in America, volume 4, book 3, chapter 3.

W. Britton, Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border, chapters 21-22.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (August-December: South Carolina). Siege and Reduction of Fort Wagner. Bombardment of Fort Sumter and Charleston.

After the unsuccessful assault and bloody repulse of July 18th General Gillmore began against Fort Wagner the operations of a regular siege.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (JULY: SOUTH CAROLINA)

"Trenches were dug, and by the middle of August the batteries were within a quarter-mile of Wagner and within two and a half miles of Sumter. The work on these batteries had to be done mostly by night, for the forts kept up a heavy fire. Another battery was also begun in the marsh on the west side of Morris Island. The black mud there was so soft that it would not bear the weight of a man, and was at least 16 feet deep. After the site was chosen, a lieutenant was ordered to superintend the work, and told to call for whatever materials he wanted. Being something of a wag, he sent to the quartermaster for 100 men 18 feet high, to work in mud 16 feet deep; but as men of that height could not be had, he had to be satisfied with workmen of common stature. {3510} All the work had to be done in the dark, for it was within range of the guns of the forts. During fourteen nights piles were driven through the mud into the solid ground beneath, and on them were piled 15,000 bags of sand to form a parapet. After breaking down several trucks, a monster eight-inch Parrott gun, a 200-pounder, was dragged across the swamp and mounted, and about the middle of August the Swamp Angel, as the soldiers named it, was ready to throw shells into Charleston, nearly five miles away. On the 17th of August twelve land-batteries and the monitors opened fire on Sumter, Wagner, and Gregg. The heaviest of the fire was aimed at Sumter, as General Gillmore wished to silence it before he made another assault on Wagner. The bombardment was kept up for seven days, when Gillmore sent a dispatch to General Halleck, saying: 'Fort Sumter is to-day (August 24) a shapeless and harmless mass of ruins.' On the 21st of August, General Gillmore wrote to General Beauregard, who was in command in Charleston, demanding the evacuation of Fort Sumter and of Morris Island, threatening, in case of refusal, to bombard Charleston. Not hearing from him, he ordered a few shells to be thrown into the city from the Swamp Angel. Some of them fell in the streets and frightened the people, but did little damage. Beauregard then wrote him a letter in which he accused him of barbarity in 'turning his guns against the old men, the women and children, and the hospitals of a sleeping city,' and called the act 'unworthy of any soldier. General Gillmore replied that it was the duty of the commander of an attacked place to 'see to it that the non-combatants were removed,' and that he (Beauregard) had had forty days' time in which to do it. But the Swamp Angel was fired only a few times. At the thirty-sixth shot it burst and blew out the whole of its breech, and no other gun was mounted in its place. Gillmore then turned his attention once more to Fort Wagner, which he determined to assault again. To do this it was necessary to silence its guns and drive its defenders into the bomb-proofs; so a heavy fire was opened on it by the batteries, while the armored frigate New Ironsides poured eleven-inch shells into it from the sea side. The bombardment was kept up day and night, strong calcium lights being used by night to blind the Confederates and to show all parts of their works. The Confederates, driven from their guns, were obliged to fly for safety to their bomb-proofs. In the morning of September 7, the troops, under General Terry, were about ready to make the assault, when it was reported that the fort was empty. The garrisons of both Wagner and Gregg had fled during the night, and the whole of Morris Island was at last in possession of the Union troops. The next night an attack was made on Sumter by thirty boat-loads of men from the fleet. They reached the base of the walls and began to go up, thinking that the garrison was asleep; but before they reached the top a fire of musketry and hand-grenades was opened on them by the Confederates within, aided by some gun boats outside, and the assailants were driven off with a loss of about 200. But little more was done against Charleston during the rest of the year. General Gillmore thought that, as Sumter's guns were silenced, the fleet might easily pass into the harbor and capture Charleston. But Admiral Dahlgren did not care to run the risk of the torpedoes and powder-mines over which he knew he would have to pass. Besides, General Beauregard had taken advantage of the long delay in taking Wagner to strengthen the inner forts. Fort Johnson had been made into a powerful earthwork, and the fleet, even if Sumter were passed, would meet with as hot a fire as had been experienced outside. General Gillmore therefore contented himself with repairing Wagner and Gregg and turning their guns on Charles·ton and the forts defending it. As they were a mile nearer the city than the Swamp Angel battery, a slow bombardment was kept up until near the end of the year. About half of Charleston was reached by the shells, and many buildings were greatly injured. As the wharfs and most of the harbor were under fire, blockade-runners could no longer run in, and the business of the city was thus wholly destroyed."

J. D. Champlin, Jr., Young Folk's History of the War for the Union, chapter 32.

ALSO IN: Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 4, book 3, chapter 2.

A. Roman, Military Operations of General Beauregard, volume 2, chapters 32-34.

C. B. Boynton, History of the Navy during the Rebellion, volume 2, chapter 35.

L. F. Emilio, History of the 54th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers., chapters 6-7.

[Image: Map of the Battlefield of Chattanooga. 1863.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (October-November: Tennessee). The raising of the siege of Chattanooga. "Battle above the Clouds," on Lookout Mountain. Assault of Missionary Ridge. The Rout of Bragg's army.

After its defeat at Chickamauga the National Army was practically besieged on Chattanooga. Bragg acquired strong positions on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and was able to cut off all of Rosecrans's routes of supply, except one long and difficult wagon-road. On the 17th of October an important reorganization of the Union armies in the West was effected. "The departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, were united under the title of Military Division of the Mississippi, of which General Grant was made commander, and Thomas superseded Rosecrans in command of the Army of the Cumberland. General Hooker, with two corps, was sent to Tennessee. Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the 23d of October, and found affairs in a deplorable condition. It was impossible to supply the troops properly by the one wagon-road, and they had been on short rations for some time, while large numbers of the mules and horses were dead. Grant's first care was to open a new and better line of supply. Steamers could come up the river as far as Bridgeport, and he ordered the immediate construction of a road and bridge to reach that point by way of Brown's Ferry, which was done within five days, the 'cracker line,' as the soldiers called it, was opened, and thenceforth they had full rations and abundance of everything. The enemy attempted to interrupt the work on the road; but Hooker met them at Wauhatchie, west of Lookout Mountain, and after a three-hours' action drove them off [with It loss of 416 killed and wounded, the Confederate loss being unknown]. Chattanooga was now no longer in a state of siege; but it was still seriously menaced by Bragg's army, which held a most singular position. {3512} Its flanks were on the northern ends of Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge, the crests of which were occupied for some distance, and its centre stretched across Chattanooga valley. This line was twelve miles long, and most of it was well intrenched. Grant ordered Sherman [coming from Memphis] to join him with one corps, and Sherman promptly obeyed, but as he did considerable railroad repairing on the way, he did not reach Chattanooga till the 15th of November. Meanwhile Longstreet with 20,000 troops had been detached from Bragg's army and sent against Burnside at Knoxville. After Sherman's arrival, Grant had about 80,000 men."

R. Johnson, Short History of the War of Secession, chapter 20.

"My orders for battle," writes General Grant, "were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival, except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so far away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no special advantage to us now. Hooker was instructed to send Howard's corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with the remainder of the command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower palisades, and so get into Chattanooga Valley. The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank, form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River so as to threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force him either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at Chickamauga Station. Hooker was to perform like service on our right. His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to Rossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line there across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks. To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross at Brown's Ferry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of Mission Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on the ridge." Remaining in this concealed position until the time of attack, Sherman's army was then, under cover of night, to be rapidly brought back to the south side of the Tennessee, at a point where Missionary Ridge prolonged would touch the river, this being done by pontoons ready provided at a spot also concealed. The execution of the plan was delayed by heavy rains until November 23, when Burnside's distress at Knoxville forced Grant to begin his attack on Bragg by an advance of Thomas's army, at the center, before the flanking preparations were completed. "This movement [General Grant's narrative continues] secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied to this time. The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way. During the following night they were made strong. We lost in this preliminary action about 1,100 killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were captured. With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first day. … By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was in a position to move," and by daylight two divisions of his command were on the south side of the river, "well covered by the works they had built. The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and cavalry, was now begun. … By a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the South Chickamauga … and all the infantry and artillery were on the south side of the Tennessee. Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge. … By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height without having sustained much loss. … Artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand, The enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained. There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of Missionary Ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. But now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. Later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained. … While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker was engaged on the west. He had three divisions … all west of Lookout Creek. The enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and entrenched. … The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms. … Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary's division, supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect a crossing. The remainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. … This attracted the enemy so that Geary's movement farther up was not observed. A heavy mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain. He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the picket of over 40 men on guard near by. He then commenced ascending the mountain directly in his front. … By noon Geary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong fortifications in his front. The rest of the command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob. Hooker's advance now made our line a continuous one. … The day was hazy, so that Hooker's operations were not visible to us except at the moments when the clouds would rise. But the sound of his artillery and musketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. During the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where Hooker was as to stop operations for the time. At four o'clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable. {3513} By a little after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him. … The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was in full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It remained so all day. Bragg's headquarters were in full view. … Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held the hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base … and Corse with his brigade was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured." The fighting was severe for hours, and Bragg moved heavy masses of troops to resist Sherman's advance, while a division from Thomas was sent to reinforce the latter. "It had now got to be late in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compelling Bragg to mass in that direction also. The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expected he would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over Chattanooga Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. Hooker was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above named. He was detained four hours crossing Chattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected from his forces. … But Sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer. Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directed Thomas to order the charge at once." In this splendid charge the Union troops drove the Confederates from the first line of their works and then pushed on, with no further orders, to the second line, with the same success. "The retreat of the enemy along most of his line was precipitate, and the panic so great that Bragg and his officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured and thousands threw away their arms in their flight. Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a point above where the enemy crossed. … To Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland and the nation are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small arms that day. … The enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing everything to their left giving way, fled also. … Hooker [pushing on to Rossville as soon as he had succeeded in getting across Chattanooga Creek] … came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many of them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were captured. … The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position."

U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, chapters 42-44 (volume 2).

"Grant's losses in these battles were 757 killed, 4,529 wounded, and 330 missing; total 5,616. The enemy's losses were fewer in killed and wounded, owing to the fact that he was protected by intrenchments, while the national' soldiers were without cover. Grant captured 6,142 prisoners, 40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons, and 7,000 stand of small arms; by far the greatest capture, in the open field, which had then been made during the war. The battle of Chattanooga was the grandest ever fought west of the Alleghanies. It covered an extent of 13 miles, and Grant had over 60,000 men engaged. The rebels numbered only 45,000 men, but they enjoyed immense advantages of position in every part of the field." Pursuit of the retreating Confederates began early in the morning of the 26th, and considerable fighting occurred on that day and the next. At Ringgold, Hooker was checked by Cleburne's division, which held an easily defended gap while the main column with its trains were moved beyond reach. In this battle at Ringgold Hooker lost 65 killed and 377 wounded. He took three pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners.

A. Badeau, Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, chapters 11-12 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 8, chapter 5.

H. M. Cist, The Army of the Cumberland (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 7), chapters 13-14.

Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 4, book 2.

W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, chapter 13 (volume 1).

P. H. Sheridan, Memoirs, volume 1, chapter 16.

T. B. Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, chapters 21-22 (volume 1).

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 31._

_B. F. Taylor, Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (October-December: Tennessee). The Siege of Knoxville.

"The Army of the Cumberland remaining quiet at Chattanooga, Bragg (or his superiors) conceived the idea of improving his leisure by a movement on Burnside, which Longstreet was assigned to lead. Burnside had by this time spread his force very widely, holding innumerable points and places southward and eastward of Knoxville by brigades and detachments; and Longstreet advancing silently and rapidly, was enabled to strike heavily [October 20] at the little outpost of Philadelphia, held by Colonel F. T. Wolford, with the 1st, 11th, and 12th Kentucky cavalry and 45th Ohio mounted infantry—in all about 2,000 men. Wolford … withstood several hours, hoping that the sound of guns would bring him assistance from Loudon in his rear; but none arrived; and he was at length obliged to cut his way out; losing his battery and 32 wagons, but bringing off most of his command, with 51 prisoners. … Our total loss in prisoners to Longstreet southward of Loudon is stated by Halleck at 650. The enemy advancing resolutely yet cautiously, our troops were withdrawn before them from Lenoir and from Loudon, concentrating at Campbell's Station—General Burnside, who had hastened from Knoxville at the tidings of danger, being personally in command. Having been joined by his old (9th) corps, he was now probably as strong as Longstreet; but a large portion of his force was still dispersed far to the eastward, and he apprehended being flanked by an advance from Kingston on his left. He found himself so closely pressed, however, that he must either fight or sacrifice his trains; so he chose an advantageous position and suddenly faced the foe: his batteries being all at hand, while those of his pursuers were behind; so that he had decidedly the advantage in the fighting till late in the afternoon, when they brought up three batteries and opened, while their infantry were extended on either hand, as if to outflank him. {3514} He then fell back to the next ridge, and again faced about; holding his position firmly till after nightfall; when—his trains having meantime obtained a fair start—he resumed his retreat, and continued it unmolested until safe within the sheltering intrenchments of Knoxville. Our loss in this affair was about 800; that of the enemy was probably greater. … Longstreet continued his pursuit and in due time beleaguered the city [November 17], though he can hardly be said to have invested it. … The defenses were engineered by Captain Poe, and were signally effective. Directly on getting into position, a smart assault was delivered on our right, held by the 12th Illinois, 45th Ohio, 3d Michigan, and 12th Kentucky, and a hill carried; but it was not essential to the defenses. Our loss this day was about 100; among them was General W. P. Sanders, of Kentucky, killed. Shelling and skirmishing barely served to break the monotony for ten weary days, when—having been reenforced by Sam Jones, and one or two other small commands from Virginia—Longstreet delivered an assault, by a picked storming party of three brigades, on an unfinished but important work known as Fort Sanders, on our left, but was bloodily repelled by General Ferrero, who held it—the loss of the assailants being some 800, … while on our side the entire loss that night was about 100; only 15 of these in the fort. And now—Bragg having been defeated by Grant before Chattanooga, and a relieving force under Sherman being close at hand—Longstreet necessarily abandoned the siege, and moved rapidly eastward unassailed to Russellville, Virginia: our entire loss in the defense having been less than 1,000; while his must have been twice or thrice that number. Sherman's advance reached the city, and Burnside officially announced the raising of the siege, December 5th."

H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 2, chapter 18.

ALSO IN: A. Woodbury, Burnside and the Ninth Army Corps, part 3, chapter 6.

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 31, part 1._

T. W. Humes. The Loyal Mountaineers of East Tennessee, chapters 14-16.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (November). President Lincoln's Address at Gettysburg.

"By the retreat of Lee from Gettysburg and the immediate pursuit by Meade, the burial of the dead and care of the wounded on that great battlefield were left largely to the military and local authorities of the State of Pennsylvania. Governor Andrew G. Curtin gave the humane and patriotic duty his thoughtful attention; and during its execution the appropriate design of changing a portion of the field into a permanent cemetery, where the remains of the fallen heroes might be brought together, and their last resting-place suitably protected and embellished, was conceived and begun. The citizen soldiery from seventeen of the loyal States had taken part in the conflict on the Union side, and the several Governors of these States heartily cooperated in the project, which thus acquired a National character. This circumstance made it natural that the dedication ceremonies should be of more than usual interest and impressiveness. Accordingly, at the beginning of November, 1863, when the work was approaching its completion, Mr. David Wills, the special agent of Governor Curtin, and also acting for the several States, who had not only originated, but mainly superintended, the enterprise, wrote the following letter of invitation to President Lincoln: 'The several States having soldiers in the Army of the Potomac, who were killed at the battle of Gettysburg, or have since died at the various hospitals which were established in the vicinity, have procured grounds on a prominent part of the battlefield for a cemetery, and are having the dead removed to them and properly buried. These grounds will be consecrated and set apart to this sacred purpose, by appropriate ceremonies, on Thursday, the 19th instant. Honorable Edward Everett will deliver the oration. I am authorized by the Governors of the different States to invite you to be present and participate in these ceremonies, which will doubtless be very imposing and solemnly impressive. It is the desire that after the oration, you, as Chief Executive of the nation, formally set apart these grounds to their sacred use by a few appropriate remarks. It will be a source of great gratification to the many widows and orphans that have been made almost friendless by the great battle here, to have you here personally; and it will kindle anew in the breasts of the comrades of these brave dead, who are now in the tented field or nobly meeting the foe in the front, a confidence that they who sleep in death on the battlefield are not forgotten by those highest in authority; and they will feel that, should their fate be the same, their remains will not be uncared-for. We hope you will be able to be present to perform this last solemn act to the soldier dead on this battlefield.' President Lincoln expressed his willingness to perform the duty requested of him. … At the appointed hour on the 19th a vast procession, with military music, moved to the cemetery grounds where, in the midst of a distinguished auditory, the orator of the day, Edward Everett, made an address worthy alike of his own fame and the extraordinary occasion. … Mr. Everett ended in a brilliant peroration, the echoes of which were lost in the long and hearty plaudits of the great multitude, and then President Lincoln arose to fill the part assigned him in the programme. It was a trying ordeal to fittingly crown with a few brief sentences the ceremonies of such a day, and such an achievement in oratory; finished, erudite, apparently exhaustive of the theme, replete with all the strength of scholastic method and the highest graces of literary culture. If there arose in the mind of any discriminating listener on the platform a passing doubt whether Mr. Lincoln would or could properly honor the unique occasion, that doubt vanished with his opening sentence; for then and there the President pronounced an address of dedication so pertinent, so brief yet so comprehensive, so terse yet so eloquent, linking the deeds of the present to the thoughts of the future, with simple words, in such living, original, yet exquisitely molded, maxim-like phrases that the best critics have awarded it an unquestioned rank as one of the world's masterpieces in rhetorical art. {3515} He said:

'Four-score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this. But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate—we cannot consecrate—we cannot hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember, what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us,—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion— that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.'"

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 8, chapter 7.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (December).

The President's Message to Congress, at the opening of its session, December 8, was accompanied by the following Proclamation of Amnesty, which made known the terms of political reconstruction and rehabilitation that would be favored by the Executive, in dealing with rebellious citizens who might return to their allegiance:

"Whereas, in and by the Constitution of the United States, it is provided that the President 'shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment;' and Whereas a rebellion now exists whereby the loyal State governments of several States have for a long time been subverted, and many persons have committed and are now guilty of treason against the United States; and 'Whereas, with reference to said rebellion and treason, laws have been enacted by Congress declaring forfeitures and confiscation of property and liberation of slaves, all upon terms and conditions therein stated, and also declaring that the President was thereby authorized at any time thereafter, by proclamation, to extend to persons who may have participated in the existing rebellion, in any State or part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions and at such times and on such conditions as he may deem expedient for the public welfare; and Whereas the congressional declaration for limited and conditional pardon accords with well established judicial exposition of the pardoning power; and Whereas, with reference to said rebellion, the President of the United States has issued several proclamations, with provisions in regard to the liberation of slaves; and Whereas it is now desired by some persons heretofore engaged in said rebellion to resume their allegiance to the United States, and to reinaugurate loyal State governments within and for their respective States: Therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare and make known to all persons who have directly, or by implication, participated in the existing rebellion, except as hereinafter excepted, that a full pardon is hereby granted to them and each of them, with restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves, and in property cases where rights of third parties shall have intervened, and upon the condition that every such person shall take and subscribe an oath, and thenceforward keep and maintain said oath inviolate; and which oath shall be registered for permanent preservation, and shall be of the tenor and effect following, to wit:

'I, ------, do solemnly swear, in presence of Almighty God, that I will henceforth faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the union of the States thereunder; and that I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all acts of Congress passed during the existing rebellion with reference to slaves, so long and so far as not repealed, modified, or held void by Congress, or by decision of the Supreme Court; and that I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all proclamations of the President made during the existing rebellion having reference to slaves, so long and so far as not modified or declared void by decision of the Supreme Court. So help me God.'

The persons excepted from the benefits of the foregoing provisions are all who are, or shall have been, civil or diplomatic officers or agents of the so-called Confederate Government; all who have left judicial stations under the United States to aid the rebellion; all who are, or shall have been, military or naval officers of said so-called Confederate Government above the rank of colonel in the Army, or of lieutenant in the Navy; all who left seats in the United States Congress to aid the rebellion; all who resigned commissions in the Army or Navy of the United States, and afterwards aided the rebellion; and all who have engaged in any way in treating colored persons, or white persons in charge of such, otherwise than lawfully as prisoners of war, and which persons may have been found in the United States service as soldiers, seamen, or in any other capacity. And I do further proclaim, declare, and make known that whenever in any of the States of Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, [Virginia?], Florida, South Carolina, and North Carolina, a number of persons, not less than one tenth in number of the votes cast in such State at the presidential election of the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty, each having taken the oath aforesaid and not having since violated it, and being a qualified voter by the election law of the State existing immediately before the so-called act of secession, and excluding all others, shall re-establish a State government which shall be republican, and in nowise contravening said oath, such shall be recognized as the true government of the State, and the State shall receive thereunder the benefits of the constitutional provision which declares that 'the United States shall guaranty to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and, on application of the Legislature, or the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.' And I do further proclaim, declare, and make known that any provision which may be adopted by such State government in relation to the freed people of such State, which shall recognize and declare their permanent freedom, provide for their education, and which may yet be consistent, as a temporary arrangement, with their present condition as a laboring, landless, and homeless class, will not be objected to by the national Executive. {3516} And it is suggested as not improper, that, in constructing a loyal State government in any State, the name of the State, the boundary, the subdivisions, the constitution, and the general code of laws, as before the rebellion, be maintained, subject only to the modifications made necessary by the conditions hereinbefore stated, and such others, if any, not contravening said conditions, and which may be deemed expedient by those framing the new State government. To avoid misunderstanding, it may be proper to say that this proclamation, so far as it relates to State governments, has no reference to States wherein loyal State governments have all the while been maintained. And for the same reason, it may be proper to further say, that whether members sent to Congress from any State shall be admitted to seats constitutionally rests exclusively with the respective Houses, and not to any extent with the Executive. And still further, that this proclamation is intended to present the people of the States wherein the national authority has been suspended, and loyal State governments have been subverted, a mode in and by which the national authority and loyal State governments may be re-established within said States, or in any of them; and, while the mode presented is the best the Executive can suggest, with his present impressions, it must not be understood that no other possible mode would be acceptable. Given under my hand, at the City of Washington, the eighth day of December, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the independence of the United States of America the eighty-eighth. ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

In the Message Mr. Lincoln gave his reasons for the Proclamation, and explained the grounds on which he rested the policy declared in it, as follows: "On examination of this proclamation it will appear, as is believed, that nothing is attempted beyond what is amply justified by the Constitution. True, the form of an oath is given, but no man is coerced to take it. The man is only promised a pardon in case he voluntarily takes the oath. The Constitution authorizes the Executive to grant or withhold the pardon at his own absolute discretion; and this includes the power to grant on terms, as is fully established by judicial and other authorities. It is also proffered that if, in any of the States named, a State government shall be, in the mode prescribed, set up, such government shall be recognized and guaranteed by the United States, and that under it the State shall, on the constitutional conditions, be protected against invasion and domestic violence. The constitutional obligation of tire United States to guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and to protect the State, in the cases stated, is explicit and full. But why tender the benefits of this provision only to a State government set up in this particular way? This section of the Constitution contemplates a case wherein the element within a State, favorable to republican government, in the Union, may be too feeble for an opposite and hostile element external to or even within the State; and such are precisely the cases with which we are now dealing. An attempt to guarantee and protect a revived State government, constructed in whole, or in preponderating part, from the very element against whose hostility and violence it is to be protected, is simply absurd. There must be a test by which to separate the opposing elements so as to build only from the sound; and that test is a sufficiently liberal one which accepts as sound whoever will make a sworn recantation of his former unsoundness. But if it be proper to require, as a test of admission to the political body, an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States, and to the Union under it, why also to the laws and proclamations in regard to slavery? Those laws and proclamations were enacted and put forth for the purpose of aiding in the suppression of the rebellion. To give them their fullest effect, there had to be a pledge for their maintenance. In my judgment they have aided, and will further aid, the cause for which they were intended. To now abandon them would be not only to relinquish a lever of power, but would also be a cruel and an astounding breach of faith. I may add at this point, that while I remain in my present position I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation; nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress. For these and other reasons it is thought best that support of these measures shall be included in the oath; and it is believed the Executive may lawfully claim it in return for pardon and restoration of forfeited rights, which he has clear constitutional power to withhold altogether, or grant upon the terms which he shall deem wisest for the public interest. It should be observed, also, that this part of the oath is subject to the modifying and abrogating power of legislation and supreme judicial decision. The proposed acquiescence of the national Executive in any reasonable temporary State arrangement for the freed people is made with the view of possibly modifying the confusion and destitution which must at best attend all classes by a total revolution of labor throughout whole States. It is hoped that the already deeply afflicted people in those States may be somewhat more ready to give up the cause of their affliction, if, to this extent, this vital matter be left to themselves; while no power of the national Executive to prevent an abuse is abridged by the proposition. The suggestion in the proclamation as to maintaining the political frame-work of the States on what is called reconstruction, is made in the hope that it may do good without danger of harm. It will save labor, and avoid great confusion. But why any proclamation now upon this subject? This question is beset with the conflicting views that the step might be delayed too long or be taken too soon. In some States the elements for resumption seem ready for action, but remain inactive, apparently for want of a rallying-point—a plan of action. Why shall A adopt the plan of B, rather than B that of A? And if A and B should agree, how can they know but that the General Government here will reject their plan? By the proclamation a plan is presented which may be accepted by them as a rallying-point, and which they are assured in advance will not be rejected here. This may bring them to act sooner than they otherwise would. The objection to a premature presentation of a plan by the national Executive consists in the danger of committals on points which could be more safely left to further developments. Care has been taken to so shape the document as to avoid embarrassments from this source. {3517} Saying that, on certain terms, certain classes will be pardoned, with rights restored, it is not said that other classes, or other terms, will never be included. Saying that reconstruction will be accepted if presented in a specified way, it is not said it will never be accepted in any other way. The movements, by State action, for emancipation in several of the States, not included in the Emancipation Proclamation, are matters of profound gratulation. And while I do not repeat in detail what I have heretofore so earnestly urged upon this subject, my general views and feelings remain unchanged; and I trust that Congress will omit no fair opportunity of aiding these important steps to a great consummation. In the midst of other cares, however important, we must not lose sight of the fact that the war power is still our main reliance. To that power alone we can look, yet for a time, to give confidence to the people in the contested regions, that the insurgent power will not again overrun them. Until that confidence shall be established, little can be done anywhere for what is called reconstruction. Hence our chiefest care must still be directed to the army and navy, who have thus far borne their harder part so nobly and well. And it may be esteemed fortunate that in giving the greatest efficiency to these indispensable arms, we do also honorably recognize the gallant men, from commander to sentinel, who compose them, and to whom, more than to others, the world must stand indebted for the home of freedom disenthralled, regenerated, enlarged, and perpetuated. Abraham Lincoln."

A. Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, pages 442-456.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863-1864 (December-April: Tennessee-Mississippi). Winter operations. Sherman's Meridian Expedition. Longstreet's withdrawal from East Tennessee.

"Sherman was at Vicksburg. On a line with Vicksburg, but almost on the eastern boundary of the State, was the town of Meridian. Here two railroads crossed, one running north and south, extending from Mobile into the heart of Tennessee, and the other extending to the eastward into Alabama and Georgia. Railroads were few in the South at that time and the junction had made Meridian an important point. Here the Confederates had erected great warehouses for the storage of provisions and munitions of war. A considerable body of troops, too, was maintained at this point, whence they could be sent speedily by rail north or south, east or west, as the necessity might arise. General Sherman determined to fall upon Meridian, drive away the Confederate garrison, burn the arsenal and tear up the railroads so as to isolate the different parts of the Confederacy thenceforth. But in addition to accomplishing this he desired to effect the defeat and dispersal of the Confederate cavalry force under General Forrest, which was operating in Northern Mississippi and Southern Tennessee. Forrest was a brave and dashing leader. His men were hardy troopers, used to quick marches and reckless of danger. To crush him and annihilate his command would be a notable victory for the Union cause. Full of this project, Sherman boarded a steamer at Vicksburg and set out for Memphis, where were the headquarters of General W. Sooy Smith, then chief of cavalry in the division of the Mississippi. The river was full of great cakes of floating ice that bumped against the prow of the boat and ground against her sides until those on board feared that she might be sent to the bottom. But Memphis was reached without accident, and Sherman and the chief of cavalry were soon in earnest consultation. General Smith was ordered to take the field against Forrest with a force of 7,000 men. … It was agreed that General Smith should start from Memphis on February 1 and march southeast, while Sherman should leave Vicksburg February 3, and march due east. Thus they would effect a junction in the vicinity of Meridian. Sherman then re-embarked on the icy river and made his way back to Vicksburg. Promptly on the appointed day the head of Sherman's column passed out through the chain of earthworks that girdled the land ward side of Vicksburg. It was to be an expedition of destruction—a raid. His force of 25,000 men was in light marching order and advanced with such rapidity that the Confederates were driven from the very first, without having time to rally and oppose the advance of the invaders. Jackson was reached without any fighting, other than slight skirmishing with Polk's cavalry. The ministerial general had but 9,000 men in all, so he dared not make a determined stand against Sherman, but fled, without even destroying his pontoon bridge across the Pearl River, whereby the Federal advance was much expedited. From Jackson eastward the path of Sherman's army was marked by a broad belt of ashes and desolation. No public property was spared, nor anything which could be applied to public uses. Mills, railway stations, and rolling stock were burned. Railway tracks were torn up, the ties heaped on roaring fires and the rails heated red· hot and twisted out of shape. Sometimes the soldiers would twine a hot rail about a young tree, making what they facetiously termed 'Jeff Davis's neck-ties.' To Sherman's lines came escaping slaves in droves, old and young men, women and pickaninnies. … The slaves still further impoverished their masters by taking horses and mules with them when they fled, so that after Sherman's army had passed, most of the plantations in its track were stripped of their live-stock, both cattle and human. When Meridian was reached its defenders were nowhere to be seen. Sherman took possession and waited for Smith. Days passed without any word coming from the cavalry column. After a week in Meridian, Sherman set the torch to the public buildings and retraced his steps toward Vicksburg. He had taken 400 prisoners, destroyed 150 miles of track, 67 bridges, 20 locomotives and 28 cars; had burned several thousand bales of cotton, a number of steam mills, and over 2,000,000 bushels of corn. Over 1,000 Union white refugees and 8,000 negroes followed in his wake. In 1866, the historian Lossing, passing through Meridian, asked the Mayor of the town if Sherman had done the place much injury. 'Injury!' was the emphatic reply, 'Why, he took it away with him.'"

