Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Volume 15 (part 3 of 3)
MR. ROBERTS: I wasn’t asking what it could have become, but what it received. It received the SS, the Gestapo, the concentration camps, the suppression of opponents, and the persecution of Jews, didn’t it?
JODL: Those are questions with which I did not concern myself. Those questions you have to put to the competent authorities. In addition it received me as artillery commander; and they loved me; I only want to confirm that.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. You say the people appeared pleased to see you?
JODL: The people who were under my jurisdiction were very happy about this officer; I can say that.
MR. ROBERTS: They had to appear to be, whether they were or not, didn’t they?
JODL: No, they did not have to be. At any rate, after I had been away for a long time, they certainly did not have to write enthusiastic letters to me, letters which I received throughout the war from these Austrians to whom my heart belonged.
MR. ROBERTS: There was one man who was not pleased to see you, wasn’t there?
JODL: I know no such person.
MR. ROBERTS: Don’t you?
JODL: No.
MR. ROBERTS: What about Schuschnigg?
JODL: I never saw Schuschnigg. He doesn’t know me and I do not know him. I don’t know...
MR. ROBERTS: He wasn’t pleased to see you come in, was he?
JODL: I cannot say that.
MR. ROBERTS: What happened to him?
THE PRESIDENT: We know that, Mr. Roberts.
MR. ROBERTS: I quite realize that. I can’t imagine my question is not admissible, but if you don’t want me to put it—it is one of a series of questions—I won’t.
Schuschnigg was put in a concentration camp, wasn’t he?
JODL: I was told that the Führer had decided: “I do not want a martyr, under any circumstances, but I cannot liberate him; I must put him in honorary custody.” That was the impression I had during the entire war.
MR. ROBERTS: Honorary custody?
JODL: It was called honorary custody.
MR. ROBERTS: What? Was he an honorary member of Dachau?
JODL: That I do not know. Those are not questions that you can put to me, for I was a soldier and not the commandant of a concentration camp.
MR. ROBERTS: That is an honor that one would be glad to dispense with, isn’t it?
JODL: I would gladly dispense with much that took place during these years.
DR. EXNER: Please, I must protest against questions like that, purely political and based purely on legal questions and on matters which the defendant cannot at all answer through his own knowledge. It is not a fact whether Schuschnigg was happy.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, in my respectful submission, these questions are perfectly proper; they are questions the like of which have been put by every counsel who has cross-examined both for the Prosecution and the Defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, the Tribunal thinks that the cross-examination is proper.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I am passing from that point. I am grateful to you.
[Turning to the defendant.] The only question I ask in conclusion is that Schuschnigg was kept in prison or kept in confinement for several years without any charge and any trial. That is right, isn’t it?
JODL: It may be, I do not know.
MR. ROBERTS: You knew, did you not, when you signed those orders for the march into Austria, that Germany had given an assurance in May 1935 to respect the territorial integrity of the state of Austria and that on the 11th of July 1936 there had been entered into by your Government and the Austrian Government an agreement by Germany to recognize the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria? Did you know of these things?
JODL: At that moment I did not know that; in my position as a colonel in the General Staff that did not concern me in the least. What would that have led to?
MR. ROBERTS: I am passing from Austria with this one last question: Is there an entry in your diary—it is a passage in L-172, the basis for the draft of your speech—that after the Anschluss Czechoslovakia was enclosed by pincers and was bound to fall a victim? My Lord, that is Page 290 of Book 7. Do you remember that passage?
JODL: In the first draft which I made for my Gauleiter speech it was put down exactly what strategic improvements had taken place through the various actions of the Führer, in retrospect, but only these strategic results....
MR. ROBERTS: Well, but—again I do not want to stop you, but did you say that—something to this effect—and I will give you the document if you like—that Czechoslovakia was enclosed by pincers and was bound to fall a victim?
JODL: In the first draft I set down that through the taking over—through the Anschluss of Austria—the strategic situation of Czechoslovakia had become so hopeless that at any time it must fall a victim to a pincers attack; a strategic retrospect about facts, indisputable facts.
MR. ROBERTS: I accept that, Witness. Now I go very shortly to the case of Czechoslovakia. I only want to deal really with a couple of documents. I want to deal with item 17, which the Tribunal will find on Page 29 of Book 7. And it is marked—if you’ll hand it up—and I have flagged that for you, Witness, item 17.
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: You are familiar with that?
JODL: Yes, I know that.
MR. ROBERTS: And I do not propose to read it again, because it was read very recently; but you agree, do you not, you said yesterday, the problem was this: First of all, you must have a surprise attack; if you were going to attack at all, you must have a surprise attack.
JODL: On the basis of the stipulations made by the Führer; yes.
MR. ROBERTS: You must have a surprise attack first, and your troops would take 4 days to get into their battle position.
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And therefore you must know the time, the incident which is going to be the cause of the attack; you must know the time when the incident is going to take place.
JODL: Yes, I said that one would either have to predetermine the time or one must know it in advance; otherwise the demands could not be carried out.
MR. ROBERTS: And, therefore, you must create the incident yourself.
JODL: I testified to that at length yesterday. Either one of the many had to be exploited or perhaps one would have to help the situation along a bit; but, as I said, those are General Staff considerations which, when we capture them from the French, you consider entirely irrelevant.
MR. ROBERTS: It is set down at the end of the document on Page 30 that either the Wehrmacht or the counterintelligence section would be charged with the manufacture of the incident in the last paragraph.
JODL: Yes, I therefore wrote: “In case the counterintelligence service is not charged with the organization of an incident aside from that”—“in case.” These are all theoretical deliberations of the General Staff in a situation, which I depicted quite accurately yesterday, where such incidents already occurred every day.
MR. ROBERTS: I know. Then, if this had taken place, the world would have been told that because of that incident Germany had been compelled to go to war?
JODL: I do not believe that this would have been reported to the world. Rather, I believe the true reason would have been told the world, which, furthermore, was made known constantly through the press, that 3½ million Germans cannot be used as slaves by another people permanently. That was the issue.
MR. ROBERTS: If the world is going to be told the truth, what is the earthly good of manufacturing an incident?
JODL: I testified as to that yesterday—I can only repeat what I said yesterday at length: I knew the history of war too well not to know that in every war things like that happen—the question as to who fired the first shot. And Czechoslovakia at that time had already fired thousands of shots which had fallen on this territory.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, I say, Witness, subject to correction, that you are not answering the question at all. The question was a very short one and you make a long speech about something quite different. The question is, if the truth was sufficient to justify your going to war, why should you want to manufacture an incident? If you can’t answer it, say so.
JODL: Well, it isn’t at all confirmed that I wanted to bring about an incident. I wrote, “in case ... not.” We never prepared one and that is surely the essential thing.
MR. ROBERTS: I won’t argue any further with you. I have put my point and will leave it. But now I want, on quite another point, to refer to the last paragraph on Page 29, the same document:
“Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequence could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack.”
Perhaps you would read this paragraph, known already to the Tribunal.
“...death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers.”
That means an air raid before there has been any declaration of war or any warning to the civilian population, doesn’t it?
JODL: That meant that I called the attention of the Führer, through this document, to the fact that on the basis of his decree that result could or would come about.
MR. ROBERTS: Would you call that a terror attack? A terror attack?
JODL: It cannot be said under what conditions such an action would be launched. These are all theoretical tasks for our General Staff. How and if that was translated into practice, that no one can say, whether with justice or injustice; that depended on the political decision.
MR. ROBERTS: I will show you later how those thoughts were carried into practice in the case of other countries. So we will leave that document altogether now and I will leave the case of Czechoslovakia. Now you were recalled to the OKW on the 23d of August 1939, from your artillery employment. We know that, don’t we?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: That was a great compliment to the opinion that the Führer had of you, wasn’t it?
JODL: The Führer was not responsible for my being called back. I do not know whether he knew about it at all. I do not believe so.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. On a very small point, Witness, you told the Court yesterday or the day before that you never had a conference with the Führer, I think, until September 1939; but your diary, on the 10th of August 1938—it is Page 136 of Book 7—your diary said you attended a conference at the Berghof with the Army chiefs and the Air Force groups. Didn’t you meet the Führer then?
JODL: That which you asserted in your first sentence, I did not say. What I said was, word for word:
“On 3 September I was introduced to the Führer by Field Marshal Keitel, and on this occasion, at any rate, I spoke with him for the first time.”
That is what I testified to, word for word, yesterday. I had seen the Führer a dozen times before then and I had heard him when he delivered his big speeches, after he was Reich Chancellor and Supreme Commander.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I accept that. It is quite likely that I was wrong. Now, with regard to the Polish campaign, did I hear you right when you said that Warsaw was only bombed after leaflets had been dropped?
JODL: That applies to the period of the siege of Warsaw. The terror attack, I might say, which was to hit the entire city through artillery bombardment, that took place after two previous warnings.
MR. ROBERTS: It is a matter of history, is it not, that Warsaw was bombed, with many other Polish towns, in the early hours of the 1st of September 1939 before any declaration of war? Isn’t that a matter of history?
JODL: As far as this historical fact is concerned, Field Marshal Kesselring, who is very well informed about this, testified to that here in detail. He said—and also Reich Marshal Göring—that on this date the militarily important objectives throughout Poland were attacked but not the population of Warsaw.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. You are quite right, now Kesselring—If the Tribunal wants the reference, he gave evidence as to the bombing of Warsaw, the English transcript, Page 5731 (Volume IX, Page 175).
[Turning to the defendant.] Now, I suppose the result of the Polish campaign was naturally a source of satisfaction to all of you?
JODL: The military development of the Polish campaign, from the military point of view, was extremely satisfactory to us. Of course things happen in life that would give more satisfaction than a military action.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, I want you to look at a letter. This is—My Lord, this is a new exhibit, D-885, and it is GB-484.
That letter is in your writing, is it not? Is it in your writing?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, it is written to Police President Dr. Karl Schwabe, Brünn, Moravia, Police Presidency, dated October 28, 1939:
“My dear Police President: For your enthusiastic letter of 22 September, I thank you heartily. I was quite particularly pleased about it. This wonderful campaign in Poland was a grand opening for this hard and decisive struggle and has brought about for us an unusually favorable point of departure politically as well as militarily. The difficult part for the people as well as the Armed Forces is still ahead.”—I propose to read it without comments and comment afterward.
“But the Führer and his associates are full of the greatest confidence; for the sanctimonious British will not succeed in throttling our economy, and militarily we are without worry. Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this the many strong-willed and devoted men who are today at the head of the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of. This time we will show that we have better nerves and greater unity. That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty share to keeping the Czechs at it and not let them perk up, of this I am convinced.”
Then he is very pleased about the high recognition granted to the troops:
“Thanking you heartily once more for your words of appreciation which exceed my modest contribution in the shadow of the powerful personality of our Führer. I am with a Heil Hitler.”
Why did you call the British sanctimonious? Because they keep treaties and don’t have concentration camps and don’t persecute Jews? Is that why you thought we were sanctimonious, because we don’t break treaties?
JODL: No, that was not the reason. The reason was that the political situation generally was represented that way, and that I was actually of that opinion at the time.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now you deal with:
“Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this the many strong-willed and devoted men who are at the head of the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of.”
Who were these strong-willed and devoted men? Is that the SS and the Gestapo?
JODL: No, these are the Gauleiter.
MR. ROBERTS: The Gauleiter?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, but I mean we have one or two Gauleiter here, Gauleiter Sauckel, for instance; in a large area like Thuringia, he couldn’t do much by himself, could he? He would have to have some SS or Gestapo, wouldn’t he?
JODL: We are not at all concerned with that here. The fact is that these Gauleiter actually directed the organization of the State and the administration in this war in a noteworthy way. Despite the catastrophe the people were much better taken care of than in the years 1914-18. That is uncontested and it is to the credit of these people.
MR. ROBERTS: They were better taken care of?
JODL: Even in the most terrible conditions at the end every man in Berlin received his normal rations. It was a model of organization, I can only say that.
MR. ROBERTS: And a model of organization because no opposition to the government or the Party was allowed, was it?
JODL: Certainly, it made it easier on one hand, and on the other hand, led to terrible catastrophes about which, of course, I only heard here for the first time.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Well, the letter speaks for itself, and I will go along. May I just ask you about this last sentence:
“That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty share to keeping the Czechs at it and to not let them perk up...”
What did you mean by that?
JODL: Since he was Police President in Brünn, it was his task to see that quiet and order were maintained in Brünn and not to tolerate a Czech uprising at our backs while we were at war. That is a matter of course. I did not say that he was to murder or germanize the Czechs at all, but he had to keep them in order.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I pass from that now and I want to go to the various campaigns in the West. Now, with regard to Norway, of course you knew that your country had given its solemn word repeatedly to respect the integrity of Norway and Denmark, did you not?
JODL: I said yesterday, with reference to the two declarations of...
MR. ROBERTS: Please answer my question, it is such a simple one.
JODL: Yes, I believe, I recalled that at the time. I am quite sure.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good; and we know there was an assurance at the beginning of the war to reassure all these western neutrals, and there was another assurance on the 6th of October; and you say that in November Hitler decided to invade Denmark and Norway?
JODL: Yes. I testified as to that at length yesterday.
MR. ROBERTS: I know you did. Please don’t always say that. I have got to ask you to go over the same ground from the other angle, you see. “Norway,” as your speech said—and I am quoting from Page 291 of Book 7—perhaps you had better give it to him—Page 11 of your notes...
[Turning to the Tribunal.] It is in the middle, My Lord, under Paragraph 8:
“In the meantime we were confronted by a new and urgent problem: The occupation of Norway and Denmark....
“In the first place there was danger that England would seize Scandinavia and thereby, besides effecting a strategic encirclement from the north, would stop the import of iron and nickel which was of such importance to us for war purposes. Secondly, it was with the realization of our own maritime necessities”—“Notwendigkeiten”—that is the word, isn’t it—“Notwendigkeiten”...
My Lord, that ought to be “necessary” and not “imperative”—“erforderten.”
“...which made it necessary for us to secure free access to the Atlantic by a number of air and naval bases.”
[Turning to the defendant.] You wanted air bases and U-boat bases, didn’t you?
JODL: Militarily they were tremendously important to us, there is no doubt about that; but the prerequisites to taking them, those were the reports which we had, the threat to Norway.
MR. ROBERTS: What I suggest to you, you see, is this: In this, like the case of the other three Low Countries—in this case, you simply made an excuse. You thought England might do something, although she had not done it for months, and you breached Norway’s neutrality at your own chosen time. Is that right?
JODL: In order to answer that question “yes” or “no,” one would have to undertake a very thorough study of all the historical documents on both our own and the other side. Then one can say if it is correct or not. Before that has been decided, only a subjective opinion exists. I have mine, and you have another.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. And I point out to you that it was Germany on every occasion who violated the neutrality. The other countries, the Allies, did not.
JODL: In the case of Norway, the English did that first in the case of the Altmark by laying mines and by firing upon German ships in Norwegian territorial waters. That has been proved indisputably. There is no doubt about that.
MR. ROBERTS: The Altmark, as you very well know, Witness, was not an occupation at all; it was merely the act of the British Navy in taking British prisoners from a German prison ship, and I imagine your Navy would have done the same if they had had the chance. What is the good of talking about the Altmark? It was not an occupation at all.
JODL: But it was a violation of international law as far as Norwegian sovereignty was concerned. You could only request that Norway do that, but you yourselves could not carry out a combative action in Norwegian waters. I know the regulations in this connection exactly.
MR. ROBERTS: Why should you break your word to Norway and cause untold suffering and misery to the inhabitants of that country because the British went into the territorial waters and took out a few hundred prisoners? What is the logic of it? Why should the Norwegians suffer for it?
JODL: You are just quoting one small example from the tremendously real picture of England’s occupation, but there are hundreds of them.
MR. ROBERTS: It is the example you quoted, Witness, not I. I did not quote it.
JODL: I can only say that we were under the definite subjective impression that we carried through an enterprise, in the last second, for which British troops were already embarked. If you can prove to me that is not true, I shall be extremely grateful to you.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now I am going to call your attention to the only outside evidence that you have produced about that, because it was read rather hurriedly—quite rightly, yesterday.
[Turning to the Tribunal.] My Lord, it is in Jodl’s Document Book 2, and it is Page 174. Well, My Lord, it begins at Page 174. My Lord, that is on the left-hand top corner. Page 174 says that Albrecht Soltmann was an expert specialist, that he evaluated files from the British landing brigade, and that he examined diaries. That is on the second page, and the bottom of Page 175:
“The documents and statements by prisoners showed that a short time before our landing in Norway the British invasion troops had been embarked on destroyers. On the following day they were again disembarked and remained in the vicinity of the port of embarkation. They were then reembarked after the German invasion of Norway for the second time and transported to Norway. What intention the English pursued in the embarkation of their troops before our landings could not be determined from the documents and from the statements of prisoners. Whether they intended to occupy Norway before our invasion could at that time only be conjectured, because the prisoners did not make any exact statements in this respect. The conjectures are based on the special equipment of these British troops. Insofar as I could evaluate the documents and statements furnished by prisoners they did not contain proof of the English plans with regard to Norway.”
And this is the next question:
“Have not the results of all documents and statements furnished by prisoners been to the effect that in the invasion of Norway we arrived only just ahead of the English?
“Answer: ‘Yes, the information in the documents and the statements furnished by prisoners could be interpreted to mean that in our invasion we were just ahead of the English. However, whether this was considered unmistakable evidence I cannot judge.’”
And then they deal with French documents captured in a railway train. The witness does not know anything about them.
[Turning to the defendant.] That is pretty poor evidence, isn’t it, on which Norway was to be invaded, contrary to all the treaties and all the assurances?
JODL: I quite agree with you on that; you are quite correct. But that is only because Soltmann was unfortunately not the expert in this field. He was not even an officer of the General Staff. I had forgotten that. We had further and quite different evidence which lay before me on my desk; namely, all the commands carried by the English landing brigade. They confirmed our assumptions absolutely and definitely.
MR. ROBERTS: An invasion without any warning or any declaration of war?
JODL: That is a political question.
MR. ROBERTS: You have told the Court yesterday what a stickler you were about international law, how keen you were to see that international law was observed. You knew that was against international law, didn’t you?
JODL: These matters were not in our regulations, but only the provisions which applied to the Wehrmacht. The concept of an aggressive war was not found in any regulation. We went only by the Geneva Convention and the Hague Land Warfare Regulations.
MR. ROBERTS: I mean if an honorable German gives his word he keeps it, does he not? He does not break his word without saying that he is going to depart from it, does he, an honorable German?
JODL: That seems to be a practice which is generally observed all over the world when human beings work together, but not in the sphere of politics.
MR. ROBERTS: If that is your code of honor, why is it not grossly dishonorable for Germany to break her word over and over and ever again? Or would you rather not answer that question?
JODL: No, you would do better to put that question to the people who were responsible for German politics.
MR. ROBERTS: Very well, I will leave that. Now I want to come to the invasion of Holland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. I beg your pardon, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.
You have no doubt at all, have you, on the documents that in the event of war in the West, it was always Hitler’s intention to violate the neutrality of those three small countries?
JODL: From the beginning, in his orders for the attacks in the West, he had the intention to go through Belgium; but he had reservations with regard to Holland for a long time, which were only rescinded later—I believe in the middle of November. Regarding Holland his intentions were not specific. Regarding Belgium his intentions in that direction were known comparatively early, that is, about the middle or the early part of October.
MR. ROBERTS: You could not, of course—I mean Germany naturally wanted to wage an offensive war and an offensive war in somebody else’s country. That is the ambition, naturally, isn’t it?
JODL: The German objective in this war was to win, at that time.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. You couldn’t attack in the West unless you attacked through Belgium, could you?
JODL: In any event, any other attack was tremendously difficult and was highly doubtful. I have already said that.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. That is why, of course, France built the Maginot Line, so that you couldn’t attack her frontally.
Well, now, if you secured the coast of Belgium and Holland, you secured air bases from which you could annihilate England or Great Britain. That is what you hoped, wasn’t it?
JODL: No doubt the strategic position of Germany in the battle against England improved through our having the coast; that is true.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. May I just remind you of a few documents which the Tribunal know already. I do not intend to read them, but the first document in order of date is 375-PS, USA-84, dated 25 August 1938. It is during the Fall Grün time. That was the Air Force appreciation which, in the last paragraph of the document, Page 11, I think, it says:
“Belgium and the Netherlands in German hands would represent an extraordinary advantage in the air war against Great Britain....”
And the Army is asked to say how long it would take.
That was at the time of the Czechoslovakian crisis, wasn’t it?
JODL: Yes, but this document, I believe, has already been characterized as a ridiculous piece of paper, being the work of an insignificant captain.
MR. ROBERTS: He seems to have been a very good judge, at any rate, judging what happened afterwards.
Well now, the next document—I know you were in Austria, but no doubt you heard about it from Keitel—was the Chancellery meeting the 23d of May 1939. That is L-79, it is Book Number 7, Page 275. Do you remember there that the Führer said:
“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be militarily occupied. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored....
“In this matter, considerations of right and wrong or treaties have no significance....
“The Army will have to take positions essential to the Navy and the Air Force. If Belgium and the Netherlands are successfully occupied and held, if France is also defeated, then fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured....
“Daily attacks by the German Air Force and Navy will cut her life lines.”
There wasn’t any doubt as to the policy of the Führer in May 1939, was there?
JODL: It was in Court here that I first heard about this conference and about the things which were purportedly discussed at that time; and I am not able to judge whether it is correct, for I did not hear it, not even from Keitel, not even later.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Did you hear about the speech made by the Führer on the 22d of August 1939?
[Turning to the Tribunal.] I do not know if the Court has got this. It is not in the Document Book; 798-PS, in Document Book Number 4. There are some loose copies, My Lord.
[Turning to the defendant.]
“Those countries”—Holland, Belgium—“and Scandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available means. England and France will not violate their neutrality.”
You always thought Hitler was a good prophet, didn’t you? You thought Hitler was a good judge.
JODL: Very often, yes, very often.
MR. ROBERTS: And he was a good judge that England and France would keep their word, whereas Germany would break hers.
Now, then, that is August. Now then I want to...
JODL: But that I don’t know.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, I want to come to the document which you put in yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, wait a minute. Defendant, what do you mean by saying you don’t know that? Do you mean that you did not know the document? You said, “I don’t know that.”
JODL: I do not know what the Führer actually said in his conference on the 22d of August. I did not even know that a discussion had taken place, for I was in Vienna. I only know what is ostensibly in documents which have been submitted here.
MR. ROBERTS: Now I want to put the whole Document L-52. Dr. Exner, quite properly of course, read some extracts; but I want to read some more. Have you got copies for the Tribunal?
Now, L-52 was Hitler’s memorandum on the 9th of October 1939. May I point out that the 9th of October 1939 was 3 days after his renewed assurances to the western neutrals.
I want to refer—certain passages you have read; I want to refer to others.
[Turning to the Tribunal.] My Lord, what I am now reading from, starting with the outside page, is the 5th page. It is Page 27 of the original, which appears in the bottom right-hand corner.
[Turning to the defendant.] I read the paragraph on Page 25 of your original, Witness.
“Germany’s military means of waging a lengthy war are, as far as our main enemy is concerned, the Air Force and the U-boat arm.
“The U-boat can even today, if ruthlessly employed, become an extraordinary threat to England. The weaknesses of German U-boat warfare lie in the great distance of approach to the scene of their activity, in the extraordinary danger attached to these approaches, and in the continual threat to their home bases. That England has not, for the moment, laid the great mine fields as in World War I, between Norway and the Shetland Islands, is possibly connected—provided the will to wage war exists at all—with a shortage of necessary blockade materials. But if the War lasts long an increasing difficulty to our U-boats must be reckoned with in the use of these only remaining inward and outward routes. Every creation of U-boat bases outside these constricted home bases would lead to an enormous increase in the striking power of this arm.”
Is that a covert reference to the Norwegian bases, do you think, giving access to the Atlantic?
JODL: I do not believe so. I believe it is a general correct naval strategic consideration and can apply just as well to a base at Murmansk which, for instance, we already had at that time, or in Spain, or in some other state that was neutral at the time; but it is not a reference to Norway, for I have declared under oath that at the time, the Führer never gave a thought to Norway, not the slightest thought, before he received the report from Quisling.
MR. ROBERTS: I have your answer. Now, may I go on reading?
“The German Air Force: It can only succeed in effective operations against the industrial center of England and her south and southwest ports, which are gaining in importance during the war, when it is no longer compelled to operate offensively from our present small North Sea coast by tremendously devious routes involving long flights. If the Dutch-Belgian area were to fall into the hands of the English and French, then the enemy air forces, in order to strike at the industrial heart of Germany, would need to cover barely a sixth of the distance required by the German bomber to reach really important targets. If we were in possession of Holland, Belgium, or even the Straits of Dover as jumping-off bases for German air attacks, then, without a doubt, Great Britain could be struck a mortal blow, even if the strongest reprisals were attempted.
“Such a shortening of the air approaches would be all the more important to Germany because of our greater difficulties in fuel supply. Every 1000 kilograms of fuel saved is not only an asset to our national economy, but means that 1000 kilograms more of explosive can be carried in the aircraft; that is, 1000 kilograms of fuel would become 1000 kilograms of bombs. This also leads to economy in aircraft, in mechanical wear and tear, and above all, in the precious blood of soldiers.”
Then I ask you to turn to your Page 41.
My Lord, it is two pages on, and Your Lordship will see “41” nearly at the top of the page, with an asterisk, and the heading, “The German Attack.” Has Your Lordship got it?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: “The German Attack. The German attack is to be launched with the fundamental object of destroying the French Army, but in any case it must create a favorable initial situation which is a prerequisite for a successful continuation of the war. Under these circumstances the only possible area of attack is the sector between Luxembourg in the south and Nijmegen in the north, excluding the fortress of Liège. The object ... is to attempt to penetrate the area Luxembourg-Belgium, and Holland in the shortest possible time and to engage and defeat the opposing Belgian-French-English forces.”
I suppose I can’t ask you to say what is your opinion of the honesty of giving those western neutrals a guarantee on the 6th of October and saying that is the only possible means of attack in that memorandum of the 9th. I suppose that is a question of politics, is it?
JODL: That is a political question, but the declarations were always made only on the condition of the strictest neutrality of these countries. But this neutrality was not kept, for British fliers flew over this area by day and by night.
MR. ROBERTS: Why should the wretched people of the Netherlands and Belgium be destroyed and mutilated because British airmen fly over their territory—destroyed and mutilated by the German Army? What is the logic of your remark at all?
[Turning to the Tribunal.] My Lord, there was one more passage from that document I should like to read. If Your Lordship is thinking of adjourning, perhaps I might read it, and then I will have finished with the document. My Lord, it is the next page, and it is toward the end of the page. It is against the lettering—the number L-52. It is just above, “Time of Attack.”
[Turning to the defendant.] It is on your Page 52, Witness, at the very beginning, or just at the end of Page 51:
“All the leaders must keep firmly fixed in their minds the fact that the destruction of the Anglo-French Army is the main objective, the attainment of which will make possible the prerequisite conditions for later and successful employment of the German Air Force against other objectives. The brutal employment of the German Air Force against the heart of the British will to resist can and will follow at the given moment.”
Did that mean terror attacks against the civilian population?
JODL: You are asking me continually about a document which from the first to the last word was written by the Führer, as I have already told you. You are producing a rather interesting picture of the Führer as a strategist and as a military leader, and it is of interest to the world; but I cannot see how this concerns me. These are the thoughts which the Führer put down as military commander and are of great interest for all soldiers in the world. But what does it have to do with me? That I do not understand.
MR. ROBERTS: But may I point out, Witness, that your own counsel produced it and you relied on certain parts of it. That is how it concerns you; you relied on it.
JODL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
MR. ROBERTS: Witness, I only have two other questions on the alleged aggression against the Low Countries. Will you look at your diary, 1809-PS, for the 8th of May 1940. It is Page 141 in Document Book 7, and it is Page 115 in the German book. The actual quotation is Page 143 in the Document Book 7; at the top of the page: “8 May. Alarming news from Holland, canceling of furloughs, evacuations, road blocks, other mobilization measures.”
Were you afraid that the Dutch might actually take some steps to defend themselves against your invasion?
JODL: I was sure that the Dutch would defend themselves against Germany.
MR. ROBERTS: Was it alarming you because you thought the Dutch might have suspected you were going to break your treaties and assurances?
JODL: I did not understand the question.
MR. ROBERTS: I will go on:
“According to the intelligence reports the British are said to have asked for permission to march in, but the Dutch refused. According to reports, measures of the Dutch partly directed against the coast and partly against us. Not possible to obtain a clear picture whether the Dutch do not work hand in hand with the English or whether they really want to defend their neutrality against the first attacker.”
It is clear from that, is it not, that you had no information at all that Dutch neutrality was going to be broken?
JODL: That is not clear from the entry; it is only a brief argument on the basis of masses of reports which we received from Canaris on that day or on the previous day. If they were to be followed up accurately, the reports immediately preceding this entry would have to be at hand; the entry refers to the latest reports, and not to the many thousands which had come in before.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, on the 10th of May without any declaration of war these three countries, small countries, were invaded with all of the armed might of Germany, were they not?
JODL: The attack began on the 10th of May along the whole front.
MR. ROBERTS: What had those countries done at all to deserve the horrors of invasion and the misery of German occupation?
JODL: That, again, is a historical question. I have already said that according to my personal point of view England and France in fact forced them to give up their strictly neutral attitude. That was my impression.
MR. ROBERTS: Their only fault, was it not, was that they stood in the way of your air bases and U-boat bases?
JODL: They were not only in the way, but by tolerating actions incompatible with neutrality, they helped England in the war against us. That was my subjective impression.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, I have only got—with the permission of the Tribunal, there was one question I should have asked on Norway; only one; and if I might go back to that, I want to ask you about your diary entry, 1809-PS, Page 143 in Document Book 7. I have not got a reference to the German but it is about at that place. I will read it slowly: “13 March: Führer does not give order yet for ‘W’”—Weser—“He is still looking for an excuse”—or “justification”—to use your word. And the next day: “14 March: Führer has not yet decided what reason to give for Weser Exercise.”
If you had a good reason for breaking Norwegian neutrality, why should the Führer be unable to find one?
JODL: Because for this operation the Führer considered it absolutely necessary to have some documentary proof. So far, there had only been very strong indications which came near to a proof, but we had as yet no documentary evidence.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I leave that part of the case, and I now go to Yugoslavia, and I have only two or three questions on Yugoslavia.
I want you to look at Document 1746-PS, Page 127 in Document Book 7; German book, 112.
Before we deal with the document, Witness, Yugoslavia had also received assurances from Hitler. That is so, is it not, or do you not know?
JODL: Yes. Not only did Yugoslavia receive assurances from Hitler, but we also received them from the Yugoslav Government, which had concluded a treaty with us on the previous day.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, you will find the document I am going to refer to—it has got a piece of paper headed with the German word for “discussion,” “Besprechung.” Have you found it? It should be a piece of paper with the word “Besprechung.”
JODL: “Discussion on the Situation in Yugoslavia”; yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, that is right.
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Dated 27 March 1941?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Now if you turn to—I think it is Page 2:
“The Führer is determined, without waiting for declarations of good faith from the new government, to make all preparations to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No diplomatic inquiries will be made; no ultimatum presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav Government, which cannot be trusted for the future, will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the means and the troops suitable are ready. It is important that action be taken as fast as possible.”
Now I go to Page 3, Witness:
“Politically it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and military destruction is done in a lightning-like undertaking.”
Now I go to Page 5, Witness:
“The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as possible with the destruction of the Yugoslav Air Force ground installation, and to destroy its capital, Belgrade, in waves of attacks.”
The Führer was not going to give the civilian population even half an hour’s warning, was he?
JODL: I do not know what preparations for warning the Yugoslav Government had been made, but at the moment of the Putsch it immediately made military preparations and deployed its forces along our border.
MR. ROBERTS: May I ask you this? Do you approve, as an honorable soldier, of attacking a city crowded with civilians without a declaration of war or even half an hour’s warning?
JODL: I do not hold that view. I have already said that I, personally, and half an hour or an hour later the Reich Foreign Minister, suggested an ultimatum.
MR. ROBERTS: When you lost air superiority and people were able to hit back, you Germans made a great deal of fuss then about terror attacks, did you not?
JODL: This city was at the same time the center of a Putsch government which had annulled a treaty concluded with Germany, and which from that moment on had made preparations along the whole front for war with Germany.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, I am going to leave the incident. Do you remember how you referred to it in the notes for your lecture? It appears on Page 127—no, My Lord, it does—I beg your pardon, it appears on 292 of Book 7 and at 304 of the German. You refer to it as “an interlude.” Do you remember? The German word is “Zwischenspiel,” “interlude.” Is that your idea of an interlude?
JODL: To be juridically exact, you mean the first draft of my lecture and not my lecture which you do not know. However, even in this first draft I cannot recall mentioning an interlude.
MR. ROBERTS: How many civilians, how many thousands, do you think were killed in the first movement of that “interlude”—in the bombing of Belgrade without warning?
JODL: I cannot say, but surely only a tenth of the number killed in Dresden, for example, when you had already won the war.
MR. ROBERTS: Now I come to the alleged aggression against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Republic in July of 1940, did he not?
JODL: In July of 1940 he had not yet reached that decision.
MR. ROBERTS: But at any rate—I do not want to waste time—we know that on the 22d of June 1941 Germany invaded the Soviet Union contrary to her nonaggression pact. That is history, is it not?
JODL: Yes. The surprise attack on 22 June 1941 is a historical fact which took place because the politicians were of the opinion that the Soviet Union had not kept the pact.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, Witness, I am going to pass from this part of the case altogether. I want to put one last question: Do you not think that this record of broken pledges will dishonor the name of Germany for centuries to come?
JODL: It might, if historical research after exact investigation of Russian documents delivers clear proof that Russia had no intention of strangling us politically or of attacking us. In that case, yes; otherwise, no.
MR. ROBERTS: I now want to ask—to come to quite a different part of the case under Count Three and Count Four. The documents have been put to you so often. I do not want to put them again.
But, you remember the “Barbarossa” order. That is C-50, in Document Book 7, Page 187; and German book, 146. That was circulated by your office, was it not, Wehrmachtführungsstab, L?
JODL: It was dealt with in the Quartermaster Section of the Wehrmachtführungsstab.
MR. ROBERTS: Well now, would you agree that that was a shameful order to have to issue?
JODL: I agree. I have already said that there was no soldier who was not opposed to this order; they all did so.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now we know that on the 17th of July—and this is Document C-51, which is in Document Book 7, at Page 190, German Page 150—we know that from the same office, the WFSt, L, there was issued an order that the previous order was to be destroyed, but its validity was not to be affected, destroyed below corps level. What was the object of the destruction of that order?
JODL: Unfortunately I cannot tell you; I do not recall this order. I do not believe I ever saw it, at least not before this Trial.
MR. ROBERTS: Perhaps you would look at it, Witness, C-51, Page 190, Book 7; 150, German book. Now, that comes from WFSt—that is, Wehrmachtführungsstab—Department “L”; and then “Q” for “Quartermaster,” in brackets. That is your office, is it not?
JODL: That is a part of the Wehrmachtführungsstab.
MR. ROBERTS: It is signed Keitel.
JODL: Yes. But I do not know this order; it was shown to me for the first time here in Nuremberg; I had never seen it before. I do not know what it is about or what order is being rescinded. I have already said that these questions of military legal jurisdiction were dealt with by Field Marshal Keitel, and that he used my Quartermaster Section as a working staff without my having any part in these matters. I do not know this order.
MR. ROBERTS: And you cannot suggest any reason why it had to be destroyed?
JODL: No; I cannot give you any information about it.
MR. ROBERTS: Now then, I want C-52, which has not yet been put in. Your Lordships will find it on Page 191 of Book 7. I offer it as GB-485, and it is in the German book on Page 153.
[Turning to the defendant.] Now, this is another Keitel order. It comes from Wehrmachtführungsstab, L; then, in brackets, “I Op.” Is that your department?
JODL: That is the section which worked with me on all operational questions.
MR. ROBERTS: Do you remember that order?
JODL: Yes, I remember the order.
MR. ROBERTS: Now—I think you took part in drafting it; did you not?
JODL: Certainly, because it is an operational order which supplements a directive.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, well, will you look at Paragraphs 6 and 7? Paragraph 6:
“In view of the vast size of the occupied areas in the East, forces available for establishing security will be sufficient only if all resistance is punished not by legal prosecution of the guilty, but by the occupation forces spreading such terror as is alone appropriate to eradicate every inclination to resist.
“The respective commanders, together with the troops at their disposal, are to be held responsible for maintaining peace in their respective areas. The commanders must find the means of keeping order within the regions where security is their responsibility, not by demanding more forces, but by applying suitable Draconian measures.”
That is a terrible order, is it not?
JODL: No, it is not at all terrible for it is established by international law that the inhabitants of an occupied territory must follow the orders and instructions of the occupying power, and any uprising, any resistance against the army occupying the country is forbidden; it is, in fact, partisan warfare, and international law does not lay down means of combating partisans. The principle of such warfare is an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, and this is not even a German principle.
MR. ROBERTS: Is it not the tooth and the eye of the innocent?
JODL: It is not a question of the innocent. It expressly states, “to eradicate every inclination to resist.” It is a question of those who resist, that is, by partisan warfare.
MR. ROBERTS: I will not argue about it, Witness. I gather you approve of the order.
JODL: I approve it as a justified measure conforming to international law and directed against a widespread resistance movement which employed unscrupulous methods. Of that we had evidence.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now I want to come to something quite different. I want to come to the Commando Order, and I desire to put in two documents which have not yet been put in, to trace the history of the making of this order, because I suggest it was drawn up in your office under your jurisdiction.
Will you give the witness, please, 1266-PS, which I offer, My Lord, as GB-486.
Now, this is the first document, dated the 8th of October. That is a memorandum from the “Q” branch of the Wehrmachtführungsstab; that is right, is it not?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And it was—that is the wireless order that you mentioned?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: First it deals with the “tying up,” My Lord, which is not important. Secondly, the wireless announcement of the 7th of October 1942, which reads as follows:
“All terror and sabotage detachments of the British and their accomplices who do not behave like soldiers but like bandits will in future be treated as such by German troops and will be ruthlessly slain in battle wherever they make their appearance.”
[Turning to the defendant.] Well, of course, that order does not mean very much, does it? It assumes that the enemy are not behaving like soldiers, but like bandits, and says they may be slain in battle.
But then the second paragraph:
“The Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff...”
That was Warlimont, was it not, Witness?
JODL: Yes, that was Warlimont.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes.
“...has given the following urgent task to ‘Q’:
“1) Drafting of the order.”
Look at Number 2:
“Like the Barbarossa order issued at the time this order must also be drawn up—in conjunction with the Armed Forces Legal Department and Counterintelligence—with great thought and care. Distribution down to armies only, from there forward only orally. To be destroyed after having been taken cognizance of.”
What was the nature of that order that was drawn up with so much care by your staff and the Legal Department and Counterintelligence?
JODL: I believe that was Document C-50, which you mentioned earlier. The Barbarossa order is not a clear term.
MR. ROBERTS: “The following must be borne in mind regarding the contents of the order:
“In cases where captives are temporarily taken into custody for our own purposes, the persons concerned are to be handed over to the SD by Counterintelligence after a thorough examination in which the SD is also to take part.
“Not to be lodged in prisoner-of-war camps under any circumstances.
“This order is to take effect subsequently with regard to the people from Norway.”
The people from Norway were some English Commandos who had blown up a power station in Norway; is not that so?
JODL: That is possible, but I do not know. I have never seen this.
MR. ROBERTS: I think I will be able to remind you later about it.
The next document I do not read. It is from somebody called “Dr. Hülle,” whom I do not know, and I do not think it adds anything to it.
Then the next document—the third in Your Lordship’s bundle—is dated 9 October and is signed “Warlimont.” Is it dated 9 October, Witness?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Signed Warlimont?
JODL: Signed by Warlimont.
MR. ROBERTS: It sets out the first facts in the first two paragraphs that we know:
“The Führer wishes an order to be issued laying down the proper behavior of the Armed Forces.
“At the instance of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, the Armed Forces Legal Department has drawn up the draft attached hereto.
“You are requested to co-operate in a thorough examination, if necessary, calling in the Reichsführer SS.
“We refer to the discussion between Chief of Counterintelligence and the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.”
Then the next document is the draft order prepared by the Legal Department:
“Members of terror and sabotage detachments of the British Armed Forces who demonstrably break the rules of an honorable way of fighting will be treated as bandits: To be exterminated mercilessly in battle or in flight. If in case of military necessity they should be temporarily arrested, or if they fall into German hands outside combat actions, they are to be brought before an officer immediately for interrogation and are then to be handed over to the SD.
“Holding them in a prisoner-of-war camp is forbidden.
“This order may be distributed only down to armies. From there to the front it must be transmitted only verbally.”
And did you—do you remember having a conversation on the telephone with the head of the Legal Department about this order?
JODL: No, I do not remember.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, will you look at the next document; it is dated 14 October. It is in the same bundle, the next page of it—I beg your pardon, it is a memorandum. Now you notice the heading, the original heading was: “Reprisal Actions—Prisoners of War.” Somebody struck that out and put instead: “Combating of Enemy Sabotage Detachments.”
“Memorandum. (Telephone discussion with the Chief of the Armed Forces Legal Department).
“The Chief of the Armed Forces Legal Department has spoken with the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff by telephone.”
That is you, is it not?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: “The latter”—that is you—“said that the Führer’s aim in this action was to prevent this manner of waging war (dropping small detachments who do great damage by demolitions and then surrender).”
That was the object of the order, was it not?
JODL: Yes, but by using methods contrary to international law.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, that is a matter perhaps neither for you nor me to discuss. But if I might be allowed to ask you this question: Do you draw any distinction between a British airman who bombs a power station from the air and a British parachutist in uniform who is landed and blows it up with an explosive? Do you draw any distinction in international law?
JODL: No. As such, the destruction of an objective by a demolition troop I consider completely admissible under international law; but I do not consider it admissible during such an operation for civilian clothes to be worn under the uniform and armpit pistols to be carried which start firing as soon as the arms are raised in the act of surrender.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, there are two things there, you see, and one answer and I am not going to argue at all with you; but when you consider the case you will find many, many cases where these persons were executed and there is no suggestion they had anything but a uniform at all.
JODL: I believe that these cases were quite rare, that at least these people were mixed with those who wore civilian clothes.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, I am not going to argue with you because there are other documents and they will have to be, perhaps, summarized sometime. But would you agree that a parachutist in uniform, with no civilian clothes, acting like that, if he is killed, shot by the SD, would you agree that that would be murder? Or would you rather not answer that?
JODL: I have already said that if a soldier in full uniform only blows up or destroys an objective, I do not consider it an action contrary to international law; and for that reason I opposed the Commando Order in this form almost to the last moment...
MR. ROBERTS: I hear your answer and I will not pursue that matter. Then the document goes on—I do not want to read it all:
“The Chief of the Armed Forces Legal Department spoke to the effect that under these circumstances one should consider issuing an order fit for publication. Article 23c of the Hague Land Warfare Regulations, which forbids the killing or wounding of an enemy who lays down his arms or is unarmed, if he surrenders unconditionally, had to be explained; when the Land Warfare Regulations were concluded this manner of waging war was not yet known and the regulation therefore could not apply to this.”
Well now, that was the first bundle. Now I want to put you a...
JODL: I should like to make a brief comment on this document. I have not seen any of these papers before; I am now seeing them for the first time; but they prove, word for word, what I said here the day before yesterday under oath, that on their own initiative, the members of my staff, as they heard that the Führer had demanded an executive order, began preparatory work for the draft of such an order with the Legal Department and with the Foreign Department, but that I did not accept and did not submit any order to the Führer.
MR. ROBERTS: Well now, I want to put to you another document, 1265-PS.
My Lord, I offer it as GB-487.
Now the first document in the bundle is a teletype dated 13 October and it is signed by Canaris. Is that right, Witness?
JODL: Yes, a teletype message from Canaris.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, and it is a teletype to the OPS Staff. The subject is “Treatment of Prisoners of War.”
“Regarding discussions and measures in pursuance of OKW’s announcement of 17 October 1942 the following general attitude is taken:”
Number 1 does not matter; it is about chaining. Number 2 is the important one:
“Treatment of Sabotage Units: Sabotage units in uniform are soldiers and have the right to be treated as prisoners of war. Sabotage units in civilian clothes or German uniform have no claim to treatment as prisoners of war (francs-tireurs).”
You agree, of course, with the correctness of that, do you not? The rest of that document does not matter. You agree, do you not, with that opinion in Paragraph 2, as a man who knows international law?
JODL: Yes, I agree with Paragraph 2; it corresponds entirely with my opinion; it agrees completely with my point of view.
MR. ROBERTS: And now the next document.
If you go to the—if the Tribunal would kindly go to the last document of the three; and would you go to the document which is headed, “Telephone call; Reference: Letter Ausland Abwehr of 13. 10. 42.” My Lord, that is the one I have just read.
“Opinion of the Armed Forces Legal Department”—Paragraph 2, that is referring to Canaris’ opinion—“Fundamentally in agreement.
“It may, however, be possible to support the following train of thought with regard to special cases:
“Fighting methods such as exist now and such as it is intended to prevent came about long after the creation of the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare, in particular as a result of war in the air. Special attention is drawn to the mass use of parachutists for purposes of sabotage. Anyone who commits acts of sabotage as a soldier with the intention of surrendering after the act of sabotage without fighting does not act like an honest fighter. He misuses Article 23c of the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare during the formulation of which no such methods were contemplated. The misuse lies in the speculation on surrender without fighting after successful completion of the act of sabotage.
“This view regarding the inadmissibility of sabotage Commandos can be backed up without reservation provided we also apply it to ourselves.”
That document has your initial on the top, Witness? Is that right?
