Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Volume 15 (part 2 of 3)
DR. SERVATIUS: We have shown you the document in which Laval complains about the conduct of the German authorities. Did this complaint refer to Sauckel’s activities, or was it not that he had told Sauckel of these complaints and was thanking him personally for his attitude?
TIMM: I recall from the talks with Laval, that Laval repeatedly expressed his gratitude to Sauckel for having put into effect measures and means for facilitating matters which he had suggested. Laval attached special importance—to use his own expression—to putting the climate and the atmosphere in order, and to having talks with Hitler himself as soon as possible; and he asked Sauckel to pave the way for him. As far as I know, Sauckel did actually arrange for talks of this kind and Laval thanked him for doing so.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions for this witness.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): The job of the GBA was to get workmen to replace the men who had been taken into the Army out of industry. That was largely your work, was it not?
TIMM: The task of the GBA was much more comprehensive, as previously all the tasks...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, I understand, but that was part of your work, was it not?
TIMM: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. Now, you were therefore told beforehand the number of people that the Army was taking out of industry, weren’t you, so you could make up your estimates?
TIMM: The numbers were adjusted in the Central Planning Board. It was precisely the task of the Central Planning Board, that the plans made in the OKW...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait a minute. I don’t care who examined the figures, but your organization certainly had knowledge of the needs of the Army, of the number of people the Army was taking out of industry. You had to have that information, had you not?
TIMM: The number of men to be drafted was reported to the Central Planning Board.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right, reported to the Central Planning Board. Now then, they were taking people out of industry also who were not needed for the Army, weren’t they? I mean Jews. They were taking Jewish people out of industry, were they not? Sauckel said yesterday that Jewish people were being taken out of industry. You admit that, don’t you?
TIMM: Yes. Jews were eliminated from industry.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right; and I suppose the Central Planning Board was given the number of Jewish people that were taken out of industry, were they not?
TIMM: I do not know that. In the conferences at which I was present...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you not assume that that must have been the case, if they had to find the number of replacements. It must have been so, mustn’t it?
TIMM: I cannot judge as to that because I learned only the total number of men to be drafted, independently of the Jewish question. I will not venture an opinion; I do not know.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you not know that Himmler and the SS told the Central Planning Board the number of Jews that were being taken out of industry for whom replacements were needed? You know that as a fact, don’t you?
TIMM: No.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You do not?
TIMM: No. I know only that we received certain statements from the Reichsführer SS that people were being taken out of industry, and owing to the objections of the Plenipotentiary General, who had to supply the replacements—I remember that this measure was partly withdrawn.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And you do know that one of the duties of the Reichsführer SS was to withdraw Jews from industry? You know that?
TIMM: I know from statements in reports that Jews were to be withdrawn from industry.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire and the Tribunal will adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]
[The witness Hildebrandt took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.
HUBERT HILDEBRANDT (Witness): Hubert Hildebrandt.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you were working in the office of Sauckel, is that correct?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: You were subordinate to Timm. What was your special field?
HILDEBRANDT: In the Reich Ministry of Labor from 1930 I dealt with questions concerning labor for the iron and metal industry, the chemical industry, and the textile industry. After 1940 I also dealt with questions concerning workers in the West.
DR. SERVATIUS: Regional questions in the West?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes; in France, Belgium, and Holland; some of those questions.
DR. SERVATIUS: You must remember to pause before you answer. Did you have any general idea about what happened in Sauckel’s office?
HILDEBRANDT: No; I did not.
DR. SERVATIUS: But you participated in the staff conferences?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes; I was present at most of those.
DR. SERVATIUS: And in that way you found out, to a certain extent, about what happened in other offices?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: I want to ask you especially about conditions in France. What was the position of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor in France?
HILDEBRANDT: The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor in France, just as in other occupied countries, had appointed special deputies who transmitted his wishes, and helped to carry out these wishes and these tasks. The organization of the entire labor strength from the occupied western territories remained in the hands of the German military or civil administrative offices there.
DR. SERVATIUS? So he did not have an organization of his own?
HILDEBRANDT: The first deputy in France tried to establish an organization of his own, but after a short time he met with the opposition of the German administrative offices, and the offices which he had established in the meantime were taken over by the military commander.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the position of the military commander?
HILDEBRANDT: The military commander was and remained responsible for the entire allocation of the labor in his district, and also for the labor sent from his district to Germany.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the position of the German Embassy?
HILDEBRANDT: The German Embassy took the leading part in all negotiations which were to be carried out by the Plenipotentiary General or his deputies, with French Government offices.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the position of the French Government as regards the allocation of labor?
HILDEBRANDT: The French Government made agreements with the Plenipotentiary General concerning the carrying out of his programs, and ordered its own offices to carry out certain tasks, especially when compulsory labor was introduced in France. It published the necessary decrees and gave the necessary directives to the subordinate offices.
DR. SERVATIUS: And who had the executive power to recruit labor? Was that done by the French or the Germans?
HILDEBRANDT: One must distinguish between two periods. When it was still a question of recruiting volunteers, until the fall of 1942 these volunteers could report to German offices as well as to French offices; and also to recruiting offices which had been established by German firms, and some by branches of the Wehrmacht. After the introduction of compulsory labor, the administrative executive for the carrying out of the decrees rested solely with the French authorities.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what happened when somebody did not report?
HILDEBRANDT: Then a first summons to appear was received from the French authorities, and then repeated summonses, and if these proved to be unsuccessful the French authorities called in the French police.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were those who did not come brought before the courts?
HILDEBRANDT: I assume that that may have happened sometimes. I do not know for certain.
DR. SERVATIUS: German or French courts?
HILDEBRANDT: French courts, according to French regulations.
DR. SERVATIUS: What would be your estimate of the number of voluntary workers who came from France to Germany?
HILDEBRANDT: The number of voluntary workers from France, until the middle of 1942—but I can only give approximate figures from memory...
DR. SERVATIUS: Please, just the approximate figure.
HILDEBRANDT: Something over 200,000. After the compulsory labor decree had been introduced in the course of 1942, there were still voluntary recruitments as well on a fairly large scale. The number of volunteers was, at times, considerably larger than the number of conscripts, so that altogether more than half of all the labor recruited in France consisted of volunteers. It is noticeable that women were only recruited if they volunteered. There was no compulsory service for them. With regard to the compulsory labor assignments moreover, it must be pointed out that a number of them were only formal. In reality these people had come voluntarily, but for economic reasons, or out of consideration for their relatives and friends in their home towns, they attached importance to being conscripted. We had compulsory labor assignments which were only put on an official basis afterwards. Such requests reached the German labor offices especially during the last months before the end of the war; and the Foreign Office requested the Plenipotentiary General to approve such demands, and that was done.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you hear anything in your department about recruiting measures such as the surrounding of churches, cinemas, and similar places in France?
HILDEBRANDT: No; I do not know of any such recruiting measure. I know that in France, as well as in Belgium, identity papers were controlled among members of the age groups which had been called up to register.
DR. SERVATIUS: You were also probably in Paris, and you spoke to the German authorities there; is that right?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes. Every time I was in Paris I took the opportunity to talk to members of the offices about current events.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did they not tell you about things which must have surprised you?
HILDEBRANDT: With each major task we carried out we had some difficulties, of course, and certain excesses. Once it was reported to me, among other things, that there were impossible conditions in the “Pépinière”—a camp, a kind of transit camp for people who had to leave. These conditions were reported immediately to the Town Major of Paris who remedied matters. Then there were irregularities in the recruiting in Marseille, where recruiting agents used blackmail. This was also stopped immediately.
Beyond that, a fairly large number of individual cases were brought to me. These were minor difficulties about vacations, salaries, and so forth, which I transmitted each time to the competent offices for further action.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was it part of your official duties to follow these things up?
HILDEBRANDT: As far as they came within my sphere, I took the necessary steps immediately. As far as it was the business of other departments I immediately transferred them to those departments for further attention.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I did not ask what you did, but whether it was your official duty to look after these things.
HILDEBRANDT: The general problems of recruiting and statistical checking of programs came within my field of duty. Questions of housing, pay, and transport were dealt with by other departments. Of course, when I found out about bad conditions it was my duty to investigate them at once, if only in the interests of further recruiting.
We considered it of the greatest importance that every abuse should be stopped immediately, because it was only in this way that further recruiting of volunteers could be guaranteed. Labor conscription was therefore looked on as a last resort.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I would like to know whether it was your official duty, or your moral duty to look after these things?
HILDEBRANDT: In this case it was my moral duty as well as my official duty.
DR. SERVATIUS: As regards the way transports were effected, I have one question. Mention has been made of irregularities on transports. That is why I would like you to tell us what steps you took to have the transports that came from France supervised and directed. Can you describe that briefly?
HILDEBRANDT: A special department was created in the office of the military commander in France for the carrying out of transports. For each man who went to Germany, it was already settled to what firm he was to be sent. The recruiting was effected on the basis of planned contracts and definite working conditions, so that it was known what route could be chosen for the journey. Transports were assembled to include as many as possible, so that a definite number of workers would go in the same direction and to the same firm.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, these details are of less interest to me than the question of how you conducted these transports and kept a check on them when something irregular happened on the way.
HILDEBRANDT: In giving a few details, I only wanted to indicate that there was a detailed check made of every person intended for Germany. For each transport there was an exact list of the persons and of the firms to which they were sent. The transports were given guides who brought them to their destination, and there they were turned over to the presidents of the regional labor offices whose duty it was to take further care of them.
DR. SERVATIUS: I should like to put a concrete case to you. A case has been reported here of a transport train which was left in the Saar district, and when it was opened, after a few days, most of the people had been frozen to death. Did you have control of such trains? Should that have been reported to you? Could that train have been sent upon your orders? How do you explain that?
HILDEBRANDT: Such an incident would have become known to us immediately. As the coming of transports was reported beforehand to the presidents of the regional labor offices, we were informed immediately when they did not arrive. That happened frequently, namely, when difficulties arose because of some emergency on the way, and a transport was held up—for instance, in the last days of the war, when traffic obstructions caused by bomb damage had to be cleared away, and so on. We could then immediately have inquiries made concerning the transports, which was always done. I know nothing of the case which you have just mentioned.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you must speak more slowly. The interpreters cannot possibly follow.
Will you state your opinion as to the incident, which I have described, of the train with the people who froze to death in the Saar district.
HILDEBRANDT: The incident could not possibly have occurred on transports of labor recruits. The transports were well prepared.
DR. SERVATIUS: You have said that before.
HILDEBRANDT: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: How do you explain then, the case of that transport?
HILDEBRANDT: I learned for the first time through the press during the last few months that the SS also conducted transports to Germany, and that conditions such as you have just described are said to have been present.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, were you present during the negotiations between Sauckel and Laval?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes, I was frequently present.
DR. SERVATIUS: In what kind of atmosphere were these negotiations conducted?
HILDEBRANDT: These negotiations were conducted in a friendly manner; but occasionally, especially when promises on the part of the French Government had not been kept, quite violent disputes occurred. Any real difficulties, however, did not as a rule arise during these negotiations. Arrangements were made concerning the number of people who were to be sent to Germany. As a matter of principle, Laval was always willing to put manpower at the disposal of Germany.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what, in particular, were the relations between Laval and Sauckel? Did Laval speak well of Sauckel or not?
HILDEBRANDT: M. Laval expressed his gratitude from time to time for the way in which things had been made easier for France, too. For instance, as regards the status of French prisoners of war, the permission given to the wives of French workmen to visit their husbands, and the taking over of welfare work for the relatives of the French workmen in Germany. All these things, as I have said, took the form of agreements whereby one party put labor at the disposal of the other party, and that party in return gave back manpower or granted other advantages. Laval certainly expressed repeatedly his urgent wish to do more for Germany if he could only be given political advantages for it. Therefore, he asked the Plenipotentiary General repeatedly to make it possible for him to have discussions with the Führer in order to create a favorable atmosphere in France for further efforts.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did these friendly relations prevail until the end?
HILDEBRANDT: Until the last negotiation, which I think took place at the end of 1944.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I believe the question of relève and “transformation” has been clarified sufficiently, so that I need not question the witness about it again.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, in what manner did the negotiations with the German military commander take place? Did Sauckel give orders there? Was he the highest authority, or was it the military commander?
HILDEBRANDT: The negotiations were never carried out in the form of a transmission of orders. The Plenipotentiary General described the situation in Germany and what needs...
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you can be very brief.
HILDEBRANDT: I only want to say the following: Of course, the military commander, as was the case with the civil administration in Holland, was more interested in receiving orders to be filled than in sending manpower to Germany, and that led to conflict. The authorities, however, had to be convinced in each instance that manpower must be sent to Germany—for agricultural work, for example, which could not be done in Holland, and also for a number of branches of the German armaments industry.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, a few questions now concerning Belgium and Northern France: Was the position of Sauckel as regards the chief authorities there the same as in France on the whole; and was everything conducted similarly, or were there any differences?
HILDEBRANDT: No, the conditions were the same as in France, only that the deputies of the Plenipotentiary General were, from the very beginning, incorporated into the military administration.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive any reports or discover anything yourself about irregularities in that territory?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes. There were isolated cases of irregularities. For instance, I was informed one day that reprisals were to be taken against relatives of members of age groups who had not appeared when they were called up. We stopped that immediately by discussing the matter with the representatives of the military commander.
DR. SERVATIUS: And how did Sauckel negotiate with the military commander there?
HILDEBRANDT: He also told him what he wanted. Von Falkenhausen was, of course, also interested in the first place in having orders for the German armaments industry carried out in Belgium; but it was also agreed that manpower should be sent to Germany. He certainly made frequent efforts to protect students, school children, and members of younger age groups.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I will show you the minutes of an interrogation of General Von Falkenhausen on 27 November 1945. I want you to look at a few sentences. If you take Page 2, you will find there in the middle of the page, in answer to the question: “Is the witness in a position...”
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the document?
DR. SERVATIUS: It is Document Number RF-15.
[Turning to the witness.] It is the following question:
“Is the witness in a position to define to us the limitations of his powers and the competence of the administration for the Allocation of Labor?”
Answer by General Von Falkenhausen:
“Up to a certain time there was a labor office in my territory which was concerned with the recruiting of voluntary workers. I cannot remember the exact date any longer—it may have been in the fall of 1942—when the labor office was put under Sauckel; and from then on I had only to carry out the orders I received from him.”
Is this position of the military commander in relation to Sauckel correct?
HILDEBRANDT: It is not quite correct in several points. In Belgium there was not just one labor office, but a number of labor offices which dealt with the recruiting of volunteers, and also a number of recruiting offices which worked with them. But from the very beginning these labor organizations worked under the supervision of the Feldkommandanturen in Belgium. These Feldkommandanturen were offices of the military commander. There was no question of the Plenipotentiary General taking over the work. Before he appointed his deputies he could only send his requests directly to the military administration, to General Von Falkenhausen, but not directly to a labor office.
DR. SERVATIUS: What were the conditions in Holland? Who was the competent district head there?
HILDEBRANDT: It was the Reich Commissioner.
DR. SERVATIUS: And was there a deputy of Sauckel’s with him?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes, a deputy was appointed there too, who was a member of the administration of the Reich Commissioner.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who issued the labor service decrees there?
HILDEBRANDT: The Reich Commissioner.
DR. SERVATIUS: And who carried out the recruiting? German or Dutch offices?
HILDEBRANDT: As far as I remember there were Dutch labor offices. The heads of these labor offices were Germans; the rest of the personnel was mainly Dutch. These offices took the necessary steps for the allocation of labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: Now, I have one more question concerning Germany. The metal industries came into your field, did they not?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Krupp, for instance.
HILDEBRANDT: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: What kind of reports did you receive about conditions in the Krupp works as far as the welfare of the workmen was concerned?
HILDEBRANDT: I had no unfavorable reports about Krupp. The personal adviser of the Plenipotentiary General, Landrat Berk, visited the Krupp works frequently and informed me of the requests made by the firm and of the impressions he had received, but he never said that proper care was not taken of foreign workmen. I myself never visited the Krupp firm during the war.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions for the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the German counsel want to ask questions? Prosecution?
M. HERZOG: Mr. President, we have the same problems here. The Tribunal has already heard explanations on these points. The Tribunal is in possession of the documents which I have submitted, and I have, therefore, no questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
DR. SERVATIUS: Then with the permission of the Tribunal, I will call the witness Stothfang.
[The witness Stothfang took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Would you state your full name?
WALTER STOTHFANG (Witness): Walter Stothfang.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat these words after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, what was your position with Sauckel?
STOTHFANG: I was personal adviser to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: When did you assume that position?
STOTHFANG: One year after the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor had assumed office; that was on 19 April 1943.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was the witness Timm there when you came?
STOTHFANG: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: And the witness Hildebrandt?
STOTHFANG: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: What orders did you receive when you came?
STOTHFANG: The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor did not give any special personal directives because his general principles could be clearly seen in his decrees and in his program, and I only started work 1 year later.
DR. SERVATIUS: Before that, had you already been in the Ministry of Labor?
STOTHFANG: Yes, I had been connected with that type of work since 1926; and for the last 8 years I was the personal assistant of State Secretary Dr. Syrup in the Ministry of Labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was it a considerable change when you came to Sauckel?
STOTHFANG: No.
DR. SERVATIUS: What did your colleagues in the office tell you about the whole work, and Sauckel’s attitude to the work?
STOTHFANG: The work, as such, was carried out according to principles and decrees which were not essentially different to previous ones. In practice of course, they were much more far reaching than anything hitherto.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you work very closely with Sauckel in your sphere? You were his personal assistant.
STOTHFANG: As far as that was necessary for carrying out the task of the Plenipotentiary General for the war effort. Sauckel was not only Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, but at the same time he had remained Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter in Thuringia. Besides that, during the last 1½ years of his activities, he was very much occupied with the construction of an underground factory in Kahle, in Thuringia; so that he...
DR. SERVATIUS: We will come back to that later.
STOTHFANG: ...could only be in Berlin from time to time; at the most 1 day a week, and often only half a day.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what was your task as his personal adviser?
STOTHFANG: We had to receive incoming mail, sort out what had to be reported, and pass on the rest to the competent departments. We also had to submit newly arrived drafts to the Plenipotentiary General.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who called staff conferences? Do you know that?
STOTHFANG: That was generally done by the office.
DR. SERVATIUS: You always attended these conferences?
STOTHFANG: Yes, from the time I first came into the office.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you participate in conferences to which individual members returned from so-called inspection trips and made their reports?
STOTHFANG: Later that no longer happened or only very seldom. It was only in the beginning.
DR. SERVATIUS: That you were present, or that inspection trips took place?
STOTHFANG: No; that reports were made.
DR. SERVATIUS: There were fewer reports later?
STOTHFANG: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the reason for that?
STOTHFANG: I do not know the reason.
DR. SERVATIUS: During the period when you were present, did you learn of anything particularly shocking as regards irregularities in Germany? We will include transports to Germany, transit camps, the work shops themselves, the camps, and the factories.
STOTHFANG: I myself found out about some irregularities on the occasion of inspection trips which I made on orders, but these were at once discussed with the competent offices and steps were taken to put a stop to them.
DR. SERVATIUS: Sauckel had to work with a number of offices. Was there any special opposition to overcome here?
STOTHFANG: With the exception of two cases, no.
DR. SERVATIUS: What cases were these?
STOTHFANG: One was the Party Chancellery; and the other was the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the Secret State Police.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know of specific instances in the case of the Reichsführer SS?
STOTHFANG: The general treatment of foreign workers—particularly of those coming from the East—as far as it was determined by the Reichsführer SS or the principles laid down by the Reichsführer SS, was contrary to the ideas of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. The Reichsführer SS was not inclined to meet the far-reaching, definite demands of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. The same thing happened, in other directions, in the case of the head of the Party Chancellery.
DR. SERVATIUS: In what directions?
STOTHFANG: For example, where social insurance was concerned. In this case the Party Chancellery was of the opinion that equality with German workers was not justified on either practical or political grounds; nor was as high a rate of pay.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what did Sauckel say to that?
STOTHFANG: He tried, again and again, to regulate all these matters according to his principles. In some things he was definitely unsuccessful, and in others he was successful only after great efforts. I would remind you of the equal status given to the Eastern Workers which was actually only put into effect in March 1945 through a decree.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive any special reports from the Gauleiter who were appointed deputies for the Allocation of Labor, or did you speak to the Gauleiter?
STOTHFANG: There were instructions that on inspection trips the competent Gauleiter of the district visited had to be seen, so that any relevant questions could be discussed with him.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you take part in meetings of the Central Planning Board?
STOTHFANG: I went to one single meeting of the Central Planning Board with the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have just mentioned March 1945 as the date when the Eastern Workers were given equality with the rest of the workers. Are you not mistaken in the year—1944? I will show you the decree.
STOTHFANG: As far as I remember, it was March 1945.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I will have it shown to the witness in a moment; we are looking for it.
[Turning to the witness.] What was the relationship between Speer and Sauckel?