W. J. Abbot, Battle Fields and Victory, chapter 1.

{3518}

General Smith, in his report to General Sherman, gave the reasons for the falling back of the cavalry expedition, as follows: "We advanced to West Point and felt of the enemy, who was posted back of the Sakatonchee on our right and the Oktibbeha in our front, in force fully equal to my own that was available for service, encumbered as we were with our pack-mules and the captured stock, which by this time must have numbered full 3,000 horses and mules. The force consisted of mounted infantry, which was dismounted and in strong position under good cover, and beyond obstacles which could only be passed by defiles. To attempt to force my way through under such circumstances would have been the height of folly. I could not cross the Tombigbee, as there were no bridges and the stream could not be forded. To have attempted to turn the position by our right would have carried me all the way round to Houston again, and Forrest could again check me at the Houlka Swamp. I was ten days behind time; could get no communication through to you; did not know but what you were returning, and so determined to make a push at Forrest in front while I retired all my incumbrances and my main body rapidly toward Okolona, just in time to prevent a rebel brigade from getting in my rear, which had been thrown back for that purpose. We then retired, fighting for over 60 miles day and night."

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 32, part 1, page 252._

In East Tennessee, during the winter little was done by either army. A slight encounter occurred at Dandridge, in January, between Longstreet's forces and those of the Union General Parke. In April Longstreet was recalled by Lee, and the Ninth Corps, with Burnside again in command, went back to the army of the Potomac.

J. D. Cox, Atlanta (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 9), chapters 1-2.

ALSO IN: A. Badeau, Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, volume 1, chapter 13.

Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 4, book 4, chapter 1.

W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, volume 1, chapter 14.

W. J. Tenney, Military and Naval History, chapter 38.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863-1864 (December-July). President Lincoln's plan of reconstruction, and its application to Louisiana. The opposing Congressional plan.

"The proclamation which accompanied the Annual Message of the President for 1864 embodied the first suggestions of the Administration on the important subject of reconstructing the Governments of those States which had joined in the secession movement. The matter had been canvassed somewhat extensively by the public press, and by prominent politicians, in anticipation of the overthrow of the rebellion. … A considerable number of the friends of the Government, in both houses, maintained that, by the act of secession, the revolted States had put themselves outside the pale of the Constitution, and were henceforth to be regarded and treated, not as members of the Union, but as alien enemies:—that their State organizations and State boundaries had been expunged by their own act; and that they were to be readmitted to the jurisdiction of the Constitution, and to the privileges of the Union, only upon such terms and conditions as the Federal Government of the loyal States might prescribe. … After the appearance of the President's proclamation, the movement towards reconstruction in Louisiana assumed greater consistency, and was carried forward with greater steadiness and strength. On the 8th of January a very large Free State Convention was held at New Orleans, at which resolutions were adopted indorsing all the acts and proclamations of the President, and urging the immediate adoption of measures for the restoration of the State to its old place in the Union. On the 11th, General Banks issued a proclamation, appointing an election for State officers on the 22d of February, who were to be installed on the 4th of March, and another election for delegates to a convention to revise the Constitution of the State on the first Monday in April. The old Constitution and laws of Louisiana were to be observed, except so far as they relate to slavery. … Under this order, parties were organized for the election of State officers. The friends of the National Government were divided, and two candidates were put in nomination for Governor, Honorable Michael Hahn being the regular nominee, and representing the supporters of the policy of the President, and Honorable B. F. Flanders being put in nomination by those who desired a more radical policy than the President had proposed. Both took very decided ground against the continued existence of slavery within the State. … The election resulted in the election of Mr. Hahn. … Mr. Hahn was inaugurated as Governor on the 4th of March. On the 15th he was clothed with the powers previously exercised by General Banks, as military governor. … On March 16th, Governor Hahn issued a proclamation, notifying the electors of the State of the election for delegates to the convention previously ordered by General Banks. The party which elected Governor Hahn succeeded also in electing a large majority of the delegates to the convention, which met in New Orleans on the 6th of April. On the 11th of May it adopted, by a vote of 70 to 16, a clause of the new Constitution, by which slavery was forever abolished in the State. The Constitution was adopted on the 5th of September, by a vote of 6,836 to 1,566. Great umbrage was taken at these proceedings by some of the best friends of the cause, as if there had been an unauthorized and unjustifiable interference on the part of the President. … In Arkansas, where a decided Union feeling had existed from the outbreak of the rebellion, the appearance of the proclamation was the signal for a movement to bring the State back into the Union. On the 20th of January, a delegation of citizens from that State had an interview with the President, in which they urged the adoption of certain measures for the re-establishment of a legal State Government, and especially the ordering of an election for Governor. … Meantime, a convention had assembled at Little Rock, composed of delegates elected without any formality, and not under the authority of the General Government, and proceeded to form a new State Constitution, and to fix a day for an election. … The convention framed a constitution abolishing slavery, which was subsequently adopted by a large majority of the people. It also provided for the election of State officers on the day appointed for the vote upon the constitution; and the legislature chosen at that election elected two gentlemen, Messrs. Fishback and Baxter, as United States Senators, and also Representatives. These gentlemen presented their credentials at Washington. … The whole matter was referred to the Judiciary Committee, who … reported on the 27th of June that on the facts it did not appear that the rebellion was so far suppressed in Arkansas as to entitle the State to representation in Congress, and that therefore Messrs. Fishback and Baxter were not entitled to seats as Senators from the State of Arkansas. And the Senate on the next day adopted their report by a vote of 27 to 6. {3519} In the House, meanwhile, the Committee on Elections, to whom the application of the Arkansas members had been referred, reported to postpone their admission until a commission could be sent to inquire into and report the facts of the election, and to create a commission for the examination of all such cases. This proposition was, however, laid on the table, and the members were not admitted. … The cause of the rejection of these Senators and Representatives was, that a majority in Congress had not agreed with the President in reference to the plan of reconstruction which he proposed. A bill for the reconstruction of the States was introduced into the Senate, and finally passed both Houses on the last day of the session. It provided that the President should appoint, for each of the States declared in rebellion, a Provisional Governor, who should be charged with the civil administration of the State until a State Government should be organized and such other civil officers as were necessary for the civil administration of the State; that as soon as military resistance to the United States should be suppressed and the people had sufficiently returned to their obedience, the Governor should make an enrolment of the white male citizens, specifying which of them had taken the oath to support the Constitution of the United States, and if those who had taken it were a majority of the persons enrolled, he should order an election for delegates to a Constitutional Convention, to be elected by the loyal white male citizens of the United States aged twenty-one years. … The bill further provided that when a constitution containing … provisions [excluding rebels from office, prohibiting slavery, and repudiating Confederate debts] should have been framed by the convention and adopted by the popular vote, the Governor should certify that fact to the President, who, after obtaining the assent of Congress, should recognize this government so established as the Government of the State, and from that date senators and representatives and electors for President and Vice-President should be elected in the State. … This bill thus passed by Congress was presented to the President just before the close of the session, but was not signed by him."

H. J. Raymond, Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln, chapter 16.

The President's reasons for not signing the bill were given to the public as well as to Congress in the following Proclamation:

"Whereas, at the late session, Congress passed a bill to 'guarantee to certain States, whose governments have been usurped or overthrown, a republican form of government,' a copy of which is hereunto annexed; And whereas the said bill was presented to the President of the United States for his approval less than one hour before the sine die adjournment of said session, and was not signed by him; And whereas the said bill contains, among other things, a plan for restoring the States in rebellion to their proper practical relation in the Union, which plan expresses the sense of Congress upon that subject, and which plan it is now thought fit to lay before the people for their consideration: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare, and make known, that, while I am (as I was in December last, when by proclamation I propounded a plan for restoration) unprepared, by a formal approval of this bill, to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration; and, while I am also unprepared to declare that the free-State constitutions and governments already adopted and installed in Arkansas and Louisiana shall be set aside and held for nought, thereby repelling and discouraging the loyal citizens who have set up the same as to further effort, or to declare a constitutional competency in Congress to abolish slavery in States, but am at the same time sincerely hoping and expecting that a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery throughout the nation may be adopted, nevertheless I am fully satisfied with the system for restoration contained in the bill as one very proper plan for the loyal people of any State choosing to adopt it, and that I am, and at all times shall be, prepared to give the executive aid and assistance to any such people, so soon as the military resistance to the United States shall have been suppressed in any such State, and the people thereof shall have sufficiently returned to their obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the United States, in which cases military governors will be appointed, with directions to proceed according to the bill.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, this eighth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred an sixty-four, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-ninth. Abraham Lincoln. By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State."

A. Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, page 545.

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, volume 2, chapter 3.

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 8, chapters 16-17.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (January-February: Florida). Unsuccessful Operations. Battle of Olustee.

"Early in the winter of 1863-64, General Gillmore, commanding the Department of the South, … resolved upon an expedition into Florida to take possession of such portions of the Eastern and Northern sections of the State as could be easily held by small garrisons. … He afterwards added another detail to his plan: to assist in bringing Florida back into the Union, in accordance with the President's Proclamation of December 8, 1863. This came in time to be regarded by the opponents of the Administration as the sole purpose of the expedition, and Mr. Lincoln has received a great deal of unjust censure for having made a useless sacrifice of life for a political end. … The expedition to Florida was under the immediate charge of General Truman Seymour, an accomplished and gallant officer of the regular army. He landed at Jacksonville and pushed forward his mounted force 20 miles to Baldwin. … Gillmore himself arrived at Baldwin on the 9th of February, and after a full conference and, as he thought, understanding with Seymour, returned to Jacksonville. … On the 18th he was surprised at receiving a letter from Seymour, dated the day before, announcing his intention of moving at once to the Suwanee River without supplies, and asking for a strong demonstration of the army and navy in the Savannah River to assist his movement. … Gillmore wrote a peremptory letter, ordering him to restrict himself to holding Baldwin and the south prong of the St. Mary's River and occupying Palatka and Magnolia, and dispatched a staff officer to Florida with it. He arrived too late. {3520} Seymour had made up his mind that there was less risk in going forward than in staying at Baldwin, and like the brave and devoted soldier that he was had resolved to take the responsibility. He marched rapidly out towards Olustee, where the enemy under General Joseph Finegan was supposed to be, but came upon them unexpectedly about two miles east of that place. The forces were equal in numbers, about 5,500 on each side; the advantage to the Confederates was that they were in a strong position selected by themselves and ready for the fight. General J. R. Hawley, who commanded a brigade of infantry in the battle, says: 'We rushed in, not waiting for the proper full formation, and were fought in detail.' … Seymour's attack was constantly repulsed with heavy loss, until at nightfall he fell back to a new line. He was not pursued, and retired in good order and unmolested to Jacksonville. The Union loss was 1861; the Confederate, 940. This misadventure put an end for the moment to the attempt to occupy Florida."

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 8, chapter 11.

ALSO IN: _S. Jones and J. R. Hawley, Olustee (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

L. F. Emilio, History of the 54th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers, chapter 8.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (February-March: Virginia). Kilpatrick's and Dahlgren's Raid to Richmond.

"Public feeling throughout the North had been greatly excited by the deplorable condition of the prisoners of war held at Richmond. Early in the year, before the opening of the great campaign, some expeditions had been undertaken both from the Army of the Potomac and from Fortress Monroe, with the intention of relieving them. On February 27th, Custer, with 1500 horse, had crossed the Rapidan on a feint to the west of the Confederate army, while Kilpatrick, starting on the following day, moved down on its opposite flank, by Spottsylvania Court House, to within 3½ miles of Richmond, passing its first and second lines of defenses [March], but being obliged to fall back from its third. Pursued by a force of the enemy, he was compelled to cross the White House Railroad and move down the peninsula. A detachment of Kilpatrick's force, 400 strong, under Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, leaving the main body at Spottsylvania, had gone to the right through Louisa and Goochland Counties, intending to cross the James River and enter Richmond from the south, while Kilpatrick attacked it on the north. But the river was found to be too deep to be forded. Dahlgren passed down the north bank to the fortifications of Richmond, forcing his way through the outer works, but being repulsed from the inner. Finding that Kilpatrick's attempt had miscarried, he moved toward King and Queen Court House; but after crossing the Mattapony at Dabney's Ferry, he fell into an ambuscade [March 3], his command being scattered, and himself killed. Under a false pretense that papers were found upon him showing an intention to set fire to Richmond, and take the lives of Davis and his cabinet, his corpse was insulted and the place of its interment concealed. At the time of his death he was but 21 years of age."

J. W. Draper, History of the American Civil War, chapter 82 (volume 3).

"The document alleged to have been found upon the person of Colonel Dahlgren is utterly discredited by the fact that the signature attached to it cannot possibly be his own, because it is not his name,—a letter is misplaced, and the real name Dahlgren is spelled 'Dalhgren'; hence it is undeniable that the paper is not only spurious, but is a forgery. … It is entirely certain that no such orders were ever issued by Colonel Dahlgren."

Admiral J. A. Dahlgren, Memoirs of Ulric Dahlgren, pages 233-234.

ALSO IN: C. C. Chesney, Essays in Military Biography, page 185.

B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the Civil War, volume 3, chapter 10.

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 33._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (March-April). General Grant in chief command of the whole army. His plans of campaign.

"Immediate]y after the victories at Chattanooga Mr. Washburne of Illinois, the devoted friend and firm supporter of General Grant through good and evil report, introduced a bill in Congress to revive the grade of lieutenant-general in the army. The measure occasioned a good deal of discussion. This high rank had never been conferred on any citizen of the republic except Washington, who held it for a short time before his death. It was discontinued for more than half a century and then conferred by brevet only upon General Scott. There were those who feared, or affected to fear, that so high a military rank was threatening to the liberties of the republic. The great majority of Congress, however, considered the liberties of the republic more robust than this fear would indicate, and the bill was finally passed on the 26th cf February, and received the approval of the President on the 29th of February. … Immediately upon signing the bill the President nominated Grant to the Senate for the office created by it. … The Senate immediately confirmed his nomination, and on the 3d of March the Secretary of War directed him to report in person to the War Department as early as practicable. … He started for Washington the next day, but in the midst of his hurried preparations for departure he found time to write a letter of the most warm and generous friendship to Sherman." Grant's commission as Lieutenant-General of the Army of the United States was formally presented to him by President Lincoln on the 9th of March. "After the presentation of the commission a brief conversation took place. General Grant inquired what special service was expected of him. The President replied that our country wanted him to take Richmond; he said our generals had not been fortunate in their efforts in that direction and asked if the Lieutenant-General could do it. Grant, without hesitation, answered that he could if he had the troops. These the President assured him he should have. There was not one word said as to what route to Richmond should be chosen. The next day Grant visited General Meade at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at Brandy Station. … Meade said that it was possible Grant might want an officer to command the Army of the Potomac who had been with him in the West, and made especial mention of Sherman. He begged him if that was the case not to hesitate about making the change. … Grant assured him that he had no thought of making any change; and that Sherman could not be spared from the West. He returned to Washington on the 11th. The next day he was placed in command of all the armies by orders from the War Department; but without waiting for a single day to accept the lavish proffers of hospitality which were showered upon him, he started West again on the evening of the 11th of March. {3521} In that short time he had utterly changed his views and plans for the future conduct of the war. He had relinquished the purpose he had hitherto firmly held of leading the Western armies on the great campaign to Atlanta and the sea, and had decided to take the field with the Army of the Potomac. … Sherman at his request was promoted to command the Military Division of the Mississippi, McPherson succeeded to Sherman's command of the Department of the Tennessee, and Logan was promoted to the command of McPherson's corps." The necessary arrangements were quickly made. General Sherman assumed his enlarged command on the 18th of March, and General Grant a few days later was with the Army of the Potomac. He "established his headquarters at Culpeper Court House near the end of March, and spent a month in preparations for the great campaign which he, in common with the entire North, hoped would end the war. … The plan of the Lieutenant-General, as set forth in his report, was extremely simple. So far as practicable, the armies were to move together, and towards one common center. Banks was to finish his operations in Louisiana, and, leaving a small garrison on the Rio Grande, was to concentrate an army of some 25,000 men, and move on Mobile. Sherman was to move simultaneously with the other armies, General Johnston's army being his objective, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate aim. Sigel, who was in command in the Shenandoah, was to move to the front in two columns, one to threaten the enemy in the Valley, the other to cut the railroads connecting Richmond with the Southwest. Gillmore was to be brought north with his corps, and in company with another corps, under W. F. Smith, was to form an army under General B. F. Butler to operate against Richmond south of the James. Lee's army was to be the objective point of Meade, reënforced by Burnside. As to the route by which the Army of the Potomac was to advance, Grant reserved his decision until just before he started upon his march. … The two armies lay in their intrenchments on both sides of the Rapidan. The headquarters … of Lee [were] at Orange Court House; the Army of Northern Virginia guarded the south bank of the river for 18 or 20 miles, Ewell commanding the right half, A. P. Hill the left. The formidable works on Mine Run secured the Confederate right wing, which was further protected by the tangled and gloomy thickets of the Wilderness. Longstreet had arrived from Tennessee with two fine divisions, and was held in reserve at Gordonsville. The two armies were not so unequally matched as Confederate writers insist. The strength of the Army of the Potomac, present for duty equipped, on the 30th of April, was 122,146; this includes the 22,708 of Burnside's Ninth Corps. The Army of Northern Virginia numbered at the opening of this campaign not less than 61,953. While this seems like a great disparity of strength, it must not be forgotten that the Confederate general had an enormous advantage of position. The dense woods and the thickly timbered swamps … were as well known to him as the lines of his own hand, and were absolutely unknown to his antagonist."

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 8, chapters 13-14.

ALSO IN: U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, chapters 46-47 (volume 2).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (March-May: Louisiana). The Red River Expedition.

"As the third year began, General Banks conceived the idea that the trade of Western Louisiana could be opened by the medium of the Red river, and projected an expedition to take possession of the country adjacent to its course. This river is open for navigation by larger vessels, only during the high water of March and April. Porter was to command the fleet of twenty of the finest vessels on the Mississippi, and Sherman was persuaded to lend some of his troops for the purpose. A. J. Smith was to start from Vicksburg with 10,000 men, while Banks would proceed up river from New Orleans, with Franklin's division. Steele from Little Rock was to operate towards Shreveport to join the main army. General Taylor was in command of the enemy's forces at Shreveport. The fleet started up the Red river in company with the transports carrying A. J. Smith's column. Fort De Russy was captured [March 14], the enemy retiring before our troops, and Alexandria and Nachitoches fell into our hands as the joint force advanced. Banks put in an appearance a week later. There was more or less skirmishing with the enemy's horse and outposts along the entire route; and near Mansfield, at Sabine Cross-Roads, the vanguard met the enemy in force. Sufficient care had not been taken to keep the several bodies concentrated. It was on Smith that the attack fell [April 8], and though this general's record for endurance is of the best, he was nevertheless badly worsted with a loss of 2,000 men out of 8,000 engaged, and some twenty guns. Retiring to Pleasant Hill, another stand was made for the possession of what had been so far gained. … The fleet had meanwhile reached Grand Écore. High water was coming to an end, and Porter was obliged to return down river, to Alexandria. Here it was found that most of the vessels were of too heavy draught to pass the falls below the town; and the loss of most of them would have been certain, but for a dam and waterway ably constructed by Colonel Bailey, an engineer remarkably fertile in expedients. By means of this device the fleet was safely floated over. On the retreat, Alexandria was burned [May 15] by accident, traceable to no particular cause, though, naturally enough laid by the Confederates to our spirit of revenge."

T. A. Dodge, Bird's-Eye View of our Civil war, chapter 31.

"We prefer not to enter into the bitter discussions to which this disastrous campaign gave rise on both sides of the line. A life-long quarrel sprang up between Kirby Smith and Taylor, between Banks and Porter, while Franklin, Charles P. Stone (Banks's chief-of-staff), and Albert L. Lee, all of whom relinquished their commands, added their quota of misunderstanding and resentment. … The Committee on the Conduct of the War made an investigation of the matter in the year 1865, at the time when the antagonism between Mr. Lincoln and the Radicals in relation to the subject of reconstruction had assumed an acute form. … The charge was made by the committee against Banks, that what he had in view was to carry out measures for the establishment of a State government in Louisiana, and to afford an egress for cotton and other products of that region, and that the attention directed to the accomplishment of these objects exerted an unfavorable influence on the expedition. … The honorable poverty in which General Banks has passed his subsequent life is the best answer to the reckless charges of his enemies."

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 8, chapter 11.

ALSO IN: D. D. Porter, Naval History of the Civil War, chapters 41-42.

_Report of Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, 38th Congress, 2d Session, volume 2._

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 33._

R. B. Irwin, History of the 19th Army Corps, chapters 23-28.

{3522}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (March-October: Arkansas-Missouri). Last important operations in the West. Price's raid.

"During the winter of 1863-1864 the forces of Generals Steele and Blunt held the Arkansas River as a Federal line of advance. … During this period of inactivity, however, Steele was making preparations for a vigorous spring campaign. It was decided that the column under General Banks and the columns under General Steele from Little Rock and Fort Smith should converge toward Shreveport, Louisiana. The Federal columns under Steele left Little Rock and Fort Smith the latter part of March, moved toward the Southern part of the State, and after some fighting and manœuvring drove General Price's forces from Camden, Arkadelphia and Washington. In the midst of these successful operations, Steele received information that Banks' army had been defeated and was retreating and that Price had received reënforcements from Kirby Smith of 5000 infantry and a complement of artillery, and would at once assume the offensive.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (March-May: Louisiana).

Not feeling strong enough to fight the combined Confederate forces, Steele determined to fall back upon Little Rock. He had scarcely commenced his retrograde movement when Smith and Price began to press him vigorously. A retreating fight was kept up for several days, until the Federal army reached Jenkins's Ferry on the Saline River," where Smith and Price made an energetic attack on the Federal army (April 30) and were repulsed with heavy loss. "After the battle of Jenkins's Ferry, instead of making preparations to attack the Federal forces at Little Rock and Fort Smith, Price commenced organizing his forces for an expedition into Missouri. … Price's army for the invasion of Missouri numbered some 15,000 men and 20 pieces of artillery before crossing the Arkansas River, and consisted of three divisions, commanded by Generals Fagan, Marmaduke and Shelby. … About the 1st of September, while strong demonstrations were being made against Fort Smith and Little Rock, Price, with his army, crossed the Arkansas River about half-way between those points, at Dardanelle, and marched to the northern part of the State without opposition, and, in fact, without his movements being definitely known to General Rosecrans, who then commanded the Department of the Missouri at St. Louis," to which he had been appointed in January. At Pilot Knob, where they arrived September 26th, the Confederates were opposed by General Thomas Ewing, Jr., with a small force of 1051 men. The fortifications at Pilot Knob were strong and Ewing held them against the vigorous attacks of Price throughout the 27th, but evacuated that night, blowing up the magazine and retreating safely. The Confederate invaders then marched on St. Louis and attacked the outer defences of the city, some miles to the south of it, but found themselves opposed by the veterans of General A. J. Smith's division, which had been opportunely stopped on its way down the Mississippi River to join Sherman. Foiled at St. Louis, Price then moved upon Jefferson City, the State capital, but was closely pursued and driven off. Advancing westward, he was met at Lexington, October 20th, by forces from Kansas, under General Blunt, but forced the latter to retire from the town, after severe fighting. Thence to Independence his progress was steadily resisted by Generals Blunt and Curtis, with volunteers and militia from Kansas. At Independence, on the 22d, Pleasonton's cavalry, of Rosecrans's army, came up and formed a junction with the forces of Curtis, and the next day they engaged Price in battle near Westport. "The opposing armies fought over an area of five or six square miles, and at some points the fighting was furious. … About the middle of the afternoon Price's lines began to give way, and by sundown the entire Confederate army was in full retreat southward along the State line, closely pursued by the victorious Federal forces." At the crossing of the Marais des Cygnes River he lost ten pieces of his artillery and a large number of prisoners, including Generals Marmaduke and Cabell. "At Newtonia in south-west Missouri, on the 28th of October, Price made another stand, and was attacked by the pursuing forces … and finally driven from the field with heavy loss. This was next to the severest battle of the campaign. Blunt, and some of the Missouri troops, continued the pursuit to the Arkansas River, but Price did not again attempt to make a stand. His line of march from Westport to Newtonia was strewn with the debris of a routed army. He crossed the Arkansas River above Fort Smith with a few pieces of artillery, with his army demoralized and reduced by captures and dispersion to perhaps less than 5,000 men. Most of the noted guerrilla bands followed him from the State. The 'Price raid,' as it was called in the West, was the last military operation of much consequence that took place in Missouri and Arkansas. It is certain that Price lost more than he gained in war material and that the raid did not tend to strengthen the Confederate cause in the West."

_W. Britton, Résumé of Military Operations in Missouri and Arkansas, 1864-1865 (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

"In General Price's report occurs the following summary of the campaign: 'I marched 1,434 miles, fought 43 battles and skirmishes, captured and paroled over 3,000 Federal officers and men, captured 18 pieces of artillery, 3,000 stand of small-arms, 16 stand of colors … and destroyed property to the cost of $10,000,000. I lost ten pieces of artillery. 2 stand of colors, 1,000 small arms, while I do not think I lost 1,000 prisoners. … I brought with me at least 5,000 recruits.'"

Editor's note to above.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (April: Tennessee). The Massacre at Fort Pillow.

After General Sherman's return from his raid to Meridian, and General William Sooy Smith's return to Memphis, the Confederate cavalry leader Forrest advanced into Tennessee, devastating the country. "He captured Jackson in that State, on the 23d of March, and moving northward, appeared before Paducah, held by Colonel Hicks with 650 men. {3523} His demand for a surrender was accompanied with a threat: 'If you surrender, you shall be treated as prisoners of war; but if I have to storm your works, you may expect no quarter:' he made three assaults, and then retired, having lost 1,500 men. On the 12th of April he was at Fort Pillow, which was garrisoned by 19 officers and 538 men, of whom 262 were negroes. This force was not a part of the army, but a nondescript body in process of formation, placed there to cover a trading-post for the convenience of families supposed to be friendly, or at least not hostile; it had been left in violation of Sherman's peremptory orders. The attack was made before sunrise; and after some severe fighting, Major Booth, the commanding officer of the garrison, was killed. Major Brodford, who succeeded him, drew the troops from the outer line of intrenchments into the fort, and continued the contest until afternoon. A gun-boat which had been co-operating in the defense, withdrew to cool or clean her guns, and, the fire slackening, Forrest sent a summons to surrender, and shortly after a second, demanding that the surrender should be made in twenty minutes. These terms were declined by Bradford. But while the negotiations were in progress, the assailants were stealthily advancing, and gaining such positions that they could rush upon the fort. Accordingly, as soon as Bradford's answer was received, they sprang forward. The fort was instantly carried. Its garrison threw down their arms and fled, seeking refuge wherever they could. And now was perpetrated one of the most frightful acts of all recorded history. The carnage did not cease with the struggle of the storming, but was continued as a carnival of murder until night, and renewed again the next morning. Without any discrimination of color, age, or sex, the fugitives were dragged from their hiding-places, and cruelly murdered. Wounded men, who had made a gallant defense, were atrociously compelled to stand up and be shot; some were burnt in their tents, some were stabbed. For the black soldiers there was no mercy. 'They were massacred because they were niggers,' and the whites 'because they were fighting with niggers.' General Stephen E. Lee, the superior of Forrest, partly denying and partly excusing this atrocity, says, 'It is generally conceded by all military precedent that, when the issue has been fairly presented and the ability displayed, fearful results are expected to follow a refusal to surrender. The case under consideration is almost an extreme one. You had a servile race armed against their masters, and in a country which had been desolated by almost unprecedented outrages.' The Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War appointed a sub-committee to go to such places as they might deem necessary, and take testimony in relation to the Fort Pillow massacre. Their report presents facts in connection with this massacre of the deepest atrocity. Men were not only shot in cold blood and drowned, but were even crucified, buried alive, nailed to the floors of houses, which were then set on fire. 'No cruelty,' says this committee, 'which the most fiendish malignity could devise, was omitted by these murderers.' 'From 300 to 400 men are known to have been killed at Fort Pillow, of whom at least 300 were murdered in cold blood after the post was in possession of the rebels, and our men had thrown down their arms and ceased to offer resistance.' … It should be mentioned in behalf of General Forrest that one of the witnesses, who had been rewounded, testified that 'Forrest gave orders to stop the firing.'"