JODL: I have read this document. It contains a statement on international law by the Armed Forces Legal Department, which on this point agrees with the Führer’s opinion. It actually confirms the possibility that a misuse of international law may be committed by surrendering immediately after an action and thus securing for oneself complete absence of danger in the conduct of a war operation. That interpretation is disputable; I do not fully approve of it, but it was the view of the highest legal authority at that time.
MR. ROBERTS: Many, many brave soldiers, when they are outnumbered, surrender, do they not? Many Germans surrendered at Bizerte and Tunis, thousands of them. How did that put them outside the pale of international law or the protection of it?
JODL: But they were soldiers captured in the normal manner of war, which the Führer always recognized. This is a disputable case and very doubtful under international law, but, as I said, it is not an idea of mine and has nothing to do with me; I only took note of it.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. My Lord, the intermediate document is a letter signed “Lehmann,” who was head of the Legal Department. It merely confirms the telephone conversation which I have read, and I do not think it is necessary to read it again. It is before the defendant.
[Turning to the defendant.] Well now, the last of these documents before the order was finally drawn up and issued, the Court has already seen, because it was put in.
It is 1263-PS, RF-365, My Lord, it was in Jodl’s Document Book Number 2, Page 104.
Will you look at the original, please.
There is an unfortunate omission from Page 110 in Dr. Exner’s book, which I am perfectly certain is quite inadvertent. Will you look at the document dated 15 October 1942?
My Lord, I think that is the first in your bundle. It is Page 110. It is first in the single documents. It is Page 110 of Dr. Exner’s book, and I apologize to him because I have just seen the marginal writing. It was covered over before, and I had not seen it. I apologize.
My Lord, the...
It is a note, is it not, Witness, signed Warlimont, your deputy, 15 October. I think you will find it the second document in your file. I do not want to read it all again because it has been read, but you see: “The Proposal of the Amt Ausland Abwehr will be submitted as Appendix 1.”
The Tribunal will find Appendix 1, in which he says—in which it is suggested, under letter “A,” that sabotage troops who do not wear uniforms should be court-martialed. You have said “no.” You have given your reasons. I will not worry you about that any more. And then “B”; members of sabotage units, who are in uniform but are guilty of dishonorable activities are after capture to be put into special confinement. Do you say that that does not go either?
And then, if you will go back to 15 October, just the second paragraph down:
“The Chief of WR”—that is the Legal Department—“has made a statement to the effect that the order was to be drawn up in such a way that it will take into account our own interests...”
Is it “our own interests,” Witness? “Take into account our own interests”?
JODL: Yes, “our own interests.”
MR. ROBERTS: “...our own interests while considering the future conduct of the war. In this way he wanted to avoid repercussions which would run counter to our further intentions. Sabotage is an essential part of conducting war in time of total warfare; we ourselves have strongly developed this method of fighting.”
And you write against that, do you, “But the English make much more use of it”?
JODL: Yes, it is an undeniable fact that at that time of the war the English made much more use of it than we.
MR. ROBERTS: Is that a reason for making a law, an order of this kind, to try and discourage the English from using sabotage detachments?
JODL: No, that is certainly not a reason. It is only a denial of the statement that we had strongly developed this method of fighting; hence my remark, “Yes, but the English to a much greater extent than we.” That, of course, has nothing at all to do with the reason for the order.
MR. ROBERTS: Then I am not going to take more time on that particular document, except—have you got a document dated 14 October with 1, 2, 3, 4 at the end? I think it is on a separate page, the 1, 2, 3, 4.
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: It says:
“With the view in mind—to prevent the enemy’s fighting the war by using sabotage troops—following questions have to be clarified before formulating an order:
“1) Have we ourselves the intention of dropping sabotage Units in the zone of rear echelons of the enemy, or also far back in the interior?
“2) Who will drop more sabotage troops, the enemy or we?
“3) Can we establish the principle: Sabotage troops do not conduct legal war; they are to be exterminated in the fighting without mercy?
“4) Do we attach importance to first arresting the single members of this group for interrogation by Counterintelligence and not killing them immediately?”
These were the considerations which were discussed in your office before the orders were drawn up.
JODL: These were questions—not points of view—questions which were raised in the Armed Forces Operations Staff as a result of the Armed Forces communiqué. Fortunately, the submission of all these documents proves the complete correctness of everything I said here 2 days ago. The staff, the Legal Department, and the Ausland department racked their brains and pondered how they could draw up the executive order implementing the Führer’s additions to the Wehrmacht communiqué. Neither they nor I came to any conclusion, and no proposal was made to the Führer; nothing was done. That is what I stated here the day before yesterday, and that is what, fortunately, you yourself have proved by submitting these documents.
MR. ROBERTS: You have said, I think, that part of the Führer’s order disgusted you?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And you have said in your interrogation that circulating this order was one of the things which went against your inner conscience—one of the few things. “Your inner convictions”—to use your actual words.
JODL: In the preliminary interrogation I said that it was one of the few—or the only—order I received from the Führer which I, in my own mind, completely rejected.
MR. ROBERTS: You rejected it, but these young men went on being shot, did they not?
JODL: I have already described exactly how the commanding generals at the front, vigorously supported by me, interpreted this order in the mildest imaginable way in practice; actually, only very few such incidents occurred, and I believe that most—at any rate, nearly all that came to my knowledge—were highly justified, because the fighting methods of those people were not methods of honest soldiers.
MR. ROBERTS: You see, you talk about your “inner convictions.” I think Keitel spoke about his “inner conscience.” But should we have heard anything about these convictions and this conscience if Germany had not lost the war?
JODL: No, but then we might have heard of the strangled at Dieppe in a similar trial.
MR. ROBERTS: It is very late and—now, I just want to deal with a few examples, very very quickly, of the order being carried out, as you said it was only carried out a few times. I just, first of all, want to refer to UK-57, which is Page 309 of Document Book 7, the German copy Page 33—German copy Page 344. I am sorry, I had given you the wrong number. I can read this out. It is a report which is initialed by Keitel.
“On 16 September 1942”—mark the date, that is more than a month before the Commando Order came into force—“10 Englishmen and 2 Norwegians landed on the Norwegian coast, dressed in the uniform of the British Mountain Rifle Regiment, heavily armed and equipped with explosives of every description. After negotiating difficult mountain country, they blew up important installations in the power station Glomfjord on 21 September. A German sentry was shot during the incident. Norwegian workmen were threatened that they would be chloroformed if they resisted. For this purpose the Englishmen were equipped with morphium syringes. Seven of the participants have been arrested. The others escaped into Sweden.”
Then follow seven names, which I read out to this Court, I think, in January. They were shot on 30 October 1942. That would be, shot as a result of the order which you circulated, although it was not in existence when those men blew up that power station. You told me some little time ago that that power station was a proper military target. These men were in uniform. Can you begin to justify that?
JODL: No, I cannot justify that, and I will not justify it. I consider it completely illegal, because this order could certainly not have been retroactive; but I did not learn of this affair at the time. Of UK-57 I read the first and second parts here for the first time; the third part I read in April 1944.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, there are other exhibits dealing with this matter which I am not going to put to you. They have been referred to before, and I do not want to be cumulative. I would like you—or perhaps I will ask you one question first.
I think it was laid down, was it not, that every action taken under this Führer Order was to be reported in the Wehrmacht report?
JODL: Yes, that was ordered.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I just want to give you an example of the Wehrmacht report.
526-PS, USA-502, My Lord, it is 7a, Page 15. It is dated 10 May 1943, German Page 21 of the small book.
[Turning to the defendant.] It is a notice from the “Q” branch of your staff.
“On 30 March 1943 in Toftefjord an enemy cutter was sighted. Cutter was blown up by enemy. Crew: 2 dead men, 10 prisoners.
“Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetlands) by the Norwegian Navy.
“Arms: Two Colt machine guns, two mounted machine guns, a small transmitter ... 1,000 kilograms of explosives....
“Purpose: Forming an organization for sabotaging strong-points, battery positions, staff and troop billets, and bridges....
“Führer order executed by the SD.
“Wehrmacht report of 6 April announces the following:
“In northern Norway an enemy sabotage unit was engaged and destroyed on approaching the coast.”
That was false, was it not?
JODL: I confirmed this communiqué of 6 April which included the contribution from the commander in Norway as I received it on 6 April; this brief formulation always originated with the commander at the front. But what actually happened is set down in this note of 10 May which, most unfortunately, I never saw, because on 10 May 1943 I traveled by train to Bad Gastein to begin a cure for a severe case of lumbago; and so, unfortunately, I saw this document for the first time here in Nuremberg. I am sorry, because this would have been one of the few cases in which I might have been able to intervene.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, but, Witness—keep it in front of you—because you see the action was not taken on 10 May; it was taken before, or on 6 April. Look at the last paragraph:
“Wehrmacht report of 6 April announces the following:
“...enemy sabotage unit engaged and destroyed on approaching the coast.”
Whereas, in fact, they had been taken prisoner and then shot like dogs by the SD.
JODL: Yes, I have just said that. Before this contribution of 6 April, I heard nothing about the whole matter, but only on the 10th of May did it come to our knowledge, and then the Armed Forces Operations Staff drew up this note. The whole investigation into these events was made by the Intelligence Service, the office of Canaris, together with its Security Police; it was not the SD; that is wrong; it was the Security Police.
Unfortunately I did not know of these details; the Intelligence Service knew them. I was concerned with the whole question only because I had to edit the Armed Forces communiqué; otherwise I would never have dealt with the Commando Order; I was quite innocent of it.
MR. ROBERTS: Now I just want to show you one more instance. It is 2610-PS.
It is, My Lord, in small Document Book 7a, Page 23, the German small book Page 41.
Now, I want you to notice, Witness, this is the only document which I rely on, which is not one of your own captured contemporaneous German documents. This is a report from the Judge Advocate General’s Department, United States Army. It concerns 15 United States personnel who were shot under this order. If you look at the second page:
“On the night of 22 March 1944, 2 officers and 13 enlisted men of the Special Reconnaissance Battalion of the Army of the United States disembarked from some United States Navy boats and landed on the Italian coast near Stazione di Framura. All 15 men were members of the United States Army and were in the military service of the United States. When they landed they were all properly dressed in the field uniform of the United States Army and they had no civilian clothes. Their mission was to demolish a railroad tunnel on the main line between La Spezia and Genoa. That rail line was being used by the German Forces to supply their fighting forces on the Cassino and Anzio Beachhead fronts.”
That was a good military target, that tunnel, was it not?
JODL: Yes, a military target, absolutely.
MR. ROBERTS: And all 15 men were shot because of the order that you circulated...
JODL: I did not understand. The order which—which I circulated; yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Which you circulated on the 19th of October. You circulated a supplementary order to the Führer Order, the last paragraph of which, I think, disgusted you. That is 503-PS.
JODL: It would be more correct to say “which you had to circulate.”
MR. ROBERTS: I will take that question up in a moment. I do not agree. I must not argue with you, but I must put some questions.
General Dostler, who ordered the shooting of those men, he himself, you see, was also shot by sentence of this court martial.
I am going to turn now from the Commando Order and...
JODL: May I say something else about this document?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, anything you like.
JODL: This incident never came to my knowledge; at least, I have no recollection of it. As far as I know, it never appeared in the Armed Forces communiqué, because General Dostler did not report the incident to his commanding officer, Kesselring, who might have been able to take, and might have taken, a different course in this affair.
MR. ROBERTS: Why do you say that you had to circulate this order? No man can compel another to circulate an order for murder, unless he does it.
JODL: I have explained at length that this order could not simply be interpreted as an order to murder, but that very serious and justified doubts and considerations could arise with regard to international law and with regard to the justness of this order. In any case, you should have complete appreciation of such a delicate situation, because even now, in my position here, I cannot say or do as I like, and that exactly is what I experienced during these last 5½ years.
MR. ROBERTS: You could have refused. You could have said, and the other generals could have said, could you not: “We are all honorable soldiers. We will not publish and issue those orders”?
JODL: Certainly under other circumstances it might have been possible, first, if at the time I had not had that conflict with the Führer, and secondly, if the British Ministry of War had made my task a little easier. However, these events and the statement made by the British on the 2d of September put the Führer into a rage against which I was powerless. How much I tried to resist, for that the document itself is the best proof, because the threat of punishment and detailed justification for it were directed against me personally.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, would that be a convenient time to break off?
[A recess was taken.]
MR. ROBERTS: I want to ask you a few questions about the deportation of the Jews from Denmark. Will you look, please, at a new exhibit, D-547, which I offer as GB-488. Now, that is the OKW Operational Staff from the commander, Denmark, dated 20 September 1943. That is before the teletype which has been put in, 2 days before:
“The Führer has agreed in principle with Dr. Best’s telegram that the Jewish question in Denmark be solved very soon by deportation.
“Execution of this measure should take place while the state of military emergency still exists. It is not certain if sufficient police forces can be provided for the arrest of the Jews and their families, about 6,000 persons, most of whom live in Copenhagen. The Army would be heavily burdened....
“I believe that the results of the deportation will be serious....
“The armament industry deliveries will be prejudiced. Considerable disturbances will have to be reckoned with.”
And you made a note on the back of it:
“I know nothing of this. If a political measure is to be carried out by the commander of Denmark the OKW must be notified by the Foreign Office.”
Is that right?
JODL: Yes. I would not have recalled this document, but I certainly wrote the note. It proves that I did not remember until now that obviously this question had been discussed in Denmark some days before and that the commander in Denmark had been making objections. Consequently I wrote, I know nothing of this. This is a political measure, and if a political measure is to be carried out in Denmark, then the Foreign Office should kindly notify us.
MR. ROBERTS: I omit one or two unimportant documents. Will you go to document dated 1 October 1943—the fifth or sixth document of Your Lordship’s file, Number D-547, dated 1 October 1943. It is to the OKW from Denmark, and quotes as follows:
“The Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark has given the following report to the Minister for Foreign Affairs:
“1) The arrest of the Jews will take place on the night of 1-2 October. Transportation from Zealand will be carried out by ship....
“2) Should I receive no contrary instruction, I do not intend allowing the Jewish action to be mentioned, either on the radio or in the press”—and then
“3) ...I intend leaving the possessions of the evacuated Jews undisturbed in order that the seizure of these possessions cannot be imputed to be the reason or one of the reasons for the action.”
Then you deal with the disadvantages—the writer does—and there is a question: “Does the Reichsführer SS know?” The answer:
“The Reichsführer SS knows, is in agreement,” and then a pencil note in Jodl’s handwriting, “The Führer agrees.” Is that in your writing?
JODL: Yes, that is my handwriting, but that refers only to the announcement of the release of the interned Danish soldiers.
MR. ROBERTS: I see.
JODL: Then it is important to note in this document that the commander in Denmark said that he did not intend having the property of the evacuated Jews disturbed. He said:
“...I intend leaving the possessions of the evacuated Jews undisturbed....”
He had the executive power at that time.
MR. ROBERTS: Have you got the next document in the same bundle, 2d of October 1943, to OKW Operations Staff, from Denmark? I quote:
“Jewish action carried out in the night of the 1-2 October by the German Police without incidents.”
And then the last document, dated 3 October 1943, to the OKW Operations Staff:
“According to the statement of the Reich Plenipotentiary, the Reichsführer SS has ordered that the Reichsführer SS alone as the person ordering the Jewish action is to receive the exact figures on arrests.
“The Plenipotentiary has, therefore, given no figures to the commander of the German troops in Denmark. 232 Jews have been handed in by the Police via the collecting points set up by the Watch Battalion, Copenhagen.”
What was the Watch Battalion?
JODL: I cannot say that at the moment; I do not know how it was composed. It might have been a unit of the Police; it might have been part of the Army; I cannot say with certainty. At any rate it was a unit which was used only for guard duties. But it is interesting that I wrote the remark: “Is a matter of complete indifference to us,” which proves that I was not interested in the affair, and refused to have any part in it.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I wonder. First of all, you said that the Watch Battalion might have been a part of the Wehrmacht. Were you...
JODL: That is not certain. I do not wish to dispute it definitely. There were also watch battalions of the Army, but it might equally well have been a watch unit of the Police. I cannot say it with certainty, but General Von Hannecken should have information about it.
MR. ROBERTS: But were your “decent German soldiers,” whom you mentioned yesterday, were they called upon to round up Jews who managed to get through the SS net?
JODL: No, it says here, “...it was carried through by the Police,” and I do not believe that any unit of the Wehrmacht concerned itself with deportation of Jews. I do not believe it; the Wehrmacht rejected that.
MR. ROBERTS: Dirty work, was it not?
JODL: I do not believe that it happened; I do not believe it.
MR. ROBERTS: Then your note: “...is a matter of complete indifference to us”—it was a matter of complete indifference to you how many Jews were deported, you did not care?
JODL: The note does not imply that, but it does prove that the matter was a political one, and with political matters I was not concerned. My attitude to the Jewish question has, I believe, been made clear already.
MR. ROBERTS: Where did the Jews go to, Auschwitz?
JODL: No. The French Prosecution read it here; these Jews of whom we are speaking now were taken to Theresienstadt; a few of the older people died there, but all of them were treated well, and received clothing and food. I had the same information, and this document of the Danish Government confirms it.
MR. ROBERTS: You believe that, do you?
JODL: Yes, I believe that, because the Danish Government confirms it here; it was confirmed in this court by the Prosecution itself.
MR. ROBERTS: Now I want to deal with one other topic, the topic of forced labor. Did you say in your speech—will you look at your notes of your speech, Pages 38 and 39, and it is Page 298 of Document Book 7, the big one, the paragraph, which begins on Page 38 in the witness’ copy. It has got a frame; I think it is a piece of paper headed “38.” I wonder if you can find it for him.
“This dilemma of manpower shortage has led to the idea of making more thorough use of the manpower reserves in the territories dominated by us. Right thinking and wrong thinking are mixed up together. I believe that insofar as concerns labor, everything has been done that could be done. Where this has not yet been achieved, it appeared to be more favorable politically to refrain from measures of compulsion, and secure in turn order and economic aid. In my opinion, however, the time has now come to take steps with remorseless vigor and resolution in Denmark, Holland, France, and Belgium to compel thousands of idlers to carry out the fortification work which is more important than any other work. The necessary orders for this have already been given.” (Document Number L-172, Exhibit Number USA-34.)
Do you remember them?
JODL: There is no doubt that I drafted this once.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes?
JODL: But that does not prove that I said it.
MR. ROBERTS: But had the necessary orders been given for the civilians in the occupied territories to work on the German fortification?
JODL: A compulsory labor order was issued in most countries, but I—you may not know it—I state under my oath that in Denmark and Holland, and also in Belgium, local firms, which recruited their own labor under the labor order, worked on these fortifications and that the populations of these areas were particularly glad about this, because the stronger their coast was fortified, the more certain were they that the invasion would not take place in their neighborhood. And, of course, they were greatly interested in preventing an invasion, which they knew would destroy everything. Though it sounds incredible, the local inhabitants did work on these fortifications, some of them with the greatest enthusiasm. That is a fact.
MR. ROBERTS: No, I did not stop you. But had the necessary orders been given—that is in the last sentence—to compel these people who did not want to, to compel them to work on fortification? I am not talking about the people who did want it, but the people who did not.
JODL: I understand. I did not know details of the procedure, as I did not concern myself with it, but I did know that compulsory labor orders had been issued in the occupied countries.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I will leave that, if you have said all you want to say. Will you look now, please, at a new document, Number 1383-PS, which I offer as GB-489. This is a report of a discussion of the current military situation, 12 December 1942, Pages 65 and 66, Jodl speaking:
“The military commander of France reports: The number of French workers deported into the Reich since 1 June has now passed 220,000. There are in round figures 100,000 skilled laborers in Berlin.”
How many of these 220,000 were volunteers, did you find out?
JODL: I cannot say that; I only quoted from a report which was appended to the situation report from France. That a large-scale exchange between prisoners of war and workers had been in progress has already been stated in detail by Sauckel.
MR. ROBERTS: I will leave that. I ask only two questions now on Sagan, Stalag Luft III.
You said yesterday that after the incident of the Sagan shooting, you thought Hitler was no longer “humane.” Did you say that?
JODL: I said yesterday, I had the impression then that he was disavowing all humane conceptions of right.
MR. ROBERTS: Had you thought that he was humane up to March of 1944?
JODL: Before this time, I personally knew of no action of his which could not be justified legally, at least under international law. All his previous orders, so far as I knew, could still be justified in some way. They were reprisals. But this act was not a reprisal.
MR. ROBERTS: This was—would you agree with me—the word is not too strong—that this was sheer murder of these 50 airmen?
JODL: I completely agree with you: I consider it sheer murder.
MR. ROBERTS: How could you honorable generals go on serving a murderer with unabated loyalty?
JODL: I did not serve with unabated loyalty after this event, but I did everything in my power to avoid further injustice.
MR. ROBERTS: Now I come to something else, the question of destruction in Norway. The document is 754-PS. It has not yet been exhibited. I offer it as GB-490. This document is signed by you, is it not?
JODL: I have known this document for a long time; it is signed by me.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. Perhaps I might just read parts of it to the Tribunal. Dated 28 October 1944. It is from your staff, and the distribution is to the Army supreme command; commander-in-chief, Norway; to the Reich Commissioner, Norway; and the Navy.
“Because of the unwillingness of the northern Norwegian population to evacuate voluntarily the Führer has agreed to the proposals of the Reich Commissioner and has ordered that the entire Norwegian population east of the Fjord of Lyngen be evacuated by force in the interest of their own security, and that all homes are to be burned to the ground or destroyed.
“The commander, Northern Finland, is responsible that the Führer’s orders be carried out without consideration. Only by this method can the Russians with strong forces, aided by these homesteads and the population familiar with the terrain, be prevented from following our withdrawal operations during the winter and shortly appearing in front of our position in Lyngen. This is not the place for sympathy for the civilian population.”
Lyngen is in the very north of Norway, is it not, on the west coast?
JODL: No, on the northern coast, where Finland is closest to the coast of the polar region and very near Norway.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, that order was carried out, according to the Norwegian report, UK-79, which the Tribunal will find as the last document in the small book, 7A, Page 26 of the Norwegian report, at the bottom of the page, Page 26:
“As a result of the advance of the Russian troops and the retreat of the German Army in Finnmark, October-November 1944, the Germans practiced the ‘scorched earth’ policy for the first time in Norway. Orders were issued that the civilian population was to evacuate, and that all houses, transport, and stores were to be destroyed. As a result of this, about 30,000 houses were damaged apart from 12,000 items of damage to chattels amounting to 176 million kroner.”
And then, for photographs will the Tribunal turn to Pages 62 and 63; 62 is a copy of the German order, and 63 is a photograph of the ruins of a fishing village.
That was a cruel order, was it not, Witness?
JODL: No, not exactly. I should like to make a few explanatory remarks about it. Typically, as I have always said, this order was urged upon the Führer by the Reich Commissioner Terboven; not by the soldiers but much against their will.
Secondly, this order was not carried out, because otherwise the cities of Kirkenes, Hammerfest, and Alta would today no longer exist. All these cities are east of the Lyngen Fjord. In practice this order was moderated by our forces in agreement with me, and in conversations I had with my brother, who was the commanding general in that region—and whom I wanted to call as a witness since I expected this document to be produced—it was moderated to such an extent that, in fact, only what was necessary from a military point of view and could be justified under Article 23 of the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare was destroyed. Otherwise no city or house would be left today in northern Norway; and if you were to travel there, you would see that these cities are still standing, not destroyed.
The Armed Forces commander in Norway strongly protested against this attitude of Terboven, and I repeated these objections to the Führer in similarly strong terms, but nevertheless he demanded that this order be issued. We who retained our humanitarian sentiments carried out the order only insofar as it was absolutely necessary for military reasons. These are the facts.
MR. ROBERTS: I think you said, when you were interrogated, that your brother complained of this order, did he not?
JODL: Yes, quite, he was enraged by this decree.
MR. ROBERTS: Very well. I am now going to turn to two documents with regard to the treatment of the Norwegian civilian population.
They are in your Document Book 1, Pages 99 and 100—well, it begins at Page 98. These are regulations on the conduct during the occupation of Denmark and Norway. And there are instructions to the troops to treat the inhabitants politely and well and to behave themselves with due decorum. That is right, is it not?
JODL: Yes, that is correct.
MR. ROBERTS: And they must be told that they are entering Norway for the protection of the country and the safety of its inhabitants. That appears on Page 99. That is rather a euphemistic description of a sudden invasion with no declaration of war, is it not?
JODL: Yes, but at first it was carried out in a fairly peaceful manner on the whole.
MR. ROBERTS: From your point of view?
JODL: No, from the point of view of the Norwegians as well. The most extraordinary things...
MR. ROBERTS: Well, you know, we have seen—we can see in the Norwegian Government’s report photograph after photograph of these towns and villages bombed to ruins. Is that your idea of an orderly occupation?
JODL: What was bombed on the day of the landing is hardly worth mentioning; just a few coastal batteries and a few fortifications, but no cities. Villages were destroyed only later in the battle with the English brigade at Dombass and at Lillehammer, but nothing was destroyed when the country was first occupied. Then the Norwegians only stood at the quays, hands in their pockets, and looked on with great interest.
MR. ROBERTS: And naturally, Witness, if you could have landed without opposition and occupied the country without opposition, so much the better for you? That is obvious, is it not?
JODL: Yes, undoubtedly; that would have been even better; and the Norwegians would certainly have fared very well during the occupation if Terboven had not come.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, I want you to look at a part of that document which, quite properly, of course, was not read.
It is Appendix 5 which will be part, My Lord, I assume, of Exhibit AJ-14, the number which this document was given when it was put in in the examination-in-chief. But I am handing the Tribunal copies of Appendix 5, because it does not appear in the Jodl document book.
[Turning to the defendant.] Well, now, Appendix 5, I can describe as the sting in the tail of this document:
“Guiding Principles for the Attitude of Troops in Occupied Areas.
“Only”—I do not read the first few paragraphs—“Only in the event of the civil population’s putting up a resistance or behaving rebelliously can the following decisions be carried out:
“1) If the civilian population offers resistance or if attacks are to be feared, the arrest of hostages should, on principle, be resorted to. Hostages should only be arrested on orders of the commander of a regiment or a commander of equivalent rank.
“When accommodating and feeding hostages it should be borne in mind that they are not imprisoned because of crimes. Hostages and population are to be informed that the hostages will be shot at any sign of hostile action. Previous sanction of the shooting by the divisional commander must be obtained....”
Then:
“Armed resistance by the civilian population is to be crushed by force of arms.”
The last sentence on that page:
“The death penalty will be imposed for violence of any kind against the German Armed Forces. Immediate trials will be held by a field court martial. The regimental commander can appoint the summary court, composed of one captain, one sergeant, one corporal, hear witnesses, draw up the sentence in writing. The verdict will be the death penalty if guilty, otherwise acquittal. The sentence will be executed immediately after confirmation by the regimental commander.
“The following are to be considered as acts of violence: Sabotage, destruction of our lines of communications, cutting of telephone wires, demolitions, et cetera.” (Document Number Jodl-37, Exhibit Number AJ-14.)
A little drastic, that, was it not? Only the death penalty?
JODL: These instructions are, word for word, in complete accord with our directives which, in times of peace, were laid down by the group of experts on international law in co-operation with the Foreign Office and with German professors of international law. It would have been well, if only these, our military precepts, our military court procedure laid down before we went to war, had been followed consistently everywhere. Our official directives laid down the question of hostages from the point of view of international law, and there is no doubt that under international law as applicable in the year 1939, the taking of hostages was admissible.
MR. ROBERTS: I suggest to you, as you raise that point, that nowhere in international law will you find the shooting of hostages legalized at all.
JODL: Then it is not with certainty prohibited anywhere in international law. I believe it is an open question. In our directives, even in the Handbook on Tactics, the concept of taking hostages had been laid down for years.
MR. ROBERTS: That may be so, and I do not want to argue with you about it. I suggest to you that the Hague Regulations protect the lives of civilians in occupied countries, unless they commit crimes, of course, and also prohibit collective punishment of the innocent.
If you do not want to say any more on that—I do not want to stop you if you do.
JODL: I can only summarize and say that every word here is in accord with the directives applicable in the German Army, and these directives were not illegal. But one would have to argue this problem with experts on international law.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, will you look at one other document dealing with Norway? It is D-582.
My Lord, it is a new document, and I offer it as GB-491.
[Turning to the defendant.] Is that a document which comes from your office?
JODL: Yes. It originated with the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Quartermaster Section.
MR. ROBERTS: Do you know of it or not?
JODL: I cannot recall it, but there are some notes of mine on it, and so I undoubtedly saw the document.
MR. ROBERTS: Oh, yes. Where are the notes, Witness?
JODL: They are on the back page of the last teleprint message.
MR. ROBERTS: Oh, I see what you mean, yes. Well, will you take first of all—I had forgotten that you were getting more than one document. Will you take first of all the document dated the 2d of February 1945? I think it is the top one.
JODL: There are no remarks of mine on that document, so I cannot say with certainty whether I have seen it.
MR. ROBERTS: Just have a look at it and tell me whether you have seen it.
JODL: I do not think I have seen this. I do not—I have no recollection of having ever read it.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, then, I do not think it would be right to cross-examine you on that document.
My Lord, in that case, I would ask to withdraw it, and I will not put it in as an exhibit.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the defendant said that it was from his office.
MR. ROBERTS: Very well, then. I will—he did that.
[Turning to the defendant.] You see what the document says, Defendant. It is dated 2 April 1945; it deals with...
JODL: The 2d of February.
MR. ROBERTS: It is the 2d of February. It deals with Reich Commissioner Terboven’s report to the Führer. It says:
“Those responsible for attempts to murder and to carry out sabotage are the illegal elements within Norway with a bourgeois-national majority and a communist minority, as well as individual groups which came direct from England or Sweden....
“The bourgeois-national majority was opposed to the communist minority in conception of sabotage and murder, and in particular with regard to their extent and nature. This resistance has ... become progressively weaker during the course of the past year.
“Official departments of the exile government, as for instance the Crown Prince Olaf, as so-called Commander-in-Chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces, and various others, have called upon the population in speeches and orders to carry out sabotage. As a result, there is a particularly good possibility here of stamping every supporter of the exile government as an intellectual instigator or accomplice.
“The aim of the coming measures must therefore be: a) to strengthen the power and will to turn once more against sabotage by threatening the very influential class of leaders in the bourgeois camp; b) thereby to exacerbate more and more antagonism between the bourgeois and Communists....”
And then, “Suggestions.” These are suggestions from your office, apparently:
“1. Particularly influential representatives of the explicitly anti-German and anti-National Socialist class of industrialists to be shot without trial on the accusation that they are intellectual instigators or accomplices and stating that they were convicted within the framework of police investigations.
“2. Similar men from the same circle to be sent to Germany to work on fortifications.
“3. In cases where the circumstances are particularly suitable, proceedings to be taken before the SS and Police Court, with the execution of the sentence of death and suitable publicity.”
There are other suggestions which I need not read. And then the last paragraph but one:
“The Führer has agreed to these proposals only in part. Especially in connection with efforts at protection against acts of sabotage he has rejected taking hostages. He has rejected the shooting of influential Norwegian representatives without trial”—which is underlined in blue pencil.
Is that your blue pencil?
JODL: No, it is not mine.
MR. ROBERTS: You see, it is a remarkable document, Witness, because that is one instance where your department is suggesting a course of what I submit is brutal action, which for once the Führer rejects.
JODL: I believe, Mr. Roberts, you are somewhat mistaken. No proposal at all is being made here, but the Armed Forces Operations Staff is advising the military commander in Norway of what Reich Commissioner Terboven has told the Führer. He reported to the Führer first about the general situation and then be made the proposals mentioned here; and the Armed Forces Operations Staff which obviously had a representative at this meeting—I was not there—immediately advised the military commander of the handsome proposals of his friend Terboven.
That is what happened and these proposals went beyond—they were too much even for the Führer. But they were not our proposals.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, Witness, I hear your answer, and the Court will consider it. It may be accepted. The document speaks for itself.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you read the first—the subject description “Orientation about Reich Commissioner Terboven’s Report to the Führer”?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. That is the first—that is the subject, is it not, beginning, Witness, “Orientation about Reich Commissioner Terboven’s Report”? Whose orientation? Your department’s?
JODL: Orientation of the Mountain Army, that is, of General Böhm. General Böhm as commanding general of the Mountain Army, High Command 20, is advised of the report made to the Führer by Reich Commissioner Terboven, so that he would know what his friend Terboven was proposing. It is no more than information on what Terboven said to the Führer. I cannot tell you who was present; I was not there. The entire thing did not originate with me; I have never seen it.
MR. ROBERTS: Well now, the second document, this is from Terboven to Bormann on the 28th of October 1944. That is with regard to the evacuation east of Lyngen. I do not think I need read that. Then, the next document, maybe the second document, it is a teleprint of the 6th of April 1945, from Oberführer Fehlis, SS Oberführer to the Operations Staff, and it says:
“In accordance with the instructions of the OKW (WFSt) ... dated 29 March 1945, members of the Norwegian resistance movement who appear in organized units and who are easily recognizable as combatants by arm bands or other insignia are to be treated as prisoners of war.”
And then the SS Oberführer says:
“I consider this order completely intolerable. I explained this clearly to Lieutenant Colonel Hass and Major Benze from the Armed Forces Operations Staff, who stayed here. There have been isolated appearances of uniformed groups in Norway, but there has been no fighting as yet. Inquiries were made at the defense headquarters in London as to whether armed resistance should be offered in case of German or Norwegian police action. As yet no partisan or other fighting in Norway. On one occasion, captured members of the military organization in uniform claimed the right to be treated as prisoners of war. If this demand were met at the present moment, the result would be that active fighting on the part of the military organization would be set going. Please obtain cancellation of the order of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.”
And you, you voted for the exemption being removed, did you not?
“The objection is justified. Norway has a government in its own country. Whoever fights against it in the country is a rebel. It is another question in the case of Norwegian troops who were taken to England and from there brought into the struggle under England’s order.”
That is your note?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And you stick to that, do you? I mean you—that is your opinion today?
JODL: Yes, indeed. I am of the opinion, from the point of view of international law, that members of a resistance movement against their own Norwegian government are certainly not to be considered as normal troops but as constituting an uprising, a rebellion. But if Norwegian troops come to Norway from England, then they are regular soldiers. And that, today, is still my opinion on the basis of international law.
MR. ROBERTS: What do you call their own Norwegian government, the puppet government which was set up by the Germans?
JODL: In any event, there was the government of Quisling at the time; and in any event, speaking now from the point of view of international law, we were occupying the country, and therefore, according to international law, were justified in issuing laws and enforcing them. That is accepted under international law, and resistance against it has been considered all over the world as rebellion. The same applies to us in Germany today.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, I want to deal quite shortly with three other matters, and then I have finished. I want to deal first of all with what you have said with regard to Hitler’s suggestion to revoke the Geneva Convention. You say you were instrumental in preventing him from renouncing that Convention?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Would you look at a document which has already been put in, C-158, which is GB-209. I think you have loose copies for it; it is not in a document book. This was put in with regard to the case against Dönitz. It is headed, “Extracts from Minutes of the Hitler Conference on the 19th of February 1945...”:
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy was present on 19 February 1945.
“The Führer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention. As not only the Russians but also the Western Powers are violating international law by their actions against the defenseless population and the residential districts, it appears expedient to adopt the same course in order to show the enemy that we are determined to fight with every means for our existence, and also to urge our people to resist to the utmost. The Führer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to consider the pros and cons and to state his own opinion.”
Then, further down, My Lord—Commander-in-Chief of the Navy on the Hitler conference of the 20th of February:
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy informed Generaloberst Jodl, Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and the representative of the Foreign Office at the Führer’s headquarters, Ambassador Hewel, of his views with regard to Germany’s possible renunciation of the Geneva Convention. From a military standpoint there are no grounds for this step as far as the conduct of the war at sea is concerned. On the contrary, the disadvantages outweigh the advantages; even from a general standpoint it appears to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that this measure would bring no advantages. It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning and at all costs to save face with the world. The Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and Ambassador Hewel are in full agreement.”
You were saying there, were you not, that you agreed with Raeder when he said, “Break the Geneva Convention, but do not tell the world that we are doing so.”
JODL: Grossadmiral Dönitz.
MR. ROBERTS: Dönitz, right. I beg your pardon. That is what you were saying, is it not?
JODL: No. The whole thing, as I have said, is a notice of Admiral Wagner on a conference from which one can gather only that Grossadmiral Dönitz disapproved, and that he is supposed to have made this remark at the end. I can hardly account for that remark today, because the only reason given to us by the Führer at that time was that the tremendous number of German soldiers in the West must be prevented from deserting as a consequence of enemy propaganda about good treatment. I cannot explain this remark, and in my written draft which I submitted to the Führer and which contains the attitude of the Navy that sentence was not included, but only advantages and disadvantages were compared. The disadvantages were overwhelming; the whole thing was completely impracticable and impossible, and so it was not carried out. More I cannot say. Witnesses will confirm my statement.
MR. ROBERTS: I am now going to put to you your own Document D-606.
My Lord, that has not yet been exhibited. I offer it as 492-GB. GB-492.
[Turning to the defendant.] Now that is signed by you, is it not? It deals with the subject of the breach of the Geneva Convention. If you would say first if it is signed by you? Is it signed by you? Please answer my question: Is it signed by you?
JODL: Yes; my signature is at the end.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, that is where one usually finds the signature. Now, it is dated 21 February 1945, and it is written on your letterhead notepaper. And then, “Notes on report submitted to the Führer on 23 February through the Chief of the Operations Staff. The following questions were to be examined.”
My Lord, I do not propose to read it all, or anything like that. If the witness would follow me, I will read anything he wants. But it is a discussion as to the various advantages and disadvantages of repudiating the various international agreements, and I think I am not doing the witness an injustice if I say from a utilitarian rather than a moral point of view.
JODL: Yes, quite correct. For my only aim was to succeed with the Führer, and this document was worded accordingly.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, I want to read the last paragraph.
My Lord, it is the last page but one of Your Lordship’s document, right at the bottom:
“C. Proposal of the OKW:
“At the present moment the disadvantages of repudiating the agreements which have been kept up to now in any case outweigh the advantages by far.
“Just as it was a mistake in 1914 that we ourselves solemnly declared war on all the states which had for a long time wanted to wage war on us, and through this took the whole guilt of the war on our shoulders before the outside world, and just as it was a mistake to admit that the necessary”—note the word “necessary”—“passage through Belgium in 1914 was our own fault, so it would be a mistake now to repudiate openly the obligations of international law which we accepted and thereby to stand again as the guilty party before the outside world.
“Adherence to the accepted obligations does not demand in any way that we should have to impose on ourselves any limitations which will interfere with the conduct of the war. For instance, if the British sink a hospital ship, this must be used for propaganda purposes, as has been done to date. That, of course, in no way prevents our sinking an English hospital ship at once as a reprisal and then expressing our regret that it was a mistake in the same manner as the British do.”
That is not very honorable, is it?
JODL: I can only say in reply that this was the sole method which achieved success with the Führer, and by its use success was, in fact, achieved. If I had come to him with moral or purely legal arguments, he would have said, “Leave me alone with this foolish talk,” and he would have proceeded with the renunciation of the Convention; but these things compelled him to reconsider the step and, in consequence, he did not carry it through.
You must after all grant me that at the end of 5½ years I knew best how to achieve good results with him and avoid bad ones. My aim was to achieve success, and I achieved it.
MR. ROBERTS: But, you see, you were deploring it there, the fact that you told the world the truth in 1914. In 1914 you said that you regarded treaties only as a scrap of paper. You are saying now, “What a pity we told the world the truth in 1914. We ought to have told them something untrue, and then we should have, possibly, had a better world reputation.”
JODL: That was an argument which the Führer used frequently. If one repeated his arguments in that form again and again he was more inclined to read and accept one’s suggestions. One had to prevent his flinging our proposals to the ground in a fit of rage and immediately decreeing renunciation. That was the approach one had to follow. If one cannot do good openly, it is better to do it in a roundabout way than not at all.
MR. ROBERTS: I am now coming to quite another point: Were you an admirer of the principles of the Nazi Party?
JODL: No.
MR. ROBERTS: Were you of the opinion that there was a successful fusion between the Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht, which brought about the rejuvenation, the resurrection of Germany after 1933?
JODL: It would have happened, and I hoped for a long time that it would happen; indeed, on the whole the relationship improved somewhat in the course of the years and especially during the war. At first, it was poor, very poor.
MR. ROBERTS: You wrote—please, I am reading now from your speech, L-172. It is Page 290 of Document Book 7, and it is Page 6 of your lecture notes, Page 290 of Document Book 7 and 203 of the German:
“The fact that the National Socialist movement in its struggle for internal power was the preparatory stage to the outer liberation from the shackles of the dictate of Versailles I need not enlarge upon in this circle. I should like, however, to mention how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National Socialist movement in reawakening the will to fight, in nurturing fighting strength, and in rearming the German people. Despite all its inherent virtues this small Reichswehr could never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Führer aimed at and has luckily been successful in bringing about was a fusion of these two forces.”
Did that represent your honest opinion or not?
JODL: Yes, that is historical truth, indisputable historical truth. The Movement did bring that about; that is certain.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Then, I now want to put to you the last document but one that I put in.
My Lord, it has not been exhibited. It is 1808-PS. I offer it as GB-493.
[Turning to the defendant.] You made a speech, did you not, after the attempt on Hitler’s life, to your staff? And are these the notes of your speech on 24 July?
JODL: I have never seen this document before; I am seeing it for the first time now. I did not know that any notes were made about the speech.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, let us go by stages. Did you make a speech to your staff shortly after the attempt on Hitler’s life—on 24 July 1944?
JODL: Yes, even while my head was still bandaged.
MR. ROBERTS: Secondly, is that document which you have in front of you, is that a document which comes from your files? Look at the cover, if necessary.
JODL: I assume so. It is headed: “Armed Forces Operations Staff War Diary.” Most likely these are notes of Major Schramm.
MR. ROBERTS: Let me begin at the beginning of those notes. Just see if you can remember what you said. Did you begin by saying: “The 20th of July was the blackest day which German history has seen as yet, and will probably remain so for all times”?
JODL: Yes, that is quite possible.
MR. ROBERTS: Why was it such a black day for Germany? Because somebody tried to assassinate a man whom you now admit was a murderer?
JODL: Should I—at a moment when I am to be blown up in a cowardly, insidious manner by one of my own comrades, together with many opponents of the regime—should I perhaps approve of it all? That was to me the worst thing that happened. If the man with a pistol in his hand had shot the Führer and had then given himself up, it would have been entirely different. But these tactics I considered most repulsive to any officer. I spoke under the impression of those events, which are actually among the worst I know, and I maintain today what I said then.
MR. ROBERTS: I do not want to argue with you, but do you think it is any more dastardly than shooting those 50 American soldiers who landed in the north of Italy to destroy a military target, shooting them like dogs?
JODL: That also was murder, undoubtedly. But it is not the task of a soldier to be the judge of his commander-in-chief. May history or the Almighty do that.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I have only about three more questions to ask you.
My Lord, I am going to read from Page 2 of that document, about 10 lines from the top. It begins, “The Führer...”
[Turning to the defendant.] If I read this slowly, perhaps see if you can recognize it.
“The Führer ignored this and other things, and now the would-be assassins wished to do away with him, as a ‘despot’.”
Do you remember saying that or something like that? Can you find the place?
“The Führer ignored this and other things, and now the would-be assassins wished to eliminate him as a ‘despot’.”
Do you remember that?
“And yet, they themselves experienced how the Führer did not come to power by force, but borne up by the love of the German people.”
Do you remember saying that?
JODL: Yes, and that is true. He came to power, borne up by the love of the German people. I had tremendous experiences in that respect. He was almost overwhelmed by this love of the people and of the soldiers.
MR. ROBERTS: Borne up by—I beg your pardon, have you finished? I did not mean to interrupt you.
JODL: Yes, I have dealt with that point.
MR. ROBERTS: Borne up by the love of the German people. You have forgotten the SS, the Gestapo, and the concentration camps for political opponents, have you not?
JODL: I have told you how unfortunately little I knew of all these things, almost nothing. Of course, with a knowledge of these things, all this takes a different aspect.
MR. ROBERTS: I take your answer, and I put my last document to you.
My Lord, this is a new document, 1776-PS; I offer it as GB-494.
[Turning to the defendant.] Just have a look; see if it is signed by you, will you?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: So it is signed by you. Now, you have told this Court that you were opposed to terror attacks. Just see what this document says. Now, note the date first, the 30th of June 1940. That is just after the temporary fall of France?
“Chief WFA.
“The Continuation of the War against England.
“If political means are without results, England’s will to resist must be broken by force:
“a) by making war against the English mother country.
“b) by extending the war on the periphery.
“Regarding Point a) there are three possibilities:
“1) Siege....
“2) Terror attacks against English centers of population.
“3) Landing of troops....”
And now I read this as an example of historical prophesy:
“Germany’s final victory also over England is only a question of time.”
Then I go down several paragraphs:
“Together with propaganda and temporary terror attacks—declared to be reprisal actions—this increasing weakening of English food supply will paralyze the will of her people to resist and finally break and thus force its government to capitulate....”—Signed—“Jodl.”
“Terror attacks against English centers of population”—would you like to say anything to justify that sentence?
JODL: Yes, a few remarks. This proposal, which actually is only a compilation of notes, proves three things:
First of all, that on 30 June 1940 I did not know of any intention or of the possibility of entering into a war with Russia, otherwise I would not have written: “Germany’s final victory over England is only a question of time.”
Secondly, I admit having voiced a thought which was later carried into practice with such perfection by the Anglo-American Air Force.
Thirdly, this thought came to me only after the attack on the civilian population had been started and continued by the English Air Force, despite months of efforts and repeated warnings on the part of the Führer.