STOTHFANG: Apparently the appointment of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor was due to a suggestion which Minister Speer had made to the Führer.
DR. SERVATIUS: I refer to Document 58, in Document Book Number 2, Page 167 of the German text, and Page 156 of the English text. That is the decree concerning the conditions of employment of Eastern Workers, of 25 March 1944, and I read Paragraph 2:
“Wages.
“For Eastern Workers the same conditions apply for wages and salary as for other foreign workers. Eastern Workers are paid wages only for work they actually do.”
THE PRESIDENT: How did the wages compare with the wages of the German workers?
STOTHFANG: It was a fundamental rule that they must be based on the German wages for the same type of work, in order to avoid additional profits for the industries which employed Eastern Workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you remember a conference at which Goebbels stated his opinion to Sauckel as regards the latter’s policy concerning social questions and questions of wages?
STOTHFANG: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Can you describe it to us?
STOTHFANG: I myself did not take part in that conference. I only knew about it from the description given by my colleague Dr. Hildebrandt, who was present at the meeting with Gauleiter Sauckel.
It was the first discussion between the two gentlemen after Reich Minister Goebbels had become Reich Plenipotentiary for Total War Effort. At this conference Minister Speer was also present, and in the course of the conference Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels reproached the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor with the fact his previous measures...
THE PRESIDENT: He is now telling us, is he not, what Hildebrandt told him?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Hildebrandt has been in the witness box and he has not been asked about it.
DR. SERVATIUS: There has been confusion of the two witnesses. They arrived only a short time ago. I ask permission for this witness to say what Hildebrandt told him. It can be explained by the fact that the witness was here for only a very short time.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, the Tribunal does not think that you ought to be allowed to ask him that question.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were there any difficulties with Speer?
STOTHFANG: Not at the beginning. In the course of years difficulties arose because of the fundamentally different ideas of the two men.
THE PRESIDENT: We have had the relationships between Sauckel and Speer gone into elaborately.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. I will withdraw that question.
[Turning to the witness.] What did the offices have to do with the employment of concentration camp prisoners? Did they deal with that?
STOTHFANG: No.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not receive reports that manpower was disappearing from other industries, and in this way became concentration camp workers?
STOTHFANG: No reports were received about that.
DR. SERVATIUS: Are you aware that concentration camp workers were employed in large numbers for work?
STOTHFANG: It was the general practice of the Police to put prisoners to work.
DR. SERVATIUS: You did not receive any reports about that, did you?
STOTHFANG: No. An effort was made to gain influence to the extent of having reports sent to the offices of the labor administration concerning the employment of concentration camp prisoners, so that they could be considered in the general planning of labor allocation. But these reports were not received by the labor offices.
DR. SERVATIUS: Now I have only a few more questions concerning the control offices, and other control agencies, which had been established in order to investigate conditions among the workers in Germany. Do you know how far foreign workers themselves were included in that control system? I am thinking first of all of the office of Ambassador Scapini. How did this office work? Did you hear anything about it?
STOTHFANG: I do not know many details about the office of Scapini. I know of its existence, but to the best of my knowledge Scapini’s office was chiefly occupied with the welfare of French prisoners of war rather than with the welfare of French civilian workers, because for the latter a special office existed under M. Brunedon. But generally the foreign workers were represented by the German Labor Front. So-called Reich liaison offices were set up everywhere, from the central office via the Gaue to the small districts, and each employed several people who visited the camps, listened to complaints and negotiated with the offices of the German Labor Front, or with other offices of the labor administration.
DR. SERVATIUS: Those were German employees that you mentioned?
STOTHFANG: No; they were foreign employees from countries abroad, in fact from almost every country.
DR. SERVATIUS: In the factories themselves, did the workmen have any representatives who had contact, as liaison men, with the supervisory offices of the German Labor Front?
STOTHFANG: Not to my knowledge.
DR. SERVATIUS: For the Eastern Workers there was also a control office. Do you know that office?
STOTHFANG: In Rosenberg’s department there was a special one for that purpose.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did that office work? Did you hear anything about it?
STOTHFANG: Yes. It had regular contact with the technically competent offices of the labor administration.
DR. SERVATIUS: And whom had this office to contact if it received complaints? The Labor Front, Sauckel’s office, or the Minister of Labor? To whom did they have to go?
STOTHFANG: That depended on the nature of the irregularities, or the complaints which were made.
DR. SERVATIUS: I will give you an example—complaints about labor conditions.
STOTHFANG: In that case one had to go first to the competent local labor office in order to have detailed inquiries made into the case, and to see about the general conditions, or the actual conditions.
DR. SERVATIUS: And if it was a matter of housing and nutrition, to whom did one go?
STOTHFANG: First to the offices of the German Labor Front, which, by a decree of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor—I believe it was Decree Number 4—was given the general task of looking after the foreign workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: And did the Labor Front report to you further?
STOTHFANG: Within the scope of their capacity they tried to put matters right.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then the Labor Front itself, in fact, was the highest authority for questions of complaints about the welfare of workers?
STOTHFANG: If you put it like that, yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who supervised the treatment of prisoners of war? Did the complaints come to Sauckel?
STOTHFANG: No.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who had charge of that?
STOTHFANG: The High Command of the Armed Forces.
DR. SERVATIUS: The Reich Inspection Board was also a control office. What did Sauckel have to do with the Reich Inspection Board?
STOTHFANG: That must be an incorrect designation. I do not know what you mean by the Reich Inspection Board.
DR. SERVATIUS: I mean the Trade Inspection Board, the Reich Trade Inspection Board.
STOTHFANG: In Germany the trade inspection boards in principle were competent for labor protection in factories. As far as labor protection in factories was concerned, they had to see that the decrees which had been issued, and were in force, were carried out and obeyed. Therefore in case of complaints they were the competent authorities.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was Sauckel accused by other offices of looking after the workmen too well? And was there not, in some cases, even envy of the situation of certain foreign workers?
STOTHFANG: Yes. Such accusations came from three places. First, from the two offices I mentioned before, which offered general objections and resistance to the far-reaching demands of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. Then Bormann’s office, and Himmler’s office. It went so far that the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor was even suspected of being pro-Bolshevik.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defense counsel wish to ask any questions?
[There was no response.]
Does the Prosecution wish to?
[There was no response.]
The witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I do not know whether the witness Jäger has arrived yet.
THE PRESIDENT: I am told not.
DR. SERVATIUS: I assume that he will be here by Monday, and I would suggest that I be permitted to submit some documents now, or perhaps an interrogation of the witness Goetz, which is in the document book. Perhaps I may refer to several passages. It is a very long affidavit, and it throws some light on the matter in this connection and will make it easier to understand.
THE PRESIDENT: You probably have some remarks to make about your documents, have you not, which will take you up until 1 o’clock?
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the document books contain primarily the decrees which Sauckel issued, and they cover what has been said here by the witnesses and by the defendant himself as a witness. As far as possible, the book is divided up into sections dealing with special subjects, but as the decrees which were issued frequently applied to several subjects at the same time, the separate divisions overlap in this book.
I refer principally to Volume I, to all the decrees included there, which I do not want to read individually. I should like only to call special attention to the decrees about police matters. That is Document 6, which is on Page 16; Document 10, on Page 20; and Document 15, on Page 25. These documents...
THE PRESIDENT: You understand that you must offer in evidence each document or number of documents that you want to put in evidence? It is not sufficient to put it in your document book. So please state the document which you wish to put in evidence.
DR. SERVATIUS: These documents are included in a collection of laws which has already been submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: The whole thing you mean? The whole thing has been submitted?
DR. SERVATIUS: It has, as far as I know. That is Document Number 3044-PS: “Enactments, Decrees, Announcements.”
THE PRESIDENT: Well, probably only a small part of 3044-PS has been read and, therefore, unless it is translated into the four languages, it does not form part of the record. Dr. Servatius, if you will go into the matter and offer what you want to offer in evidence on Monday morning, that will be quite satisfactory.
DR. SERVATIUS: But may I refer to them now, and then submit the documents on Monday?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: These three decrees and enactments of the Reichsführer SS I have submitted in order to show how efforts were made at improvement even in this difficult field. Decree Number 6 was issued shortly before Sauckel came into office, and one must assume that this was done in order to produce a fait accompli.
The next decree, Document Number 10, already shows an improvement. It deals with the barbed wire and the workers’ outings, and this is even more relaxed in the next document. Document Number 15, that is Decree Number 4, which has already been submitted, is probably the most important first decree, which describes the fundamental authority and directives, as well as recruiting methods, transportation, and treatment in Germany.
Decree Number 16 deals with the employment of Eastern Workers and gives the first basic regulations, because until then there was no definite legal regulation of a uniform type.
Then I come to Document Number 19, which is on Page 54 in the English text. This is a decree and a letter from Sauckel to the Gau labor offices and the Gauleiter, of 14 October 1942, concerning good treatment for foreign workers. This letter is an intervention on the part of Sauckel to remove poor conditions and to correct certain abuses of which he had been informed. I quote here in the German text on Page 59 the following...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that document has been quoted already I think, hasn’t it?
DR. SERVATIUS: A part of the document has already been mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: Which part has not been quoted?
DR. SERVATIUS: It is Page 59 in my book; in the English text, Page 54.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 54 is only the heading.
DR. SERVATIUS: Heading: “Decree and letter of Sauckel dated 14 October 1942,” and on the next page the text begins. The first page contains only the title of the decree.
THE PRESIDENT: But Page 55 in the English text, the beginning of the document has already been read.
DR. SERVATIUS: The beginning has already been read.
THE PRESIDENT: Then what did you want to read?
DR. SERVATIUS: I should like to read the whole thing in order to show how far Sauckel...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you see, beginning with the words, “If in a Gau district the statement was recently still made,” that has been read already, down to the bottom of that paragraph.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have here only a short note. If it has already been read, then I need not read it again. I will dispense with the reading.
Document Number 20 on Page 56 in the English document book deals with compulsory labor service for foreign female domestic help and shows the regulations in force at that time...
THE PRESIDENT: Which document?
DR. SERVATIUS: Document Number 20.
THE PRESIDENT: Continue.
DR. SERVATIUS: ...whereby it is pointed out particularly that a forced transfer of foreign women for domestic help would not be carried out; and the statement made by Sauckel emphasizes that only voluntary workers should be taken for domestic employment.
Decree Number 21 introduces the labor book. That is in the English text on Page 57. The purpose of the labor book was, as Sauckel has stated here, to facilitate a registration of manpower, so that one could review it and not lose control. Above all, in connection with this, there was to be an allocation of land to the Eastern Workers, as the Defendant Sauckel has explained. A central file was to be compiled, and with the help of this the regular transportation of the workers home again was to be arranged at a later date. That was the preparatory measure of the labor book.
Then we come to Document Number 22, of 23 July 1943, which deals with the limitation of the duration of employment of Eastern Workers. It is said in this connection that the duration of employment should be for 2 years, with certain modifications, and that there should be facilities for leave, and premiums should be given for the work done. There was to be leave in Germany, and, under certain conditions, home leave. For vacations in Germany, as can be seen here, special leave camps were set up for Eastern Workers. The reason was that, on account of transport conditions and other circumstances, these workers could not go home, especially if they came from territories which in the meantime were no longer occupied by Germans.
Then there follows Decree Number 13. That is Document Number 23, Page 62 in the English document book. This decree deals with the keeping of order in factories and works. It is the decree on the basis of which measures could be taken for the maintenance of discipline. I have submitted it in order to show that it was valid both for German and for foreign workers, and is not a decree which discriminates against Eastern Workers.
Now I will refer to Document Number 26. That is Page 66 in the English document book. This is a decree of 25 July 1944 according to which the position of female domestic workers from the East was in principle to be equal to that of the German domestic help. Working hours are regulated and also time off. It reads: “Every week the female Eastern Worker is to have an adequate amount of free time.”
The question of vacations is regulated in Paragraph 7, to the effect that they will be granted leave after 12 months’ work in Reich territory.
THE PRESIDENT: Are those figures right in Document 26, Page 67 in the English document book? Working hours to fall between 6 o’clock in the morning and 9 o’clock at night?
DR. SERVATIUS: It says there: “The regular working hours, including rest periods and preparation for work, are to fall between 0600 and 2100 hours, unless special conditions call for other arrangements.” That does not mean that the work is to be done from 6 o’clock in the morning until 9 o’clock at night. It means that between these two time limits these people have to work. They cannot work before 6 o’clock in the morning, and these girls cannot work after 9 o’clock at night. It cannot...
THE PRESIDENT: I am only asking if the figures are correct.
DR. SERVATIUS: The figures are correct.
Document 27 deals with the position of foreign workers in factories. It is a decree of the German Labor Front and there are one or two basic statements made in it. Here for example:
“The pleasure they take in their work and the willingness of German workers must in no circumstances be endangered by preferential treatment for foreign workers.
“As regards the treatment of foreign workers, it must be taken into consideration that they came to Germany voluntarily and are giving us their services for the carrying out of tasks of military importance. In order to maintain their pleasure in their work, the conditions of their contracts must be respected, and absolutely fair treatment and comprehensive care and attention must be given them.”
Document 28 is the agreement between Ley and Sauckel instituting the supervision by the Central Inspectorate. It has already been submitted by the Prosecution.
Document 30 deals with the tasks in detail and it states:
“The Reich Inspectorate, with regard to allocation of labor, affairs of the Reich Trustee, and administration, is entrusted with the following tasks:
“The supervision of the execution of my regulations and decrees. On the basis of the practical knowledge gained, the Reich Inspectorate is to make suggestions, propose improvements and foster mutual exchange of experiences.”
The last document in this book deals with the establishment of French offices. It is in the English document book on Page 79, and is entitled, “French agencies for the care of the French workers employed in the Reich.”
I believe I have already read the document here. With that, I have finished Document Book 1.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; we will adjourn.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 3 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH DAY Monday, 3 June 1946
Morning Session
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the witness Jäger is to appear in about half an hour. I shall read some other documents from my document book, if it please the Tribunal.
In the last session I had read all the documents from the first document book with the exception of Document Sauckel-16, which I left out by mistake. It is a leaflet for Eastern Workers. I need not read it, but I shall refer to it.
I have submitted as Exhibit Sauckel-1 the Handbuch für die Dienststellen ... (Manual for Labor Employment), and in this exhibit we find the following documents which I have read in part, and shall read some now: Documents Sauckel-12, 13, 15, 22, 28, 58(a), 67(a), 82, 83, 85, 86, and 88.
Then, I have submitted Exhibit Sauckel-2, Sonderveröffentlichung des Reichsarbeitsblattes (Special Publication of the Reichsarbeitsblatt)—namely, Einsatzbedingungen der Ostarbeiter, sowie der sowjetrussischen Kriegsgefangenen (Conditions for the Employment of Eastern Workers and Soviet Russian Prisoners of War), which contains the following documents: Documents Sauckel-6, 32, 36, 39, 47, and 52.
Then, as Exhibit Sauckel-3, I have submitted the Manifest des Generalbevollmächtigten für den Arbeitseinsatz (Manifesto of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor), Document Sauckel-84.
Then, as Exhibit Sauckel-4, Arbeitsgesetze: Textsammlung des Deutschen Arbeitsrechtes (Labor Laws: Collection of German Laws), which contains Documents Sauckel-16, 31, and 49.
As Exhibit Sauckel-5, I have submitted a book, Fritz Sauckels Kampfreden (Fritz Sauckel’s Battle Speeches). That is Document Sauckel-95.
As Exhibit Sauckel-6, Nationalsozialistische Regierungstätigkeit in Thüringen, 1932-33 (National Socialist Governmental Activity in Thuringia, 1932-33), has been submitted. It is contained in Document Sauckel-96.
Exhibit Sauckel-7, Nationalsozialistische Regierungstätigkeit in Thüringen, 1933-34 (National Socialist Governmental Activity in Thuringia, 1933-34), is contained in Document Sauckel-97.
I have once more submitted as Exhibit Sauckel-8 the publication entitled Europa arbeitet in Deutschland (Europe Works in Germany), which has already been submitted as Document RF-5.
Then I shall submit an affidavit of Sauckel’s son, Dieter Sauckel, which is very short. It refers to the evacuation of the Buchenwald Camp which Sauckel is said to have ordered. I shall read the eight lines of the affidavit:
“Between 4 and 7 April 1945, approximately, I was present when my father, Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel, had a conference in his study. On this occasion the question of the Buchenwald Camp was discussed, and the following was decided: A certain number of guards should remain in the camp until the arrival of the enemy in order to hand the camp prisoners over to them.”—This is Sauckel Document Book 3, Document Sauckel-94, Page 247.
“I swear to the truth of the preceding statement for the purpose of having it submitted to the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.
“I am ready to swear upon oath to the truth of my statement. Schönau, 22 March 1946. Dieter Sauckel.”
I submit this as Exhibit Sauckel-9.
In Exhibit USA-206, Document 3044-PS, which has been submitted already, the following documents of Volume II are contained, which I shall read later: Sauckel-7, 10, 14, 18, 19, 27, and 41.
The documents which have not been read yet are in the official collections of laws. I have had the individual laws laid aside in the library. I do not know whether it is necessary to submit them individually, or whether it is sufficient for me to state here in what volume of the Reichsgesetzblatt they can be found.
THE PRESIDENT: Are they in your document book?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. They are short excerpts from the official legal gazettes. In each case the relevant passages have been extracted.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, I think it would be convenient if you gave their exhibit numbers, if they are in your book; but I do not quite understand how you are arranging these. You told us that Number 1 contained a great number of other numbers. Now is Number 1 the exhibit number?
DR. SERVATIUS: Number 1 is the exhibit number, and this exhibit contains these documents with the numbers they have in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: In the books?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I understand. So that you are only submitting—up to the present you have only got as far as nine exhibits.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And then you are going to give these various laws which you have in your books additional exhibit numbers. They will be 10 to...
DR. SERVATIUS: I did not know whether it was necessary to submit these Reich legal gazettes as exhibits. As far as I know they have already been submitted because they are an official collection of laws from the Reichsgesetzblatt of 1942 and 1940. Of course, I can take out these individual issues and submit them here.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it not be best if you submitted them as, say, Exhibit 10, and then told us the numbers in your books which are contained in Number 10?
DR. SERVATIUS: Then it would be necessary to submit the original text of the collection of laws. I wanted to avoid that.
THE PRESIDENT: We can take judicial notice of them.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of them. I shall point out in what volumes these documents can be found. That will be Reichsgesetzblatt 1942 in which Documents Sauckel-8, 11, and 17 are contained; Reichsgesetzblatt 1940 which contains Document Sauckel-45; Reichsgesetzblatt 1943, which contains Document Sauckel-21...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Which was the first Reichsgesetzblatt? The one which contained 8, 11, and 17?
DR. SERVATIUS: 1942.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: The second was Reichsgesetzblatt 1940, with Document Sauckel-45. The third was Reichsgesetzblatt 1943, with Document Sauckel-21. The fourth is Reichsarbeitsblatt 1940, Document Sauckel-33...
THE PRESIDENT: What year, though?
DR. SERVATIUS: 1940. Reichsarbeitsblatt, Document Sauckel-33. The fifth is Reichsarbeitsblatt 1942, which contains Documents Sauckel-9, 35, 40, 46, 50, 51, 64(a). The sixth, Reichsarbeitsblatt 1943, contains Documents Sauckel-20, 23, 37, 42, 43, 44, 48, 54, 55, 57, 60, 60(a), 61, 62, 64, and 68.
And the last, Reichsarbeitsblatt 1944, has Documents Sauckel-26, 30, 38, 58, 59, 65, 67, and 89.
I shall now go briefly through the document book. I begin with Sauckel Document Book 2, Document Sauckel-32, “Orders and Decrees Concerning the Employment of Prisoners of War.” That is the agreement of 27 July 1939. This is an excerpt concerning the work of prisoners of war, and in Article 31 prohibited labor is listed.
In the next document, Sauckel-33, there is a decree of the Reich Minister of Labor, “Use of Prisoners of War in Places of Work.” There the types of work for which these prisoners of war are being used are listed in detail. Among the types of work not included is the manufacture of arms; but included is work in factories, agriculture, forestry, work on roads, canals, and dams of importance to the war, work in brickyards, and so forth, as can be read in detail.
In Document Sauckel-35 we can see how the employment of prisoners of war took place, namely by co-operation between the prisoner-of-war camp and the contractors, and how a contract regulated in detail the conditions under which the employment of prisoners of war took place. It can be seen from this that Sauckel’s labor recruitment had nothing to do with that.
In Document Sauckel-36 we find a circular decree concerning the treatment of prisoners of war—a memorandum concerning the treatment of prisoners of war—which was drawn up jointly by the OKW and the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda:
“Treatment of prisoners of war: Prisoners of war must be treated in such a way that their full production capacity may benefit industry and food economy. To insure this, sufficient nourishment is necessary.”
This I wanted to underline.
Document Sauckel-37 deals with the question of an improved status, namely the conversion of prisoners of war into civilian workers for work of importance to the war in Germany. It shows that in this case they get special allowances, such as an allowance of money for maintaining a separate household—a so-called compassionate pay. It shows that these workers were treated like civilian workers.