J. W. Draper, History of the American Civil War, chapter 74 (volume 3).

"I arrived off the fort at 6 a. m. on the morning of the 13th inst. [April]. … About 8 a. m. the enemy sent in a flag of truce with a proposal from General Forrest that he would put me in possession of the fort and the country around until 5 p. m. for the purpose of burying our dead and removing our wounded, whom he had no means of attending to. I agreed to the terms proposed. … We found about 70 wounded men in the fort and around it, and buried, I should think, 150 bodies. … All the wounded who had strength enough to speak agreed that after the fort was taken an indiscriminate slaughter of our troops was carried on by the enemy with a furious and vindictive savageness which was never equalled by the most merciless of the Indian tribes. Around on every side horrible testimony to the truth of this statement could be seen. … Strewn from the fort to the river bank, in the ravines and hollows, behind logs and under the brush where they had crept for protection from the assassins who pursued them, we found bodies bayoneted, beaten, and shot to death, showing how cold blooded and persistent was the slaughter of our unfortunate troops."

_Report of Acting-Master W. Ferguson, United States Steamer Silver Cloud (Official Records, Series 1, volume 32, part 1, page 571)._

ALSO IN: _Report of Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War (30th Congress, 1st Session, H. R. Report Number 65)._

Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 4., book 4, chapter 1.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (April-May: North Carolina). Exploits of the ram Albemarle. Surrender of Plymouth.

In the squadron [of the Confederates] we were gladdened by the success of our iron-clad ram Albemarle, which vessel, under Captain James B. Cooke, had (after overcoming innumerable difficulties) succeeded in descending the Roanoke river, April 19th [1864], and dispersing the Federal squadron off Plymouth, North Carolina. She sunk the steamer Southfield, and drove the other vessels off; and her presence led to the recapture of Plymouth by the Confederates. On the 5th of May the Albemarle started from Plymouth with the small steamer Bombshell in company, on what was called a secret expedition. I think it probable the intention was to destroy the wooden men-of-war in the sounds, and then tow troops in barges to Hatteras and retake it. If this could have been done the Albemarle would have had it all her own way, and Roanoke island, Newbern and other places would again have fallen into the hands of the Confederates. Shortly after leaving Plymouth the Albemarle fell in with the Federal squadron, consisting of the steamers Mattabesett, Sassacus, Wyalusing, Whitehead, Miami, Ceres, Commodore Hull and Seymour—all under the command of Captain Melancton Smith, and after a desperate combat was forced to return to Plymouth."

W. H. Parker, Recollections of a Naval Officer, page 339.

ALSO IN: J. R. Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers (The Navy in the Civil War, volume 1), chapter 4.

_D. Ammen, The Atlantic Coast (same Series, volume 2), chapter 9._

B. Boynton, History of the Navy, volume 2, chapter 36.

{3524}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia). Grant's movement on Richmond. The Battle of the Wilderness.

"The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders of Major-General Mead, pursuant to instructions. Before night the whole army was across the Rapidan—the Fifth and Sixth Corps crossing at Germanna Ford, and the Second Corps at United States' (Ely's) Ford, the cavalry, under Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance,—with the greater part of its trains, numbering about 4,000 wagons, meeting with but slight opposition. The average distance traveled by the troops that day was about 12 miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country and protected. Early on the 5th, the advance corps (the Fifth, Major General G. K. Warren commanding), met and engaged the enemy outside his intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable promptness.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April-May: Virginia).

General Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was at the time the Army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria railroad, holding the road back to Bull Run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. This crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. By 6 o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was leading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some of his troops having marched a distance of over 30 miles, crossing both the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers. Considering that a large proportion (probably two-thirds), of his command was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches and carrying the accouterments of a soldier, this was a remarkable march. The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of the 5th. After dark the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. On the morning of the 7th reconnaissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. From this it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would await an attack behind his works. I therefore determined to push on and put my whole force between him and Richmond, and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right flank. On the night of the 7th the march was commenced toward Spottsylvania Court House, the Fifth Corps moving on the most direct road. But the enemy having become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first."

_Gen. U. S. Grant, Official Report (Official Records, Series 1, volume 36, part 1, page 18)._

The casualties of the Army of the Potomac and Burnside's Ninth Corps (then not incorporated with it) in the battle of the Wilderness were "2,265 killed, 10,220 wounded, and 2,902 missing. Total, 15,387. Killed and wounded, 12,485. … The woods took fire in many places, and it is estimated that 200 of our wounded perished in the flames and smoke. According to the tabular statement, Part First, 'Medical and Surgical History of the War,' the casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia were 2,000 killed, 6,000 wounded, and 3,400 missing. The authority for this statement is not given, and I do not find anywhere records of the loss of that army in the Wilderness. … Both sides lost many valuable officers in this battle, [including, on the Union side, General Wadsworth]. … So far as I know, no great battle ever took place before on such ground. But little of the combatants could be seen, and its progress was known to the senses chiefly by the rising and falling sounds of a vast musketry that continually swept along the lines of battle many miles in length, sounds which at times approached to the sublime."

_A. A. Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865 (Campaigns of the Civil war, volume 12), chapter 2._

"All the peculiar advantages of the Army of the Potomac were sacrificed in the jungle-fighting into which they were thus called to engage. Of what use here were the tactical skill and the perfection of form, acquired through long and patient exercise; of what use here the example and the personal influence of a Hays or a Hancock, a Brooke or a Barlow? How can a battle be fitly ordered in such a tangle of wood and brush, where troops can neither be sent straight to their destination nor seen and watched over, when, after repeatedly losing direction and becoming broken into fragments in their advance through thickets and jungles, they at last make their way up to the line of battle, perhaps at the point they were designed to reinforce, perhaps far from it? … It will never cease to be an object of amazement to me that, with such a tract in prospect, the character of it being known, in general, to army headquarters through the Chancellorsville campaign … a supreme effort was not made … to carry the Army of the Potomac either through these jungles toward Mine Run, or past it, toward Spottsylvania."

F. A. Walker, History of the Second Army Corps, chapter 13.

ALSO IN: _E. M. Law, A. S. Webb, and others, The Wilderness Campaign (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, chapters 50-51 (volume 2).

W. Swinton, The Twelve Decisive Battles of the War, chapter 9.

A. L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, chapter 17.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia). Sheridan's raid to Richmond.

"When the Army of the Potomac emerged from the Wilderness, Sheridan was sent to cut Lee's communications. This was the first of the remarkable raids of that remarkable leader, in Virginia, and, though short, was a destructive one. He took with him a greater portion of the cavalry led by Merritt, Gregg and Wilson, and, cutting loose from the army, he swept over the Po and the Ta, crossed the North Anna on the 9th, and struck the Virginia Central railway at Beaver Dam Station, which he captured. {3525} He destroyed ten miles of the railway; also its rolling stock, with a million and a half of rations, and released 400 Union prisoners, on their way to Richmond from the Wilderness. There he was attacked in flank and rear by General J. E. B. Stuart and his cavalry, who had pursued him from the Rapid Anna [Rapidan], but was not much impeded thereby. He pushed on, crossed the South Anna at Ground-squirrel Bridge, and at daylight on the morning of the 11th, captured Ashland Station, on the Fredericksburg road, where he destroyed the railway property, a large quantity of stores, and the road itself for six miles. Being charged with the duty of not only destroying these roads, but of menacing Richmond and communicating with the army of the James, … Sheridan pressed on in the direction of the Confederate capital, when he was confronted by Stuart at Yellow Tavern, a few miles north of Richmond, where that able leader, having made a swift circuitous march, had concentrated all of his available cavalry. Sheridan attacked him at once, and, after a sharp engagement, drove the Confederates toward Ashland, on the north fork of the Chickahominy, with a loss of their gallant leader, who, with General Gordon, was mortally wounded. Inspirited by this success, Sheridan pushed along the now open turnpike toward Richmond, and made a spirited dash upon the outer works. Custer's brigade carried them at that point and made 100 prisoners. As in the case of Kilpatrick's raid, so now, the second line of works were too strong to be carried by cavalry. The troops in and around the city had rallied for their defense, and in an attack the Nationals were repulsed. Then Sheridan led his command across the Chickahominy, at Meadow Bridge, where he beat off a considerable force of infantry sent out from Richmond, and who attacked him in the rear, while another force assailed his front. He also drove the foe on his front, when he destroyed the railway bridge there, and then pushed on southward to Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where he rested three days and procured supplies. Then, by way of White House and Hanover Court House, he leisurely returned to the Army of the Potomac, which he rejoined on the 25th of May."

B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the Civil War, volume 3, chapter 11.

ALSO IN: P. H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, volume 1, chapters 18-19.

H. B. McClellan, Life and Campaigns of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart, chapter 20.

J. B. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, volume 2, pages 202-208.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia). Grant's movement upon Richmond: Spottsylvania Court House. The Bloody Angle.

"Throughout the entire day succeeding this first great conflict [in The Wilderness], General Lee remained quiet, watching for some movement of his adversary. His success in the preliminary struggle had been gratifying, considering the great disproportion of numbers, but he indulged no expectation of a retrograde movement across the Rapidan, on the part of General Grant. He expected him rather to advance, and anxiously awaited some development of this intention. There were no indications of such a design up to the night of the 7th, but at that time, to use the words of a confidential member of Lee's staff, 'he all at once seemed to conceive the idea that his enemy was preparing to forsake his position, and move toward Hanover Junction via the Spottsylvania Court-House, and, believing this, he at once detailed Anderson's division with orders to proceed rapidly toward the court-house. General Anderson commenced his march about nine o'clock at night, when the Federal column was already upon its way. A race now began for the coveted position, and General Stuart, with his dismounted sharp-shooters behind improvised breastworks, harassed and impeded the Federal advance, at every step, throughout the night. This greatly delayed their march, and their head of column did not reach the vicinity of Spottsylvania Court-House until past sunrise. General Warren, leading the Federal advance, then hurried forward, followed by General Hancock, when suddenly he found himself in front of breastworks, and was received with a fire of musketry. Lee had succeeded in interposing himself between General Grant and Richmond. On the same evening the bulk of the two armies were facing each other on the line of the Po. … General Lee had taken up his position on the south bank of one of the four tributaries of the Mattapony. These four streams are known as the Mat, Ta, Po, and Nye Rivers, and bear the same relation to the main stream that the fingers of the open hand do to the wrist. General Lee was behind the Po, which is next to the Nye, the northern-most of these water-courses. Both were difficult to cross, and their banks heavily wooded. It was now to be seen whether, either by a front attack or a turning movement, General Grant could oust his adversary, and whether General Lee would stand on the defensive or attack. All day, during the 9th, the two armies were constructing breastworks along their entire fronts, and these works, from the Rapidan to the banks of the Chickahominy, remain yet [1871] in existence. On the evening of this day a Federal force was thrown across the Po, on the Confederate left, but soon withdrawn; and on the 10th a similar movement took place near the same point, which resulted in a brief but bloody conflict, during which the woods took fire, and many of the assaulting troops perished miserably in the flames. The force was then recalled, and, during that night and the succeeding day, nothing of importance occurred, although heavy skirmishing and an artillery-fire took place along the lines. On the morning of the 12th, at the first dawn of day, General Grant made a more important and dangerous assault than any yet undertaken in the campaign. This was directed at a salient on General Lee's right centre, occupied by Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, and was one of the bloodiest and most terrible incidents of the war. For this assault [made by three divisions of Hancock's corps] General Grant is said to have selected his best troops. These advanced in a heavy charging column, through the half-darkness of dawn, passed silently over the Confederate skirmishers, scarcely firing a shot, and, just as the first streak of daylight touched the eastern woods, burst upon the salient, which they stormed at the point of the bayonet. The attack was a complete surprise, and carried everything before it. The Southern troops, asleep in the trenches, woke to have the bayonet thrust into them, to be felled with clubbed muskets, and to find the works apparently in secure possession of the enemy before they could fire a shot. {3526} Such was the excellent success of the Federal movement, and the Southern line seemed to be hopelessly disrupted. Nearly the whole of Johnson's division were taken prisoners—the number amounting to more than 3,000—and 18 pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the assaulting column. The position of affairs was now exceedingly critical; and, unless General Lee could reform his line at the point, it seemed that nothing was left him but an abandonment of his whole position. The Federal army had broken his line; was pouring into the opening; and, to prevent him from concentrating at the point to regain possession of the works, heavy attacks were begun by the enemy on his right and left wings. It is probable that at no time during the war was the Southern army in greater danger of a bloody and decisive disaster. At this critical moment General Lee acted with the nerve and coolness of a soldier whom no adverse event can shake. … Line of battle was promptly formed a short distance in rear of the salient then in the enemy's possession, and a fierce charge was made by the Southerners, under the eye of Lee, to regain it. … The word ferocious best describes the struggle which followed. It continued throughout the entire day, Lee making not less than five distinct assaults in heavy force to recover the works. The fight involved the troops on both flanks, and was desperate and unyielding. The opposing flags were at times within only a few yards of each other, and so incessant and concentrated was the fire of musketry that a tree of about 18 inches in diameter was cut down by bullets, and is still preserved, it is said, in the city of Washington, as a memorial of this bloody struggle. The fighting only ceased several hours after dark. Lee had not regained his advanced line of works, but he was firmly rooted in an interior and straighter line, from which the Federal troops had found it impossible to dislodge him."

J. E. Cooke, Life of General Robert E. Lee, part 8, chapter 4.

"For the distance of nearly a mile, amid a cold, drenching rain, the combatants [on the 12th, at the salient] were literally struggling across the breastworks. They fired directly into each other's faces, bayonet thrusts were given over the intrenchments; men even grappled their antagonists across the piles of logs and pulled them over, to be stabbed or carried to the rear as prisoners. … Never before, since the discovery of gunpowder, had such a mass of lead been hurled into a space so narrow as that which now embraced the scene of combat. Large standing trees were literally cut off and brought to the ground by infantry fire alone; their great limbs whipped into basket stuff that could be woven by the hand of a girl. … If any comparisons can be made between the sections involved in that desperate contest, the fiercest and deadliest fighting took place at the west angle, ever afterwards known as 'The Bloody Angle.' … All day the bloody work went on. … The trenches had more than once to be cleared of the dead, to give the living a place to stand. All day long, and even into the night, the battle lasted, for it was not till twelve o'clock, nearly twenty hours after the command 'Forward' had been given to the column at the Brown House, that the firing died down, and the Confederates, relinquishing their purpose to retake the captured works, began in the darkness to construct a new line to cut off the salient."

F. A. Walker, History of the Second Army Corps, chapter 15.

General Humphreys estimates Grant's losses in killed and wounded on the 12th at 6,020; missing 800. Lee's losses that day in killed, wounded and prisoners he concludes to have been between 9,000 and 10,000. His estimate of losses on the 10th is 4,100 (killed and wounded) on the Union side, and 2,000 on the Confederate side. Major General John Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Army Corps, was killed in the skirmishing of the 9th.

A. A. Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865, chapter 3.

ALSO IN: _C. N. Galloway, Hand to Hand Fighting at Spotsylvania (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 36._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia). Grant's movement upon Richmond: from Spottsylvania to the Chickahominy.

"The lines of Spottsylvania remained still intact, and General Grant, who might easily have turned the position and manœuvred his antagonist out of it, seemed bent on carrying it by direct attack. Accordingly, during the succeeding week [after the battle of the 12th], various movements of corps were made from flank to flank, in the endeavor to find a spot where the lines could be broken. These attempts were skilfully met at every point—the Confederates extending their line to correspond with the shiftings of the army; so that wherever attack was essayed, the enemy bristled out in breastworks, and every partial assault made was repulsed. Day by day Grant continued to throw out towards the left, in the hope of overlapping and breaking in the Confederate right flank: so that from occupying, as the army did on its arrival, a line extending four or five miles to the northwest of Spottsylvania Courthouse, it had at the end of ten days assumed a position almost due east of that place, the left resting at a distance of four miles at Massaponax Church. After twelve days of effort, the carrying of the position was seen to be hopeless; and General Grant, abandoning the attempt, resolved by a turning operation to disengage Lee from a position seen to be unassailable. Preparations for this movement were begun on the afternoon of the 19th; but the enemy, observing these, retarded its execution by a bold demonstration against the Union right. … This attack somewhat disconcerted the contemplated movement, and delayed it till the following night, May 20th, when the army, moving by the left, once more took up its march towards Richmond. Before the lines of Spottsylvania the Army of the Potomac had for twelve days and nights engaged in a fierce wrestle, in which it had done all that valor may do to carry a position by nature and art impregnable. … Language is inadequate to convey an impression of the labors, fatigues, and sufferings of the troops. … Above 40,000 men had already fallen in the bloody encounters of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania [General Humphreys—in 'Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865,' page 117—makes the total of killed and wounded from May 5 to 21, to be 28,207, and the entire losses of the army, including the missing and the sick sent back to Washington, 37,335]. … The exhausted army began to lose its spirit. {3527} It was with joy, therefore, that it at length turned its back upon the lines of Spottsylvania. … The two armies once fairly on the march … neither … seems to have sought to deal the other a blow … and both headed, as for a common goal, towards the North Anna. … The advances of the 21st and 22d brought the different corps [of the Army of the Potomac], which had moved on parallel roads at supporting distance, within a few miles of the North Anna River. Resuming the march on the morning of Monday, May 23d, the army in a few hours reached the northern bank of that stream. But it was only to descry its old enemy planted on the opposite side." Warren's corps crossed the river at Jericho Ford without resistance, but was furiously assailed late in the afternoon and held its ground, taking nearly 1,000 prisoners. The left column, under Hancock, forced a passage in the face of the enemy, carrying a bridge by storm. But nothing was gained by these successes. "While Lee, after the passage of Hancock on the left, threw his right wing back from the North Anna, and on the passage of Warren on the right threw back his left wing, he continued to cling with his centre to the river; so that … his army took up a very remarkable line in the form of an obtuse-angled triangle. … The game of war seldom presents a more effectual checkmate than was here given by Lee; for after Grant had made the brilliantly successful passage of the North Anna, the Confederate commander, thrusting his centre between the two wings of the Army of the Potomac, put his antagonist at enormous disadvantage, and compelled him, for the reenforcement of one or the other wing, to make a double passage of the river. The more the position of Lee was examined, the more unpromising attack was seen to be; and after passing the two following days in reconnoissances, and destroying some miles of the Virginia Central Railroad, General Grant determined to withdraw across the North Anna and take up a new line of advance. The withdrawal from the North Anna was begun at dark of the 26th of May, when the Second, Fifth and Sixth Corps retired by different bridges to the north bank. … The Second Corps held position till the morning of the 27th, when it covered the rear. From the North Anna the line of march of the army made a wide circuit eastward and then southward to pass the Pamunkey. This river is formed by the confluence of the North and South Anna; and the Pamunkey in turn uniting with the Mattapony forms the York River, emptying into Chesapeake Bay. Thus the successful passage of the Pamunkey would not only dislodge Lee from the lines of the North and South Anna, but would bring the army in communication with a new and excellent water-base." The crossing of the Pamunkey, at and near Hanovertown, was accomplished without difficulty on the 27th and 28th, "and the routes to White House, at the head of York River, being opened up, the army was put in communication with the ample supplies floated by the waters of Chesapeake Bay. Grant's new turning movement was met by a corresponding retrograde movement on the part of Lee, and as he fell back on a direct line less than half the distance of the great detour made by the Army of the Potomac, it was not remarkable that, on crossing the Pamunkey, the Confederate force was again encountered, ready to accept the gage of battle. Lee assumed a position in advance of the Chickahominy. … The region in which the army was now operating revived many reminiscences in the minds of those who had made the Peninsular Campaign under McClellan. … Gaines' Mill and Mechanicsville were within an hour's ride; Fair Oaks could be reached in a two hours' trot; Richmond was ten miles off. … Reconnoissances showed Lee to be in a very strong position covering the approaches to the Chickahominy, the forcing of which it was now clear must cost a great battle."

W. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, part 11, chapters 3-5.

ALSO IN: A. Badeau, Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, chapters 18-19 (volume 2).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia). The Co-operative movement of the Army of the James.

In the plan and arrangement of General Grant's campaign, General Butler, commanding at Fortress Monroe, was instructed "to collect all the forces of his command that could be spared from garrison duty estimated at not less than 20,000, and operate on the south side of James river, Richmond being his objective. To his force 10,000 men from South Carolina, under Gillmore, were to be added. He was ordered to take City Point as soon as notification of movement was given, and fortify it. By this common advance from the Rapidan and Fortress Monroe the two armies would be brought into co-operation. … As arranged, Butler moved from Fortress Monroe on May 4th, Gillmore having joined him with the 10th Corps. The next day he occupied, without opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. On the night of the 9th he received dispatches from Washington informing him that Lee was retreating to Richmond and Grant in pursuit. He had, therefore, to act with caution, fearing that he might have Lee's whole army on his hands. On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of the enemy's first line of defenses at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling. The time thus consumed from the 6th left no possibility of surprising and capturing Richmond and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his forces in North and South Carolina, and bring them to the defense of these places. On the 16th the Confederates attacked Butler in his position in front of Drury's Bluff, forced him back into his entrenchments between the forks of James and Appomattox Rivers [in the district called Bermuda Hundred], and, intrenching strongly in his front, not only covered the railroads and city, but completely neutralized his forces. … Butler's army being confined at Bermuda Hundred, most of the re-enforcements from the South were now brought against the Potomac Army. In addition to this, probably not less than 15,000 men, under Breckenridge, arrived from the Western part of Virginia. The position of Bermuda Hundred being easy to defend, Grant, leaving only enough to secure what had heen gained, took from it all available forces under W. F. Smith, and joined them to the Army of the Potomac."

J. W. Draper, History of the American Civil War, volume 3, pages 368 and 382-385.

ALSO IN: A. A. Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865, chapter 5.

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 36, part 2._

{3528}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May: Georgia). Sherman's Movement upon Atlanta: Johnston's Retreat.

Sherman now held command of the three armies of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and the Ohio, having McPherson, Thomas and Schofield for their subordinate commanders, respectively. The main army of the rebellion in the West, Joe Johnston commanding, was at Dalton, northern Georgia, confronting Thomas at Chattanooga. "Grant and Sherman had agreed to act in concert. While the former should thrust Lee back upon Richmond, his late lieutenant was to push Johnston towards Atlanta. And Banks was to transfer his forces from New Orleans to Mobile and thence move towards and join hands with the Western armies. Sherman devoted his earliest energies to the question of transportation and railroads. Baggage was reduced to the lowest limits, the higher officers setting the example. Actual supplies and fighting-material were alone to be carried. Luxuries were to be things of the past; comforts to be forgotten. War's stern reality was to be each one's lot. Probably no officer in such high command ever lived so entirely from hand to mouth as did Sherman and his military family during the succeeding campaigns. The entire equipment of his army head-quarters would have shamed the shabbiest regimental outfit of 1861. Spring was to open with a general advance. It was agreed to put and keep the Confederates on the defensive by a policy of constant hammering. Bragg had been removed to satisfy public opinion in the South, but was nominally called to Richmond to act as Mr. Davis' chief-of-staff. Johnston, as commander of the Department, had personally undertaken to hold head against Sherman. But the fact that he possessed neither the President's good will nor that of his new adviser, militated much against a happy conduct of the campaign. Sherman's forces occupied a front sixteen miles in advance of Ringgold, just south of Chattanooga. McPherson and the Army of the Tennessee was on his right with 25,000 men and 100 guns. Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland held the centre with 60,000 men and 130 guns. Schofield and the Army of the Ohio formed the left wing. His command was 15,000 men and 30 guns. This grand total of 100,000 men and 260 guns formed an army of as good stuff as ever bore arms, and the confidence of the leader in his men and of the men in their leader was unbounded. Johnston himself foresaw the necessity of a strictly defensive campaign, to which his far from sanguine character, as well as his judgment as to what the existing conditions demanded, made him peculiarly suited. Counted after the same fashion as Sherman's army, Johnston had some 75,000 men. … He intrenched every step he took; he fought only when attacked; he invited battle only when the conditions were largely in his favor. Subsequent events showed how wise beyond his critics he could be. Sherman took the measure of the intrenchments at Dalton with care, and, though he outnumbered his antagonist, preferred not to hazard an engagement at such odds when he might force one on better ground. This conduct shows in strong contrast with Grant's, when the latter first met his opponent at this same moment in Virginia. Sherman despatched McPherson towards Resaca, on the railroad in Johnston's rear, with instructions to capture the town if possible. Combined with this flanking movement, a general advance was made upon the Confederate lines, and after tactical manœuvring of several days in front of Rocky Face Ridge, Johnston concluded to retire from his stronghold. McPherson had strangely failed to seize Resaca, though an excellent chance had offered, and at this place the Confederate army took up its new stand. … Sherman faced his antagonist on the line of Camp Creek in front of Resaca, with his right flank resting on the Oostanaula. From this position he operated by unintermitted tapping upon Johnston's defences at constantly varying points, without, however, bringing on a general engagement [though the losses were 2,747 Union and 2,800 Confederate]. … Sherman's uniform tactics during this campaign, varied indefinitely in details, consisted, as will be seen, in forcing the centre of the army upon Johnston's lines, while with the right and left he operated upon either flank as chance or ground best offered. Johnston did not propose to hazard an engagement unless all conditions were in his favor. He attempted a stand at Adairsville, twenty miles south of Resaca, but shortly withdrew to Kingston and Cassville. Each captain manœuvred for a chance to fight the other at a disadvantage. … From Cassville, Johnston retired across the Etowah. So far this campaign had been one of manœuvres. Neither combatant had suffered material loss. Like two wrestlers, as yet ignorant of each other's strength or quickness, they were sparring for a hold. … The Union army was growing skillful. Local difficulties multiplied many fold by bad maps and hostile population were overcome in considerable measure by an able corps of topographical engineers. … Bridges were uniformly burned and railroads wrecked by the retreating Confederates. To save delays in rebuilding, so far as possible, trestles were fitted in the rear to a scale with interchangeable timbers, so that bridges could be constructed with a speed never before dreamed of. No sooner had the Confederates put torch to a bridge, than a new one arose as by magic, and the whistle of the locomotive always followed hard upon the heels of the army."

T. A. Dodge, Bird's-Eye View of our Civil War, chapters 42-43.

ALSO IN: W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, chapter 15 (volume 2).

T. B. Van Horn, History of the Army of the Cumberland, chapters 25-28 (volume 2).

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 38, part 1._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May-June: Virginia). Grant's Movement upon Richmond: The Battle of Cold Harbor.

"The passage of [the Pamunkey] had been completed on May 28, and then, after three days of marching, interspersed with the usual amount of fighting, the army found itself again confronted by Lee's main line on the Totopotomoy. The operations which followed were known as the battle of Cold Harbor. On the afternoon of May 31st, Sheridan, who was on the left flank of the army, carried, with his cavalry, a position near the old well and cross roads known as Old Cold Harbor, and, with his men dismounted behind rough breast-works, held it against Fitzhugh Lee until night. To this point, during the night, marched the van·guard of the Army of the Potomac. … About 9 the next day (June 1st) the head of the column reached Sheridan's position, and the cavalry was withdrawn. {3529} The enemy, who had been seriously threatening Sheridan, withdrew from our immediate front within their lines and awaited us, occupying a strong outer line of intrenchments in front of our center, somewhat in advance of their main position, which included that on which the battle of Gaines' Mill had been fought two years before. It covered the approaches to the Chickahominy, which was the last formidable obstacle we had to meet before standing in front of the permanent works of Richmond. A large detachment, composed of the Eighteenth Corps and other troops from the Army of the James, under General W. F. Smith, had disembarked at White House on the Pamunkey, and was expected to connect that morning with the Sixth Corps at Cold Harbor. A mistake in orders caused an unnecessary march and long delay. In the afternoon, however, Smith was in position on the right of the Sixth Corps. Late in the afternoon both corps assaulted. The attack was made vigorously and with no reserves. The outer line in front of the right of the Sixth and the left of the Eighteenth was carried brilliantly, and the enemy was forced back, leaving several hundred prisoners in our hands. … This left the well and the old tavern at Cold Harbor in our rear, and brought us in front of the most formidable position yet held by the enemy. In front of him was a wooded country, interspersed with clearings here and there, sparsely populated, and full of swamps. Before daylight the Army of the Potomac stood together once more almost within sight of the spires of Richmond, and on the very ground where, under McClellan, they had defended the passage of the river they were now endeavoring to force. On the 2d of June our confronting line, on which the burden of the day must necessarily fall, consisted of Hancock on the left, Wright in the center, and Smith on the right. Warren and Burnside were still farther to the right, their lines refused, or drawn back, in the neighborhood of Bethesda Church, but not confronting the enemy. … No reconnoissance had been made other than the bloody one of the evening before. Everyone felt that this was to be the final struggle. No further flanking marches were possible. Richmond was dead in front. No further wheeling of corps from right to left by the rear; no further dusty marches possible on that line, even 'if it took all summer.' The general attack was fixed for the afternoon of the 2d, and all preparations had been made, when the order was countermanded and the attack postponed until half-past four the following morning. Promptly at the hour named on the 3d of June the men moved from the slight cover of the rifle-pits, thrown up during the night, with steady, determined advance, and there rang out suddenly on the summer air such a crash of artillery and musketry as is seldom heard in war. No great portion of the advance could be seen from any particular point, but those of the three corps that passed through the clearings were feeling the fire terribly. Not much return was made at first from our infantry, although the fire of our batteries was incessant. The time of actual advance was not over eight minutes. In that little period more men fell bleeding as they advanced than in any other like period of time throughout the war. A strange and terrible feature of this battle was that as the three gallant corps moved on [necessarily diverging, the enemy's line forming an arc of a circle, with its concave side toward them] each was enfiladed while receiving the full force of the enemy's direct fire in front. … At some points the slashings and obstructions in the enemy's front were reached. Barlow, of Hancock's corps, drove the enemy from an advanced position, but was himself driven out by the fire of their second line. R. O. Tyler's brigade (the Corcoran Legion) of the same corps swept over an advance work, capturing several hundred prisoners. One officer alone; the colonel of the 164th New York [James P. McMahon], seizing the colors of his regiment from the dying color-bearer as he fell, succeeded in reaching the parapet of the enemy's main works, where he planted his colors and fell dead near the ditch, bleeding from many wounds. Seven other colonels of Hancock's command died within those few minutes. No troops could stand against such a fire, and the order to lie down was given all along the line. At points where no shelter was afforded, the men were withdrawn to such cover as could be found, and the battle of Cold Harbor, as to its result at least, was over. … Shortly after midday came the order to suspend for the present all further operations, and directing corps commanders to intrench, 'including their advanced positions,' and directing also that reconnoissances be made, 'with a view to moving against the enemy's works by regular approaches'. … When night came on the groans and moaning of the wounded, all our own, who were lying between the lines, were heart-rending. Some were brought in by volunteers from our intrenchments, but remained for three days uncared for beneath the hot summer suns and the unrefreshing dews of the sultry summer nights. … An impression prevails in the popular mind, and with some reason perhaps, that a commander who sends a flag of truce asking permission to bury his dead and bring in his wounded, has lost the field of battle. Hence the reluctance upon our part to ask a flag of truce. In effect it was done at last on the evening of the third day after the battle, when, for the most part, the wounded needed no further care and our dead had to be buried almost where they fell."