It is a historical fact, confirmed by many documents, that the Führer tried to the utmost to avoid this form of aerial war against the population. But it was already clear at that time, that he would not be able to succeed.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, I have finished, Witness. You will notice that of all the documents I have put, except for that one American report, they were all German documents, originating at the time of these events about which I have been cross-examining.
In the face of those documents, do you still say that you are an honorable soldier and a truthful man?
JODL: Not only do I still affirm that, but I also think that the submission of these documents has actually and quite specifically proved it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 7 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-NINTH DAY Friday, 7 June 1946
Morning Session
[The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at 4 o’clock to sit in closed session. The Tribunal will sit tomorrow in open session from 1000 to 1300.
COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): You have testified that you were the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. That was the chief department of the OKW, was it not?
JODL: I did not quite understand the last part of your question.
COL. POKROVSKY: Was the Armed Forces Operations Staff the chief department of the OKW?
JODL: Because of the significance of the activity, one can certainly say that the Armed Forces Operations Staff was one of the most important departments of the OKW.
COL. POKROVSKY: Is that the reason why you deputized for Keitel in his absence?
JODL: In the majority of cases I was the deputy only in operational matters. As for war ministerial questions, it was the senior chief, as a rule, Admiral Canaris, who deputized.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you deny that you were Keitel’s deputy?
JODL: When Keitel was not at headquarters, then, as a matter of course, whenever the Führer had anything to say to the OKW, he talked first with me, as I was the next officer by seniority.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you remember the testimony of the witness Wagner to the effect that either you or Keitel usually represented the OKW at all important staff meetings at which this witness, Admiral Wagner, was also present? Do you remember that testimony?
JODL: I did not quite understand that question on account of translation difficulties.
COL. POKROVSKY: That is possible. I shall repeat it. On the 13th of May, appeared the witness Wagner here before the Tribunal. Do you remember, or not?
JODL: I remember the witness Wagner. He testified that Field Marshal Keitel and I were present at every situation report, and I do not dispute it.
COL. POKROVSKY: He said either Field Marshal Keitel or Generaloberst Jodl was present. Is that correct? Do you catch the difference in the way this question is phrased?
JODL: In 99 percent of all cases, both of us were present at the situation conferences.
COL. POKROVSKY: So that if we forget for one minute such formal considerations, such formal circumstances, would it be right to conclude that it was precisely you, Jodl, who actually was Keitel’s acting deputy in the eyes of Hitler, of the whole cadre of officers, and of the entire military machinery of the German Reich? Would that be correct, or not?
JODL: In individual cases, when the Field Marshal was not there, and in unimportant things, yes; but when it came to important things I could reach him by telephone, at any time, and so it hardly ever happened that I deputized. He was never ill, and was never away on leave. When he was away he was in Berlin at headquarters.
COL. POKROVSKY: In that case I would like to remind you of one such fact, which you yourself confirmed here on the 6th of June, while testifying to the Tribunal about the motives which caused you to sign Document UK-56, Exhibit RF-1438. You said that the document had had no connection with your sphere of activity. It concerned the deportation of Jews from Denmark and, you signed the document even though it actually had no connection with the operations staff work. You signed it because Keitel was away at the time. Was it not so? Is it true?
JODL: That is absolutely correct. It was an urgent matter and had to be signed immediately.
COL. POKROVSKY: Good. We can find a great many documents of that type; but I do not consider it necessary to waste any more time on the further elucidation of this point. Tell me, would it be correct to say that you were well aware of the entire work carried out by the OKW—that you well knew what important problems were occupying the OKW at that time?
JODL: Only to a limited extent—in individual matters. I was not at all aware of everything that took place in the numerous offices in Berlin. That was quite impossible. It did not concern me. I have testified already that my time was so fully taken up that I had much more to do than I had time for.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, you force me to revert to a question which I really wanted to have done with. Will you please now look at our new Document USSR-476. This document consists of excerpts from Keitel’s testimony of 9 November 1945. It is stated there:
“Question: ‘Would it have been possible for General Jodl, without your knowledge to call such a meeting?’”
We are talking, My Lord, of the conference in Reichenhall.
Reply of Field Marshal Keitel:
“Yes, it was quite possible, as I was frequently on official journeys; and General Jodl had authority to call a meeting because he represented me in my absence.”
Have you found the passage? Have you read it?
JODL: Colonel Pokrovsky, of course, it is very difficult for you to follow these military matters. It is ridiculous. Surely I may question my staff officers. I do not need to call a meeting for that. These were my General Staff officers with whom I worked in Reichenhall. Surely I could go to them. That was my office and my duty.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary for you to raise your voice in that way.
COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me that you have still not answered two of my questions. First, have you read this document?
Please tell me: Have you, or have you not, read the passage which I have just read into the record on Page 1?
JODL: Yes. Here, Field Marshal Keitel says, “...since I was very often away on official journeys...”
COL. POKROVSKY: You do not have to read it a second time. I have read it already. I merely want you to tell me whether you have read that passage?
JODL: Yes, I read that, and it says here, “...to ask Generaloberst Jodl.”
COL. POKROVSKY: No, you are reading beyond the passage which interests me at this moment. As for the words “...to ask Generaloberst Jodl.”—rest assured, we shall get to that passage. But is it true that Keitel was often away, and that you deputized for him? I do not hear any answer.
[There was no response.]
I still hear no answer.
JODL: I have already said that, now and then, he went to the front for a day or so and that he was several times in Berlin for a few days; but he was at those offices which were subordinate to him. I was alone with my operations staff, and I could do whatever I pleased with my staff. During the entire war I never called a conference of other offices as a deputy of Field Marshal Keitel. I did not understand anything about those matters.
COL. POKROVSKY: You have uttered a great many words, but have not given me a clear answer to my very short and simple question—namely, do you confirm, or do you not confirm, the truth of Keitel’s statement? “Yes” or “no.” That is very easy to answer, is it not?
JODL: That is what it amounts to, but the thing as written down is ridiculous.
COL. POKROVSKY: We shall gauge the truth of your statement later. It is important to me to establish the fact.
I am submitting our Document USSR-263 to the Tribunal. You will now have the pleasure of reading it yourself. It is an excerpt from the evidence of another officer who worked with you, General Warlimont. Please acquaint yourself with that passage which is marked on your copy while I read it aloud. That will be quicker.
The question put to Warlimont:
“When did the OKW first receive the order for preparing for the attack on the Soviet Union?”
Have you found this passage?
JODL: That which I have before me—the passage which is marked in red—contains a statement by Warlimont as to the organization of the offices of the OKW. On the next page something follows about the preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union.
COL. POKROVSKY: “When did the OKW first receive the order for preparing for the attack on the Soviet Union?”
Warlimont replies:
“I personally first heard about the plan on 29 July 1940... On that day Generaloberst Jodl arrived by special train in Bad Reichenhall, where also Section ‘L’ of the Armed Forces Operations Staff was quartered.”
Have you found the passage?
JODL: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, I do not consider it necessary to read a greater part of Warlimont’s testimony, because we are dealing with a well-known fact, that is, the convocation of the conference during which Jodl gave his colleagues the order to prepare the plan for the attack on the Soviet Union. This document has already been accepted in evidence by the Tribunal.
Warlimont then states, “Jodl stunned us by his announcement of the coming attack, for which we were not at all prepared.” Have you found the passage? Please look at the document.
[There was no response.]
Jodl, will you please take the document in your hand and see whether it has been read into the record correctly.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it not coming through properly? Wait a minute.
DR. EXNER: I just wanted to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that the translation and the transmission is coming through to us so very badly that I have scarcely understood anything. I hear only half a question at a time, and I am surprised that the defendant could answer at all.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it coming through better now? Is the translation coming through better now?
DR. EXNER: I am of the opinion that the translation itself is poor, not only the technical transmission. It is often very difficult to understand the question—it makes no sense at all. And my colleague, Dr. Stahmer, confirms this. Therefore it is difficult for us.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we had better go on and see, perhaps, if it will improve.
COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to read one other sentence to yourself. It is the passage in which Warlimont states to whom the responsibility for elaborating the plans was entrusted and how the officers present had reacted. He testifies, “Jodl stunned us by this announcement...” It is on the first page at about the middle of the page. Have you found it?
JODL: I could not find the sentence which you have just read, “Jodl stunned us.” I cannot find that sentence.
COL. POKROVSKY: In that case, I shall begin with the preceding sentence. Perhaps it will be easier for you.
“Besides myself, he also ordered three other senior officers ... Colonel Von Lossberg, Lieutenant Colonel Freiherr von Falkenstein of the Luftwaffe, and Captain Junge of the Navy to attend.”
Have you found it?
JODL: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you.
“Jodl stunned us by this announcement ... for which we were not at all prepared.”
And then a little further down:
“Jodl announced that the Führer had decided to prepare for war against Russia. The Führer based his decision on the fact that war with Russia must come sooner or later and that it would be better to carry this campaign through in the course of this war...”
Have you found the passage?
JODL: Yes, I have it.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Now, I would like you to read one more paragraph from Document USSR-476, which has just been handed to you, on Page 1. It is, Jodl, the one which you began to read the first time, and I told you then that we should get back to it eventually. Keitel is asked whether he knows anything about that conference, and he answers:
“I know nothing whatever about a conference with regard to an attack on the Soviet Union. I heard about it for the first time after I was imprisoned here.”
Have you found the place?
JODL: No. I have not found it, but I do recall it. I read it just a short while ago.
COL. POKROVSKY: I should like you to have it. We do not want any misunderstandings. A little lower down Keitel states that you did not inform him of this conference even later. Is that so? Do you confirm this statement, or do you not? Would you say that Keitel had testified correctly?
JODL: Actually there is no such thing as a conference in these military matters. You have conferences in civil and parliamentary life, but we do not have conferences. I talked to my General Staff officers as often as I pleased. Therefore, it is...
COL. POKROVSKY: Excuse me, I am going to interrupt you here. Later on you may add all you wish to say, but I merely want a direct answer to the question: Is Keitel’s testimony correct, that you never reported this conference to him? Is that true or not?
JODL: I certainly did not report to him on this very discussion; but that is not in the least important. I am certain that I reported to him what the Führer told me, because that was an important matter; and later, because of this, he wrote a memorandum. Therefore, he must have heard about it—but that is only a supposition, a very likely supposition, which I am voicing here.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, I am perfectly satisfied with your reply. And to conclude my first group of questions, I want to ask just one more on this particular matter: Do you not agree with me that only the Deputy Chief of the OKW, and not just any other responsible official, could quite independently—without Keitel’s knowledge, without any instructions, and without even a post factum report to him—decide questions, such as the preparation of a plan for attacking another country? Have you understood my question?
JODL: I understood your words, but not their meaning. First of all, you put a wrong assertion in your question. You asserted that I did not report the preparation for an attack on a neutral country to Field Marshal Keitel. That is an assertion on your part which I refuted yesterday under oath. We were not concerned with an attack on the Soviet Union at this meeting. We were concerned with the defense against a Soviet attack on the Romanian oil fields. That is established in Document C-170, the War Diary of the Navy.
COL. POKROVSKY: Is that all you wanted to say on that question?
JODL: I believe that suffices.
COL. POKROVSKY: I do not intend to argue with you. I merely wish to say that we have two proofs of this conference. First, your testimony, in which you deny the fact of the preparation of a plan for attacking the Soviet Union; and second, the testimony of another participant at this conference, Warlimont, who says straight out that the meeting was specifically concerned with elaborating the plan of attack on the Soviet Union and that this directive greatly astonished all of them. I do not intend to deal with this question any further, but I should like to ask...
JODL: If you are interested, I could explain that divergence to you.
COL. POKROVSKY: No, at the present moment it does not interest me.
Would it be correct to state that you were either the leading, or one of the leading, staff officers in Hitlerite Germany who were engaged in preparing measures for attacking the Soviet Union, as far back as the summer of 1940? It is precisely on this matter that I want to hear your reply. Is the question clear to you?
JODL: The question is clear, and my answer to it is that I was probably the first who learned of the Führer’s concern about Russia’s political attitude. However, I was not the first who made preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union. To my surprise I discovered here, through the witness Paulus, that long before we concerned ourselves with any orders of this kind, plans of attack were already worked out in the General Staff of the Army. I cannot tell you with absolute certainty why it was done. Perhaps Generaloberst Halder can tell us about that. I can only express that as a supposition on my part.
COL. POKROVSKY: Suppositions are of no interest to us; we are only concerned with facts here. On the day before yesterday, the 5th of June, you stated that the attack on the Soviet Union, whereby Germany broke her nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, was in the nature of a preventive war. That is what you then stated, is it not?
JODL: Yes, that is what I said, it was a preventive war.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. That is your opinion. Do you remember that from the testimonies of Milch and Raeder, from the testimony of Göring, from the testimonies of Paulus and Keitel, it seems that they were all opposed to the attack on the Soviet Union? I shall read into the record one sentence from Keitel’s testimony here in court just to help you to remember.
While General Rudenko, Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. was cross-examining Keitel, he put this question:
“You stated that you especially went to Hitler with the request that he, Hitler, change his intentions with regard to the Soviet Union?”
Answer (Keitel): “Yes, I asked him not only to change this plan, but to do away with these plans altogether, that is, not to wage war against the Soviet Union.”
Do you remember that testimony of Keitel?
JODL: Yes, I remember, and I know the memorandum as well.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Do you not find it rather strange that a man—in this case yourself—who has in every way endeavored to disclaim the fact that he was Keitel’s deputy, should emphasize before Hitler and here before the Tribunal, that he was better informed on current events than Keitel and could, therefore, find the courage to make a statement in direct opposition to the attitude of Keitel, Paulus, Raeder, Göring, and Milch?
JODL: I did not understand that.
COL. POKROVSKY: I shall be very pleased to make my meaning more explicit. Keitel did not appear to see any necessity for what you call a “preventive” war, and all the persons whose testimony I have just mentioned also saw no reason for waging a so-called “preventive” war. They did not believe that the Soviet Union intended to attack Germany, whereas you declared that the war was of a “preventive” nature. Now, do you understand my question?
JODL: Yes, now I understand you.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, would you like to answer the question?
JODL: Yes, I can give an explanation. First of all, it is not certain what stand Field Marshal Keitel took in the spring of 1941 with regard to this question. Secondly, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force—with due respect to both of these gentlemen—saw the problem as a whole only from the point of view of naval or air strategy, and they saw no danger whatsoever in the Russian Navy or the Russian Air Force. What was taking place on land, of course, was of less interest to them. That explains why the strongest opposition came from the Luftwaffe and the Navy; and only the Army, in this case, was much more inclined to see the tremendous danger with which it was confronted. But in spite of this, every one of us, I myself included, warned the Führer most urgently against this experiment, which should have been undertaken only if there really was no other way out. I will not take it upon myself to judge whether there might perhaps have been a political possibility which was not exhausted; I cannot judge that.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. I am satisfied with your reply, and particularly with the fact that you have condescended to define the breaking of this treaty and the attack on the Soviet Union by the word “experiment.” I want you to look at the document...
THE PRESIDENT: I think you should not make comments of that sort. You must ask questions and not make comments.
COL. POKROVSKY: My remark, My Lord, is connected with my next question.
[Turning to the defendant.] Witness, please look at Document 865-PS. Have you got this document?
JODL: Yes, I have the document before me.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In reply to the questions of your counsel, you stated that Lammers had, quite by accident, designated you as a collaborator of Rosenberg. There in your hands is a very brief document, which I shall now read aloud—a document signed by Keitel. It is a top-secret letter of 25 April 1941, addressed to Rosenberg personally. This letter states:
“The Chief of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the Führer’s directive appointing you his plenipotentiary for dealing with questions relating to eastern European territories. I, on the part of the High Command of the Armed Forces, entrust the handling of these questions to the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, General of Artillery Jodl, with Major General Warlimont as his deputy. I request that your department contact these two persons only.
“Heil Hitler! Yours truly”—signed—“Keitel.”
With this document in mind what do you say now in reply to the question as to whether or not you remember, that you, with Warlimont as your deputy, were charged by the High Command of the Armed Forces, as far back as April 1941, to deal with the practical problems of the Hitlerite expansion to the east in accordance with the directives of the Staff Rosenberg.
Do you understand my question?
JODL: I already told the Court yesterday everything that can be said in connection with this formality. Minister Lammers sent the very same letter to all Reich Ministries. He asked every Ministry to designate a plenipotentiary and a deputy; and accordingly, Field Marshal Keitel naturally designated the two officers who were at headquarters. I never worked with Rosenberg, and it was not necessary to do so—except for one single talk with him, which I mentioned yesterday. Only my propaganda section conferred with the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories about leaflets—quite simple matters which every soldier can understand.
COL. POKROVSKY: By the way, concerning the question of soldiers. You stubbornly affirm that you were only concerned with military questions of an operational nature and had nothing to do at all with political questions. Have I understood you correctly?
JODL: I gave that explanation yesterday as well, insofar as politics were not an integral part of the strategy. To a certain extent politics did come into it, for without politics there could be no strategy. It is an essential part of strategy. But since I was not a strategist, but only dealt with this matter as a General Staff officer, I was not concerned with this subject directly.
COL. POKROVSKY: You were not concerned with these matters? You will now look at Document C-26, Exhibit USSR-477, and I must ask you if you have found your own signature on the last page.
JODL: Yes, I see my signature.
COL. POKROVSKY: You have found it? It is a directive on the organization of propaganda in connection with “Case Barbarossa.” Is that correct?
JODL: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Are you going to deny that in that directive, issued by you, the question is clearly put that the U.S.S.R., as a sovereign state, should be destroyed and that you consider that a purely military problem—you, an officer of the General Staff, did not deal with politics?
JODL: I cannot find the place where it says that Russia is to be destroyed.
COL. POKROVSKY: You are quite right if you want to draw attention to the wording. It is not stated there in just these words. I am thinking of the general sense of the directive, particularly of Subparagraph “d.”
JODL: Yes, but—I know the document.
COL. POKROVSKY: I want to read out one sentence:
“Propaganda aiming at the dismemberment of the Soviet Union into separate states shall not be used for the time being.”
Further on there are a couple of technical remarks, and then it says in the same paragraph:
“Nevertheless, we should avoid such terms as ‘Russia,’ ‘Russians,’ ‘Russian Armed Forces,’ et cetera, and substitute ‘Soviet Union,’ ‘Peoples of the Soviet Union,’ ‘Red Army,’ et cetera.”
Have you found the place, Jodl?
JODL: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. What would you like to say if you want to say anything at all on the subject?
JODL: Why, certainly. I wish to answer the question.
COL. POKROVSKY: If you please.
JODL: As may be seen from the heading of this directive, it deals with the handling of propaganda. Compared with the British and the Soviet Union, we were mere schoolboys in propaganda. You are perhaps aware that propaganda is something quite justifiable and is not limited by any regulations of international law. At one time, in Geneva, there was a long debate about this; and the idea that propaganda should be restricted by international law was rejected. I have already stated that in my preliminary interrogation. In the field of propaganda, I can do whatever I wish. There is no law, either criminal or international, in regard to that. But perhaps you do not know that this propaganda had to be in line with the political directives of the Führer, and this was being done here. I am very well acquainted with propaganda, for I studied it for 5 years—yours, too. That is still quite another type of propaganda.
COL. POKROVSKY: You preferred not to give a direct answer to the question you were asked. I am perfectly satisfied with that, too, since I have understood your attitude toward this subject.
Now, I should be interested in receiving a reply to the following question: What connection did the Ministry of Propaganda have with the issue of this directive? Did this Ministry participate in the drafting of the directive, or were you and the OKW solely responsible? Did you understand me?
JODL: Yes, I understood you. My propaganda division worked in Berlin. I cannot tell you in detail how it worked with Minister Rosenberg or with the Ministry of Propaganda on such a document. But General Von Wedel, the chief of this division, could tell you. I only knew it was drawn up in agreement with the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, for I was always eager that we should not take separate lines but rather work in line with the competent civilian authorities. But it is only propaganda; it is not a directive to destroy Russia. Propaganda is a spiritual weapon.
COL. POKROVSKY: I do not propose to enter into a discussion with you on what constitutes propaganda and whether you were only responsible for propaganda. We shall have quite a number of other questions to ask.
Do you suggest that this directive was issued after a certain pattern decided upon with other departments? That is how I understood you. Is this correct? Partly by agreement with “Stab Rosenberg”?
JODL: Yes, I believe that.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Now let us pass on to a second complex of questions. Do you dispute the fact that the document regarding the conference at Hitler’s headquarters on 27 March 1941 dealt with the subject of Yugoslavia? You, of course, remember that conference?
JODL: Yes, I remember that.
COL. POKROVSKY: Would you argue the fact that the documents describing this conference and the directive for operations against Yugoslavia—both documents are dated 28 March 1941, in other words, they were issued on the following day—would you still argue that these documents did not emanate from the Armed Forces Operations Staff, that is, from you personally? You can, if you like, take a look at Document 1746-PS. It might help you to remember events.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, you are not losing sight of the fact that this subject was fully gone into by Mr. Roberts in cross-examination of the defendant?
COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, if you consider that the question has already been completely clarified, I shall refrain from asking it. But it seems to me that insofar as I understood him, he analyzed this question in another sense. But if you think the matter is clear, I shall withdraw it.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know yet. But I was only pointing out to you that it had been fully gone into by Mr. Roberts. I do not know what this document you are suggesting is.
COL. POKROVSKY: I offered for the attention of the defendant two documents, My Lord: the directive for operations against Yugoslavia, dated 28 March, and the minutes of the conference. Both documents were submitted to the Tribunal. If you think that the matter has been fully covered already, I will not ask the questions. However, it appears to me that there is some reason for asking the question.
THE PRESIDENT: All the Tribunal want to know is whether there is some really fresh point which is being brought out. You must have heard Mr. Roberts’ cross-examination of the defendant upon the Yugoslavian attack. And I do not know what these documents of the 22d of March and the 28th of March are, or what you are asking to get out of them. If there is anything that is really fresh or new, of course, you may put it; but if it is not, then it is covered by what the Tribunal have already said, that cross-examination ought not to go over the same ground again.
COL. POKROVSKY: If you will permit me to say so, My Lord, I understood Jodl to mean that for him...
THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you, too.
COL. POKROVSKY: I understood in Jodl’s testimony, in reply to Mr. Roberts’ question, that it is still not quite clear as to who was in charge of the operations against Yugoslavia; and I only want to have this point elucidated. Now, if the Tribunal consider that this question has already been replied to, I shall, of course, withdraw it.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal are not able to see what there is fresh in this method of questioning that you are now raising; and unless you insist upon it yourself because you think it is of great importance, I think you should pass on to the next matter in your cross-examination.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. I shall continue, My Lord.
[Turning to the defendant.] Your counsel has submitted Document L-172, containing the following sentence made by you in your speech to the Gauleiter of 7 November 1943. I shall read out this sentence: “This dilemma of the shortage of men has brought us to the idea of utilizing more fully the reserves of manpower in the occupied territories.”
Do you remember this document?
JODL: I did not understand the question.
COL. POKROVSKY: I can repeat it. Your counsel submitted to the Tribunal Document L-172, which is a speech made by you before the Gauleiter.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the matter now? You cannot hear without your earphones on.
[Turning to Dr. Exner.] Do you wish to say something?
DR. EXNER: If you please, Mr. President, the translation is such that we simply cannot understand anything. We receive half a sentence which makes no sense at all—at least, that is our opinion—and I believe the other gentlemen, including the defendant, have the same difficulty...
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has not shown any sign that he was unable to understand the translation; he has never protested, and he has answered the questions.
DR. EXNER: Do you understand, Defendant?
JODL: I would say that I can guess what most of the questions mean. Since I am fully acquainted with the problem, it is easy for me; but I am not sure...
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, will you go a little slower. You heard, did you not, what Dr. Exner said?
COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, I heard him. I fear, however, My Lord, that the tempo of my speech may impede the interrogation, but I shall try to speak more slowly.
[Turning to the defendant.] In the speech with which you addressed the Gauleiter on the 7th of November 1943, you expressed, inter alia, the following idea: “The dilemma of the shortage of men has brought us to the idea of utilizing more fully...”
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, can you possibly indicate to us what page this is on. In our book we have not any single document in English, as yet. This document we have not had in English.
COL. POKROVSKY: It is Document L-172, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, this very passage that you have just read, or part of which you just read, was put by Mr. Roberts yesterday to the defendant. Surely that is contrary to our rules; we cannot have the same subject gone over twice. We already have it marked.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am quoting this sentence, My Lord, not as a question to the witness, but only as an introductory remark to the question which is to follow this sentence. I am reminding him of this sentence in order to receive an answer. The sentence as such is not to be considered as a question.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat what you said?
COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, he will now receive the document in order to save time, and I shall then ask him the question. I want...
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, we want to know what the question is, so we may see if it is not a question which has been gone into by Mr. Roberts. Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal have indicated to you that they do not want you to go over the same ground which was gone over yesterday. If you have some new question, by all means put it.
COL. POKROVSKY: I do not intend, Mr. President, to repeat in my questions any question previously asked by Mr. Roberts. Therefore, with your permission, I shall now continue, and I should like you, Witness, to look at Document J-6, Exhibit Number USSR-130. It is stated in these documents that they were issued with the consent of the OKW. They deal with the introduction of general conscription in the occupied territories of Carinthia and Krain. Have you found it? Have you found the passage that I have just read, that is, the decree dealing with the introduction of conscription in the occupied territories of Carinthia and Krain?
JODL: Yes, that document begins with the following sentence...
COL. POKROVSKY: It begins with the following sentence, “In agreement with the OKW...” Is that correct?
JODL: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: As Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, you could not but know of such facts as the conscription for service in the German Army of the population of the occupied Yugoslav territories. What do you have to say about this decree, which is a gross violation of international law? Do you understand my question?
JODL: Yes. I can only say that I see it here for the first time. This is the first I have heard of it. After all, I am not the OKW. I am Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. I never read this document during the war.
COL. POKROVSKY: Will you read it, then, immediately. Do you not consider it a gross violation of international law?
JODL: In order to give my opinion, I would have to go into it more fully from a legal point of view, and I am not in a position to do that, and I believe it is not of interest to the Tribunal.
COL. POKROVSKY: Well, on 4 June you testified before the Tribunal that the decisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions were your reference book. You will now be shown Document 638-PS, submitted to the Tribunal on 20 March as Exhibit USA-788. The authenticity of this document...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, 638 is the document which has been handed up.
COL. POKROVSKY: It is Document 638-PS, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, is the document that you just handed up to us J-6? Are you offering that in evidence? Are you offering that?
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I am not submitting a new document. It was already submitted as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Are you referring to the Document 638-PS, or are you referring to Document J-6?
COL. POKROVSKY: I am referring to Document 638-PS, accepted by the Tribunal as U.S.A. evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: I was not. I was referring to the Document J-6. The document which is here before me, which is 638, is the Yugoslav document.
COL. POKROVSKY: The document to which you refer, My Lord, bears a double number, USSR-130 and J-6; and the second document also bears a double number, USSR-447.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not want to know about the second document. I only want to know whether you are offering the first document in evidence, or has it already been offered in evidence?
COL. POKROVSKY: It has already been submitted, My Lord, by the Delegation of the Soviet Union.
[Turning to the defendant.] You, Jodl, have probably had sufficient time to read the document. Is that right? Have you read it?
JODL: I know about this document from these proceedings.
COL. POKROVSKY: Quite correct. I only wish to remind you that Göring has twice confirmed the authenticity of this document and merely questioned the accuracy of certain entries in individual sentences. I should now like to ask you how you reconcile your concepts of international law with the formation of bands under German command, attired in German military uniforms, bands recruited from the dregs of the criminal classes, who were officially authorized to plunder, murder, burn, and violate—they could also do all this during military operations. Have you understood my question?
You, of course, well remember that these bands were actually created and entered the ranks of the Armed Forces of the German Reich. You remember the testimony of the witness Von dem Bach-Zelewski, of 7 January 1946, concerning the special commands acting on these principles?
JODL: I do not know just how you come to know that the High Command gave its approval and that this actually took place; I do not know. These are merely the notes of alleged statements by the Reich Marshal, but I do not know how they concern me.
COL. POKROVSKY: I shall try to help you to understand this fact. Do you remember that at the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942 a special command was formed to operate against the partisans? The first commanding officer of that unit was Dirlewanger, and Von dem Bach-Zelewski testified about him here on 7 January 1946. Do you remember that?
JODL: No, I do not remember that.
COL. POKROVSKY: You cannot remember? Very well. Then we shall prove it without your testimony. Do you remember the fact that units of the Yugoslav Army wore regulation uniforms, complete with insignia, numbers of regiments and divisions? Do you remember that? Do you understand my question, or do you not?
JODL: I understood. Do you mean the Brandenburg Regiment? I have some idea of that.
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I have something else in mind. I wish to remind you that despite the fact that parts of the Yugoslav Army did not come under these descriptions which you have enumerated here before the Tribunal in speaking of bands—that these parts of the Yugoslav Army were referred to in every official document of the German High Command as bands, in order to justify any atrocity perpetrated against them, and only in the top-secret correspondence between German officers and staffs was the correct, factual nomenclature of these divisions, regiments, and brigades indicated. Perhaps this fact, in your opinion, also testifies to the adherence of the German High Command to the standards of international law? Have you understood me?
JODL: I understand you very well, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you wish to say anything on the matter?
JODL: Yes. I can only say this assertion of yours is untrue. We...
COL. POKROVSKY: I would ask you to reply as briefly as possible.
JODL: Yes, I was going to answer very briefly. We always called these Yugoslav bandits “bands” for propaganda reasons, but in practice uniformed fighters always were treated as prisoners of war; and there is no order which would have prevented them from receiving such treatment as prisoners of war. Otherwise, we would not have had so many prisoners.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am very much obliged to you for having raised the question of the prisoners of war. You have testified on oath before the Tribunal that there was no decree which forbade taking prisoners of war. You have not yet forgotten that testimony of yours?
JODL: No, there are no international law regulations which apply to a rebellion. There is no such thing.
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I asked you to confirm only if I have rendered your testimony correctly to the Tribunal. You stated, before the Tribunal, that there was no decree against taking prisoners of war. Did you give such testimony before the Tribunal, or did you not?
JODL: What you have stated here is not my verbatim testimony.
COL. POKROVSKY: Just a minute, just a minute. We shall discuss in detail the matter I have mentioned. First, I want you to tell me the following: You stated, before the Tribunal, on oath, that there was no decree in the German Armed Forces to the effect that prisoners of war were not to be taken. Did you give this testimony or not? Have you understood me?
JODL: I think I remember. I do not know of any such order that no prisoners of war were to be taken.
COL. POKROVSKY: Good. One moment more. I now want you to help me to elucidate another matter. A sentence of yours appears in this typed script to the effect that you considered it improper to question a prisoner-of-war if a decision had already been made that the prisoner-of-war was to be shot. Is that so? Is it correct?
JODL: Yes, I testified to the effect that I rejected that sentence from the moral and from the humane point of view.
COL. POKROVSKY: Excellent. Now I want you to tell me the following: Do you remember that there was a 4th Mountain Division in the German Army? It seems that you, at one time, were directly connected with it? Was there such a division or not?
JODL: That there were four mountain divisions, that I do not remember, there were many more.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am not talking about four divisions. You have been given an inaccurate translation. I am asking you whether you remember that there was a 4th Mountain Division?
JODL: I certainly knew about that. I wanted to be the commander of that division.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In that case, you may also remember another responsible officer of the German Army, whose name was Kübler? He operated in Yugoslavia.
JODL: There were two men of the name of Kübler, an older man and a younger man.
COL. POKROVSKY: Major General Kübler is the one who interests me. I am not asking you who Keitel was. You know that better than I do.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now for a few minutes?
[A recess was taken.]
COL. POKROVSKY: Now, you and I, Defendant Jodl, will attend to these two documents. Please take Document J-67, Exhibit Number USSR-132. It is a directive to the 118th Infantry Division.
JODL: 118th Infantry Division.
COL. POKROVSKY: I will read to you the “Instructions for Conduct of Troops during Operations,” Paragraph 2. “Prisoners: Any man who has obviously fought against the German Armed Forces, and has been captured, is to be shot after interrogation.” Is that correct? It says so precisely in those words? Do you hear me?
JODL: That is approximately what it says in that one sentence, but I should like to have the whole document. Nothing can be gathered from one sentence. What is decisive is what comes before it, and that is not stated in the document.
COL. POKROVSKY: It is written above: “Instructions for the Conduct of Troops during Operations.”
Now for the second document. It bears the stamp of the IV Mountain Regiment. It was issued on 6 October 1943 and contains Keitel’s personal instructions, written in his own hand, on how to deal with prisoners of war. I will ask you to revert to Subparagraph 3. It says, in the second part of this subparagraph, “...commanders having at least the rank of divisional commanders are authorized to issue orders to take no prisoners, and the civilian population in the combat area may be shot.”
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Apparently the translation was not coming through correctly. Perhaps you are going too fast. It was coming through correctly to me, but it apparently was not coming through correctly to the defendants. Would you put your question again?
COL. POKROVSKY: In Subparagraph 3 of the document issued by the IV Mountain Regiment it says...
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give us the number of it?
COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, My Lord. It is Exhibit USSR-470; and it bears a double number, Document J-127.
[Turning to the defendant.] Have you found Subparagraph 3, Defendant Jodl?
JODL: Yes, but this cannot possibly be described as a document. That is not a document.
COL. POKROVSKY: This document says how prisoners of war are to be treated.
I do not know how you feel about it, but it is quite clear to me.
JODL: But it is not an original. It is a fantastic translation. Any soldier would have thrown it straight into the wastepaper basket. It is a falsification. But I admit that it may be due to the foolish translation. In my opinion, all it contains is nonsense. The heading says “IV Mountain Regiment,” and it is a Roman four. It should be an Arabic number. It is never called Mountain Regiment. It then goes on to say, the commander of the IV Mountain Division, Section Ic, delivers under number such and such the following—all that is nonsense, pure, unadulterated nonsense! This is not a document. It is a scrap of paper.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am not responsible for the translation.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to see the original of these documents. They were put in, apparently, as USSR-132 and USSR-470. Is USSR-470 a new document?
COL. POKROVSKY: No, My Lord, this document has already been submitted, and the original is in the records of the Tribunal. Now I am only submitting a copy of this document which is at our disposal. Both documents were previously submitted in the original. If it is necessary, we can obtain these original documents and submit them a second time.
THE PRESIDENT: One of the secretaries of the Tribunal says that it was not submitted before—not offered in evidence before—USSR-470. Are you sure?
COL. POKROVSKY: There may have been some technical error. I was informed that it had already been submitted. We shall now go into this matter thoroughly. I believe, My Lord, that the original of the second document is in your possession.
JODL: I can say something to clarify this.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal are uncertain about the admission of this Document 470. Could you tell us exactly what the document is, and in what circumstances it is now being offered in evidence? What the document is, and where it came from?
COL. POKROVSKY: I can give quite a definite answer to the last question, My Lord, but perhaps I shall have to answer the first part of your question a few minutes later. The matter is being investigated.
On the second page of Exhibit USSR-470, at the bottom of the page, there is an affidavit:
“This is to certify that this is a correct and certified copy of the original document which was captured during military operations in June 1944, at Pakracu, by the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation. The original document is kept in the archives of the State Commission for the Investigation of Atrocities perpetrated by the occupants and their collaborators in Belgrade, dated 4 January 1946, Belgrade,”
signed by the President of the State Commission, University Professor Dr. D. Nedelkovitsch.
I am just having investigations made as to whether this document has already been submitted, by what member of the Soviet Delegation it was submitted, and on what date. If the document has not yet been submitted, then we can demand the original from the Belgrade archives—the German, the captured copy—or else a certified photostat, whichever is most acceptable to the Tribunal and have it presented in evidence.
My Lord, I have just been informed that this document was not presented. Therefore, it will be submitted for the first time, and we shall immediately ask for the original as additional evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, with reference, for the moment, to Document USSR-132, which I understand has already been put in evidence—offered in evidence—the Tribunal would like to see the original of that document because there are only two paragraphs put out in the copy that we have before us, and that was the point that was taken by the Defendant Jodl, that he wanted to see the whole document.
Colonel Pokrovsky, first of all, with reference to Document 132, which the Tribunal understand has already been offered in evidence, the Tribunal think that that document in full should be put before the defendant for him to make any comments. With reference to Document 470, which you are now offering in evidence, the Tribunal are of the opinion that you should go on cross-examining with reference to that document, subject to the production, as soon as possible, of the original or a photostatic copy of the original, and subject to the right of the defendant’s counsel to apply to have that cross-examination struck out if there is any substantial difference between the translation in the Yugoslav language—which is now being put to the defendant, or used for the purpose of cross-examination of the defendant—and the original document.
Is that clear to you and to Dr. Exner?
COL. POKROVSKY: It shall be done, My Lord.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I think that a discussion of this document ought not to be permitted at the moment. There are too many discrepancies in it. As it stands, it cannot be correct. Roman numeral IV, for instance, “the IV Mountain Regiment,” is referred to. That Roman numeral IV is quite wrong. Then it says “the commander delivers...” which is not German. Then, on Line 4 there is mention...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal want to know what you are talking about. Are you talking about 470?
DR. EXNER: Yes. I am merely trying to show that this cannot be a genuine document because it is not proper German at all.
For instance, in Line 4 it says, “Armed Forces Operations Staff, Ob.H.” The Armed Forces Operations Staff is attached to the OKW, not to the Ob.H.
Then, there is no signature. It is signed “Keitel” on the first page; but he signs as a Generaloberst, whereas I am told he was already a Field Marshal at that time.
Furthermore, this signature is part of the quotation and it says, “The OKW supplies the following...” Then there is the quotation—and Keitel’s signature is a part of that—whereas the document itself is supposed to originate from the 4th Mountain Regiment, and there is no signature of the 4th Mountain Regiment. I really do not think there would be any sense in talking about the document until the original has been supplied. For instance, on Page 2 of the document there is the statement that this goes to the commanders of 6, 7, et cetera. They are not commanders, these company commanders. No German military person could have written this document.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal adhere to the decision that this document may be used now. All the points which you are now raising and any other points which you may wish to raise upon the document will be open to you if you wish to move to have the cross-examination struck out at a later stage when the original had been produced.
DR. EXNER: I understand.
THE PRESIDENT: For the purposes of not wasting time, it is, the Tribunal think, more convenient to have the cross-examination now upon this document. We will leave it to you to move hereafter to strike the whole cross-examination out.
DR. EXNER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Colonel Pokrovsky, here is the original Document USSR-132 which the defendant ought to have for the purpose of making any comments that he wishes to make.
COL. POKROVSKY: The instructions of the Tribunal will be carried out, My Lord. We shall submit the original document.
[Turning to the defendant.] Have you acquainted yourself with the contents of the document?
JODL: It is an order of the 118th Infantry Division.
COL. POKROVSKY: You have no doubts at all about the authenticity of the document?
JODL: No, there is no doubt that it is an order of the 118th Infantry Division, but the connection between the 118th Infantry Division and myself is puzzling. But the order is genuine.
COL POKROVSKY: Perhaps you would like to admit now that this is not a question of stupidity but of villainy. Perhaps you would like to amplify your testimony in this sense?
JODL: I did not understand you.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, when you were asked about Paragraph 2 of Document USSR-132, you said that the whole document was not before you. Now you have the whole document.
JODL: I have it, yes. I have the entire document. The entire order from Kübler is perfectly in order in my opinion. Apparently the doubts which the Prosecutor has refer to Point 2, where it says, “Any man who has obviously fought against the German Armed Forces and has been captured is to be shot after interrogation.”
That, of course, does not refer to normal troops. That refers to the population. At least, that is how I see it. Paragraph 8 says, “Attitude towards the Population.”
That is also in order from the point of view of international law. It draws a distinction between the attitude towards a hostile population and the attitude towards a peaceful population.
COL. POKROVSKY: Is that all you wish to say?
JODL: Yes, but as I said, I do not understand the connection between Major General Kübler’s order and myself. I do not understand it.
COL. POKROVSKY: You confirm that the question of the treatment of the civilian population has been isolated to form an independent paragraph, Number 8? Is that correct? You have just referred to that.
JODL: Yes, Paragraph 8 mentions the treatment to be meted out to the civilian population.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am satisfied with your answer. Let us pass on to another group of questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.
JODL: But I wished, with the permission of the Tribunal, to object...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Defendant, are you suggesting that there is anything in the order itself which indicated that the prisoners dealt with in Paragraph 2 are not, as you have put it, normal troops?
JODL: In that respect, the paragraph is not very clear; but the next document which the Prosecutor has submitted might give the proof regarding what other orders have been issued. However, I consider that it is out of the question that Kübler gave an order saying that Yugoslav troops captured in battle should be shot. That is quite impossible. And had he done so, then he would have done so against the orders of the High Command of the German Armed Forces. But how can I give my views on an order from Major General Kübler? It would be best to ask him, he is alive.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, your answer to my question, then, is in the negative, that there is nothing in the order itself which shows or indicates that the prisoners referred to in Paragraph 2 are not normal troops.
JODL: That cannot be concluded from the wording of that order.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps I ought to draw your attention to the words under “General Directives for the Conduct of Troops in Action.”
At any rate, that is your answer upon the whole document.
JODL: May I please have permission to look at the original again? I have only a copy here before me.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
THE PRESIDENT: You now have the original document before you. Do you want to add anything to what you have said?
JODL: I just wanted to add—if you are dealing with this order of Major General Kübler—that it is not certain whether this order refers to any particular action, for example, the mopping up of guerrillas in a given territory who were not regarded as regular troops at that particular moment, but were regarded as a revolt of the population. That is feasible.
At any rate, I cannot answer these questions because I am not Major General Kübler.
THE PRESIDENT: Now you can pass on to 470.
JODL: May I ask the Tribunal for permission to make a correction in my objection to this document?
THE PRESIDENT: Which document are you speaking of?
JODL: Document USSR-470.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you want to say about it?
JODL: I previously described that document as nonsensical because, at the first moment, I regarded it as a German order. In the meantime I have ascertained that it is obviously a Croatian order, because it is addressed to three Ustashi battalions. In this Croatian order the Croatian commander of this mountain regiment tells his troops something which he had apparently received in the way of orders from the 4th German Mountain Division, regarding the treatment of prisoners. He, in turn, traces it back to an order from Keitel which, however, is misrepresented and which, if it were correct, would best be handed in to the counsel for Field Marshal Keitel, because it is the best example of the attitude toward the guerrillas in Yugoslavia in keeping with international law—that is, if it is correct. Therefore, it is not a German order; it is apparently a draft or a translation of a Croatian order of the 4th Mountain Regiment. But what the 4th Croatian Regiment has to do with the General or the Defendant Jodl is a puzzle to me. I do not understand it.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Colonel Pokrovsky.
COL. POKROVSKY: I ask you, Defendant Jodl, whether you knew of such a directive by Keitel to the effect that division commanders or officers of higher rank were entitled to issue orders that no prisoners should be taken. Do you know of such a directive?
JODL: No, it is not known to me; and it is not certain that the order was issued in that way. However, in certain cases it is permissible under international law.
COL. POKROVSKY: I have no further questions to ask in connection with this document. The defense counsel will obviously ask some questions when the original document is submitted to the Tribunal.
I shall now proceed to another group of questions. If I am not mistaken, you confirmed the authenticity of your so-called notes for “Plan Grün” where it dealt with the creation of an incident on the borders of Czechoslovakia. It is stated quite clearly there that the organization of this incident was to be entrusted to the counterintelligence. Have I interpreted the idea of your notes correctly?
JODL: No. The translation as it came over to me is completely distorted. But there has been a full discussion about that, too.
COL. POKROVSKY: To facilitate the task of the interpreters, I shall simplify the question. You, I believe, confirmed the authenticity of this document dealing with the incident and the organization of the incident. This is Defense Document Jodl-14.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it has come through properly.
JODL: No. It did not make any sense to me at all.
COL. POKROVSKY: All right. I shall repeat it. Do I clearly understand that you do not contest the authenticity of Document Jodl-14?
JODL: If that is the letter from me to Major Schmundt, then that is an absolutely genuine document, which I wrote myself.
COL. POKROVSKY: In this connection I should like to ask you one precise question: Do you confirm that the provocation which you call the “organization of an incident” had two objectives: First, to give a pretext for an attack against Czechoslovakia; and secondly—to use your own terminology, which we heard here on 4 June—to shift the blame for the war on to somebody else’s shoulders? Had you these two objectives when you proposed to organize an incident? Do you understand my question?
JODL: I understood roughly what you said.
COL. POKROVSKY: Can you give an answer?
JODL: Yes, I can repeat the answer I gave yesterday. I have...
COL. POKROVSKY: You confirm this?
JODL: My testimony of yesterday? Yes, of course. I still maintain today something which I said yesterday.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. I would like you to tell the Tribunal everything you know about the supplying of weapons to the Sudeten Germans organized into the Henlein Corps, which you mentioned to the Tribunal in passing. You stated that this corps contained a certain number of officers. Do you remember?
JODL: Yes, I remember.
COL. POKROVSKY: In order to help you, I will show you a document.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
It is the testimony of Karl Hermann Frank. He declares in this testimony that the Henlein Corps received a certain quantity of weapons. Do you know anything about this?
JODL: I only know of weapons supplied to the Henlein Free Corps at the time when it was being formed on German territory. Whether arms had been previously smuggled into Czechoslovakia for that Sudeten-German group, or how they were brought in, is something which I know nothing about. The Armed Forces were never in any way concerned with that, just as later on they were not concerned with the Henlein Free Corps.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you know what kind of weapons were sent there? Were they of German origin or not?
JODL: The fact that arms were taken into Czechoslovakia is something I know absolutely nothing about. I was not a smuggler of arms; I was a General Staff officer.
COL. POKROVSKY: That is why I am asking you, since you have said that you received reports on the arming of the Henlein Free Corps when it arrived on German territory. That is why I asked you, an officer of the General Staff, were these weapons of German origin or not? You must know that.