The next document, Sauckel-38, is along the same lines and deals with the visits of relatives to French, Belgian, and Dutch prisoners of war and to Italian military internees in the Reich. It says there:
“Visits to French, Belgian, and Dutch prisoners of war as well as to Italian military internees are permitted only for wives, parents, children, and brothers and sisters, who work in Germany or have their homes in Alsace or Lorraine, and then only on Sundays and holidays.”
This shows that actually the prisoner-of-war status had ceased.
Document Sauckel-39 is a memorandum with respect to general conditions valid for the employment of prisoners of war. It deals with the working hours: “The daily working hours, including the time of marching to and from work, should not be excessive.” And in another passage it says, “The prisoners of war have a right to a continuous rest period of 24 hours, to be granted on Sundays when possible...”
Under Paragraph 7 it is stated that neither the employer, nor his relatives, nor his employees are entitled to carry out any punitive measures against prisoners of war.
Then there follows an excerpt about housing and other accommodation in camps. It is Document Sauckel-40, which decrees—on the basis of Sauckel’s Order Number 9—the inspection of housing, food, heating, and upkeep of the camps by workmen employed at the camps. It is dated 14 July 1942. It says:
“By 10 August 1942 an inspection of all industrial establishments employing foreign labor must be made by all labor offices in their respective districts to determine whether they have duly carried out regulations and decrees governing housing, feeding, and treatment of all foreign male and female workers and prisoners of war. It is my desire that the offices of the NSDAP and the DAF should participate in this inspection to a proportionate extent. Where shortcomings are discovered, the manager of the works is to be given a time limit within which such shortcomings are to be remedied.”
Further on, under 2(a) it is stated that provision should be made for feeding in winter. And finally: “All factories are to make provision for camps and billets to be heated when cold weather sets in and to see that the necessary fuel is ordered in time.” The decree states at the end that workmen, paid by the factories, are to be employed in the camps to see to the upkeep of the camps.
Then there is Document Sauckel-18, a memorandum for works managers and Eastern Workers, which contains camp rules. The introduction says:
“In response to a wish of the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, I recommend that the officials satisfy themselves from time to time that the regulations issued with respect to the employment of Eastern Workers are being adhered to within the establishments.”
That shows that control was emphasized here once again.
The camp rules then go on to say:
“Eastern Workers, you are finding in Germany wages and bread, and by your work you are safeguarding the maintenance of your families....”
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Could you not summarize these documents more shortly?
DR. SERVATIUS: Document Sauckel-41 shows that caring for the Eastern Workers was especially the task of the German Labor Front, which is explained here in detail.
Document Sauckel-42 deals with the same subject. It stresses above all the importance of trade inspection and says that all necessary measures for the welfare of foreign workers must be taken immediately and all shortcomings remedied at once. The inspection officials and the local authorities have to arrange matters together with the Labor Front. It is issued by Reich Minister of Labor Seldte, not by Sauckel, which makes it evident that Sauckel had not become the Reich Minister of Labor.
In Document Sauckel-43 there are explanations of the camp regulations to which I shall refer in detail later. But in Document Sauckel-43 I should like to stress again the position of the Trade Inspection Board. Here the question of responsibility for hygienic conditions and for the extermination of vermin is regulated; and it says at the end: “The supervisory authority in accordance with the new regulations is the Trade Inspection Board....”
Document Sauckel-44 contains specifications about sleeping quarters: Their size, the number of beds, and the administration of medical care. This again is signed by the Reich Minister of Labor, Franz Seldte, and not by Sauckel.
The next group of documents deals with food. Document Sauckel-45 is the meat inspection law which deals with the question of how far meat of inferior quality is fit for consumption. That law too has a certain importance with regard to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, about the inspection of meat, we do not require any further information about it.
DR. SERVATIUS: Document Sauckel-46 shows merely that the foreign workers received their food ration cards when away from the camp.
Document Sauckel-47 is a decree by the Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, and shows that he was responsible for determining the food quotas. The document also gives the rations. I mention only a few: For the ordinary workers, 2,600 grams of bread per week. That increases, and it may be read here, if questions of importance...
THE PRESIDENT: Page 128 shows that prisoners of war are employed in the armament industry, does it not? Page 128.
DR. SERVATIUS: It says there: “Food rations of Soviet prisoners of war working in the armament industry or in trade industries, if they are accommodated in camps...” and then follows a list of rations. I cannot see how far that shows...
THE PRESIDENT: 128 in English, Page 128, Lines 4 to 12: “Treatment of the sick. All prisoners of war and Eastern Workers, male and female, who are employed in the armament industry...”
DR. SERVATIUS: It says there, “All prisoners of war or Eastern Workers ... who are employed in the armament industry...” Armament industry is not the manufacture of weapons.
Document Sauckel-48 only refers to a law—I see the translation department has left out a short paragraph, but I can do without that. The heading indicates the subject. It refers to taking food for the journey home. It thus concerns supplies for the return journey.
Document Sauckel-49 shows a regulation whereby additional food could also be given; and special diets in the hospitals were also provided.
In the next group, questions of wages are dealt with. The first decree is Document Sauckel-50.
THE PRESIDENT: How far you go—it seems to me sufficient if you give us a group, and then tell us what it deals with.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. That is from Documents Sauckel-50 to 59, omitting Document Sauckel-56. The questions of wages and scales of wages are included here. One will have to look at these more carefully if these questions become crucial. Therefore, I shall not make any further specific statements about that now.
Sauckel Document Book Number 3 is a group of documents containing legal orders. Documents Sauckel-60 to 68 refer to medical care. I believe here also I need not go through the individual documents, because they become of interest only when the subject is dealt with.
THE PRESIDENT: Give us a group and tell us what it is about, and then we can look at it.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. It deals with medical care; and as I said, the details become of interest only when the question becomes important. There is no point in speaking of them now.
The next group is speeches made by Sauckel on the subject of labor allocation, and they are contained in the manual. I should like to refer to one in particular—a speech of 6 January 1943 which was made after the conference between Sauckel and Rosenberg. It says there at the beginning: “The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor on 5 and 6 January...”
THE PRESIDENT: Which page?
DR. SERVATIUS: It is 204 in my book, and in the English text it should also be Page 204.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably that 8,000 should be 800.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, it should be 800. I have also mentioned that document already, and read the main parts.
Documents Sauckel-82 and 83 have also been mentioned already in their essential parts.
Document Sauckel-84 is a manifesto which has already been presented in detail.
Document Sauckel-85 shows the generally valid and binding principles followed by Sauckel, all of them well-known principles. The main fact is that after 1943 they showed the same tendency as they had before.
Document Sauckel-86 is a later speech—a speech of 24 August 1943—to the presidents of the Gau labor offices. Here again in his speech to the responsible Gau labor presidents Sauckel stresses his basic attitude, as he has often stated it here. He adheres to the same attitude on 17 January 1944—that is, Document Sauckel-88—when he again emphasizes to these presidents, that:
“The foreign workers must be treated better. The reception camps are not to be primitive; rather they must be a recommendation for us.”
And at the end:
“The more I do for the foreign laborers working in Germany, the better I treat them, the more I influence them—the greater the extent of their available production capacity.”
And that was shortly—2 months—before he succeeded in putting the other foreign workers on an equal footing with the German workers.
THE PRESIDENT: We have heard the Defendant Sauckel explain...
DR. SERVATIUS: I beg your pardon?
THE PRESIDENT: ...that the work was carried on. And will you tell us where the group of speeches—how far does the group go?
DR. SERVATIUS: It is Document Sauckel-89.
Document Sauckel-94 I have read already. Documents Sauckel-95, 96, 97 I have already read to the extent necessary. And that brings me to the end of the presentation of documents.
Now, comes an affidavit of the witness Karl Goetz, which is included in the document book. I submit it as Exhibit Number 10, the affidavit by Karl Goetz. This is an interrogatory which was submitted very early and was therefore considered in a very abridged form, as the details had not become apparent at that time. Consequently, the witness answered very shortly and could say nothing specific to a number of questions. Where he did answer the questions, he refers to an introduction which he wrote, and in answering the questions raised by the Prosecution he also refers to that introduction. Therefore, I believe that I might also read this introduction as far as is necessary.
The affidavit is of 20 March 1946. In this introduction, on the second page, I should like to call attention to a conference in Paris. This witness Goetz was a bank expert in Weimar. He had known Sauckel before and had worked on his staff of experts. He had been with him in Paris and had taken part in the negotiations with Laval. He says here:
“The negotiations led to an extensive talk, which was conducted in a proper and polite manner as far as I could judge. Laval took note of Sauckel’s proposals and agreed to accede to his request. But he made counterproposals...”
I do not think I need go into detail, because what was then negotiated is of minor significance. He says on the third page:
“During a later conference in Paris the proceedings were similar. Laval assumed a stiffer attitude, and he pointed out the great difficulties which would impede the recruitment of additional workers. He emphasized in particular the necessity of not stripping the French labor market of its best forces.”
I think I can go on to Page 4. The witness says there under 5:
“My last mission, at Sauckel’s request, was to ascertain whether it was possible by means of using our banking connections to purchase an additional amount of grain in Romania and Hungary—about 50,000 to 100,000 tons was the figure given. This grain was to be used as additional food for foreign laborers in the form of a light afternoon meal.”
Then he says that that project failed due to circumstances. He gives a general impression of Sauckel, and says briefly:
“Sauckel approached that task with the energy and vigor peculiar to him. He pointed out repeatedly what conditions were necessary for the success of the task and repeatedly emphasized that it was the major duty of all authorities to see that correct treatment was given to workers at their places of employment.”
Then he describes the details:
“Above all, he demanded that foreign workers should not be given the feeling of being imprisoned in their camps. He demanded the removal of all barbed wire fences.”
He continues by saying:
“...Sauckel said that the workers must return to their native countries as propaganda agents.”
Then the witness gives an important statement concerning information as to atrocities and bad conditions. I should like to read something from Page 6 to show what kind of person this witness Goetz is. He says...
THE PRESIDENT: What page is your excerpt from?
DR. SERVATIUS: Page 6, or Page 266 of the document book, at the top of the page.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go on.
DR. SERVATIUS: He says:
“I feel also that I should mention that following my arrest by the Gestapo, after the affair of 20 July 1944, Sauckel spoke on my behalf to the RSHA (Kaltenbrunner). I cannot say to what extent my release from the Ravensbrück Concentration Camp was brought about by this.
“I wish to state further that I did not receive from Sauckel any material remuneration, awards, or decorations.
“I found it expedient to conceal from him my own inner political convictions and my connections with Goerdeler and Popitz. In his blind obedience to Hitler—and in spite of our old friendship—he would otherwise no doubt have handed me over to that Gestapo from which he endeavored to free me in November 1944.”
I have read this in advance and I return now to Page 265, because the witness, who was then working on Sauckel’s staff, states his attitude to that question which is of great interest to all of us. He says:
“Now that the extent of atrocities in concentration camps has become known to me from publications, I ponder and rack my brains as to how the picture drawn above can be made to tally with the events now brought to light. Although I have thought it over for weeks, I can find no explanation for this.”
THE PRESIDENT: What page is this? Page 265?
DR. SERVATIUS: Page 265. It is near the top of the page. Where it is in the English text, I cannot say; but it should be Page 265.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: “On one side I see the foreign workers, men and women who move freely about in great numbers and associate with the German population. Frenchmen and Belgians, with whom I spoke out of personal interest, were usually happy to hear their native tongue, conversed freely, hoped the war would soon end, and criticized their work, but rarely sharply. On the other side appears the totally unbearable sight of the recently revealed mass atrocities. One had heard that foreign workers were tried and sentenced—they were certainly subject to the same arbitrariness and the same methods of punishment as were the natives—but not that mass sentences were passed. But that really had nothing to do with the Allocation of Labor. I find it impossible to reconcile what I heard and what I saw in those days with the present revelations. Either this was a development which took place in the last year and a half, when I was not able to observe the situation because of my arrest and my retirement to the country, or else there existed, besides the regular Allocation of Labor, an employment of concentration camp inmates on a vast scale. It is also possible that Sauckel was not able to supervise things and was not informed or that he deceived himself with his general orders and oral statements, which I could not comprehend.”
I considered these statements of particular importance, because the witness stood on the side of the men of 20 July 1944 and certainly observed carefully, and great importance has to be attached to his judgment.
As to the questions themselves, Question Number 1 and its answer I consider irrelevant; also, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. All of these are answers which are of minor importance.
To Question Number 10, Page 276:
“Who was responsible for the billeting, treatment, and feeding of foreign workers after they had arrived at the place of work?”
The answer is:
“The only thing I heard was that from the moment work was started responsibility for that rested with the factory managers, and in most cases with special employees under them.”
Question 11 is:
“What kind of orders did Sauckel issue for the treatment of workers in the factories?”
The witness in his answer refers to the introduction which I have read.
The next questions—13, 14, 15, 16, and 17—are irrelevant.
Question 18 is:
“Did Sauckel receive reports about irregular conditions? What measures did he take? Do you know of any individual cases?”
The answer is:
“I remember only one case. Sauckel was informed that the workers of a certain factory were still housed in a camp surrounded by barbed wire. I cannot recollect the name of the place or the factory concerned. I heard that he ordered the immediate removal of the fence.”
Then we come to the questions which are put by the Prosecution. I consider that Question Number 1 is not relevant because it deals with personal, unofficial relations with Sauckel, and how he became acquainted with him. He made his acquaintance when a prisoner of war.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, Mr. Biddle thinks that the Prosecution ought to be asked to read anything they wish to out of those interrogatories.
M. HERZOG: The Prosecution, Mr. President, does not wish to read any excerpts from this interrogatory.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, you know that the witness Jäger is present, do you not?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, he is present.
THE PRESIDENT: You know he is present.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then, with the permission of the Tribunal, I will call the witness Jäger.
[The witness Jäger took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
DR. WILHELM JÄGER (Witness): Dr. Wilhelm Jäger.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, during the war you worked as a doctor with the firm of Krupp, in Essen, and were entrusted with the medical care of the camps of foreign workers? Is that true?
JÄGER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who put you in charge there?
JÄGER: I was appointed by the firm of Krupp which employed me when a change in the care of foreign workers was brought about through the public health administration having to take it over.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were you not also appointed to this post by the German Labor Front?
JÄGER: No. The contract which the firm of Krupp made with me was made through the German Labor Front.
DR. SERVATIUS: If I understand you correctly, you did not conclude the contract directly with the Labor Front; but you were under obligations to the German Labor Front, were you not?
JÄGER: I have never felt that I had anything to do with the Labor Front in that respect.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you not continuously send reports to the German Labor Front about the conditions in the camps?
JÄGER: That happened only in a few cases, as far as I can remember. I generally sent these reports to the public health authorities and to the firm of Krupp.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not also report to the Trade Inspection Board?
JÄGER: Not always. I reported just a few cases to the health office of the city of Essen, but only in individual cases when it appeared important to me that the health office should be informed.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know the office for public health and medical care?
JÄGER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: With what office was that connected?
JÄGER: That was in Essen.
DR. SERVATIUS: I do not mean the locality, but with what office was it connected? Was it not with the German Labor Front?
JÄGER: I cannot say that precisely. I know only that it was a subdepartment of the public health administration in Essen.
DR. SERVATIUS: Is it known to you that the foreign workers were under the care and control of the German Labor Front?
JÄGER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Also with respect to their health?
JÄGER: On only one occasion did I meet a commission from the Labor Front in my camp.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know the institution of Gau camp doctors?
JÄGER: An institution of that kind was to have been created in Essen, but it did not happen. At that time, when we had just had a typhus epidemic, I suggested to the health officer—who was then Dr. Heinz Bühler of Mühlheim—that something of the sort should be instituted. Then also at a meeting I spoke about my idea, but I did not hear anything more about this Gau office for camp doctors.
DR. SERVATIUS: That will do. How many camps did you supervise?
JÄGER: That varied. First, there may have been 5 or 6, then later maybe 17 or 18, and later again it fell to a lower figure. But I am not able at this moment to give you the exact figure.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the nature of your task?
JÄGER: Above all, I was supposed to assure the medical care of foreign workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have anything to do with the treatment of the sick?
JÄGER: Only when they were brought to me and when I was in the camps. I always concerned myself personally with individual cases in the camps whenever I inspected them.
DR. SERVATIUS: You had not only a supervisory capacity, but you also gave treatment yourself?
JÄGER: Whenever I was in a camp I would be consulted by the camp doctors and I would advise them.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the job of the camp doctors?
JÄGER: The camp doctors had their daily duty in the infirmary and the care of the patients in general.
DR. SERVATIUS: So your work was supervisory?
JÄGER: Yes; supervisory.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, the Prosecution has repeatedly interrogated you outside this courtroom?
JÄGER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: You have been in Nuremberg before—in this building here?
JÄGER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you make an affidavit about the conditions in the Krupp camps?
JÄGER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: I will put this affidavit to you. This is an affidavit of 15 October 1945. Did you give that affidavit as a witness for the Prosecution?
JÄGER: As far as I can remember, yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Now I ask you to state whether you still stand by the statements which you made at that time?
JÄGER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: I shall read the statements to you: “My name is Dr. Wilhelm Jäger. I am a physician in Essen...”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, we cannot have the whole document read to him. You can put to him anything you want to challenge him upon.
DR. SERVATIUS: Very well.
[Turning to the witness.] You say, at about the middle of the first page:
“I began my work with a thorough inspection of the camps. At that time, in October 1942, I found the following conditions...”—and you go on to say—“The Eastern Workers were housed in the following camps: Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse, Spendlerstrasse, Hoegstrasse, Germaniastrasse, Dechenschule...”
THE PRESIDENT: Are you challenging that?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Where were these camps?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, that is what I want to ask him.
[Turning to the witness.] Did these camps exist at the time, and were they occupied?
JÄGER: As far as I can remember. One has to take into consideration that until I started my work I did not know at all what camps existed. At a meeting which had been called, where there were doctors of the various nationalities, I asked first of all what camps there were. They did not know; and then a list was procured in which the camps were given. Then...
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have mentioned the camps here by name, and yet you are not certain that these camps existed at that time, in October 1942?
JÄGER: I have given the camps which existed at the beginning of my activities, as far as I could remember. I had to go to each one of these camps personally, and I had to depend entirely upon myself.
DR. SERVATIUS: Further, concerning the food of the Eastern Workers—if you will look at the second page of the document—you state the following:
“The food for the Eastern Workers was completely inadequate. They received 1,000 calories less per day than the minimum for Germans....”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, below the names of the camps he says: “...all surrounded by barbed wire and were closely guarded.” I understand you are challenging that?
DR. SERVATIUS: Were the camps surrounded by barbed wire and closely guarded, as it says here?
JÄGER: In the beginning, yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: But you do not know whether that was the same case in all camps, do you?
JÄGER: The camps which I visited, where I was as yet unknown, for instance, Krämerplatz and Dechenschule, were closely guarded, and I had to show my credentials in order to get in.
DR. SERVATIUS: I repeat the question concerning the food. You said the Eastern Workers received 1,000 calories less per day than the minimum for Germans. Whereas German workers who did hard work received 5,000 calories per day, the Eastern Workers who performed the same kind of work received only 2,000 calories per day. Is that true?
JÄGER: That was true at the beginning of my activities. The food for Eastern Workers—as could be seen from the posted lists—had been determined as to quantity, and there was a difference between that for Eastern Workers and that for German workers. The 5,000 calories mentioned here were given to specific categories of German workers who did the hardest type of work. That was not given to everybody.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I shall put to you a chart of the calories.
I submit to the Tribunal a copy of this chart. That is an exact table of the calories to which the individual categories of workers were entitled. It begins with 9 February 1942 and shows the individual quotas for the various types of workers; and on the last page there is a summary of the average quotas of calories which were allotted.
It is shown there in the summary, Group 1. Eastern Workers and Soviet prisoners of war: Average workers, 2,156 calories; heavy workers, 2,615; very heavy workers, 2,909; for long hours and night workers, 2,244. Are you familiar with these figures?
JÄGER: Approximately.
DR. SERVATIUS: Will you compare that with what the German workers received: The normal consumer, 2,846 calories; heavy workers, 3,159; very heavy workers, 3,839; for long hours and night workers, 2,846 calories. Is that in accordance with your statement, according to which you said that German workers doing the heaviest work received 5,000 calories, whereas the Eastern Workers received only 2,000 calories?
THE PRESIDENT: It is very hard to follow these figures unless you give us the exact page. Are you on the last page?
DR. SERVATIUS: This is a summary.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, on which page are you?