_M. T. McMahon, Cold Harbor (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

"According to the report of the Medical Director, Surgeon McParlin, the wounded brought to the hospitals from the battle of the 3d of June numbered 4,517. The killed were at least 1,100. The wounded brought to the hospitals from the battle of the 1st of June were 2,125; the killed were not less than 500. The wounded on the 1st and 3d of June were, therefore, 6,642, and the killed not less than 1,600; but, adopting the number of killed and missing furnished General Badeau from the Adjutant General's office, 1,769 killed, 1,537 missing (many—most, indeed—of them, no doubt, killed), we have 8,411 for the killed and wounded, and for the total casualties, 9,948."

A. A. Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865 (Campaigns of the Civil War), page 191.

"I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. … At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side. … This charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared."

U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, chapter. 55 (volume 2).

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 36._

{3530}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May-June: Virginia). The Campaigning in the Shenandoah Valley, and Sheridan's raid to Trevillian Station.

"In the spring of 1864, the Department of West Virginia, which included the Shenandoah Valley, was under the command of Major-General Franz Sigel. A large portion of his forces was in the Kanawha region, under Brigadier-General George Crook. … In opening his Virginia campaign, Lieutenant-General Grant directed Sigel to form two columns, whereof one, under Crook, should break the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at the New River bridge, and should also, if possible, destroy the salt-works at Saltville; while the other column, under Sigel himself, proceeding up the Shenandoah Valley, was to distract attention from Crook by menacing the Virginia Central Railroad at Staunton."

G. E. Pond, The Shenandoah Valley in 1864 (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 11), chapter 2.

"Early in May, General Sigel entered the Valley with a force of 10,000 or 12,000 men [6,000 or 7,000, according to Pond, as above], and proceeded to advance toward Staunton. The Valley at that time was occupied only by a small force under General Imboden, which was wholly inadequate for its defence. General Breckenridge was therefore withdrawn from South-Western Virginia to oppose Sigel. On the 15th of May, Breckenridge with a force of 3,000 men [4,600 to 5,000—Pond] encountered Sigel at Newmarket and defeated him and compelled him to retire behind Cedar Creek. The cadets of the Virginia Military Institute formed a portion of Breckenridge's division, and behaved with distinguished gallantry. … After the battle of Newmarket Breckenridge was withdrawn from the Valley to reinforce Lee … in the neighborhood of Hanover Junction. In the meantime Crook and Averill had reached the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, where they inflicted some damage, but were compelled to retire by a force sent against them by General Sam Jones. They then proceeded to join the main column operating in the Valley. After the battle of Newmarket, Sigel was relieved by General David Hunter, who was instructed by General Grant to advance upon Staunton, thence to Charlottesville, and on to Lynchburg if circumstances favored that movement. Breckenridge having been withdrawn, General W. E. Jones was ordered to the Valley to oppose Hunter, who slowly advanced, opposed by Imboden with an almost nominal force. About the 4th of June, Imboden was joined by General Jones in the neighborhood of Harrisonburg with a force of between 3,000 and 4,000 men, which he had hastily collected in Southwestern Virginia. … Although greatly outnumbered, he [Jones] engaged Hunter near Port Republic [at the village of Piedmont, which gives its name to the battle], where he was defeated and killed. … After the fall of Jones, McCauslin opposed Hunter with gallantry and vigor, but his small force was no match for the greatly superior force against which he contended. The affairs in the Valley now began to attract the attention of the commanding generals of both armies. It was evident that if Hunter could succeed in taking Lynchburg and breaking up the canal and Central Railroad, it would only be necessary to tap the Richmond and Danville and the Petersburg and Weldon railroads to complete a line of circumvallation around Richmond and Petersburg. On the 7th of June General Grant detached General Sheridan, with a large cavalry force, with instructions to break up the Central Railroad between Richmond and Gordonsville, then proceed to the James River and Kanawha Canal, break that line of communication with Richmond, and then to co-operate with Hunter in his operations against Lynchburg. About the same time General Lee sent General Breckenridge with his division, 2,500 strong, to occupy Rockfish Gap of the Blue Ridge to deflect Hunter from Charlottesville and protect the Central Railroad as far as practicable. A few days later General Early was detached by General Lee to oppose Hunter, and take such other steps as in his judgment would tend to create a diversion in favor of Richmond. General Sheridan, in compliance with his instructions, proceeded by a circuitous route to strike the railroad somewhere in the neighborhood of Gordonsville. This movement was, however, discovered by General Hampton, who, with a considerable force of cavalry encountered Sheridan on the 12th of June at Travillians [or Trevillian's] Station. After much severe and varied fighting Sheridan was defeated, and in order to escape was obliged to make a night-retreat. [In his 'Memoirs,' Sheridan claims the victory, having forced Hampton back and taken 500 prisoners; but learning that Hunter would not meet him, as expected, at Charlottesville, he turned back to rejoin Grant south of Richmond]. … This was one of the most masterly and spirited cavalry engagements of the war. Hunter, finding Rockfish Gap occupied in force, was unable to comply with that part of his instructions which directed him to Charlottesville. He therefore continued his march up the Valley, with the view of reaching Lynchburg by way of some one of the passes of the Blue Ridge south of the James River. In the neighborhood of Staunton he was joined by Crook and Averill, increasing his force to about 20,000 men, including cavalry and artillery. From Staunton he advanced by way of Lexington and Buchanan, burning and destroying everything that came in his way, leaving a track of desolation rarely witnessed in the course of civilized warfare." Before Hunter's arrival at Lynchburg, General Early, who withdrew his corps (formerly Stonewall Jackson's, and lately commanded by Ewell), from Richmond on the 13th of June, had reached that city and was prepared to defend it. "Hunter, finding himself unexpectedly confronted by Early, relinquished his intended attack upon the city and sought safety in a rapid night-retreat."

A. L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, chapter 18.

ALSO IN: P. H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, volume 1. chapter 21.

[Image: Map of the Atlanta Campaign. Page 331.]

{3532}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May-September: Georgia). Sherman's Movement upon Atlanta: New Hope Church. Kenesaw. Peach Tree Creek. The siege and capture of the city.

From Cassville, for reasons given in his memoirs, Johnston continued his retreat behind the next spur of mountains to Allatoona. "Pausing for a few days," writes General Sherman, "to repair the railroad without attempting Allatoona, of which I had personal knowledge acquired in 1844, I resolved to push on toward Atlanta by way of Dallas; Johnston quickly detected this, and forced me to fight him, May 25th-28th, at New Hope Church, four miles north of Dallas, with losses of 3,000 to the Confederates and 2,400 to us. The country was almost in a state of nature—with few or no roads, nothing that a European could understand; yet the bullet killed its victim there as surely as at Sevastopol. Johnston had meantime picked up his detachments, and had received reënforcements from his rear which raised his aggregate strength to 62,000 men, and warranted him in claiming that he was purposely drawing us far from our base, and that when the right moment should come he would turn on us and destroy us. We were equally confident, and not the least alarmed. He then fell back to his position at Marietta, with Brush Mountain on his right, Kenesaw his center and Lost Mountain his left. His line of ten miles was too long for his numbers, and he soon let go his flanks and concentrated on Kenesaw. We closed down in battle array, repaired the railroad up to our very camps, and then prepared for the contest. Not a day, not an hour, not a minute was there a cessation of fire. Our skirmishers were in absolute contact, the lines of battle and the batteries but little in rear of the skirmishers; and thus matters continued until June 27th, when I ordered a general assault, with the full cooperation of my great lieutenants, Thomas, McPherson and Schofield, as good and true men as ever lived or died for their country's cause; but we failed, losing 3,000 men to the Confederate loss of 630. Still, the result was that within three days Johnston abandoned the strongest possible position and was in full retreat for the Chattahoochee River. We were on his heels; skirmished with his rear at Smyrna Church on the 4th day of July, and saw him fairly across the Chattahoochee on the 10th, covered and protected by the best line of field intrenchments I have ever seen, prepared long in advance. … We had advanced into the enemy's country 120 miles, with a single-track railroad, which had to bring clothing, food, ammunition, everything requisite for 100,000 men and 23,000 animals. The city of Atlanta, the gate city, opening the interior of the important State of Georgia, was in sight; its protecting army was shaken but not defeated, and onward we had to go. … We feigned to the right, but crossed the Chattahoochee by the left, and soon confronted our enemy behind his first line of intrenchments at Peach Tree Creek, prepared in advance for this very occasion. At this critical moment the Confederate Government rendered us most valuable service. Being dissatisfied with the Fabian policy of General Johnston, it relieved him, and General Hood was substituted to command the Confederate army [July 18]. Hood was known to us to be a 'fighter' … and I confess I was pleased at this change. … I was willing to meet the enemy in the open country, but not behind well-constructed parapets. Promptly, as expected, General Hood sallied from his Peach Tree line on the 20th of July, about midday, striking the Twentieth Corps (Hooker), which had just crossed Peach Tree Creek by improvised bridges. The troops became commingled and fought hand to hand desperately for about four hours, when the Confederates were driven back within their lines, leaving behind their dead and wounded. These amounted to 4,796 men, to our loss of 1,710. We followed up and Hood fell back to the main lines of the city of Atlanta. We closed in, when again Hood, holding these lines with about one-half his force, with the other half made a wide circuit by night, under cover of the woods, and on the 22d of July enveloped our left flank 'in air,' a movement that led to the hardest battle of the campaign. He encountered the Army of the Tennessee—skilled veterans who were always ready to fight, were not alarmed by flank or rear attacks, and met their assailants with heroic valor. The battle raged from noon to night, when the Confederates, baffled and defeated, fell back within the intrenchments of Atlanta. Their losses are reported 8,499 to ours of 8,641; but among our dead was McPherson, the commander of the Army of the Tennessee. While this battle was in progress, Schofield at the center and Thomas on the right made efforts to break through the intrenchments at their fronts, but found them too strong to assault. The Army of the Tennessee was then shifted, under its new commander (Howard), from the extreme left to the extreme right, to reach if possible, the railroad by which Hood drew his supplies, when, on the 28th of July, he repeated his tactics of the 22d, sustaining an overwhelming defeat, losing 4,632 men to our 700. These three sallies convinced him that his predecessor, General Johnston, had not erred in standing on the defensive. Thereafter the Confederate army in Atlanta clung to its parapets. I never intended to assault these, but gradually worked to the right to reach and destroy his line of supplies, because soldiers, like other mortals, must have food. Our extension to the right brought on numerous conflicts, but nothing worthy of note, till about the end of August I resolved to leave one corps to protect our communications to the rear, and move with the other five to a point (Jonesboro') on the railroad 20 miles below Atlanta, not fortified. This movement was perfectly strategic, was successful, and resulted in our occupation of Atlanta, on the 2d of September, 1864. The result had a large effect on the whole country, at the time, for solid and political reasons. I claim no special merit to myself, save that I believe I followed the teachings of the best masters of the 'science of war' of which I had knowledge. … But I had not accomplished all, for Hood's army, the chief 'objective,' had escaped. Then began the real trouble. We were in possession of Atlanta, and Hood remained at Lovejoy's Station, 30 miles south-east, on the Savannah Railroad, with an army of about 40,000 veterans inured to war, and with a fair amount of wagons to carry his supplies, independent of the railroads."

_W. T. Sherman and others, Atlanta (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

ALSO IN: W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, chapters 15-18 (volume 2).

J. D. Cox, Atlanta (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 9), chapters 7-16.

_C. C. Chesney, The Atlanta Campaign (Fort. Rev., Nov. 1895)._

J. E. Johnston, Narrative, chapters 9-11.

Official Records, series 1, volume 38.

J. B. Hood, Advance and Retreat, chapters 12-13.

{3533}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May-November). The Twentieth Presidential Election. Renomination and Re-election of Abraham Lincoln.

"Preparations for the nomination of candidates had begun to be made, as usual, early in the spring of 1864. Some who saw most clearly the necessities of the future, had for some months before expressed themselves strongly in favor of the renomination of President Lincoln. But this step was contested with great warmth and activity by prominent members of the political party by which he had been nominated and elected four years before. Nearly all the original Abolitionists and many of the more decidedly anti-slavery members of the Republican party were dissatisfied, that Mr. Lincoln had not more rapidly and more sweepingly enforced their extreme opinions. Many distinguished public men resented his rejection of their advice, and many more had been alienated by his inability to recognize their claims to office. The most violent opposition came from those who had been most persistent and most clamorous in their exactions. And as it was unavoidable that, in wielding so terrible and so absolute a power in so terrible a crisis, vast multitudes of active and ambitious men should be disappointed in their expectations of position and personal gain, the renomination of Mr. Lincoln was sure to be contested by a powerful and organized effort. At the very outset this movement acquired consistency and strength by bringing forward the Honorable S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, a man of great political boldness and experience, and who had prepared the way for such a step by a careful dispensation of the vast patronage of his department, as the rival candidate. But it was instinctively felt that this effort lacked the sympathy and support of the great mass of the people, and it ended in the withdrawal of his name as a candidate by Mr. Chase himself. The National Committee of the Union Republican party had called their convention, to be held at Baltimore, on the 8th of June." Those who opposed Mr. Lincoln's nomination issued a call for a convention to be held at Cleveland, Ohio, on the 31st of May. The Cleveland Convention, attended by about 150 persons, put in nomination General John C. Fremont, for President, and General John Cochrane, of New York, for Vice President. "General Fremont's letter of acceptance was dated June 4th. Its main scope was an attack upon Mr. Lincoln for unfaithfulness to the principles he was elected to defend, and upon his administration for incapacity and selfishness. … He intimated that if the Baltimore convention would nominate anyone but Mr. Lincoln he would not stand in the way of a union of all upon the nominee. … The Convention, the nomination and the letter of acceptance, fell dead upon the popular feeling [and Fremont withdrew his candidacy in September]. … The next form which the effort to prevent Mr. Lincoln's nomination and election took was an effort to bring forward General Grant as a candidate." But this was decisively checked by General Grant, himself. The Convention at Baltimore, when it assembled on the 8th of June, showed no hesitation in nominating Abraham Lincoln for reelection, and it associated with him, Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, as its candidate for Vice President. The National Convention of the Democratic party was held at Chicago, beginning August 29th, The second resolution which it adopted in its platform declared that, "after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war … justice, humanity, liberty and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States or other peaceable means, to the end that, at the earliest practicable moment, peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States." On this issue, having nominated General George B. McClellan for President, and George H. Pendleton, of Ohio, for Vice President, the opponents of the war went to the country in the election, in November, and were overwhelmingly defeated. "Of all the States which voted on that day, General McClellan carried but three—New Jersey, Delaware and Kentucky."

H. J. Raymond, Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln, chapter 18.

The electoral vote was for Lincoln 212, for McClellan 21. The popular vote cast was, for Lincoln 2,213,665, for McClellan, 1,802,237. Many of the States had made provision for taking the votes of soldiers in the field, and the army vote was 116,887 for Lincoln against 33,748 for McClellan.

E. Stanwood, History of Presidential Elections, chapter 21.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June). Repeal of the Fugitive Slave Laws.

At every session of Congress from 1861 to 1864 ineffectual attempts were made in the Senate and in the House of Representatives to accomplish the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Laws of 1793 and 1850. It was not until June of the latter year that the necessary bill was passed—by the House on the 6th, by a vote of 82 to 57, and by the Senate on the 22d by 27 to 12. The President approved it on the 28th, and it became a law.

H. Wilson, History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, volume 3, chapter 29.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June). Revenue Measures. The War Tariff and Internal Taxes.

See TARIFF LEGISLATION: A. D. 1861-1864 (UNITED STATES).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June). The destruction of the Alabama by the Kearsarge.

See ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1862-1864.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June: Virginia). Grant's movement to the south of James River. The Siege of Petersburg.

"In consequence of the check at Cold Harbor, a restlessness was becoming general among the people, which the government in vain pretended not to notice. … Public opinion, shaken in its confidence, already began to listen to the sinister interpretations of the opposition journals, when, in the last half of June, it learned that the lieutenant: general had boldly crossed the James and laid siege before Petersburg. … This passage of the James was … a very fine movement, as ably executed as it was boldly conceived. It inaugurated a new phase in the campaign. … Henceforth, the battering not having produced the expected effect, Grant was about to try the resources of military science, and give precedence to strategic combinations. In the first place, he took his measures so well to conceal his intentions from the enemy that the latter did not recognize the character of the movement until it was already executed. Warren was ordered to occupy Lee's attention by the menace of an advance on Richmond from the direction of White Oak Swamp, while Smith (W. F.) reëmbarked from White House to return to Bermuda Hundred, and Hancock, with the Second Corps, would be transferred to the right bank of the James by a flotilla of large steamers collected at Wilcox Landing for that purpose. {3534} At the same time, a bridge of boats was thrown across a little below, where there were thirteen fathoms of water in the channel, and where the river was more than 2,000 feet broad. The Fifth and Sixth Corps crossed over on the bridge. Grant hoped to get hold of Petersburg by a 'coup de main.' If he had succeeded, the fall of Richmond would have soon followed in all probability. Unfortunately, delays occurred and contretemps which caused the opportunity to fail and completely modified the course of events. General Smith (W. F.), after having carried the first line, which was defended by militia only, did not know how to take advantage of his first success. Proceeding methodically and cautiously, where it was, above all, necessary to act with vigor and promptness, he put off the serious work until the next morning. Hancock, in his turn, debarked on the right bank, did not receive the order to march on Petersburg until he had been delayed to wait for rations which were behind-hand, and went astray in his march owing to false indications on a map which had been sent to him as correct. In short, he lost precious hours in the afternoon of June 15, and on the morning of the 16th it was too late; Lee's troops had arrived. Nevertheless, the intrenchments thrown up hastily by the enemy were not so formidable that they might not be carried. In the morning, a fresh attack, with Birney's and Gibbon's divisions, met with some success, but with no decisive results. In the afternoon, the Ninth Corps having arrived, the attempt was renewed on a greater scale, and it ended by carrying the line at sundown, after a hard fight and considerable loss. On the next morning, a new assault, always by the Second Corps, supported by the Ninth. The enemy lost more ground and a redoubt of importance. In the evening, he succeeded in surprising the intrenchments which Burnside had taken from him. All these fights were not without cost; the loss of that day alone, on our side, amounted to 4,000 men. The Confederates defended the ground step by step, with such determination, only to gain the time necessary to finish a stronger and better selected line, on the hills immediately around the city. They retired to these lines in the following night, and during the whole of the 18th they sustained in them a series of attacks which met with no success. From that day, the siege of Petersburg was resolved upon, and regular works were begun. It must be remarked that this siege was not a siege, properly speaking. The place was never even invested. It lies 22 miles south of Richmond, on the right, bank of the Appomattox, eight miles southwest of City Point, where that river empties into the James, and where the new base of supplies of the army was naturally established. So that we had turned Richmond to put ourselves across a part of the enemy's communications with the South, and directly threaten the rest. These communications were: the railroads to Norfolk, Weldon and Lynchburg, and the Jerusalem and Boydton roads, all ending at Petersburg. Besides these, the Confederate capital had only the James River Canal, to the west, and the Dansville railroad, to the south. The latter did not extend beyond the limits of Virginia, but it crossed the Lynchburg railroad at Burksville, which doubled its resources. If, then, we succeeded in enveloping Petersburg only on the right bank of the Appomattox, the population and the Confederate army would be reduced to draw all their supplies from Richmond by a single-track railroad. To accomplish that was our effort; to prevent it, the enemy's: that was the point towards which all the operations of the siege were directed for nine months. On the day on which we finally succeeded, Petersburg and Richmond fell at the same blow, and the whole structure of the rebellion crumbled with these two cities."

R. de Trobriand, Four Years with the Army of the Potomac, chapter 28.

ALSO IN: F. A. Walker, History of the Second Army Corps, chapters 19-23.

U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, chapter 56 (volume 2).

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 40._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (July). The Greeley and the Jaques-Gilmore Peace Missions.

"Two abortive efforts to open a door to accommodation between the belligerents were made during this gloomy period. One of these originated with certain Confederates then in Canada, one of whom wrote [July 5, 1864] to the author of this work [Horace Greeley], averring that Messrs. Clement C. Clay, of Alabama, James P. Holcombe, of Virginia, and George N. Sanders (the writer) would proceed to Washington in the interest of Peace, if full protection were accorded them. Being otherwise confidentially assured that the two former had full powers from Richmond, Mr. Greeley forwarded the application to President Lincoln, urging that it be responded to, and suggesting certain terms of reunion and peace which he judged might be advantageously proffered to the Rebels, whether they should be accepted or rejected. … The 'Plan of Adjustment,' which he suggested that the President might advantageously offer," contemplated the restoration of the Union, abolition of slavery, with $400,000,000 paid in compensation to the slave states, and complete amnesty for all political offenses. "The President hereupon saw fit—alike to the surprise and the regret of his correspondent—to depute him to proceed to Niagara, and there communicate with the persons in question. He most reluctantly consented to go, but under a misapprehension which insured the failure of the effort in any event. Though he had repeatedly and explicitly written to the President that he knew nothing as to what the Confederates in Canada might or would propose as a basis of adjustment … it was expected on the President's part that he was virtually and substantially to negotiate and settle the basis of a pacification with them; so that their visit to Washington was, in effect, to be the result, and not the possible occasion, of adjustment und peace. … The whole matter thus terminated in failure and disappointment, with some exasperation on the Rebel side, and very decided condemnation on the part of the opposition. … Happily, another negotiation—even more irregular and wholly clandestine—had simultaneously been in progress at Richmond, with a similar result. Rev. Colonel James F. Jaques, 73d Illinois, with Mr. J. R. Gilmore, of New York, had, with President Lincoln's knowledge, but without his formal permission, paid a visit to the Confederate capital on a Peace errand; being allowed to pass through the lines of both armies for the purpose. {3535} Arrived in Richmond they addressed a joint letter to Judah P. Benjamin, Secretary of State, requesting an interview with President Davis, which was accorded; and a long, familiar, earnest colloquy ensued, wherein the Confederate chief presented his ultimatum in these terms: … The North was mad and blind; it would not let us govern ourselves; and so the war came; and now it must go on till the last man of this generation falls in his tracks, and his children seize his musket and fight our battle, unless you acknowledge our right to self-government. We are not fighting for Slavery, we are fighting for Independence; and that or extermination we will have'. … Thus it was not only incontestably settled but proclaimed, through the volunteered agency of two citizens, that the War must go on until the Confederacy should be recognized as an independent power, or till it should be utterly, finally overthrown. The knowledge of this fact was worth more than a victory to the National cause."

H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 2, chapter 30.

ALSO IN: E. McPherson, Political History of the United States during the Great Rebellion, pages 301-307.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (July: Virginia-Maryland.) Early in the Shenandoah Valley. His invasion of Maryland and approach to Washington.

"… [General Jubal Anderson] Early had forced Hunter into the Kanawha region far enough to feel assured that Lynchburg could not again be threatened from that direction;

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (MAY-JUNE: VIRGINIA).

[Early then] united to his own corps General John C. Breckenridge's infantry division and the cavalry of Generals J. H. Vaughn, John McCausland, B. T. Johnson, and J. D. Imboden, which heretofore had been operating in southwest and western Virginia under General Robert Ransom, Jr., and with the column thus formed, was ready to turn his attention to the lower Shenandoah Valley. At Early's suggestion General Lee authorized him to move north at an opportune moment, cross the upper Potomac into Maryland and threaten Washington. … By rapid marching Early reached Winchester on the 2d of July, and on the 4th occupied Martinsburg, driving General Sigel out of that place the same day that Hunter's troops, after their fatiguing retreat through the mountains, reached Charlestown, West Virginia. Early was thus enabled to cross the Potomac without difficulty, when, moving around Harper's Ferry, through the gaps of the South Mountain, he found his path unobstructed till he reached the Monocacy, where Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps, and some raw troops that had been collected by General Lew Wallace, met and held the Confederates till the other reinforcements that had been ordered to the capital from Petersburg could be brought up. Wallace contested the line of the Monocacy with obstinacy, but had to retire finally toward Baltimore. The road was then open to Washington, and Early marched to the outskirts and began against the capital the demonstrations [July 11-12] which were designed to divert the Army of the Potomac from its main purpose in front of Petersburg. Early's audacity in thus threatening Washington had caused some concern to the officials in the city, but as the movement was looked upon by General Grant as a mere foray which could have no decisive issue, the Administration was not much disturbed till the Confederates came in close proximity. Then was repeated the alarm and consternation of two years before, fears for the safety of the capital being magnified by the confusion and discord existing among the different generals in Washington and Baltimore; and the imaginary dangers vanished only with the appearance of General Wright, who with the Sixth Corps and one division of the Nineteenth Corps, pushed out to attack Early as soon as he could get his arriving troops in hand, but under circumstances that precluded celerity of movement; and as a consequence the Confederates escaped with little injury, retiring across the Potomac to Leesburg, unharassed save by some Union cavalry that had been sent out into Loudoun County by Hunter, who in the meantime had arrived at Harper's Ferry by the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. From Leesburg Early retired through Winchester toward Strasburg, but when the head of his column reached this place he found that he was being followed by General Crook with the combined troops of Hunter and Sigel only, Wright having returned to Washington under orders to rejoin Meade at Petersburg. This reduction of the pursuing force tempting Early to resume the offensive, he attacked Crook at Kernstown, and succeeded in administering such a check as to necessitate this general's retreat to Martinsburg, and finally to Harper's Ferry. Crook's withdrawal restored to Early the line of the upper Potomac, so, recrossing this stream, he advanced again into Maryland, and sending McCausland on to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, laid that town in ashes [July 30] leaving 3,000 non-combatants without shelter or food. … This second irruption of Early and his ruthless destruction of Chambersburg led to many recommendations on the part of General Grant looking to a speedy elimination of the confusion then existing among the Union forces along the upper Potomac, but for a time the authorities at Washington would approve none of his propositions. … Finally the manœuvres of Early and the raid to Chambersburg compelled a partial compliance, though Grant had somewhat circumvented the difficulty already by deciding to appoint a commander for the forces in the field that were to operate against Early. On the 31st of July General Grant selected me as this commander. … On the evening of August 1, I was relieved from immediate duty with the Army of the Potomac, but not from command of the cavalry as a corps organization. I arrived at Washington on the 4th of August, and the next day received instructions from General Halleck, to report to General Grant at Monocacy Junction, whither he had gone direct from City Point, in consequence of a characteristic despatch from the President indicating his disgust with the confusion, disorder and helplessness prevailing along the upper Potomac, and intimating that Grant's presence there was necessary."

P. H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, volume 1, chapter 23.

ALSO IN: G. E. Pond, The Shenandoah Valley in 1864, chapters 4-6.

_F. Sigel, Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864 (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

{3536}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (July: Virginia). The siege of Petersburg: The Mine.