JODL: Henlein’s Free Corps—which was formed near Hof, and in the district to the North, on 17 September—received, in my opinion, former Austrian, or even German, arms. I think they were Austrian weapons, but I do not know that for certain.
COL. POKROVSKY: Then it is not necessary. We only need definite information and definite facts. You will now be handed a photostatic copy of the Case Green folder.
[The folder was submitted to the defendant.]
You will look at the passage which has been marked. The marked passage says, “For the success of the operation, the penetration into Sudeten Germany with parachute troops will be of great value.” The Defendant Keitel, on 6 April 1946, when questioned regarding this part of the document, said that it is precisely you who could give the requisite explanations with regard to this document.
JODL: With reference to this paragraph I have to say that, in the preparation for a possible war, the Army had a notation inserted to the effect that fortifications would have to be penetrated quickly or would have to be opened up from the rear and that for the success of this joint action the co-operation of airborne troops, together with the border population and the Sudeten Germans who deserted to us, might be of value. For, of course, it was a fact that among the Germans who had been drawn into the ranks and who numbered about 100,000, not one would have turned his weapon upon us but would have deserted on the spot. They wrote that to me personally while in Czech uniform. These Germans would have deserted on the spot. That, of course, we expected and had taken into account in our military calculations.
COL. POKROVSKY: I fear that you have not understood me quite correctly or that you did not wish to understand the question which I put to you.
Defendant Jodl, I am interested in something else. Do you confirm the fact that prior to the attack on Czechoslovakia you had planned diversionary activity on the territory of Czechoslovakia proper. That is what I am interested in. Yes or no?
JODL: First, there was no attack upon Czechoslovakia at all; that is a historical untruth. Second, this was General Staff work, which was prepared for a possible war; and there is nothing else to be said about that.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. The question was whether you planned before the war—or the possible war—diversionary activity in Czechoslovakia. Did you plan that? Can you answer that?
JODL: No, I did not. You will have to ask Admiral Canaris about that. Such matters were not in my jurisdiction.
COL. POKROVSKY: Keitel advised us to ask you, and you advise us to question Canaris. Very well; I have another question to ask you. Was the unification of all pro-Fascist forces and armed Fascist bands in Yugoslavia, which fought against the Allies, carried out with your knowledge? Or do you know nothing about that?
JODL: You mean the military organization under Marshal Tito. That is known to me, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I am referring to the organization under the direction of the German High Command, of a united front of all pro-Fascist bands—of Nedish, Michailovič, and others—financed by Germany, helped by Germany, and under the leadership of the German High Command. Do you know anything about that, or do you not?
JODL: I do not know whether you have in mind the Chetniks. They were under Italian command. Because of this there was always a big row between us and the Italians. Then there was the Ustashi, they were Croatians. But the other pro-Fascist organizations are not known to me.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. You will look at Document J-95, Exhibit USSR-288. It has already been submitted to the Tribunal. It is the testimony of Nedish. Two or three sentences from this document have a direct bearing on the questions that I have asked you. Nedish testified under oath, naming those who had helped him to form and to finance his bands. He named the representatives of the German High Command and the Gestapo who helped him to create his armed forces.
Have you found that?
JODL: That is right. Nedish formed a Serbian unit. I forgot that before. Nedish had a—what shall I say—a Serbian...
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you remember it?
JODL: Yes. Nedish had a small unit. That is right. There were perhaps 5,000 to 6,000 men. They were Serbs.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did you give financial support to this organization?
JODL: No. I had no money. I did not back these things.
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I am not speaking of your personal means, but the means of the German Reich.
JODL: I cannot tell you that. I did not concern myself with money in this war.
COL. POKROVSKY: Was the German High Command at the head of the work of controlling the organization of these bands, or was it not?
JODL: No. I did not organize it. The Commander, Southeast, probably discussed that with Nedish. But it was Nedish’s own private affair if he wished to call on the Serbs to fight.
COL. POKROVSKY: I do not know whether it was his private business or not. But it is most important to me that you confirm the fact that these bands actually existed. How Nedish organized them does not interest me.
JODL: I can confirm that. There were about 5,000 to 6,000 men of the Serbian auxiliary police.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. You will be shown another report from this group of questions. It is an official report of the Polish Government sent to the Military Tribunal. You will find that it contains some very valuable information about the activities of the Fifth Column. Please turn to the sentence which is marked “B.” It is said there:
“In addition to the agents selected from among the young people and appointed to co-operate with the German civilian population, there also existed a group of leaders and instructors made up of officers who had come to Poland, supplied with valid passports, weeks before the outbreak of hostilities.”
Do you, as the direct leader of the counterintelligence—this section was subordinate to you—know anything about this Fifth Column organization in Poland?
JODL: There are two small errors you have made, Colonel Pokrovsky: first of all, counterintelligence was not under me but under the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces; and secondly, I stated at length yesterday that I know nothing about any of the preparations for the Polish campaign, either from the point of view of operations or otherwise, because I was Artillery Commander in Vienna and Brünn. What Canaris did at that time with respect to Poland is something I know absolutely nothing about. I am afraid, therefore, that I cannot be of any help.
COL. POKROVSKY: Well, let us proceed to the next group of questions. You were examined on 8 November by the Soviet Prosecution, and you were asked whether Germany was pursuing a predatory policy when attacking the Soviet Union? Do you remember being asked this question?
JODL: I remember very well, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: You will now be handed a copy of your answer. You replied:
“I admit that the question of the expansion of Germany’s ‘Lebensraum’ and the utilization of Russian economy for Germany’s needs did play a certain part, but it was not the basic reason for the attack on the Soviet Union.”
Do you remember answering in this sense?
JODL: It is possible. I did not sign it. At any rate, I said it was not the chief cause.
COL. POKROVSKY: You also said in the same answer:
“It was never our intention to keep enlarging our ‘Lebensraum’ and thereby create new enemies.”
It appears that you do remember that?
JODL: Yes, I do.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Perhaps you will now recall that the witness Ohlendorf testified before the Tribunal that prior to the outbreak of hostilities against the Soviet Union, Himmler, in his speech, had outlined a program for the annihilation, in the East, of 10,000,000 Slavs and Jews? Do you remember this statement?
JODL: I recollect having heard that testimony in this courtroom, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: In the light of this—in the light of Ohlendorf’s testimony—would you not like to answer more precisely the question as to whether the war against the Soviet Union was waged with a predatory purpose, with the purpose of seizing territory, annihilating the population, and then of transforming the occupied territories, to quote Hitler’s own words, “into a paradise for the Germans”? Do you not think that is exactly what did happen?
JODL: What the Führer might have wanted to create later on I do not know; but the military and strategic reasons, which he gave us and which were definitely confirmed by the many reports received, I explained yesterday in great detail. The main reason was the feeling that we were under a dire threat of being attacked by Russia. That was the decisive point.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. You will now be handed Document C-57. It has already been submitted to the Tribunal, My Lord. On the evening of 5 April 1946 this document was put to Defendant Keitel as Exhibit USSR-336. I must ask you to turn to Subparagraph 4 of this document and to Subparagraph 7, for Defendant Keitel stated that you could give far more detailed explanations about these documents. Point 4 referred to the active participation of Spain in the seizure of Gibraltar as far back as 1941. Tell us, how was this active participation of Spain to be expressed? Have you found this passage in the document?
JODL: Yes, I already know the document. But nobody signed it. First of all, I have to give an explanation of what this document is, so that it is not mistaken for an order.
COL. POKROVSKY: But I do not believe I ever said that it was an order.
JODL: That is all right, because it is not an order. I cannot say what the people who drew up this document had in mind at the time. It was obviously a draft which the General Staff officers, presumably from my department, together with the operations expert of the Navy, prepared in my office and which they submitted to the Naval Operations Staff for their perusal, according to the principle that General Staff officers must think and plan a long time ahead. They had these personal ideas and put them down on paper without my ever having seen them.
THE PRESIDENT: What was your question, Colonel Pokrovsky? It was whether the draft did not...
COL. POKROVSKY: I asked a question to which I received no answer. My Lord, I asked him what he could say about the actual part which Spain was to play in the seizure of Gibraltar in 1941.
JODL: I cannot make a statement on what other people thought. I can only talk about serious intentions in connection with Spain in 1940. That I can talk about. But as far as this paper is concerned, I can say nothing about it. For at the time I had long ago dismissed the thing as impossible. I know of it only since I have been in Nuremberg; I never saw it before.
COL. POKROVSKY: Whether that plan could not be fulfilled is quite another question. Defendant Keitel said that you could give an explanation. You declare that you cannot say anything.
JODL: As I have just said, it is some preliminary work carried out by the younger General Staff officers, which I saw here in the document room for the first time with great interest and some amusement. It was not shown to me at the time, because it could already be seen that in a week’s time the situation would change.
COL. POKROVSKY: You know nothing about the proposed dispatch of an expeditionary corps to Egypt, Iran, and Iraq, through Trans-Caucasia in the direction of the Persian Gulf, if the Soviet Union had fallen, as is stated here; you did not know anything about that either?
JODL: It was never a really serious proposition. On the contrary, I had the biggest row of my life with the Führer because I refused to attack beyond the Caucasus in the direction of Baku. But the General Staff officers did entertain such ideas in the first flush of optimism because of the big victories in the summer. That is what they are there for—to have ideas. But the decisions are made by the older and more level-headed men.
COL. POKROVSKY: So you confirm that the success of the Red Army upset what you call “the bold and far-reaching plans” of Hitler to send an expeditionary corps to Syria and Egypt? Is that right?
JODL: If the Soviet Union had collapsed, then one might have entertained such ideas for continuing the war. But never the idea, for instance, of attacking Turkey. She would have come over to our side anyway voluntarily. That was the opinion of the Führer.
COL. POKROVSKY: How do you know that?
JODL: How do I know it? Even the document says so. And there are the entries in the Diaries of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, which are here in Court. It says:
“After big German victories, Turkey will come over to our side, anyway. I order that she be given preferential treatment in the supply of munitions and arms and tanks.”
In fact, Turkey had expressed such a wish, and she was very grateful to receive from us tanks equipped with arms. The Führer would never have done that if he had expected Turkey to join our opponents.
COL. POKROVSKY: We shall proceed to another group of questions. On the eve of the campaign against Russia, a conference was held between the representatives of the OKW, the OKH, and the so-called RSHA. The participation of the subdepartment SIPO was being considered. Do you know anything about this conference, at which the witness Ohlendorf was present?
JODL: I know nothing about that. I was working on quite different matters, and I have never had any conferences or connections with the Reich Security Main Office at all.
COL. POKROVSKY: Are you acquainted with Wilhelm Scheidt, a colleague in the Prisoners of War Organization of the OKW?
JODL: Yes, I know him. He was an assistant to General Scherff.
COL. POKROVSKY: Are you acquainted with his testimony which was given before the Tribunal? It is, My Lord, on Page 2207 of the English transcript (Volume IV, Page 467). He testifies that the criminal practice of inflicting punitive measures on the peaceful civilian population was known to the leading officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and of the General Staff of the Army. Do you remember that?
JODL: I do not know the words that he used. Criminal actions were neither known to the Armed Forces Operations Staff nor to me. I rejected criminal actions and fought against them, and I made that abundantly clear here.
COL. POKROVSKY: Am I to understand that you deny all knowledge of the criminal punitive measures taken against the civilian population? Do you mean to say you knew nothing about them?
JODL: Of course, I know of the fight against your partisans. That is quite clear. I have shown two instructions which were issued by the Armed Forces Operations Staff in this connection.
COL. POKROVSKY: On 7 January 1946, the witness Von dem Bach-Zelewski testified that the real aim of this struggle against the partisans was the extermination of the Slavs and the Jews, and that the methods used in this struggle were known to the High Command. Do you wish to deny this, too?
JODL: It might have been the intention of Bach-Zelewski; it was not mine. My instructions were different. I already described the intention yesterday as completely senseless. The numbers of guerrillas made no difference at all in the gigantic struggle between the German and the Soviet Armies. It was a minute percentage.
COL. POKROVSKY: Could you perhaps recollect, Defendant Jodl, when and in what circumstances you yourself said, at one of Hitler’s conferences, that the German troops were entitled to treat the partisans as they wished and to subject them to any kind of death by torture, by quartering, hanging them head downward, et cetera. Do you remember having said something of the kind at that time?
JODL: About this matter—which is more comical than serious—we talked for quite some time during the preliminary interrogation.
COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps you can tell us about this matter at less length but with greater precision. Will you answer my question whether you spoke these words or anything like these words, and in what circumstances did you say them?
JODL: I want to explain it briefly. It was on 1 December 1942. As the Tribunal will remember, a directive in regard to combating the guerrillas was issued on 11 November by the Armed Forces Operations Staff, which we declared to be outdated by the new issue on 6 May 1944. In that directive, which was issued on 11 November, I had written the sentence: “The burning down of villages as a reprisal is forbidden, because it necessarily only creates new partisans.”
The draft of that instruction remained in the Führer’s hands for weeks. He always objected that this instruction would hamper the troops in ruthlessly combating the guerrillas. As at that time I had already issued that instruction and he still had not given his approval, I became rather rude; and when he once more came with lengthy explanations of his fighting experience, his experience of fighting the Communists in Chemnitz, I said, in order to break the ice at last, “My Führer, what people do in battle does not come into this instruction at all. As far as I am concerned, they can quarter them or they can hang them upside down.”
If I had known that the Russian gentlemen have so little sense of irony, I would have added, “and roast them on the spit.” That is what I said and I added, “But in this instruction we are concerned with reprisals after the battle, and they must be prohibited.”
Then there were roars of laughter from all the officers present, and also from the Führer; and he gave me permission to issue that directive; and the testimony of a witness, General Buhle, who was present, will confirm that to you. That quartering people has not been the custom in Germany since the sixteenth century, any more than hanging people upside down, everybody in the world certainly knows. Therefore that remark could only be an ironical one.
COL. POKROVSKY: I ask the Tribunal to grant me one minute for one last question, literally one minute only.
[Turning to the defendant.] Do you know that the German troops, evidently understanding irony better than we do—and in the literal sense of the word—quartered, hanged upside down, and roasted Soviet captives over the fire? Did you know of that?
JODL: Not only I did not know it, but I do not even believe it.
COL. POKROVSKY: With the permission of the Tribunal I shall proceed to the last group of questions left to me after the recess.
THE PRESIDENT: How much longer will that take, Colonel Pokrovsky?
COL. POKROVSKY: I have only a very few questions to put, and I believe it will not take very long.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
COL. POKROVSKY: You have given very important testimony before the Tribunal. You have admitted that in 1941 the warriors of the Red Army at Vyazma were fanatically resisting the Fascist invaders. Many of them were taken prisoner only because they were too exhausted to move. You thereby explained the abnormally high mortality among the Soviet prisoners of war. Is that correct?
JODL: That is true with regard to the prisoners, particularly in the Vyazma pocket.
COL. POKROVSKY: Can you think of any other reasons you know which would account for this high mortality among the Soviet prisoners of war?
JODL: I did not hear of any other reasons.
COL. POKROVSKY: Then I will refresh your memory a little and draw your attention to a short excerpt from our Exhibit Number USSR-353. It is a letter from Rosenberg to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, that is, it was sent directly to the OKW. The letter is dated 28 February 1942. I would draw your attention to a few short extracts from this document. On Page 1, I believe, the following sentences are underlined:
“The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is a large-scale tragedy.... A great part of them have died of hunger or from the inclement weather. Thousands have also died of typhus.”
I will leave out a few sentences and proceed to the next page:
“Several intelligent camp commanders have taken this line with some success.”
Before it had been a question of the population being willing to supply the prisoners of war with food of their own accord.
“In the majority of cases, however, the camp commanders have forbidden the civilian population to give any food to the prisoners of war and have preferred to let them die of starvation.... Moreover, in many cases, when prisoners of war on the march could no longer keep up from sheer hunger and exhaustion, they were shot in full view of the horrified civilian population; and the corpses were left by the roadside.”
And further on:
“Remarks have been heard like these: ‘The more of these prisoners that die, the better it will be for us.’”
And again on Page 3:
“It would be too naive to imagine that what went on in the prisoner-of-war camps could be concealed from the Soviet Government. It is obvious from Molotov’s circular note that the Soviets are perfectly well aware of the conditions described above....”
Have you found the passages in question?
JODL: Yes, I have found them.
COL. POKROVSKY: Now, did you really know nothing of the reasons for this high mortality?
JODL: No. I heard of the letter here in court for the first time.
COL. POKROVSKY: Defendant Jodl, I am not asking you about the letter. I am asking you about the reasons for these mass deaths among the Soviet prisoners. So you did not know of the reasons which led to these mass deaths?
THE PRESIDENT: Is the document signed?
COL. POKROVSKY: The document bears no signature. It is a captured document, Number 081-PS. It belongs to the documents captured by the United States and was handed to us so that we could submit it to the Tribunal.
[Turning to the defendant.] I did not hear your reply, Defendant.
JODL: I knew nothing about these reasons for the mass deaths. In any case they are completely wrong; that I do know, because I can give rough figures from memory as regards the number of Soviet prisoners of war and their whereabouts.
COL. POKROVSKY: Good. We will now deal with this question from a different angle. Are you familiar with the name of Von Graevenitz?
JODL: Von Graevenitz? Yes, the name is familiar to me.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did he not work in the OKW?
JODL: He was, if I am not mistaken, in the Armed Forces Department as a subordinate of General Reinecke.
COL. POKROVSKY: This time you are quite accurate; you are right. Do you know General Österreich?
JODL: No, I do not know that general.
COL. POKROVSKY: You have never even heard the name?
JODL: I do not recall it.
COL. POKROVSKY: This general was chief of the department in charge of prisoners of war in one of your military districts. Do you perhaps remember this general’s testimony about the directive he had received from Von Graevenitz in the OKW with respect to the Soviet prisoners of war? You will now be shown Document Number USSR-151, Page 5 of the German text. You will find there the passage to which I should like to draw your attention.
“At the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942 I was repeatedly called to Berlin to attend conferences held by the commanders in charge of prisoners of war in the military districts.
“The newly appointed commander of the Prisoners of War Organization in the headquarters of the OKW, Major General Von Graevenitz, presided over the conference.
“During the conference there was a discussion about the treatment of prisoners of war who, because of their wounds or from exhaustion and disease, were unfit to live and unfit to work. At the suggestion of General Von Graevenitz several of the officers present, among them several doctors, gave their opinions on it and declared that such prisoners of war should be concentrated in a camp or in a hospital and be poisoned. Following this discussion, Major General Von Graevenitz issued an order to the effect that all prisoners of war who were unfit to live and to work should be killed and that medical personnel should be employed for this purpose.”
Did you know anything at all about that?
JODL: I knew nothing about that at all, and I cannot comment on this document. It has nothing to do with me and I do not know whether what has been said here is true, but General Von Graevenitz must certainly know about it. I had no connection whatsoever with prisoners of war. That was another office, General Reinecke.
COL. POKROVSKY: Von Graevenitz himself defends his statement. He was an executive; he put the directives of the OKW into effect and also issued the relevant instructions and yet you tell me you knew nothing about them?
JODL: I did not say that. General Von Graevenitz is no subordinate of mine. I had no interviews of any kind with him. I have seen him perhaps twice in all my life. I was not responsible for prisoners of war, and I was not competent to deal with them.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. We will now pass on to my last group of questions. There are very few of them.
When Defendant Keitel was cross-examined here before the Tribunal, as well as in the preliminary interrogations preceding the Trial—I believe these particular subjects arose during the preliminary interrogation—he said that you would give us more detailed information about directives for the destruction of Moscow and Leningrad. You stated here before the Tribunal that the directives were issued for two reasons: First, because General Von Leeb had reported on the gradual seeping through of the Leningrad populations to the west and south to the front lines; and secondly, they were issued as a reprisal for Kiev. Is that correct?
JODL: Not reprisals, but the justifiable fear that whatever could happen to us in Kiev could also happen to us in Leningrad; and the third reason was the announcement by the Soviet Russian radio that this would actually take place.
COL. POKROVSKY: Good. The only important thing for me is to establish the fact that you connected the issuing of this directive with the report from the Leningrad front and with the affair in Kiev; is that correct?
JODL: I did not connect them; but events, as they actually happened, necessarily influenced the decision of the Führer in this direction. These were the reasons which he gave himself.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Perhaps you will remember when the High Command received this information from Leeb—in what month?
JODL: It was in the first days—as far as I remember in the first days of September.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Perhaps you can also remember the date on which the Germans captured Kiev. Was it not towards the end of September 1941?
JODL: As far as I remember, Kiev was occupied at the end of August. I believe it was on 25 August or about that date. But I cannot...
COL. POKROVSKY: Was that not on 22 September?
JODL: That is entirely out of the question. We have a document here, a report about the incidents in Kiev; I do not know the date of it from memory, but it is Document 053-PS. We must be able to see the date from that document.
COL. POKROVSKY: It is precisely in that document that 23 and 24 September are mentioned. Well, let us, however, suppose that it really did happen in August. Would you not remember the date when Hitler first declared that Leningrad should be razed to the ground?
JODL: I beg your pardon. I have made a mistake all the time about the date. This document is—Document C-323, the Führer decree, is dated 7 October. So, your statement may be correct. I was a month off in my calculations, and the taking of Kiev was actually at the end of September. The reports which we received from Leeb came in the first days of October. I made a mistake. I am sorry.
COL. POKROVSKY: Please, do not mention it; it is of no importance. I only want you to remember when Hitler first stated categorically that he would raze Leningrad to the ground. That is important for me.
JODL: You are referring to the naval document, I assume, the document of the SKL, the Naval Operations Staff.
COL. POKROVSKY: You will now be handed Document L-221 and will be shown the passage where it is written that, on 16 July 1941, during a conference in the Führer’s headquarters, the following statement was made:
“The Finns are claiming the district of Leningrad. The Führer wants to raze Leningrad to the ground and then hand it over to the Finns.”
Have you found the passage?
JODL: Yes, I have found the place.
COL. POKROVSKY: This took place on 16 July 1941, did it not?
JODL: The document was written on 16 July 1941, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: That was considerably earlier than the date you received the report from the Leningrad front?
JODL: Yes, it was 3 months before then.
COL. POKROVSKY: It was also long before the day when explosions and fires first occurred in Kiev. Is that correct?
JODL: Quite correct.
COL. POKROVSKY: It was clearly not by accident that in the directive you drew up yourself and in the statements you made before the Tribunal, you declared that the Führer had again decided to raze Leningrad to the ground. It was not the first time he had made this decision.
JODL: No, this decision, if it actually was a decision—and the statements made at this conference—I learned for the first time here in Court. I personally did not take part in the discussion, nor do I know whether the words were said in that way. My remark that the Führer had again taken a decision refers to the verbal order he had given to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army shortly before, perhaps 1 or 2 days earlier. It is quite clear that there was already talk of this and that in the order I am referring to—a letter of the High Command of the Army of 18 September—and in that way the word “again” is to be explained. I was quite unaware of the fact, and I heard of it for the first time here in Court. It was only here in Court that I heard of the conference taking place at all.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. The Tribunal will probably be able to judge precisely when Hitler made this statement for the first time.
You have declared that you knew nothing about reprisals against the Jews?
JODL: No.
COL. POKROVSKY: And yet you have just referred to Document Number 053-PS.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
It is a report from Koch, personally signed by him. Maybe you will confirm that it states quite clearly that Koch held the civilian population of the city responsible for the Kiev fires and exterminated the entire Jewish population of Kiev, numbering some 35,000 souls, over half of whom were women. That is what the report says. Is it correct?
JODL: I know that very well indeed, but I only found this document here in the document room; and I used it as a good piece of evidence for the incidents in Kiev. The existence of the document was unknown to me until I came to Nuremberg and it never went to the OKW either. At all events, it never came into my hands. I do not know whether it was ever sent.
COL. POKROVSKY: You also did not know whether the Jews were exterminated or not? Is that true?
JODL: I certainly believe it today. There can be no more doubt about that; it has been proved.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In the document submitted by your defense counsel as Exhibit Number Jodl-3, Document Number 1780-PS, Page 6 of your document book, in the last entry made on that page, you will read the following: “A large proportion of senior generals will leave the Army.”
This refers to the entry in your diary of 3 February 1938. Do you remember?
JODL: Yes, that is from my diary.
COL. POKROVSKY: Are we to understand that resignations from the Army could take place at any time, in other words, that any general could retire or resign from the Army whenever he wanted to? That is what you say here.
JODL: At that time, I believe it was quite possible. In the year 1938 I knew of no decree which prohibited it.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In Document Number Jodl-64, Exhibit Number AJ-11, which was submitted by your defense counsel, we find a passage which, for some reason or other, was not read into the record; and I would like to quote it now. It is the testimony of General Von Vormann, who states under oath that you, together with General Von Hammerstein, often used such expressions as “criminal” and “charlatan,” when referring to Hitler?
Do you confirm the accuracy of that testimony, or has Vormann expressed himself incorrectly?
JODL: To the best of my knowledge, and in all good conscience, I believe that he is confusing two things. In talking about the Führer, I very often said that I looked on him as a charlatan; but I had no cause or reason to consider him a criminal. I often used the expression “criminal”; but not in connection with Hitler, whom I did not even know at the time. I applied it to Röhm. I repeatedly spoke of him as a criminal, in my opinion; and I believe that Vormann is confusing these statements just a little. I often used the expression “charlatan”; that was my opinion at the time.
COL. POKROVSKY: That is to say, you considered Röhm a criminal and the Führer a charlatan? Is that correct?
JODL: Yes, that is right, because at that time it was my opinion. I knew Röhm, but I did not know Adolf Hitler.
COL. POKROVSKY: Then how are we to explain that you accepted leading posts in the military machine of the German Reich, after the man whom you yourself described as a charlatan had come to power?
JODL: Because in the course of the years I became convinced—at least during the years from 1933 to 1938—that he was not a charlatan but a man of gigantic personality who, however, in the end assumed infernal power. But at that time he definitely was an outstanding personality.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did you receive the Golden Party Badge of the Hitler Party?
JODL: Yes, I have already testified to that and confirmed it.
COL. POKROVSKY: In what year did you receive the badge?
JODL: On 30 January 1943.
COL. POKROVSKY: Was it after that when you came to the conclusion that Hitler was not a “charlatan”? Did you hear my question?
JODL: Yes. It became clear to me then that he was, as I said before, a gigantic personality, even if with certain reservations.
COL. POKROVSKY: And after you had reached that conclusion you promptly received the Golden Party Badge? I thank you.
I have no more questions, Your Honor.
DR. NELTE: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the Document Number USSR-151, which was submitted by Colonel Pokrovsky. I should like to ask for this document to be admitted only if General Österreich can be produced as a witness for cross-examination. My reasons for this are the following:
1. The document as submitted contains the heading “Aussagen” or “statements,” but we cannot make out before whom these statements were made.
2. The document contains no mention of the place where it was drawn up.
3. The document is not an affidavit, although according to the last paragraph General Österreich set it down in his own handwriting; and, therefore, it could have been certified as a statement under oath.
Because of the severity of the accusation which this document brings forward against the administration of the prisoner-of-war system, it is necessary in my opinion to order this general to appear here in person.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; go on.
DR. NELTE: Those are the reasons for my request. In conclusion I should just like to point out that General Von Graevenitz is no longer alive. At all events, he cannot be located. I tried to find him as a witness on behalf of Defendant Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it a fact that this document was offered in evidence as long ago as February or March?
DR. NELTE: I do not remember that, nor—and I know this for certain—was it issued to us through the Document Division. I am seeing this document for the first time now. But perhaps Colonel Pokrovsky can give some information about it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider your request.
DR. NELTE: May I also call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that the document is dated 28 December 1945, and it is to be assumed that General Österreich can also be produced by the people who took his testimony at that time.
COL. POKROVSKY: Mr. President, I believe that I can give some information about this document. It was submitted by the Soviet Delegation on 12 February 1946, when it was accepted as evidence by the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, just a moment. Was it translated into German then or was it read in Court?
COL. POKROVSKY: I have just received a memorandum from our document room. The document was submitted on 13 February, at the time when I was presenting documentary evidence with regard to the subject of prisoners of war. It is all I have on the matter.
I personally assume that the document was translated into German as a matter of course at that time. I have almost no doubt about it. However, we can easily make sure.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to re-examine the defendant?
DR. EXNER: First of all, I should like to put one question which came up again during the interrogation by the Defense Counsel. It was a point which seems to me in need of clarification.
One of the Defense Counsel reminded you of the photographs which were shown us here depicting atrocities in the occupied countries, and you said that the pictures were genuine.
What do you mean by that?
JODL: I meant to say that it was not trick photography, at which the Russian propagandists were past masters, according to my experience. I meant that they were pictures of actual events. But I also meant to say that the pictures offered no proof of whether it was a matter of atrocities at all, nor did they show who committed them. The fact that they were found in the possession of Germans would even lead us to assume that they were pictures of things which had been perpetrated by the enemy, by the forces of Tito or perhaps the Ustashi. Generally one does not take a picture of one’s own acts of cruelty if any were ever committed.
DR. EXNER: Very well. The English Prosecutor has submitted a new document, 754-PS, dealing with the destructions during the retreat in Norway. Why in this purely military Führer Decree did you write: “The Führer had agreed to the proposals of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories, and has given his orders accordingly....” and so on? Why did you deliberately put in “to the proposals,” and so forth?
JODL: In issuing orders I had a kind of secret code for the commanders-in-chief. If an order was the result of an agreement between the OKW and the Führer, then I started with the words “The Führer has decreed....”
If a decree originated from the Führer himself, I started the decree with a preamble which gave the Führer’s reasons and the arguments in favor. Then, after the preamble, I wrote “The Führer, therefore, has decreed....”
If the Führer was prompted by the proposal of a nonmilitary agency to issue a decree, then, as a matter of basic principle, I added, “The Führer, on the proposal of this or that civil authority, has decided....” In this way the commanders-in-chief knew what it was all about.
DR. EXNER: Did you draft this decree—Document Number 754-PS—without objection or resistance?
JODL: This decree originated in much the same manner as the Commando Order. One of the Führer’s civilian adjutants advised me that Terboven wished to speak to the Führer. He had had trouble with the Wehrmacht in Norway because of the evacuation of the civilian population from northern Norway. The civilian adjutant said he wanted to advise me first before he established connections with Terboven by telephone. Thereupon I at once had inquiries made through my staff of the commander in Norway-Finland. I was told that the Wehrmacht—the commander of the Wehrmacht in Norway had rejected Terboven’s proposals and did not consider them possible on such a large scale. In the meantime Terboven had spoken with the Führer. I then remonstrated with the Führer and told him that, in the first place, the decree and Terboven’s intention were not practicable on such a scale, and secondly, that there was no necessity for it on such a large scale. I said that it would be better to leave it to the discretion of Generaloberst Rendulic to decide what he wanted or had to destroy for military reasons. The Führer however, incited by Terboven, insisted on the decree’s being issued on the grounds of these arguments which I had to set down. But it was certainly not carried out to this extent. This is also shown by the report of the Norwegian Government, and it can also be seen from personal discussions between me and my brother.
DR. EXNER: Now let us turn to something else. When there were drafts and proposals to be submitted to the Führer, you often voiced objections and presented arguments. It seems remarkable that when matters contrary to international law were contemplated you raised no objections on the grounds of international law or on moral grounds, but you mostly voiced objections of a practical nature or from considerations of opportunity. Can you tell us briefly why you acted in this manner?
JODL: I already told you that when I gave my reasons for the formulation of the proposal not to renounce the Geneva Convention.
DR. EXNER: Namely?
JODL: This form had to be chosen to meet with any success with the Führer.
DR. EXNER: Yes, that is sufficient. Now, you said yesterday...
MR. ROBERTS: Your Lordship, I object to this merely in the interest of time, because it is exactly the same evidence which was given yesterday; and, in my submission, it is pure repetition.
DR. EXNER: This discussion at Reichenhall was mentioned today. Please tell us briefly how it came about that you made such statements in Reichenhall or how such directives as you described today were decided upon in Reichenhall?
JODL: I have already testified about the conversation with the Führer.
DR. EXNER: Yes, it was only a question of provisions...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the defendant has just told us that he has given evidence about this already.
DR. EXNER: Yes, about the conversation which preceded it, but you did not testify about the actual conversation at Reichenhall.
JODL: No, I have not yet spoken of the actual conversation at Reichenhall.
DR. EXNER: Please be brief.
JODL: In regard to this conversation at Reichenhall—that is, the orientation of the three officers of my staff—Warlimont’s description is somewhat different from mine. He is confusing here the earlier events with the later ones, which is not surprising, because from 20 July until the time he was arrested, he was ill at home with severe concussion of the brain and complete loss of memory. Up to the time he was captured he was no longer fit for service. That my description is the right one may be readily seen from the notes in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. It is stated there that these divisions would be transferred to the East only to prevent Russia from taking the Romanian oil fields.
DR. EXNER: I should like to correct one point which, it seems to me, was presented erroneously by the Russian prosecutor. He said that Göring and Keitel did not consider the war against Russia to be a preventive war. On Page 5956 of the record (Volume IX, Page 344) it states that Göring, too, considered the war to be a preventive one and that he only differed in opinion from the Führer insofar as he would have chosen a different period of time for this preventive war. Keitel was, in general, of the same opinion.
Furthermore, the Russian prosecutor submitted a document, Number 683-PS. I do not know what exhibit number he gave. I cannot quite see how this document is to be connected with Jodl; and I have the idea that may be a matter of signature, for the document is signed “Joel,” who is not at all identical with the Defendant Jodl. I just wanted to draw attention to this point. Perhaps there is simply a mistake in the names.
Further, the Prosecution said that the defendant made a remark about partisans being hanged upside down, and so on.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you have simply made a statement, which you are not entitled to do, about this document. If you want to prove it by evidence you should ask the witness about it. You have told us that this document has nothing to do with Jodl, and that the signature on it is somebody else’s. Why didn’t you ask the witness?
I am told just now that it has already been proved that it isn’t Jodl’s document.
DR. EXNER: The translations this morning were bad; I do not remember having heard that. I do not know whether it is permissible for me now in this connection to read something from a questionnaire? It is only one question and an answer in connection with this remark about the hanging of prisoners, and so on. Is that permissible?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if it arises out of the cross-examination.
DR. EXNER: Yes; the Russian prosecutor brought up the question of whether the defendant made this remark during the discussions about the prisoners, in connection with the guerrilla directive—that members of guerrilla bands could also be quartered during combat.
There it says:
“Question: Is it true or not...?”
Oh yes, I must say that is my Document Number Jodl-60, Exhibit Number AJ-7. Page 189 of Volume III of my document book. It is an interrogatory of General Buhle, which was made in America.
Then it says:
“Question: ‘According to a stenographic transcript, you also took part in a report on the military situation on the evening of 1 December 1942, which resulted in a lengthy discussion between the Führer and Jodl as to combating partisans in the East. Is that correct?’
“Answer: ‘I took part in this discussion, but I no longer remember the exact date.’”
THE PRESIDENT: What page did you say, Dr. Exner?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is the third page of the third book—or the third document in the third book.
DR. EXNER: It is Page 189. I have just read Question 4. Now I come to Question 5:
“Question: ‘Is it or is it not correct that on this occasion Jodl asked the Führer to return the directive which had been drawn up in his office relative to the combating of partisans?’
“Answer: ‘That is correct.’
“Question 6: ‘Is it or is it not correct that in this draft the burning of villages was expressly prohibited?’
“Question 7: ‘Is it or is it not correct that the Führer wanted to have this prohibition rescinded?’
“Answer: ‘Since I never had the draft of the directive in my hands, I do not know for certain if the burning of villages was expressly prohibited. However this is to be assumed, because I remember that the Führer protested against individual provisions of the directive and demanded the burning down of villages.’
“Question 8: ‘Is it or is it not correct that the Führer also had misgivings about the draft because he did not want any restrictions to be placed on soldiers who were directly engaged in combating the partisans?’”
According to the minutes Jodl stated in reply:
“This is out of the question here. During the fighting they can do whatever they like, they can hang them, hang them upside down or quarter them; it says nothing about that. The only limitation applies to reprisals after the fighting in those areas in which the partisans were active....
“Answer: ‘It is correct that the Führer had fundamental misgivings about these restrictions. Jodl’s remark is correct as far as its contents are concerned. I can no longer recall his exact words.’
“Question 9: ‘Is it or is it not correct that following this remark all those present’—Führer, Keitel, Kranke, and you yourself—‘including the Führer, laughed and the Führer abandoned his standpoint?’
“Answer: ‘It is probable that all of us laughed on account of Jodl’s remark. Whether after this the Führer really abandoned his standpoint I do not know for certain. However, it seems probable to me.’
“Question 10: ‘Then how were the expressions “hang, hang upside down, quartered,” interpreted?’
“Answer: ‘The expressions, “hang,” “hang upside down,” “quartered,” could in this connection only be interpreted as an ironical remark and be understood to mean that in accordance with the directive no further restrictions were to be placed on the soldiers in combat.’
“Question 11: ‘Could you perhaps say something about Jodl’s fundamental attitude towards the obligation of the Wehrmacht to observe the provisions of international law in wartime?’
“Answer: ‘I do not know Jodl’s fundamental attitude. I only know that Keitel, who was Jodl’s and my own immediate superior, always endeavored to observe the provisions of international law...’
“Question 12: ‘Did you ever have the experience yourself that Jodl influenced the Führer to issue an order which violated international law?’
“Answer: ‘No.’”
THE PRESIDENT: None of that last part arises out of the cross-examination.
DR. EXNER: Did you have anything to do with prisoners of war?
JODL: I had nothing at all to do with prisoners of war. It was the general Armed Forces Department which dealt with them.
DR. EXNER: Now, one last question.
It is alleged by the Prosecution, and during yesterday’s examination it was reaffirmed, that there was or had been a conspiracy between political and military leaders for the waging of aggressive wars and that you were a member of that conspiracy. Can you say anything else about that before we finish?
JODL: There was no conspiracy...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal does not think that that really arises out of the cross-examination. Anyhow, he said it already; he said that he was not a member of a conspiracy. There is no use repeating his evidence.
DR. EXNER: It was again said yesterday that there was a very close connection with the Party and the members of the Party and, of course, that is connected with the conspiracy. That is why I should have thought the question permissible.
THE PRESIDENT: He said already that he was not a member of the conspiracy.
DR. EXNER: In that case, I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I merely wish to join in the objection which Dr. Nelte has raised to the written statement of Lieutenant General Von Österreich. I refer to the reasons which he has given. That is all.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant Jodl, you spoke—I think it was the day before yesterday—about the number of SS divisions at the end of the war. Do you remember that?
JODL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I think you said there were 35 at the end of the war. Is that right, 35 about?
JODL: If I remember rightly, I said between 35 and 38.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. Now, what I want to be clear about is this. You were referring only to Waffen-SS divisions, were you not? Only the Waffen-SS?
JODL: Yes, only the Waffen-SS. It is true they were...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were they completely co-ordinated into the Army and under the command of the Army?
JODL: For tactical operations they came under the Wehrmacht commanders, but not for disciplinary matters. As regards the latter their superior was, and remained, Himmler, even when they were fighting.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was discipline the only thing that brought them under Himmler’s jurisdiction?
JODL: He was also looked upon as their commander for all practical purposes. That is seen from the fact that the condition of the divisions, their equipment, and their losses were frequently or almost exclusively reported to the Führer by Himmler himself.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When had they been co-ordinated into the Army? When? What year?
JODL: They were co-ordinated into the Wehrmacht at the beginning of the war, at the moment when the Polish campaign began.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, only one other question, about Russia; I want to see if I understood your point of view clearly. You feared an invasion of Germany by Russia; is that right?
JODL: I expected, at a certain moment, either political blackmail on the strength of the large troop concentration or an attack.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, please, Defendant, I asked you if you did not fear an attack by Russia. You did at one time, did you not?
JODL: Yes, I was afraid of that.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. When was that? When?
JODL: It began through...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When did you fear it? When did you first fear that attack?
JODL: I had that fear for the first time during the summer of 1940; it arose from the first talks with the Führer at the Berghof on 29 July.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then from the military point of view, from that moment on, it was necessary for you to attack first, was it not?
JODL: After the political clarification, only then; up to then it had only been a conjecture.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How could you afford to wait for the political clarifying work if you were afraid of an immediate attack?
JODL: For that reason we increased our defensive measures to begin with, until the spring of 1941. Up to then we only took measures for defense. It was not until February 1941 we began concentrating troops for an attack.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, then, just one other question. I am not at all clear on this. During that attack did you then advise that Germany attack first, or did you advise that Germany should not attack? What was your advice? You saw this danger; what did you do about it?
JODL: That problem, too, like most of the others, was the subject of a written statement I made to the Führer in which I drew his attention to the tremendous military effects of such a decision. One knew of course how the campaign would begin, but no human being could imagine how it would end...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): We have heard all that. I did not want to go into that. What I wanted to get at is this: You were afraid that Russia was going to attack. If that was true, why didn’t you advise Germany to attack at once? You were afraid Russia would attack, and yet you say you advised against moving into Russia. I do not understand.
JODL: That is not the case. I did not advise against marching into Russia; I merely said that if there were no other possibility and if there was really no political way of avoiding the danger, then I, too, could only see the possibility of a preventive attack.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all. Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.
[The defendant left the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner?
DR. EXNER: I have four witnesses to bring before the Tribunal, but I should like to begin by making a request. In consideration of my lame leg may I leave it to my colleague Jahrreis to question these four witnesses?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Dr. Exner.
Dr. Exner, the Tribunal wishes me to say that we allow another counsel to examine the witnesses as an exception to our general rule that only one counsel may appear in court and in the presentation of the case on behalf of the defendant. We will make this exception in your favor.
PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): In that case, with the permission of the Tribunal, I will call the first witness, General Horst Freiherr von Buttlar-Brandenfels.
[The witness Von Buttlar-Brandenfels took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name, please?
GENERAL HORST FREIHERR VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS (Witness): Horst Freiherr von Buttlar-Brandenfels.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, were you in the Wehrmacht Operations Staff during the war?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: During what period?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I was a member of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff from 1 January 1942 until 15 November 1944.
DR. JAHRREISS: What was your position on the staff?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I was first General Staff officer of the Army, and in my capacity as department chief I was in charge of the Operations Department of the Army.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am going to have a document shown you, Document Number 823-PS, Exhibit Number RF-359. It is in document book Jodl, second volume, Page 158. Will you please be good enough to have a look at it.
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Do you want me to read the whole document?
DR. JAHRREISS: I want you to glance through it. Who is the author of the document?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is written by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, Department QU, Administration Group.
DR. JAHRREISS: By whom is it signed?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is signed by me.
DR. JAHRREISS: By you. To what extent is that document connected with the Defendant Jodl?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The document has nothing at all to do with the Defendant Jodl.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then please will you look at the signatures at the upper right-hand corner on the first page; there is an initial which can be read as a “J.”
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: That must be a mistake. The initial is exactly the same as the one which appears below in the signature to the written note, and this initial is that of the Chief of the Quartermaster Department, Colonel Polleck.
DR. JAHRREISS: Colonel Polleck?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: If you will look at Page 2, you will see two signatures at the bottom. The first must be that of the expert. I cannot recognize it for certain. I take it for the signature of the Senior Administrative Counsellor Niehments.
DR. JAHRREISS: You mean the initial behind which there are the Numbers 4 or 9 for the date?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I mean the top one.
DR. JAHRREISS: The top one?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The top one. The bottom initial is the signature, the initials of Colonel Polleck. When the document had been submitted to the Chief of the OKW it was returned to me. Then I initialed it again at the top, and marked it for the Quartermaster Department, that is the “QU” underlined at the top. Then it was again initialed by the “QU” chief, and after that it is marked “Administrative Group” and initialed again by the man who dealt with it. In addition I should like to point out that all this relates to prisoners of war, and that was a field of work with which Jodl actually had nothing to do. In the quartermaster and organizational branches of the Armed Forces Operations Staff we had several fields of work which, although they came from his staff...
DR. JAHRREISS: Just a minute, Witness. I do not mind your giving us a lecture, but I should like to get to the point. There are remarks in the margin of this document, do you see them?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Is any one of them written by Jodl?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: No, they are initialed with a “K” for Field Marshal Keitel.
DR. JAHRREISS: But the French Prosecution assert that these are comments made by Jodl on the prisoner-of-war question; and if I understood you correctly, you mean to say that this was not possible at all for reasons of competency?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Apart from the fact that there is not a mark on the document made by Jodl, it is unlikely that Jodl had any knowledge of the affair at all, because of the way in which it had to be dealt with.
DR. JAHRREISS: But is it not correct, Witness, that Department “QU” came under Jodl?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Actually, it is correct, but in “QU” Department, just as in “Org.” Department there were several fields of work which the Generaloberst had given up and which were dealt with either directly by the head of the department, or through the deputy chief, with the Chief of the OKW.
DR. JAHRREISS: You say prisoner-of-war questions were among those, is that true?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Among other things also the question of prisoners of war.
DR. JAHRREISS: What other work did this Department “QU” have?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: As its main task or in its first department, “QU-1,” Department “QU” looked after nothing but supplies and also supervised the provisioning of the various theaters of war, which came directly under the OKW. The second department was occupied mainly with military administration, and the third department dealt with general questions, such as the prisoner-of-war system—for example, questions concerning international law and so on.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then I have just one more question about these organizational matters. Were all the departments of the Armed Forces Operations Staff in the Führer’s headquarters?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: No; for example we had the “Org.” Department, an organizational department, which was not located at headquarters but in the neighborhood of Berlin.
DR. JAHRREISS: If I have understood you correctly, the affairs of Department “QU” by-passed Jodl, so to speak, and were handled with the Chief of OKW?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Not in every case, but in a certain number of cases.