DR. SERVATIUS: On the last page, the last sheet on the right side. First, there are the food groups 1, 2, 3 on different pages; and then on the last page, on the right side next to Group 3, which concerns the Poles, there is a summary of calories for Eastern Workers, for Germans, and for Poles. If you compare the amounts of calories here in the columns, that should tally with what the witness has stated. He singled out the very heavy workers and said that the Germans received 5,000 calories; the table shows that they received only 3,839. He also says the Eastern Workers received 2,000 calories; whereas, according to the table, they received 2,900—that is, instead of a proportion of 5,000 to 2,000, it is from 2,900 to 3,800—in round figures about 1,000 calories and not, as the witness has said here, 3,000 calories. Is that correct? Do you stand on your statement? A distinction has to be made...
THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear the witness’ answer.
MR. DODD: I think it would be more helpful to the Tribunal, and certainly to the Prosecution, if it were established who made up this chart, and whether or not the figures given here cover the camps where this witness had jurisdiction. From looking it over I cannot tell where it was made up, except on the front page it says:
“According to the food table by Dr. Hermann Schall, Medical Superintendent of the ‘Westend’ Sanatorium. Calculations of controlled foodstuffs for the camps of the firm of Krupp...”
And so on.
But these things can be made up by the bale and presented to witnesses. Unless there is some foundation laid, I think it is an improper way to cross-examine.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have an affidavit which can prove where that chart comes from.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you ever seen this chart before?
DR. SERVATIUS: It is the affidavit of the witness Hahn.
JÄGER: Was a question put to me, please?
DR. SERVATIUS: The witness has the original. It is attached. May I ask the witness to return the document to me?
JÄGER: I wanted to make a statement on this subject.
At the beginning of my activity the Eastern Workers’ food definitely differed from that of the German people, and also from that of the so-called western workers—the French, the Belgians, and so on. It can be seen from the figures that, even though it may not be stated exactly, at least there is a difference of 700 to 800 calories. In the beginning until, I believe, February or March 1943, the Eastern Workers received no additional rations for long hours, heavy work, or very heavy work. These additional quotas were given only after Sauckel had ordered it; and that was, if I remember correctly, at the beginning of 1943. At that time, as far as I remember, the Eastern Workers were put on an equal footing with the German workers as far as food was concerned; and they received additional rations for long hours, heavy work, and very heavy work, which they had not received at all before.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, if I understand you correctly, you want to say that this chart may be right but that in reality the workers did not receive what is listed on the chart. Did I understand you correctly?
JÄGER: Even from this chart you can see the difference.
DR. SERVATIUS: It was a difference of 3,000 calories which you mentioned, whereas the table shows a difference of about 1,000 calories.
JÄGER: I said before that there were individual categories of workers doing the heaviest type of work—such as stokers and miners—and that they received up to 5,200 calories. That, however, was not the rule. Only very special workers received up to 5,200 calories.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then what you say here is not correct, because you did not mention that. You say generally that, whereas the German worker who did the heaviest type of work received 5,000 calories, the Eastern Workers who did the same type of work received only 2,000 calories per day. That is, however, a general statement; and it does not show that you are referring to exceptional cases of individual groups of workers. Is that correct?
JÄGER: That is the way I saw it, and I believe that you understand it as it appears here.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, where does this chart come from, and are you putting it in? Will you put it in?
DR. SERVATIUS: In the affidavit this assertion is made, and the witness said clearly at that time that the workers doing the heaviest type of work received 5,000 calories if they were German, and if they were Eastern Workers, they received only 2,000. That is a very clear statement in the affidavit, which is not in accordance with the chart.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you offering it in evidence?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What will it be? What number will it be?
DR. SERVATIUS: That will be Exhibit Sauckel-11.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the affidavit refer to the chart?
DR. SERVATIUS: I asked because I questioned the correctness of the affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I asked whether the affidavit refers to and identifies the chart, the chart which the witness has just had in his hand.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, you have put in an affidavit by Walter Hahn. Does that affidavit mention the chart and say where the chart comes from and by whom it was made up and to what it refers?
DR. SERVATIUS: The affidavit which is here as Document Number D-288 does not mention the chart, but only the affidavit which I have submitted. Now I understand it is the affidavit by the witness Hahn, and the chart is attached; and it is covered by the affidavit made by the witness. That document I submit in evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: I said the affidavit by Walter Hahn—does it identify and is it attached to the chart? What page? There are seven pages, you know. We cannot find it unless you tell us.
DR. SERVATIUS: In the German text on Page 4.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, do you mean where it says, “The amount of calories contained in this food can be seen from the calorie table made by me which covers the whole period of the war”? Is that what you mean? That is on Page 4 of our copy. It is under the heading “C”: “Food Supply of French Prisoners of War and Italian Military Internees.”
DR. SERVATIUS: It is there, as I have said before, on Page 4 of the German text, where it says that the rations were based on calories; and that the caloric content of the food can be seen from the calculations made which cover the entire duration of the war. That is the document attached.
THE PRESIDENT: But it is all right to say that the document is attached, but it does not refer to it by any name.
DR. SERVATIUS: But the document is attached, so that it is obvious that it must belong to it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I do not want to be contentious about this, but—maybe I do not understand—I think we ought to know when this schedule was made; by whom. This affidavit says it is an appendix. Maybe it was made by the man Hahn, but we do not know it yet; and this witness has not testified to it, and counsel has not told us.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the position is this, is it not: The man named Walter Hahn made an affidavit annexed to this chart. That affidavit is dated, I imagine...
MR. DODD: Yes, 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: ...after the affidavit had been made by this witness, and replies in detail to the evidence given by this witness.
MR. DODD: Yes. What I wanted to understand fully was that this schedule, concerning which this witness is being cross-examined, was apparently not made up at the time when he had responsibility for these camps; and so far it does not appear from the examination that that is so, and I think it would have great bearing on the weight of the evidence adduced through the cross-examination.
I would like to point out that it was the defense of Sauckel that he had nothing to do with the feeding and care of these workers after they came into Germany, but that it was the responsibility of the DAF. I think it might be more helpful if counsel cleared that up, so that we would know whether he does admit responsibility after they came in and whether that is the purpose of this cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. The Tribunal does not think that you need interrupt your cross-examination. You can go on.
DR. SERVATIUS: The Prosecution has just made that assertion as an accusation against Sauckel. If the Prosecution today is of the opinion that Sauckel was not responsible for the happenings in the factories but rather the works manager was responsible and that he was not responsible for prisoners of war but that the Armed Forces were responsible for them, then I do not need this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on with your cross-examination, please.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have made some statements concerning the clothing of Eastern Workers. You said that they slept in the same clothes in which they had come from the East and that almost all of them had no overcoats and were therefore forced to use their blankets—even in cold and rainy weather—to carry their blankets in the place of coats.
Was it always like that, or only for a time? Was that a general occurrence or only an individual case?
JÄGER: In order to avoid another misunderstanding I have to state again: At the beginning of my activity I depended entirely on myself. There was no camp command. There was nobody else to work with me. The calorie tables as were as the clothing charts were not made until later.
The camp management which existed, according to Hahn—if I remember correctly—was only until February or April 1943. The phase which I intended to describe, and have described here, refers strictly to the time when I started my work. At that time the conditions were actually as I have described them, and I had to go by that. That also included clothing, as I have confirmed. These people remained in the same condition as on arrival, as far as clothing was concerned, for quite a while; and as far as I know they did not receive anything at that time.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was done about that?
JÄGER: I reported these conditions as soon as possible. I do not remember when. As far as I could see, the intention was to establish tailor shops, shoe repair shops, and other work shops in the camps; and some of them were actually established.
DR. SERVATIUS: One question. Did things generally get much better in the course of your activities, or did they become worse?
JÄGER: They did not become worse after 1943. After, the first heavy air raids, of course, the confusion was always very great. A great deal was destroyed by fire. I recall that during one night 19,000 persons became homeless; and, of course, clothes and underwear were destroyed also. It naturally took quite some time to make up these losses.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were these conditions caused by the firm of Krupp, or by lack of supervision on the part of the Labor Front?
JÄGER: As I have said, I saw members of the Labor Front only once in a camp. Then that commission did actually criticize conditions. It was in the camp at Krämerplatz, and the firm of Krupp was fined at that time, because of the conditions. But that was the only time that I got in touch at all with the Labor Front.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the firm of Krupp object in any way to the improvements, so that the Labor Front had to intervene?
JÄGER: That I cannot say. I had no influence in that respect and did not know anything about it, because I had to deal only with medical affairs, and did not participate in meetings of the firm of Krupp or the Labor Front. I could only make reports.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you also made statements concerning the conditions of health; and you said that the supply of medical instruments, bandages, medicines, and other medical equipment was completely inadequate in these camps. Is that true, or were those exceptional cases; or was it a condition which existed all the time?
JÄGER: That was how I found the camps in October 1942, and slowly I had to clear up these conditions. Later, of course, there was an improvement.
DR. SERVATIUS: You say here that the number of Eastern Workers who fell sick was twice as high as the number of German workers; that tuberculosis was especially prevalent; and that the percentage was four times as high among the Eastern Workers as among the Germans. Is that correct?
JÄGER: That was the case at the beginning when we received workers who had not had any medical examination at all. When I went through the camps, I heard from the camp doctors—and saw for myself on the occasion of inspections—that very many people were sick. The figure was considerably higher than among the Germans, as far as I could see at that time.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what was done about that by the Krupp firm?
JÄGER: After we had found out that it was tuberculosis we had to deal with, we made examinations in large numbers, even X-ray examinations. Then those affected with tuberculosis were separated from the others and put into the Krupp hospital for medical treatment.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then you mentioned typhus, and said that that was also widespread among the workers.
JÄGER: I busied myself with that in particular, as we had about 150 cases.
DR. SERVATIUS: At what time?
JÄGER: During the entire period from 1942 to 1945.
DR. SERVATIUS: How many workers did you have during that time?
JÄGER: Oh, that varied.
DR. SERVATIUS: Give us some approximate figure.
JÄGER: Well, if I remember correctly, there may have been 23,000 or 24,000; there may have been more. Later, there were about 9,000. But these figures varied.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you consider it correct, if 150 people out of such a large number are affected by typhus over such a long period of time, to say that it was very widespread among the workers?
JÄGER: Yes, for we had no typhus at all among the German population. So that statement may be justified. If among a population of 400,000 or 500,000—such as there was in Essen at that time—there was no typhus at all, and if one then takes an average of 20,000, with 150 cases among the 20,000, then that statement can quite well be made.
DR. SERVATIUS: In other words, you maintain your statement, that it is a correct statement that typhus was widespread. You say, furthermore, that carriers of these diseases were fleas, lice, bedbugs, and other vermin which tortured the inhabitants of those camps. Was that true of all the camps?
JÄGER: It was the case in almost all the camps when I began my work. Then a disinfection station was set up by the firm of Krupp, which was hit in an air attack immediately. It was then rebuilt, and then destroyed a second time.
DR. SERVATIUS: You say that in cases of illness the workers had to go to work until a camp doctor certified that they were unfit for work. In the camps at Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse, Germaniastrasse, and Kapitän-Lehmannstrasse there were no daily consultation hours, and that at these camps the camp doctors appeared only every second or third day. Consequently workers were forced to go to work despite illness, until a doctor appeared. Is that correct?
JÄGER: Naturally a worker had to work unless a camp doctor certified he was unfit. It was the same with the German population. I am a panel doctor myself and I know that in many cases a man had to go to work if he did not report himself sick; there was no difference in that respect.
DR. SERVATIUS: And you say that that was the case in the camps mentioned; that there was no real consultation hour, which meant that a man could not possibly report sick?
JÄGER: But he could go to a doctor. Because there were no doctors there, I purposely arranged that whenever possible people should come to me during my consultation—to me personally.
DR. SERVATIUS: But you have said here...
THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better adjourn now.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you just said that the workers could report ill even when there was no doctor present, that there was some other provision for them. Here you say that these camps were visited only every second or third day by the competent camp doctors; that as a consequence the workers, despite illness, had to report for work until a doctor was actually there. Is that correct?
JÄGER: That is wrongly expressed. If anyone reported ill he had to be taken to a doctor, or the doctor was notified.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I should like to return once more to the subject of the spreading of typhus. How many deaths resulted?
JÄGER: Only about three or four cases of death resulted, and they occurred only because the case was diagnosed too late. I always took personal charge of the typhus cases and had them brought to the hospital immediately, for I was responsible for this.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then you say in another place, on Page 2:
“The plan of supplies prescribed a little meat each week. Only Freibankfleisch could be used for this purpose, which was horse meat, meat infected with tuberculosis, or meat condemned by the veterinary.”
Does that mean that the foreign workers received bad meat?
JÄGER: One must define the expression “Freibankfleisch.” That was meat which was not released for general consumption by the veterinary but which, after being treated in a certain way, was quite fit for human food. Even in times of peace and afterwards, the German population bought this meat. During the war the German population received in return for their coupons a double quantity of Freibankfleisch.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then the veterinary allowed it for consumption?
JÄGER: Meat which had been condemned at first was released for human consumption after it had been treated in a certain manner and was then not harmful.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then the expression “condemned by the veterinary” means that it was first condemned and then allowed?
JÄGER: Yes, then allowed.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, regarding the French prisoner-of-war camp in Nöggerathstrasse you said the following:
“This camp was destroyed in a bombing attack; and the inmates for almost half a year were housed in dog kennels, latrines, and old baking ovens.”
Is that correct?
JÄGER: That is how I found this camp.
DR. SERVATIUS: And you saw that yourself for a half year?
JÄGER: I was there only on three occasions. It was described to me in that way, and I found the camp in that condition. As far as I could determine at the time, it had been in that condition for about 4 months; then it was rebuilt.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I am interested in the dog kennels. How many dog kennels were there? Were they really dog kennels, or was that only a derogatory remark about some other kind of billets?
JÄGER: It was an expression of mine, because the inmates built and hammered these huts together themselves.
DR. SERVATIUS: Is the same true of the latrines, or what does that mean?
JÄGER: That was the place where the doctor had his consultations.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was that a former latrine, or was it a latrine that was being used as such?
JÄGER: A former latrine.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then it was a former latrine which had been rebuilt?
JÄGER: It had not been rebuilt; it was just as it had been.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was this latrine then still being used?
JÄGER: It was not being used.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then you say that there were no tables, chairs, or cupboards in this camp.
JÄGER: That was also not the case.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you swear to this testimony which you have seen?
JÄGER: Yes, to the one I saw before.
DR. SERVATIUS: Are you sure it is that testimony which you have just had in your hands?
JÄGER: In my home in Chemnitz I crossed out various things in the record of the interrogatory which was submitted to me, and initialed these corrections...
DR. SERVATIUS: This very sentence, did you not...
THE PRESIDENT: Please do not interrupt him.
DR. SERVATIUS: Please continue.
JÄGER: I must assume that this is that corrected record.
DR. SERVATIUS: But you have it before you?
JÄGER: Yes, I have a record before me.
DR. SERVATIUS: Can you not determine which passages you crossed out? Were there many passages like that, or was it just single words?
JÄGER: No, sometimes entire sentences.
DR. SERVATIUS: And you swore to that?
JÄGER: Yes. After I had made these changes, I swore to this record.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that this statement was in the Krupp files at the beginning of the proceedings, and that it was considerably shorter, and that a number of sentences which the witness has sworn to here were lacking in that statement. I would suggest, therefore, that the Prosecution should submit the original, which the witness states he has altered, so that it can be seen just what he did write. As far as I know, he struck out at the time a few of those very statements which he has just repeated here.
As an example, I mention that he stated that in this camp there were no chairs, tables, or cupboards. That is a sentence which was struck out. The witness thus had doubts at the time, and did not swear to these facts.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what you are talking about. We have before us what is called a sworn statement, which was put in evidence and which is signed by the witness. The witness is now saying that that statement is correct, subject to any alterations which you have extracted from him in cross-examination.
DR. SERVATIUS: He said it might be entire sentences. I should like to ask the Prosecution to produce the original document with the passages crossed out, because I have seen two statements: a brief one in which these passages are apparently left out, and a complete one, such as we have before us, and which the witness says had been cut short.
THE PRESIDENT: All that the witness is saying, is it not, is that it was originally submitted to him in a certain form? He made certain alterations in it. Then, when those alterations had been made—I do not know whether it was fair-copied or not—he then signed it and swore to it, and that is the document that we have.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, my contention is this: The document which we have before us does not show these crossings out. The words which were struck out are still contained in the document.
THE PRESIDENT: You may ask the witness any question you like about it.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did you mark your alterations?
JÄGER: I crossed the passages out with ink and put my name next to the alterations. It is difficult, of course, and today I am not able to say what I did strike out at that time, as I did not retain a copy.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, if this document which we have before us were reproduced correctly these crossed-out passages would have to be shown, especially as the witness says that he put his initials in the margin.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you sign the document after it had been fair-copied? Witness, did you sign the document after it had been fair-copied? You know what a fair copy is, do you not?
JÄGER: Yes. I must try to remember exactly.
The document was submitted to me. I made the alterations, and then I signed three or four of these statements. Then these records were taken away; and on the same day or the following day, I was in Essen and swore to this record. Then I received a record which I read before the court.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was that a fair copy without any alterations?
JÄGER: That was a fair copy. I do not remember exactly; I really cannot.
DR. SERVATIUS: And why did you make these alterations?
JÄGER: The record came about in this way. Captain Harris came to me and interrogated me on these matters. Notes were taken; and then Captain Harris, I think, compiled this record and asked me to sign it.
DR. SERVATIUS: And why did you make these alterations?
JÄGER: Because I could not swear to those things—the things that I struck out I could not swear to.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was it incorrect, or did it go too far?
JÄGER: In part it went too far, I think I can put it that way; and in part it was incorrect—unintentionally, of course. But I had to make those changes, and I did make them.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, if I show you a document in which I mark in red the passages that you struck out, would you recognize those passages?
JÄGER: That is very difficult, for I cannot remember that.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I have no further questions.
MR. DODD: I am not clear on this. I do not know whether counsel is claiming that we have another document, one which we have not submitted. I do not know of any such. We submitted the only one that came into our possession...
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got that original, or is it with...
MR. DODD: There were a number of these made up, and they were all signed as originals. The first was the copy made with the typewriter, the others carbon copies. It was a joint British-American team that interrogated the witness, and this one copy was turned over to us, and we submitted it. That is the only one we have ever seen.
THE PRESIDENT: I see in the certificate of translation it refers to a certificate dated 14 October 1945, signed by Captain N. Webb...
MR. DODD: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You will find that at the end of the document, I think.
DR. BALLAS: As former counsel for Herr Krupp Von Bohlen, I wish to make a statement about this.
In the Krupp file which the counsel for Krupp...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What have you got to do with it? We are now considering the suggestion made by Dr. Servatius that this document, which we are now considering...
DR. BALLAS: I am sorry. I did not quite follow you, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: We are now considering the Document Number D-288. You haven’t anything to do with that document.
DR. BALLAS: Yes, this document does concern me. The Krupp portfolio...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What right have you to speak about it? You are only a former counsel to Krupp.
DR. BALLAS: I want to help explain the matter. At present I am appearing for Dr. Siemers, counsel for Admiral Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: But how can you help us about the framing of the affidavit of this witness by the Prosecution? You cannot do anything about that.
DR. BALLAS: I just wanted to refer to the different versions of the document.
In the Krupp file there is a Document D-288 which is considerably shorter than this Document D-288 which has been submitted by the Prosecution in the case of Sauckel. At the time I called Dr. Servatius’ attention to this difference, and we checked point by point just how far the deviations went. There are thus two documents—the one original Document D-288 and the one in the Krupp file which differs from the document presented in the case of Sauckel.
THE PRESIDENT: But this document was signed by this witness. There may have been some other document signed which was put in the Krupp file, but this witness has said that he signed this document. Therefore, it does not seem to me that it is material.
DR. BALLAS: I just wanted to call your attention to the fact that there are two different documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; thank you. Is there any other member of the Defense that wants to ask questions of this witness?
[There was no response.]
Then, Mr. Dodd, do you want to re-examine him?
MR. DODD: No, Sir—except that I would like to say, with respect to the Tribunal’s question concerning this certificate of translation where the name Captain N. Webb appears, that I am informed that refers to a certificate which is attached to all British documents and that is a certificate which goes along for the purpose of the translators. Undoubtedly, that is what it is. However, I will have a search made in the document room and clear it up. It is better that way. But my British friends say that is so—they do send a certificate; and the only possible explanation is that it is the certificate with a mistake in the date. But in any event, I will look into it.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the witness had the original of that affidavit put to him?
MR. DODD: I believe he has. I understood he had the one which is before the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Has he acknowledged the signature?
MR. DODD: Well, I understood so. I can inquire.
[Turning to the witness.]
Witness, you saw the signature? Is it your signature?
JÄGER: Yes.
MR. DODD: As a matter of fact, I talked to you personally on this matter; and you told me that this was a statement you gave. Do you remember that? Do you recall when you and I talked, and you told me this was your statement? You looked it over and read it.
JÄGER: Yes.
MR. DODD: You read English as well as German, do you not? You have some knowledge of English.
JÄGER: Some knowledge, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, the document is being handed to you. It is in German, is it not?
JÄGER: It is in German.
THE PRESIDENT: And it is signed by you, is it?