"Burnside's corps held a position directly in front of Petersburg, including a point where our lines, owing to the nature of the ground, had been pushed up to within 150 yards of the enemy's, where a fort projected beyond their average front. Under this fort a mine had been run from a convenient ravine or hollow within our lines, which was entirely screened from the enemy's observation; and this mine would seem to have been completed not only without countermining by the Rebels, but without being even suspected by them; though a report of its existence (probably founded on the story of some deserter or prisoner) was printed in one of the Richmond journals. All being ready, the morning of July 30th was fixed for springing the mine; which was to be instantly followed, of course, by the opening of our guns all along the front, and by an assault at the chasm opened in the enemy's defences by the explosion. … The explosion took place; hoisting the fort into the air, annihilating its garrison of 300 men, and leaving in its stead a gigantic hollow or crater of loose earth, 150 feet long by some 60 wide and 25 to 30 deep. Instantly, our guns opened all along the front; and the astounded enemy may well have supposed them the thunders of doom. But it was indispensable to success that a column of assault should rush forward instantly and resolutely, so as to clear the chasm and gain the crest before the foe should recover from his surprise; and, on this vital point failure had already been secured. The 9th corps, as then constituted, was not that from which any commanding general would have selected a storming party; yet because it was Burnside's mine, his corps was, without discussion, allowed to furnish the column of assault. His inspecting officer had reported that, of its four divisions, that composed of Blacks was fittest for this perilous service; but Grant, discrediting this, had directed that one of the three White divisions should be chosen. Thereupon, the leaders of these divisions were allowed to cast lots to see which of them should go in—or rather which two of them should stay out—and the lot fell on the 1st, Brigadier-General Ledlie—and no man in the army believed this other than the worst choice of the three. … Several minutes passed—precious, fatal minutes!—before Ledlie's division, clearing with difficulty the obstacles in its path—went forward into the chasm, and there stopped, though the enemy at that point were still paralyzed and the deciding crest completely at our mercy. Then parts of Burnside's two remaining White divisions (Potter's and Wilcox's) followed; but once in the crater, Ledlie's men barred the way to a farther advance, and all huddled together, losing their formation and becoming mixed up; General Potter finally extricating himself, and charging toward the crest; but with so slender a following that he was soon obliged to fall back. Two hours were thus shamefully squandered, while the Rebels recovering their self-possession, were planting batteries on either side, and mustering their infantry in an adjacent ravine; and now—when more men in the crater could only render the confusion more hopeless and magnify the disaster—Burnside threw in his Black division; which, passing beyond and rather to the right of the crater, charged toward the crest, but were met by a fire of artillery and musketry which speedily hurled them back into the crater, where all order was lost, all idea of aught beyond personal safety abandoned, while the enemy's shells and balls poured into it like hail, rendering it an arena of unresisted slaughter. … A first Rebel assault on our unfortunates was repulsed in sheer desperation; and thousands of course took the risk of darting out of the death-trap and racing at top speed to our lines; but our loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was 4,400; while that of the enemy, including 300 blown up in the fort, was barely 1,000."

H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 2, pages 590-591.

ALSO IN: _W. H. Powell and others, The Battle of the Petersburg Crater (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

A. Woodbury, Burnside and the 9th Army Corps, part 4, chapter 5.

A. A. Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865, chapter 9.

_Report of Joint Commission on the Conduct of the War, 38th Congress, 2d Session: volume 1._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (August: Virginia). The Siege of Petersburg: Fighting for the Weldon Road. Battle of Reams's Station. The Dutch Gap Canal.

"Taking advantage of the absence of many of Lee's troops from Petersburg, Grant made a vigorous movement for securing possession of the Weldon road, not more than three miles from the left flank of his lines on the Jerusalem plank road. This movement was made by Warren, with the Fifth Corps, on the morning of the 18th of August, and at noon he reached the coveted railway without opposition, where he left Griffin to hold the point seized, while with the divisions of Ayres and Crawford he moved toward Petersburg. He had marched but a short distance when a division of Confederates suddenly and heavily fell upon his flank. … Warren held the ground he had gained at a cost of 1,000 men killed, wounded and prisoners." The next day (August 19), Lee sent Hill with a heavy force to drive Warren from the road, and the attempt, desperately made, was nearly successful, but not quite. Two days later it was repeated, and the Confederates were repulsed with a loss of 1,200 men. "In his entire movement for the possession of the road Warren lost, in killed, wounded and missing, 4,450 men. He now rendered his position almost impregnable, and General Lee was compelled to see one of his most important lines of communication wrested from him. On the day of Warren's Victory [August 21], Hancock, who … had been called from the north bank of the James [where an unsuccessful demonstration towards Richmond had been made from Deep Bottom], and who had moved with part of his corps rapidly toward the Weldon road, in the rear of Warren, struck that highway north of Reams's Station, and destroyed the track to that point and some miles south of it. He formed an intrenched camp at Reams's," and was attacked there on the 25th by Hill with such determination that he was forced back to a rear line, "where the troops had been rallied, and when night fell Hancock withdrew from Reams's Station. He had lost in the fight 2,400 of his 8,000 men, and five guns; 1,700 of the men were made prisoners. Hill's loss was but little less, and he, too, withdrew from Reams's. But this disaster did not loosen Warren's hold upon the Weldon road. … For about a month after the battle of Reams's Station there was comparative quiet along the lines of the opposing armies. … A strong party of colored soldiers had been set to work by General Butler on the north side of the James, under cover of a battery on that side mounting 100-pounder Parrott guns, in digging a canal across the narrow isthmus of a peninsula formed by a sharp bend in the river, called Farrar's Island. {3537} By this canal it was intended to secure a nearer base of operations against Richmond, and afford a passage for the National war vessels, by which they might flank several important works of the Confederates." The Dutch Gap Canal, as it was called, did not prove successful, the necessary depth of water never being secured during the war, though the canal has been brought into use since.

B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the Civil War, volume 3, chapter 13.

ALSO IN: _P. S. Michie, Dutch Gap Canal (Battles and Leaders, volume 4, page 575)._

_O. B. Willcox, Actions on the Weldon Railroad (Battles and Leaders, volume 4, page 568)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (August: Alabama). The Battle of Mobile Bay. Capture of Confederate forts and fleet.

"After the capitulation of Vicksburg the vessels of the so-called Gulf Squadron which had been cruising on the lower Mississippi and its tributaries were in part joined to the Upper Squadron, under the command of Admiral Porter. The remainder were recalled to their duties on the outside blockade. Admiral Farragut was now free to turn his whole attention to the coast of the Gulf, whither he returned in January, 1864, after a well-earned rest at the North. Mobile was now the principal port in the possession of the Confederates in this quarter, and earnestly did the Admiral desire to attack and reduce the forts at the entrance of the bay. But troops were required to invest the forts after the fleet had passed them, and at this moment it seemed that there were no troops to be spared. It was also much to be desired that at least a few monitors should be added to the fleet, but neither were these as yet available. So the time wore on; winter passed into spring and spring into summer, but still the attack was not made. This delay was of incalculable advantage to the enemy, enabling him to complete his preparations. The Confederate force afloat in Mobile Bay was commanded by Admiral Franklin Buchanan. … This force consisted of only four vessels, but they nevertheless made an important addition to the defences of the place. Three of them were only paddle-wheel gun-boats … while the fourth was the iron-clad ram Tennessee … the most formidable vessel that the Confederates had ever built. … The City of Mobile lies at the head of a long bay, which is about 20 miles wide at its lower end. The greater portion of the bay is very shallow, too shallow even for vessels of moderate draft. The entrance lies between a long sandspit … and a shoal. … The ship-channel between the shoals, five miles in length, is perhaps half a mile wide at its narrowest point. Two forts guarded the passage,—on the right hand Fort Morgan, on Mobile Point, and on the left Fort Gaines, on Dauphin Island. … In addition to the land and naval defences, additional protection had been given by obstructions in the water. A line of piles ran out from Fort Gaines, which was continued nearly across the main ship-channel by a triple line of torpedoes. The eastern end of the row of torpedoes was marked by a red buoy, and between the buoy and Fort Morgan the channel had been left open for blockade runners. The open space, only 100 yards wide, lay directly under the guns of the fort, and it was through this narrow passage that Admiral Farragut intended to carry his fleet. The ships were gradually assembled toward the latter part of July. The Admiral's plan of action was simple, but in the highest degree effective. His fleet consisted of four monitors and fourteen wooden vessels, seven of the latter large and seven small. The wooden vessels were arranged in pairs, as at Port Hudson, each of the larger vessels having a smaller one lashed to her port side, so that if one was disabled the engines of the other would carry both past the forts. The four monitors were placed in a flanking column inshore, between the fleet and Fort Morgan. … At six o'clock on the morning of the 5th of August the fleet started with the flood tide. The Admiral took up his position in the port main rigging of the Hartford, so that he might have a good post of observation. [According to accounts given by officers who were on board the Hartford, Admiral Farragut climbed the rigging, after the battle began, in order to get above the thickest of the smoke, and Captain Drayton sent a man to lash him where he stood, so that, if wounded, he might not fall to the deck]. … Above the fort, and just beyond the obstructions, lay the Confederate ram Tennessee and her three attendant gunboats. … Soon after half-past six the Tecumseh [the leading monitor] fired the first two shots at Fort Morgan. For half an hour after this, the ships advanced in silence. Then the fort opened on the Brooklyn, and presently the whole line of vessels was hotly engaged. Their concentrated fire kept down that of the enemy, and all seemed at this time to be going well with the fleet. The Tecumseh, though all the while advancing, was now silent, reserving her fire for the Tennessee, which lay beyond the obstructions. Captain Craven saw the red buoy, but it seemed so close to the beach that he thought there must have been a mistake in his orders; and altering his course, he headed straight for the Tennessee, passing to the westward of the buoy right over the line of torpedoes. Suddenly there came a frightful explosion; the huge mass of iron gave a lurch first to one side, then to the other; her bow made one downward plunge, her screw was seen for a moment revolving high in air, and she sank to the bottom of the channel. Of 120 men on board only 21 were saved. … From the Brooklyn, leading the main column, something was now descried in the water ahead which resembled torpedo-buoys, and the sloop, with the Octorara lashed to her side, suddenly stopped, and in a moment they were backing down on the vessels astern of them. The bows of the two ships turned, falling off towards the fort, so that they blocked up the channel. The Hartford, the Admiral's flag-ship, which was next astern, also stopped to prevent a collision, but she was drifting fast with the Metacomet toward the two vessels ahead, and the Richmond and Port Royal were close upon them, followed by the others. At that moment it seemed as if nothing could save the vessels of the fleet from being thrown into hopeless confusion, massed together as they were directly under the guns of the fort. It was in that moment, at the crisis of the battle, that the calm and dauntless spirit of the Admiral rose to its greatest height. … 'Captain Drayton, go ahead! Jouett, full speed!' came the command, in clear, ringing tones from the Admiral's place in the rigging. {3538} In a moment the Hartford had turned, and dashing with the Metacomet past the Brooklyn, rushed straight over the barrier. Snap, snap, went the primers of the torpedoes under the bottom of the ship,—the officers and men could hear them,—but no explosion followed, and the Hartford passed safely into the waters above. Meanwhile the four ships lay entangled under Fort Morgan. A collision seemed inevitable, but Captain Jenkins of the Richmond, an officer of cool head and splendid courage, backed away from the others, and began a furious cannonade on the fort with his whole broadside, driving the enemy out of the water-batteries. The Brooklyn was by this means able to recover, and presently she steamed ahead, followed by the Richmond and the rest of the fleet. … No sooner was the battle with the fort over than a new battle began with the Tennessee. The moment that the ships had fairly entered the bay, the Confederate ram … came charging down the whole line, taking each vessel in turn," but doing no serious injury to any. On the arrival of the monitors, which had lagged behind, "the Tennessee took refuge under the guns of the fort, and the fleet rejoined the Hartford, now four miles up the bay." Meantime the Hartford and the Metacomet had disposed of two of the Confederate gunboats: the Selma, which surrendered, and the Gaines, which had been run ashore and set on fire. The third, the Morgan, took shelter, with the Tennessee, near the fort. "The Hartford had by this time come to anchor, and her crew went to breakfast. The other ships gradually joined her. But the battle was not yet over. It was now a little before nine o'clock, and suddenly the Tennessee was reported approaching." In the battle which ensued, the stout iron-clad was rammed repeatedly by the Monongahela, the Lackawanna, the Hartford and the Ossipee, and pounded by the terrible guns of the monitor Chickasaw, until, with her commander wounded, her tiller-chains and smoke stack gone, her port shutters jammed, and her armor starting from the frame, she raised the white flag. "A few days later the forts surrendered, and Mobile, as a Confederate port, ceased to exist. The fall of the city did not come about until some time afterward; indeed no immediate attempt was made upon it, for the capture of the forts and the occupation of Mobile Bay served every purpose of the Federal Government."

J. R. Soley, The Sailor Boys of '61, chapter 13.

"This great victory cost the Union fleet 335 men. … The losses in the rebel fleet were 10 killed and 16 wounded—confined to the Tennessee and Selma—and 280 prisoners taken. The loss in the forts is unknown."

Loyal Farragut, Life of David Glasgow Farragut, chapter 27.

ALSO IN: _J. O. Kinney and J. D. Johnston; Farragut at Mobile Bay, and The Ram Tennessee at Mobile Bay, (Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

A. T. Mahan, The Gulf and Inland Waters (The Navy in the Civil War, volume 3), chapter 8.

A. T. Mahan, Admiral Farragut, chapter 10.

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 39._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (August-October: Virginia). Sheridan's Victories in the Shenandoah Valley. Winchester. Fisher's Hill. Cedar Creek. The famous Ride.

"The events of July showed the urgent need of unity of command in Northern Virginia, and the lieutenant-general, in August, consolidated these four departments [of Washington, the Susquehanna, West Virginia and the Middle Department] into one, named the Middle Military Division, under General Hunter. That officer, however, before entering on the proposed campaign, expressed a willingness to be relieved, and General P. H. Sheridan, who had been transferred from the Army of the Potomac to the command of the forces in the field under Hunter, was appointed in his stead." General Sheridan was appointed to the command on the 7th of August, and took the field with an effective force (which included the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps) of 40,000 men, 10,000 being cavalry. "His operations during that month and the fore part of September were mainly confined to manœuvres having for their object to prevent the Confederates from gaining the rich harvests of the Shenandoah Valley. But after once or twice driving Early southward to Strasburg, he each time returned on his path towards Harper's Ferry. General Grant had hesitated in allowing Sheridan to take a real initiative, as defeat would lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania before another army could be interposed to check him. Finding, however, while on a personal visit to General Sheridan, in the month of September, that that officer expressed great confidence of success, he authorized him to attack. At this time the Confederate force held the west bank of Opequan Creek, covering Winchester; and the Union force lay in front of Berryville, twenty miles south of Harper's Ferry. The situation of the opposing armies was peculiar: each threatened the communications of the other, and either could bring on a battle at any time. It would appear that General Early had designed assuming the offensive." He made a movement which General Sheridan was prompt to take advantage of, on the morning of September 19th, and a battle ensued—known as the battle of Winchester, but some times called the battle of Opequan Creek—which resulted in a victory for the latter. "It is due to state that there was a great disparity in the numbers engaged—Early's force consisting of 8,500 muskets and 3,000 sabres, while Sheridan's strength was thrice that of the aggregate Confederate force. Sheridan's preponderance in horse enabled him to extend far beyond and overlap the Confederate left, and when, after several hours of indecisive fighting between the infantry, a general advance was, at four P. M., made by the whole line, the cavalry, by an impetuous charge, carried the fortified heights: the Confederates … broke in confusion, retiring from the field and through Winchester, with the Union forces in pursuit. Night, however, prevented Sheridan from following up the victory, among the trophies of which were 2,500 prisoners, five pieces of artillery, and nine battle-flags. … After his defeat at Winchester, Early did not pause in his southward retreat till he reached Fisher's Hill, near Strasburg, 30 miles south of Winchester. This is a very defensible position, commanding the débouché of the narrow Strasburg valley between the north fork of the Shenandoah River and the North Mountain. On these obstacles Early rested his flank. In front of this position Sheridan arrived on the morning of the 22d and formed his force for a direct attack, while he sent Torbert with two divisions of cavalry by the parallel Luray Valley, to gain New Market, 20 miles in Early's rear. After much manœuvring, and several ineffectual efforts to force the position, an attack of cavalry was made from the right. {3539} Under cover of this mask a corps of infantry was moved to that flank, and by an impetuous assault carried the Confederate left resting on the North Mountain. A general attack in front then disrupted Early's whole line, and the Confederates retired in great disorder, leaving behind 16 pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. … Early's retreat was not stayed until he reached the lower passes of the Blue Ridge, whither he retired with a loss of half his army. Sheridan, after pushing the pursuit as far as Staunton, and operating destructively against the Virginia Central Railroad, returned and took position behind Cedar Creek near Strasburg. Previously to abandoning the country south of Strasburg, it was laid waste by the destruction of all barns, grain, forage, farming implements, and mills. The desolution of the Palatinate by Turenne was not more complete. On the withdrawal of Sheridan, Early, after a brief respite, and being re-enforced by Kershaw's division of infantry and 600 cavalry from Lee's army, again marched northward down the Valley, and once more ensconced himself at Fisher's Hill. Sheridan continued to hold position on the north bank of Cedar Creek. Nothing more important than cavalry combats, mostly favorable to the Federal arms, took place, until the 19th of October, when Early assumed a bold offensive that was near giving him a victory as complete as the defeat he had suffered. … The army was, at this time, temporarily under the command of General Wright—Sheridan being absent at Washington. The position held by the Union force was too formidable to invite open attack, and Early's only opportunity was to make a surprise. This that officer now determined on, and its execution was begun during the night of the 18-19th of October." A flanking column, "favored by a heavy fog … attained, unperceived, the rear of the left flank of the Union force, formed by Crook's Corps … and rushed into the camp—the troops awaking only to find themselves prisoners. To rally the men in their bewilderment was impossible, and Crook's Corps, being thoroughly broken up, fled in disorder, leaving many guns in the hands of the enemy. As soon as this flank attack was developed, Early, with his other column, emerged from behind the hills west of Cedar Creek, and crossing that stream, struck directly the troops on the right of Crook. This served to complete the disaster, and the whole Union left and centre became a confused mass, against which the Confederates directed the captured artillery (18 guns), while the flanking force swept forward to the main turnpike. Such was the scene on which the light of day dawned. The only force not yet involved in the enemy's onset was the Sixth Corps, which by its position was somewhat in rear. With this General Ricketts quickly executed a change of front, throwing it forward at right angles to its former position, and firmly withstood the enemy's shock. Its chief service was, however, to cover the general retreat which Wright now ordered, as the only practicable means of reuniting his force. … At the first good position between Middletown and Newtown, Wright was able to rally and reform the troops, form a compact line, and prepare either to resist further attack, or himself resume the offensive. It was at this time, about half-past ten A. M., that General Sheridan arrived upon the field from Winchester, where he had slept the previous night. Hearing the distant sounds of battle rolling up from the south, Sheridan rode post to the front, where arriving, his electric manner had on the troops a very inspiriting effect. General Wright had already brought order out of confusion and made dispositions for attack. … A counter-charge was begun at three o'clock in the afternoon. … A large part of Early's force, in the intoxication of success, had abandoned their colors and taken to plundering the abandoned Federal camps. The refluent wave was as resistless as the Confederate surge had been. … The retreat soon became a rout. … In the pursuit all the captured guns were retaken and 23 in addition, The captures included, besides, near 1,500 prisoners. … With this defeat of Early all operations of moment in the Shenandoah forever ended," and most of the troops on both sides were recalled to the main field of operations, at Petersburg.

W. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, chapter 12, part 8.

ALSO IN: P. H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, volume 2, chapters 1-4.

G. E. Pond, The Shenandoah Valley in 1864, chapters 7-13.

_M. M. Granger, The Battle of Cedar Creek (Sketches of War History, Ohio Commandery, L. L. of the United States, volume 3)._

_W. Merritt, Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley._

_J. A. Early, Winchester, Fisher's Hill, and Cedar Creek (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

R. B. Irwin, History of the 19th Army Corps, chapters 33-34.

_H. C. King, The Battle of Cedar Creek (Personal Recollections of the War: New York Com. L. L. of the United States)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (September-October: Georgia) Atlanta cleared of its former inhabitants. Sherman's Preparations for the March to the Sea. Hood's Raid to the rear.

"During the month of September, Sherman's army remained grouped about Atlanta. … The Army of the Cumberland, under Major-General Thomas, held Atlanta; the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by Major-General Howard, was at East Point; and the Army of the Ohio occupied Decatur. … Sherman now determined to make Atlanta exclusively a military post. On the 4th of September he issued the following orders: 'The city of Atlanta belonging exclusively for warlike purposes, it will at once be vacated by all except the armies of the United States and such civilian employes as may be retained by the proper departments of the Government.' … This order fell upon the ears of the inhabitants of Atlanta like a thunderbolt." To a remonstrance addressed to him by the mayor and two councilmen of the city, he replied: "We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop the war, we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution, which all must respect and obey. To defeat these armies, we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses. … My military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible. … War is cruelty and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war on our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. … You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these terrible hardships of war." A truce of ten days was arranged, during which "446 families were moved south, comprising 705 adults, 860 children and 79 servants, with an average of 1,651 pounds of furniture and household goods of all kinds to each family."

S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin, Sherman and his Campaigns, chapter 18.

{3540}

"Gen. Hood, meanwhile, kept his forces in the neighborhood of Jonesboro, receiving his supplies by the Macon road. His army numbered about 40,000 men, exclusive of the Georgia militia; and, as if to show that no immediate offensive movement was contemplated, the latter were withdrawn from him by Governor Brown soon after the evacuation of Atlanta. … To allow their principal Southern army to rust in inactivity, was not however the intention of the rebel authorities. … Something must be done, and that speedily, to arrest the progress of the Federal army, or Georgia and perhaps the Gulf States, would be irretrievably lost. … The whole army of General Hood, it was decided, should rapidly move in a compact body to the rear of Atlanta, and, after breaking up the railroad between the Chattahoochee and Chattanooga, push on to Bridgeport and destroy the great railroad bridge spanning the Tennessee river at that place. Should this be accomplished, Atlanta would be isolated from Chattanooga, and the latter in turn isolated from Nashville, and General Sherman, cut off from his primary and secondary bases, would find Atlanta but a barren conquest to be relinquished almost as soon as gained, and would be obliged to return to Tennessee. Atlanta would then fall from lack of provisions, or in consequence of the successful attacks of the Georgia militia. In connection with this movement, General Forrest, confessedly their ablest cavalry officer, was already operating in Southern Tennessee. … A week sufficed to complete General Hood's arrangements, and by the 2d of October his army was across the Chattahoochee and on the march to Dallas, where the different corps were directed to concentrate. At this point he was enabled to threaten Rome and Kingston, as well as the fortified places on the railroad to Chattanooga; and there remained open, in case of defeat, a line of retreat southwest into Alabama. From Dallas he advanced east toward the railroad, and, on the 4th, captured the insignificant stations of Big Shanty and Ackworth, effecting a thorough destruction of the road between the two places. He also sent a division under General French to capture the Federal post at Allatoona Pass, where he had ascertained that a million and a half of rations for the Federal army were stored, on which he probably depended to replenish his commissariat. … General Sherman, … immediately upon hearing that General Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee, … despatched General Corse with reënforcements to Rome, which he supposed the enemy were aiming at. During the previous week he had sent General Thomas with troops to Nashville to look after Forrest. His bridges having meanwhile been carried away by a freshet which filled the Chattahoochee, he was unable to move his main body until the 4th, when three pontoons were laid down, over which the armies of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio crossed, and took up their march in the direction of Marietta, with 15 days' rations. The 20th corps, General Slocum, was left to garrison Atlanta. Learning that the enemy had captured Big Shanty and Ackworth, and were threatening Allatoona, and alive to the imperative necessity of holding the latter place, General Sherman at once communicated by signals instruction to General Corse at Rome to reënforce the small garrison and hold the defences until the main body of the Federal army could come to his assistance. Upon receiving the message General Corse placed 900 men on the cars, and reached Allatoona before the attack of French. With this addition the garrison numbered 1,700 men, with six guns. Early on the morning of the 5th, General French, with 7,000 troops, approached Allatoona, and summoned the Federal commander, 'in order to save the unnecessary effusion of blood,' to make an immediate surrender; to which the latter replied: 'I shall not surrender, and you can commence the unnecessary effusion of blood whenever you please.' The battle opened at 8 A. M., and was waged hotly until 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Driven from fort to fort, until they reached their last defence, the garrison fought with an obstinacy and desperation worthy of the great stake for which they contended. Their general was wounded early in the action, but relaxed in no degree his efforts to repel the enemy. … During the heat of the contest General Sherman reached the summit of Kenesaw Mountain, whence he repeatedly signalled to General Corse to hold out to the last. The announcement of approaching succor animated the garrison to renewed exertions, and they threw back the assaulting columns of the enemy again and again, finally compelling them to retire, beaten and disheartened, in the direction of Dallas. Their retreat was hastened by the rapid approach of Stanley's (4th) corps from the direction of Pine Mountain. The enemy left 700 to 800 killed, wounded and prisoners in the hands of the Federals, and their total loss must have exceeded 1,000. The garrison lost 600 men. The town of Allatoona was reduced to a mere wreck by the [severe fire of the enemy, and all the Federal artillery and cavalry horses were killed; but the valuable stores were saved, and the fort and pass held. The only important injury done by the rebels, was the destruction of six or seven miles of railroad between Big Shanty and Allatoona, which General Sherman immediately commenced to repair. For several days subsequent to the fight at Allatoona, General Sherman remained in the latter place, watching the movements of Hood, who, he suspected, would march for Rome, and thence toward Bridgeport, or else to Kingston. … General Hood, however, crossing the Etowah and avoiding Rome, moved directly north, and on the 12th Stuart's corps of his army appeared in front of Resaca, the defences of which were held by Colonel Weaver with 600 men and three pieces of artillery. … No serious attack was made upon the garrison, the enemy being more intent upon destroying the railroad toward Dalton than wasting their time or strength upon the reduction of a post, the possession of which they wisely considered would be of no particular advantage to them. … Meanwhile the rebel army, pursuing its devastating march north, reached Dalton on the 14th. … The 14th and 15th were employed by the enemy in continuing the destruction of the railroad as far as Tunnel Hill. … {3541} The approach of the Federal columns now warned General Hood to move off to the west, and the 16th found him in full retreat for Lafayette, followed by General Sherman. … From Lafayette the enemy retreated in a southwesterly direction into Alabama through a broken and mountainous country, but scantily supplied with food for man or beast; and passing through Summerville, Gaylesville, and Blue Pond, halted at Gadsdens, on the Coosa River, 75 miles from Lafayette. Here he paused for several days, receiving a few reënforcements brought up by General Beauregard, who had on the 17th assumed command of the Confederate military division of the West. … General Hood still retained his special command, subject to the supervision or direction of General Beauregard, and his army, after remaining a few days in Gadsden, moved, about the 1st of November, for Warrington, on the Tennessee River, 30 miles distant. General Sherman meanwhile remained at Gaylesville, which place his main body reached about the 21st, watching the enemy's movements. … Whatever … might be the final result of Hood's flanking movement, it had entirely failed to interrupt the Federal communications to a degree that would compel the evacuation of Atlanta. … In the light of subsequent events it would now appear that General Sherman, making only a show of following his adversary, deliberately lured him into Northern Alabama, for the purpose of pursuing an uninterrupted march with his own army through the heart of Georgia. The ill-advised plan of General Hood had given him the very opportunity which he desired, and he prepared at once to avail himself of it."

_W. J. Tenney, Military and Naval History in the United States, chapter 45. _

ALSO IN: _J. D. Cox, Atlanta (Campaigns of the Civil war, volume 9), chapter 17._

W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, chapter 19 (volume 2).

T. B. Van Horne, Life of Major-General George H. Thomas, volume 2, chapter 12.

J. B. Hood, Advance and Retreat, chapter 15.

_Official Records, 1st Series, volume 39._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October). Admission of Nevada into the Union.

See NEVADA: A. D. 1848-1864.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October). Report on secret disloyal associations in the North. Knights of the Golden Circle, etc.

"During more than a year past [this report bears date October 8, 1864], it has been generally known to our military authorities that a secret and treasonable organization, affiliated with the Southern Rebellion, and chiefly military in its character, has been rapidly extending itself throughout the West. A variety of agencies … have been employed, and successfully, to ascertain its nature and extent, as well as its aims and its results; and, as this investigation has led to the arrest, in several States, of a number of its prominent members, as dangerous public enemies, it has been deemed proper to set forth in full the acts and purposes of this organization. … This secret association first developed itself in the West in the year 1862, about the period [August] of the first conscription of troops, which it aimed to obstruct and resist. Originally known in certain localities as the 'Mutual Protection Society,' the 'Circle of Honor,' or the 'Circle' or 'Knights of the Mighty Host,' but more widely as the 'Knights of the Golden Circle,' it was simply an inspiration of the Rebellion, being little other than an extension, among the disloyal and disaffected at the North, of the association of the latter name, which had existed for some years at the South [see GOLDEN CIRCLE, KNIGHTS OF], and from which it derived all the chief features of its organization. During the Summer and Fall of 1863, the Order, both at the North and South, underwent some modifications as well as a change of name. In consequence of a partial exposure which had been made of the signs and ritual of the Knights of the Golden Circle, Sterling Price had instituted, as its successor in Missouri, a secret political association, which he called the Corps de Belgique, or Southern League, his principal coadjutor being Charles L. Hunt, of St. Louis, then Belgian Consul at that city. … Meanwhile, also, there had been instituted at the North, in the autumn of 1863, by sundry disloyal persons, prominent among whom were Vallandigham and P. C. Wright, of New York, a secret, Order intended to be general throughout the country … and which was termed, and has since been widely known as the O. A. K., or 'Order of American Knights.' … The secret signs and character of the Order having become known to our military authorities, further modifications in the ritual and forms were introduced, and its name was finally changed to that of the O. S. L., or 'Order of the Sons of Liberty,' or the 'Knights of the Order of the Sons of Liberty.' These later changes are represented to have been first instituted … in May last [1864], but the new name was at once generally adopted throughout the West, though in some localities the association is still better known as the 'Order of American Knights.' Meanwhile, also, the Order has received certain local designations. In parts of Illinois it has been called at times the 'Peace Organization,' in Kentucky the 'Star Organization,' and in Missouri the 'American Organization;' these, however, being apparently names used outside of the lodges of the Order. Its members have also been familiarly designated as 'Butternuts' by the country people of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. … The 'Temples' or 'Lodges' of the Order are numerously scattered through the States of Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Missouri, and Kentucky. They are also officially reported as established, to a less extent, in Michigan and the other Western States, as well as in New York, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, and Tennessee. … It has been asserted by delegates to the Supreme Council of February last, that the number was there represented to be from 800,000 to 1,000,000; but Vallandigham, in his speech last summer at Dayton, Ohio, placed it at 500,000, which is probably much nearer the true total. … Although the Order has, from the outset, partaken of the military character, it was not till the summer or fall of 1863 that it began to be generally organized as an armed body.' … In March last the entire armed force of the Order capable of being mobilized for effective service was represented to be 340,000 men."