DR. JAHRREISS: At all events the question of prisoners of war?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Certainly, the question of prisoners of war.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. Witness, what position did you have at the beginning of the war?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: At the beginning of the war I was the second General Staff officer in the Central Department of the General Staff of the Army.
DR. JAHRREISS: Would you speak a little more slowly. And what were your duties there?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: My department dealt with the filling of positions in the higher command offices for mobilization.
DR. JAHRREISS: Those of the General Staff officers of the OKW too?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, those, too.
DR. JAHRREISS: General, do you know who was meant to be Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff in the event of mobilization from 1 October 1939 on?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, General Von Sodenstern was meant to hold this position for the next mobilization year.
DR. JAHRREISS: Am I to understand that if the war had broken out after 1 October—let us say on 5 or 6—then Jodl would not have been Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff at all?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I am not sure of the date on which the new mobilization year of 1939 to 1940 began. From that time on...
MR. ROBERTS: I submit this testimony is not relevant to any issue in this case at all, and it may be somewhat interesting to know the answers that are submitted have no relevancy at all.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t quite understand what the relevancy of the evidence at the moment is.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if the Prosecution are right that the Defendant Jodl belonged to a group of conspirators aiming at world conquest and if, as the Prosecution say, that group of conspirators obtained use of the German state machine to achieve their aims, then it must be a somewhat peculiar state system when conspirators are changed periodically. To that extent I believe the case must be presented to the Tribunal for consideration.
THE PRESIDENT: Has he been given the dates of his exchanges, without any cross-examination? He went to Vienna at a certain date, he came back at another date, and we have no challenge of that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, that is a different question. The Defendant Jodl has said that if mobilization was decreed before 1 October he was Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and had to leave Vienna for Berlin. Now the witness says that this was only up to the new mobilization year and that then the other would have come along if the war had broken out 14 days later. I think...
THE PRESIDENT: Surely that is extraordinarily remote, Dr. Jahrreiss. You show us a matter of surmise about what would have happened if something else would have happened. That does not help us very much.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, the testimony of the witness is not a mere conjecture. He only said that the person who held this important position was disposed of in a routine manner according to date. That was the only thing to be shown.
May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: No, in the interest of time and an expeditious trial, the Tribunal rules you may not go into that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, if I now ask you about a certain field of activity which you just mentioned, it is because I assume that you have particularly expert knowledge of it. Is it true that you were officially connected with the suppression of partisans?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. The chief authority for combating guerrillas was turned over to my department toward the end of the summer of 1942, and the tactical basis for combating guerrillas was dealt with by my department from that date on.
DR. JAHRREISS: Are you familiar with the pamphlet on the suppression of partisans, issued in May 1944?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, the leaflet was drawn up in my department.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was that the first one, or had there been a previous regulation concerning guerrilla warfare?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. In the autumn of 1942 a short and incomplete directive had been issued on the subject of combating guerrillas. At that time we were still comparatively inexperienced; and since guerrilla fighting had not been anticipated in peacetime, we first had to get further experience.
DR. JAHRREISS: In this connection I am interested particularly in the guerrilla fighting in the East and Southeast, on the subject of which the Prosecution have shown that they have a very definite idea. Is it correct to speak of a “guerrilla war,” as has been done here several times?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is correct according to the extent and danger which guerrilla fighting assumed, given its limitations in regard to time and space.
DR. JAHRREISS: Does that mean that the characteristics of this fighting went beyond the general conception of the franc-tireur system?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: In extent, yes. In the methods, no.
DR. JAHRREISS: What do you mean by “extent”?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I mean by “extent” the dimensions of the area affected by guerrilla fighting.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was it therefore unusual with regard to territory or with regard to people involved?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The guerrilla fighting was certainly unusual both in regard to its territorial extent and the people who took part in it.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know, Witness, whether there were many Jews in these guerrilla groups in the East and Southeast?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I do not remember that among the hundreds of reports I received on guerrilla fighting, there was never any mention of Jews. If there were Jews in these groups it can only have been to a very limited extent.
DR. JAHRREISS: But it has been asserted here that this anti-guerrilla warfare was carried on for the purpose of exterminating the Jews; is that true?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I never heard anything about that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Or the extermination of the Slavs?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: There again, I never heard so much as a hint of such a thing. Such an interpretation would have been quite contrary to the intentions of the military leaders.
DR. JAHRREISS: Why?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The military command had a very definite interest in seeing a peaceful country and a productive population behind every front; and every measure which aimed at this was always welcomed by the military authorities. Every soldier we had to use in guerrilla fighting was urgently needed at the front.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was the policy in the East carried out as the Wehrmacht command wished for their purposes?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Without any doubt that was not the case, because the Wehrmacht would have been glad to see a different policy in the East for the very sake of its volunteer units. We ourselves, with our own methods, made attempts to reach a bloodless pacification of the country even among the guerrillas. Big propaganda campaigns were undertaken there to induce the guerrillas to stop fighting. In certain cases there were special negotiations with individual groups; and, although they were limited to certain occasions and periods, these were most successful.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know General Von Pannewitz?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. General Von Pannewitz was the Commander of the 1st Cossack Division.
DR. JAHRREISS: When, please?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It must have been during 1943.
DR. JAHRREISS: Is it correct that this General, as Commander of the 1st Cossack Division, this volunteer division, once complained to the OKW about the difficulties he was having in his division?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. General Von Pannewitz is a friend of mine from my old regiment. He came to see me at headquarters and on that occasion—in the summer of 1943 or maybe during the autumn—talked to me in detail about the state of affairs in recruiting his troops and the difficulties he was experiencing with the morale of his unit, particularly because of the Government’s policy in the East. At that time he complained particularly about the fact that the Government’s policy held up no national aim for his division; and he made other complaints about the difficulties incurred by the members of his division at that time who were partly on the road and had to be settled.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did Jodl take care of the affair?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. After the visit I reported the subject of our conversation to the Generaloberst and asked him to use his influence in the interests of our volunteer units.
DR. JAHRREISS: Influence on whom do you mean?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Influence on the Führer.
DR. JAHRREISS: But you told me that Jodl was not competent for this?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Generaloberst Jodl...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, what is the relevancy of this, about some general who commanded a Cossack Division and that he had difficulties with morale? What has that got to do with this case?
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, that was a preparatory question. I am now coming to the real question. It is the question of the dividing up of competency and responsibility. I was just about to ask the witness the decisive question.
[Turning to the witness.] General...
THE PRESIDENT: What relevancy have the preparatory questions got to do with the decisive question? How can a visit of this general have anything to do with it? What is the decisive question?
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if I am to give the reason for that, then I will have to tell the witness what I want him to tell me. Then my question will become a leading one.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is not an unusual thing in this Court.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but I did not want to make that mistake.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on, Dr. Jahrreiss. The Tribunal hopes that you won’t take up too much time over these preliminary questions which are leading to decisive ones.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am sorry, but I did not understand.
THE PRESIDENT: I said, the Tribunal hopes that you will not take up too much time with these preparatory questions before the decisive one.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I can abbreviate the examination of the witness a great deal because I am in possession of an affidavit by this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, why are you at the microphone?
DR. LATERNSER: I thought, My Lord, that Dr. Jahrreiss had finished with his interrogation, that he had no more questions to put to the witness.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, there is a misunderstanding. The witness has, in fact, already answered my question.
THE PRESIDENT: He has answered it, has he?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, he has answered it. I merely wanted to enlarge on it a little further but...
THE PRESIDENT: Then you have finished, have you, Dr. Jahrreiss?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes. I now have no further questions to put to the witness.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I can shorten the examination considerably because I have an affidavit from the witness which he made on 20 May 1946. If it is my turn, I propose to submit this affidavit to the Tribunal. But so that I may not be reproached for not having ascertained the facts when the witness was available in the courtroom, I will now ask the witness whether the contents of the affidavit of 20 May 1946, are correct.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, are the contents of the affidavit which was given me, dated 20 May 1946, correct?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: They are correct.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, do you know General Heusinger?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, I know General Heusinger.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution in their case against the General Staff submitted Affidavit Number 20, Document Number 3717-PS, Exhibit Number USA-564; and on Page 2, Figure 4, this general makes the following statement. I quote:
“It has always been my personal view that the treatment of the civilian population in operational areas and the methods of guerrilla fighting in the operational zone offered a welcome opportunity for the supreme political and military leadership to carry out their aims, that is to say, to bring about the systematic reduction of Slavs and Jews.”
I want to ask you now, can you explain how General Heusinger could have arrived at that view?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I worked closely with General Heusinger and very often I talked to him about questions concerning anti-guerrilla warfare.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: He never said anything to me which might express this view and I cannot explain this statement of his, because it is entirely contrary to the basic views of the military leaders in regard to the conduct of anti-guerrilla warfare.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. Why was the general command over anti-guerrilla fighting in the East in 1943, as well as in Italy at the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, transferred to Himmler by the Führer’s order?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The Führer always held the view that anti-guerrilla warfare was predominantly a task for the Police and that police forces were more suited to carrying it out than the partly over-aged security forces of the Army which we could detail for these tasks. Just how far Himmler wanted to obtain a new increase of power in this connection I do not know, nor how far he might have suggested it to the Führer.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the OKW and especially of the Armed Forces Operations Staff to this decree of Hitler’s?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It must be emphasized first of all in this connection that, so far as operational areas were concerned, there was no change. The operational area remained until the end, in the case of guerrilla warfare too, under the orders of the commanding generals. In the remaining areas the Armed Forces Operations Staff did not altogether disagree with this arrangement, because we hoped that in these zones the Reichsführer SS would be in a position to use some of his reserves, which were, mostly unknown to us; and we should then have some forces released for the front.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you remember, Witness, that the Commander, Southwest made an urgent request to be excepted from this measure, that is, from transferring his authority in anti-guerrilla warfare to Himmler?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These cases were discussed with General Westphal several times over the telephone, and I consider it possible that he might have made such a suggestion at that time.
DR. LATERNSER: You yourself did not discuss it with the Commander, Southwest?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: With the chief?
DR. LATERNSER: With the chief, yes. As you have just said, before the war you were in the Central Department of the General Staff of the Army; and, as I know, the filling of the higher command positions was handled there, too. Now I want to ask you on what principles they based their selection of commanding generals of army groups and armies?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These appointments were made according to ability and length of service, and the peacetime appointments formed the framework for filling positions at the time of mobilization.
DR. LATERNSER: Were these appointments of the higher commanders carried out strictly from a military standpoint?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These nominations took place entirely on the strength of military considerations; and retired officers, some of whom I am convinced left because of political pressure, were again placed in responsible positions in the event of mobilization. I should like to cite as examples General Von Leeb, General Von Kressenstein, General Von Kleist, Generaloberst Von Hammerstein.
DR. LATERNSER: And these officers you have just mentioned had already retired before the outbreak of the war but were meant to take over higher positions of command in the event of a mobilization?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the Central Department, which had to fill these positions, ever learn that the military leaders had formed a group with the aim of carrying out aggressive wars and of disregarding international law in these wars of aggression?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: In the Central Department we knew nothing of the formation of such a group. Perhaps I may state in this connection that during the years 1937 to 1939 quite a number of General Staff officers came to see Lieutenant Colonel Von Zielberg and me, as personnel administrators of the General Staff officers, and talked to us. The majority of these officers were chiefs of army corps, army, and army group general staffs; and they were, therefore, the confidential and responsible advisers of the commanding generals and commanders. These officers, just like their commanding generals, had fought in the first World War; and the opinion they always expressed to us was only that the German nation should be spared a second war. In spite of every positive attitude to the Führer’s successes, there was a certain anxiety about his policy and particularly about the rapid rearmament of the forces, which made careful work difficult.
After the Munich negotiations confidence increased a great deal and it was the general opinion of the officers that the Führer would continue to be successful in maintaining peace.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the higher commanders towards Hitler after the Munich Agreement?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: After the Munich Agreement I concluded from my talks with General Staff officers that there was a general conviction among them that, thanks to his policy, the Führer would continue to preserve peace. I remember that as late as 25 or 26 August I saw the Führer, at headquarters in Zossen, having a conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Von Zielberg and several other officers. At that time these officers were still of the opinion that a war would not occur and that to render the Führer’s political aims feasible it was only necessary to keep the troops firmly under control so that no political catastrophe should be produced by the laying down of arms.
DR. LATERNSER: I think that is enough as far as this question is concerned. Now, regarding the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944, at what time were the preparations for that offensive begun?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: So far as I can remember...
THE PRESIDENT: How can that have any relevance after about 5 years of war?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, for my next question I should like to ask the witness who of the commanding generals were informed of this offensive and when. It is important to ascertain what co-operation there was among the group. I beg you to allow me to put this question. It is the last but one. The one I just mentioned is the last.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.
DR. LATERNSER: When were the preparations for the Ardennes Offensive begun?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: As far as I can remember, the first preparations were begun in about September 1944.
DR. LATERNSER: When were the commanding generals informed of these intentions and were commanding generals who did not take part in the offensive informed before it began?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: To the last question I can answer, “no.” The first question I cannot answer as far as the date is concerned: but I do know that in the zone which was proposed for the offensive there had already been troop movements ordered by the supreme command before the Commander, West, who was responsible, was informed and that he therefore made frequent inquiries of us asking for an explanation of these movements.
DR. LATERNSER: The Commander, West, who later on had to direct the offensive, was not previously informed about the movements and transfer of divisions for the offensive, all of which took place in his very territory?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. Later on, of course, he was informed.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 8 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH DAY Saturday, 8 June 1946
Morning Session
[The witness Von Buttlar-Brandenfels resumed the stand.]
MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the Defendants Hess and Raeder are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the applications for witnesses and documents that were made the other day in Court, I will take them in the order in which they were dealt with in Court.
The first application is the application of Kaltenbrunner, and the three witnesses which he asks for are allowed: Tiefenbacher, Kandruth, and Strupp.
The application of the Defendant Schirach is rejected.
The applications of the Defendants Hess and Frank for General Donovan are rejected.
The applications of the Defendants Speer and Keitel are granted, and the application of the Defendant Jodl for an affidavit I think was granted yesterday.
The application for the Defendant Göring for two witnesses, Stuckart and Burmath is granted, but on the condition that three witnesses only may be called upon the subject concerned.
With reference to the application of the Defendant Hess, the Tribunal order as follows:
The affidavit of the former Ambassador Gaus of the 17th of May 1946 is rejected on the ground that it is not in accordance with the permission given on May 14, 1946, but purports to incorporate not merely the substance but also the form of the secret treaties, and the form embraced in the affidavit is not identified as being correct either by a person who made the copies or by one who compared them with the originals. Such copies cannot be received in evidence, and the Tribunal have twice ruled to this effect. The matter of importance to the issues before the Tribunal is not the form of the treaties, but their contents, and evidence of their contents is already before the Tribunal by the testimony of three witnesses. The admission of this affidavit would add nothing to the proof before the Tribunal. The same is true of the proposal to call Gaus as a witness, who would only support evidence as to the contents of the treaties which has not been contradicted. The motion of the 23d of May 1946 to reconsider the Tribunal’s former decision and the motion of the 24th of May 1946 to call Gaus as a witness are accordingly denied.
There is one other matter with which the Tribunal propose to deal, and it is this: In the future, counsel for the organizations which the Prosecution have asked the Tribunal to declare to be criminal will not be permitted to examine or to cross-examine any witnesses other than the defendants in this Court. If they wish to examine or to cross-examine those witnesses, they must call them before the commissions which are now sitting for the taking of evidence oh the questions with which the organizations are concerned.
That is all.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to voice a further request for the case of Von Papen. I already submitted a written request on 6 June. This was discussed with the Prosecution, and the General Secretary has instructed me to bring this matter to the attention of the Court.
Prince Erbach-Schönberg has filled out an interrogatory. His answers, however, are partially incomplete and sometimes misleading, and it is therefore necessary to supplement them. I suggest that Prince Erbach, who is in Gmunden in the American-occupied zone of Austria, be brought here and interrogated—outside of this Court but in the presence of the Prosecution—to supplement this interrogatory.
My associate received a letter some days ago from Count Pfeil, who is living in Bad Ischl, which is also in the American-occupied zone of Austria, not far from Gmunden, the residence of Prince Erbach. In this letter he has made detailed statements about the contacts which the Defendant Von Papen had with the circle of conspirators involved in the attempted assassination of 20 July. Since this question was raised by the witness Gisevius, the Defense feel themselves bound to discuss it in the presentation of evidence, although they attach no great importance to it. This evidence can probably be produced by means of an affidavit.
I ask that Count Pfeil be brought here with Prince Erbach at the same time so that he can depose an affidavit in the presence of the Prosecution. It is absolutely essential to bring both of these witnesses here, because the case of Von Papen is imminent, and we could not take care of these matters by correspondence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, will you draw our attention to the particular points in which you say that the interrogatory of Prince Erbach-Schönberg is incomplete or misleading?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection with one of the preceding questions of this interrogatory, Prince Erbach answered that the Defendant Von Papen had desired to achieve his assignment by peaceful means rather than by the use of force. The witness answered a later question as to whether the Defendant Von Papen acted in accordance with these political principles as follows:
“As long as I was there I had the impression that the Defendant Von Papen acted in accordance with these principles—that is, the establishment of relations by peaceful means rather than by the use of force.”
This last statement contradicts the first half of the answer. Moreover, this latter phrasing scarcely corresponds to the facts.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that that answer is incomplete or contradictory?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: There is a contradiction. “Rather than by force” contradicts the first half of his reply, that he acted according to these principles. These questions...
THE PRESIDENT: The answer that I have got is:
“As long as I was there I had the impression that the Defendant Von Papen acted according to this policy of establishing relations through peaceful means rather than force.”
There is nothing contradictory in that, in English.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German text it says, “rather than with force.” The word “rather” disturbs me, and is a contradiction. It does not mean the same thing—namely, that he wanted to bring about connections in a peaceful manner only and not by force.
THE PRESIDENT: It means the same thing. It means that he wanted to establish the relations by peaceful means rather than with forceful means. “Not by force” he means.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This version might lead to the assumption that the Defendant Von Papen may even have considered non-peaceful means. We want to prove, in accordance with the foregoing answer, that he rejected all means other than peaceful means from the beginning, and never introduced them into his discussions. However, if the High Tribunal interpret the interrogatory in the manner which has just been stated, then I have no further reason to supplement it.
THE PRESIDENT: It couldn’t mean anything else in English. I don’t know what it could mean in German.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German version it is translated, “I would prefer peaceful means to force; as a last resort, other than peaceful means might have to be considered.” That would be the interpretation placed on the German translation.
We want to establish clearly the fact that none other than peaceful methods were ever considered.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To save any trouble, I should like to assure the Tribunal that the Prosecution accepted the answer in the sense which Your Lordship has just put. We shouldn’t suggest for a moment that Prince Erbach would make any other answer than in the sense the Tribunal have accepted it.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps a way of meeting the difficulty would be if you would agree to read the words in the sense “and not by force.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then, of course, I quite agree. And I should like to have the Tribunal’s decision as to whether Count Pfeil is to be brought here to depose an affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the other witness?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The second witness, Count Pfeil, who wrote the letter which we wish to submit to the High Tribunal in the form of an affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: We will consider that when we have heard Sir David.
Are there any other inconsistencies or contradictions which you wish to draw our attention to in the Prince’s interrogatory?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the letter of Count Pfeil been translated?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, it has not as yet been translated. But it is simply a letter, the identity of which we cannot prove, and that is why we wanted the affidavit in the proper form.
THE PRESIDENT: Would the letter itself be sufficient if the Prosecution were prepared to admit the letter?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, it would suffice, for we could certainly prove nothing more with the affidavit than what is contained in the letter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have no objection to admitting the letter, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you, Sir David.
Then the interrogatories of Prince Erbach-Schönberg will be amended in the way that we have indicated, and the letter of Count Friedrich Karl von Pfeil will be admitted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wonder if Your Lordship will allow me to mention one point that arose on Tuesday.
Your Lordship may remember that the Defendant Jodl said that he had not been permitted by the Prosecution to mention a document. My Lord, a misunderstanding arose in this way. Your Lordship may remember that at an early stage in dealing with witnesses and applications, I objected to general evidence of shackling because I said that the Prosecution had not made the evidence as to shackling by the Germans a part of their case, and therefore it did not seem to me an issue that need be pursued. I put that forward, and Mr. Roberts, who was dealing with the later stages, adopted the same line.
Apparently that was understood as including an objection to the Wehrmacht order which the Defendant Jodl mentioned, and which he wanted to use as an answer to a broadcast of the British War Office. This, I think, is a further remark which could be made. I certainly didn’t wish to object to the Defendant Jodl clarifying a Wehrmacht order that was part of the preparations for the Commando Order, and I said so at the time.
I should not like the Tribunal to think that I was making any reflection on the learned professors who are conducting the Defendant Jodl’s case, or putting forward that they had made a basic accusation against me. I thought, therefore, the Tribunal would allow me just a moment to explain that it was a misunderstanding, and that neither of us feels that we have been injured in any way by the other by what has been said.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything further that needs to be done with reference to the admission or introduction of this?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not at all, because I waived any objection to it, and the Defendant Jodl was permitted, in giving his evidence, to make a full explanation concerning it. I only wanted it understood how the misunderstanding had arisen, and that I did not feel that Professor Exner or Professor Jahrreiss had made any baseless charges against me in so doing.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you very much.
DR. NELTE: I should like to put one question to the witness.
Witness, the charge has been made against the Defendant Field Marshal Keitel that—and I quote—“rather than back up his subordinate officers and protect them, he threatened them; yes, he threatened to turn them over to the Gestapo.”
Can you give us facts about this charge which prove that this was not the case?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I can testify that Field Marshal Keitel, as superior, was always very well-disposed toward the officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. For instance, the relations between himself and Colonel Moench, who was closely connected with him in his military capacity of Chief of the Organization Division, were almost that of father and son; and he deeply lamented his death in action on the Eastern Front.
I can also say that I myself, along with Lieutenant Colonel Ziehrvogel, the A-1 man on my staff, on the basis of factual disagreement with the staff of the Reichsführer SS, was in 1944 accused in a letter to Field Marshal Keitel of sabotaging the co-operation between OKW and Reichsführer SS and the conduct of the war. In his reply, which I saw myself, Field Marshal Keitel defended us in every way, and said that he would take entire responsibility for everything done by his subordinate officers.
DR. NELTE: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any cross-examination?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not propose to cross-examine. That, of course, will not be taken that the Prosecution is accepting the truth of this evidence at all. But the whole question of atrocities in the East has been so thoroughly covered by evidence and by document, My Lord, I think it would be wrong and repetitious if I cross-examined.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Roberts.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, there was one other point. Dr. Laternser, in the interests of saving time, produced an affidavit of this witness dated the 20th of May 1946.
My Lord, of course, we are most anxious to assist Dr. Laternser in any effort on his part to save time, and we do not put any objection to this affidavit. But I am not quite certain as to what the affidavit is, and as to whether it has been put in as an exhibit—in which case it should be given a number—or whether it should go to the commission.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think it necessary for it to be given an exhibit number. It was put to the witness, and he says the evidence was correct. That enables Dr. Laternser to refer to it hereafter.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. Then I propose the Prosecution should get copies. Could that be conveniently arranged?
THE PRESIDENT: Of course.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, Mr. Dodd is pointing out that we have not seen this affidavit; we do not know what it contains. But we will get a copy, and if we have any further application to make, we can make it.
THE PRESIDENT: When an affidavit is used in this way and put to a witness who is in the witness box, of course the affidavit ought to be supplied to the Prosecution in order that they may see what is in it, and so be able to cross-examine if they wish to do so.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That has not been done in this case. The best course would be for the affidavit to be supplied to the Prosecution, and they may, if they wish, apply to examine on it before the commission.
Do you think it is necessary? Perhaps you could see the affidavit soon and decide whether it is necessary to keep the witness here.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I respectfully agree.
THE PRESIDENT: And we shall hold the witness in Nuremberg?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, we accept the invitation to examine the affidavit over the week end, and then, if necessary, we could make an application on Monday.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; that is quite all right. Then, the witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
Yes, Dr. Jahrreiss, will you call the next witness?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, if it is the Tribunal’s wish. With the permission of the Tribunal, I wish to call Major Büchs as my next witness. Major Büchs.
[The witness Büchs took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
HERBERT BÜCHS (Witness): Herbert Büchs.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold nothing and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, what position did you have in the last years of the war?
BÜCHS: From November 1943 I was a General Staff officer of the Air Force serving with the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff; and in that capacity I was second adjutant to General Jodl.
DR. JAHRREISS: And were you in this position until the end of the war?
BÜCHS: I remained in this position until the end, until our arrest on 23 May 1945.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, during this time in which you were in the Führer’s headquarters, were you in the various compounds of these headquarters?
BÜCHS: Yes. I was in the headquarters in East Prussia, and in addition to that I was in the headquarters in Berlin, and in 1944 also in Berchtesgaden.
DR. JAHRREISS: It has been said that there was a Party clique at the Führer’s headquarters. Do you know anything about that?
BÜCHS: If I am to understand by that a circle of people, I would name Fegelein, Bormann, and Burgdorf.
DR. JAHRREISS: You would say that that was a clique?
BÜCHS: These were three gentlemen who were in very close personal and official contact, and who made that impression on outsiders.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was this very close official and personal relationship between themselves or with others?
BÜCHS: They not only had very close relations among themselves, but I also observed that these three gentlemen had very strong influence on Adolf Hitler himself.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, would you ascertain the names of the three again? They did not come to us quite clearly.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes.
[Turning to the witness.] Major, will you please pronounce slowly the names of these three gentlemen you just mentioned?
BÜCHS: There is Fegelein, Himmler’s liaison officer to Adolf Hitler; then Bormann, the head of the Party Chancellery and the representative of the Party; and General Burgdorf, who had a dual position as Chief of the Army Personnel Office and at the same time Chief Adjutant of the Armed Forces with the Führer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did General Jodl have official relations with each of these three gentlemen?
BÜCHS: If I may start with Fegelein: Fegelein as liaison officer to Himmler was, as far as the Führer was concerned, the man to whom he turned in all questions of material and personal equipment of the Waffen-SS divisions whenever these questions arose during the situation discussions in connection with putting these divisions into operation. In this connection, points which fell within Fegelein’s sphere were frequently raised during situation reports. But the official connection between Jodl and Fegelein was otherwise very distant.
DR. JAHRREISS: And how about Bormann?
BÜCHS: In dealing with Bormann as Deputy of the Party, General Jodl always strictly defined his own sphere of military tasks. He always rejected complaints or unjustifiable accusations or possible attacks against the Armed Forces. I witnessed this especially while the war was fought on German soil and there was often friction with the Gauleiter who had been appointed Reich Defense Commissars. For instance, I saw that General Jodl on receiving complaints or letters from Bormann simply returned the originals with rather abrupt marginal notes of his views. If that had no effect, he did not hesitate to express his views to the Führer in every possible way in order to obtain his decision as to the dispute in question.
DR. JAHRREISS: And the third of these gentlemen, Burgdorf?
BÜCHS: To my recollection Generaloberst Jodl had very little official contact with General Burgdorf, although it was Burgdorf who discussed the important questions of the appointment of the commanders and higher officers with the Führer. It was in just such a case that I saw General Burgdorf first of all discuss these matters with the Führer alone, so that General Jodl had comparatively little influence in that direction.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now I should like to hear from you, Witness, what personal relations existed between Generaloberst Jodl and each of these three gentlemen.
BÜCHS: Jodl disliked Fegelein, because—I believe—he discerned the defects of his character at a very early stage. I have known him on several occasions to call Fegelein to account and reprimand him.
As for Bormann, I should say General Jodl had no connection with him at all. I also have never noticed any personal or informal relations between them. What I have said about Fegelein also applies to his relations with General Burgdorf, whom General Jodl probably also disliked personally.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now I turn to a different point. Witness, do you know anything about the fact that in the last phase of the war the possibility of exposing a certain category of captured enemy airmen to the popular rage was under consideration? Did you hear about that?
BÜCHS: Yes. I recall that in the spring of 1944, at Berchtesgaden, the Führer vehemently demanded that Allied fliers who made emergency landings in Germany no longer be protected by the Armed Forces against the enraged populace. This demand was based on reports alleging that a Kreisleiter of the Party and an officer of the Air Force had protected an Allied airman. At that time the Führer made this demand in a very sharp and pointed manner. He demanded that the Armed Forces issue the appropriate orders to put a stop to this once and for all.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did Hitler also make this demand of General Jodl?
BÜCHS: This demand was made at a situation conference attended by these gentlemen and Jodl himself; but I do not think that General Jodl had any direct connection with the handling of the whole question, as it was not directly connected with military matters.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did the General make no comment at all on the matter?
BÜCHS: General Jodl, like all the other gentlemen, rejected this demand and, on his part, did everything he could to try to dissuade the Führer from this demand. He began immediately by adopting a critical attitude, which expressed itself later in details he gave of four cases of violation of international law on the part of Allied airmen.
DR. JAHRREISS: I really do not need to ask you about this, for we have documentary proof of it. If Hitler was so enraged and demanded a decree with the urgency you have described, was it possible to pursue a delaying action?
BÜCHS: In a case of this kind, in which the Führer in the heat of his rage made such demands, it was impossible for the gentlemen to whom the demand was put to oppose him at the moment, let alone flatly refuse to carry out the order. There was nothing else for them to do—General Jodl used these tactics frequently—but to try by obtaining data, arguments pro and con, and asking for comments and opinions from all the offices concerned—to collect the material and at a quiet opportune moment approach the Führer on the matter again and try to dissuade him from his extravagant demand. Outwardly, this resulted in a lengthy correspondence, in which the files of the various departments involved were sent back and forth, all with the intent of delaying the matter to the utmost and, if possible, shelving it completely. My impression, as far as the treatment of the terror-fliers was concerned, was that in this case we really succeeded even though the Führer’s attention was repeatedly called to this question through new reports and statements and he demanded that a decree be put into execution.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then was no such order issued?
BÜCHS: I know of no such order.
DR. JAHRREISS: Can you cite an incident which shows clearly that no such decree was issued?
BÜCHS: On one occasion in August 1944 I personally was called to account by the Führer rather sharply. After an air raid on Munich, Fegelein had described low-level attacks to Hitler rather crudely and reported the incident where a plane was shot down by antiaircraft artillery, and two Allied airmen had made an emergency parachute landing. When they were captured and brought off by a Wachtmeister of the antiaircraft artillery, he himself said that he had called this man to account, and had asked him why he had not shot the two fliers. The man replied, “because I had no orders to do so.” At that moment I interpolated on my own account that no such order existed. And then the Führer reproached me in the most violent manner because the leading men of the Armed Forces had not issued a decree like that. Then, of course, he again demanded that the order be carried out.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was it carried out then?
BÜCHS: No, for that was the period after 20 July, and the time of the campaign in the West when there were more urgent questions in the foreground. And because of all of these questions that of the treatment of terror-fliers was again put aside.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know about an incident in Berlin—I believe in March 1945—which is supposed to have taken place in the Reich Chancellery, where the Führer again complained that in spite of his demand this decree had not been issued?
BÜCHS: I recall that in March 1945 the Führer again expressed himself very heatedly on this problem to General Koller, who was then Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force. I myself was not present at the beginning of this conversation. I was called in, however, and heard the Führer say something to the effect that on the basis of the attitude taken by the Armed Forces, and especially by the Air Force, it had been impossible for him to counteract the terror of the Allied fliers over Germany by means of a corresponding counterterror...
DR. JAHRREISS: Just a moment, Witness. You said that you had not been present at the entire discussion.
Mr. President, we have an interrogatory which we want to submit to the Tribunal. It is in our document book, Volume II, Page 178, and is the testimony of General of the Air Force, Koller. This testimony under Number 5, which is on Page 180 of the document book, contains all the details worth preserving of this extremely important conference in Berlin. Only part of this conversation took place in the Führer’s room. Another part took place in the anterooms—as, for instance, that with Kaltenbrunner—while the conversation with Göring was carried on by telephone. In order to save time and to avoid splitting up the matter, I should like to have the Tribunal’s permission to present it as a whole, even though the witness heard only a part.
With regard to Jodl, the last sentence says, as a whole—I believe, Mr. President, we can save time if I may present it now.
First of all, I must read the first question put to General Koller, which is to be found on Page 179. Here the witness was asked:
“How long have you been Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force?” The answer is on the next page and is:
“From 1 September 1943 to 3 September 1944 I was Chief of the Air Force Operations Staff; from 23 November 1944, Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force.”
Question 5—and that is the question which concerns us—is on Page 179:
“Do you recall that about March 1945, in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery, the Führer censured you and the Air Force because such an order was not given?”
Answer, Page 180:
“Yes, I remember exactly. A notice taken from the Allied press reporter survey between the beginning and the middle of March 1945 was laid before the Führer by Bormann during the situation discussion. In brief it read somewhat to this effect:
“‘An American combat air crew, shot down over Germany a short time previously, was overtaken by advancing American troops. They had declared that they were ill-treated by enraged members of the population, threatened with death, and probably would have been killed if German soldiers had not released them and taken them under their protection.’
“Bormann further pointed out to the Führer in a few words that this confirmed that soldiers in such cases intervene against the population.
“b) Hitler turned angrily to me and said excitedly:
“‘I have already issued one order that bomber crews which bail out are not to be protected against the population. These people only murder German women and children. It is unheard of that German soldiers should take measures to protect them against our own population, which is acting on motives of justifiable hate. Why are my orders not carried out?’
“Surprised by this attack I replied something like this:
“‘I know nothing about any such order; and it would in any case be a practical impossibility.’
“Hitler turned to me and said very loudly and sharply:
“‘The reason why my orders are not carried out is only the cowardice of the Air Force, because the gentlemen of the Air Force are cowards, and are afraid that something might happen to them too. The whole thing is nothing more than a cowardly pact between the Air Force and the British and American airmen.’
“Hitler then turned also to Kaltenbrunner, who happened to be present in the background, and went on, addressing him but sometimes not looking at him:
“‘I hereby order that all bomber crews who bailed out in the last few months, as well as all bomber crews bailing out in future, are to be turned over immediately by the Air Force to the SD, and are to be liquidated by the SD. Anyone failing to carry out my orders, or taking action against the population, is liable to the death penalty and is to be shot.’
“Hitler then further expressed in general terms his indignation and his views on the matter. The assembled officers gave the impression of general surprise and disapproval.
“c) After the situation discussion with the Führer I requested an interview with Kaltenbrunner in the side passageway. Essential points:
“Koller: ‘It is impossible to carry out those orders. The Air Force will have nothing more to do with them, nor I myself in any way whatsoever—and I can say as much for the Reich Marshal. It is entirely out of the question that the Air Force will agree to this in any way, shape, or form.’
“Kaltenbrunner: ‘The Führer has completely mistaken ideas. The duties of the SD are also constantly misunderstood. Those things are no concern of the SD. Moreover, no German soldier does what the Führer demands. That is not in the German soldier’s line. He does not kill prisoners. If individual fanatical Party followers of Herr Bormann try to do so, the German soldier intervenes. The Führer has a completely false idea of the views held by our soldiers. Moreover, I myself will do nothing in the matter either. I have no intention of doing anything. We must just take care that we get out of it again, otherwise we will be the first to get shot. We must gain time. I am again leaving Berlin at once for a fairly long time anyway.’
“Koller: ‘Then we are agreed on the main point. Your leaving Berlin is favorable. But we must have another way out as far as the Führer is concerned, for it is possible that he may again refer to his order tomorrow. Later on if it becomes extreme, we will have to see how we can put a stop to the business, or what is going to happen to us?’
“The following was decided at my suggestion:
“No order along the lines decreed by the Führer will be issued by the Air Force or the SD.
“Surrenders to the SD—none.
“In case the Führer should refer to his order again, then, first of all, prevent further action through explanations of the following kind: All members of air crews previously captured, not in the hands of the Air Force but dispersed under the control of the Replacement Army Commander (BdE). Time of capture not known to a central office. Therefore a lengthy and difficult process to determine the number of air personnel captured during the last few months.
“Also, preparations must be made in detail for getting them out without attracting attention. The newly captured crews go automatically to interrogation centers. These are in process of transfer owing to operations. Communications are bad.
“Detailed discussions and agreements with the SD necessary. In order to preserve the appearance of discussion, the I-c officer of the High Command of the Air Force (I-c of OKL) should go to a delegate of Kaltenbrunner who, however, would first have to be appointed.
“d) After the situation discussion with the Führer, I spoke to Field Marshal Keitel at the entrance of the air-raid shelter, and said:
“‘The Führer’s order is insane.’—Keitel affirmed, ‘It certainly is’—‘The Air Force must keep its escutcheon clean. The order cannot be carried out. I am convinced that the Reich Marshal is entirely of my opinion. To issue such an order—and verbally—and moreover with such threats of punishment. He must sign an order of this kind with his own name. It may or may not be carried out—but not by the Air Force. Nor by the SD, either; I have spoken to Kaltenbrunner.’
“Field Marshal Keitel: ‘He will not sign such orders then, and everything is always placed on the shoulders of the OKW. But I’ll be damned if I issue such an order.’
“Koller: ‘The Air Force cannot join in this in any circumstances. We will not assume such a responsibility.’
“Field Marshal Keitel: ‘You are right; neither can I. I must think over what I can do about it, and how I can do it.’
“The conversation was interrupted because Keitel was called to the telephone. Keitel was very indignant and annoyed about the Führer’s order.
“e) After refreshments in a side room of the air-raid shelter, I had to cross the antechamber of the conference room again to reach the cloakroom and exit. Hitler happened to come out of the room to give an order to an orderly, and he called me as I was passing. The door leading to the conference room was open, and Ley was sitting at the table. Hitler said to me:
“‘I must come back to my order once more. You must all help me, for matters cannot go on like this any longer. The Air Force—or at least defense of the Reich—has failed. What am I to do against the frightful bombing terror which is murdering German women and children?’
“Koller: ‘The Air Defense and our crews do what they can and what is humanly possible. Our neglect of air armament and the enemy’s present technical and numerical superiority cannot be eliminated or remedied overnight. When the searchlight units get stronger, the air situation over Germany will be more in our favor.’
“Hitler: ‘I cannot wait for that. I can no longer be responsible to the German people for the continuation of this situation in the air. If those fliers realize that they will be liquidated as terrorists, they will think twice about flying here.’
“Koller: ‘That will certainly not improve the situation in the air. On the contrary, it will make it worse.’
“Hitler: ‘No; the Japanese method is the best.’
“Hitler’s manner was now calm again, in comparison with what it had been at the situation discussion. He appeared more approachable. Experience had shown that it was better to talk to him alone than in the presence of others. I thought it was a good opportunity to attack the whole problem and stated:
“‘If I may state my point of view, I think that this will not do. Measures of this kind are in such crass opposition to the education, feelings, and way of thinking of all soldiers, that they cannot be carried out. One cannot train soldiers on the regulations governing warfare and decent conduct, and then order actions which are repulsive to everyone. You must not forget, my Führer, that enemy airmen also carry out orders, and do their duty just as ours do. If they are shot down or make forced landings, they are defenseless and unarmed prisoners. What would the world think of us? And the first thing the enemy would do would be to treat our air crews in the same way. That is something for which we cannot answer to our men and their relatives. All their willingness to serve and their discipline would collapse at one blow.’
“Up to that point the Führer had not interrupted me. After his first glance at me he looked away again and seemed to be lost in thought. He had been listening, however, and at that point he interrupted me and said quietly and earnestly:
“‘So the Air Force is afraid after all. That is all very well. But I am responsible for the protection of the German people and have no other means except this.’
“Hitler turned away, and went back into the conference room.
“f) After my arrival at the Air Force headquarters (Kurfürst) I told Colonel Von Brauchitsch what had happened, and ordered him to report it to the Reich Marshal as soon as possible. I myself could not contact the Reich Marshal at the moment. During our conversation Brauchitsch also expressed disapproval of the Führer’s order.
“g) An hour or two later the Reich Marshal called me, and began with the following words, ‘Tell me, has he gone quite mad now?’
“It was quite clear who was meant. I myself reported the principal happenings and the conversation with Kaltenbrunner to the Reich Marshal again, and added:
“‘I will not carry out this order or anything connected with it. I will endeavor to handle the situation so as to gain time now, in any case, and will do everything in my power to protect any of us from disastrous consequences. Perhaps after the last conference the Führer will not refer to his order again. If he does, however, a very difficult situation will arise, and you will have to go to the Führer yourself. What the Führer has ordered must in no case be allowed to happen.’
“The Reich Marshal expressed strong disapproval of Hitler’s attitude and agreed with me in every point. He ordered me to act as I had suggested, to inform him immediately when necessary, and ended the interview with these words, ‘This is all insane and cannot be done.’
“h) Measures against Allied airmen on the basis of the above-mentioned Führer’s order were taken neither by the Air Force nor by the SD. This order did not become known, in my opinion, to the Replacement Army Command (BdE), or its offices, as the Replacement Army Command was not present at the Führer’s meeting, and the order was not transmitted by the Armed Forces High Command (OKW).
“Hitler made no further reference to his order, either to the Reich Marshal or to myself or my representative or, I think, to Kaltenbrunner. To be sure, I never spoke to the latter again about this matter.
“I cannot judge whether Hitler deliberately let the matter drop or whether he forgot about it under the pressure of events.
“i) I know that about two or three weeks later an OKW directive was issued—I think a teletype—in which, as I recall, mention was made of the correspondent’s report that occasioned it. It disclosed the fact that the Führer had expressed his displeasure that German soldiers had taken action against their own people.
“No mention was made of the main point of Hitler’s order. If I remember correctly, the directive was signed by Keitel, and must be regarded as an attempt to cover himself as far as the Führer was concerned.
“In my opinion, General Jodl had nothing to do with the affair at all.”
Witness, as far as you were present at this meeting, is the picture presented by General Koller correct?
BÜCHS: I remember personally something like the following formulation by the Führer, “This results from the fact that in the Air Force war is based on a mutual life insurance policy of, ‘Don’t hurt me; I won’t hurt you.’” That was the sentence which impressed me most strongly, which emphasizes what was said...
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. Then I need not ask you any further questions on this point.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, we will adjourn now.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, I assume that you can still recollect how the offices of the Führer’s headquarters were furnished.
BÜCHS: Yes, I can still remember.
DR. JAHRREISS: In the offices occupied by the Führer, the Field Marshal, the General, and yourself, were there maps on the wall?
BÜCHS: Yes, and also in East Prussia—particularly the headquarters—the Führer had a topographic map of Germany, as well as a political map of Europe, and there were similar maps in the various other rooms.
DR. JAHRREISS: Were maps of Germany hanging there, too?
BÜCHS: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: And the neighboring territories on which concentration camps and penal institutions were indicated with a red or blue ring?
BÜCHS: No. Neither in the headquarters in East Prussia nor in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, nor at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden, have I ever seen such a map.
DR. JAHRREISS: At 1230 hours on 11 May 1946, the Munich radio station broadcast a letter from a painter asserting that he had seen maps in the Führer’s headquarters which could only be intended to show the location of concentration camps. Is that possible?
BÜCHS: That is quite out of the question.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was there any more detailed statement about...?
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need go into the broadcast from Munich. We have no evidence of a broadcast from Munich.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am afraid I was misunderstood. I did not ask him whether he heard it, but I wanted to illustrate how the public had come to believe that there were such maps. Thank you, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: What I was pointing out was that it ought not be referred to, as it is not in evidence. The fact which you alleged, that there was a broadcast, ought not to be referred to.
DR. STAHMER: Major Büchs, during the time you spent as commanding officer attached to Führer headquarters, were you regularly present at the daily discussions of the situation?
BÜCHS: Yes, I participated in the daily military situation discussions.
DR. STAHMER: Do you still remember whether you attended the situation discussion of 27 January 1945, at which the fate of the 10,000 air force officers imprisoned in the Sagan Camp was discussed?
BÜCHS: I can remember something like this: Fegelein must have raised the question of evacuating that camp on the approach of the Russian troops. These captured officers were asked whether they wished to remain in the camp and be handed over to the Russian Army, or whether they wanted to be taken away in the course of the evacuation of Silesia. As far as I remember, they definitely decided on the latter alternative—that is to say, to be taken away; and I believe that the only question still to be decided was how their transport was to be arranged.
DR. STAHMER: Can you still remember the suggestions that were made regarding that transport, and who made them?
BÜCHS: No. I believe, at that time, the Führer only said in general terms that these imprisoned officers could not receive better treatment than our own people. It was just at the time of the evacuation of Silesia, and our traffic situation did not permit the transport of even our own people by means of railway trains or in large columns, and the population had to tramp along the roads even in winter. And I think I remember that, at the time, the Führer said, “If these officers wish to be taken along on a transport, they will have to march just like the German civilian population.”
DR. STAHMER: May I, Mr. President, in connection with this statement, refer to an error, in the record. During the cross-examination of the Defendant Göring on 20 March 1946, Document 3786-PS, Exhibit USA-787 was presented. In the German record, Page 6249, after a discussion of how they should be transported, there is a statement that the Führer said, “They will have to go even if they march in ‘Dreck’ (mud).” The actual text is, “They will have to go even if they trek (Treck) on foot.” That is quite a different thing. I do not know how the word is translated in the English text; but that, of course, would give it a very different and entirely wrong meaning. As the witness has just said, the Führer said, “They have got to go even if they have to trek”—that is to march in a column, on foot.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Now, the Tribunal think that the best way to deal with these questions of translation is to take it up with the General Secretary, and get it submitted to the Translation Division.
DR. STAHMER: I merely wanted to establish the fact.
[Turning to the witness.] A remark is supposed to have been made in the course of that conference, during the discussion on transport, “Take off their boots and trousers so that they cannot walk in the snow.” Do you remember who made that remark?
BÜCHS: No, I cannot remember; and I think it is quite impossible.
DR. STAHMER: You do not remember any such remark, or by whom it was made?