JÄGER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any passage in it which you want to strike out of it?
JÄGER: May I read the document first?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; you may read it as quickly as you can.
MR. DODD: While the witness is reading the document, I should like to inform the Tribunal that we made a call to the document room and have been told by the officer there that there is only one Document D-288, and this is it; there is no duplicate signed, as counsel for Krupp stated.
JÄGER: Yes, here there is an alteration which is written in pencil, on Page 2. I crossed that out, but that was not written by me.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, may I submit the document which I received from the counsel for Krupp at the beginning? I also have here an English document, Document Number 288 and the passages which allegedly were crossed out at the time have been marked by me in red. I should like to submit this document for the information of the Court; I believe it will help in clarifying this matter. There are many passages struck out.
THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Servatius, that is a different document, as I understand it.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We do not need that. We have this document before us, signed by the witness; and we have asked him whether he has anything in it which he thinks did not form part of the original document which he signed.
JÄGER: On Page 1 it says, “Conditions in all these camps were extremely bad.” I would have probably limited this statement, because I...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Witness, we do not want to know whether you think you expressed yourself too strongly. We only want to know whether the document represents the document which you signed—accurately represents the document which you signed. If there is anything which you want to change now, you can say what it is.
JÄGER: The record, as it is before me, I would not change in any way.
THE PRESIDENT: Just one or two questions I want to ask you. Were prisoners of war employed at Krupp’s during the time you were supervising these camps?
JÄGER: I did not supervise the prisoner-of-war camps. That is a wrong expression. I received the permission to visit the prisoner-of-war camps which were under the sole jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht, and I was told that these prisoners of war were all working for Krupp.
THE PRESIDENT: Were any of the people who were working at the camps, which you mentioned in this, prisoners of war?
JÄGER: In Hoegstrasse.
THE PRESIDENT: Prisoners of war were working there, were they?
JÄGER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Krupp’s?
JÄGER: For the Krupp Works, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What sort of work was it?
JÄGER: These things were not under my jurisdiction. It depended on their trade—locksmiths probably worked in the locksmith shop. But there were also many unskilled laborers. But I am naturally not able to give you all the details; these matters were not under my jurisdiction. I was concerned with these people only in my capacity as a physician.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[The witness left the stand.]
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I have found that certificate; and it is as I described it for the Tribunal. It is a certificate by Captain Weber of the British Army service that he received a copy of this document from the American team; and it is signed by him, Captain H. Weber, IMT Corps, British Army, European Sector.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that your case then, Dr. Servatius?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. There are two more witnesses, Biedermann and Mitschke. I can dispense with both of these witnesses.
Then we still do not have the sworn affidavits, the interrogatories from Dr. Voss, Dr. Scharmann, a witness by the name of Marenbach, and the witness Letsch, who was an expert in Sauckel’s office. We have received interrogatories from the witnesses Darré and Seldte, but these have not been translated as yet. I shall submit them as soon as they have been translated.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I have concluded my case.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, counsel for the Defendant Jodl.
DR. EXNER: Your Honors, with your kind permission I shall present my case in the following manner. First of all, I shall call the Defendant Jodl to the stand and use all documents, with a single exception, during his examination, and submit them to the Court.
I do not need to bore the Tribunal with lengthy readings. I have three document books which are numerically arranged, Jodl 1, Jodl 2, and so forth—and I shall in each case quote the page which is found in the upper left-hand corner on every page of the translation. The numbering is the same as in the original; they correspond. I am sorry to say that the documents are not exactly in the order in which I shall read them, and this is due partly to the fact that they were received too late and partly to other factors. I still do not have several interrogatories, particularly one which is very important to me. I hope that I shall be able to submit them later. I was granted five witnesses, but I can dispense with one of them. The four remaining witnesses will take up little time.
Now, with the kind permission of the Tribunal, I should like to call the Defendant Jodl to the witness box.
[The Defendant Jodl took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
ALFRED JODL (Defendant): Alfred Jodl.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The defendant repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. EXNER: Generaloberst Jodl, in the English-American trial brief it says that you are 60 years old. That is a mistake. You became 56 recently. You were born when?
JODL: I was born in 1890 on 10 May.
DR. EXNER: You were born in Bavaria, and both of your parents are descended from old Bavarian families. You chose the military profession; what was the chief reason for your choice?
JODL: A great-grandfather of mine was an officer; my father was an officer; an uncle was an officer; my brother became an officer; my father-in-law was an officer—I can well say that the military profession was in my blood.
DR. EXNER: And now I should like to hear something about your political attitude. To which of the political parties which existed in Germany before 1933 were you closest in spirit?
JODL: As an officer all party politics were entirely remote to me; and especially the offshoots of the post-war period. If I look at the background from which I come, the attitude of my parents, I must say that I would have been closest to the National Liberal Party and its ideas. In any event, my parents never voted anything but National Liberal.
DR. EXNER: Tell us in a few words what your attitude was to the Weimar Republic.
JODL: True to my oath I served the Weimar Republic honestly and without reserve. If I could not have done that, I would have resigned. Moreover, a democratic system and a democratic constitution was not at all a foreign idea to us southern Germans, for our monarchy was also democratic.
DR. EXNER: And what were your relations to Von Hindenburg?
JODL: I knew Hindenburg. I was assigned to him after his first election to the Reich Presidency when he spent his first vacation in Dietramszell. Then I spent a day with the Hindenburg family at their Neudeck estate together with Field Marshal Von Manstein. I can only say that I admired him; and when he was elected Reich President for the first time, I considered that the first symptom of the German people’s return to self-respect.
DR. EXNER: What was your attitude toward the National Socialist Party?
JODL: The National Socialist Party I hardly knew and hardly noticed before the Munich Putsch. It was this Putsch which dragged the Reichswehr into this internal political development. At that time, with few exceptions, it met this test of obedience. But after this Putsch there was a certain cleavage in the views of the officers’ corps. Opinions varied as to Hitler’s worth or worthlessness. I was still extremely skeptical and unconvinced. I was not impressed until Hitler, during the Leipzig trial, gave the assurance that he was opposed to any undermining of the Reichswehr.
DR. EXNER: Did you attend meetings at which Hitler spoke?
JODL: No, never.
DR. EXNER: Tell us which leaders of the Party you knew before 1933.
JODL: I knew only those who had previously been officers: for example, Epp, Hühnlein, and Röhm. But I no longer had any connection or contact with them after they had left the Reichswehr.
DR. EXNER: Before the seizure of power had you read the book Mein Kampf?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Did you read it later?
JODL: I read parts of it later.
DR. EXNER: What was your opinion on the Jewish question?
JODL: I was not anti-Semitic. I am of the opinion that no party, no state, no people, and no race—not even cannibals—are good or bad in themselves, but only the single individual. Of course I knew that Jewry, after the war and in the moral disintegration that appeared after the first World War, came to the fore in Germany in a most provocative fashion. That was not anti-Semitic propaganda; those were facts, which were regretted very much by Jews themselves. Nevertheless, I was most sharply opposed to any outlawing by the state, any generalization, and any excesses.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution asserts that all the defendants cried, “Germany awake; death to the Jew.”
JODL: As far as I am concerned, that assertion is wrong. At every period of my life I associated with individual Jews. I have been a guest of Jews, and certain Jews have visited my home. But those were Jews who recognized their fatherland. They were Jews whose human worth was undisputed.
DR. EXNER: Did you on occasion use your influence on behalf of Jews?
JODL: Yes, that too.
DR. EXNER: Did you know that the Reich Government in the year 1932 counted on the possibility of attempts to overthrow it and sought to save itself in this direction?
JODL: I certainly knew that, for when I came to Berlin at that time I did not find in the later operational division any preparations for war; but I found preparations for the use of the Reichswehr in the interior of the country, against the extreme leftists as well as the extreme rightists. There were plans for maneuvers of some sort in that connection in which I myself participated.
DR. EXNER: What was your attitude to the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor in the year 1933?
JODL: The appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor was a complete surprise to me. That evening when I was returning home with a comrade, through the excited crowds, I said to him, “This is more than a change of government; it is a revolution. Just how far it will lead us we do not know.” But the name of Hindenburg, who had legalized this revolution, and the names of such men as Von Papen, Von Neurath, Schwerin-Krosigk exerted a reassuring influence on me and gave me a certain guarantee that there would be no revolutionary excesses.
DR. EXNER: At this point I should like to read a part of General Vormann’s interrogatory. This is Page 208 of the third volume of my document book. I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that Page 208 in the upper left hand corner—I submit the original—refers to the period from 1933 on. Jodl was then at the group headquarters (Gruppenamt), and Vormann was in his group. I read under Figure 2:
“Jodl, who at that time was a major on the General Staff, was my group (Gruppe) leader in 1933. He shared completely the view of the Chief of the Army Command at that time, General Von Hammerstein, and was thoroughly opposed to Hitler and the Party.”
I shall now skip a few lines; they are not so important. Then in the center of the page, I continue:
“When on 30 January 1933 Hitler was appointed Reich Chancellor, Jodl was dismayed and astonished. I clearly recall that on 30 or 31 of January, at his request, I had to call together the officers of his group for a conference. At this conference he explained that Hitler had been called to be the head of the Reich according to the existing constitution and the laws in force. It was not for us to criticize this, particularly the behavior of Reich President and Field Marshal Von Hindenburg. We must obey and do our duty as soldiers. The kind of criticisms made hitherto, of the new measures initiated by the new chancellor, were not to be made in future for they were inconsistent with his and our own position.
“His entire speech showed great worry and apprehension with regard to the coming development of the situation...” and so forth.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, this would be a convenient time to break off.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Sir David, you were going to show these applications.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
I wonder if I might leave, for the moment, Number 1, which my friend General Rudenko will deal with, because he will deal with another one; and if I might deal with the ones which I have?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The second one is on behalf of Defendant Kaltenbrunner and is an application to cross-examine three witnesses whose affidavits were used by the Prosecution. The first is Tiefenbacher, and he dealt with conditions at Mauthausen; the second, Kandruth, who dealt with the same subject; the third, Stroop, dealt with the reception of orders from the Defendant Kaltenbrunner by Stroop as SS and Polizeiführer in Warsaw. The Prosecution submits that in these cases cross-examination by way of interrogatories would be sufficient. Next, I do not know if...
THE PRESIDENT: Interrogatories are all they asked for, certainly in the case of—in all three.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will have no objection to cross-interrogatories as long as they are not brought here as witnesses.
My Lord, the next application is on behalf of the Defendant Von Neurath to use M. François-Poncet as witness. The Prosecution will be grateful if the Tribunal would allow that to stand over for a day or two, as my French colleagues are awaiting instructions from Paris at the moment and they have not got a reply yet. I do not think it will prejudice the Defendant Von Neurath’s case. It will be time for a reply before there is any difficulty as to time.
Then, My Lord, the next is an application on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach. I think that all that is now wanted is to use an affidavit from Dr. Otto Wilhelm von Vacano. The affidavit is 12 pages long and is a highly academic statement on the educational philosophy underlying the Adolf Hitler Schools. The Prosecution feel that the matter has been thoroughly covered by the Defendant Von Schirach himself and also by his witnesses Hoepken and Lauterbacher, and they feel that the affidavit would be cumulative and repetitive. But, of course, it is an affidavit; it is not a question of an oral witness, and if the Tribunal feel that they ought to have it, the Prosecution do not wish to press their objection unreasonably.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the affidavit been translated yet?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I have certainly got an English—I have read the English translation of it, My Lord, so I assume that it has been translated into the other languages.
The next, applications from the Defendants Hess and Frank to put an interrogatory to General Donovan. If I may put the objection quite shortly, that raises the same point as the application on 2 May 1946 for Mr. Patterson of the United States War Department. The objection of the Prosecution is the same as I made on that occasion, that when you are cross-examining a witness as to credibility you are bound by his answer, and should not, in the opinion of the Prosecution, be allowed to call evidence to contradict him. So it is on exactly the same point, the relationship between the witness Gisevius and the United States Office of Strategic Services.
The next application is on behalf of the Defendant Speer for the approval of certain documents which are in his possession. The Prosecution have no objection to the application. They reserve the right to make any individual objection when the documents are produced at the Trial.
My Lord, the next is a purely formal application on behalf of the Defendant Jodl, whose case is now before the Tribunal, to use an affidavit of Dr. Lehmann. There is no objection to that.
Next is the application on behalf of the Defendant Hess...
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, that application we have already heard. We have heard the arguments for that in full and the Tribunal will consider that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
Then I think that only leaves an application of the Defendant Keitel for the use of a decree of Hitler of 20 July 1944, and the Prosecution has no objection to that.
My Lord, I think I have dealt with every one except the first one, which my friend General Rudenko will deal with—the application of the Defendant Göring.
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Members of the Tribunal, the Soviet Prosecution have several times expressed their view respecting the application of Defense Counsel to call witnesses with regard to the mass shooting of Polish officers by the Fascist criminals in Katyn Forest. Our position is that this episode of criminal activity on the part of the Hitlerites has been fully established by the evidence presented by the Soviet Prosecution, which was a communication of the special Extraordinary State Commission investigating the circumstances of the mass shooting of Polish officer prisoners of war by the German Fascist aggressors in Katyn Forest. This document was presented by the Soviet Prosecution under the Document Number USSR-54 on 14 February 1946, and was admitted by the Tribunal; and, as provided by Article 21 of the Charter, it is not subject to argument.
Now the Defense once again are putting in an application for the calling of three supplementary witnesses—a psychiatrist, Stockert; a former adjutant of the Engineer Corps, Böhmert; and a special expert of the staff of the Army Group Center, Eichborn.
We object to the calling of these three witnesses for the following reasons:
The calling of the psychiatrist Stockert as a witness must be considered completely pointless as the Tribunal cannot be interested in the question of how the commission drew its conclusion—a conclusion which was published in a Hitlerite White Book. No matter how this conclusion was drawn, the fact of the mass shooting of Poles by Germans in Katyn Forest has been unequivocally established by the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission.
Stockert himself is not a doctor of forensic medicine but a psychiatrist—at that time a member of the Hitlerite commission, not on the basis of his competence in the field of forensic medicine, but as a representative of the German Fascist military command.
The former adjutant, Captain Böhmert, is himself a participant in the crimes of Katyn Forest, having been a member of the Engineer Corps which carried out the executions. As he is an interested party, he cannot give any useful testimony for clarifying the circumstances of this matter.
Third, the expert of the staff of the Army Group Center also cannot be admitted as a witness because he, in general, knew nothing at all about the camp of the Polish prisoners of war, and could not have known all that pertained to the matter. The same reasons apply to his potential testimony to the fact that the Germans never perpetrated any mass shooting of Poles in the district of Katyn. Moreover, Eichborn cannot be considered an unprejudiced witness.
Regardless of these objections which express the opinion of all the prosecutors, the Soviet Prosecution especially emphasize the fact that these bestial crimes of the Germans in Katyn were investigated by the special authoritative State Investigating Committee, which went with great precision into all the details. The result of this investigation has established the fact that the crimes in Katyn were perpetrated by Germans, and are but a link in the chain of many bestial crimes perpetrated by the Hitlerites, a great many proofs of which have previously been submitted to the Tribunal.
For these reasons the Soviet Prosecution categorically insists on the rejection of the application of the Defense Counsel.
I have finished my statement.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for Kaltenbrunner, Sir David was right, was he not, in saying that you were only asking for cross-interrogatories, which the Prosecution do not object to?
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President, I have no objection to questionnaires, but I would then ask that these witnesses be heard in my presence outside this courtroom; and then, on the basis of this interrogation, questionnaires can later be submitted to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: But are the witnesses here?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I do not know.
THE PRESIDENT: We granted interrogatories, and you now ask for cross-interrogatories; that is all you ask for, and that does not involve bringing the witnesses here at all. The cross-interrogatories will be sent to them; they will answer them. If, for any reason, on the cross-interrogatories being answered, you want to make further application, you can always do so.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The rule of the Court so far was, as I understood it, that I have the right to cross-examine in this courtroom if the Prosecution submits affidavits of these witnesses here. That has, so far, been the ruling of the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it depends on what the substance of the affidavit is. If it is a matter of importance, no doubt we—we have never made any general rule, but we have generally allowed the witness to be brought here for cross-examination if the matter is of importance; but if the matter is of less importance, then we have very frequently directed that there should be cross-interrogatories.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I add to this last sentence? I consider this testimony extremely important. The Court will probably know the contents.
THE PRESIDENT: Again in your application you say that three interrogatories were used by the Prosecution on the understanding that the deponents would be subject to cross-interrogation. That means, I suppose, cross-interrogatories. It does not say cross-examination; it says cross-interrogation. Do you want to have them brought here for cross-examination?
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is what I had intended, unless my first suggestion is accepted. My first suggestion is simpler, in my opinion, and it would save time. It proposes that I be allowed to be present at the questioning of the witnesses outside this courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we understand your point of view, Dr. Kauffmann, and we will consider it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): May I make a brief statement with reference to General Rudenko’s motion?
General Rudenko wishes to reject my application for evidence, referring to Article 21, I believe, of the Charter. I do not believe that this regulation opposes my application. It is true of course, that government reports are evidence...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I think the Tribunal has already ruled that that article does not prevent the calling of witnesses; but General Rudenko, in addition to an argument based upon Article 21, also gave particular reasons why he said that these particular witnesses were not witnesses who ought to be called. He said that one of them was a psychiatrist, and the other one could not give any evidence of any value. We should like to hear you upon that.
DR. STAHMER: In the report submitted by the Soviet Union, the charge is made that members of the engineer staff which was stationed near Katyn carried out the execution of these Polish officers. They are mentioned by name, and I am bringing counterevidence—namely members of the same staff—to prove that during the whole time that this staff was stationed there no killings of Polish officers occurred. I consider this is a pertinent assertion and a presentation of relevant evidence. One cannot eliminate a witness by saying that he was involved in the act. With reference to these people, that is not yet settled, and it is not mentioned at all in the record. Neither are these people, whom I have now named, listed in the Russian record as having taken part in the deed. Apart from that, I consider it out of the question to eliminate a witness by saying that he committed the deed. That is what has to be proved by hearing him.
THE PRESIDENT: About the psychiatrist, was he a member of the German commission?
DR. STAHMER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: He was a member of it?
DR. STAHMER: Yes. He was present at the unloading, and he ascertained from the condition of the corpses that the executions must have been carried out at some time before the occupation by the German Army.
THE PRESIDENT: But he does not actually say in the application that he was a member. He said he was present during the visit of the military commission; he knows how the resolution of the commission was produced.
DR. STAHMER: I do not think he was an appointed member, but he took part in this inspection and in the duties connected with it. As far as I know, he was a regimental doctor in some regiment near—he was a regimental doctor of a regimental staff in the vicinity.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will consider your argument.
Then, is the counsel for Von Neurath agreeable that that matter should stand over? Is counsel for Von Neurath here? He is not here? Very well then, we will consider that.
Then, Counsel for the Defendant Schirach, do you wish to say anything in answer to what Sir David said?
DR. NELTE: My colleague Dr. Sauter asked me, if necessary, to represent the interests of the Defendant Von Schirach.
As to the statement of Sir David, I have only to say that, according to the opinion of the Defendant Von Schirach, the witness Von Vacano, who made and signed this affidavit, makes statements on a number of points on which Herr Von Schirach did not speak when he was examined as a witness. I therefore ask the Court to examine this affidavit to determine whether it does not contain individual points which would be important in connection with the charges against Von Schirach, and then to decide whether to admit it.
THE PRESIDENT: Then does counsel for the Defendants Hess and Frank want to say anything about the application for an interrogatory to General Donovan? Dr. Seidl, we have already heard the argument about it.
DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendants Hess and Frank): I have nothing to add to the arguments which I have already offered on the application to obtain official information from the War Department. I have also withdrawn my request for a decision on my first application, which was to obtain information from the War Department. It has not yet been decided, however, whether a questionnaire is to be submitted to Secretary of War Patterson.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the matter will be considered. There was no objection to the other three applications, so it is unnecessary to hear argument. Then the Tribunal will consider all these matters.
Now, Dr. Exner. Dr. Exner, if it is convenient to you personally, the Tribunal thinks that you might go a little bit faster in your speech through the earphones.
DR. EXNER: Before the recess, we heard what you told your officers when Adolf Hitler entered the government. Now I should like to hear what you felt about the appointment of Hitler as head of the State in 1934.
JODL: The union of the two offices in one person gave me much concern. When we lost Hindenburg, we lost the Field Marshal loved by the Wehrmacht and by the whole German people. What we should get with Hitler, we did not know. It is true, the result of the plebiscite was so overwhelming that one could say that a higher law than this popular will could not possibly exist. Thus we soldiers were quite justified in taking the oath to Adolf Hitler.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution speak of your close relationship with Hitler. When did you learn to know Adolf Hitler personally?
JODL: I was presented to the Führer by Field Marshal Keitel in the command train on 3 September 1939 when we were going to the Polish Eastern Front. At any rate that was the day I first exchanged words with him.