J. Holt, Judge Advocate General's Report on Secret Associations and Conspiracies against the Government.

ALSO IN: E. McPherson, Political History of the United States during the Great Rebellion, appendix, pages 445-454.

J. A. Logan, The Great Conspiracy, page 499, and appendix chapter B.

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 8, chapter 1.

See, also, COPPERHEADS.

{3542}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October). The St. Albans Raid.

"Along the Northern border … the rebel agents, sent thither on 'detached service' by the Rebel Government, were active in movements intended to terrify and harass the people. On the 19th of October, a party of them made a raid into St. Albans, Vermont, robbing the banks there, and making their escape across the lines into Canada with their plunder, having killed one of the citizens in their attack. Pursuit was made, and several of the marauders were arrested in Canada. Proceedings were commenced to procure their extradition [which were protracted until after the close of the war]. … The Government received information that this affair was but one of a projected series, and that similar attempts would be made all along the frontier. More than this, there were threats, followed by actual attempts, to set fire to the principal Northern cities."

H. J. Raymond, Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln, page 611.

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 8, chapter 1.

Correspondence relating to the Fenian Invasion and the Rebellion of the Southern States (Ottawa, 1869), pages 117-138.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October: North Carolina). The destruction of the ram Albemarle.

The ram Albemarle, which had proved in the spring so dangerous an antagonist to the blockading vessels in the North Carolina Sounds, was still lying at Plymouth, in the Roanoke River, and another attack from her was feared by the fleet.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (APRIL-MAY: NORTH CAROLINA).

"She was finally destroyed by a brave young lieutenant, William B. Cushing, who blew her up with a torpedo. Though only twenty years old, he was one of the most daring officers in the navy, and he had become noted for his fearlessness in the expeditions in the sounds and rivers of North Carolina. One dark night (October 27) he set out from the fleet in a steam launch—a long open boat used by naval vessels—with a crew of thirteen officers and men. The launch was fitted with a torpedo which could be run out forward on the end of a long boom so as to be thrust under the vessel to be attacked. Cushing got within sixty feet of the Albemarle before his boat was seen. The guards then shouted the alarm, rang the boat's bell, and began firing their muskets at the launch. There was a raft of logs thirty feet wide around the Albemarle to protect her from just such attacks, but Cushing ran the bow of the launch upon the logs, lowered the boom so that the torpedo came right under the side of the vessel, and fired it. At the same moment a shot from one of the great guns of the ram crashed through the launch, and it was overwhelmed by a flood of water thrown up by the explosion of the torpedo. The Confederates called out to Cushing to surrender, but he refused, and ordering his men to save themselves as they best could, he sprang into the water amid a shower of musket balls and swam down the river. He succeeded in reaching the shore, almost exhausted, and hid himself during the next day in a swamp, where he was cared for by some negroes. From them he heard that the Albemarle had been sunk by his torpedo. The next night he found a small boat in a creek, paddled in it down the river, and before midnight was safe on board one of the vessels of the fleet. Only one other man of the party escaped, all the rest being either drowned or captured. The Albemarle being thus put out of the way, Plymouth was recaptured a few days afterward."

J. D. Champlin, Jr. Young Folks' History of the War for the Union, chapter 33.

ALSO IN: _W. B. Cushing, E. Holden, and others, The Confederate Ram Albemarle (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (November: Tennessee). Hood's advance Northward. The Battle of Franklin.

When General Sherman started on his march to the sea General Thomas was left to oppose Hood. "The force Thomas had for this purpose was curiously small, considering how formidable Hood's army had been in the Atlanta Campaign, and still was. All Thomas had for immediate field service were the Fourth and Twenty-Third Corps, numbering together about 22,000 infantry, and also about 3,000 cavalry. These troops were sent to Pulaski, Tennessee, in command of General Schofield, Thomas, himself remaining at Nashville. A little after the middle of November, 1864, Hood crossed the Tennessee River and inaugurated his campaign by a flank movement. He made a rapid march upon Columbia, with the view of getting in behind Schofield, who was at Pulaski. But Schofield retired to Columbia in time to frustrate Hood's plans. The two armies remained in close proximity to each other at Columbia until November 28th, when Hood made another skilfully-planned flank movement … to Spring Hill, in rear of Schofield. Again Hood was foiled. … General Thomas at Nashville wanted the Confederates held back as long as possible, in order that he might have time to receive there his expected reinforcement of A. J. Smith's corps. It was, therefore, Schofield's duty to check Hood's advance as long as he could. … He started General Stanley, with a division of 5,000 men, and a great part of his artillery, to Spring Hill (12 miles north of Columbia) early in the morning. He put two other divisions on the road. He held one division in front of Columbia, and prevented the enemy from crossing the river during the entire day, and also that night. Stanley reached Spring Hill in time to prevent Hood from occupying that place. He skirmished and fought with Hood's advance troops at Spring Hill during the afternoon of November 29th. … Schofield … accomplished exactly what he believed he could accomplish. He held back his enemy at Columbia with one hand and fenced off the blow at Spring Hill with the other. … The beneficial result of all this bold management of Schofield, November 29th, was apparent the next day in the battle of Franklin. Hood fought that great battle practically without his artillery. He only had the two batteries which he took with him on his detour to Spring Hill. Those two he used. … But his vast supply of artillery had all been detained at Columbia too long to be of any service at the time and place it was most needed. … The Federal troops left Spring Hill in the night for Franklin, ten miles distant. Early in the morning of November 30th they began to arrive at Franklin, and were placed in position covering the town. Early the same morning the Confederates moved up from Spring Hill, following hard upon the rearmost of the Federals. … {3543} General Stanley says, in his official report: 'From one o'clock until four in the evening, the enemy's entire force was in sight and forming for attack. Yet, in view of the strong position we held, and reasoning from the former course of the rebels during the campaign, nothing appeared so improbable as that they would assault.'" The assault was made, however, with a terrible persistency which proved the ruin of Hood's army, for it failed. "The Confederate loss in this dreadful battle can be estimated from data given. There is good authority for stating the killed at 1,750. The usual proportion of killed and wounded is four or five to one. This would make the killed and wounded not less than 7,000 or 8,000. The attacking force numbered full 20,000. … Hood's loss was, indeed, more than one-third of the attacking force. The Federal loss was much smaller, being 1,222 killed and wounded. … One of the features of this battle was the enormous expenditure of ammunition [100 wagon loads] in the short time of its duration. … The expenditure of so much ammunition produced a dense smoke, which hung over the field, and brought on sudden darkness, like an eclipse. So noticeable was this phenomenon, it is mentioned in all the official reports. … In the darkness of the night the battle ended. The Confederates desisted, and the Federal line became quiet. … In their front, and so near that the outstretched hand could almost reach them, were thousands of men in the agonies of death. The wail that went up from that field as the thunder of the battle ceased can never be forgotten by those who heard it. … The [Federal] troops were quietly withdrawn before midnight. A silent rapid march brought them to Nashville the next morning, and weary with fighting and marching they bivouacked in the blue grass pastures under the guns of Fort Negley."

_T. Speed, The Battle of Franklin (Sketches of War History, Ohio Commandery L. L. of the United States, volume 3). _

ALSO IN: T. B. Van Horne, Life of General George H. Thomas, chapter 13.

J. B. Hood, Advance and Retreat, chapters 10-17.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (November-December: Georgia). Sherman's March to the Sea.

"It was at Alatoona, probably, that Sherman first realized that, with the forces at his disposal, the keeping open of his line of communications with the North would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to operate offensively beyond Atlanta.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (September-October: Georgia).

He proposed, therefore, to destroy the roads back to Chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the latter place garrisoned. … Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving south, by making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky. I myself [writes General Grant] was thoroughly satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did. On the 2d of November I telegraphed Sherman authorizing him definitely to move according to the plan he had proposed: that is, cutting loose from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga. … Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military purposes before starting, Sherman himself remaining over a day to superintend the work and see that it was well done. Sherman's orders for this campaign were perfect. Before starting, he had sent back all sick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy, well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect. … The army was expected to live on the country. … Each brigade furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the command to which they belonged. … The skill of these men, called by themselves and the army 'bummers,' in collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands, was marvellous."

U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, chapter 59 (volume 2).

All preparations being completed, General Sherman caused the foundries, mills and shops of every kind in Rome to be destroyed on the 10th of November, and "started on the 12th with his full staff from Kingston to Atlanta. … As Sherman rode towards Atlanta that night he met railroad trains going to the rear with furious speed. He was profoundly impressed with the strange aspect of affairs: two hostile armies marching in opposite directions, each in the full belief that it was achieving a final and conclusive result in the great war. 'I was strongly inspired,' he writes, 'with a feeling that the movement on our part was a direct attack upon the rebel army and the rebel capital at Richmond, though a full thousand miles of hostile country intervened; and that for better or worse it would end the war.' The result was a magnificent vindication of this soldierly intuition. His army consisted in round numbers of 60,000 men, the most perfect in strength, health, and intelligence that ever went to war. He had thoroughly purged it of all inefficient material, sending to the rear all organizations and even all individuals that he thought would be a drag upon his celerity or strength. His right wing, under Howard, consisted of the Fifteenth Corps, commanded by Osterhaus, in the absence of John A. Logan; and the Seventeenth Corps, commanded by Frank P. Blair, Jr. The left wing, commanded by Slocum, comprised the Fourteenth Corps, under Jeff. C. Davis, and the Twentieth Corps, under A. S. Williams. In his general orders he had not intimated to the army the object of their march. 'It is sufficient for you to know,' he said, 'that it involves a departure from our present base and a long, difficult march to a new one.' His special field orders are a model of clearness and conciseness. The habitual order of march was to be, wherever practicable, by four roads as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at points to be indicated from time to time. There was to be no general train of supplies; behind each regiment should follow one wagon and one ambulance; a due proportion of wagons for ammunition and provision behind each brigade; the separate columns were to start at seven in the morning and make about fifteen miles a day. The army was to subsist liberally on the country; forage parties, under the command of discreet officers, were to gather near the routes traveled whatever was needed by the command, aiming to keep in the wagons a reserve of at least ten days' provisions; soldiers were strictly forbidden to enter dwellings of inhabitants or commit trespasses; the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton gins, etc., was intrusted to corps commanders alone. {3544} No destruction of property was to be permitted in districts where the army was unmolested; but relentless devastation was ordered in case of the manifestation of local hostility by the shooting of soldiers or the burning of bridges. … Precisely at seven o'clock on the morning of the 16th of November the great army started on its march. A band struck up the anthem of 'John Brown's body lies a-moldering in the grave'; the soldiers caught up the refrain, and, to the swelling chorus of 'Glory, Hallelujah,' the great march was begun. The month that followed will always remain to those 60,000 men the most romantic and inspiring memory of their lives. The weather was favorable all the way; to veterans the marches were of reasonable length; the work of destroying the Southern railroads was so easy to their experienced hands that it hardly delayed the day's march. With the exception of the affair on the 22d of November, when P. J. Phillips with a division of Smith's Georgia troops attacked C. C. Walcutt's Brigade, which was marching as the rear-guard of the right wing at Griswoldville, and met with a severe repulse, and a series of cavalry fights between Wheeler and Kilpatrick near 'Waynesboro', there was no fighting to do between Atlanta and Savannah. A swarm of militia and irregular cavalry hung, it is true, about the front and flank of the marching army, but were hardly a source of more annoyance than so many mosquitoes would have been. The foragers brought in every evening their heterogeneous supplies from the outlying plantations, and although they had to defend themselves every day from scattered forces of the enemy, the casualties which they reported each evening were insignificant. The utmost efforts of Sherman and his officers to induce the negroes to remain quietly at home were not entirely successful. The promise of freedom which was to come to them from the victory of the Union cause was too vague and indefinite to content them. … The simple-hearted freedmen gathered in an ever-increasing cloud in rear of the army; and when the campaign was over they peopled the sea-islands of Georgia and furnished, after the war, the principal employment of the Freedmen's Commission. The march produced an extraordinary effervescence throughout the Confederacy. If words could avail anything against heavy battalions, Sherman would have been annihilated in his first day's march. … As Sherman drew near to Milledgeville on the 23d of November the Georgia Legislature passed an act to levy the population en masse; but this act of desperate legislation had no effect in checking the march of the 'Yankees,' and the Governor, State officers, and Legislature fled in the utmost confusion as Sherman entered the place. The Union general occupied the Executive Mansion for a day; some of the soldiers went to the State House, organized themselves into a constituent assembly, and after a spirited mock-serious debate, repealed the ordinance of secession. Sherman took the greatest possible pains to prevent any damage to the city and marched out on the 24th on the way to Millen. … Finding it impossible to stop him, the Georgia State troops by sharp marching had made their way directly to the vicinity of Savannah, where Sherman himself arrived and invested the city from the Savannah to the little Ogeechee River, on the 10th of December."

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 9, chapter 20.

On the 13th, Fort McAllister, which commanded the Ogeechee River, was stormed and taken by Hazen's division, and communication was opened with Admiral Dahlgren, and with General Foster, the Union commander at Port Royal. On the 17th, General Hardee, the Confederate commander at Savannah, refused a demand for the surrender of the city, but on the night of the 20th he escaped, with his forces, and on the 22d General Sherman telegraphed to President Lincoln: "I beg to present to you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah, with 150 heavy guns and plenty of ammunition; also about 25,000 bales of cotton."

ALSO IN: _J. D. Cox, The March to the Sea (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 10), chapter 3._

_O. O. Howard, and others, Sherman's March (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, chapter 20 (volume 2).

_G. W. Nichols, The Story of the Great March._

W. B. Hazen, Narrative of Military Service, chapters 21-22.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (December: Tennessee). The Battle of Nashville and the destruction of Hood's army.

After the battle of Franklin Hood went forward to Nashville, with his badly shaken army, and invested that place.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (NOVEMBER: TENNESSEE).

Thomas was strongly fortified, and quietly took his time to make ready before striking his audacious antagonist, unmoved by repeated demands for an advance, from the War Office, the President, and General Grant. "With all just confidence in Thomas' ability, the entire North insisted on instant action, and Grant finally ordered Thomas either to move upon Hood at once or else turn over the command to Schofield. Thomas quietly replied that he would cheerfully do the latter, if directed, but would not attack Hood until he was satisfied that the time was ripe. He desired both favorable weather and to increase his force of mounted men. But the enemy was devastating a considerable part of Tennessee and was forcing all the young men into their ranks; and everyone was fearful of a repetition of Bragg's march to the Ohio in 1862. Logan was finally ordered to Nashville to supplant Thomas. But before he could reach the ground, Thomas had struck his blow. His preparations had been two weeks before substantially completed. Small detachments were at Murfreesboro', Chattanooga, and along the railroad. This latter had been, however, interrupted by Hood for a number of days. A heavy storm of sleet and ice had made the country almost impassable and would render the operations of the attacking party uncertain. Thomas had made up his mind to wait for clearing weather. Finally came sunshine and with it Thomas' advance. Hood lay in his front, with Stewart on his left, Lee in the centre and Cheatham on the right, while a portion of Forrest's cavalry was operating out upon his left. He had some 44,000 men, but his check and heavy losses at Franklin had seriously impaired the 'morale' of his army as well as thinned his ranks. Hood could, however, not retreat. He was committed to a death-struggle with Thomas. It was his last chance as a soldier. The Union general had placed A. J. Smith on his right, the Fourth corps in the centre, and Schofield on the left. He advanced on Hood, bearing heavily with his right, while sharply demonstrating with his left. The position of the Confederate Army had placed A. J. Smith's corps obliquely to their general line of battle, an advantage not to be neglected. {3545} Smith pushed in, later supported by Schofield, and successively capturing the field-works erected by the enemy's main line and reserves, disastrously crushed Hood's left flank. Meanwhile Wood was making all but equal headway against Hood's right, and the first day closed with remarkable success for the amount of loss sustained. Still this was not victory. The morrow might bring reverse. Hood's fight promised to be with clenched teeth. Hood seriously missed Forrest, whom he had detached on a raiding excursion and without whose cavalry his flanks were naked. Cheatham he moved during the night over from the right to sustain his left, which had proved the weaker wing. On the morning of the next day he lay intrenched upon the hills back of his former line, with either flank somewhat refused. Thomas sent Wilson with his cavalry to work his way unobserved around the extreme left flank thus thrown back. At 4 P. M. a general assault was made all along the line. Upon our left, Wood's advance did not meet with success. On the right, however, A. J. Smith's onset, concentrated at the salient of Hood's left centre, proved heavy enough to break down the Confederate defense. Sharply following up his successes, allowing no breathing time to the exultant troops, Smith pushed well home, and overcoming all resistance, drove the enemy in wild confusion from the field. Meanwhile Wilson's troopers, dismounted, fell upon the Confederate flank and rear and increased the wreck tenfold. This advantage again enabled Wood to make some headway, and with renewed joint effort the rout of the enemy became overwhelming. Almost all organization was lost in Hood's army as it fled across the country towards Franklin. Pursuit was promptly undertaken, but though seriously harassed, Hood saved himself beyond the Tennessee river with the remnants of his army. Thomas' losses were 3,000 men, Hood's were never officially given, but our trophies included 4,500 prisoners and 53 guns. Thomas had settled all adverse speculation upon his slowness in attacking Hood by the next to annihilation he wrought when he actually moved upon him. No army was so completely overthrown during our war."

T. A. Dodge, Bird's-Eye View of our Civil War, chapter 58.

ALSO IN: T. B. Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, chapter 35 (volume 2).

W. Swinton, The Twelve Decisive Battles of the War, chapter 11.

J. D. Cox, The March to the Sea, Franklin and Nashville (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 10), chapters 6-7.

_H. Stone, Repelling Hood's Invasion (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

H. Coppée, General Thomas, chapter 11-12.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864-1865 (December-January: North Carolina). The Capture of Fort Fisher.

"In the latter part of 1864 two ports only, Wilmington and Charleston, remained to the Confederates. … The northward march of Sherman would cut off Charleston, too, so that the Confederates would have to abandon it. The National government now desired to complete its work by capturing Fort Fisher, and thus finally shutting off the Confederacy from all communication with the foreign world. The accomplishment of this task was in no wise easy. … The army and navy co-operated in the attempts to reduce Fort Fisher. There were more than 50 men-of-war tossing on the waves before the lowering sea-front of the work. Six thousand five hundred men were in the military force. They were in command of General B. F. Butler, whom we saw last in New Orleans. The General's active and ingenious mind conceived a plan for destroying the fort without sacrificing a single Federal soldier. He procured an old gun-boat, painted it white and otherwise disguised it, so as to look like a blockade-runner, stored 250 tons of gunpowder in its hold with fuses penetrating every part, ran the craft in within 1,500 feet of the works and exploded it. Butler expected that the shock would demolish the seaward face of the fort altogether, and perhaps bury the guns under great masses of sand, but in this he was mistaken, for the heavy bastions were not in the least disturbed by the shock. … The navy then took its turn, and for some hours the heavy vessels of Admiral Porter's fleet poured so rapid and well aimed a fire upon the work, that the garrison were driven from their guns, and only the occasional report of a heavy cannon told that the fort was still tenanted. But secure in their heavy bomb-proofs, the garrison minded the storm of shells and solid shot no more than the well-housed farmer heeds a hailstorm. It was very clear that Fort Fisher could not be taken at long range. … The original plan had contemplated an assault as soon as the fire of the fleet should have silenced the guns of the fort, and in pursuance of this 700 men had been landed from the army transports. But the weather was too rough to permit of landing more troops that day, and the next morning General Butler concluded that Fort Fisher was impregnable, withdrew his men already landed, and sailed away, greatly to the disgust of the navy. This was on the 25th of December, 1864. The chagrin of the whole North over the failure of the expedition was so great that it was speedily determined to renew the attempt. January 13th saw a new Federal force, this time under command of General A. H. Terry, landing on the shore of the sandy neck of land above the fort. … At early dawn of the 15th the attack was begun. The ships arranged in a great semicircle poured their fire upon the fort, dismantling guns, driving the garrison to the bomb-proofs, and mowing down the stockade. A line of sharp-shooters, each carrying a shovel in one hand and a gun in the other, spring out from Terry's most advanced lines, rush forward to within 175 yards of the fort and dig pits for their protection before the Confederates can attack them. Then the sharpshooters and the navy occupy the attention of the enemy, while Curtis's brigade dashes forward and digs a trench within 500 yards of the fort. By this time too a party of 2,000 sailors and marines has been landed from the fleet. They are to storm the sea-wall of the fort while the army attacks its landward face. Suddenly the thunder of the naval artillery is stilled. There is a moment of silence, and then the shrill scream of the whistles rises from every steamer in the fleet. It is the signal for the assault. The sailors on the beach spring to their feet and dash forward at a rapid run; they fire no shot, for they carry no guns. Cutlasses and pistols, the blue-jackets' traditional weapons, are their only arms. Toward the other side of the fort came Terry's troops. … The fate of the naval column is quickly determined. Upon it is concentrated the fire of the heaviest Confederate batteries, Napoleon guns, Columbiads, and rifles shotted with grape and cannister. {3546} The blue-jackets, unable to reply to this murderous fire, and seeing their companions falling fast around them, waver, halt, and fall back to the beach, throwing themselves upon the ground to escape the enemy's missiles. But though repulsed they have contributed largely to the capture of the fort. While the chief attention of Confederates has been directed toward them, the troops have been carrying all before them on the other front. Colonel Lamb turns from his direction of the defense against the naval column to see three Union flags waving over other portions of the work. … The Confederates were determined, even desperate. Long after the fort was virtually in the hands of its captors they stubbornly clung to a bomb-proof. Finally they retreated to Battery Buchanan and there maintained themselves stoutly until late at night when, all hope being at an end, they surrendered themselves, and the National victory was complete."

W. J. Abbot, Battle-Fields and Victory, chapter 15.

ALSO IN: D. D. Porter, Naval History of the Civil War, chapters 49-51.

_W. Lamb and T. O. Selfridge, Jr., The Capture of Fort Fisher (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (January). Congressional adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.

"On the last day of [January, 1865] … one of the grandest events of the century was witnessed in the House of Representatives in the final passage of the Constitutional Amendment [the Thirteenth] forever prohibiting slavery. Numerous propositions on the subject had been submitted, but the honor of drafting the one adopted belongs to Lyman Trumbull, who had introduced it early in the first session of this Congress. It passed the Senate on the 8th of April, 1864, only six members voting against it, … but failed in the House on the 15th of June following. It now came up on the motion of Mr. Ashley to reconsider this vote. Congress had abolished slavery in the District of Columbia, and prohibited it in all the Territories. It had repealed the Fugitive Slave law, and declared free all negro soldiers in the Union armies and their families; and the President had played his grand part in the Proclamation of Emancipation. But the question now to be decided completely overshadowed all others. The debate on the subject had been protracted and very spirited. … The time for the momentous vote had now come, and no language could describe the solemnity and impressiveness of the spectacle pending the roll-call. The success of the measure had been considered very doubtful, and depended upon certain negotiations, the result of which was not fully assured, and the particulars of which never reached the public. The anxiety and suspense during the balloting produced a deathly stillness, but when it became certainly known that the measure had prevailed the cheering in the densely-packed hall and galleries surpassed all precedent and beggared all description. Members joined in the general shouting, which was kept up for several minutes, many embracing each other, and others completely surrendering themselves to their tears of joy. It seemed to me I had been born into a new life."

G. W. Julian, Political Recollections, chapter 11.

"The Joint Resolution passed [the House of Representatives, on the 31st of January], 119 to 56, 8 not voting, 10 Democrats voting aye. … It was the greatest day the House had ever seen, nor is it likely ever to see a greater."

O. J. Hollister, Life of Schuyler Colfax, page 245.

The Thirteenth Amendment, which was ratified before the close of the year by three-fourths of the States, and its embodiment in the Constitution of the United States proclaimed by the Secretary of State on the 18th of December, 1865, is as follows:

"Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (February). The Hampton Roads Peace Conference.

"Several informal attempts at opening negotiations for the termination of hostilities were made in the course of this Winter—Honorable Francis P. Blair, of Maryland, visiting Richmond twice on the subject, with the consent, though not by the request, of President Lincoln. At length, upon their direct application, Messrs. Alex. H. Stephens, John A. Campbell, and Robert M. T. Hunter, were permitted to pass General Grant's lines before Petersburg, and proceed to Fortress Monroe; where [on board a steamer in Hampton Roads] they were met by Gov. [Secretary of State] Seward, followed by President Lincoln; and a free, full conference was had."

H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 2, chapter 30.

Secretary Seward first went to meet the three Confederate Commissioners, with the following letter of instructions from President Lincoln, dated January 31, 1865: "Honorable William H. Seward, Secretary of State: You will proceed to Fortress Monroe, Virginia, there to meet and informally confer with Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell, on the basis of my letter to F. P. Blair, Esq., of January 18, 1865, a copy of which you have. You will make known to them that three things are indispensable, to wit: 1. The restoration of the national authority throughout all the States. 2. No receding by the executive of the United States on the slavery question from the position assumed thereon in the late annual message to Congress, and in preceding documents. 3. No cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the government.

You will inform them that all propositions of theirs, not inconsistent with the above, will be considered and passed upon in a spirit of sincere liberality. You will hear all they may choose to say, and report it to me. You will not assume to definitely consummate anything. Yours, etc., Abraham Lincoln." Two days later, the President followed him, persuaded by a telegram from General Grant to meet the Commissioners personally. In a subsequent message to the Senate, Mr. Lincoln reported the results of the conference as follows: "On the morning of the 3d, the three gentlemen, Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell, came aboard of our steamer, and had an interview with the Secretary of State and myself, of several hours' duration. No question of preliminaries to the meeting was then and there made or mentioned. No other person was present; no papers were exchanged or produced; and it was, in advance, agreed that the conversation was to be informal and verbal merely. {3547} On our part the whole substance of the instructions to the Secretary of State, hereinbefore recited, was stated and insisted upon, and nothing was said inconsistent therewith; while, by the other party, it was not said that in any event or on any condition, they ever would consent to reunion; and yet they equally omitted to declare that they never would so consent. They seemed to desire a postponement of that question, and the adoption of some other course first which, as some of them seemed to argue, might or might not lead to reunion; but which course, we thought, would amount to an indefinite postponement. The conference ended without result."

A. Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, pages 644-649.

ALSO IN: B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the Civil War, volume 3, chapter 20.

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 10, chapter 6.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (February: South Carolina). Evacuation of Charleston by the Confederates. Federal occupation of the City.

While General Hardee, with 14,000 men, waited at Charleston for the expected coming of General Sherman to attack that city, the latter pursued a movement which made Charleston untenable and shook it like a ripened apple into the hands of General Gillmore, who was waiting at the gates. The Confederates evacuated the city in haste and with reckless disorder, and it was occupied by the Federal troops on the morning of the 18th of February. The following is the report of Colonel A. G. Bennett, who was the first to enter the city: "On the morning of February the 18th I received information that led me to believe the defences and lines guarding the city of Charles·ton had been deserted by the enemy. I immediately proceeded to Cummings Point, from whence I sent a small boat in the direction of Fort Moultrie, which boat, when 40 yards east from Fort Sumter, was met by a boat from Sullivan's Island, containing a full corps of band musicians abandoned by the enemy. These con·firmed my belief of an evacuation. I had no troops that could be available under two hours, as, except in a few pontoon boats, there were no means whatever of landing troops near the enemy's works or into the city. I directed Major Hennessy to proceed to Fort Sumter and there replace our flag. The flag was replaced over the southeast angle of Fort Sumter at 9 o'clock A. M. I now pushed for the city, stopping at Fort Ripley and Castle Pinckney, from which works Rebel flags were hauled down and the American flag substituted. … I landed at Mill's wharf, Charleston, at 10 o'clock A. M. where I learned that a part of the enemy's troops yet remained in the city, while mounted patrols were out in every direction applying the torch and driving the inhabitants before them. I at once addressed to the Mayor of the city [a communication demanding its surrender]. … My whole force consisted of five officers and the armed crews of two small boats, comprising in all 22 men. Both officers and men volunteered to advance from the wharf into the city; but no reenforcements being in sight, I did not deem it expedient to move on. Public buildings, stores, warehouses, private dwellings, shipping, etc., were burning and being fired by armed Rebels, but with the force at my disposal it was impossible to save the cotton and other property. While awaiting the arrival of my troops at Mill's wharf, a number of explosions took place. The Rebel commissary depot was blown up, and with it is estimated that not less than 200 human beings—most of whom were women and children—were blown to atoms. These people were engaged in procuring food for themselves and their families by permission from the Rebel military authorities. … Observing a small boat sailing toward the bay under a flag of truce, I put off to it, and received from a member of the common council a letter [from the Mayor, announcing the evacuation of the city by the Confederate military authorities]. … The deputation sent to convey the above letter represented to me that the city was in the hands of either the Rebel soldiery or the mob. They entreated of me in the name of humanity to interpose my military authority and save the city from utter destruction. … Two companies of the 52d Pennsylvania regiment and about 30 men of the 3d Rhode Island volunteer heavy artillery having landed, I proceeded with them to the citadel. I here established my headquarters, and sent small parties in all directions with instructions to impress negroes wherever found, and to make them work the fire apparatus, until all fires were extinguished."