BÜCHS: It is perfectly possible that Fegelein made such a suggestion in some connection or other; I do not know.
DR. STAHMER: According to the record, Reich Marshal Göring is supposed to have made such a remark.
BÜCHS: I think that is quite out of the question.
In this connection may I just mention that it was extremely difficult to take notes of the proceedings. Four to six people frequently spoke at once during these conferences—and much more rapidly than usual. The stenographers could only take down what they heard. They could neither look up nor make certain who actually made such and such a remark at such and such a moment. There was a table around which there were often some 30 people standing; and that interfered with the work of the stenographers.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, at this point of the Trial I feel obliged to make a statement. I wanted to ask this witness some important questions, but I am not in a position to do so because of the decision announced by the Tribunal today. I state that through that decision I...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you will have full opportunity to put the questions to the witness before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I please complete my statement.
I have explained that as a result of the decision announced today, I am not in a position to put my questions, and that I must submit to that decision. I wish to state, however, that I consider this decision...
THE PRESIDENT: But it is inaccurate to say you are not in a position to put your questions. You are not able to put your questions now to the witness, but it is not true to say that you are not in a position to put your questions without further qualification. You are in a position to put your questions to the witness before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: Nevertheless, Mr. President, I feel there is an impediment for the defense, constituted by the fact that the defense of the organizations is thus not in a position to present its evidence directly.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has announced its decision.
DR. LATERNSER: I only regret, Mr. President, that that decision was announced without the Defense having first been notified.
DR. MARTIN LÖFFLER (Counsel for the SA): I should like to add in connection with the statements of my colleague Laternser that I must emphasize them because...
THE PRESIDENT: On what point, Dr. Löffler?
DR. LÖFFLER: On the point that the witnesses called today cannot be questioned by defense counsel for the organizations, as has been the custom until now, and that is, therefore, a disadvantage to the defense because for all practical purposes we lose these witnesses altogether.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Löffler, you and Dr. Laternser seem not to have read Article 9 of the Charter, which provides that the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall be represented and heard. That is with reference to the organizations. The Tribunal, after very great trouble, have brought to Nuremberg a very large number of witnesses and have set up commissions for the purpose of examining those witnesses, and they are going to hear some witnesses from among those witnesses at a future date in this Court.
The Tribunal have given the matter full consideration, and it doesn’t desire to hear any further arguments from you or from any other of the counsel for the organizations.
DR. LÖFFLER: Mr. President, we appreciate the Tribunal’s grounds, but we feel obliged to point out from the point of view of the defense that these reasons are justified in theory, but entail in practice the loss of that witness.
I ask permission, therefore, to give you a very brief explanation so that the Tribunal will understand why we lose those witnesses. You, Mr. President, have said that the witnesses can be heard before this Commission. These witnesses cannot be heard before the Commission because the number...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Löffler, the Tribunal, as I have told you, have already considered this matter, and it may be that they will consider it further, but they don’t desire to hear any further argument about it. It is a matter entirely within their discretion, and they have been at very great pains to provide that the applicants who wish to be heard in respect to these organizations shall be fully and thoroughly heard.
The Tribunal will not hear you further at this stage.
DR. LÖFFLER: May I give one explanation...
THE PRESIDENT: Did you hear what I said? I said the Tribunal will not hear you further at this stage.
DR. LÖFFLER: Very well.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have only a few questions.
[Turning to the witness.] Your memory of that conference doesn’t seem to be entirely clear.
BÜCHS: May I ask which conference?
MR. ROBERTS: The conference that you last mentioned, with regard to the evacuation of the prisoners of Sagan.
BÜCHS: I am not aware that it was incorrect in any point.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, but you say that you don’t remember any mention being made of the prisoners having to walk through the snow without their boots on.
BÜCHS: Yes, that is what I said.
MR. ROBERTS: And you know that it is—I can’t find the actual place; I had no idea this exhibit was going to be referred to—but you know that that is in the actual stenographer’s notes, do you not?
BÜCHS: So it was said.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. And you would agree with me that the stenographer could hardly put that remark down unless it was said?
BÜCHS: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: But you didn’t hear the remark; therefore, you don’t know who said it?
BÜCHS: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: That is all I ask on that.
I just ask on one other matter: In April of 1945 did Fegelein attain the status of Hitler’s brother-in-law, when Hitler got married?
BÜCHS: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And two days afterwards, was Fegelein shot on the orders of his new-found brother-in-law?
BÜCHS: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: That is all.
DR. JAHRREISS: I have no further question to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
DR. JAHRREISS: With the permission of the Tribunal, I now call the witness Professor Dr. Schramm.
[The witness Schramm took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
PERCY ERNST SCHRAMM (Witness): Percy Ernst Schramm.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, were you working in the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the war?
SCHRAMM: Yes. From March 1943 onwards, I was working in the Armed Forces Operations Staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: Until the end?
SCHRAMM: Until the end—that is to say, the beginning of May 1945.
DR. JAHRREISS: What functions did you have in the Armed Forces Operations Staff?
SCHRAMM: During my entire time in the Armed Forces Operations Staff I kept the War Diary of that staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was there a special reason why you received that task?
SCHRAMM: My appointment to the Armed Forces Operations Staff was due to the fact that my civilian profession is professor of history at the University of Göttingen. At that time an expert was sought whose name would constitute a guarantee for expert work. General Jodl appointed me to the position at the suggestion of the deputy chief.
DR. JAHRREISS: If you were to write a war diary in the way a historian would wish to do, you would require an insight into all the events connected with that staff, would you not?
SCHRAMM: Yes. I did not attend the Führer’s situation discussions or the internal conferences; but I did participate every day in the situation discussions of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and every important document passed through my office during those two years.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, considering that you had perhaps more insight into the activities of the Armed Forces Operations Staff than anyone else, I should like you to tell us here what you know of the range of General Jodl’s activities.
SCHRAMM: It is impossible to overestimate the range of the General’s activities. As proof of this, I may say that in 1944 alone, according to information which I received from a competent officer, 60,000 teleprint messages went through the teleprint department of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. There was also a large courier correspondence which, of course, was even larger. Then there was internal correspondence between individual departments. The bulk of that correspondence appeared on the General’s desk at some time or other. To look at it from another angle, the General was responsible for four theaters of war: North Finland and Norway; West Holland, Belgium, France; then the Southwest, in the first place Africa and Italy; and then the Southeast.
DR. JAHRREISS: Please speak more slowly.
SCHRAMM: It was the General’s task not only to have up-to-date information based on incoming reports, but also to act as operational adviser to the Führer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did I understand you correctly as saying that the four theaters you have just mentioned were the so-called OKW main theaters of war?
SCHRAMM: Precisely. The East was under the General Staff of the Army, and the General was concerned only insofar as the main difficulty always lay in co-ordinating the interests of the other theaters of war with those of the Eastern Front.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did I understand you correctly as mentioning 60,000 teleprint messages in a year?
SCHRAMM: Yes, 60,000. I remember the exact figure. And I remember it exactly, because my clerk calculated that 120 volumes of files passed through the War Diary office, and that they were so [demonstrating] thick. Therefore, about 12 yards of material passed constantly through my office. That represents 10,000 sheets of paper, if not 100,000.
DR. JAHRREISS: Perhaps you may be able to help us with a question which has been repeatedly touched upon here, but to which no precise answer has ever been given. Do you know anything about an order from Hitler saying that generals must not resign?
SCHRAMM: Yes, I remember that very exactly from an order which appeared in the middle of 1944, repeating with great strictness an order already issued before my time—that must have been during 1940 or 1941. That order was about 1½ typewritten pages in length and most forcefully worded. Its contents are still clear in my mind, because I discussed it afterwards with several of my comrades. The order stated that every commanding officer—and the departments under him correspondingly—was entitled to mention any objections he might have to the measures of the Supreme Command, but that he would then have to obey unconditionally the order once it was given him by higher quarters—that is to say, he would have to do something which meant acting contrary to his intentions. It added that it was impossible for a commander to resign in consequence of this. The reason stated was that the sergeants in the trench could not tell their company commander that they wanted to resign when they were not in agreement with his orders.
I repeat, it was so emphatically worded that we talked about it a great deal. From that time on, the commanders had even less chance of evading an order from the Supreme Command.
DR. JAHRREISS: Professor Schramm, might I ask you to speak just a little more slowly?
This order—the contents of which you have just described to us, and by means of which you have established the date of the final and most stringent formulation—did this order also apply to a man like General Jodl?
SCHRAMM: If it applied to the commanders, it naturally applied all the more to General Jodl.
DR. JAHRREISS: I now turn to another question.
General Jodl has been described as a political general. You are a civilian and a professor; and I assume, therefore, that you possess the detachment required to enable you to make up your mind on the matter and to supply the Tribunal with facts which will permit it to form its decision. Can you give us facts which would of necessity form a basis for judgment for or against?
SCHRAMM: If the question aims at establishing whether or not the General was a Party general, then I deny it most emphatically. It was utterly immaterial to the General whether the members of his staff were Party members or not. Although I was on that staff for 2 years, I personally could not tell you which of the officers were Party members. That was completely unimportant. As to whether the General tried to exercise political influence, I must again draw your attention to the tremendous amount of work for which he was responsible. He would not have had time for it; and with regard to my documents I can only tell you that I do not remember any papers from which such a conclusion might be drawn. What the General committed to paper—and these papers, as I have seen myself, run into thousands—was always strictly confined to military matters, and in no way encroached upon the sphere of politics. To be more exact, I do not remember in the course of those 2 years ever having seen in my files any document of a political nature inspired by the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff or written by himself.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes; but perhaps he was fond of the limelight and had great ambitions; and perhaps, and outside of the files...
SCHRAMM: I can answer that question with a definite “no,” because I know from his associates, and from conversations with him, that all diplomatic procedure was repugnant to him and that he disliked it because it had nothing to do with soldiers. I did not notice any ambition, because if the General was ambitious he certainly had chosen the least suitable position for such a purpose, since he thus exposed himself to criticism from those below him—from people who did not know the underlying reasons. From that time on he was criticized a good deal, and he did not receive from higher quarters the recognition he deserved. I always thought it peculiar, and even grotesque, that the General, at the time of Adolf Hitler’s, death, had scarcely more German war decorations than I had myself, as a mere major in the reserve. I did not see whether he had foreign decorations. I never saw him wearing a foreign order. At any rate, there were no indications of ambition or of political aspirations.
DR. JAHRREISS: During this Trial there has been frequent mention of a speech made by the General during the winter of 1943-44 addressed to the Gauleiter. I do not know whether you know anything about that speech.
SCHRAMM: Yes, I remember it exactly.
DR. JAHRREISS: What do you remember exactly?
SCHRAMM: First of all, let me tell you that the reason why I remember it exactly is because I received the material on which the speech was based. After it was no longer needed, it was given to me for my War Diary. It was like this:
That was a speech for which material was collected in the various departments. For this purpose an enormous map was needed, which was difficult to prepare because it was larger than the offices in which we were working. The speech was made at this annual meeting in Munich on 8 or 9 November. The particular reason for the General making a speech outside the usual military circle was the following: Italy’s dropping out of the war in September 1943 had led to a break in the Southern Front extending from Marseilles to Athens, a distance of 4,000 km. We had succeeded in filling the gap again, but a good deal of uneasiness was felt by all those who understood the situation.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I object to long reasons being given for the speech being made. The speech is in evidence and, in my submission, the reasons for the speech are entirely immaterial.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal upholds the objection.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, please go on telling us about the attack.
SCHRAMM: This was the one reason...
THE PRESIDENT: No, no, I said that the Tribunal upheld Mr. Roberts’ objection as to what the witness must say. That’s a mistranslation.
DR. JAHRREISS: It was a misunderstanding. I am sorry. It was wrongly translated.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, I want to show you a document which was submitted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution 2 days ago, Document 1808-PS. Perhaps you will just look through the whole of the document first.
[The document was submitted to the witness.]
THE PRESIDENT: Is it among the Jodl documents?
DR. JAHRREISS: No, it is a document which the Prosecution submitted in the course of the cross-examination 2 days ago.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, that document was handed up separately by me during the cross-examination, and I am afraid it is not in the book. It is one of those documents which received a new GB number, and was handed up loose towards the end of the cross-examination, Document 1808-PS.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. May I go on?
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Jahrreiss.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, does your signature appear at the foot of the second last page, on the right?
SCHRAMM: Yes. This is a file which I started after the attempt of 20 July 1944, in order to have a permanent record of what was being done in the Armed Forces Operations Staff. I want to add in this connection that the Armed Forces Operations Staff was in no way involved in that conspiracy. This copy presumably comes from the war archives. The signature and the corrections are partly mine, and partly those of my clerk.
DR. JAHRREISS: I want to draw your attention to Number 5 in this file of documents.
SCHRAMM: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: It is dated 25 July. Do you have it?
SCHRAMM: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you draw it up?
SCHRAMM: Yes, I drew it up myself.
DR. JAHRREISS: Please, will you tell us what the basis for this work of yours was?
SCHRAMM: The officers of the staff were called to our mess hall at short notice. We were told that the General wanted to address his staff. As not all the officers were able to attend, I was ordered to take notes, so that the other officers could be informed of what the General had said. I remember clearly that I jotted down a few key words, still standing, so this is not a shorthand record. I cannot write shorthand. There was no time to find a stenographer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Well, did you base this on your notes?
SCHRAMM: Yes. Afterwards, probably on the following day, I reconstructed the General’s speech as far as possible from my notes. I am not certain, of course, if all the details are quite accurate, because the notes which I had taken standing up were much too sketchy for that. And, of course, I am particularly doubtful about the accuracy of the actual words spoken. I now see that there are 4½ pages. The speech was, of course, very much longer than that. It is therefore a compressed account.
DR. JAHRREISS: A compressed account only...
SCHRAMM: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, I should like to know more about the circumstances in which the General made that speech, the actual words of which we do not possess. That was...
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is my respectful submission—again in the interests of saving time—to mention that these matters are all very irrelevant. We know that an attempt was made on Hitler’s life, and that Jodl addressed his staff. It is my submission that the circumstances are not relevant at all.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hope you’ll do it briefly.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes; thank you.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, will you please be very brief and quote the personal circumstances?
SCHRAMM: The General appeared on the scene with white bandages around his head. We were all most surprised that he should have recovered so quickly from the attempt considering that he had been standing right next to the explosion. I must say that, at that time, we were deeply impressed by the concentrated energy with which he reappeared before his staff and by his moral attitude to such an attempt.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do other defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions?
[There was no response.]
Does the Prosecution want to?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have no questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. JAHRREISS: I have no further questions. May I now call the next witness, General Winter?
[The witness Winter took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.
AUGUST WINTER (Witness): August Winter.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, did you take part in the beginning of the Russian campaign?
WINTER: Yes, I took part as the first general staff officer of Field Marshal Von Rundstedt’s army group.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, may I point out to you that I want you to allow a small pause after my question and to speak in general more slowly than you have just been doing.
WINTER: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Can you tell me—since you had a very responsible position—what was officially said to be Hitler’s reason, at that time, for the German attack on the Soviet Union?
WINTER: The official reason, given to me at the time by my commander and my chief, was that an attack from Soviet Russia was to be expected shortly, and that this was therefore a preventive measure.
DR. JAHRREISS: And then you experienced the first battles on the frontier, did you not?
WINTER: Yes, in this staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: That was toward the south?
WINTER: It was in the Ukraine, Army Group South.
DR. JAHRREISS: Even after those first battles, you had a certain amount of experiences and certain impressions of the opponent, did you not?
WINTER: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Were they, General, such impressions as to confirm the official reason given, that of a preventive war?
WINTER: It was the uniform impression of the command of the army group—including the commander, the chief, and the operations department under my command—that the reason given for the campaign was the true one. Our own impression at the time was that we had hit on active preparations for an offensive campaign.
DR. JAHRREISS: But did you have the facts on which to base this impression?
WINTER: We had a number of facts which confirmed that impression, according to our ideas. I may state them briefly. First of all, there was the strength of the troops we encountered which, although I cannot give you figures now, was greater than the figures mentioned in our marching orders. Then there was the extraordinary deployment of troops, so near and like a front, which struck us, with unusual large proportions of armored troops far exceeding anything we had expected, and the deployment of a comparatively strong group opposite the Hungarian border which we could not explain to ourselves as a defensive force. One point is particularly significant; the fact that during the first week we found that captured enemy staffs were equipped with maps which covered a large area of German or ex-Austrian territory which, again, did not seem in keeping with purely defensive considerations. In addition we observed a number of smaller things, not very important in themselves.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, just now you spoke of evidence which, in your opinion, was particularly significant—namely, the finding of these maps which you described a few minutes ago. Why is that particularly significant—more significant than the other things you have mentioned?
WINTER: It is particularly noticeable that the units on the Russian Front were equipped with maps covering much more than the area which would normally be included in a defensive reconnaissance area—even allowing for the fact that at the beginning of a campaign such reconnaissance might go beyond the enemy’s frontier.
DR. JAHRREISS: There has been mentioned in this courtroom the fact that after marching into the Ukraine, our troops found themselves faced with exceptional circumstances and difficulties in certain Ukrainian cities. Have you any idea of what I mean?
WINTER: Yes, that is obvious. We encountered an enormous number of these difficulties when we approached the Dnieper. I imagine that you are referring to the matter of remote-controlled explosions, or delayed-action explosions, which were carried out, as it seemed, on a very large scale in our fighting zone in the Kiev-Kharkov-Poltava area. They caused us a great deal of trouble, and they forced us to adopt extensive countermeasures at the time.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know whether that applies to Odessa?
WINTER: I heard that things were blown up in Odessa, but I cannot give you details.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know the details about Kharkov?
WINTER: I know about Kharkov indeed, because something happened there which caused us to adopt certain security measures. In the battles along the west border of Kharkov which were rather long and serious, a divisional staff with all its main material—I cannot remember its number—was destroyed by a delayed-action explosion of this kind. This caused orders to be issued for the carrying out of special security searches in all buildings which had to be used for accommodation of staffs and other authorities from that time on.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you, Witness, actually handle a Russian map, or see one, which indicated plans for such blowing-up operations?
WINTER: No, I cannot remember seeing such a map.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, another point. You said a few moments ago that Field Marshal Von Rundstedt was your commanding officer. Who was your chief?
WINTER: Infantry General Von Sodenstern.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, another subject. If I remember correctly, Field Marshal Von Rundstedt retired at that time or was dismissed; is that right?
WINTER: When the attack on Rostock failed in November 1941 and permission to withdraw his leading units had been refused by the OKH, Field Marshal Von Rundstedt sent a report to the OKH, to the army to which we were subordinated, in which he said that if the necessary confidence was not felt in his leadership, he must ask the Führer to nominate a new commander for that army group. I have a painfully accurate recollection of this incident, because I myself drafted the telegram and the Field Marshal made that addition with his own hand.
The telegram was dispatched in the evening, and Hitler’s answer, relieving him of his post, arrived in the course of the same night.
DR. JAHRREISS: So that his application was granted?
WINTER: The application was granted. But perhaps I may tell you that there were repercussions later with Hitler. A few days afterwards Hitler himself flew to Mariupol in order to obtain information about the actual situation on the spot. On his homeward flight, he visited Field Marshal Von Rundstedt’s Poltava headquarters and had a discussion with him. In the course of this discussion, Hitler—I cannot tell you for certain whether I witnessed this scene myself, or whether the Chief Adjutant Oberst Schmundt told me about it immediately afterwards—I repeat, there was a personal discussion in the course of which Hitler again reproached the Field Marshal for having put that alternative question, and said to him:
“In the future I do not intend to tolerate any such applications to resign. When I have once made a decision the responsibility is transferred to me. I myself am not in a position to go to my superior, for instance, God Almighty, and to say to him, ‘I am not going on with it, because I don’t want to take the responsibility.’”
We considered, at the time, that that scene was of basic importance, and I may add that, to judge from the orders later given on that point, our impression was correct.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know, Witness, whether Hitler, at some later date, altered his decision not to allow that in the future?
WINTER: No, he certainly did not alter his decision. Because, as I know, there were two occasions, I believe, on which orders to that effect were issued, forbidding resignations on the part of a commander, or an officer in a leading position, on grounds of unwillingness to assume responsibility.
DR. JAHRREISS: I now come to another point. If I am properly informed, you were in the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the later stages of the war, were you not?
WINTER: On 15 November 1944 I was called there to succeed General Warlimont who had fallen ill; and I took over his functions on 15 November 1944. My appointment was dated from 1 December 1944.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, did you regularly attend the situation discussions with the Führer?
WINTER: Yes, I was there on an average of 5 days out of 7 during the week.
DR. JAHRREISS: There has been a great deal of discussion about these situation conferences in this courtroom, and a great many events took place at them which are of importance for this Trial; but up to now, no real picture has yet been presented to us of what those situation discussions really were. Can you explain the procedure of such a situation discussion with reference to its length and the number of people present?
WINTER: The situation discussion was a permanent part of the afternoon’s program, and was attended by a fairly large number of people, while there was a second situation discussion at 2 o’clock in the morning, of no importance to us here. In it, reports were made only by the junior General Staff officers of the OKH for the Eastern Front and of the Operations Staff of the OKW for the Western Front.
MR. ROBERTS: Mr. President, I have a submission again in the interest of time. The Defendant Jodl gave evidence as to these conferences, and no one put one word of cross-examination to suggest that his evidence was not accepted. Therefore, I would like to submit that this is pure repetition on a point which is not disputed.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not wish to hear anything of a general or detailed nature about these conferences unless there is something in particular that you want to prove about them.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, so as to clarify matters, may I ask at this time whether the objection raised by Mr. Roberts means that in this case the rule applies that something which has not been touched upon in cross-examination can be considered proved? I am not sure whether I have made myself understood. The objection from the prosecutor apparently is based on the supposition that something has been heard...
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think you need lay down any hard and fast rules, but General Jodl gave general evidence about the nature of these “situation conferences,” and he was not cross-examined on it. It doesn’t seem at all necessary to go into the general nature of these conferences with any other witness.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, it is possible in military life for an officer to receive an order with which he does not agree, is it not?
WINTER: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: In that case, is it possible for him to put his divergent opinion on record?
WINTER: In the German Army, if I remember rightly, such a possibility existed from the time of Moltke. An order from Hitler which came out in 1938—I think, in winter 1938-39—removed such a possibility once and for all. An order was issued at the time prohibiting even chiefs of general staffs and command authorities from putting their divergent opinions on record.
DR. JAHRREISS: In order to avoid creating difficulties for the interpretation, will you please explain the word “Aktenkundig”?
WINTER: According to that it was not possible to include in the official files or in the war diaries of events kept by command staffs any comments to the effect that the chief was not in agreement with the decision or order of his superior.
DR. JAHRREISS: It was canceled?
WINTER: These possibilities existed previously, but since 1938 they no longer existed as they were done away with.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, General, I am now going to have a document shown to you, Document D-606, a document which the Prosecution also submitted during cross-examination 3 days ago. I am afraid I do not know the exhibit number. Perhaps it is...
MR. ROBERTS: Well, that’s the Number 3606. It’s Exhibit GB-292, My Lord. I put it in separately in cross-examination, in their book...
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Jahrreiss.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know this document?
WINTER: I am acquainted with the document. It has my file reference number on it.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you write it yourself?
WINTER: No, General Jodl wrote it personally. But I can see a blank space under Figure 11. I do not know whether it is complete. The document consists of a preliminary draft, which is not contained here; but now that I have looked at it, I can see that it is dealt with in the file copy from my quartermaster’s department. The third copy must have been sealed and attached to the same records.
Immediately after the attacks on Dresden, when Hitler had raised the question of leaving the Geneva Convention, this preliminary draft was drawn up at my headquarters under the responsibility of General Jodl, and the order stated that all angles should be worked on which would prevent the Führer from coming to such a decision—that is, of leaving the Geneva Convention. This document was carefully worked out from the point of view of international law and from the point of view of the psychological effect on the enemy troops, as well as on our own at home. I myself did it. The following day, my chief, General Jodl, received me. He had this document, the contents of which I have not checked now, and he told me that he was completely in agreement with this negative treatment, but that he had felt obliged to work on the draft in more detail, and bring it into line with the information he had from the Navy and so formulate it tactically in such a way that would guarantee its success with Hitler under all circumstances—for his idea must not be allowed to be put into practice.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other defendant’s counsel want to ask questions?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I ask whether the prohibition regarding interrogation applies to this witness? And I want to point out that this witness is a member of the indicted group of the General Staff and of the OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether he is or not, but it does not matter whether he is or not. You can question him before the Commission. I mean, you can call him yourself before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: I merely wanted to clarify the matter by means of this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thanks. Dr. Laternser, if there is any witness who is not residing in Nuremberg, you can have him kept for the purpose of having him examined before the Commission if you want to do so.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I only want to ask one question.
[Turning to the witness.] You have told us that Germany attacked the Soviet Union in breach of their Nonaggression Pact, because Germany feared an attack from the Soviet Union.
WINTER: May I be more precise by saying that we, as General Staff officers in the high command of an army group that was deployed in the Ukraine, were given that reason by our commanding officer. Whether politically...
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. We know now from the evidence in this Court that Hitler decided, in July 1940, to attack the Soviet Union; that on 18 December 1940—446-PS, it is Page 53 of Book 7—that on 18 December Hitler stated that the Armed Forces must be prepared to overthrow Soviet Russia in a single attack of lightning-like speed. We know that the attack was not until 22 June. It does not look as though the leaders of Germany were very much frightened, does it, of Russia, or should we say the Soviet Union, breaking the Nonaggression Pact.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Witness, you had to take retaliation measures in the Ukraine, did you not?
WINTER: We did not undertake any reprisals—as far as the troops were concerned—in the operational zone of the Ukraine; at least, I have no recollection now of any such instances.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What measures did you take against the resistance of the population?
WINTER: During the entire campaign in which Army Group South was involved, there was no resistance by the population in the operational zone in the Ukraine. Only in rear areas were there fights, at that time, with struggling Russian troop units. A resistance on the part of the population did not occur—as far as I know—until later when the operational zone had already been limited in the rear, and then there was resistance against political Reich commissioners.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Very well. You were not there at that time?
WINTER: The command to which I belonged was withdrawn from the front at the end of January, or in the early days of February 1943. The rear area lines were at the Dnieper at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, in conclusion I have only two interrogatories to submit to the Tribunal; and I want to read a few lines from one of them—something which was forgotten.
To begin with, the interrogatory, Exhibit AJ-8, Document Jodl-61, an interrogatory of Waizenegger, which I herewith submit and beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of its contents. And then there is Exhibit AJ-6, Document Jodl-59, an interrogatory of Brudermüller, with reference to which I wish to make a similar request. Then, from the last to be submitted, Exhibit AJ-12, Document Jodl-65, General Greiffenberg’s statement, I should like to quote the important parts. It is a question of the attack against Yugoslavia and the question of whether or not, after the Simovic Putsch, Yugoslavia had already taken up a position against us. This is in the third volume of my document book on Page 211. The Simovic Putsch was over, and the question was whether there was an immediate threat from Yugoslavia at the time.
“Question: Is it a fact that Yugoslavia, immediately after the coup d’état of the army, started to deploy her armies on all her borders?
“Answer: I know only the front which was opposite the German Twelfth Army, located at the Bulgarian border. Here the Yugoslavs had deployed their armies at the border.
“Question: Is it a fact that the Army ‘List,’ of which you were the commander at the time, had the order, before the coup d’état in Yugoslavia, to respect strictly the neutrality of Yugoslavia during the pending attacks on Greece, and that not even supply trains should be dispatched through Yugoslavian territory?
“Answer: I can testify that the strictest order had been given to respect Yugoslavia’s neutrality.
“Question: Did you hear of any violations of this order?
“Answer: No.”
Gentlemen of the Tribunal, a number of interrogatories have not yet come in. Whether we are going to get them or not, I do not know. At any rate, I shall have to reserve to myself the right to submit them later. Apart from that, I have completed my case.
THE PRESIDENT: On Monday the Tribunal will hear the case of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, will it not?
Very well, the Tribunal may adjourn.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 10 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST DAY Monday, 10 June 1946
Morning Session
THE PRESIDENT: I call on counsel for the Defendant Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: Your Lordship, High Tribunal, I open the defense case with the last words spoken by Dr. Schuschnigg as he resigned from the Austrian Chancellorship on 11 March 1938: “God protect Austria.”
It is a coincidence in history that at a time when the question of the Anschluss is being discussed here with reference to the person of Seyss-Inquart, the four Foreign Ministers are preparing the peace treaties on the basis of the same events. May I, therefore, draw the Tribunal’s attention to my documents on this matter and ask that I be permitted to quote from them at somewhat greater length than I had originally intended?
Now, with the permission of the Tribunal, may I begin with the examination of the defendant as witness in his own defense.
[The defendant took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART (Defendant): Arthur Seyss-Inquart.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The defendant repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, when and where were you born?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was born in 1892 in Iglau, situated in what was up to now a German-speaking enclave in Moravia. Moravia, at that time, was a crown province of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. There and in the German-speaking enclave Olmütz, also in Moravia, I lived until the age of 15, when with my parents I moved into the vicinity of Vienna where I completed my studies at the Gymnasium and the legal faculty of the University of Vienna. In August 1914 I enlisted in the Army.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you in the Army during the whole of the war?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I served with the Tyrolean Kaiserjäger and saw fighting in Russia, Romania, and in Italy. On a furlough during the war I passed my final examinations, and in 1917 I received my doctor’s degree. I was wounded once, decorated several times, three times for bravery in the face of the enemy.
DR. STEINBAUER: What impressions of importance for your later life did you retain from the time of your youth?
SEYSS-INQUART: Relevant to my case is, I think, only the experience of the struggle between the nationalities in Moravia, between the Germans and the Czechs. The Germans in those days were in favor of a unified Austrian state, while the Czechs pursued a predominantly nationalistic policy. It is, however, not without significance that a language compromise was agreed upon in Moravia.
DR. STEINBAUER: What lasting impressions did you retain from your service in the war?
SEYSS-INQUART: Apart from the experience of comradeship at the front, I remember especially the discussion toward the end of the war on the Fourteen Points of President Wilson.
DR. STEINBAUER: Their essential content being the people’s right of self-determination?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was clear to us that the realization of those Fourteen Points would mean the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. We Germans regarded it as at least a compensation that in pursuance of this right of self-determination the German Erblande (the domain of the Holy Roman Emperors) would be able to return to the Reich from which they had been separated just 50 years before, in 1866. Yes, these territories had been created by the German Reich and had been part of it for 950 out of the 1,000 years of their existence.
DR. STEINBAUER: What did you do after your return from the war?
SEYSS-INQUART: I devoted myself to my legal profession. In 1921 I set up my own practice, which in time grew into a very successful one.
DR. STEINBAUER: What of your political attitude? Were you a member of any political party?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was not a member of any political party, because I did not want to tie myself to partisan politics. I had good friends in all parties, including the Christian Social and Social Democratic Parties; but the party programs seemed to me rather one-sided, too much designed for individual groups of the community.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you a member of any political clubs, for instance, the Austro-German Volksbund?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I was a member of the executive of the Austro-German Volksbund, because the only political idea to which I adhered after 1918 was Austria’s Anschluss with the German Reich. I witnessed 12 November 1918, when the Provisional National Assembly, in fulfillment of the right of self-determination, decided that “Austria is a part of the German Republic.” Furthermore, the Constitutional National Assembly repeated the decision 6 months later. But the Treaty of St. Germain forbade the Anschluss. Thereupon the various districts tried to hold plebiscites; in Salzburg and the Tyrol 98 percent of those entitled to the vote were in favor of the Anschluss. Dr. Schuschnigg describes these events in his book, Three Times Austria.
The answer was a serious attempt to divide Austria among its non-German neighbors; but they could not agree on the booty.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I at this point submit to the Tribunal and refer briefly to several documents of my document book? The first document, to which I have given the Document Number Seyss-Inquart-1, is on Page 2 of the document book and contains the proclamation of the German-Austrian deputies after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on 21 October 1918. There the second sentence reads:
“The German-Austrian State claims the territorial jurisdiction over the entire territory of German settlement areas, especially in the Sudetenland. The German-Austrian State will fight any annexation by other nations of territories which are inhabited by German farmers, workers, and citizens.”
Then, as Document Number Seyss-Inquart-2, I should like to submit—it is on Page 4 of the document book—the resolution which the witness has already mentioned, passed by the Provisional Austrian National Assembly on 12 November 1918, which says:
“German-Austria is a democratic republic. All public authorities are installed by the people. German-Austria is a part of the German Republic.”
The leader of the biggest national party of the time, Dr. Karl Renner, explained the reasons for this law on 12 November and said the following, which appears on Page 6 as Document Number Seyss-Inquart-3:
“Our great people is in distress and misery, the people whose pride it has always been to be called the people of poets and thinkers, our German people of humanism, our German people which loves all mankind is deeply bowed in misery. But it is just in this hour in which it would be so easy and convenient and perhaps also tempting to settle one’s account separately and perhaps to snatch advantages from the enemy’s ruse, in this hour our people in all provinces wish to proclaim: We are one family and one people living under a common fate.”
Then I come to Document Number Seyss-Inquart-4, which is on Page 18...
THE PRESIDENT: Page 8, is it not?
DR. STEINBAUER: Page 18. I beg your pardon, yes, Page 8.
That refers to the plebiscite on 24 April 1921 in the Tyrol, when 145,302 voted for the Anschluss and 1,805 against it. On 18 May 1921, there were 98,546 votes for the Anschluss in the district of Salzburg, and 877 votes against it.
Your Honors, while submitting the document, I said that I maintain there were three component factors leading to the Anschluss: First, the economic emergency which runs as a recurring theme through the entire history of the period. Second, the disunity among the democratic parties, resulting therefrom. Third, the attitude of the rest of the world, particularly the big powers, toward our small country.
Those thoughts are laid down in my document book, and I should like now with reference to the economic emergency of that time to submit as my next exhibit the speech of Prelate Hauser, President of the Austrian Parliament. The speech, made on 6 September 1919, appears on Page 14 of my document book. As President of the Parliament he suggested the acceptance of the Peace Treaty of St. Germain, giving the following reason:
“The National Assembly has no choice. Country and people need lasting peace which will open the world to them again morally and economically and which can once again procure work for the masses of our people at home and abroad....”
Then in the second paragraph he says:
“It also has no other choice because our country depends on the big powers for its supply of food, coal, and industrial raw materials as well as in the re-establishment of its credit and its currency.”
The same point of view was expressed by the two statesmen Seipel and Schober. In Document Number Seyss-Inquart-17, Seipel, regarded as the greatest Austrian statesman, said at that time:
“But we will never believe that the Central European question is solved as long as the great state which virtually makes up Central Europe, the German Reich, is not a party to the solution.”
I shall now continue with the examination of the witness.
I want to ask you, Witness, do you still remember the time and the conditions after 1927?
SEYSS-INQUART: On account of the economic situation which you have just described, the League powers again and again forced Austria to make so-called voluntary declarations renouncing the Anschluss. This had repercussions in Austrian domestic politics. The Austrians, who in 1918 had been resolved to have a democratic parliamentary form of government, turned to radical ideas of an authoritarian character.
DR. STEINBAUER: At that time a new party was formed. Which one was that?
SEYSS-INQUART: Then there occurred the so-called Palace of Justice fire, an uprising of the Marxists, which brought in its wake the creation of the anti-Marxists Home Guard, a militant organization. Thus uniforms were introduced into the political life of Austria. The controversy between the Marxists and the anti-Marxists became ever more marked. The only nonpartisan organization at that time was the German-Austrian Volksbund, and the Anschluss idea was the only political objective which still held all parties together. Around the year 1930—at least then it was first noticeable—the National Socialist German Workers Party made its appearance.
DR. STEINBAUER: What impression did that Party make on you, particularly with reference to the seizure of power in the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: I want to say quite openly that amidst Austrian conditions the Party appeared somewhat strange. Uniforms had, of course, already been introduced into politics by the Republican Guard of the Marxists and the Home Guard, but in the NSDAP even the actual political leaders wore uniforms and marched in close formation. And also the kind of political intransigence which they displayed was not in keeping with our customary political thinking.
DR. STEINBAUER: But what then were the reasons for that?
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, let me say that the NSDAP did not recognize any value in any other party and was never prepared to co-operate with any other.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then, what positive successes did you think the Party had gained in the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think that the influence of the Party in Austria—undoubtedly very great as time went on—was due to its unqualified determination to attain the Anschluss. I am of the opinion that the radicalism is to be attributed, for instance, to the negation of the customs union by the Hague decision, to please the democratic party leaders.
DR. STEINBAUER: In addition, were there not economic reasons which brought success to the NSDAP?
SEYSS-INQUART: What was discussed in the Reich, and what we heard from the Reich...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, I suppose you are hearing the words spoken by Dr. Steinbauer direct, and you are answering them without any pause, which gives the interpreter no chance.
SEYSS-INQUART: We in Austria observed after 1933 the removal of the discriminations imposed by the Versailles Treaty and above all, the elimination of unemployment in the Reich. In Austria, too, about 10 percent of the population were unemployed at that time. Especially the Austrian workers, therefore, were hoping that the Anschluss would put an end to their unemployment; and Austrian farmers were greatly interested in the Reich Food Estate and in the German market control.
DR. STEINBAUER: If I understand you correctly, then, it was the Anschluss idea which brought you, too, in contact with the Party? I do not want to speak of the Party program, which has been discussed here again and again; but I just want to ask you briefly: When did you join the Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: Officially, I became a member of the Party on 13 May 1938, and my membership number is above 7 million.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have any contact with Dr. Dollfuss?
SEYSS-INQUART: I met Dr. Dollfuss in the period after the war. I knew that he wanted to take me into his Ministry in 1933; and a week before 25 July 1934, at his invitation, I had a discussion with him.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you participate in any way in the murder of Federal Chancellor Dr. Dollfuss on 25 July 1934?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, in no way. Dr. Dollfuss planned to have another discussion with me. He was interested in my view regarding the calming of the very radical situation of that time. I told Dr. Dollfuss already at that time that there were no more nationalists in Austria but only National Socialists, and that the National Socialists were acting only on Hitler’s orders.
DR. STEINBAUER: But, I must remind you, Doctor, that the Prosecution have submitted a photograph which shows the murder of Dollfuss being extolled.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is the so-called Annual Commemoration in the year 1938. During that celebration nobody thought of Dollfuss; it was a Commemoration by the Party in honor of the seven SS men who had been hanged in connection with the Putsch attempt at that time. None of us referred to that death as murder.
DR. STEINBAUER: Well, Dr. Schuschnigg succeeded Dollfuss as Federal Chancellor, and I want to ask you: What conclusions were drawn by the NSDAP from this event, as far as you could gather?
SEYSS-INQUART: The NSDAP itself was completely broken up and disorganized, and a small circle of men was formed at that time; I also found my way to those men, and we drew the following conclusions from the events of 25 July:
First, that they represented a considerable danger. I recall the meeting of statesmen in Stresa and their resolutions against Germany. And even though we were never worried about Italy, one had nevertheless to realize that in this very troubled atmosphere anything could easily lead to war. We all agreed that the main task of German policy must be to avoid war.
DR. STEINBAUER: We are now in the year...
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to add that, with regard to domestic policy, the events on 25 July were the worst that could possibly have happened to the prospect of the Anschluss. We reflected on what might be done and came to the conclusion that the Party in the Reich should cease its interference in the Austrian National Socialist Party, the existence of which anticipated the Anschluss; but in return, the National Socialists in Austria should once more receive permission to be active, and especially, there should be elections to ascertain the proportional strength of the parties.
DR. STEINBAUER: What I am interested in is the question whether you had any connections with authorities in the Reich at that time, that is, in 1936?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had no connections with authorities in the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. Did you...
SEYSS-INQUART: Only, as Reich Marshal Göring has already testified, when I became a State Councillor, did I, for the first time, meet a leading German politician.
DR. STEINBAUER: When was that?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was in June or July 1937.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was your attitude toward the NSDAP in Austria at that time, when you were State Councillor?
SEYSS-INQUART: When the agreement of 11 July 1936 was reached—without my having taken any part in it—Dr. Schuschnigg, through Minister Klees asked me for my political co-operation. At that time I had particularly close connections with Zernatto, the General Secretary of the Fatherland Front. At the suggestion of Zernatto and his friends I became an Austrian State Councillor and Dr. Schuschnigg gave me the task, in writing, of examining the conditions under which the national opposition could be enlisted to collaborate politically. In order to fulfill that task I did, of course, have to contact the National Socialists, because the national opposition consisted only of National Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who was the head of the NSDAP in Austria?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Party in Austria had reorganized illegally; Captain Leopold was the head.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you on friendly terms with him?
SEYSS-INQUART: I could not come to an agreement with Captain Leopold; he did not understand my policy, but thought that on the basis of the agreement of 11 July Dr. Schuschnigg had to allow the NSDAP again in its earlier form. I think I talked to Leopold only twice, or at most three times, throughout that time. He demanded that I be subordinate to him; that I refused.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I in this connection draw attention to the following documents without reading from them?
Exhibit Number Seyss-Inquart-44, on Page 103 of the document book, an excerpt from the Document Number 3471-PS, Exhibit Number USA-583, already submitted to the Court.
Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-45, on Page 105, Document Number 3473-PS, Exhibit Number USA-581.
And Document Number Seyss-Inquart-97, on Page 109, in which Zernatto expressly states that Seyss-Inquart did not fall in with Leopold’s aims and efforts.
My client has been accused by the Prosecution of having played a double game. As counterevidence, I applied for permission to hear the former Gauleiter Siegfried Uiberreither. He was interrogated here, and I want to quote from the interrogatory, which is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-59, from the counterquestions put by the Prosecution on Page 140:
“Question: ‘Was not the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, before the time when the Nazi Party was legalized, that is, before it was declared legal in February 1938, was he not in constant contact with the illegal Nazi Party of Austria?’
“Answer: ‘No. I personally did not know Seyss-Inquart until his visit to Graz. In Nazi circles he was considered a non-Party member. I think—I do not know with certainty—that he joined the NSDAP only when it was legalized. For this reason, he personally encountered a strong opposition in illegal Nazi circles.’”
On Page 6 of the same document it says:
“Question: ‘Did not the Defendant Seyss-Inquart play a double game: On one side his legal position in Schuschnigg’s Cabinet and on the other side his co-operation with the formerly illegal Nazi Party, whose activity was then legalized to a certain extent through the efforts of the defendant at Berchtesgaden in February 1938?’
“Answer: ‘I do not know to what extent he was in touch with the illegal Nazi circles before 12 February. I do not know about it, because I was not in Vienna. But from 18 February his contact with the Nazi Party was not duplicity but his duty. Schuschnigg himself had discussions with Leopold, the leader of the Nazis at that time—before Klausner it was Leopold.’”
[Turning to the defendant.] This brings us to 1938. At the beginning of that year you were State Councillor in the Austrian Government. What did you think of the political situation at that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: In many conversations with Dr. Schuschnigg but most of all in continual discussions with Zernatto, I suggested, in line with the conclusions I had drawn from the events of 25 July 1934, that the Reich, and particularly Hitler, be asked to refrain from any interference in Austrian politics through the medium of the Austrian National Socialist Party. I proposed that instead the Austrian National Socialists should receive permission to resume activities. That did not mean at all that I would give up the Anschluss, but I was completely convinced that a lawful and responsible policy of the Austrian National Socialists in Austria would in the course of time win for them the support of a clear majority of the Austrian nation—I mean of the Germans in Austria; and that the demonstration of such a clear majority would no longer be challenged by the powers of the League of Nations. One had to attempt to make Adolf Hitler agree to such a policy by enlisting the support of the autonomous and independent state of Austria for the Führer’s policy and the demand for equal rights of the German people. It was in the interests of these ideas that I talked to Field Marshal Göring and Herr Hess. I reported the outcome of these conversations to Dr. Schuschnigg and to Zernatto and I recommended the formation of a coalition government by taking National Socialist ministers into the cabinet, on condition that Adolf Hitler offer adequate guarantees. My suggestions made no headway with either of the two parties, but were not directly turned down. Meanwhile, the Austrian National Socialists continued to be active illegally; the police intervened and made arrests; three Austrian concentration camps were set up; in short, the events of that time foreshadowed today’s denazification system.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you at the Obersalzberg on 12 February 1938?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. But I want to describe how that meeting came about. First of all, a renewed Party radicalism set in. At the beginning of 1938, legitimist tendencies were being promoted in Austria, the laws regarding the return of the Hapsburg property were discussed in the State Council. For the moment my own position, therefore, became untenable; I retired and informed Zernatto and State Secretary Keppler who had been officially nominated by the Reich Government to conduct the political affairs relating to Austria. I felt that in view of my task it was my duty to inform Keppler also. I myself accepted an invitation from the Reich Sports Leader Tschammer-Osten and went to Garmisch-Partenkirchen. There, without previous appointment, I met Herr Von Papen. Each of us poured out his troubles to the other, and came to the conclusion that both parties, that is to say, Hitler as well as the Austrian Government—that is, Dr. Schuschnigg—should be made aware of the fact that a clear decision on the lines of my proposal was necessary. At that time, participation of the National Socialists in the government was certainly discussed. Perhaps the Ministry of the Interior was also a subject of discussion, but my name was definitely not mentioned though it was the obvious one. I received no report on the discussions which Herr Von Papen had with Hitler, but I informed Zernatto of my conversation with Herr Von Papen. Zernatto at that time met me half-way on some questions, in particular with regard to the expansion of those sections dealing with national policy which were concerned with the National Socialists; and for this purpose he also placed means at my disposal. It was on 10 February, I think, when I heard through the group of my colleagues that Hitler had invited Dr. Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden. Among the members of my circle were Dr. Reiner, Dr. Jury, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, Langot, and several others.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you informed of the outcome of the discussions at the Obersalzberg?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was informed of the outcome of this conference only by Zernatto. On the evening of the 11th, before Dr. Schuschnigg left for Berchtesgaden, I had a detailed discussion with him and Zernatto. We agreed to a large extent regarding the appointment of National Socialists—for instance, Jury, Reinthaller, and Fischböck—to certain public functions but not to ministerial positions. I did not broach the subject of a ministerial post, because I did not know how Adolf Hitler reacted to the suggestion which I made to Herr Von Papen. On 13 February Zernatto asked me to see him, and he then told me of the results and contents of the Berchtesgaden conference, which were known to him.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection, I want to refer to Document Number Seyss-Inquart-48, Page 111, in which Zernatto states, “I had the definite impression that he”—Seyss-Inquart—“did not until then know anything about the result of the discussion and the contents of the agreement”—of 12 February.