DR. EXNER: Two days after the outbreak of war?
JODL: Two days after the beginning of the war.
DR. EXNER: Did the Führer have confidence in you?
JODL: That came about very gradually. The Führer had a certain distrust of all General Staff officers, especially of the Army, as at that time he was still very skeptical toward the Wehrmacht as a whole.
I may, perhaps, quote a statement of his which was often heard: “I have a reactionary Army, a Christian”—sometimes he said too—“an imperial Navy, and a National Socialist Air Force.”
The relations between us varied a great deal. At first, until about the end of the campaign in the West, there was considerable reserve. Then his confidence in me increased more and more until August 1942. Then the great crisis arose, and his attitude to me was severely caustic and unfriendly. That lasted until 30 January 1943. Then relations improved and were particularly good, sincere, after the Italian betrayal in 1943 had been warded off. The last year was characterized by numerous sharp altercations.
DR. EXNER: To what extent did the Führer confide in you regarding his political intentions?
JODL: Only as far as we needed to know them for our military work. Of course, for the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff political plans are somewhat more necessary than for a battalion commander, for politics is part of strategy.
DR. EXNER: Did he permit discussions of political questions between himself and you?
JODL: Discussion of political questions was generally not admissible for us soldiers. One example is especially characteristic. When I reported to the Führer in September 1943 that Fascism was dead in Italy, for party emblems were scattered all over, this is what he said: “Such nonsense could only be reported by an officer. Once again it is obvious that generals do not understand politics.”
It can be easily understood that after such remarks the desire for any political discussions was slight.
DR. EXNER: Were political and military questions therefore kept strictly separate?
JODL: Yes, they were strictly separated.
DR. EXNER: Was it possible for you to consult him on military matters or not?
JODL: Consultation on military questions depended entirely on the circumstances of the moment. At a time when he himself was filled with doubts, he often discussed military problems for weeks or months, but if things were clear in his own mind, or if he had formed a spontaneous decision, all discussion came to an end.
DR. EXNER: The system of maintaining secrecy has often been discussed here. Were you also subject to this secrecy?
JODL: Yes, and to an extent which I really first realized during this Trial. The Führer informed us of events and occurrences at the beginning of the war—that is, the efforts of other countries to prevent this war, and even to put an end to it after it had already begun—only to the extent that these events were published in the press. He spoke to the politicians and to the Party quite otherwise than to the Wehrmacht; and to the SS differently again.
The secrecy concerning the annihilation of the Jews, and the events in the concentration camps, was a masterpiece of secrecy. It was also a masterpiece of deception by Himmler, who showed us soldiers faked photographs about these things in particular, and told us stories about the gardens and plantations in Dachau, about the ghettos in Warsaw and Theresienstadt, which gave us the impression that they were highly humane establishments.
DR. EXNER: Did not news reach the Führer’s headquarters from the outside?
JODL: The Führer’s headquarters was a cross between a cloister and a concentration camp. There were numerous wire fences and much barbed wire surrounding it. There were outposts on the roads leading to it to safeguard it. In the middle was the so-called Security Ring Number 1.
Permanent passes to enter this security ring were not given even to my staff, only to General Warlimont. Every guard had to check on each officer whom he did not know. Apart from reports on the situation, only very little news from the outer world penetrated into this holy of holies.
DR. EXNER: But what about foreign papers and radio reports?
JODL: Among foreign papers we studied very carefully the illustrated American and English papers, for they gave us very good information on new weapons. The foreign news itself was received and censored by the headquarters civilian press section. I was given only what was of military interest. Reports concerning internal politics, police, or the present situation were forbidden.
DR. EXNER: How did your collaboration with the Führer take place?
JODL: It took place as follows: Every day I made at least two reports on the situation. Some time ago it was asserted, rather indignantly, that I took part in 119 conferences. I took part in far more than 5,000 conferences. This discussion of the situation and reporting on the military position was at the same time an issuing of orders. On the basis of the reports on events, the Führer decided immediately what orders were to be given for the next few days.
I worked in this way: When my report was finished, I went into an adjoining room. There I immediately drew up the teletype messages and orders for the next few days, and while the reports on the situation were still going on, I read these drafts to the Führer for his approval. Warlimont then took them along to my staff where they were sent off.
DR. EXNER: Were you also present at political talks?
JODL: May I add—to complete the picture it should be said that I did not hear many things which were discussed during these reports on the situation. The same is true of Field Marshal Keitel, who worked in a similar manner.
DR. EXNER: Were political matters also brought up at the discussions of the situation, and to what extent were you present at discussions of a political nature?
JODL: As I have already said at the beginning, political problems were discussed only to the extent that was necessary for our military measures. Also on occasions when political and military leaders came together, when the Reich Foreign Minister was present, problems were discussed which lay on the borderline between politics and the conduct of the war. I did not take part in the exclusively political talks with foreign politicians, neutral or allied, or with the Reich Foreign Minister. I did not even take part in the discussions on the organization, armament, and administration of the occupied territories, for the purely military discussions of the situation in which I had to take part often lasted or required as much as 6 or 8 hours a day. I really needed the time I then had left for my own work.
DR. EXNER: It has often been stated here that it was impossible to contradict the Führer. Did you have any success with remonstrances?
JODL: One cannot say it was really impossible to contradict the Führer. Very many times I contradicted him most emphatically, but there were moments when one actually could not answer a word. Also by my objections I induced the Führer to desist from many things.
DR. EXNER: Can you give an example?
JODL: There were a great number of operational questions which do not interest the Court; but in the sphere of interest to the Court, there was, for example, Hitler’s intention to renounce the Geneva Convention. I prevented that because I objected.
DR. EXNER: Were there other possibilities of influencing Hitler?
JODL: If it was not possible by open contradiction to prevent something which according to my innermost convictions I should prevent, there was still the means I often employed of using delaying tactics, a kind of passive resistance. I delayed work on the matter and waited for a psychologically favorable moment to bring the question up again.
This procedure, too, was occasionally successful, for example, in the case of the intention to turn certain low-level fliers over to lynch justice. It had no success in the case of the Commando Order.
DR. EXNER: We will speak about that later. The Führer therefore ordered that himself.
The witness Gisevius in answer to questions by the Prosecution, said that “Jodl had a key position with Hitler.”
Did you know this witness by sight, or by hearing about him, or in any other way?
JODL: I did not have that honor. I heard the name of this witness for the first time here, and I saw him for the first time here in Court.
DR. EXNER: What, if anything, could you influence Hitler not to do?
JODL: Obviously, I could give the Führer only an extract of events. In view of his inclination to make emotional decisions I naturally was particularly cautious in presenting unverified reports made by agents. If the witness meant this by his general term of “key position,” he was not wrong. But if he intended it to mean that I kept from the Führer atrocities committed by our own Wehrmacht, or atrocities committed by the SS, then that is absolutely untrue. Besides, how was that witness to know about it?
On the contrary, I immediately reported any news of that kind to the Führer, and no one could have stopped me from doing so. I will give examples: An affidavit by Rittmeister Scheidt was read here. He testified that Obergruppenführer Fegelein told the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Guderian, and Generaloberst Jodl of atrocities committed by the SS Brigade Keminski in Warsaw. That is absolutely true. Ten minutes later I reported this fact to the Führer and he immediately ordered the dissolution of this brigade. When I heard through the American radio, through my press chief, of the shooting of 120 American prisoners near Malmédy, I immediately, on my own initiative, had an investigation started through the Commander, West so as to report the result to the Führer. When unimaginable horrors committed by an Ustashi company in Croatia came to my knowledge, I reported this to the Führer immediately.
DR. EXNER: I should like to interrupt you a moment. In your diary Document Number 1807-PS, you write, on 12 June 1942—Page 119, second document book:
“The German field police disarmed and arrested a Ustashi company because of atrocities committed against the civilian population in Eastern Bosnia.”
I should like to add here that this is noteworthy because this Ustashi company was something like an SS troop in Croatia and was fighting on the German side. Because of the atrocities, the German field police arrested this Ustashi company.
“The Führer did not approve of this measure, which was carried out by order of the commander of the 708th Division, as it undermined the authority of the Ustashi on which the whole Croatian State rests. This is bound to have a more harmful effect on peace and order in Croatia than the unrest of the population caused by the atrocities.”
Was this the incident of which you were thinking just now?
JODL: Yes.
DR. EXNER: Have you another example?
JODL: After the issuing of the Commando Order, I reported enemy violations of international law to the Führer only when he would be certain to have heard of them through other channels. I reported cases of Commando undertakings and capture of Commandos only when I could be quite sure that he would hear of them through other channels. In this respect I did try to hold back any new spontaneous emotional decisions.
DR. EXNER: Was it possible to hold Hitler back?
JODL: Unfortunately not.
DR. EXNER: I do not understand.
JODL: I can only say, unfortunately not. There were endless ways through which the Führer was informed about military matters. Every individual and every office could hand in reports direct to the adjutant’s department. The photographer sent out by the Führer to take pictures at the front, found it expedient to use this opportunity to report to the Führer on military matters also. When I objected to this, the Führer answered, “I do not care from whom I hear the truth; the main thing is that I hear it.” These reports, however, were not reports of atrocities, but just the opposite. Unfortunately, through many channels hostile to the Wehrmacht, inciting reports against the correct and chivalrous attitude of the Wehrmacht reached the Führer. It was these reports which brought about these decisions which led to brutal proceedings. A tremendous amount of damage would have been avoided if we soldiers had been in a position to hold the Führer back.
DR. EXNER: What role did Canaris play in this connection?
JODL: Canaris saw the Führer dozens of times. Canaris could report to him what he wanted and whatever he knew. It seems to me that he knew far more than I, for I was concerned exclusively with the operational conduct of the war. But he never said a word. He never said one word to me, and it is quite clear why; this witness was on the best of terms—this man, who is now dead, was on the very best of terms with Himmler and with Heydrich. It was necessary that he should be so that they would not become suspicious of this nest of conspirators.
DR. EXNER: The witness Gisevius said a great deal about revolts and intentions to carry out a Putsch. Did you personally ever learn anything about such plans?
JODL: I never heard a single word or intimation about any revolt or about any intentions to carry out a Putsch.
DR. EXNER: At any time, before or during the war, would you have considered a revolt possible or promising?
JODL: The witness spoke of revolts as casually as of washing his hands. That alone proves to me that he never thought about it seriously. The results of the Kapp Putsch in 1921, of the Hitler Putsch of 1923, are well known. If more proof is necessary, there is the result of 20 July 1944. At that time no one any longer hoped for victory in the true sense of the word. Nevertheless, in this revolt, in this attempt, not one soldier, not a single arm of the Wehrmacht, not one worker, rose up. All the perpetrators and all the members of the Putsch were alone. To overthrow this system a revolution would have been necessary, a mightier, a more powerful revolution than the National Socialist one had been. And behind such a revolution there would have had to be the mass of the workers and the majority of the Wehrmacht as a whole, and not simply the commander of the Potsdam garrison of whom the witness spoke.
But how one could wage a war for life or death with other countries and at the same time carry on a revolution and expect to gain anything positive for the German people, I do not know. Only geniuses who lived in Switzerland can judge that. The German Wehrmacht and the German officers were not trained for revolution. Once the Prussian officers struck the ground with their swords—that was the only revolutionary deed of the German Armed Forces that I know of. That was in the year 1848. If today people who co-operated actively to bring Hitler to power, who had a part in the laws which we soldiers with our oath of allegiance to Adolf Hitler were bound to support, if these people demanded revolution and mutiny of the Wehrmacht when they no longer liked the man, or when reverses occurred, then I can only call that wicked.
DR. EXNER: Did tension and crises arise in your relations with Hitler? You have already intimated something in that connection.
JODL: I could write a book about that more easily than give a brief answer. I should like to say only that, apart from many exalting moments, our life in the Führer’s headquarters was in the long run a martyrdom for us soldiers; for it was not a military headquarters, it was a civilian one, and we soldiers were guests there. It is not easy to be a guest anywhere for 5½ years. I should like to add just one thing. Among the few officers who dared to look the Führer squarely in the face, and to speak in a tone and manner that made listeners hold their breath because they feared a catastrophe—among these few officers, I myself belonged.
DR. EXNER: Give us an example of such a crisis in your relations with Hitler.
JODL: The worst crisis was in August 1942, in Vinnitza, when I defended Generaloberst Halder against unjustified criticism. It was my operational problem, the details of which will not interest the Court. Never in my life did I experience such an outbreak of rage from any human being. From that day on he never came to dinner.
DR. EXNER: To your mess?
JODL: No, he never came to the mess during the remainder of the war. The report on the situation was no longer given in my map room but in the Führer’s quarters. At every report on the situation from that day on an SS officer took part. Eight stenographers were ordered to be there, and from then on they took down every word. The Führer refused to shake hands with me any more. He did not greet me any more, or rarely. This situation lasted until 30 January 1943. He told me, through Field Marshal Keitel, that he could no longer work with me and that I would be replaced by General Paulus as soon as Paulus had taken Stalingrad.
DR. EXNER: Did you yourself not try during this time to be released from the OKW?
JODL: During all this time, every other day I asked General Schmundt to see to it that I should be sent at last to a position at the front with the mountain troops in Finland. I wanted to go there. But nothing happened.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution has asserted that you enjoyed the good graces of the Führer and that the Führer lavished his favor on you. How much of that is true?
JODL: I need not waste many words on that. What I said is the actual truth. I am afraid that what the Prosecution said is imagination.
DR. EXNER: It was also said that you were ambitious in your military career. How about that?
JODL: If the Prosecution mean that as a so-called political soldier I was promoted especially quickly, they are mistaken. I became a general in my fiftieth year. That is quite normal. In July 1940, when I was appointed general of Artillery it is true I skipped the grade of lieutenant general, but that was only an accident. A much younger general in the Air Force, Jeschonnek, Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, was to be promoted to Air Chief Marshal. Then Schmundt said to the Führer: “Jodl could perhaps do that too.” Thereupon, shortly before the Reichstag session, the Führer decided to promote me also—to general of Artillery. This Jeschonnek, who is much younger than I am, became Generaloberst much sooner than I. Zeitzler, who was formerly my subordinate, became Generaloberst at the same time as I did.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we will break off.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn this afternoon at 4:30.
DR. EXNER: We were discussing to what extent you enjoyed the favor of the Führer, that is with regard to—
Did you not receive exceptional decorations from Hitler?
JODL: To my surprise, when the Vinnitza crisis was over, on 30 January 1943, I received from the Führer the Golden Party Badge. That was the only decoration I received from the Führer.
DR. EXNER: In the entire 5½ years of war?
JODL: Yes.
DR. EXNER: Did you receive a gift or donation from Hitler, or from the Party?
JODL: Not a single cent. If I am to conceal nothing I must mention the fact that at headquarters we received a package of coffee from the Führer each Christmas.
DR. EXNER: Did you acquire any property in the territories occupied by us, or receive any as a gift or as a token of remembrance?
JODL: Nothing at all. When in the Indictment the sentence is found to the effect that the defendants enriched themselves from the occupied territories, as far as I am concerned I have only one word for that, and I must be frank—it is a libel against a decent German officer.
DR. EXNER: During the war you saved some of your pay as a Generaloberst. How did you invest this money?
JODL: My entire savings of this war are at the moment in Reich bonds...
THE PRESIDENT: He said that he could not save a penny. He has not yet been cross-examined about it.
DR. EXNER: During the entire period of the war you were with Hitler and therefore you must really know him best. So I should like to ask you in detail about the personality of the Führer, but the Court is not very fond of repetition. Therefore tell us quite briefly what particularly influenced you in Hitler’s behavior, what impressed you particularly? What were the things you disliked?
JODL: Hitler was a leader to an exceptional degree. His knowledge and his intellect, his rhetoric, and his will power triumphed in the end in every spiritual conflict over everyone. He combined to an unusual extent logic and clarity of thought, skepticism and excess of imagination, which very frequently foresaw what would happen, but also very often went astray. I really marveled at him when in the winter of 1941-42, by his faith and his energy, he established the wavering Eastern Front; for at that time, as in 1812, a catastrophe was imminent. His life in the Führer headquarters was nothing but duty and work. The modesty in his mode of life was impressive. There was not one day during this war...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. As you said, Dr. Exner, the Tribunal has had to listen to this sort of thing over and over again already. We are not interested in that.
DR. EXNER: Perhaps you can tell the Tribunal something which they have heard less frequently, namely what you disliked in the personality of Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that, put in that general way, it is of any interest to the Tribunal, what he disliked in Hitler. I mean, can he not get on with his own case?
DR. EXNER: Did you feel that you were close to the Führer personally?
JODL: No; in no way at all.
DR. EXNER: All your relations were essentially official?
JODL: Yes, purely official. I did not belong to his private circle, and he did not know any more about me than that my name was Jodl, and that therefore, presumably, I came from Bavaria.
DR. EXNER: Who belonged to the private circle?
JODL: Chiefly all the old guard from the time when the Party was in its developing stage: Bormann first of all, the original women secretaries, his personal physician, and the political or SS adjutants.
DR. EXNER: Your Gauleiter speech was used by the Prosecution to prove that you were an unconditional follower of the Führer and his enthusiastic adherent. Tell us, how did you come to make that speech?
JODL: Bormann proposed this speech to the Führer, and the Führer ordered it, though I undertook this speech very reluctantly, chiefly because of lack of time. But it was generally the wish in this period of crisis...
DR. EXNER: When was this speech?
JODL: In November 1943. The Italian defection had preceded it. It was the time of the heavy air attacks. At that moment it was naturally necessary to give the political leaders at home a completely unembroidered picture of the whole military situation, but at the same time to fill them with a certain amount of confidence in the supreme leadership. This speech, which had the title, “The strategic situation of Germany at the beginning of the fifth year of the war,” could obviously not be made by a Blockleiter, it could only be made by an officer of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and so I came to deliver this speech.
DR. EXNER: What were the contents of this speech?
JODL: The contents, as I have already said, were an over-all picture of the strategic situation. Here, before the Tribunal naturally only the introduction was read. This introduction painted a picture of what lay behind us, but not from the political point of view, rather from the strategic angle. I described the operational necessity for all the operations of the so-called wars of aggression. In no way did I identify myself with the National Socialist Party, but, as is only natural for a General Staff officer, with my Supreme Commander; for at that time it was no longer a question of National Socialism or democracy. The question was the “to be or not to be” of the German people. And there were patriots in Germany too, not only in the neighboring states; and I shall count myself among these patriots while I have breath. Moreover, it is not important to whom one speaks, but it is important what one says and what one speaks about. Besides, I may also state that I delivered that same speech to the military district commanders and to the senior officers of the reserve army.
DR. EXNER: The beginning and the end of the speech contain a eulogy of the Party and the Führer that is incontestable. Why did you include that in a purely objective military speech?
JODL: It was impossible for me to begin a speech of that kind with a critical controversy about the Party or about my Supreme Commander. It was necessary to create confidence between the officer and the Party leader; for this confidence was not only necessary in order that the speech would serve its purpose; this confidence was the prerequisite for victory. Moreover, I should like to make an important point; that which the Prosecution submitted as Document Number L-172...
DR. EXNER: Is that the Gauleiter speech?
JODL: That is not the Gauleiter speech at all; it is not the speech which I delivered. That is nothing else but the “wastepaper basket” version of this speech. It is the first rough draft which was completely revised and altered because it contained many things which were not important. The entire nucleus of the speech, namely the section about the situation at the time, the part dealing with the enemy and the means at his disposal and his intentions, all that is missing. The things contained in this document are many hundreds of notes for the speech which were sent to me by my staff. I compiled my speech from these notes, and then I returned all this material to my staff.
DR. EXNER: Then it is not the manuscript of your speech?
JODL: It is in no way the manuscript; that looks entirely different.
DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to a different point. Which leaders of the Party did you get to know from the time of the seizure of power until the outbreak of the war?
JODL: Not mentioning the soldiers, Reich Minister Frick alone. I was with him twice when the questions of Reich reform were to be discussed.
DR. EXNER: And which of the defendants here present did you know before 1939, or before the beginning of the war?
JODL: Of the defendants here, I knew only the Reich Marshal, Grossadmiral Raeder, Field Marshal Keitel, and Minister Frick; no one else.
DR. EXNER: In the meantime, had you concerned yourself at all with the literature of National Socialism?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Did you participate in Reich Party rallies?
JODL: In the year 1937, in my official capacity, I participated the last 3 days in Nuremberg, when the Labor Service, the SA, and the Wehrmacht were reviewed.
DR. EXNER: Did you participate in the commemorations at Munich, that is, every year on 9 November?
JODL: No. I really did not belong there.
DR. EXNER: Can you tell us what your position was with respect to the semimilitary units of the Party?
JODL: These semimilitary organizations sprang up like mushrooms after the seizure of power; but only the SA under Röhm tried to seize complete power. The witness Gisevius said here that there was no Röhm Putsch. That is correct, but it was just about to happen. At that time in the Reich War Ministry we were armed to the teeth, and Röhm was a real revolutionary, not a frock coat insurgent. When the Führer intervened in June 1934, from that moment there were no more conflicts between the Wehrmacht and the SA. The Wehrmacht became all the more suspicious of the units of the SS, which from that moment multiplied in an extraordinary fashion. The Army, one can very well say, was never reconciled to this dualism of two armed organizations within the country.