A. G. Bennett, Report, February 24, 1865 (quoted in Tenney's Military and Naval History of the Rebellion, chapter 49).

At noon on the 14th of April, 1865, the fourth anniversary of the lowering of the flag of the United States at Fort Sumter, it was formally raised by General Anderson over the ruins of the fort, with impressive ceremonies, in which many visitors from the North took part. An address was delivered on the occasion by the Reverend Henry Ward Beecher.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (February-March: The Carolinas). Sherman's march from Savannah to Goldsboro. The burning of Columbia. The Battle of Bentonsville.

"By the middle of January, a lodgment had been effected in South Carolina [at Pocotaligo, on the railroad between Savannah and Charleston], and Sherman had his whole army once more in hand as a moving column. He had no idea of wasting time on either Charleston or Augusta, but he determined to play upon the fears of the rebels, and compel them to retain a force to protect those places. … Accordingly he gave out with some ostentation that he was moving upon either Charles·ton or Augusta. Early in January the heavy winter rains set in, rendering the roads almost impassable. … This flood delayed the departure of the column for quite two weeks. … On the 1st of February, the army designed for the active campaign from Savannah northward was again 60,000 strong; and, as before, was composed of two wings, the right under Howard and the left under Slocum. Kilpatrick was once more chief of cavalry. Sixty-eight guns accompanied the command. The wagons were 2,500 in number, and carried an ample supply of ammunition for one great battle, forage for a week, and provisions for twenty days. For fresh meat Sherman depended on beeves driven on the hoof, and such cattle, hogs, and poultry as might be gathered on the march. … Sherman … started on his northward march on the 1st of February. On that day his right wing was south of the Salkehatchie river, and his left still struggling in the swamps of the Savannah, at Sister's Ferry. … The division generals led their columns through the swamps, the water up to their shoulders, crossed over to the pine land beyond, and then, turning upon the rebels who had opposed the passage, drove them off in utter disorder. {3548} All the roads northward had been held for weeks by Wheeler's cavalry, and details of negro laborers had been compelled to fell trees and burn bridges to impede the national march. Sherman's pioneers, however, removed the trees, and the heads of columns rebuilt the bridges before the rear could close up, and the rebels retreated behind the Edisto river at Branchville. … Sherman determined to waste no time on Branchville, which the enemy could no longer hold, and turned his columns directly north upon Columbia, where it was supposed the rebels would concentrate. Attempts were made to delay him at the crossings of the rivers; there were numerous bridge-heads with earth or cotton parapets to carry, and cypress swamps to cross; but nothing stayed his course. On the 13th, he learned that there was no enemy in Columbia except Hampton's cavalry. Hardee, at Charleston, took it for granted that Sherman was moving upon that place, and the rebels in Augusta supposed that they were Sherman's object; so Charleston and Augusta were protected, while Columbia was abandoned to the care of the cavalry." With little or no resistance, Sherman entered the capital of South Carolina on the 17th of February. "Hampton had ordered all cotton, public and private, to be moved into the streets and fired. Bales were piled up everywhere, the rope and bagging cut, and the tufts of cotton blown about by the wind, or lodged in the trees and against the houses, presented the appearance of a snow-storm. Some of these piles of cotton were burning in the heart of the town. Sherman, meanwhile, had given orders to destroy the arsenals and public property not needed by his army, as well as railroad stations and machines, but to spare all dwellings, colleges, schools, asylums, and 'harmless private property'; and the fires lighted by Hampton were partially subdued by the national soldiers. But before the torch had been put to a single building by Sherman's order, the smouldering fires set by Hampton were rekindled by the wind and communicated to the buildings around. About dark the flames began to spread, and were soon beyond the control of the brigade on duty in the town. An entire division was now brought in, but it was found impossible to check the conflagration, which by midnight had become quite unmanageable. It raged till about four A. M. on the 18th, when the wind subsided, and the flames were got under control. … Beauregard, meanwhile, and the rebel cavalry, had retreated upon Charlotte, in North Carolina, due north from Columbia; and on the 20th and 21st Sherman followed as far as Winnsboro. … At Winnsboro, however, Sherman turned his principal columns northeastward towards Goldsboro, still 200 miles away. Heavy rains again impeded his movements … and it was not till the 3d of March that the army arrived at Cheraw. At this point large quantities of guns and ammunition were captured, brought from Charleston under the supposition that here, at least, they would be secure. Hardee had moved due north from Charleston by his only remaining railroad, through Florence, but only reached Cheraw in time to escape with his troops across the Pedee river, just before Sherman arrived. … Having secured the passage of the Pedee … Sherman had but little uneasiness about the future. … On the 11th of March, Fayetteville was reached, and Sherman had traversed the entire extent of South Carolina. On the 12th, he sent a dispatch to Grant, the first since leaving the Savannah. … On the 15th of March, the command began its march for Goldsboro." The scattered Confederate forces were now getting together and General Johnston had been put in command of them. "Sherman estimated the entire rebel force at 37,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry; but only Hardee, with 10,000 infantry and one division of cavalry, was in the immediate front." On the 15th Hardee was encountered at Averysboro, where he attempted to check Sherman's advance while Johnston concentrated in the rear. Some sharp fighting occurred, in which Sherman lost 77 men killed and 477 wounded. Hardee reported his loss at 500. In the morning he had disappeared. "From Averysboro both wings turned eastward by different roads, and on the night of the 18th of March the army was within 27 miles of Goldsboro, and only five from Bentonsville. The columns were now about ten miles apart." At Bentonsville, on the 19th, Slocum's wing was attacked by Johnston, who had marched his whole command with great rapidity, hoping to "overwhelm Sherman's left flank before it could be relieved by its co-operating column." But Slocum held his ground that day against six distinct assaults, and the next day Sherman brought his whole army into position. He did not push the enemy, however, either on the 20th or on the 21st, being uncertain as to Johnston's strength. During the night of the 21st the latter retreated. "The total national loss was 191 killed, and 1,455 wounded and missing. Johnston states his losses to have been 223 killed, 1,467 wounded, and 653 missing; but Sherman captured 1,621 prisoners. Sherman admits that he committed an error in not overwhelming his enemy. Few soldiers, however, are great enough to accuse themselves of an error, and fewer still but might accuse themselves of greater ones than can ever be laid at Sherman's door. At daybreak on the 22d … the army moved to Goldsboro, where Schofield had already arrived.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1865 (FEBRUARY-MARCH: NORTH CAROLINA).

… Thus was concluded one of the longest and most important marches ever made by an organized army in civilized war."

A. Badeau, Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, chapter 31 (volume 3).

At Columbia, "I observed, as I passed along the street, that many shops had been gutted, and that paper, rags, and litter of all kinds lay scattered on the floors, in the open doorways, and on the ground outside. I was told on good authority that this had been done by the Confederate troops before our arrival. It was a windy day, and a great deal of loose cotton had been blown about and caught on the fences and in the branches of the shade trees along the street. It has been said that this had something to do with spreading the fire which afterward took place. I think this very doubtful. … I have never doubted that Columbia was deliberately set on fire in more than a hundred places. No one ordered it, and no one could stop it. The officers of high rank would have saved the city if possible; but the army was deeply imbued with the feeling that as South Carolina had begun the war she must suffer a stern retribution."

W. B. Hazen, Narrative of Military Service, chapters 23-25.

{3549}

"I disclaim on the part of my army any agency in this fire, but, on the contrary, claim that we saved what of Columbia remains unconsumed."

_Sherman's Official Report (Rebellion Record, volume 11)._

ALSO IN: S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin, Sherman and his Campaigns, chapters 26-29.

_H. W. Slocum and W. Hampton, Sherman's March and The Battle of Bentonville (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (February-March: North Carolina). Occupation of Wilmington. Battle of Kinston. Junction with Sherman at Goldsboro.

On the 9th of February, General Schofield, transferred from the west, arrived at Fort Fisher with Cox's division of the Twenty-third Corps, and took command of the newly created Department of North Carolina. Advancing on Wilmington, the Confederates, under Hoke, retreating before him, he occupied that city on the 22d. This accomplished, General Cox was sent to Newberne to take command of forces ordered there, and to open communication thence by railroad with Goldsboro, preparatory to the arrival of General Sherman at that point. In the prosecution of this undertaking, he fought the battle of Kinston, March 10, repelling a fierce attack by Bragg with the forces which were being collected against Sherman: "After Bragg's retreat, Schofield steadily pressed the work of rebuilding the railway. Kinston was occupied on March 14th." On the 21st Schofield entered Goldsboro, "and there, in a couple of days more, was reassembled the grand army under Sherman, whose march from Savannah had been quite as remarkable as the former one from Atlanta to the sea."

J. D. Cox, The March to the Sea (Campaigns of the Civil War), chapter 9.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (February-March: Virginia). Sheridan's destroying march through Central Virginia. Battle of Waynesborough.

"The last campaign against Lee may be said to have been inaugurated when General Sheridan started with his cavalry from Winchester, Virginia, on the 27th of February, 1865, with a sort of carte blanche of destruction as to the enemy's supply depots and communications. The general's instructions looked to his crossing the James River above Richmond, and his possible junction with the command of General Sherman somewhere in North Carolina; but the swollen condition of the James and the destruction of the bridges prevented his crossing. … General Sheridan's command on this expedition consisted of the first cavalry division, under Brevet Major-General Wesley Merritt, and the third cavalry division, under Brevet Major-General George A. Custer, to whose division was added one brigade of the cavalry of the old army of West Virginia, under Colonel Capehart. … They left Winchester on a damp, disagreeable morning. … But the spirits of the bold dragoons were not dampened, and they felt lively enough to push on to Waynesborough to the camp of General Jubal Early, late of the Confederacy, upon whom the brilliant Custer fell with his division, and soon had his guns, and men, and 'materiel,' and would have had him but that he had sufficient presence of mind to absent his person when he found how things were going. This was General Early's last appearance in public life. … Early's command at Waynesborough being now dispersed or captured, … General Sheridan proceeded to occupy Charlottesville. … Then on again toward Lynchburg and the James River. … When it was found impossible to cross the James River, attention was for a while directed to the demolition of the James River and Kanawha Canal. … When the ingenious destruction corps could devise no further damage here, the command turned off to try its hand upon a railroad or two. All the time the rains had descended—the flood-gates of the clouds were up and the water kept pouring through. … Although nothing short of a flotilla seemed likely to ride out the storm, the cavalry rode on hopefully, and came safely to harbor at the White House, on the Pamunkey, where supplies were furnished them, and where the March winds blew them dry again. … Immediately upon his arrival at this depot, General Sheridan reported to General Grant, at City Point, for orders."

With General Sheridan in Lee's Last Campaign; by a Staff Officer, chapter 2.

ALSO IN: G. E. Pond, The Shenandoah Valley in 1864, chapter 14.

A. Badeau, Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, chapter 31 (volume 3).

P. H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, volume 2, chapter 4.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (March). Emancipation of the families of colored soldiers.

"The President in his annual message, December, 1863, had estimated the colored soldiers in the service at 'nearly 100,000.' They were mostly from the border States, and the slaves of loyal masters. While they were fighting the battles of the country, their masters, who were generally opposed to their enlistment, could sell into perpetual slavery their wives and children. To deter slaves from enlisting, or to punish them when they did enlist, slave-masters made merchandise of the wives and children of colored soldiers, and often sold them into a harsher bondage. To put an end to a practice so cruel, unjust, injurious, and dishonorable to the country, Mr. Wilson introduced into the Senate on the 8th of January [1864], in his bill to promote enlistments, a provision declaring that when any man or boy of African descent, owing service or labor in any State, under its laws, should be mustered into the military or naval service of the United States, he, and his mother, wife, and children, should be forever free." The bill was warmly debated and its supporters did not succeed in bringing it to a vote during that session of Congress. At the next session, on the 13th of December, 1864, Mr. Wilson introduced a joint resolution "to make free the wives and children of persons who had been, or might be, mustered into the service of the United States." This passed the Sen·ate a few days later, by a vote of 27 to 10; was passed by the House on the 22d of February, 1865, and signed by the President on the 3d of March.

H. Wilson, History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, volume 3, chapter 30.

{3550}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (March). President Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address.

"The days of the Confederacy were evidently numbered. Only the last blow remained to be struck. Then Lincoln's second inauguration came [March 4, 1865], and with it his second inaugural address. Lincoln's famous 'Gettysburg speech has been much and justly admired. But far greater, as well as far more characteristic, was that inaugural in which he poured out the whole devotion and tenderness of his great soul. It had all the solemnity of a father's last admonition and blessing to his children before he lay down to die. … No American President had ever spoken words like these to the American people. America never had a President who found such words in the depth of his heart."

C. Schurz, Abraham Lincoln: an Essay, pages 103-104.

The following is the text of the Inaugural Address:

"Fellow-countrymen: At this second appear·ing to take the oath of the presidential office, there is less occasion for an extended address than there was at the first. Then a statement, somewhat in detail, of a course to be pursued, seemed fitting and proper. Now, at the expiration of four years, during which public declarations have been constantly called forth on every point and phase of the great contest which still absorbs the attention and engrosses the energies of the nation, little that is new could be presented. The progress of our arms, upon which all else chiefly depends, is as well known to the public as to myself; and it is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory and encouraging to all. With high hope for the future, no prediction in regard to it is ventured. On the occasion corresponding to this four years ago, all thoughts were anxiously directed to an impending civil war. All dreaded it—all sought to avert it. While the inaugural address was being delivered from this place, devoted altogether to saving the Union without war, insurgent agents were in the city seeking to destroy it without war—seeking to dissolve the Union, and divide effects, by negotiation. Both parties deprecated war; but one of them would make war rather than let the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than let it perish. And the war came. One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the Southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was, somehow, the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union, even by war; while the government claimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it. Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with, or even before, the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each invokes his aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces; but let us judge not, that we be not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered—that of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has his own purposes. 'Woe unto the world because of offenses! for it must needs be that offenses come; but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh.' If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through his appointed time, he now wills to remove, and that he gives to both North and South this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to him? Fondly do we hope—fervently do we pray—that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondman's 250 years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said 3,000 years ago, so still it must be said, 'The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.' With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan—to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations."

A. Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, pages 656-657.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (March-April: Virginia). The Flanking of Lee's lines. Battle of Five Forks. Final assault at Petersburg and Confederate retreat.

"One of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellion," wrote General Grant, "was the last few weeks before Petersburg. I felt that the situation of the Confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and I was afraid, every morning, that I would awake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket line. … I was naturally very impatient for the time to come when I could commence the spring campaign, which I thoroughly believed would close the war. … Sherman was anxious that I should wait where I was until he could come up, and make a sure thing of it; but I had determined to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing so. I had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting, until Sheridan, who was on his way from the Shenandoah Valley to join me, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the execution of the plans which I had in mind. However, [Sheridan] having arrived at White House on the 19th of March, I was enabled to make my plans. … It is now known that early in the month of March Mr. Davis and General Lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in and about Richmond and Petersburg, and they both agreed that these places were no longer tenable for them, and that they must get away as soon as possible. They, too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condition of the roads which would make it possible to move. General Lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider opening to enable them to reach the Danville road with greater security than he would have in the way the two armies were situated, determined upon an assault upon the right of our lines around Petersburg." The assault was made by General Gordon early in the morning of March 25th, and Fort Stedman, with three contiguous batteries, were taken by surprise. The captured fort and batteries were soon recovered, however, and the Confederate troops who entered them were made prisoners. {3551} "This effort of Lee's cost him about 4,000 men, and resulted in their killing, wounding and capturing about 2,000 of ours. … The day that Gordon was making dispositions for this attack (24th of March) I issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th. Ord, with three divisions of infantry and Mackenzie's cavalry, was to move in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of the James River, and take his place on our extreme left, 30 miles away. … Ord was at his place promptly. Humphreys and Warren were then on our extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps. They were directed on the arrival of Ord, and on his getting into position in their places, to cross Hatcher's Run and extend out west toward Five Forks, the object being to get into a position from which we could strike the South Side Railroad and ultimately the Danville Railroad. There was considerable fighting in taking up these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in which the Army of the James had also to participate somewhat, and the losses were quite severe. This was what was known as the battle of White Oak Road. … The 29th of March came, and fortunately, there having been a few days free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, giving indications that the time had come when we could move. On that day I moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about Petersburg. It soon set in raining again, however, and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for teams, and almost so for cavalry. … It became necessary … to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced, to move our artillery upon, The army had become so accustomed to this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done very rapidly. The next day, March 30th, we had made sufficient progress to the south-west to warrant me in starting Sheridan with his cavalry over by Dinwiddie with instructions to then come up by the road leading north-west to Five Forks, thus menacing the right of Lee's line, … The column moving detached from the army still in the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small. The forces in the trenches were themselves extending to the left flank. Warren was on the extreme left when the extension began, but Humphreys was marched around later and thrown into line between him and Five Forks. My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks, get on the enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre to protect their right, so that an assault in the centre might be successfully made. General Wright's corps had been designated to make this assault, which I intended to order as soon as information reached me of Sheridan's success. … Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the 30th, and then took a road leading northwest to Five Forks. He had only his cavalry with him. Soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with a very stout resistance. He gradually drove them back however until in the neighborhood of Five Forks. Here he had to encounter other troops, besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way. In this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place and stated that he was falling back toward Dinwiddie gradually and slowly, and asked me to send Wright's corps to his assistance. I replied to him that it was impossible to send Wright's corps … and that I would send Warren. Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move at once that night (the 31st) to Dinwiddie Court-House and put himself in communication with Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him. He was very slow in moving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o'clock next morning. … Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the afternoon. … Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later in advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon Five Forks itself. He was very impatient to make the assault and have it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in bivouac during the night. … It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to get Crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted Warren. He sent staff officer after staff officer in search of Warren, directing that general to report to him, but they were unable to find him. At all events Sheridan was unable to get that officer to him. Finally he went himself. He issued an order relieving Warren and assigning Griffin to the command of the 5th corps. The troops were then brought up and the assault successfully made. … It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went over the parapets of the enemy. The two armies were mingled together there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand the surrender of the other. Soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every direction; some 6,000 prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms in large quantities, falling into our hands. … Pursuit continued until about 9 o'clock at night, when Sheridan halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of the part of the enemy's line which had been captured, returned. … This was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st of April. I then issued orders for an assault by Wright and Parke at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 2d." The assault was successfully made, and the outer works of Petersburg were soon in the hands of the National troops. Early in the morning of the 3d the enemy evacuated Petersburg and Grant and Meade took possession of the city. The following day they were visited there by President Lincoln, who had been at City Point for a week, or more, watching the course of events.

U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, chapters 63-65 (volume 2).

ALSO IN: P. H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, volume 2, chapters 5-6.

A. A. Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865, chapters 12-13.

_H. Porter, Five Forks and the Pursuit of Lee (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

R. de Trobriand, Four years with the Army of the Potomac, chapter 34.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (April 11). President Lincoln's last public address. His view of Reconstruction in Louisiana.

On the evening of the 11th of April, a great multitude of people gathered about the White House, to convey their congratulations to the President and to signify their joy at the sure prospect of peace. Mr. Lincoln came out and spoke to them, expressing first his participation in their gladness, and then turning to discuss briefly the criticism which had opened upon his policy of reconstruction, as practically illustrated in Louisiana. {3552} He spoke of his message and proclamation of December, 1863 (quoted above); of the approval given to them by every member of his cabinet; of the entire silence at the time of all who had become critics and objectors since action under the plan had been taken in Louisiana. He then went on as follows: "When the message of 1863, with the plan before mentioned, reached New Orleans, General Banks wrote me that he was confident that the people, with his military cooperation, would reconstruct substantially on that plan. I wrote to him and some of them to try it. They tried it, and the result is known. Such has been my only agency in getting up the Louisiana government. As to sustaining it, my promise is out, as before stated. But as bad promises are better broken than kept, I shall treat this as a bad promise, and break it whenever I shall be convinced that keeping it is adverse to the public interest; but I have not yet been so convinced. I have been shown a letter on this subject, supposed to be an able one, in which the writer expresses regret that my mind has not seemed to be definitely fixed on the question whether the seceded States, so called, are in the Union or out of it. It would perhaps add astonishment to his regret were he to learn that since I have found professed Union men endeavoring to make that question, I have purposely forborne any public expression upon it. As appears to me, that question has not been, nor yet is, a practically material one, and that any discussion of it, while it thus remains practically immaterial, could have no effect other than the mischievous one of dividing our friends. As yet, whatever it may hereafter become, that question is bad as the basis of a controversy, and good for nothing at all—a merely pernicious abstraction. We all agree that the seceded States, so called, are out of their proper practical relation with the Union, and that the sole object of the government, civil and military, in regard to those States is to again get them into that proper practical relation. I believe that it is not only possible, but in fact easier, to do this without deciding or even considering whether these States have ever been out of the Union, than with it. Finding themselves safely at home, it would be utterly immaterial whether they had ever been abroad. Let us all join in doing the acts necessary to restoring the proper practical relations between these States and the Union, and each forever after innocently indulge his own opinion whether in doing the acts he brought the States from without into the Union, or only gave them proper assistance, they never having been out of it. The amount of constituency, so to speak, on which the new Louisiana government rests, would be more satisfactory to all if it contained 50,000, or 30,000, or even 20,000, instead of only about 12,000, as it does. It is also unsatisfactory to some that the elective franchise is not given to the colored man. I would myself prefer that it were now conferred on the very intelligent, and on those who serve our cause as soldiers. Still, the question is not whether the Louisiana government, as it stands, is quite all that is desirable. The question is, will it be wiser to take it as it is and help to improve it, or to reject and disperse it? Can Louisiana be brought into proper practical relation with the Union sooner by sustaining or by discarding her new State government? Some 12,000 voters in the heretofore slave State of Louisiana have sworn allegiance to the Union, assumed to be the rightful political power of the State, held elections, organized a State government, adopted a free-State constitution, giving the benefit of public schools equally to black and white, and empowering the legislature to confer the elective franchise upon the colored man. Their legislature has already voted to ratify the constitutional amendment recently passed by Congress, abolishing slavery throughout the nation. These 12,000 persons are thus fully committed to the Union and to perpetual freedom in the State—committed to the very things, and nearly all the things, the nation wants—and they ask the nation's recognition and its assistance to make good their committal. Now, if we reject and spurn them, we do our utmost to disorganize and disperse them. We, in effect, say to the white man: You are worthless or worse; we will neither help you, nor be helped by you. To the blacks we say: This cup of liberty which these, your old masters, hold to your lips we will dash from you, and leave you to the chances of gathering the spilled and scattered contents in some vague and undefined when, where, and how. If this course, discouraging and paralyzing both white and black, has any tendency to bring Louisiana into proper practical relations with the Union, I have so far been unable to perceive it. If, on the contrary, we recognize and sustain the new government of Louisiana, the converse of all this is made true. We encourage the hearts and nerve the arms of the 12,000 to adhere to their work, and argue for it, and proselyte for it, and fight for it, and feed it, and grow it, and ripen it to a complete success. The colored man, too, in seeing all united for him, is inspired with vigilance, and energy, and daring, to the same end. Grant that he desires the elective franchise, will he not attain it sooner by saving the already advanced steps toward it than by running backward over them? Concede that the new government of Louisiana is only to what it should be as the egg is to the fowl, we shall sooner have the fowl by hatching the egg than by smashing it. Again, if we reject Louisiana we also reject one vote in favor of the proposed amendment to the national Constitution. To meet this proposition it has been argued that no more than three-fourths of those States which have not attempted secession are necessary to validly ratify the amendment. I do not commit myself against this further than to say that such a ratification would be questionable, and sure to be persistently questioned, while a ratification by three-fourths of all the States would be unquestioned and unquestionable. I repeat the question: Can Louisiana be brought into proper practical relation with the Union sooner by sustaining or by discarding her new State government? What has been said of Louisiana will apply generally to other States. And yet so great peculiarities pertain to each State, and such important and sudden changes occur in the same State, and withal so new and unprecedented is the whole case that no exclusive and inflexible plan can safely be prescribed as to details and collaterals. Such exclusive and inflexible plan would surely become a new entanglement. Important principles may and must be inflexible. In the present situation, as the phrase goes, it may be my duty to make some new announcement to the people of the South. I am considering, and shall not fail to act when satisfied that action will be proper."

A. Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, pages 673-675.

{3553}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (April: Virginia). The abandonment of Richmond and retreat of Lee. Battle of Sailor's Creek. Surrender at Appomattox Court House.

"The success of the Federal army in breaking the lines of Petersburg had rendered the retreat of the Confederate force imperative. An effort to hold Richmond with every line of communication with the South broken or in imminent danger would have been madness. But by abandoning his works and concentrating his army, which still amounted to about 30,000 men, General Lee might retire to some natural stronghold in the interior, where the defensible features of the country would enable him to oppose Grant's formidable host until he could rally strength to strike an effective blow. This course was at once decided upon, and early on the morning of the 2d of April, Lee sent a despatch to the Government authorities at Richmond informing them of the disastrous situation of affairs and of the necessity of his evacuating Petersburg that night. Orders were also sent to the forces north of the James to move at once and join him, while all the preparations necessary for the evacuation of Richmond, both as the seat of government and as a military post, were expeditiously made. There was, indeed, no time to be lost. … By midnight the evacuation was completed. … As the troops moved noiselessly onward in the darkness that just precedes the dawn, a bright light like a broad flash of lightning illumined the heavens for an instant; then followed a tremendous explosion. 'The magazine at Fort Drewry is blown up,' ran in whispers through the ranks, and again silence reigned. Once more the sky was overspread by a lurid light, but not so fleeting as before. It was now the conflagration of Richmond that lighted the night-march of the soldiers, and many a stout heart was wrung with anguish at the fate of the city and its defenceless inhabitants. The burning of public property of little value had given rise to a destructive fire that laid in ashes nearly one-third of the devoted city. … The retreat of Lee's army did not long remain unknown to the Federals. The explosion of the magazine at Fort Drewry and the conflagration of Richmond apprised them of the fact, and they lost no time in taking possession of the abandoned works and entering the defenceless cities. On the morning of the 3d of April the mayor of Richmond surrendered the city to the Federal commander in its vicinity, and General Weitzel took immediate possession. He at once proceeded to enforce order and took measures to arrest the conflagration, while with great humanity he endeavored to relieve the distressed citizens. … As soon as Grant became aware of Lee's line of retreat he pushed forward his whole available force, numbering 70,000 or 80,000 men, in order to intercept him on the line of the Richmond and Danville Railroad. Sheridan's cavalry formed the van of the pursuing column, and was closely followed by the artillery and infantry. Lee pressed on as rapidly as possible to Amelia Court-house, where he had ordered supplies to be deposited for the use of his troops on their arrival. … The hope of finding a supply of food at this point, which had done much to buoy up the spirits of the men, was destined to be cruelly dispelled. Through an unfortunate error or misapprehension of orders the provision-train had been taken on to Richmond without unloading its stores at Amelia Court-house. … It was a terrible blow alike to the men and to their general. … The only chance remaining to the Army of Northern Virginia was to reach the hill-country without delay. Yet here it was detained by the error of a railroad official, while the precious minutes and hours moved remorselessly by. … Yet no murmur came from the lips of the men to the ear of their commander, and on the evening of that unfortunate day [April 5th] they resumed their weary march in silence and composure. Some small amount of food had been brought in by the foragers, greatly inadequate for the wants of the soldiers, yet aiding them to somewhat alleviate the pangs of hunger. A handful of corn was now a feast to the weary veterans as they trudged onward through the April night. … Sheridan's cavalry was already upon the flank of the Confederate army, and the infantry was following with all speed. … During the forenoon of [the 6th] the pursuing columns thickened and frequent skirmishes delayed the march. These delays enabled the Federals to accumulate in such force that it became necessary for Lee to halt his advance in order to arrest their attack till his column could close up, and the trains and such artillery as was not needed for action could reach a point of safety. This object was accomplished early in the afternoon. Ewell's, the rearmost corps in the army, closed upon those in front at a position on Sailor's Creek, a small tributary of the Appomattox River. … His corps was surrounded by the pursuing columns and captured with but little opposition. About the same time the divisions of Anderson, Pickett, and Bushrod Johnson were almost broken up, about 10,000 men in all being captured. The remainder of the army continued its retreat during the night of the 6th, and reached Farmville early on the morning of the 7th, where the troops obtained two days' rations, the first regular supplies they had received during the retreat. At Farmville a short halt was made to allow the men to rest and cook their provisions. The effective portion of the Army of Northern Virginia did not now exceed 10,000 men. This great reduction had been caused by the disaster of the previous day at Sailor's Creek, by desertions on the retreat, and by an exhaustion which obliged many to leave the ranks. Those who still remained by their colors were veterans whose courage never failed, and who were yet ready to face any odds. The heads of the Federal columns beginning to appear about eleven o'clock, the Confederates resumed their retreat." On the afternoon of the 7th, Lee received a note from Grant calling upon him to surrender, and replied to it, asking what terms would be offered. Further notes were exchanged between the two commanders the following day, while the retreat continued. Lee hoped to reach Appomattox Court House and secure supplies that were there, which might enable him to "push on to the Staunton River and maintain himself behind that stream until a junction could be made with Johnston." But when, in the afternoon of April 8th, he reached the neighborhood of Appomattox Court House, "he was met by the intelligence of the capture of the stores placed for his army at the station two miles beyond. {3554} Notwithstanding this overwhelming news, he determined to make one more effort to force himself through the Federal toils that encompassed him." This attempt was made at three o'clock on the morning of the 9th of April, General Gordon leading the attack, which failed. Lee then yielded to his fate, and sent a flag of truce, asking for an interview with Grant to arrange terms of surrender. "Grant had not yet come up, and while waiting for his arrival General Lee seated himself upon some rails which Colonel Talcott of the Engineers had fixed at the foot of an apple tree for his convenience. This tree was half a mile distant from the point where the meeting of Lee and Grant took place, yet wide-spread currency has been given to the story that the surrender took place under its shade, and 'apple-tree' jewelry has been profusely distributed from the orchard in which it grew. About 11 o'clock General Lee, accompanied only by Colonel Marshall of his staff, proceeded to the village to meet General Grant, who had now arrived. The meeting between the two renowned generals took place at the house of a Mr. McLean at Appomattox Court-house, to which mansion, after exchanging courteous salutations, they repaired to settle the terms on which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia should be concluded. … The written instrument of surrender covered the following points: Duplicate rolls of all the officers and men were to be made, and the officers to sign paroles for themselves and their men, all agreeing not to bear arms against the United States unless regularly exchanged. The arms, artillery, and public property were to be turned over to an officer appointed to receive them, the officers retaining their side-arms and private horses and baggage. In addition to this, General Grant permitted every man of the Confederate army who claimed to own a horse or mule to retain it for farming purposes, General Lee remarking that this would have a happy effect. … After completion of these measures General Lee remarked that his men were badly in need of food, that they had been living for several days on parched corn exclusively, and requested rations and forage for 25,000 men. These rations were granted out of the car-loads of Confederate provisions which had been stopped by the Federal cavalry. … Three days after the surrender the Army of Northern Virginia had dispersed in every direction, and three weeks later the veterans of a hundred battles had changed the musket and the sword for the implements of husbandry. … Thousands of soldiers were set adrift on the world without a penny in their pockets to enable them to reach their homes. Yet none of the scenes of riot that often follow the disbanding of armies marked their course."