Witness, on the basis of that agreement, you became Minister of the Interior and Police, did you not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, on 17 February.
DR. STEINBAUER: On 17 February 1938, with the assignment of establishing connections between Austria and the Reich, or rather of improving them. Did you also have a discussion with Hitler himself?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. The agreement at Berchtesgaden on 12 February contained a definite stipulation to the effect that I was to be liaison man between the Austrian Government and the Austrian National Socialists on one side, and the German Reich on the other. The contents of the protocol appeared to me unsatisfactory and even dangerous. There was no doubt at all that my appointment to the Ministry of the Interior and Security served as a notification, if not a signal, for the Austrian National Socialists that they might expect an early realization of their political objectives. In addition they received permission to profess their beliefs; they could wear the swastika and salute with the raised hand. What was not permitted, however, was their organization; that means, my National Socialist friends in Austria had no possibility of getting in touch with the National Socialists in a legal way. This agreement opened the gates without providing for a regular procedure thereafter. Hence, I myself resolved to see Adolf Hitler in order to make sure whether my plan had his approval. I went with Dr. Schuschnigg’s assent and with an Austrian diplomatic passport.
DR. STEINBAUER: And when did you talk then to Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: I mentioned an incorrect date just now; it was on 16 February that I became Minister and I went to Berlin on the 17th. I talked with Adolf Hitler alone for more than 2 hours.
It was pointed out here by the Prosecution that I saluted Adolf Hitler with the raised-hand greeting. That was permissible under the agreement. But I would ask the Prosecution to admit that during every one of my interrogations I stated that I had emphasized to Adolf Hitler at once that I was an Austrian Minister and as such responsible to Austria. I made some shorthand notes on this discussion on the back of a letter, and a few weeks later I dictated those notes to my secretary. I now want to relate the contents of my talk with Hitler on the basis of those notes. My statements...
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, will you kindly be as brief as possible; can you do it in headings, perhaps?
SEYSS-INQUART: But this is the most important point with regard to my whole responsibility.
“A condition of Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg is that I adhere to an autonomous and independent Austria, that I support the Constitution, that is, further development, including the Anschluss, must be based on this. The formation of public opinion in Austria must proceed independently and in accordance with present constitutional possibilities; I must be an active guarantor for Dr. Schuschnigg of the revolutionary way, in the meaning of these statements (Yes), no Trojan horse. The Party and Movement must not adopt a militant attitude against prevailing cultural conceptions. (Yes). No totalitarianism of the Party and Movement; that is, National Socialist ideology to be realized with due appreciation and regard for conditions in Austria; not to be imposed on others by force. The Party as such is not simply to disappear, but to exist as an organization of individuals; no illegal activity, no efforts inimical to the State, everything to be done in a legal fashion, anyone failing to do this, to be locked up.”
In the main, Adolf Hitler agreed, and he told me:
“It is not a question of the 25 points. One cannot proclaim a dogma; one must arrive from the pan-German and the national German conception to a National Socialist one.”
That was the gist of my conference with Adolf Hitler on 17 February, from 12 to 2:10 o’clock.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you...
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I understood the witness to say that he made his notes on the meeting with Hitler and later dictated them to his secretary. It is not clear to me whether he was reading from those notes. Furthermore, we have never seen such notes and I think it should be made clear on the record.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, has the defendant got the notes?
DR. STEINBAUER: The original was taken from him when he was arrested.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you heard the question I asked; have you got the notes?
SEYSS-INQUART: The original of these notes was among my files in Vienna. I made an application to have these files of mine, which were found, searched for the notes. I handed a copy of the notes to the Prosecution during one of my first interrogations; it is in the files of the Prosecution. I have only copies here; I do not have the original.
THE PRESIDENT: The copy would be just as good for the purposes.
SEYSS-INQUART: I have placed a copy at the disposal of the Defense.
DR. STEINBAUER: But I gave it back to you.
SEYSS-INQUART: Then you can submit this one.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, would you hand it over?
[The document was submitted to the Tribunal.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give it an exhibit number, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: Number Seyss-Inquart-61, otherwise it would be confused with the others.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I am confused about this; I still do not understand, and I am sure that my colleagues do not. We have never received any copy of any notes that this defendant has claimed he made soon after, or at the time of, his conference with Hitler. We have no such copy in our files. And I would like to have understood myself whether or not he is now claiming that this copy which is offered to the Tribunal is a copy of this original that he claims he gave to us.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that what you say, Defendant, that the document which you have just handed to your counsel is a copy of the document which you say you produced during your interrogations, which was from the shorthand notes you made at that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. President, the original notes I made on the afternoon of 17 February. A few weeks later I dictated these notes, which I made in shorthand, to my secretary, who took them down on a typewriter. I had several copies, one of which I presented to the Prosecution during one of my interrogations last summer. I have now given a second copy to my defense counsel. These are copies made from the original notes a few weeks after the conference. The original was in my secret flies in Vienna.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: I wonder if we could learn just who it was to whom this defendant gave these notes? Mr. President, I would like to have some search made for them, and some effort made to find them.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know who was the interrogating counsel?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Dodd himself.
MR. DODD: We do not have it.
SEYSS-INQUART: I think I am right in saying that it was handed over.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the main points of the contents coincide with the voluntary statement, which the defendant...
MR. DODD: I think this is important enough at this point, Mr. President, to clear up. I have the interrogation that I first conducted on this defendant, and it clearly shows that he referred to the notes; but he clearly said at the time that he did not have them, that he left them in a black leather case with other documents in Mondorf, and he asked me if I would make an effort to get them; and I said that I would, and we never have been able to find them, and that is the transcript of the interrogation.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I say that I received them. The black leather case was brought to me here in Court and the notes were in it. I submitted the copy at one of the subsequent interrogations.
[There was a short pause.]
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Steinbauer.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I say that Document Number Seyss-Inquart-49, Page 113, is substantially of the same content. The defendant, the present witness, informed Schuschnigg of the substance of that talk; that is evident from Document Number 3271-PS, Exhibit Number Seyss-Inquart-65, on Page 158.
Witness, I want to ask you now whether Hitler approved of your proposals?
SEYSS-INQUART: He clearly said “yes” to a number of things, but on other points he expressed doubts as to whether the Austrian Government would agree; the principal impression was, however, that this policy seemed feasible.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection it has also been alleged that as Minister of the Interior and Police you brought executive power under the control of the Nazis.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to leave the main explanation of this matter to my witness, Dr. Skubl. After Dollfuss’ death Dr. Skubl was a special confidant of the Austrian Government and was placed at my side as State Secretary and Inspector General for Security Matters—clearly also to act as a kind of check. I had no objection at all to that and was very pleased to have such an expert at my disposal.
I should just like to mention briefly that all orders of the entire executive came from Skubl. I myself never gave a direct order to the Austrian police. Skubl was given instructions by Dr. Schuschnigg, particularly on 10 and 11 March. I myself did not bring a single National Socialist into the Austrian police.
DR. STEINBAUER: All right, that is sufficient.
SEYSS-INQUART: Perhaps I might refer briefly to the public appeal...
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I want to refer to two documents, Numbers Seyss-Inquart-51 and 52, on Pages 117 and 119 respectively. We have now reached Document Book Number 2. The first is a speech by the defendant as Minister, addressed to his police officials, and the second speech is a radio talk which he gave at Linz.
We now come to the critical days in March. Were you informed of the plebiscite plan of Schuschnigg, and by whom?
SEYSS-INQUART: The day before Dr. Schuschnigg announced in Innsbruck the plan for the plebiscite he called me in and informed me of his plan. I asked him at that time whether the decision was unalterable, and he affirmed that. I expressed my concern that this might lead to difficulties; but I promised him that I would help him wherever I could, either to make the best of this plebiscite or to bring about a suitable outcome—suitable, that is to say, even for the National Socialists. Of course, I had continual contact with the Austrian National Socialists, since I was the liaison man. I spoke at several meetings—Zernatto and Dr. Schuschnigg were informed of that—and recounted what I had discussed with Adolf Hitler or what I had proposed to him. I avoided all possibilities of demonstrations, and as Minister of the Interior also banned such demonstrations. In that connection may I refer to the general ban on public meetings, imposed by me among others, and to the specific prohibition of a demonstration at Graz, evident from the interrogatory of the witness Uiberreither.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Schuschnigg give you any promises?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. I want to say that on the same evening I was also approached by Dr. Jury who in some way had already heard of the plan for the plebiscite. I did not tell him that I had given my assent to Dr. Schuschnigg, though on account of my function as liaison man as laid down in the agreement of 12 February, I should not have allowed silence to be imposed on me; yet, I did keep silent.
DR. STEINBAUER: I think, Mr. President, this might be a suitable moment for the recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will break off now.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. STEINBAUER: We got as far as the plebiscite which Schuschnigg had planned and which then became known. We come now to 11 March. What did you do in the forenoon on that day?
SEYSS-INQUART: I must say first that a day or two before, after consultation with Austrian National Socialists, I wrote a letter to Dr. Schuschnigg in which I commented on the plebiscite in an unfavorable way. The reasons were primarily that a real plebiscite result was not guaranteed, because it was not a proper plebiscite within the meaning of the national laws. For example, the plebiscite was not decided on by the Council of Ministers but by the Fatherland Front, that is, by the party; and it was to have been carried out by that party.
It was suggested that the plebiscite be postponed and a proper election with all its legal requisites be held. On the evening of 10 March, in the presence of Foreign Minister Schmidt, I had another detailed conversation with Dr. Schuschnigg; and we agreed that the Government—as well as the provincial governments, and so forth—should include National Socialists, that, in effect, a coalition government should be formed; and in that case the National Socialists would also vote “yes.” Only with reference to the license of the Party, the activities of the Party, were there still differences of opinion. I reported this to the Austrian National Socialists but they were not much interested, because news had come from Berlin that Hitler had rejected the plebiscite. I was told that on the next day I would receive a letter from Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you receive a letter?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I received a letter from Hitler by courier. I am almost certain that the letter also contained the draft of a telegram for a march into Austria, but I cannot recall whether the draft of a radio speech was also included in it.
DR. STEINBAUER: What did you do in the morning, after receiving this letter?
SEYSS-INQUART: After receiving this letter I went with Minister Glaise to Dr. Schuschnigg. We were at the Federal Chancellor’s office at 10 o’clock, and I informed Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg of the entire contents of this letter without reservation. In particular, I pointed out that in case of a refusal Adolf Hitler expected unrest among the Austrian National Socialists and that he was ready, if disturbances occurred, to answer an appeal for help by marching in. In other words, I expressly called Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg’s attention to the possibility of this development.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you ask for an answer from him?
SEYSS-INQUART: The letter set a deadline, 12 o’clock. As our talk lasted until about 11:30, I asked Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg to give me an answer by 2 o’clock. I know that in the meantime, and also on the previous day, he had taken security measures through Dr. Skubl, of which I had approved. A number of age groups of the Austrian Federal Army were called up, the police everywhere received instructions, and a curfew was imposed in the evening.
DR. STEINBAUER: What happened in the afternoon of 11 March?
SEYSS-INQUART: At 2 o’clock I went to the Federal Chancellor’s office with Minister Glaise. We had a talk with Dr. Schuschnigg; he rejected a postponement. At that moment I was called to the telephone; Field Marshal Göring was on the phone, and the conversation between us is reproduced here under the Exhibit Number USA-76, Document Number 2949-PS.
And then followed demands and concessions. When I told Field Marshal Göring that Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg rejected the postponement, he declared, in the name of the Reich, that he had to ask for Schuschnigg’s resignation, because he had broken the agreement of 12 February and the Reich had no confidence in him. Dr. Schuschnigg was then ready to adjourn, but not to resign. Thereupon Field Marshal Göring demanded not only Schuschnigg’s resignation, but my appointment as Federal Chancellor. During a conference with Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg at 3:30 in the afternoon, the Chancellor said that he would hand to the Federal President the resignation of the whole Cabinet. When I was informed of this, I left the Federal Chancellor’s office, because I considered my function as a middleman concluded in the meaning of the agreement of 12 February; and I did not want in any way to advocate or promote my own appointment as Federal Chancellor.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection may I refer to my Exhibit Number Seyss-Inquart-58, Page 134 (Document Number 2949-PS). This is an excerpt from the telephone conversations of Göring; Göring is listening to reports, and Seyss-Inquart is speaking of the relationship between Germany and Austria. It says here: “Yes, he means that Austrian independence will be preserved....”
Now, that was on 11 March, in the late afternoon?
SEYSS-INQUART: In these telephone conversations it was also suggested that the Party formation, the emigrant Legion, should come to Austria. From the same telephone conversation it is obvious that I opposed this and wanted rather an election or a plebiscite held before the entry of any formation into Austria.
In the course of that afternoon State Secretary Keppler came to Vienna and requested information from me. And so I again went to the Federal Chancellor’s office. Berlin repeatedly asked me to intervene with the Federal President in order to effect my own appointment as Federal Chancellor. I always refused to do that.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what did the Austrian NSDAP do at that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Party in Austria began demonstrations. Party members left their houses, filled the streets, and as Party members or sympathizers took part in a demonstration against the system and for the National Socialists, a demonstration which assumed enormous proportions.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the feeling in the Federal provinces?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had no contact with the Federal provinces but learned quite late during that night or on the next day that there, even on a larger scale than in Vienna, big demonstrations of very large crowds had taken place against the Fatherland Front and for the National Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: What attempts did Federal President Miklas make to solve this situation?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot say anything about that from my own observation, for until 8 o’clock in the evening no one at all approached me on these matters. No one spoke to me about the Federal Chancellorship; no other possibility of a solution was discussed with me. I heard that the Federal President wanted to make Dr. Ender, of Vorarlberg, Chancellor and me Vice Chancellor. I believe that suggestion would have been completely practicable. But I could not discuss it—least of all with Berlin—because no one had said anything to me about it.
DR. STEINBAUER: And when events reached a climax and Schuschnigg offered his resignation, did you compile a Cabinet list?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the course of the evening it became clear that Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg would resign and that the Reich would not tolerate any other than a National Socialist Government. Therefore, in order to avoid being taken by surprise, I considered it my task to study whom I should take into a Cabinet. The suggestions mentioned in the telephone conversations were not transmitted by me at all. I chose my colleagues quite independently—naturally after consultations with Austrian National Socialists—and they included also people with strong Catholic ties, such as Professor Mengin, Dr. Wolf, and others.
I asked Foreign Minister Schmidt to enter the Cabinet. He asked me for a reason, and I told him: I want to keep Austria autonomous and independent, and I need a foreign minister who has connections with the Western Powers. Schmidt refused, remarking that Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg had introduced him into polities and that he would remain loyal to him.
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to submit some documents now: Document Number Seyss-Inquart-50, Page 115, from Zernatto’s book on Seyss-Inquart’s position; then, on Page 125, Document Number Seyss-Inquart-54, also from Zernatto’s book, where it says: “...he”—Seyss-Inquart—“no longer has developments in his hands.”
Then Document Number Seyss-Inquart-62, Page 149, in which Zernatto quotes from a conversation with Dr. Seyss-Inquart:
“He says that there are two main points on which he will not compromise. The first is Austria’s independence and the second, the possibility for the conservative Catholic element to develop its own life.”
[Turning to the defendant.] Now we come to a very important question. You then made a radio speech in which you called yourself a Minister, although Schuschnigg had already resigned.
SEYSS-INQUART: The situation was as follows: The resignation of the whole Cabinet was not accepted by the Federal President; and we, including myself, remained Ministers. When Dr. Schuschnigg made his farewell speech, he did not speak of the resignation of the whole Cabinet. He only said, “We yield to force.” Dr. Schuschnigg and Federal President Miklas had agreed at that time that I would not actually be appointed Federal Chancellor, but that with the entry of German troops executive power should be passed to me. Therefore, in my opinion, I was de facto Minister of the Interior and Foreign Minister.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Prosecution assert that you yourself exerted pressure on Federal President Miklas to appoint you Chancellor.
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not see Federal President Miklas at all until 9 or 10 o’clock in the evening, after Schuschnigg’s speech “We yield to force.”
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to submit to the Court this speech of Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg of 11 March under Document Number Seyss-Inquart-53, Page 122; in it he says:
“The Federal President has commissioned me to inform the Austrian people that we are yielding to force. Since we are at all costs determined not to spill German blood, even in this grave hour, we have given orders to our Armed Forces to withdraw without resistance, if the invasion of Austria is carried out, and to await the decision within the next hours.”
The Prosecution, Witness, sees evidence of this pressure also in the fact that SS units were called to the Federal Chancellor’s office at that time. What can you say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe it was after Schuschnigg’s farewell speech, when I saw in the anterooms 10 or 15 young men in black trousers and white shirts, that was the SS. I had the impression that they were doing messenger and orderly duty for State Secretary Keppler and the others. As they approached the rooms in which Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg and President Miklas were, I ordered guards of the Austrian Guard Battalion to be placed at their doors. I may mention that these were selected men of the Austrian Army who according to Austrian standards were very well armed, while these SS men—40 at most—possibly carried pistols. Moreover, 50 steps from the Federal Chancellor’s office were the barracks of the Guard Battalion, with a few hundred picked and well-armed men. If Federal President Miklas and Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg had not been concerned with things other than those which happened in the Federal Chancellor’s office and on the street outside it, they could easily have put an end to this situation by calling out the Guard Battalion.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Prosecution has submitted an affidavit of the Gauleiter of Upper Austria, Eigruber, which states that even before you became a Federal Chancellor, you ordered the seizure of power in the various Austrian Federal provinces.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is completely incorrect, and the Gauleiter of Upper Austria also does not claim to have talked to me. I believe he says that he had received a telegram signed by me. I did not send a telegram, and I did not give oral instructions to any Gauleiter or to anyone else for the seizure of power.
Later I heard from Globocznik that he had carried out the seizure of power. He told me of that in these words: “You know, I seized power for you and acted as the government; but I did not tell you anything about it, because you would have been against it.”
DR. STEINBAUER: You say you would have been against it. Was the population against it, too, against the marching in, which had meanwhile taken place, that is, the invasion as described by the Defendant Göring?
SEYSS-INQUART: One cannot call it an invasion; it was a stormy, loudly cheered entry of German troops. There were no villages—even those with an orthodox Catholic population—and no workers’ districts which did not burst out in stormy jubilation. Moreover, both Dr. Schuschnigg and I were completely clear about this; once in 1937 he had agreed with me when I said that the entry of German troops into Austria could not be impeded by anything but the ovations of the population.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to a Document Number Seyss-Inquart-37, Page 86. This is a quotation from the book by Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision, describing a conversation between him and the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, and it says:
“Before the occupation of Austria, Dr. Schuschnigg came to Rome. He admitted to me frankly that, if Germany occupied Austria, the majority of Austrians would support the occupation and, if Italy sent troops into Austria to prevent the occupation, the Austrians as one man would join with the Germans to fight Italy.”
Now, Witness, we come to the next day, to 12 March. Did you not at that time have a telephone conversation with Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes; I called the Führer in connection with the entry of troops. I should like to repeat and explain that on the day before, at about 7 o’clock, the negotiations suddenly came to a stop. Everybody waited. At half past 7 State Secretary Skubl came with the news that the entry of German troops had actually begun, according to a report from one of the frontier posts; indeed Field Marshal Göring had repeatedly said that it would take place. Thinking that the entry was actually in progress, Schuschnigg then made his farewell speech. And with that the government of the Fatherland Front had resigned from office. And I state expressly, up to this moment I did nothing which in any way furthered the taking over of control in Austria or to express it more correctly, which intentionally furthered the establishment of the National Socialists and the seizure of power. I only acted as an intermediary within the meaning of the Treaty of 12 February. But from the moment when the system of the Fatherland Front came to an end, I considered it my responsibility to take action. First I made a radio speech, but not the one which had been prescribed for me in the morning. For I did not speak of a provisional government, but referred to myself as Minister of the Interior. Only then did I call on the SA and the SS to act as auxiliary police; and like Schuschnigg, I gave the order to offer no resistance to the entry of German troops. Subsequently I was appointed Federal Chancellor, and my Cabinet was approved. On the same night I drove Dr. Schuschnigg home in my car, because I was afraid something might happen to him at the hands of provocateurs; and I asked Dr. Keppler to call up the Führer and ask him not to give the order for the entry of troops. Reich Marshal Göring spoke about that here. In the morning I called up again; then I met the Führer at the airport in Linz, and, as the entry of the troops was in full progress, I asked him whether it would not be possible to have Austrian troops march into the German Reich, so that, symbolically at least, equal rights would be maintained. The Führer agreed; and Austrian troops actually marched into Munich, Berlin, and other cities, in Austrian uniform.
DR. STEINBAUER: How, in your capacity as newly appointed Federal Chancellor, did you envisage the further development of the situation?
SEYSS-INQUART: Since the system of the Fatherland Front had broken down, I could no longer entertain my idea of a coalition government. It was clear to me that a National Socialist government with a very strong Catholic tendency would control developments not in the form of an immediate Anschluss but rather—by carrying out appropriate elections and a plebiscite—in the form of an economic and possibly a military union with the German Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in this connection, I should like to submit an extremely important document, which shows in an entirely new way how the Anschluss Law came about. It is a sworn statement of the former State Secretary of the Interior, Dr. Stuckart, who is imprisoned here. I submit it to the Court and should like to establish the following from this testimony...
THE PRESIDENT: Where is the document?
DR. STEINBAUER: It is not in the document book because I received it later. The translation of it has not yet been completed. I will read from the witness’ testimony only briefly to establish the connection—I have submitted the original to the Court...
THE PRESIDENT: You are giving it a number, are you?
DR. STEINBAUER: Document Number Seyss-Inquart-92. The witness says in it that Hitler would probably have incorporated the presidency of Austria in his own person, that he, the witness, was told by Frick to draft a law to that effect, but that he was then suddenly ordered to Linz...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait just a minute, Dr. Steinbauer.
DR. STEINBAUER: In the Dutch matter also, there are a few affidavits which have not yet arrived or which have just come in. Perhaps it would be more expedient to submit these documents when they have been translated.
THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will have the affidavit, I suppose?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, the Prosecution already have the affidavits.
If I may continue, he says that to his surprise he was told by Hitler in Linz to draft a law providing for the direct, total Anschluss, that is, providing for Austria’s status as a province, a Land, of the German Reich, like Bavaria and the other German Länder. He worked out this law, as he had been instructed to do, flew to Vienna, and submitted it for approval to the ministers who were assembled there.
I should like to establish in three documents the impression which the Anschluss made on the population. First, Document Number Seyss-Inquart-30. This is the celebration at which the Viennese welcomed the Führer in the biggest square in Vienna, the Heldenplatz. On that occasion, on 15 March, the witness welcomed the Führer and said:
“The goal for which centuries of German history have battled, for which untold millions of the best Germans have bled and died, which has been the final aim of fierce struggle, the last consolation in the bitterest hours—has today been reached. Austria has come home.”
Hitler now ordered that this Anschluss Law subsequently be sanctioned by a plebiscite of the Austrian population. Documents showing the results of this plebiscite have already been submitted to the Court. I should just like to point out, in addition, the attitude of the Catholic bishops toward the plebiscite—that is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-32, Page 73—and the attitude at that time of the present Federal President, Dr. Karl Renner—that is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-33, Page 76. On the attitude of the other powers to the Anschluss question I shall quote from testimony of the witness Schmidt, who as the then Foreign Minister was the qualified man; but I should like to submit one document on it, namely Document Number Seyss-Inquart-38, Page 89. That is the House of Commons speech of Chamberlain, who was Prime Minister at the time. In reply to a question regarding the Anschluss he said: “...nothing could have stopped this action by Germany unless we and others had been ready to use force to prevent it.”
[Turning to the defendant.] Now Austria has been incorporated, it is a part of the Greater German Reich, with Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. Did you remain Federal Chancellor or did you receive another state function after the seizure of power?
SEYSS-INQUART: On the 13th during the night, I reported on the Anschluss Law to the Führer; and I took the opportunity of discussing three questions with him immediately. That was, however, not at all easy, for the Führer was deeply moved and wept.
First, I asked that the Austrian Party might retain relative independence and be headed by an Austrian as the provincial leader; second, that Austria as a state might also enjoy a certain degree of independence. To the first request the Führer said, “Possibly”; to the second he said, “Yes”; Austria would receive her own governor, a Reichsstatthalter. I then rose and asked the Führer that I be allowed to return to my private practice as a lawyer. As a third request, I asked that the unjust exchange rate of 2 schillings to 1 mark be altered to 1.50. The Führer agreed to that also.
On 15 March, on the occasion of the celebration which has already been mentioned here, the Führer told the radio announcer, “Announce that Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart will now speak.” That to me was actually the first news of my appointment as Reichsstatthalter. I held that post until the end of April 1939.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who really directed policy in Austria after the Anschluss?
SEYSS-INQUART: Bürckel was sent to Austria immediately with the task of reorganizing the Party and preparing the plebiscite. The interference of Bürckel and his collaborators, and various plans somewhat strange and adverse to Austrian conceptions, caused me, on 8 April, in Bürckel’s presence, to call the Führer’s attention to this sort of co-ordination and in my hearing the Führer said to Bürckel: “Bürckel, you must not do that, otherwise the enthusiasm of the Austrians for the Anschluss will change to dissatisfaction with the Reich.”
Nevertheless, a few weeks later he made Bürckel Reich Commissioner for the Reunion. He controlled the Party and politics and propaganda, including church policy, and he had the right to give me instructions in state matters.
DR. STEINBAUER: You know that the Prosecution make charges against you in connection with the policy in Austria shortly after the Anschluss. The first charge is with regard to the Jewish question, namely, that you participated in this grievous treatment of the Jewish population, or that you were responsible for it.
What can you say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot at all deny it; for certainly, as chief of the civil administration, I issued orders along that line in my field of authority, though Bürckel claimed that the Jewish question, as such was part of his field; and in a document which has been submitted here, he called the Jewish question a matter arising as a consequence of the Anschluss.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I, in this connection, refer to two documents. One is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-64, a decree on Page 154. It is the decree of the Führer on the appointment of Bürckel as Reich Commissioner for the Reunion of Austria with the Reich. I emphasize here especially Article 4, which gives Bürckel the detailed authority to issue orders to the witness. The second document is Exhibit Number Seyss-lnquart-67, Page 163; the Court already has it; it is Document Number 2237-PS. With this long document, I only want to demonstrate that the entire solution of the Jewish problem, particularly in November 1938, was a matter with which the defendant had nothing to do.
The defendant’s own attitude I should like to show by submitting an affidavit which came to me unsolicited from Australia. This is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-70, Page 175. I am fully aware of the Tribunal’s view that it is not very weighty evidence that some defendants have submitted letters from Jews; “One swallow does not make a summer,” as the proverb says. The reason for my submitting this document is Paragraph 12 on Page 4, in which the witness, Dr. Walter Stricker, who comes from a highly respected Jewish family in Linz, says the following:
“After my departure from Austria, I heard of other cases in which Dr. Seyss gave similar help to Jews and that in May 1938, when persecutions of Jews became particularly severe, he protested to the Gauleiter Bürckel.”
It is therefore quite clear that the defendant did not participate but rejected this radical policy.
Witness, you know from the trial brief that you are charged with having played a double game. What was the attitude of the Party toward you after the Anschluss?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know that this charge is made against me and has been made against me before. Radical circles of the Party made the same accusation against me, and I will admit openly that I can understand why it was made. I attempted to bring together two groups which, as history has shown, simply could not be brought together; and since this could not be anticipated at the time, the radical elements of both groups must have come to the conclusion that the man who attempted it was not honest in his attempt. But more important is something else. The final solution of the Austrian question was not my solution at all, but the solution of the radical elements in the Party. I myself, however, from 11 March at 8 o’clock in the evening, participated in that solution. As a result, it is easy for people to say that I participated in it beforehand and prepared for it; but that is not true. Only at 8 o’clock in the evening, after Schuschnigg and the Fatherland Government had resigned, did I too adopt this point of view, because under the given political conditions there was no other possibility. For there was no political power in Austria other than that of the National Socialists; the alternative was civil war.
I myself welcomed the Anschluss Law, and my decision also determined that of my colleagues. On 13 March, of course, I welcomed the opportune moment. At most, there might have been some sort of hesitation as to whether the Anschluss should actually then be carried through. I considered that, but as I saw it, there was no need for misgivings from the foreign political point of view, because, according to all reports, everything would pass quietly. Domestically, there had never been so much enthusiasm in Austria. I felt that no Austrian statesman, no man in a position of responsibility, ever had the whole population behind him as much as I. But the Anschluss Law was valuable and useful, insofar as in any case the Reich would in reality have had the authority, and thus it was certainly better it had full responsibility outwardly too.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Defendant Kaltenbrunner told me that he and you were at this time very closely shadowed by Heydrich. Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: Heydrich in particular was among those who distrusted us, and “us” includes Kaltenbrunner. At the end of 1937 Heydrich wrote a secret report, which I later received. In this report he said that the solution of the Austrian question in favor of the Party was inescapable, that the policy of State Councillor Seyss-Inquart might, however, prove to be the only obstacle, for he would be in a position to produce something like Austrian National Socialism. After the Anschluss a so-called “escort” detail was attached to me with the sole task of sending to Heydrich constant reports on what I was doing. I had as little objection to this as to the fact that, as Austrian Minister of Security, my telephone conversations were intercepted.
DR. STEINBAUER: After you had allegedly played the main role in this affair, what reward did you receive for your activity? Were you given an estate or a gratuity of several hundred thousand marks? Did you ever receive anything like that?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, and there was no question of anything like that. My reward was the knowledge of having worked for the formation of Greater Germany.
DR. STEINBAUER: I would still like to ask you: Did you ever receive anything?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. On my fiftieth birthday...
DR. STEINBAUER: But you received a title, did you not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Do you mean the title of Gruppenführer of the SS? On 15 March I was named Gruppenführer of the SS, as an honorary rank. I must add that I did not try to obtain it and that I went through no examinations or other such things. As a rule an honorary rank in the SS does not entail membership in the general SS; it does not bestow on the holder either command or disciplinary powers. I myself learned that when I complained to Himmler about Bürckel and demanded proceedings—that letter has been submitted here. Himmler told me then that he had no disciplinary powers over Bürckel, who held only an honorary rank. I myself, as regards the SS...
DR. STEINBAUER: I think that is sufficient.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, as I understood it, the defendant said that he received a secondary post to furnish reports to Heydrich. What was that secondary post? Is that what you said?
SEYSS-INQUART: Heydrich wrote a secret report against me. No, I am sorry, Heydrich sent an “escort” detail...
THE PRESIDENT: You said in 1937 Heydrich issued a secret report about Austria, and then said that the solution was unavoidable except for the policy of Seyss-Inquart. That was the substance of it, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not quite understand that.
THE PRESIDENT: And after that, I understood you to say you received a secondary post to furnish reports to Heydrich.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, Heydrich sent four or five of his men to accompany me as a kind of guard escort, and these men had orders to report my movements to him.
THE PRESIDENT: I see; I must have misunderstood the translation.
DR. STEINBAUER: To sum up, I can say that apart from your appointment as SS Gruppenführer you received no awards, with the exception of a promise that you would become Reich Minister within a year? Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: This promise was given at the end of April 1938. I refer to a question in the cross-examination of the Reich Marshal. Before 13 March 1938 I did not receive the slightest promise from the Reich on anything and was not in any way under obligation to anyone or bound to obey anyone in the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: And with that I can close the chapter on Austria and briefly discuss the Czechoslovakian question.
You are accused, on the basis of a congratulatory letter sent to the Führer by Henlein, of having taken an active part in the annexation of Czechoslovakia.
SEYSS-INQUART: In the affairs of September 1938 I had no other part at all than that of receiving, as Reichsstatthalter in Austria, the refugees from the border areas, lodging, and caring for them in Austria. Henlein, and a few other leaders, I knew personally but did not interfere in their politics and was not well acquainted with their relations to the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: What can you say about Slovakia?
SEYSS-INQUART: The relations between Vienna and Bratislava were very good even at the time of the old Austrian Monarchy. I myself had relatives in Bratislava. Hence the Slovaks and the Germans knew each other well. We knew in particular the complaint of the Slovaks that the promise of Pittsburgh had not been kept, that they had not received full autonomy of Slovakia. Father Hlinka was in favor of complete autonomy; he was venerated in Slovakia as a saint, and at least three-quarters of the Slovakian people were behind him; he advocated independence from the Parliament in Prague and the adoption of Slovakian as the official language. After March 1938—to be exact, after September 1938—I met a few Slovakian politicians, Sidor, Dr. Tiso, Dr. Churchansky, and perhaps one or two others. The Führer himself once asked me to inform him and to send him a report on Slovakian conditions; and I commissioned two of my colleagues, who had very good personal connections in Slovakia, to obtain the desired information. In March 1939 I talked to Sidor and Dr. Tiso, because they wanted to confer with me on possible Berlin-Prague developments and their consequences for Slovakia; at least, so I was told by my colleagues who had invited me. Mention was made in these discussions of the possibility of a Berlin-Prague clash and of the concern for the integrity of Slovakia, because there was the danger that the Hungarians, and the Poles too, might take advantage of the occasion by occupying Slovakian territory. The Slovakian gentlemen wanted assurances on what Berlin intended to do and what they could do to preserve the integrity of their country. I spoke very openly with these gentlemen; but I did not ask them to declare their independence, for they themselves had to make that decision. We discussed rather the question of whether differences between Slovakian and German interests existed, and we established that they did not exist.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to two documents. One is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-71, Page 181. This is the reference to the Pittsburgh Treaty. The second document is Exhibit Number Seyss-Inquart-72 (Document Number D-751), Page 183, submitted by the Prosecution as Exhibit Number USA-112, as proof that the defendant was in unlawful contact with the Slovakians.
You are, of course, acquainted with this document, Witness. It is a report of Viscount Halifax, of 21 March 1939. Who was in Bratislava with you at that time? Or were you there at all?
SEYSS-INQUART: State Secretary Keppler was at that time sent from Berlin to Vienna with the task of putting certain questions to the Slovakian Government. Both Bürckel and I had refused to take over such an assignment; that was one of the few instances in which I agreed with Bürckel. As chief of territorial administration it fell to me to make preparations for the visit to Bratislava, and it was agreed that State Secretary Keppler would go to Bratislava in my car. Bürckel and I accompanied Keppler. No generals or other representatives of the Wehrmacht were present. The record of the conversations may be considered accurate.
DR. STEINBAUER: It says in the document “and five German generals.”
SEYSS-INQUART: That is wrong.
I should like to call the Court’s attention to the fact that both the Slovakian Minister Sidor and Monsignor Tiso, who later became President, declare in this document that they negotiated only with Bürckel; the name Seyss-Inquart does not appear at all.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then, to sum up, can I say that you did not engage in the activity with which the Prosecution charge you in connection with Czechoslovakia or Slovakia? Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: At any rate, I do not think that, in pursuing the interests of the Reich, I overstepped those limits which in such negotiations must be conceded to someone charged with representing legitimate interests. I did not participate when on 12 March Dr. Tiso through Bürckel—I did not overstep the limits justified in representing legitimate interests of the German Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you, that is sufficient.
Then in 1939, on 1 May 1939, you became Minister without Portfolio. Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you ever take part in a Cabinet session, or a session of the Secret Defense Council?
SEYSS-INQUART: It no longer existed.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have influence in any way on the decision to make war on Poland?
SEYSS-INQUART: In no way whatever.
DR. STEINBAUER: When the war with Poland had actually begun, did you express your opinion on it to Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the second week of September I wrote a letter to Hitler. I hope that this letter too is among my Vienna files. I read a copy of it about a year and a half ago, and I remember the contents well. I called Hitler’s attention to the fact that among the German people there was no enthusiasm at all; but, on the contrary, the gravest concern that it would be a life-and-death struggle. I expressed my opinion that the war would not end by a military solution but would have to be solved politically and that the basis for such a political solution would be the alliance with the Soviets, which should perhaps be extended to a military alliance. Consideration should be given to the fact that the Soviets, like Czarist Russia, would never abandon their interests in the Balkans and that Pan-Slavism would also play a role; consequently, Russia would have to be reckoned with in the Czechoslovakian and Polish questions. I said that it was necessary at all costs to maintain the belt of neutral states. Then the war on the narrow Western Front would run its course. The Italian policy, however, should not become a burden for Germany; but an agreement should be reached with Greece and Turkey. England could not be defeated through the air or by U-boats; one had to attack her position in the Mediterranean to force her to make peace.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you receive an answer to this letter from the Führer?
SEYSS-INQUART: I received no direct answer, but once in a conversation he made a remark which showed clearly that he had read the letter. He said to me, “I do not want to destroy the British Empire at all,” whereby, however, he implied that he had misunderstood my letter.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, if the Tribunal agree, I think this would be a suitable time to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
DR. STEINBAUER: We last spoke about your attitude with regard to the question of Czechoslovakia. You talked about your position as Reich Governor in Vienna, and described your intolerable relations with Bürckel, which was the reason why you changed your work and went to Poland. What were your functions in Poland?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, I was appointed administrative chief for Southern Poland, which position actually came within the organization of the Armed Forces. This administrative post, however, was never set up, since the Government General was created forthwith and I became the Deputy of the Governor General. My sphere of influence was legally defined but depended, of course, upon the different cases in which the Governor General needed me as his deputy. On 19 January 1940, he determined this at a conference.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to Document Seyss-Inquart-73, on Page 185, which is an extract from Dr. Frank’s diary. On Page 14 of this diary he describes the functions of Seyss-Inquart, and then on Page 30 he says something which he repeated to me in person, namely, that he bore the responsibility for what happened there.
Now, you became the deputy of the Governor General—although by rank as a Reich Minister you were actually placed higher—and you exercised certain functions there which, as we have heard, consisted primarily of making out reports. Under Document Number 2278-PS is a report which you yourself wrote, in which there are certain things for which you are accused. Will you please tell us what you have to say about this report on your official travels.
SEYSS-INQUART: My secretary wrote that report. I have read it, of course.
DR. STEINBAUER: It is Exhibit USA-706.
SEYSS-INQUART: It is brought against me, among other things, that the Governor of Lublin had suggested that the Jews be transferred from Lublin to the district of Cycow and then decimated. The Prosecution itself has stated that this is an insertion made by the writer. In any case this was not an official report at a meeting.
Cycow itself was a settlement occupied by a group of Germans, and by employing Jews in that area I could hardly be suspected of wanting to exterminate the Jews in that district because of the climatic conditions. I knew, however, that it was the Governor’s wish to have the very large Jewish population of Lublin removed from the town. I remember nothing of any specific intention expressed by the word “decimating”—in the sense of annihilating. The Governor of Radom reported to me that desperate criminals there had been shot. It is true, he did tell me that. I was under the impression that this had been done by the summary courts martial, which still functioned at the time. But there are several passages in this same report where I always point out that German courts must be introduced, and that no sentence must be carried out without proper court procedure. I think that quite probably I said the same thing at the time I was at Radom—only this is not mentioned in the report.
I have been accused of wanting to monopolize certain vital products, such as salt, et cetera. That was quite natural, considering the economic chaos in which we found Poland. We had to arrive at a “natural” economic system, and supply the agricultural population with certain products so that they in turn could supply food to the Polish town populations. In this connection I wish to point out that I urged the re-establishment of the Polish National Relief Organization under the former Polish management, and that I asked for 9 million zloty to be placed at its disposal also for motor vehicles, et cetera. In addition to this I said that compulsory work must be replaced by normal employment as soon as possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, the so-called “AB Action” plays a considerable part in the Polish question. It is an abbreviation for “extraordinary pacification action.” Since that might still have happened in your time, I should like to ask if you know anything about it.
SEYSS-INQUART: This affair took place during the very last period of my stay in Poland. With the beginning of the Norwegian campaign the resistance movement in Poland became extremely active, and grew as a result of the campaign in the West. The Security Police demanded the severest countermeasures. Bühler really made the objection which he stated here on this witness stand. I always understood the Governor General’s words just as Bühler wanted them to be understood. But Bühler was quite right in making the objection, because the Police might have interpreted these words as giving them much greater powers than the Governor General intended to give them.
Dr. Frank always opposed the sentences passed by these summary courts martial, and he set up his own investigation commission. I was the chairman of this commission as long as I was in Poland, and sometimes we canceled as many as 50 percent of the sentences imposed.
DR. STEINBAUER: How long were you actually Deputy during your period of office, when Dr. Frank was prevented from carrying out his duties?
SEYSS-INQUART: Ten days, I believe.
DR. STEINBAUER: Ten days. Well, then, I think I can rapidly wind up the Polish question by asking: Did you introduce any measures which could really be said to be in the interests of the Polish population?
SEYSS-INQUART: During the winter of 1939-40 there was a famine in Polish towns. I myself intervened with State Secretary Backe, and on one occasion, for instance, I obtained 6,000 tons of grain for the large cities. I approached Reich Marshal Göring and the Führer too, and asked for the town of Lodz to be left under the administration of the Government General. I did the same for the coal district west of Kraków.
DR. STEINBAUER: I now come to the main part of the accusation held against you, and that is the question of your activities in the Netherlands.
My first question is this: How did you become Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Führer appointed me.
DR. STEINBAUER: And where were you at the time?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was on a service mission in the Government General, and Dr. Lammers called me to headquarters.
DR. STEINBAUER: So you did not apply for this job?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that did not even enter my mind. At that time I had just asked the Führer for permission to join the Armed Forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: But did not your war injury prevent your joining the Armed Forces?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had hoped that I might be useful somehow or other.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what were the instructions the Führer gave you with regard to your new position?
SEYSS-INQUART: The instructions are described in Document 997-PS, which was submitted by the Prosecution. That gives a fair picture of them.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is Exhibit RF-122.
SEYSS-INQUART: I was responsible for the civil administration, and, within this administrative task, I had to look after the interests of the Reich. Apart from this I had a political task. I was to see to it that while Dutch independence was maintained, the Netherlands should be persuaded to change their pro-British attitude for a pro-German one and enter into a close economic collaboration.
I wish to draw your attention to Paragraph 3 of this document, in which I pointed out the difficulties connected with these two tasks, and the difficulties in co-ordinating them. I showed that one cannot co-ordinate the two so easily. An occupational power, I said, demands the suppression of all official activities and an awakening of a common political will, but grants such freedom which in the end may lead the Dutch to feel dependent on their own decisions. It was not my intention, therefore, to force upon the Dutch people any definite political will.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was this order of the Führer ever altered later on?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, this order was never altered.
DR. STEINBAUER: How did you carry out this task from the political point of view? Did you ask the existing parties in Holland to co-operate?
SEYSS-INQUART: With the exception of the Marxists I allowed all parties to remain, and I gave them as much freedom to continue their activities as was compatible with the interests of the occupying forces. I particularly helped the National Socialist parties.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Prosecution make the accusation against you that in your speeches you often describe things quite differently from the way in which you carry them out. In this regard I refer to Document 3430-PS, Exhibit USA-708.
It is asserted there that you tried to force National Socialism upon the Dutch. That is Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-76, on Page 197 of my document book.
SEYSS-INQUART: It is certainly correct that the goal which I had set for myself, and which I proclaimed in my speeches, was not reached in practice, nor could it have been. However, it may be possible that it gave the Dutch the impression that I was trying to force National Socialism upon them because, after all, later on I could admit only National Socialist parties, whereas I had to dissolve the others. I never used state methods of coercion to force any Dutchman to become a National Socialist, nor did I make membership in the National Socialist Party a condition for exercising the general rights and privileges to which every Dutchman was entitled.
Incidentally, I referred to this quite clearly in my speech. I said:
“I shall always act as a National Socialist.... But that does not mean that I shall force National Socialism on one single person. National Socialism is a matter of inner conviction.
“There are two groups of organizations. There is the political, in the case of which I attach importance to the demand that each and every member be led to National Socialism—but these are absolutely voluntary organizations.... Then there is the vocational.... in which it is immaterial what political views the individual has, as long as he fulfills his duties in his particular profession.”
DR. STEINBAUER: Why and when did you dissolve the political parties in Holland?
SEYSS-INQUART: That happened during the second half of 1941. With the beginning of the Eastern campaign all the political parties, with the exception of the National Socialists, adopted an actively hostile attitude toward the occupational forces. In the interests of the occupational forces that could no longer be tolerated.
I think it remarkable, to say the least, that for 1½ years I allowed those parties to continue their work since, after all, they were no less hostile to National Socialism than National Socialism is today with regard to the democratic parties.
DR. STEINBAUER: Tell me, is it true or not that you showed partiality, and gave preference to the NSB Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is quite true as far as the field of political propaganda was concerned; it is untrue as far as state matters were concerned.
The creation of a so-called National Political Secretariat has been held up as an accusation against me. That was a National Socialist advisory body for my administration, and it was not allowed to exercise any influence on the Dutch administration. Any such attempts were strictly prohibited by me.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you not, nevertheless, put individual members of the NSB into state positions?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is true, and it seemed a matter of course to me, because I had to find colleagues on whom I could rely. They were not under Party orders, however; on the contrary, in most cases certain differences developed between these people and the heads of the Party.
In the face of urgent remonstrances I did not create a National Socialist government in the Netherlands—as was the case in Norway—and chiefly because Certain Dutch gentlemen like General Secretary Van Damm, President Van Lohn of the Supreme Court, and Professor Schneider who was President of the Cultural Committee, urged me to realize how wrong it would be to do so.