DR. EXNER: Now I should like to quote various excerpts from your diary—Document Number 1780-PS, Page 2 of the first volume of the document book—in order to show that Jodl again and again concerned himself with this infiltration of the SS into the Army. On 19 April—that is the second paragraph—or before that, on 22 March, there is an entry to this effect. Then on the 19th of April: “H. visits chief of the Armed Forces Department; tells him his misgivings concerning development of the SS.”
In the French translation this “H” is replaced by “Heydrich.” That, of course, has no sense, for Heydrich certainly had no misgivings concerning the development of the SS; but the “H” quite obviously stands for “Halder,” who was Quartermaster General. I do not know whether this correction was made in the French document book. I am sorry to say that I noted quite a few mistakes in translation in the English and French document books and have applied to the General Secretary in this connection to have corrections made. I must certainly say that this large number of errors in translation makes a doubtful impression, especially if for an “H” the word “Heydrich” is substituted, and the chief of the Armed Forces is connected with one of the most unpleasant figures in the SS. I must say that I am filled with misgivings—I must emphasize this—because in the course of the last few months hundreds of documents have been submitted to the Tribunal, the translation of which we could not check. When we did make a check on one occasion we found quite a few defects, as did Dr. Siemers recently.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you are supposed to be asking the questions. You are making some long statements now.
DR. EXNER: I should like to refer to the next to the last point of 3 February, on the same page...
THE PRESIDENT: Professor Exner, we cannot have counsel making long statements which are not in evidence. You cannot make statements of that sort. If there is any mistranslation you can draw our attention to it; but that is not the way to do it, making general statements about the translation of the documents.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I do not wish to give any more explanations now, but I should like to quote passages from my document book referring to 3 February...
THE PRESIDENT: You have corrected one apparent mistranslation or misinterpretation of the letter “H.” Well, you can do so again, if necessary, in other places. You cannot make general statements about it.
DR. EXNER: I will only read what is permissible. I will read extracts from the document book without making any criticism. I have nothing further to say about that.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. EXNER: It says, on 3 February:
“General Thomas reports that the liaison officer to the Ministry of Economy ... Lieutenant Colonel Drews, visited him by order of Schacht. He was of the opinion that the SS would employ all means to cast suspicion on the Wehrmacht and to force it to the wall in its present weak state.”
Then it says under the date of 10 February:
“Himmler is said to be distressed that senior officers of the Wehrmacht had made unheard of accusations against him.”
Then perhaps one other passage; from the next document, on Page 4 of the document book, again the same diary, Document Number 1809-PS, the entry of 25 May 1940:
“The plan for the unlimited expansion of the SS sounds generally suspicious.”
Did you, even at that time, have misgivings about the dangers of this dualism that you just mentioned?
JODL: As a man very well versed in history, I had many misgivings about this. Not only did I have misgivings, but even during the war I quite openly expressed these misgivings to Himmler and Bormann.
DR. EXNER: How did it come about that Himmler acquired more and more influence in military spheres?
JODL: That can be explained by the fact that the Führer had the feeling—which perhaps on the whole was right—that a large section of the officer corps opposed his ideas. He saw in this attitude not only an inner political danger but also saw in it a danger to victory, which he believed was to be attained only through ruthless methods.
DR. EXNER: And what practical results came about through this?
JODL: The practical results were these: The SS units were multiplied tremendously; the Police received authority which extended even into the operational sphere of the Army, and later, the Higher SS and Police Leaders were created; the intelligence service was transferred to the SS—where, by the way, it was organized by Kaltenbrunner far better than before—the reserve army was put under the jurisdiction of Himmler, and, in the end, also the entire Prisoners of War Organization.
DR. EXNER: In your diary you express satisfaction at the appointment by the Führer of General Von Brauchitsch as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. At that time there was a choice between him and General Reichenau. Why were you glad that Brauchitsch was chosen?
JODL: General Von Reichenau was known as a truly political general, and I was afraid that he might perhaps have no scruples in sacrificing all the good old tradition of the Army to the new regime.
DR. EXNER: I should like to refer in this connection to Jodl’s diary, Document Number 1780-PS, Page 6, first volume, with the entry of 2 February 1938, second paragraph, and again to the entry of 3 February 1938 to be found on Page 7, where he appears particularly happy:
“The chief of the Armed Forces Department informs me that the battle has been won. The Führer has decided that General Von Brauchitsch should be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army.”
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you need read this. It simply says that he is in favor of Von Brauchitsch.
DR. EXNER: You thought about the particular consequences for the generals concerned in case Von Reichenau were appointed?
JODL: Yes. There was no doubt that the senior generals, such as Rundstedt, Bock, Adam, List, Halder, and so on, would never have subordinated themselves to Von Reichenau.
DR. EXNER: After this introduction, let us turn to the crimes against the laws of war and humanity which have been charged against you. There is very little time left. Therefore, I should like to clarify your participation in the Commissar Decree. A draft by the High Command of the Army on the treatment of Soviet commissars was submitted to you, and you put a notation in the margin of this draft on the grounds of which the Prosecution has accused you...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the document?
DR. EXNER: The number of the document is 884-PS, Exhibit Number USSR-351, Page 152, second volume of my document book. The whole is a set of notes on a report.
[Turning to the defendant.] Perhaps you can tell us this first of all: What connection did you have with this matter, that is, with the treatment of commissars?
JODL: I did not participate in preparing this draft. I was not concerned with prisoners of war nor with questions of martial law at that time. But the draft was submitted to me before it was transmitted to Field Marshal Keitel.
DR. EXNER: All right. Now you added: “We must count on retaliation against German fliers. It is best, therefore, to brand the entire action as retaliation.”
What do you mean by this statement?
JODL: The intention of the Führer which was set forth in this draft was rejected unanimously by all soldiers. Very heated discussions took place about this also with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. This resistance ended with the characteristic sentence by the Führer: “I cannot demand that my generals should understand my orders, but I do demand that they follow them.” Now, in this case, by my notation I wanted to indicate to Field Marshal Keitel a new way by which one might possibly still circumvent this order which had been demanded.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution, as you probably remember, have made this order the subject of such a serious charge against the German military authorities because it was drafted before the beginning of the war. These notes are dated 12 May 1941, and there you say: “It is best to brand the entire action as retaliation.” What did you mean by that?
JODL: It is correct that, because of his ideological opposition to Bolshevism, the Führer counted on the possible authorization of the commissars (decree) as a certainty. He was confirmed in this belief, and gave his reasons by saying: “I have carried on the war against Communism for 20 years. I know Communism, but you do not know it.” I must add that we as well were, of course, to a certain extent under the influence of what had been written in the literature of the entire world about Bolshevism since 1917. We also had had some experiences, for example, the Räte Republic in Munich. Despite that, I was of the opinion that first of all we should wait and see whether the commissars would actually act as the Führer expected them to act; and if his suspicions were confirmed, we could then make use of reprisals. That was what I meant by my notation in the margin.
DR. EXNER: That is to say, you wanted to wait until the beginning of the war; then you wanted to wait until you had had experiences in this war; and then you wanted to propose measures which, if necessary, could be considered as reprisals against the methods of fighting used by the enemy. Was that what you meant when you said: “It is best, therefore, to brand the entire action as retaliation”? What do you mean by “Man zieht auf”? These words were translated by the Prosecution as...
MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): My Lord, in the examination of my learned friend, Dr. Exner, he has for several minutes now been asking the defendant very long leading questions as to what was the meaning of the passage in that letter. In my submission, that is not evidence at all by the witness; it is a speech by Dr. Exner, and I would ask him not to make another one now.
DR. EXNER: I still think that it is necessary in the presentation of evidence to determine what the defendant thought when he wrote those words.
THE PRESIDENT: You have heard me say on several occasions that when counsel ask leading questions, which put the answer into the mouth of the witness, it carries very little weight with the Tribunal. It is perfectly obvious that if you wanted to ask what the witness meant by his note he could have answered; and that is the proper way to put the question, and not to suggest the answer to him.
DR. EXNER: First of all I put the question, and then I believe I was summarizing the main points of what the witness said.
There is also a difficulty here with translation which I should like to overcome; that is, I am not sure about it. “Es wird aufgezogen” or “man zieht es am besten auf als Repressalie” is translated as, “It is best therefore to brand” in English, and in French as stigmatiser. It seems to me as though this were not quite correct, and as though one should say, “It is best to handle it as a reprisal,” and in French to say traiter.
[Turning to the defendant.] Then what happened?
JODL: I believe one should further explain the expression “aufziehen.” The German word “aufziehen” also has something doubtful about it. It has been said that that was a typical military expression used by the Defendant Jodl at that time. That does not mean, as is assumed by the Prosecution, “to camouflage.” Rather, I would say literally: “I believe we must handle this operation quite differently,” that is, tackle it in a different way. We would say that we would handle the demonstration to the Führer of new weapons in a different way; that means, for instance, “in a different sequence; in a different manner.” Among us soldiers “aufziehen,” to handle, meant exactly the same as “to tackle” or “to arrange” something. But it did not mean “to deceive.”
DR. EXNER: You mean that the word “aufziehen” has no secondary meaning indicating deception?
JODL: No.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 4 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIXTH DAY Tuesday, 4 June 1946
Morning Session
[The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand.]
DR. EXNER: General, yesterday afternoon we started dealing with war crimes, but today I should like first of all to put a few preliminary questions to you. What position and what tasks were yours during the period of the war?
JODL: I had to deal with the entire general staff work concerning the strategic operational conduct of the war. Then, subordinate to me was the military propaganda department, whose duty it was to co-operate with the press; and thirdly, I was head of an office which, speaking broadly, had to distribute means of communication to the various branches of the Wehrmacht. The whole of this sphere of work took up my time to such an extent that as a rule I worked night after night, until 3 o’clock in the morning. I had no time at all to concern myself with other things. I already had to delegate to my personal adjutant almost all my work with the press, which had to receive daily information.
DR. EXNER: These tasks, which you have just named, were all tasks connected with your office, and that was the Armed Forces Operations Staff, of which you were chief, is that not so?
JODL: Yes, of which I was chief.
DR. EXNER: And one department of the Operations Staff, the main and most important one, was the operations department?
JODL: Yes, operations.
DR. EXNER: And most of your tasks were concerned with this department. The Prosecution say you were Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Keitel. Do you agree?
JODL: That is not correct as has already been shown by the organization which was explained here during Field Marshal Keitel’s case. There is a great difference. As Chief of Staff, I would have been Field Marshal Keitel’s assistant, concerned with all of his duties. I was, however, only the chief of one of the many departments subordinate to Field Marshal Keitel.
Beginning with the year 1941 it became the practice for me and my operational branch to report to the Führer direct on all matters concerned with strategics, while Field Marshal Keitel, using my quartermaster department as a sort of personal working staff, took over all other tasks.
DR. EXNER: Did you, as Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, have authority to issue orders?
JODL: No—or rather only through my working staff. I was subordinate to Field Marshal Keitel, and even Keitel himself was not a commander but only the chief of a staff. But in the course of this war I naturally decided many operational details myself and signed them myself. There was no disagreement of any sort in these matters with the commanders-in-chief for I had their confidence, and I worked on the best possible terms with them.
DR. EXNER: For someone on the outside it is not quite easy to understand that even though you had no authority to issue orders, so many orders have been submitted here which were, in fact, signed by you, and signed in different ways—sometimes with your full name, sometimes with a “J,” the first letter of your name. Please explain these differences.
JODL: One must differentiate as follows: The decrees which the Führer himself signed, if they were of an operational nature, bear my initial at the end, on the lower right; and that means that I at least assisted in the formulation of that order. Then there were orders which also came from the Führer, though they were not signed by him personally, but were signed “by order, Jodl”; but they always had at the beginning the sentence, “The Führer has decreed,” or that sentence was found somewhere in the course of the order. There would be a preamble, usually giving reasons for the order, and then, it would read: “The Führer has therefore decreed.”
DR. EXNER: And what was the difference between these two groups of orders? Why was one group of orders signed by the Führer, and the other only by you?
JODL: The difference was merely that the orders signed by me were of less importance.
DR. EXNER: Now, there were other orders which did not begin with “The Führer has decreed,” but were signed by you nevertheless. What about these?
JODL: These orders were as a rule signed: “The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, by order, Jodl.” These were orders which emanated from me, that is, I or my staff formulated them. The Führer himself and Field Marshal Keitel had perhaps been informed of these orders, but not in every case.
Then there were other orders, which bear my initial on the first page, in the upper right-hand corner. Those were orders issued by other departments. My initial “J” on the first page was merely an office notation to show that the order had been submitted to me. But it did not mean that I had read it for if, on perusing the first page, I saw that the decree dealt with a matter not connected with my sphere of work, then I initialed it and put it aside, because I had to save time.
DR. EXNER: Now, there is another large volume of documents, of which some are being used as very incriminating evidence against you; they are not orders but summarized notes. Can you comment on these?
JODL: These summarized notes were an arrangement used on higher staff levels for the convenience of people who had not time to study enormous files. The summarized notes contained, in a short condensed form, a description of some matter or other, frequently the views taken by other departments and sometimes even a proposal. The important point, however, is that it was not an order; it was not a draft of an order, but it formed the basis for an order.
DR. EXNER: Perhaps the situation will best be clarified if you can explain this to the Tribunal in connection with the draft notes concerning the commissars, which were touched on yesterday. It is 884-PS, Exhibit USSR-351; Volume II of my document book, Page 152.
Before you start I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to an error in the translation. On Page 152, under Figure I, it says:
“The OKH has presented a draft for instructions regarding political officials et cetera ... regarding commissars...”
The English translation says: “The Army High Command presents a statement...”; but it is a draft. And I cannot quite follow the French; it says: Confirmation des instructions. It should obviously be projet.
In any case the German original says:
“The OKH has presented a draft for instructions regarding treatment of political officials et cetera, for the uniform application of the order issued on 31 March 1941.”
And these are the commissars. The whole of this is a condensed draft. Will you please explain what it means?
JODL: This document is a typical example. First of all it contains the draft by another department of the Army High Command, not verbatim, but in a brief, condensed form. Then, secondly, under Figure II, on Page 153, the views of another department—that of Reichsleiter Rosenberg’s—are set forth. Then, under Figure III, it contains a proposal of my own staff.
The whole matter, therefore, is far from being an order; it is to become one. And on a summarized draft like that, I naturally made very many, I might say, cursory marginal notes to serve as a guide for the further treatment and discussion or disposal of the whole question. Therefore one cannot apply to this the same criteria as would be applied to the well-considered words contained in an actual order.
DR. EXNER: All right. So much for the summarized draft and your notes.
Now we turn to the very delicate topic of the Commando Order. This matter has been dealt with here on various occasions; and indeed, it goes beyond this Court in its importance and its repercussions, as we know from the newspapers.
I should like to hear from you something about the factors that led to this order. This order is Document 498-PS, Exhibit Number USA-501. I do not have it in my document book, but I asked the General Secretary to have it put at the disposal of the Tribunal in the various languages. I hope this has been done.
Then there is an explanatory decree in addition to the main order; both are signed by the Führer. That is Document 503-PS, Exhibit Number USA-542.
MR. ROBERTS: It is 498-PS. It is in the Keitel and Jodl Document Book, Number 7, Page 64.
DR. EXNER: The first order is addressed to the troops; the second is an explanatory order addressed to the commanders-in-chief. The first order threatens enemy soldiers with death if they engage in bandit-like warfare; and it refers to the Wehrmacht communiqué in this connection.
Can you first explain the connection between the Commando Order and the Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October ’42?
JODL: May I ask the Tribunal to permit me, as an exception, to go into greater detail. Very much depends on this order; not my person, my own person does not matter in this Trial, but the honor of German soldiers and German officers whom I represent here is in question.
The Commando Order is inseparably linked with the announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942, for this announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué heralded the actual Commando Order.
DR. EXNER: And who was responsible for this announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué? Who wrote it?
JODL: This Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942—it was really a supplement to the communiqué—emanated in the main from me. It deals with the denial of a report by the British Ministry of War, a matter which I will not discuss further, for it is a very delicate point. The Prosecution especially does not wish it to be brought up.
DR. EXNER: But this supplement...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, we do not know—at least I have not seen the document of 7 October 1942, and the Prosecution has made no objection to any answer to any English documents as far as we know.
DR. EXNER: I wished to submit this document but objections were raised.
THE PRESIDENT: What does the defendant mean by saying that the Prosecution does not wish him to present it or to answer it?
DR. EXNER: He probably refers to the fact that we were not allowed to present this Wehrmacht communiqué; but he can give us the contents of it briefly.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, it may be a question of translation, but if he means simply that no evidence has been given by the Prosecution on the subject, of course, there is no objection to his saying that; but when he says that the Prosecution does not want him to put forward or does not want him to answer the document, that is a most improper statement to make.
DR. EXNER: Yes, I understand.
[Turning to the defendant.] Perhaps you can tell us briefly the contents of this Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942. I believe you have it in your own document book.
THE PRESIDENT: No, but, Dr. Exner, that is not quite what I mean. What the defendant has said was that the Prosecution does not want him to deal with this subject.
DR. EXNER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, if that is the remark that is made, that is an improper remark to make. The Prosecution have no communication with the Defense upon this subject, presumably, except that they have put it forward in the evidence in this case.
DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] Did you understand? You must not say that you are not allowed to touch upon this subject. Perhaps you will give us an explanation of what you meant?
JODL: This communiqué is in direct connection with the Commando Order. Only the last paragraph of this Wehrmacht communiqué is important. It was written by the Führer himself, as Field Marshal Keitel has already stated, and Professor Jahrreiss read it here before the Tribunal. It is the sentence which reads:
“...in future all terror and sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices who do not act like soldiers but like bandits will be treated as such by the German troops and will be ruthlessly eliminated in battle wherever they appear.”
This sentence was written, word for word, by the Führer himself.
DR. EXNER: And then you were instructed to issue a detailed order to that effect...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Wait a minute.
Defendant, what the Tribunal wants to know is this: You said that the Commando Order appeared originally in a Wehrmacht report of the 7th of October 1942 which, in the main, emanated from you, and that that report refuted an English statement by the Ministry of War which the Prosecution did not want you to deal with. What do you mean by that?
JODL: By that I meant that my defense counsel intended to submit the entire Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942 as a document in evidence. But he refrained from doing so when the Prosecution objected to the document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have certainly never objected to this document. I have asked Mr. Roberts and he tells me that he has never objected to it; and, as far as we know, no one on behalf of the Prosecution has ever objected to it. I certainly have no objection to it at all myself; as a member of the English Government at the time when this matter was issued, I have never heard anything about it before; but I have no objection to it at all.
DR. EXNER: May I say something?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. EXNER: If there has been a misunderstanding here, we shall be all the more pleased, and we shall submit this Wehrmacht communiqué either this afternoon or tomorrow.
I should like to clarify one point regarding the question which Mr. President put to the defendant. The defendant said that the Wehrmacht communiqué, in the main, emanated from him, but that the Führer wrote the supplementary sentence...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, if you want to correct anything that I have said you must do it through the witness and not through yourself. You are not entitled to give evidence. You only give evidence through the witness.
DR. EXNER: Yes.
[Turning to the defendant.] Please, state once more which part of the Wehrmacht communiqué you wrote and which part was added by the Führer.
JODL: The entire first part of this Wehrmacht communiqué has nothing whatever to do with Commando troops, but is concerned with the well-known affair of the shackling of German prisoners of war on the beach of Dieppe. I shall refer to that again later.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that I was correct in saying that in the main it emanated from you?
JODL: Yes, absolutely. The first part of this Wehrmacht communiqué was formulated by me and contains an authentic refutation of a statement of the British Ministry of War broadcast by the British radio.
This statement of the British Ministry of War was false, and I established the reasons why it was false on the basis of records, photographs, and affidavits which we possessed. Initially this affair had nothing to do with Commandos and reprisals. That was only introduced into the Wehrmacht communiqué through the supplement by the Führer, which begins with the sentence: “The High Command of the Wehrmacht is therefore compelled to decree the following.”
DR. EXNER: And it was considered necessary to make this announcement known in the Wehrmacht communiqué in an executive order. Did the Führer demand from you drafts for an executive order?
JODL: When the Führer had written this last supplementary sentence, he turned to Field Marshal Keitel and to me and demanded an executive order to follow this general announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué. And he added: “But I do not want any military courts.”
DR. EXNER: Did you make a draft?
JODL: I had very many doubts which a careful study of the Hague rules of warfare could not dispel. Neither Field Marshal Keitel nor I prepared such a draft; but members of my staff, on their own initiative, asked for drafts and for the views of various departments. Thus Document 1263-PS came into being, to which I shall return later.
THE PRESIDENT: That is Document 1263-PS?