A. L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, chapter 21.

"General Grant's behavior at Appomattox was marked by a desire to spare the feelings of his great opponent. There was no theatrical display; his troops were not paraded with bands playing and banners flying, before whose lines the Confederates must march and stack arms. He did not demand Lee's sword, as is customary, but actually apologized to him for not having his own, saying it had been left behind in the wagon; promptly stopped salutes from being fired to mark the event, and the terms granted were liberal and generous. 'No man could have behaved better than General Grant did under the circumstances,' said Lee to a friend in Richmond. 'He did not touch my sword; the usual custom is for the sword to be received when tendered, and then handed back, but he did not touch mine,' Neither did the Union chief enter the Southern lines to show himself or to parade his victory, or go to Richmond or Petersburg to exult over a fallen people, but mounted his horse and with his staff started for Washington. Washington, at Yorktown, was not as considerate and thoughtful of the feelings of Cornwallis or his men. Charges were now withdrawn from the guns, flags furled, and the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia turned their backs upon each other for the first time In four long, bloody years,"

F. Lee, General Lee, chapter 15.

ALSO IN: U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, chapter 65-67.

_H. Porter, The Surrender at Appomattox Court House (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

A. Badeau, Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, chapter 33-34 (volume 3).

_J. W. Keifer, The Battle of Sailor's Creek (Sketches of War History, Ohio Commandery L. L. of the United States, volume 3)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (April: Virginia). President Lincoln at Richmond. The assembling and dispersing of "the gentlemen who have acted as the Legislature of Virginia." Virtual Proclamations of the end of the war.

"President Lincoln had been at City Point and vicinity for several days before the fall of Richmond, in constant communication with the General-in-chief, at the front, receiving dispatches from him and transmitting them instantly to the Secretary of War, whence they were diffused over the country, by the telegraph. On the day after Richmond was evacuated, he went up to that city in Admiral Porter's flag-ship, the Malvern, Captain Ralph Chandler, with the Sangamon, several tugs, and 30 small boats, with about 300 men, had already cleared the channel of the river of torpedoes, and made the navigation comparatively safe. When near Rocketts, the President and the Admiral left the Malvern, and proceeded to the city in the commander's gig. With its crew, armed with carbines, they landed and walked to Weitzel's quarters, in the late residence of Davis, cheered on the way by the huzzas and grateful ejaculations of a vast concourse of emancipated slaves, who had been told that the tall man was their Liberator. They crowded around him so thickly, in their eagerness to see him, and to grasp his hand, that a the of soldiers were needed to clear the way, After a brief rest at Weitzel's, the President rode rapidly through the principal streets of Richmond, in an open carriage, and, at near sunset, departed for City Point. Two days afterward, the President went to Richmond again, accompanied by his wife, the Vice-President, and several Senators, when he was called upon by leading Confederates, several of them members of the rebel Virginia Legislature, whose chief business was to endeavor to arrange a compromise whereby the equivalent for submission should be the security to the Virginia insurgents, as far as possible, of their political power and worldly possessions. {3555} The President was assured by Judge Campbell a member of the Confederate 'Government' (who, for two years, had been satisfied, he said, that success was impossible), that the so-called Virginia Legislature, if allowed to reassemble, with the Governor, would work for the reconstruction of the Union, their first step being the withdrawal of the Virginia troops from the field, on condition that the confiscation of property in Virginia should not be allowed. Anxious to end the war without further bloodshed, if possible, and satisfied that the withdrawal of the Virginia troops—in other words, nearly all of Lee's army—would accomplish it, he left with General Weitzel, on his departure from Richmond [April 6], authority to allow 'the gentlemen who have acted as the Legislature of Virginia, in support of the rebellion, to assemble at Richmond and take measures to withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the General Government.' A safeguard was given. The fugitives returned, with the Governor, but instead of performing in good faith what had been promised in their name, they began legislating generally, as if they were the legal representatives of the people of Virginia. So soon as notice of this perfidy was given to the President after his return to Washington, he directed Weitzel to revoke the safeguard, and allow 'the gentlemen who had acted as the Legislature of Virginia' to return to private life. The surrender of Lee had, meanwhile, made the contemplated action unnecessary. The President was blamed by the loyal people for allowing these men to assemble with acknowledged powers; and the Confederates abused him for dissolving the assembly. The President returned to Washington City on the day of Lee's surrender, where he was the recipient of a multitude of congratulations because of the dawn of peace. On the 11th he issued proclamations, one declaring the closing, until further notice, of certain ports in the Southern States, whereof the blockade had been raised by their capture, respectively; and the other, demanding, henceforth, for our vessels in foreign ports, on penalty of retaliation, those privileges and immunities which had hitherto been denied them on the plea of according equal belligerent rights to the Republic and its internal enemies. … On the following day an order was issued from the War Department, which had been approved by General Grant, putting an end to all drafting and recruiting for the National army, and the purchase of munitions of war and supplies; and declaring that the number of general and staff officers would be speedily reduced, and all military restrictions on trade and commerce be removed forthwith. This virtual proclamation of the end of the war went over the land on the anniversary of the evacuation of Fort Sumter [April 14], while General Anderson was replacing the old flag over the ruins of that fortress."

B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the Civil War, volume 3, chapter 21.

ALSO IN: H. J. Raymond, Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln, chapter 20.

_C. C. Coffin, Late Scenes in Richmond (Atlantic Monthly, June, 1865)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (April 14th). The Assassination of President Lincoln.

"From the very beginning of his Presidency, Mr. Lincoln had been constantly subject to the threats of his enemies and the warnings of his friends. … Although he freely discussed with the officials about him the possibilities of danger, he always considered them remote, as is the habit of men constitutionally brave, and positively refused to torment himself with precautions for his own safety. He would sum the matter up by saying that both friends and strangers must have daily access to him in all manner of ways and places; his life was therefore in reach of anyone, sane or mad, who was ready to murder and be hanged for it; that he could not possibly guard against all danger unless he were to shut himself up in an iron box, in which condition he could scarcely perform the duties of a President; by the hand of a murderer he could die only once; to go continually in fear would be to die over and over. He therefore went in and out before the people, always unarmed, generally unattended. … Four years of threats and boastings, of alarms that were unfounded, and of plots that came to nothing thus passed away; but precisely at the time when the triumph of the nation over the long insurrection seemed assured, and a feeling of peace and security was diffused over the country, one of the conspiracies, not seemingly more important than the many abortive ones, ripened in the sudden heat of hatred and despair. A little band of malignant secessionists, consisting of John Wilkes Booth, an actor, of a family of famous players, Lewis Powell, alias Payne, a disbanded rebel soldier from Florida, George Atzerodt, formerly a coach maker, but more recently a spy and blockade runner of the Potomac, David E. Herold, a young druggist's clerk, Samuel Arnold and Michael O'Laughlin, Maryland secessionists and Confederate soldiers, and John H. Surratt, had their ordinary rendezvous at the house of Mrs. Mary E. Surratt, the widowed mother of the last named, formerly a woman of some property in Maryland, but reduced by reverses to keeping a small boarding-house in Washington. Booth was the leader of the little coterie. He was a young man of twenty-six. … He was a fanatical secessionist; had assisted at the capture and execution of John Brown, and had imbibed at Richmond and other Southern cities where he had played, a furious spirit of partisanship against Lincoln and the Union party. After the reelection of Mr. Lincoln, which rang the knell of the insurrection, Booth, like many of the secessionists North and South, was stung to the quick by disappointment. He visited Canada, consorted with the rebel emissaries there, and at last—whether or not at their instigation cannot certainly be said—conceived a scheme to capture the President and take him to Richmond. He spent a great part of the autumn and winter inducing a small number of loose fish of secession sympathies to join him in this fantastic enterprise. … There are indications in the evidence given on the trial of the conspirators that they suffered some great disappointment in their schemes in the latter part of March, and a letter from Arnold to Booth, dated March 27, showed that some of them had grown timid of the consequences of their contemplated enterprise and were ready to give it up. He advised Booth, before going further, 'to go and see how it will be taken in R---d.' But timid as they might be by nature, the whole group was so completely under the ascendency of Booth that they did not dare disobey him when in his presence; and after the surrender of Lee, in an access of malice and rage which was akin to madness, he called them together and assigned each his part in the new crime, the purpose of which had arisen suddenly in his mind out of the ruins of the abandoned abduction scheme. {3556} This plan was as brief and simple as it was horrible. Powell, alias Payne, the stalwart, brutal, simple-minded boy from Florida, was to murder Seward; Atzerodt, the comic villain of the drama, was assigned to remove Andrew Johnson; Booth reserved for himself the most difficult and most conspicuous role of the tragedy; it was Herold's duty to attend him as a page and aid in his escape. Minor parts were assigned to stage carpenters and other hangers-on, who probably did not understand what it all meant. Herold, Atzerodt, and Surratt had previously deposited at a tavern at Surrattsville, Maryland, owned by Mrs. Surratt, but kept by a man named Lloyd, a quantity of ropes, carbines, ammunition, and whisky, which were to be used in the abduction scheme. On the 11th of April Mrs. Surratt, being at the tavern, told Lloyd to have the shooting irons in readiness, and on Friday, the 14th, again visited the place and told him they would probably be called for that night. The preparations for the final blow were made with feverish haste; it was only about noon of the 14th that Booth learned the President was to go to Ford's Theater that night. It has always been a matter of surprise in Europe that he should have been at a place of amusement on Good Friday; but the day was not kept sacred in America, except by the members of certain churches. It was not, throughout the country, a day of religious observance. The President was fond of the theater; it was one of his few means of recreation. It was natural enough that, on this day of profound national thanksgiving, he should take advantage of a few hours' relaxation to see a comedy. Besides, the town was thronged with soldiers and officers, all eager to see him; it was represented to him that appearing occasionally in public would gratify many people whom he could not otherwise meet. … From the moment Booth ascertained the President's intention to attend the theater in the evening his every action was alert and energetic. He and his confederates, Herold, Surratt and Atzerodt, were seen on horseback in every part of the city. He had a hurried conference with Mrs. Surratt before she started for Lloyd's tavern. … Booth was perfectly at home in Ford's Theater, where he was greatly liked by all the employees, without other reason than the sufficient one of his youth and good looks. Either by himself or with the aid of his friends he arranged his whole plan of attack and escape during the afternoon. He counted upon address and audacity to gain access to the small passage behind the President's box; once there, he guarded against interference by an arrangement of a wooden bar to be fastened by a simple mortice in the angle of the wall and the door by which he entered, so that the door could not be opened from without. He even provided for the contingency of not gaining entrance to the box by boring a hole in its door, through which he might either observe the occupants or take aim and shoot. He hired at a livery stable a small, fleet horse, which he showed with pride during the day to barkeepers and loafers among his friends. The moon rose that night at ten o'clock A few minutes before that hour he called one of the underlings of the theater to the back door and left him there holding his horse. He then went to a saloon near by, took a drink of brandy, and, entering the theater, passed rapidly through the crowd in rear of the dress circle and made his way to the passage leading to the President's box. He showed a card to a servant in attendance and was allowed to pass in. He entered noiselessly, and, turning, fastened the door with the bar he had previously made ready, without disturbing any of the occupants of the box, between whom and himself there yet remained the slight partition and the door through which he had bored the hole. … Holding a pistol in one hand and a knife in the other, he opened the box door, put the pistol to the President's head, and fired; dropping the weapon, he took the knife in his right hand, and when Major Rathbone sprang to seize him he struck savagely at him. Major Rathbone received the blow on his left arm, suffering a wide and deep wound. Booth, rushing forward, then placed his left hand on the railing of the box and vaulted lightly over to the stage. It was a high leap, but nothing to such a trained athlete. … He would have got safely away but for his spur catching in the folds of the Union flag with which the front of the box was draped. He fell on the stage, the torn flag trailing on his spur, but instantly rose as if he had received no hurt, though in fact the fall had broken his leg; he turned to the audience, brandishing his dripping knife, and shouting the State motto of Virginia, 'Sic Semper Tyrannis,' and fled rapidly across the stage and out of sight. Major Rathbone had shouted, 'Stop him!' The cry went out, 'He has shot the President.' From the audience, at first stupid with surprise, and afterwards wild with excitement and horror, two or three men jumped upon the stage in pursuit of the flying assassin; but he ran through the familiar passages, leaped upon his horse, which was in waiting in the alley behind, rewarded with a kick and a curse the call-boy who had held him, and rode rapidly away in the light of the just risen moon. The President scarcely moved; his head drooped forward slightly, his eyes closed. … It was afterward ascertained that a large derringer bullet had entered the back of the head on the left side, and, passing through the brain, had lodged just behind the left eye. By direction of Rathbone and Crawford, the President was carried to a house across the street and laid upon a bed in a small room at the rear of the hall, on the ground floor. … The President had been shot a few minutes past ten. The wound would have brought instant death to most men, but his vital tenacity was extraordinary. … At twenty-two minutes after seven he died. Stanton broke the silence by saying, 'Now he belongs to the ages.'" At the same hour in which the President was murdered, an attempt was made by one of Booth's fellow conspirators to kill the Secretary of State. Mr. Seward had been thrown from his carriage a few days before and was prostrated by the serious injuries received. Pretending to bring a prescription from his physician, the assassin, Payne, made his way into the sick-room of the Secretary and stabbed him three times, but not fatally, in the neck and cheek. Two sons, Frederick and Augustus Seward, were seriously wounded in defending their father, and a soldier-nurse who was present struggled bravely with the assassin, though weaponless, and was stabbed repeatedly. {3557} Payne escaped for the time, but was caught a few days later. Booth made his way to Port Tobacco, and thence across the Potomac, into Virginia, assisted and concealed by numerous sympathizers. He eluded his pursuers until the 25th of April, when he was hunted down by a party of soldiers, while sleeping in a barn, below Fredericksburg, and, refusing to surrender, was shot. "The surviving conspirators, with the exception of John H. Surratt, were tried by a military commission sitting in Washington in the months of May and June. … Mrs. Surratt, Payne, Herold, and Atzerodt were hanged on the 7th of July; Mudd, Arnold, and O'Laughlin were imprisoned for life at the Tortugas, though the term was afterwards shortened; and Spangler, the scene shifter at the theater, was sentenced to six years in jail. John H. Surratt escaped to Canada," and thence to England. "He wandered over Europe, enlisted in the Papal Zouaves, deserted and fled to Egypt, where he was detected and brought back to Washington in 1867. His trial lasted two months and ended in a disagreement of the jury."

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 10. chapters 14-15.

ALSO IN: H. J. Raymond, Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln, chapter 21.

J. G. Holland, Life of Lincoln, chapter 30.

B. P. Poore, Reminiscences, volume 2, chapter 15.

_B. Pittman, Report of the Trial of the Conspirators. Trial of John H. Surratt._

_T. M. Harris, Assassination of Lincoln: a History._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (April 15th). Succession of Andrew Johnson, Vice President, to the Presidency.

"On the day after the assassination, Mr. Johnson, having been apprised of the event, took the oath of office, at his rooms, in the presence of the Cabinet, and of several members of Congress, and was thus quietly inducted into the high position so summarily vacated by the martyred President. In the few remarks made on the occasion, as to 'an indication of any policy which may be pursued,' he said it 'must be left for development as the administration progresses'; and his own past course in connection with the Rebellion 'must be regarded as a guaranty for the future.' To several delegations which waited upon him he was, however, more explicit. … 'I know it is easy, gentlemen [he said to a delegation from New Hampshire], for any one who is so disposed to acquire a reputation for clemency and mercy. But the public good imperatively requires a just discrimination in the exercise of these qualities. … The American people must be taught to know and understand that treason is a crime. … It must not be regarded as a mere difference of political opinion. It must not be excused as an unsuccessful rebellion, to be overlooked and forgiven.' … It is not surprising, therefore, with utterances like these, in such seeming harmony with his antecedents as a Southern Unionist,—antecedents which had secured his nomination and election to the Vice-Presidency,—that many were disposed to regard his advancement to the Presidency at that particular juncture as but another evidence of Providential favor, if not of Divine interposition, by which the nation was to be saved from what many feared might prove Mr. Lincoln's ill-timed leniency and misplaced confidence. … Such gratulations, however, were of short continuance. Whatever the cause or design, the new President soon revealed the change that had taken place and the purpose to adopt and pursue a policy the exact reverse of what, with such prompt and unequivocal words, he had indicated."

H. Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America, volume 3, chapter 43.

"Johnson was inaugurated at 11 o'clock on the morning of the 15th, and was at once surrounded by radical and conservative politicians, who were alike anxious about the situation. I spent most of the afternoon in a political caucus, held for the purpose of considering the necessity for a new Cabinet and a line of policy less conciliatory than that of Mr. Lincoln; and while everybody was shocked at his murder, the feeling was nearly universal that the accession of Johnson to the Presidency would prove a godsend to the country. Aside from Mr. Lincoln's known policy of tenderness to the Rebels, which now so jarred upon the feelings of the hour, his well-known views on the subject of reconstruction were as distasteful as possible to radical Republicans. … On the following day, in pursuance of a previous engagement, the Committee on the Conduct of the War met the President at his quarters in the Treasury Department. He received us with decided cordiality, and Mr. Wade said to him: 'Johnson we have faith in you. By the gods, there will be no trouble now in running the government!'"

G. W. Julian, Political Recollections, chapter 11.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (April 26th). General Johnston's surrender.

On the 11th of April, at Smithfield, North Carolina, General Sherman had news of the surrender of Lee. Entering Raleigh on the 13th, he received, next day, a communication from the Confederate General Johnston proposing a truce "to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war." In reply he invited a conference with Johnston, which occurred on the 17th—the day on which news of the assassination of President Lincoln was received. "Sherman said frankly that he could not recognize the Confederate civil authority as having any existence, and could neither receive nor transmit to Washington any proposition coming from them. He expressed his ardent desire for an end to devastation, and offered Johnston the same terms offered by Grant to Lee. Johnston replied that he would not be justified in such a capitulation, but suggested that they might arrange the terms of a permanent peace. The suggestion pleased General Sherman; the prospect of ending the war without the shedding of another drop of blood was so tempting to him that he did not sufficiently consider the limits of his authority in the matter." The result was that, on the 18th, Sherman and Johnston signed a memorandum of agreement which provided for the disbanding of all the Confederate armies, the recognition of the State governments of the several States lately forming the rebel Confederacy, the complete restoration of their old status in the Union, and complete amnesty to all concerned in the rebellion. This was forwarded to Washington, and, of course, it was disapproved, but with an unnecessary publication of sharp censure of General Sherman, and with expressions that seemed to imply distrust of the loyalty of his motives. General Grant was ordered to proceed to General Sherman's headquarters and to direct further operations. {3558} He executed this mission with great delicacy, and his presence with Sherman was hardly known. The latter held a second conference with Johnston on the 26th, and there General Johnston made the surrender of his army on the same terms that had been granted to Lee.

J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 10, chapter 12.

ALSO IN: W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, chapter 23 (volume 2).

J. W. Draper, History of the American Civil War, chapter 92 (volume 3).

J. E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations, chapter 12.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (April-May). The end of the Rebellion. Fall of Mobile. Stoneman's Raid. Wilson's Raid. Capture of Jefferson Davis. The final surrenders.

After the surrender of Johnson, "there were still a few expeditions out in the South that could not be communicated with, and had to be left to act according to the judgment of their respective commanders. … The three expeditions which I had tried so hard to get off from the commands of Thomas and Canby did finally get off: one under Canby himself, against Mobile, late in March; that under Stoneman from East Tennessee on the 20th; and the one under Wilson, starting from Eastport, Mississippi, on the 22d of March. They were all eminently successful, but without any good result. Indeed much valuable property was destroyed and many lives lost at a time when we would have liked to spare them. … Stoneman entered North Carolina and then pushed north to strike the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. He got upon that road, destroyed its bridges at different places and rendered the road useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of Lynchburg. His approach caused the evacuation of that city about the time we were at Appomattox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard of there. He then pushed south, and was operating in the rear of Johnston's army about the time the negotiations were going on between Sherman and Johnston for the latter's surrender. In this raid Stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount of stores, while 14 guns and nearly 2,000 prisoners were the trophies of his success. Canby appeared before Mobile on the 27th of March. The city of Mobile was protected by two forts, besides other intrenchments—Spanish Fort, on the east side of the bay, and Fort Blakely, north of the city. These forts were invested. On the night of the 8th of April, the National troops having carried the enemy's works at one point, Spanish Fort was evacuated; and on the 9th, the very day of Lee's surrender, Blakely was carried by assault, with a considerable loss to us. On the 11th the city was evacuated. … Wilson moved out [from Eastport, Mississippi] with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well armed. He was an energetic officer and accomplished his work rapidly. Forrest was in his front, but with neither his old-time army nor his old-time prestige. … He had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even retard materially the progress of Wilson's cavalry. Selma fell on the 2d of April. … Tuscaloosa, Montgomery and West Point fell in quick succession. These were all important points to the enemy by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, and because of their manufactories of war material. … Macon surrendered on the 21st of April. Here news was received of the negotiations for the surrender of Johnston's army. Wilson belonged to the military division commanded by Sherman, and of course was bound by his terms. This stopped all fighting. General Richard Taylor had now become the senior Confederate officer still at liberty east of the Mississippi River, and on the 4th of May he surrendered everything within the limits of this extensive command. General E. Kirby Smith surrendered the trans-Mississippi department on the 26th of May, leaving no other Confederate army at liberty to continue the war. Wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president of the defunct confederacy before he got out of the country. This occurred at Irwinville, Georgia, on the 11th of May. For myself, and I believe Mr. Lincoln shared the feeling, I would have been very glad to have seen Mr. Davis succeed in escaping, but for one reason: I feared that, if not captured, he might get into the trans-Mississippi region and there set up a more contracted confederacy. … Much was said at the time about the garb Mr. Davis was wearing when he was captured. [Mr. Davis, in his own narrative, and Captain G. W. Lawton, of the 4th Michigan Cavalry, which made the capture, agree in stating that the fugitive chief of the Confederacy wore when taken a lady's 'waterproof,' with a shawl over his head and shoulders. Mr. Davis says that he picked up his wife's waterproof in mistake for his own when he ran from the tent in which he was surprised, while camping, and that his wife threw the shawl over him. Captain Lawton asserts that he carried a tin-pail, that he affected to be bent with age, and that when he stepped out Mrs. Davis asked the soldiers at the tent entrance to let her 'old mother' go to the run for water.] I cannot settle this question from personal knowledge of the facts; but I have been under the belief, from information given to me by General Wilson shortly after the event, that when Mr. Davis learned that he was surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed in a gentleman's dressing gown. Naturally enough, Mr. Davis wanted to escape, and would not reflect much how this should be accomplished provided it might be done successfully. … Every one supposed he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he would be executed. Had he succeeded in making his escape in any disguise it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by his admirers."

U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, chapter 69 (volume 2).

"Davis was taken, via Savannah and the ocean, to Fortress Monroe; where he was long closely and rigorously imprisoned, while his family were returned by water to Savannah and there set at liberty. Secretary Reagan—the only person of consequence captured with Davis—was taken to Boston, and confined, with Vice-President Stephens (captured about this time also in Georgia), in Fort Warren; but each was liberated on parole a few months thereafter."

H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 2, chapter 35.

ALSO IN: _Major-General Wilson, How Jefferson Davis was overtaken._

_J. H. Reagan, Flight and Capture of Jefferson Davis (in Annals of the War by leading Participants)._

_G. W. Lawton, "Running at the Heads" (Atlantic Monthly, September, 1865)._

J. Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, chapter 54 (volume 2).

_C. C. Andrews, History of the Campaign of Mobile._

{3559}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (May). Feeling of surrendered Confederate officers.

After the surrender of Johnston, General Jacob D. Cox was put in command of the military district within which the surrender occurred, and had charge of the arrangements made for paroling and disbanding the Confederate forces. In a paper prepared for the Ohio Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, General Cox has given an interesting report of conversations which he had in that connection with General Johnston and General Hardee. Talking with General Hardee of the war, the latter was asked "what had been his own expectation as to the result, and when had he himself recognized the hopelessness of the contest. 'I confess,' said he, laughing, 'that I was one of the hot Southerners who shared the notion that one man of the South could whip three Yankees; but the first year of the war pretty effectually knocked that nonsense out of us, and, to tell the truth, ever since that time we military men have generally seen that it was only a question how long it would take to wear our army out and destroy it. We have seen that there was no real hope of success, except by some extraordinary accident of fortune, and we have also seen that the politicians would never give up till the army was gone. So we have fought with the knowledge that we were to be sacrificed with the result we see to-day, and none of us could tell who would live to see it. We have continued to do our best, however, and have meant to fight as if we were sure of success.' … Johnston was very warm in his recognition of the soldierly qualities and the wonderful energy and persistence of our army and the ability of Sherman. Referring to his own plans, he said he had hoped to have had time enough to have collected a larger force to oppose Sherman, and to give it a more complete and efficient organization. The Confederate government had reckoned upon the almost impassable character of the rivers and swamps to give a respite till spring—at least they hoped for this. 'Indeed,' said he, with a smile, 'Hardee here,' giving a friendly nod of his head toward his subordinate, 'reported the Salkehatchie Swamps as absolutely impassable; but when I heard that Sherman had not only started, but was marching through those very swamps at the rate of thirteen miles a day, making corduroy road every foot of the way, I made up my mind there had been no such army since the days of Julius Cæsar.' Hardee laughingly admitted his mistaken report from Charleston, but justified it by saying that all precedent was against such a march, and that he would still have believed it impossible if he had not seen it done."

_J. D. Cox, The Surrender of Johnston's Army (Sketches of War History, Ohio Commandery, Loyal Legion, United States, volume 2, page 249-256)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (May). Statistics of the Civil War.

"In a statistical exhibit of deaths in the Union army, compiled (1885), under the direction of Adjutant-General Drum, by Joseph W. Kirkley, the causes of death are given as follows: Killed in action, 4,142 officers, 62,916 men; died of wounds received in action, 2,223 officers, 40,789 men, of which number 99 officers and 1,973 men were prisoners of war; died of disease, 2,795 officers and 221,791 men, of which 83 officers and 24,783 men were prisoners; accidental deaths (except drowned), 142 officers and 3,972 men, of which 2 officers and 5 men were prisoners; drowned, 106 officers and 4,838 men, of which 1 officer and 6 men were prisoners; murdered, 37 officers and 483 men; killed after capture, 14 officers and 90 men; committed suicide, 26 officers and 365 men; executed by United States military authorities, 267 men; executed by the enemy, 4 officers and 60 men; died from sunstroke, 5 officers and 308 men, of which 20 men were prisoners; other known causes, 62 officers and 1,972 men, of which 7 officers and 312 men were prisoners; causes not stated, 28 officers and 12,093 men, of which 9 officers and 2,030 men were prisoners. Total 9,584 officers, and 349,944 men, of which 219 officers and 29,279 men were prisoners. Grand aggregate, 359,528; aggregate deaths among prisoners, 29,498.

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