DR. STEINBAUER: President Vorrink, a witness who has been examined here, talked about a policy of exploitation which you carried on. Is that true?
SEYSS-INQUART: The use of the National Socialist parties for the benefit of German policy did actually occur. I observed it, and I stated the fact publicly. I regretted this occurrence, but I could not stop it. The German occupational forces had to introduce a number of measures which were oppressive for the Dutch people, and which discredited our Dutch friends.
DR. STEINBAUER: What do you have to say to the accusation brought against you that you had co-ordinated all the cultural institutions?
SEYSS-INQUART: Certainly this accusation is, so to speak, correct in part. With the prohibition of the political parties, most of the organizations of the free professions became impossible, since right down to the chessplayers’ club everything in the Netherlands was organized on a political basis. In the interests of the occupational forces I had to create new supervisory bodies. Maybe it was due to lack of imagination that these organizations were, in part at least, very similar to their prototypes in the Reich. But I used these organizations only for purposes of supervision, and never asked them to co-operate politically. Not only did I refrain from making the exercise of a profession dependent on co-operation, but I did not even insist upon compulsory collection of membership fees.
I admit that we made two mistakes from two errors of judgment: First of all, we had the mistaken impression that the order we imposed as occupational authorities was necessarily the right one—at least the better one; and secondly, that in an occupied country, an independent political will can develop. It was there that our policy failed.
DR. STEINBAUER: What institution did you then set up?
SEYSS-INQUART: I created a cultural association (Kulturkammer), a medical association (Ärztekammer), a chemists’ association (Apothekerkammer), and a board of agriculture (Landstand). Then there was a workers’ front, but that was a voluntary organization. Members could leave it without any disadvantage to themselves whenever they wished.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then another charge is brought against you, that of “Germanization.” What do you say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, I must get something quite clear. In English, you say Germany, and in Russian you say Germanski. Both mean German (Deutsch). And when we spoke of Germanization then, we did not mean “making them into Germans”; We meant a political and cultural union of the so-called Germanic peoples, with reciprocal equal rights. That we did intervene in this way, I stated in a speech, Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-103:
“Why do the Germans interfere with everything in the Netherlands?”
Then I went on to say that in this total warfare there would be moments of tension...
THE PRESIDENT: What page is that on?
DR. STEINBAUER: It is still Exhibit USA-708, which has not been translated. But the entire book has been presented.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it got a PS number?
DR. STEINBAUER: Its document number is 3430-PS. It has been made Exhibit USA-708. It is a book entitled Vier Jahre in den Niederlanden, and it contains a collection of speeches made by the witness, several of which have been submitted by the Prosecution. The witness is now replying to them.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
SEYSS-INQUART: There are moments of tension when there is no longer any dividing line between what is important to the military war effort and something which is private and a matter for civilians.
I was quite aware of the fact that all public activities might be used for or against the occupational forces and that I had, therefore, to exercise control over them.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were there any attempts on the part of the NSDAP in the Reich to influence your administration for the interests of the Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Auslands-Organisation in the Netherlands made an alteration in its set-up which permitted it to support the policy of the Dutch National Socialist Party in every respect. It had, however, no particular influence of its own.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is the important thing. Now, let us turn to the administration proper. Who were the competent authorities in the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the civilian sector there was the Reich Commissioner; on a similar footing was the military commander and the Armed Forces, and the Police had a sector of its own. The military commander had special rights to intervene, and from July 1944 a part of the executive powers was transferred to him.
The Police were merely placed at my disposal, but came under the Higher SS and Police Leader, who was suggested by Himmler and appointed by the Führer. I was never asked about this beforehand. The Police reserved the right to investigate. That is to say, if I gave them an order they would investigate to see whether the order was in line with the instructions which Himmler had given directly to the Higher SS and Police Leader.
Then there were the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor and the Armament Minister, who carried out the orders for the Four Year Plan.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes; and as another Reich organization, there was Rosenberg’s Einsatzstab too—and Speer, to complete the picture?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, Speer was the Minister for Armaments. Then there were other smaller and separate assignments of a special nature.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that you were really nothing but a kind of executive organ for the superior Reich offices?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I was not an ordinary official. I bore the responsibility for the Reich in the civilian sector. Perhaps during the first few months departments in Berlin went straight ahead and ignored me, but I then concentrated the administration in such a way in my own hands that nothing occurred in the civilian sector to which I had not previously given my consent. The Führer acknowledged this quite plainly on one occasion, and I should like to remark that you must not draw any conclusions from this with regard to other occupied territories. I am completely convinced that in the Eastern Territories and in the Government General the same centralization did not exist.
DR. STEINBAUER: What possibilities did you have, then, of setting up an administration?
SEYSS-INQUART: The initiative for, and the extent of, the demands made by the Reich came, of course, from the competent central offices in the Reich. I investigated the demands with my colleagues in consultation with the Dutch offices. We would then make counterproposals which seemed to us reasonable for the Dutch. And if the Reich still demanded more, then we made efforts not to exceed what could be expected. Until 1943 all demands were fulfilled by the Dutch authorities themselves. I gave my officials no authority to make such demands until after this period. Then the demands became so large, that I no longer expected the Dutch authorities to supply them.
DR. STEINBAUER: I come back to the question of the Police for a moment, which, as you said, stood directly under Himmler...
SEYSS-INQUART: You asked what possibilities I had?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
SEYSS-INQUART: I had two possibilities: with the Queen of the Netherlands and the Government gone to England, I could have nominated a new Dutch Government, as in Norway, or conducted the administration of the country myself. I decided on the second solution.
DR. STEINBAUER: How did you organize the existing Dutch police force?
SEYSS-INQUART: Whereas the German Police were not in any way dependent on me, the Dutch police were under my orders; but it was a matter of course that I should transfer the supervision of the Dutch police to the Higher SS and Police Leader as well—that is, in the capacity as my Commissioner General for Security. The Dutch police were divided into three or four different branches. I think that we can safely say we were acting in the interests of the occupational power when we co-ordinated them as regards organization.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the Home Guard (Landwacht)?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Home Guard was a protection squad organized by the Dutch National Socialists. In 1943 there were serious cases of terror attacks on National Socialists—some very cruel murders. There was the danger of the counterterror of which we had heard in Denmark and, in fact, several unfortunate incidents did happen. Consequently I had this Home Guard organized with orders to act as a regular disciplined auxiliary police force, and to control street traffic at night, and guard railways, et cetera. The result was that these acts of terror ceased almost entirely, and until the middle of 1944 no further difficulties arose.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, we now come to an exceptionally important chapter.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I just for a moment refer to Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-101? This document has been held against me by the Prosecution...
THE PRESIDENT: Is 101 the right designation?
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the speeches which the defendant is quoting have been sent down by me to be mimeographed. Although they are actually already before the Tribunal, the translation department did not quite catch up, as they wanted to translate all the affidavits too. So they are not here yet in the translation, but I hope to have them by tomorrow morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Hasn’t it got a PS number, or any other designation?
DR. STEINBAUER: It is a book, Exhibit USA-708. The Prosecution have only quoted individual passages from it.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
SEYSS-INQUART: The Prosecution have quoted Page 167.
On 1 August 1943 I made a speech announcing special measures which would bring difficulties and restrictions upon the Dutch, and the Prosecution believe that the shootings which took place later are connected with it. That is an error. The restrictions I spoke of in that speech concerned only an order forbidding Dutch people to stay in places outside their own provinces, so that bands of terrorists from the northwest could not get to the east. As this happened just during the vacation time, it really was a restriction for the Dutch.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to the next question. Did you change and possibly misuse the existing organization of the lower courts?
SEYSS-INQUART: I took over the organization of the Dutch courts entirely. The administration of justice in the Netherlands was of a commendably high standard. Only on two occasions did I supplement it. The Dutch judges showed little understanding of the economic situation. For instance, on one occasion a group of black market butchers, who had killed large numbers of cattle and brought them to the black market, were fined 200 guilders; so I installed special economic judges, Dutchmen, who had more understanding of these economic necessities. But the legal situation remained as it was. Of course, we also introduced our German courts, as every occupational power does.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that we had Dutch courts, German courts for Germans staying in the Netherlands, and the police courts?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but also for the Dutch who violated the interests of the German occupational forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, it is alleged in the proceedings that through these courts there were 4,000 executions, which have to be accounted for.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is completely false. If I take into account all the death sentences which were pronounced and actually carried out by the German courts, the police courts, and the military courts; and if I add to them the cases where Dutchmen lost their lives in clashes with the executive powers; then, according to a statement of the Higher SS and Police Leader, up to the middle of 1944 there were less than 800 cases in 4 years—that is to say, less than were caused by a bombing attack on the town of Nijmegen. The shootings came afterwards.
DR. STEINBAUER: You also exercised the rights to reprieve, for which you had a special reprieve department?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I wish to refer to Document Seyss-Inquart-75, Page 190 in the document book. This is the affidavit of Rudolf Fritsch, who was a judge at the Prussian Supreme Court and reprieve expert for the Reich Commissioner. I should like to quote two paragraphs from this document, and I refer to the second paragraph on Page 3:
“In exercising his right to reprieve, the Reich Commissioner proceeded from the standpoint that this was one of the most sacred rights of the head of a state, and that it was especially calculated to create a friendly, confidential atmosphere between the Germans and the Dutch. Therefore, in the beginning it was he himself who made the decision in every case, on the basis of case reports which were submitted to him together with a suggestion for a reprieve from the reprieve department. After about 2 to 3 months he delegated the exercise of the right to reprieve within his own organization to the chief of the Department for Reprieves. The latter was competent except in the following cases: 1) the cancellation of proceedings; 2) decision in case of death sentences; 3) decision in fundamental questions; 4) decision in isolated cases without precedent...
“No sentence of death was carried out without there being an official examination of the question of a reprieve, even when a formal appeal for a reprieve was not submitted.”
Then I come to Page 5, the last paragraph:
“Since co-operation with authorities in the Dutch courts proved that they could be trusted, the Reich Commissioner gradually delegated in the main the right of reprieve to the Dutch Minister of Justice. From the huge amount of mail which came in ... I repeatedly learned of police actions staged by the Gestapo whereby regular jurisdiction was eliminated.... In such cases I would collect material and use it to take action in order to bring the persons involved before regular courts for judgment. And I was actually successful with such action. This was proof to me that the Reich Commissioner opposed the wild police methods of the Gestapo and was an adherent of regular legal procedure.”
I think that with this we can close this subject of justice and now come to the question of finance.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but the Führer’s order excluding courts is also very important.
DR. STEINBAUER: Well, if you wish to add something else.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, it is decisive.
After the strike at Amsterdam, I proposed summary court-martial procedure. That is not an invention of recent times; it is summary court procedure for special emergencies, such as you can find in the legislation of every country. The summary courts martial were subject to special precautionary provisions. First of all, a proper judge had to be there; secondly, the defense was allowed a counsel, who could be Dutch; thirdly, evidence had to be given in the proper manner, and if the question of guilt was not clearly determined, then the case had to be transferred to the ordinary courts. This summary court-martial procedure was only in force for 2 weeks at the time of the general strike in May 1943. The number of people shot later on cannot be traced back to these summary courts martial. Also they had been provided for the special emergency of the Netherlands again becoming a theatre of war.
In the meantime, however, a decree came from the Führer which had already been made public in an order from the High Command of the Armed Forces. I refer to 1155-PS—no, I beg your pardon, that is wrong—it is Document 835-PS.
On 30 July 1944 the Führer ordered that all non-German civilians in occupied territories who were guilty of sabotage or terror actions were to be handed over to the Security Police. The Higher SS Leader and I both objected to this order, as we clearly realized what damaging effects it would have, especially in the Netherlands. Through such an order the Dutch would only be driven into illegal organizations.
During a period of 4 to 6 weeks the Higher SS and Police Leader never carried out the order. But he then received a severe reprimand from Himmler, and from that time on he was obliged to deal with the Dutch who had been arrested for sabotage or illegal activities, and had to judge them according to his own jurisdiction, shooting them when necessary. One can account in this way for the shootings on a larger scale, but I do not believe that there were as many as 4,000. As often as I could, I urged the Security Police to be most careful in carrying out this order, but I never received any reports on the individual cases. I had the impression that there were perhaps 600 to 700.
DR. STEINBAUER: If I understood you correctly, then this was a police affair, which was directly...
SEYSS-INQUART: At all events it no longer came under my authority or influence. But if, at that time, I gave the Security Police orders to check up on an illegal movement somewhere, I nevertheless had to realize that some Dutchman or other, who was discovered to be the leader of such a movement, would be shot by the Police without the courts or myself being able to investigate the case. But then I could not desist from safeguarding the security of the occupational authorities, because the Führer decree had been issued.
DR. STEINBAUER: I now come to the chapter of finance. A document has been presented here where a certain Mr. Trip announces his resignation. Who was this gentleman?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Trip was the President of the Bank of the Netherlands—that is to say, the bank of issue—and he was also the General Secretary for Finance. I think he can readily be considered one of the world’s leading banking experts. He is an outstanding personality and one of the men described today as a Dutch patriot.
DR. STEINBAUER: He was also General Secretary for Finance, was he not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Until March 1941 he was the General Secretary for Finance. In my first speech to the general secretaries I said that I would not ask any general secretary to do anything that was contrary to his conscience. If he thought that there was something he felt he could not do, then he could resign without any harm to himself. I said that all I asked was that he carry out my orders loyally as long as he remained in office. Mr. Trip was in office until March 1941, and then he resigned because there was something he refused to carry out. He did this without the slightest disadvantage to himself.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who was his successor?
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to say that what Mr. Trip carried out until March 1941 is, in my opinion, justifiable in every respect. Otherwise he most certainly would not have done it.
His successor was Mr. Rost van Tonningen. Rost van Tonningen was a League of Nations Commissioner in Austria who there had had tasks similar to those I gave him in the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: What about the costs of occupation?
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as the civilian administration was concerned, Mr. Trip and I agreed that I receive 3 million guilders a month. Then there was another 20 million in fines in addition to that. During the first 3 years I saved 60 million guilders, which remained in the Netherlands as a special bequest.
As far as the cost of the military occupation was concerned, I had no authority to check that. The Armed Forces put in their demands to the Minister of Finance, and I then received orders to place the money at their disposal. During 1941, the Reich exacted indirect occupation costs. It took the point of view that not only the expenses which were incurred directly in the Netherlands should be paid for, but that the cost of preparations in the Reich should be borne too. Fifty million marks per month were demanded—partly in gold. Later this contribution was designated as voluntary assistance for the East...
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean marks, or do you mean guilders?
SEYSS-INQUART: Marks, 50 million marks. Later on this contribution was called voluntary assistance for the East, for political reasons, but of course it was not so. Later on, the Reich demanded that this sum be increased to 100 millions, but I refused.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. Trip retired as General Secretary for Finance because the foreign currency embargo, which still existed at the time between Germany and the Netherlands, was lifted?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that is correct. I received a request by my administration for the purpose of intensifying economic exchanges between the Reich and the Netherlands—to lift the foreign currency embargo so that, without having recourse to banks of issue, guilders could be exchanged for marks, and vice versa. The fundamental possibility of such exchanges had already been determined under Mr. Trip, but it was subject to the control of the bank of issue, that is to say, of the Netherlands Bank as well. Mr. Trip raised objections and I passed the matter on to Berlin. Berlin decided that it was to be carried out and Mr. Trip resigned. I appointed Mr. Rost van Tonningen, President of the Bank of the Netherlands, and I published the decree.
I wish to say that the President of the Reichsbank, Herr Funk, was against this procedure, and I can quote in explanation that at that time the effects could not be foreseen as turning out as catastrophic as they did later on. At that time the Netherlands were completely cut off, and the Reich had reached the height of its power. It was to be expected that the mark would become the leading currency in Europe, and that thereby the guilder would have been given the same importance. In February 1941, for instance, imports from the Reich into the Netherlands were greater than the exports from the Netherlands into the Reich. Reich Minister Funk always held the view that these were real debts, so that in the event of a different outcome of the war such debts which amounted to some 4½ billion would have had to be paid back to the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: If I understood you correctly, it was your General Secretary for Finance, Dr. Fischböck, who suggested this matter contrary to the wishes of Trip.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know whether the suggestion came from Fischböck alone. I presume that he must have talked it over with other people; but it was he who put the matter to me.
DR. STEINBAUER: You have also been accused of imposing collective penalties in the form of fines, which is contrary to international law.
SEYSS-INQUART: Collective fines are prohibited under international law only in case of individual offenses. The large collective fine of 18 million guilders was imposed in connection with the general strike in Amsterdam, Arnhem, and Hilversum, in which the entire population took part. Later, I had collective fines paid back whenever it was discovered that definite individuals were responsible for the offense.
DR. STEINBAUER: Can you give us any example?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think witness Schwebel will be able to tell you that. It was in towns in the south of Holland where it happened.
DR. STEINBAUER: You are also accused by the Prosecution of responsibility for what happened in the hostage camp in Michelsgestel. What have you to say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I can take full and absolute responsibility for what happened in the hostage camp in St. Michelsgestel. It was not a hostage camp in the actual sense of the word: I took Dutchmen into custody only when they had shown themselves to be active in resistance movements. The camp at St. Michelsgestel was not a prison. I visited it. The inmates of the camp played golf. They were given leave, in the case of urgent family affairs or business matters. Not a single one of them was ever shot. I think the majority of the present Dutch Ministers were at St. Michelsgestel. It was a sort of protective custody to temporarily hinder them from continuing their anti-German activities.
DR. STEINBAUER: In addition to this you are said to have prohibited the reading of pastoral letters, and to have put Catholic priests and Lutheran ministers in concentration camps?
SEYSS-INQUART: It is true that I prohibited one pastoral letter, which may happen in times of occupation—because it publicly opposed the measures of the occupational power and incited people to disobedience. That was an isolated case, and it never happened again—for the good reason, too, that there were no more provocations of such a kind in the pastoral letters. In fact, I even intervened and canceled the prohibition issued by the Police, whenever it was a matter only of a criticism toward the measures taken by the occupational powers, and there was no incitement to resistance.
I myself never sent priests to concentration camps. On the contrary, at the beginning of 1943 after having made repeated urgent requests, I finally received a list from the Security Police with the names of the priests who were shut up in concentration camps. There were 45 or 50 of them altogether. Three or four were mentioned as having died in the concentration camp. On the grounds of the facts of their case, I sought out about a third of them and demanded their release; for the second third I demanded investigation within the coming 6 months; and it was only as far as the last third was concerned that it was impossible for me to intervene without violating my own responsibility towards the Reich.
Dutch hostages were also taken for purposes of reprisal. When the Netherlands came into the war, the Germans in the Dutch East Indies were put into prison and allegedly mistreated. The Reich demanded the arrest of 3,000 Dutchmen. The Security Police arrested 800 and took them to Buchenwald. When I heard that the mortality was high, I made such urgent appeals that the hostages were finally returned. They were then accommodated in such a way that one could no longer talk of a prison. They were given leave, and when necessary I released them. In the end, I had less than 100.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, you are said to have prohibited prayers in church, and especially prayers for the Queen.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is incorrect. The prayers in Dutch churches were obvious demonstrations. Prayers were made—as was quite natural—for the Queen of the Netherlands, and for her happiness and prosperity, and the fulfillment of her wishes. At the same time there were prayers for the Reich Commissioner, for his enlightenment. I was severely reproached for tolerating these demonstrations. But I found nothing wrong with these prayers, and did not prohibit them. Perhaps, in some isolated cases a subordinate authority would put in his say, but this was always suppressed.
DR. STEINBAUER: That would not have been so bad; but it is said that you were particularly cruel and had a large number of people shot without legal proceedings. What have you to say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as I can remember, there was only one real case of hostages being shot—that is, people were shot without there being any causal connection with a crime. This occurred in August 1942, and the case has already been brought up here. It was handled strictly according to the so-called Hostage Law, which has been quoted here. It was in connection with an attack on an army transport, and 50 or 25 hostages were to be shot. It was, I think, the Higher SS and Police Leader who made the demand through the Military Commander upon request of the High Command of the Army.
My intervention consisted in reducing this figure to 5 and in looking over the list which had been submitted to me by other departments, and which has been read out here in court. I, too, noticed something peculiar about it. The Higher SS and Police Leader had expressly emphasized that the list had been drawn up strictly in keeping with the directives, saying that the attack could be traced back to rightist circles of resistance, not to those on the Left, so that no workers could be shot. I only exercised my influence insofar as I caused the Higher SS and Police Leader to cross off the list the names of fathers with several children.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what do you know, in detail, about the people who were shot when the camp at Vught was evacuated?
SEYSS-INQUART: When the British and Canadians were advancing through Belgium toward the south of Holland, I had so much to do to keep order in my province that I could not pay any special attention to the camp at Vught, which was under police direction. The Higher SS and Police Leader informed me generally that the most seriously charged political prisoners, numbering about 200, would be transferred to the Reich, that the less seriously charged political prisoners would be set free, and that ordinary criminals would be placed under the command of a Dutch police officer and handed over to the Canadians. It was only here that I heard some people had been shot, and the only way I can explain it is that at the last minute the Reich forbade these people to be transported into the Reich and gave orders for them to be shot. I do not believe there were 600 of them, because from what the witness Kollpuss said there seem to have been some 130 to 150. But even that is enough.
DR. STEINBAUER: What do you know about the shooting of hostages after the attack on the SS and Police Leader Rauter?
SEYSS-INQUART: The attack on the Higher SS and Police Leader came from the resistance movement, and was carried out with British weapons.
DR. STEINBAUER: What do you know about the Putten case?
SEYSS-INQUART: Excuse me, I have not finished my previous statement.
DR. STEINBAUER: Oh, you want to give a more exact...
SEYSS-INQUART: Himmler, at that time, gave orders for 500 hostages to be shot. Rauter’s deputy Dr. Schöngarth refused, and informed me that there were a number of Dutchmen in the prisons who were to be shot, in accordance with the Führer’s order, because they had been convicted of other acts of sabotage. He had hesitated, he said, since the number was somewhat larger, but now he could not hesitate any longer. He did not give me the actual figure. In this situation I could not, in my opinion, prevent him from carrying out the order, because we had to suppress the resistance movement by all means. The movement had been organized and supplied with arms by the Dutch Government in London, and it presented a serious danger to the German occupational forces.
Two hundred and thirty Dutchmen were supposed to be shot—amongst them 80 in Apeldoorn alone—and this seemed to me a lot. But Dr. Schöngarth told me that in the north of Apeldoorn there was a center of the illegal resistance movement.
DR. STEINBAUER: I want to ask you, last of all, what do you know about the Putten case?
SEYSS-INQUART: In Putten there was an attack on German officers. Three were murdered. The whole thing took place within the Armed Forces, the SS, and the Police; and I knew that measures of reprisal were planned. I myself, at that time, was concerned with the construction of defenses. The Higher SS and Police Leader informed me that he had received the order to burn the village of Putten, and to transfer the male population to a concentration camp in the Reich. However, he had reduced the figure to 40 percent, and later on he reported to me that there was a high mortality rate in German concentration camps. Both he and I applied to the military commander to have these men returned. The military commander agreed. Whether this order could still be carried out I do not know.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, perhaps at this point we could have a short recess?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. STEINBAUER: Your Lordship, I should like to come back to the question of the embargo on foreign currencies.
The Defendant Reich Marshal Göring has just informed me, during the recess, that in this conflict, Fischböck, Trip, and Wohlthat on the one hand, and on the other Funk, who was against it, and he himself, Göring, as head of the Four Year Plan, made a decision to lift the embargo on foreign currencies. And he writes me here, “I bear the responsibility.” So it was a decision which was taken by Göring.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, it is not, of course, a regular way in which to inform the Tribunal about anything, to tell them what one of the defendants may have said to you during an adjournment.
DR. STEINBAUER: He wrote it.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid that doesn’t make it any better. You may ask the witness any question about it.
DR. STEINBAUER: As regards the question of shooting without a court sentence, I should like to refer to a very important document. Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-77, Page 199. This is Document F-224 D, a report made by Kriminalkommissar Mund. He says the following on Page 3:
“In my opinion it is very likely that General Christiansen demanded the maximum number of victims to be executed. Christiansen spoke of numerous measures of reprisal to Rauter, who was an impulsive and tactless man, and he on his part applied pressure to the Commander of the Security Police (Dr. Schöngarth)...”
He reports further on Page 5:
“It was often a question of prisoners who had already been sentenced to death by the Higher SS and Police Leader.
“Reprisals for punishable acts were a matter for the Police. After August 1944, and in accordance with an order of the Führer’s, these measures of reprisal were interpreted in such a way that a number of Dutchmen were shot for acts of sabotage and attempts at murder although they had been arrested for entirely different reasons.”
SEYSS-INQUART: May I explain that briefly?
DR. STEINBAUER: Please do.
SEYSS-INQUART: For example, leading members of the resistance movement were arrested, and on examination by the Higher SS and Police Leader it was decided that they should be shot according to the Führer’s orders. The Higher SS and Police Leader had called upon his court officer for this examination. When later on an attempt to blow up a bridge was made, instead of shooting hostages these men were taken and shot. That was the exact opposite of the shooting of hostages—or at least, it was supposed to be.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, I come to Chapter IV-B, “Concentration Camps and Prisons.” My first question: Who was competent in these matters?
SEYSS-INQUART: For concentration camps and for police detention prisons, the Police were competent. For court detention prisons, and court authorities, I myself was competent—that is, the court prisons were under my charge.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were there concentration camps in the Netherlands, too?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, especially the big concentration camp of Putten near Hertogenbosch. Then also a police transit camp near Amersfoort, and a Jewish assembly camp in Westerborg. I have already spoken of St. Michelsgestel; that was a protective custody camp. And then there might be mentioned the camp at Ommen, which was neither a police nor a concentration camp, but abuses occurred there.
DR. STEINBAUER: What can you tell me about the Hertogenbosch Camp?
SEYSS-INQUART: Hertogenbosch was originally meant as a Jewish assembly camp, at the time when we intended to keep the Jews in the Netherlands. But Reichsführer Himmler gave orders for it to be turned into a concentration camp. After some reflection I was satisfied with this idea. In consideration of the fact that I could not prevent Dutchmen from being put into concentration camps, I preferred them to be in concentration camps in the Netherlands, where I might still be able to exert a certain influence.
DR. STEINBAUER: But there are supposed to have been excesses in these concentration camps, too—for example, especially in the Vught Camp, which you mentioned.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is quite true. There were excesses in prisons, as well as in concentration camps. In wartime I consider this almost unavoidable, because subordinates get unlimited power over others and it cannot adequately be controlled. Whenever I heard of any excesses, I took steps—the first time toward the end of 1940, or 1941, when the president of my German court reported to me that a prisoner had been brought up with injuries from blows on the head. I had the case investigated, and the prison warden received disciplinary punishment and was sent back to the Reich.
In the Vught Concentration Camp, soon after its opening, there was a high mortality rate. Immediately I had an investigation started, using the services of Dutch medical personnel. Every day—and later on every week—I had the mortality figures reported to me, until they sank to what was approximately a normal level. Of course, I do not know whether the director of the camp reported the normal death cases only, or whether he included the cases of shooting—I could not say.
In this camp there were excesses due to drinking parties and reveling; brawls and fights were also heard now and then. The head of the camp was removed and sent to the Reich. I noted that the Higher SS and Police Leader had apparently himself tried to maintain order, although he was not in charge of the camps; they were under Gruppenführer Pohl.
There was one very serious case which, in Document Number F-224 D, is described under the title, “Women in Cell.” The head of the camp, allegedly for disciplinary reasons, had a large number of women crowded into a cell overnight, whereby three or four women were smothered to death. When we heard of that, we demanded court action. The Central Administration in Berlin refused, and we turned to Reichsführer SS Himmler and did not give in. The head of the camp was put on trial and received at least 4 years—I believe even a sentence of 8 years. That is indicated, moreover, in the French report.
DR. STEINBAUER: What about the Amersfoort Camp?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was a police transit camp—that is, for police prisoners who were to be turned over to the courts, or who were to be sent to the Reich; or persons who refused labor service who were being sent to the Reich. In general, they were not to be there more than 6 or 8 weeks. There were Dutch guards in this camp—not Dutch Police, but a voluntary SS guard company, I believe.
Excesses did occur here. General Secretary Van Damm called my attention to the fact that a Dutchman was supposed to have been beaten to death there. I urged the Higher SS and Police Leader to bring this case to light. He did this through his court officer, and sent the documents to me. According to the documents, severe mistreatment occurred, but no one was killed, and the persons responsible were punished.
I repeatedly called the attention of the Higher SS and Police Leader to the fact that concentration camps and prisons in wartime actually favored the perpetration of brutal excesses. If, here or there, not a severe case but certain mistreatment was reported to me, I always called his attention to it. He then reported to me either that the case had not occurred, or that he had taken steps, and so forth.
In particular, I always had the food ration statistics of the concentration camps and prisons reported to me. The food rations were satisfactory. I believe that the Dutch in the concentration camps and prisons, at the end of 1944 and in 1945, received more than the Dutch in the western Netherlands. Of course, I do not want to give too much importance to this fact, because the Dutch did suffer from hunger.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then there was the Westerborg Camp.
SEYSS-INQUART: The Dutch Government had already set up Westerborg as a completely free camp for Jews who had fled from Germany. This was enlarged into an assembly camp for Jews. In the camp itself there were Jewish guards to maintain order. Dutch Police guarded the camp on the outside. There was only a detail of the Security Police for supervision in the camp. In all the files I found no report about excesses in the camp itself. Every Sunday clergymen went to the camp, at least one clergyman for the catholic Jews, and one for the so-called Christians. They, too, never reported anything.
DR. STEINBAUER: We will speak about their removal later on.
Now I would like to speak about Ommen. There is a long report on that.
SEYSS-INQUART: Ommen was intended as a training camp for those Dutch who voluntarily wanted to be employed in the economy in the Eastern Territories. They were given instruction on the country, the people, and their language. The head of the camp borrowed prisoners from a neighboring Dutch prison for the work. Then I received reports that these prisoners were being mistreated. The judges of Amsterdam turned to me. I gave the Dutch judges of Amsterdam permission to personally inspect the camp and speak to the prisoners. That was done, according to Document F-224(d), on 5 March 1943. Thereupon the Amsterdam judges wrote a long letter to the General Secretary for Justice. They complained about the mistreatment of the prisoners, which they had noted, and about the fact that Dutch prisoners were transferred to prisons in the Reich for labor assignment. The complaints were justified, and I ordered that the prisoners be sent back from the Ommen Camp to the Dutch penal institution, and that Dutch prisoners be returned from German prisons to Dutch prisons. This procedure was correct, and therefore I necessarily took due steps to settle the matter.
DR. STEINBAUER: But now I have to ask you a certain question and confront you with a charge. Document RF-931 shows that you removed judges who made such complaints, namely, in Leeuwarden.
SEYSS-INQUART: In my eyes the procedure of the court of Leeuwarden was incorrect. These judges did not consult me, but publicly asserted in a verdict that the Dutch prisoners were being sent to German concentration camps and shot. According to the facts, which lay before me, that was false. I then informed them of the results obtained by the Amsterdam judges. The Leeuwarden judges refused to pass further judgments. I asked them to continue to officiate, but they refused. I then dismissed them as persons who refused to work. Of course, I could have had them tried by a German court with charges of making atrocity propaganda.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you receive complaints from the Red Cross about conditions in the camps?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the Netherlands we had the arrangement that a representative of the Dutch Red Cross, Mrs. Van Overeem, could visit all concentration camps and prisons, especially for the purpose of verifying whether the food packages were being delivered. Neither Mrs. Van Overeem nor the heads of the Dutch Red Cross ever directed any complaint to me. I should like to say that this circumstance was especially gratifying for me, because the Dutch complained about everything, and if for a change I received no complaints, then that was a certain relief for me.
I should like to remark that about the beginning of 1944, according to the reports submitted to me, about 12,000 Dutch persons were in concentration camps or prisons. That is the same as if today, in all of Germany, 120,000 Germans were in prisons or camps. That occasioned my setting up legal commissions which had to visit the camps and the prisons in order to make investigations and determine what prisoners could be released or placed on trial. Naturally, in cases where there were orders for arrest from Berlin, I could do nothing.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, so you say that you waged a constant struggle with the Police on this question?
SEYSS-INQUART: I would not like to call it a struggle.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you believe that you were successful?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I believe so, on the basis of certain definite facts. I have followed the proceedings here very carefully, and—we have heard most terrible things. The reports from the Netherlands, it seems to me, are not that bad. I do not want to say that I disclaim every excess. However, such reports as those about Breedonck in Belgium, do not exist. The reports show beatings as the most serious charge. There is only a single report here—that is Document F-677, the report of the tax collector Bruder—which attains the level of the usual atrocity reports. But I do not believe that this report should be accepted at its face value, since Bruder does not even say who told him this. And the information itself is not credible. He asserts, for example, that the prisoners who were at work had to prostrate themselves before every SS guard. I do not believe that the camp authorities would have permitted that, because then the prisoners would not have been able to work.
It is hard for me to say, but I do not think that conditions in the Netherlands were quite as bad as all that.
DR. STEINBAUER: I think that I can now conclude this chapter and turn to Point V of the Indictment, which deals with the question of labor commitment. What problems did you have in the Netherlands in the field of labor commitment?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the field of labor commitment we must distinguish between three or perhaps four different phases. When I came to the Netherlands, there were about 500,000 unemployed: registered unemployed, those who might become so due to demobilization of the Dutch land and naval forces, part-time workers, and so forth. It was an urgent problem—not only a social one—for me to reduce the number of unemployed. For, in the first place, such an army of unemployed is without doubt a good source of recruits for illegal activities. In the second place, as the war continued, it was to be expected that the material condition of the unemployed would steadily become worse.
At that time we instituted measures which I must, despite all charges, call voluntary labor recruitment. That lasted until the middle of 1942—that is, about 2 years. During that period, I gave neither the German nor the Dutch labor authorities full power to press any worker to work abroad. Without doubt there was a certain economic pressure, but I believe that always exists in this connection. The recruitment was carried out by the Dutch labor offices, which were subordinate to the Dutch General Secretary for Social Administration. There were German inspectors in the labor offices. There were also private hiring agencies; companies from the Reich sent their own agents over. On the whole, about 530,000 Dutchmen were engaged to work in the Reich. In the period which I call “voluntary,” 240,000 to 250,000 volunteers went to the Reich and about 40,000 to France.
By the first half of 1942, this reservoir had been used up. The Reich demanded more workers. We then considered introducing compulsory labor service. I recall I did not receive instructions to this effect from Sauckel, but from Bormann as a direct Führer order. Now, labor commitment occurred predominantly, but not exclusively, in the following way. Young and, as far as possible, unmarried Dutchmen were called to the labor office, where they received certificates of conscription for work in the Reich. The Dutch report itself says that only a few refused. Of course, some of those who refused were arrested by the Police and taken to the Reich. The Higher SS and Police Leader reported to me that this totaled 2,600 people of about 250,000 to 260,000 labor conscripts, and of the total engaged 530,000 persons. So this meant only 1 percent, or even 0.5 percent. I believe that the figure resulting from compulsory measures in the Reich was no lower—or higher.
At the beginning of 1943 the Reich demanded a large commitment of workers, and I was advised to draft whole age groups to send to the Reich. I call attention to the fact that all of these workers received free labor contracts in the Reich and were not put into labor camps. I decided to draft three young age groups—I believe 21 to 23 years of age—in order to spare married men. The success was satisfactory in the first group; in the second group it was moderate; and in the third it was quite bad. I realized that I could draft further groups only by sheer force. I refused to do so. But at that time I managed, due to Minister Speer’s understanding, to arrange not to have the workers taken to their work, but that the work be brought to the workers. Big orders arrived in the Netherlands, and the industries charged with filling these orders were declared “blocked” industries. Among them was the Organization Todt.
Dutchmen who were needed in the Netherlands were exempted. Over a million certificates of exemption were issued by the Dutch authorities. It was clear that that was Dutch sabotage, but I did not want to take steps against it. No woman was ever forced to work outside the Netherlands, nor were young people under 18. Reich Minister Lammers has confirmed here that at the beginning of 1944 he transmitted the Führer order to me demanding that 250,000 workers be brought to the Reich. He also confirmed that I refused it. At that time Gauleiter Sauckel came to me and discussed this matter with me. I must state that he understood my arguments surprisingly quickly, and did not insist on carrying out the forced recruitment. By “forced recruitment,” I mean blocking off whole districts and seizing the men.
In the course of 1944 labor recruitment ceased almost completely. Instead of 250,000 I believe 12,000 were sent to the Reich. But something entirely different took place in the fall of 1944. From experience gathered in France and Belgium, the High Command of the Army decided that able-bodied Dutchmen were to be drawn from Holland—that is, the western Netherlands. That was because the Netherlands Government in England had set up an illegal army. I had the organizational charter in my hands. There was a complete General Staff and a complete War Ministry. We estimated that there were about 50,000 illegal troops. If an appeal was made and one more able-bodied Dutchman joined, the illegal forces would have been more numerous than the German troops in Holland. Moreover, they had received very good equipment from England. Full shiploads of the most modern tommy guns were confiscated by us, but I am convinced that the larger part of the weapons was not confiscated.
The High Command of the Army, through the military commanders, ordered the removal of the able-bodied Dutchmen. The measure was entirely carried out by the Armed Forces. A general who was sent for that very purpose was entrusted with the task, with an operational staff of his own. This measure was carried out by the local commandants. My local authorities were informed of the action to be taken, sometimes at the last moment and sometimes not at all. Of course I knew about the measure. In view of these reasons I could not take the responsibility of protesting against it. I only intervened when it was necessary to protect civilian interests, and prevent the workers in the vital industries from being removed also. I entrusted this to the Plenipotentiary General for the Total War Effort, whom Dr. Goebbels had sent to the Netherlands in the meantime. His task was to issue exemption certificates. He issued 50,000 of them.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean Himmler?
SEYSS-INQUART: Goebbels, the Delegate for Total War Effort.
I admit that this measure led to conditions which were unbearable for the Dutch. I am certain that, as for feeding, temporary lodging, and transportation, the population in the bombed German territories did not live under any better conditions. But one could not demand this from the Dutch. Many Dutch people told me, at that time, that they would be willing to agree to this labor commitment—by no means in order to aid the German cause, but only in order to avoid these severe conditions—if they would be drafted in orderly proceedings. I then did that. The Plenipotentiary General for the Total War Effort issued the proclamation which has been submitted to the Court. The people were called to the labor offices, recorded on lists, sent home again to get clothes, and ordered to report to the railroad stations. Not the Police but labor officials took them to the Reich to be put to work under normal conditions. The Dutch report, in its objectivity, recognizes this fact. It speaks of the better transportation facilities for those mobilized for labor. I am responsible for this labor mobilization for the reasons which I have given.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I remark in this connection that my Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-78, Document 1726-PS, Exhibit USA-195, Page 200, excerpt from the Netherlands Government report, confirms the statement of my client fully. I should like to read it briefly because it is important. Page 2:
“...workers who refused—relatively few—were prosecuted by the Security Service.”
Then, Page 3:
“...apart from that, the measure was not very successful. Certain German authorities seem to have opposed its execution, because many former members of the armed forces received exemption; others went underground....
“The result was that in the last month of 1943, and in the greater part of 1944, relatively few persons were deported....”
And then, Page 6:
“...until the end of 1944, the method of transportation for deportees was bearable....
“Anyone who reported for the manpower mobilization in January 1945, enjoyed improved transportation facilities—that is, almost the whole journey by rail, although only in freight cars....”
SEYSS-INQUART: Even for our own use we had no other cars at that time.
I should like to refer to the fact that I also drafted Dutch workers in order to carry out the construction work entrusted to me by the Führer on the resistance lines east of the Ijssel. I used part of the transports which came from Rotterdam, et cetera, for this purpose, and thus I prevented these people from being sent to the Reich. I had no influence on the treatment in the Reich; I only forbade further transports into the Gau Essen, because it was reported to me that in the Rees Camp the treatment was very poor, and that some Dutch people had died.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to the next count of the Indictment—that is, to the Jewish question. The Netherlands Government report, Exhibit USA-195, sums up all ordinances submitted by the Prosecution. I should like to submit this Document 1726-PS to my client, so that it may remind him of the laws. The Court already has it.
[Turning to the defendant.] What did you, as Reich Commissioner, do about the Jewish question?
SEYSS-INQUART: When I took over the functions of the Reich Commissioner, I of course realized that I had to take a definite attitude, and would have to take some steps with regard to the Jews in the Netherlands. Amsterdam, in western Europe, is perhaps one of the best known and one of the oldest seats of Jewish communities in western Europe. Moreover, in the Netherlands there were a great many German Jewish emigrants.
I will say quite openly that since the first World War and the postwar period, I was an anti-Semite and went to Holland as such. I need not go into detail about that here. I have said all that in my speeches, and would refer you to them. I had the impression, which will be confirmed everywhere, that the Jews, of course, had to be against National Socialist Germany. There was no discussion of the question of guilt as far as I was concerned. As head of an occupied territory I had only to deal with the facts. I had to realize that, particularly from the Jewish circles, I had to reckon with resistance, defeatism, and so on.
I told Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, that in the Netherlands I would remove Jews from leading posts in the economy, the press, and the administration. The measures taken by me from May 1940 to March 1941 were limited to that. The Jewish officials were dismissed, but were given pensions. The Jewish firms were registered, and the heads of the firms were dismissed. In the spring of 1941 Heydrich came to me in the Netherlands. He told me that we would have to expect that the greatest resistance would come from Jewish circles. He told me that the Jews would at least have to be treated like other enemy aliens. The English, for instance, in the Netherlands, were interned and their property confiscated. In view of the large number of Jews—about 140,000—this was not so simple. I admit frankly that I did not object to this argument of Heydrich’s. I also felt that this was necessary in a war which I absolutely considered a life and death struggle for the German people. For that reason, in March 1941 I ordered that the Jews in the Netherlands be registered. And then things went on step by step.
I will not say that the final results—as far as the Netherlands are concerned—were intended thus from the beginning; but we decided on this method. The regulations cited here, if they appeared in the Dutch Legal Gazette, were mostly signed by me personally. At least, they were published with my express assent. Individual measures mentioned here, however, were not by me. For example, in February 1,000 Jews were supposed to have been arrested and sent to Buchenwald and Mauthausen. That much I know. In the Amsterdam ghetto...
THE PRESIDENT: February of what year?
SEYSS-INQUART: February 1941. In the Amsterdam ghetto, a National Socialist was killed by Jews. Reichsführer Himmler thereupon ordered 400 young Jews sent to Mauthausen. I was not in the Netherlands at that time. That was, by the way, the reason for the general strike in Amsterdam in March 1941. After my return to the Netherlands, I protested against this measure, and to my knowledge such a mass transfer to Mauthausen did not occur again. Synagogues were also burned. Apparently someone ambitiously tried to imitate the 8 November 1938. I immediately intervened. Further incidents did not occur. On the other hand, the Police wanted to tear down the old temple in Amsterdam. General Secretary Van Damm called this to my attention, and I prevented it.
I indicated earlier that the motive for the measures is to be found in the consideration to treat Jews like enemy aliens. Later, with other measures, the original intention was certainly abandoned; they became the same as those taken against the Jews in the Reich. Perhaps, in one case or another, this was even exceeded, for I know that, for example, in the Netherlands there was a drive to get the Jews sterilized.
Our goal was to keep the Jews in the Netherlands—namely, in two districts of Amsterdam and then in the Westerborg Camp and in the Vught Camp. We had also prepared to create the necessary opportunities for work. I instructed the General Secretary for Education to withdraw as much money from the Dutch budget for the education of the Jews as they should have according to their proportion of the population. It is certain that with this measure of concentrating the Jews in two districts and two camps, harshness occurred which was perhaps unavoidable, and which might even in some cases be considered as excessive.
Finally, the Security Police demanded the introduction of the so-called Jewish Star. A not inconsiderable number of Jews were not in the confined areas, and the Security Police demanded that they be marked in order that it might be ascertained whether the Jews adhered to the other restrictions. In the eyes of Germans, this star was certainly considered a stigma. The Dutch did not consider it as such. There was many a Dutchman who, out of protest, wore such a star himself.
About 1942, I believe, Heydrich came along with further demands—this time that the Jews be evacuated. He explained this by saying that Holland would sooner or later be a theater of war, in which one could not allow such a hostile population to remain. He pointed out that he was responsible for the police security of the Reich, and that he could not bear this responsibility if the Jews remained in Holland. I believe that we in the Netherlands opposed this evacuation project for 3 or 4 months while attempting to find other ways out.
Finally, Heydrich had a Führer decree sent to me, according to which he had unlimited powers to carry out all measures in the occupied territories as well. I inquired of Bormann what this meant, and this order was confirmed, whereupon the evacuation of the Jews was begun. At that time I tried to ascertain the fate of the Jews, and it is rather difficult for me to speak about it now because it sounds like mockery. I was told that the Jews were to be sent to Auschwitz. I had people sent from the Netherlands to Auschwitz. They came back with the report that that was a camp for 80,000 people with sufficient space. The people were comparatively well off there. For example, they had an orchestra of 100 men. A witness here, confirming that this orchestra played when victims arrived at Auschwitz, made me think of that report.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, you probably won’t finish today.
DR. STEINBAUER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you are likely to be?
DR. STEINBAUER: I hope to be finished, at the latest, by noon tomorrow, but perhaps it will take only an hour. I still have questions on plundering, economic measures, and destruction. Then I will be finished.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 11 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]
TRANSCRIBER NOTES
Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus “Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: hence Führer, Göring, etc. throughout.
Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations between the German, English, French, and Russian documents presented in the trial.
An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as possible to the original document presentation and layout.
[The end of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal Vol. 15, by Various.]