DR. EXNER: 1263. It is Page 104, Volume II of my document book, 1263-PS, RF-365; but we shall deal with that later.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say Page 204?
DR. EXNER: No, Page 104, Volume II.
[Turning to the defendant.] Please continue.
JODL: My wish was an entirely different one. It was my intention to avoid an order altogether, and I rather expected that as a result of the announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué—an announcement which was certainly not kept secret but which was broadcast over the air to the entire world—the British Ministry of War would approach us again, either directly or via Geneva, as it had done on several previous occasions. And I hoped that in this way the whole matter would be shifted to the sphere of the Foreign Office. However, that did not happen. The British War Ministry remained silent.
In the meantime 10 days had passed and nothing had been done. Then on 17 October General Schmundt, the Chief Adjutant of the Führer, came to me and said that the Führer was demanding an executive order. I gave him the following answer, word for word:
“Please give him my best regards, but I will not issue an order like that.” Schmundt laughed and said, “Well, I cannot tell him that,” and my reply was, “Very well, then, tell the Führer that I do not see how a decree like that could be justified under international law.”
And with that he left. I hoped now that I would be asked to come to the Führer, so that at last, after many months, I should again be able to speak to him personally.
DR. EXNER: And this coincided with the Vinnitza crisis?
JODL: Yes. I wanted an opportunity either of telling him my misgivings or else being thrown out altogether. Either eventuality would have helped me but neither occurred. A few minutes later Schmundt called me on the telephone and informed me that the Führer was going to draw up the orders himself. On 18 October Schmundt again came in person and brought with him these two orders of the Führer—the order to the troops, and an explanation for the commanders.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you referring to two documents which are before us?
JODL: These are the two documents, 498-PS and 503-PS. The papers submitted to the Tribunal as documents are not the originals of the Führer; I personally handed over the originals at Flensburg. The documents which are in the hands of the Tribunal are copies of the originals, or mimeographed copies of my staff.
DR. EXNER: Now, I should like to interpolate a question. You mentioned that your staff worked out something in detail, and you referred to 1263-PS, which has been submitted to the Tribunal—Page 104 of Volume II. In this document you wrote two remarks on Page 106. The first remark on that page is “No.” In the French translation this non is missing, and should be added. On the same page a little further down, it says in your own handwriting, “That will not do either,” and your initial “J” for Jodl.
Can you explain in general what this means?
JODL: As I have already said, the members of my staff—as may be seen under the first figure on Page 104—on their own initiative asked for proposals, firstly, from the foreign intelligence department, Canaris, because he had a group of experts on international law and, secondly, from the Wehrmacht legal department, since, after all, we were concerned with a legal problem.
On Page 106, under paragraph “a,” there is the proposal which the foreign division of the intelligence department made:
“Members of terrorist and sabotage troops who are found ... without uniform, or in German uniform, will be treated as bandits ... or if they fall into German hands outside battle operations, they are to be taken at once to an officer for interrogation. Thereafter they are to be dealt with by summary court martial.”
That was quite impossible, for if one came across a soldier in civilian clothing, without uniform, no one could know just who he was. He might be a spy or an escaped prisoner-of-war or an enemy airman who had saved his life by jumping from his plane and now hoped to escape in civilian clothing. That had to be determined by an experienced interrogating officer and not by a summary court martial consisting of a lieutenant, two noncommissioned officers, and two soldiers. In paragraph “b”...
DR. EXNER: And for that reason you wrote “No”?
JODL: For that reason I wrote “No.”
In paragraph “b” it was suggested that if such sabotage groups were captured wearing uniforms, a report should be made to the Armed Forces Operations Staff, which should then decide what should be done. But in that case the Armed Forces Operations Staff would have assumed the function of a military court, and that it could never be.
I really must claim for myself that, thanks to my wider experience, I saw these problems a little more clearly than some of my subordinates.
DR. EXNER: And so you rejected this proposal. You said that you also had grave misgivings about the Führer Order. Will you tell the Court now what misgivings you had?
JODL: First of all I had a number of doubts as to its legality. Secondly, the order was ambiguous, and also it was not sufficiently clear for practical application. Particularly in this case I considered military courts absolutely necessary. I know well that even judges may on occasion, consciously or not, be under coercion and may pass judgment not strictly in accordance with the law; but at least they provide some safeguard against a miscarriage of justice.
DR. EXNER: Therefore, if I understand you rightly, you wanted to install some legal procedure. What did you mean by unclear and ambiguous?
JODL: The theory was that soldiers, who by their actions put themselves outside the laws of war, cannot claim to be treated in accordance with the laws of war. This is a basic principle definitely recognized in international law, for instance in the case of a spy or a franc-tireur.
The aim of this order was to intimidate British Commando troops who were using such methods of warfare. But the order of the Führer went further and said that all Commando troops were to be massacred. This was the point on which I had grave misgivings.
DR. EXNER: What legal doubts did you have?
JODL: Just this doubt—that on the basis of this order, soldiers also would be massacred...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, it is not necessary to speak so slowly, if you can speak a little bit more fast.
JODL: I was afraid that not only enemy soldiers who, to use the Führer’s expression, really behaved like bandits, but also decent enemy soldiers, would be wiped out. In addition—and this was especially repugnant to me—at the very end of Document 503-PS it was ordered that soldiers were to be shot after they had been captured and had been interrogated. What was totally unclear to me was the general legal position, namely, whether a soldier who had acted like a bandit would upon capture enjoy the legal status of a prisoner-of-war, or whether on account of his earlier behavior he had already placed himself outside this legal status.
DR. EXNER: By that you mean the Geneva Convention?
JODL: Yes, I mean the Geneva Convention.
DR. EXNER: Could you understand the idea that enemy soldiers who had acted in an unsoldierly manner should not be treated as soldiers?
JODL: Yes, I could quite understand that, and so could others, for the Führer had received very bitter reports. We had captured all the orders of the Canadian brigade which had landed at Dieppe, and these orders were put before me in the original. These orders said that, wherever possible, German prisoners were to have their hands shackled. But after some time, through the Commander, West, I received authentic reports and testimony of witnesses, with photographs, which definitely convinced me that numerous men of the Todt Organization, fathers of families, unarmed, old people, who were wearing an arm band with a swastika—that was their badge—had been shackled with a loop around their necks and the end of the rope fastened around their bent-back legs in such a way that they had strangled themselves.
I may add that I kept these photographs from the Führer, and I did not tell him of these aggravating incidents which to me had been proved. I concealed them from the German people and from the Propaganda Ministry. Then came the English radio report denying emphatically that any German soldier had been shackled at Dieppe.
Some time later, a Commando troop made an attack on the island of Saercq. Again we received official reports that German prisoners had been shackled.
Finally we captured the so-called British order for close combat. That was the last straw for the Führer; I also studied it very carefully. These close-combat instructions showed by pictures how men could be shackled in such a way that they would strangle themselves through the shackling, and it was stated exactly within what time death would occur.
DR. EXNER: Therefore, the reasons which Hitler gave for his Order 498 were actually based on reliably reported facts. I remark that Hitler referred to prisoners who had been shackled, prisoners who had been killed, and that criminals, as Commandos...
THE PRESIDENT: You are paraphrasing the evidence in a way that is inaccurate, because the defendant has just said that he kept these things from Hitler. You are now saying that Hitler knew about them. That is not what the witness said.
DR. EXNER: Then, I must ask you whether the facts upon which this order is based were reported to you.
JODL: I believe the Tribunal has Document 498-PS. In it the Führer first makes the general statement that for some time our opponents in their conduct of the war have been using methods which violate the international Geneva Convention. I must support this statement as true on the basis of reports which, regrettably, we had been receiving since the summer of 1941. I do not wish to go into individual cases. There was an outrageous incident with a British U-boat in the Aegean Sea. There was the order in North Africa that German prisoners of war should not be given water before they were interrogated. There were a large number of such reports.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal thinks that it is very difficult to go into individual incidents which occurred long before this order was drafted, and you have told us what you said the order was drafted in respect of, namely the shackling; and you are now referring to other things which you allege happened long before that. It does not seem that it is possible for the Tribunal to investigate all those matters which happened long before.
JODL: And I do not want to speak about these matters any longer. I only want to point out, as I think I must, that generally speaking the reasons given by the Führer for this order did not spring from a diseased imagination but were based on actual proof in his and in our possession. For it is certainly very different whether I, in my own mind, had to admit there was some justification for this order or whether I considered the whole order an open scandal. That is a vital point for my own conduct. But I shall try to be very brief. The fact that many previously convicted persons and criminals were included in the Commandos, who were of course reckless people, was proved by the testimony of prisoners; and the fact that prisoners were shackled was obvious from captured orders and the testimony of witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: You have told us that already. We have heard that more than once—that you had evidence before you that prisoners were shackled and that you had the Canadian orders before you.
DR. EXNER: Perhaps you can just say a few words on the subject of killing prisoners.
JODL: In conclusion, I want to say that I did not see any order, any captured order, which decreed death for German prisoners of war, though this was also contained as a reason in the Führer Order. But I must explain that the British Ministry of War advised us—I cannot recall exactly whether it was via Geneva or through the radio—that situations might very well arise in which prisoners of war would have to be killed—no, rather, in which prisoners of war would have to be shackled because otherwise one would be forced to kill them. And so, if at the end here the Führer says orders have been found according to which the Commandos were on principle to kill prisoners, then I think he is referring to the British close-combat instructions which described a method of shackling which would cause death.
DR. EXNER: And that was your own part in this Commando Order?
JODL: My part consisted only in distributing this order, or having it distributed, in accordance with express instructions.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution said once that you also signed this order—one of these two orders, I do not know which one. That is not correct?
JODL: No, I signed only a general decree to have one of the orders kept secret.
DR. EXNER: Yes, we will deal with that in a moment. Could you have refused to transmit this order?
JODL: No, if I had refused to transmit an order of the Führer, I would have been arrested immediately; and I must say, with justification. But as I said, I was not at all sure whether this decree, either in its entirety or in part, actually violated the law; and I still do not know that today. I am convinced that if one were to convene here a conference of experts on international law, each one of them would probably have a different opinion on the subject.
DR. EXNER: General, you can speak a little faster.
Could you have made counterproposals?
JODL: At any other time, probably yes. At that time, however—a time of conflict with the Führer—it was not possible for me to speak to him personally at all. To broach the subject during the general conference on the situation was quite out of the question. Therefore I intended in the execution of this order to adopt a very magnanimous attitude, and I was certain that the commanders-in-chief would do the same.
DR. EXNER: And what do you mean by magnanimous? Could this order have been interpreted in different ways?
JODL: Yes. The order offered two ways of avoiding the treatment of really decent soldiers like criminals. If a Commando troop, mostly encountered in fights at night, was not wiped out but captured, as was the rule in almost all cases, that was already certain proof that our troops did not consider these men as bandits. It was then the task of the commanders-in-chief to make an investigation. If it was purely a reconnaissance operation, the entire action did not fall within the sphere of the Commando Order at all and would not be reported as a Commando raid. However, if the operation was really carried out by a sabotage and demolition unit, its equipment had to be examined. It had to be investigated whether the men were wearing civilian clothing under their uniforms; whether they were carrying the famous armpit guns, which go off automatically when the arms are lifted in the act of surrender; or whether they used other despicable methods during the fighting. The commanders-in-chief could then act in accordance with the outcome of such an investigation. I believe that in that way it was quite possible—and in fact it happened many times, I might almost say in the bulk of cases—that the shooting of brave, decent soldiers was avoided.
DR. EXNER: Could you yourself exert any influence on the practices followed by the troops?
JODL: I tried to exert my influence on various occasions. When it was reported to me that a Commando unit had been captured—which according to the Führer decree was not allowed—then I raised no questions or objections. I made no report at all to the Führer on Commando operations which met with only minor success. And finally, I often dissuaded him from taking too drastic views, as in the Pescara case, which Field Marshal Kesselring has already described here, when I succeeded in convincing the Führer that only a reconnaissance unit was involved.
DR. EXNER: Were many units actually wiped out?
JODL: Commando operations decreased considerably as a result of the public announcements in the Wehrmacht communiqué. I believe that not more than 8 or 10 cases occurred in all.
For a time, during the months of July and August 1944, increasingly large numbers of terrorists were reported killed in the Wehrmacht communiqué; these, however, were not Commando troops, but insurgents who were killed in the fighting in France. That may be proved if the Tribunal will read Document 551-PS, Figure 4. There the order is given—it is USA-551, on Page 117.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is Page 70 of Book 7.
JODL: Or Page 117 of our Volume II. There it is ordered...
DR. EXNER: What is ordered? I should like to deal now with another document, Document 532-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: It is time to break off.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. EXNER: With reference to the Commando Order, I want to mention Document 532-PS, Exhibit Number RF-368, which is in our Document Book 2, Page 113.
This document was offered on a previous occasion, and I objected to it because it was not signed, or rather because it was crossed out.
Will you explain why you crossed out the draft order which is contained in this document?
JODL: Immediately before this draft order was written, the Commander, West requested that now, after the invasion, the Commando Order should be rescinded altogether. I approved that proposal. A draft was submitted to me here which rescinded the order only partially, namely in regard to the immediate area of the beachhead and that part of Brittany, a little further from the beachhead, where landings by parachutists were taking place daily at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: At the time of your objection was this document not rejected? You told us that you objected to the document. What I am asking you is, what did the Tribunal do upon your objection? Did they maintain it, or did they deny it?
DR. EXNER: The objection was allowed, and I think the document was struck off. I do not think that I am mistaken.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, why are you putting it in now?
DR. EXNER: I did not ask at the time to have the document struck off. I merely raised the objection that no mention was made of the facts that the draft order in the document was crossed out, and that it clearly bore a handwritten marginal note by Jodl rejecting it.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. Either the document was offered in evidence or it was not; and either it has got an exhibit number or it has not; and, as I understand, your objection was rejected.
MR. ROBERTS: It was in fact objected to by Dr. Exner, after having been given the French Exhibit Number RF-368; and after discussing it, it was then stricken from the record, the English shorthand note reference being Page 3631 (Volume VI, Page 360). My Lord, I think in fact both the Prosecution and the Defense agreed it has Jodl’s writing upon it; and, therefore, I feel certain that there can be no question as to its admissibility, either on behalf of the Prosecution or the Defense. My Lord, I certainly intend, with the permission of the Tribunal, to cross-examine him about it; and I have not the slightest objection to my friend Dr. Exner putting it in.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. It may, therefore, be left in as RF-368.
DR. EXNER: Will you continue?
JODL: At that time it was my intention to get rid of the Commando Order entirely. For that reason I wrote, next to the sentence under Figure 4: “That is just what they should not”—the entire first page. That was of no use, however, because on that very day the Führer made a different decision with regard to the request of the Commander, West, and his decision is contained in Document 551-PS.
DR. EXNER: 551-PS, Exhibit Number USA-551. That is contained in the second volume on Page 115; it is an order on the treatment of men belonging to Commandos. This order contains the following handwritten remark of yours: “Similar action should be taken in the Italian theater of war.” This is on Page 117.
Will you briefly explain the contents of that order and the reason for your remark.
JODL: That can be quickly explained. In that order territorial limits were set restricting the use of the Commando Order, which henceforth was to apply only to enemy operations behind the corps command posts but not to the battle area of the beachhead. These were territorial limitations which had not so far been fixed or ordered; and I immediately accepted this order for the Italian theater of war, because in Italy also there existed a fighting front on land. If this order were put into practice in Italy, it would mean that no Commando operation which began with a landing on the coast need be regarded as a Commando operation, because all these landings took place in front of the lines of the corps command posts. Therefore I was very anxious to have the same lighter conditions applied to the whole Italian theater of war.
DR. EXNER: I just want to read one paragraph on Page 116. It is the second paragraph under Number 1. In the first paragraph it says: “...the order remains in force....” But the second paragraph reads:
“Excepted are enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate battle area of the beachhead—that is in the area of the divisions fighting in the front line—as well as reserve troops up to and including corps commands, in accordance with Figure 5 of the basic order....”
The word “Generalkommando” means “corps command,” and it has not been quite correctly translated into English and French. This limitation of the order to certain areas was, on the basis of Jodi’s comment, also to apply to the Italian theater.
Now finally—but before that I have another important question...
THE PRESIDENT: What is it you are saying about this translation?
DR. EXNER: Yes; the word “Generalkommando” has been translated into the French, Région Militaire. Région Militaire is not quite clear.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that in the English?
DR. EXNER: And in the English it says, “corps command.” That is correct. The English is correct: “corps command.” That is the same as “Generalkommando.”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal would prefer that you should draw the attention of the Tribunal to anything which you say is a mistranslation, rather than stating that it is a mistranslation. I call it a question of opinion whether it is a mistranslation or not. It is not for you to tell us that it is a mistranslation. You may draw our attention to it and say that you submit it as a mistranslation. But now, will you tell us this also: In one copy of this Document 551-PS, it appears to be signed by, or initialed by Warlimont. In the other, in your version of the translation, it appears to be signed by the Defendant Keitel. What is the explanation of that?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, might I make a suggestion? I think the Court should get the original from the Exhibit Room. 551-PS in fact consists of three documents. The first is a draft altered in pencil; and the second is a draft initialed “W”—that is Warlimont, with Jodi’s penciled note at the end extending it to Italy; and the third is the final order in which the penciled note of Jodl and the alteration of distribution to Italy is incorporated. So, there are really three documents, and the last is a mimeographed document with the mimeographed signature of Keitel. That appears from the original draft.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Exner.
DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution has been emphasizing that you gave strict instructions to have this order kept secret, and that you ordered its distribution only down to the level of commanding officers to avoid its falling into enemy hands at all costs. You gave these instructions for the second order, the explanatory order, 503-PS. Will you explain why you ordered such strict secrecy?
JODL: These instructions for secrecy refer actually only to Document 503-PS.
DR. EXNER: That, I may add, is in the second volume of my document book, on Page 102. That is the order for secrecy, signed by Jodl.
[Turning to the defendant.] Will you continue?
JODL: Particular secrecy for this order was quite inevitable. First of all, it was directed only to the commanders. Secondly, the order contained in great detail information on the considerable damage which the German Wehrmacht had already suffered through these Commando operations, and the damage which might still be caused under certain circumstances. If the order were to fall into enemy hands, it would certainly be an incentive for the enemy to continue that particular type of warfare in increased measure. Thirdly, the order, 498-PS, could be considered as a reprisal. But the last sentence in Document 503-PS, a sentence which can easily be recognized as a later addition—as the order seems to end before it—that sentence, I must say, made me indignant and was one of the reasons why I insisted on such particularly strict secrecy for this order.
THE PRESIDENT: Which sentence are you referring to?
JODL: I refer to the last sentence of document 503-PS, which says:
“If it should serve some useful purpose to save one or two men temporarily to interrogate them, they are to be shot immediately after interrogation.”
I cannot prove it...
THE PRESIDENT: That is not in 503, is it?
DR. EXNER: 503-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: You have not printed the whole of 503 in your document book. Is that it?
DR. EXNER: Unfortunately, 503-PS is not in it, but only the secrecy order, Page 102. I expressly requested, however, that it should be submitted to the Tribunal.
JODL: May I add that this sentence became the source of all trouble. The troops made use of that sentence and on principle, or as a rule, did not kill Commandos but took them prisoner.
DR. EXNER: You said this last sentence made you indignant. Were you also convinced that it was against international law?
JODL: One might have doubts in that respect too. But I found it distasteful from a human point of view, for if one does shoot a man, I think it is base to extort all information out of him first.
DR. EXNER: I want to ask one more question concerning what you mentioned before the recess. You said that you did not report everything to the Führer; you did not report all Commando raids to him. That is quite clear. But you said you also did not report information which you obtained from the enemy—killings, and so on. What did you mean by that?
JODL: I reported the results of Dieppe and, should we say, the violations of international law which we considered had been committed there—the shackling of German prisoners, and so on. There was only one thing which I did not report, namely, the shackling of some men belonging to the Todt Organization in such a manner that they strangled themselves. I did not report that, and it did not appear in any order or Wehrmacht communiqué.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already told us about this, so why you should ask him again I don’t know.
DR. EXNER: I thought it was not quite clear.
[Turning to the defendant.] We now pass to another subject, the order regarding Leningrad and Moscow. How did Hitler’s order about the fate of Leningrad and Moscow come into being? It is C-123, second volume, Page 145 of my document book; it was submitted under the number USSR-114. This is the order stating that surrender was not to be accepted. How did this order come into being?
JODL: At the beginning of the second paragraph appears the sentence: “The moral justification for this measure is clear to the whole world.” I shall now explain that. The first reason was a report from Field Marshal Von Leeb, the Commander of Army Group North at Leningrad. He reported that the population of Leningrad had already begun to flock out toward his lines in the south and west. He pointed out that it would be absolutely impossible for him to keep these millions of Leningrad people fed and supplied if they were to fall into his hands, because the supply situation of the army group was deplorable at that time. That was the first reason. But shortly beforehand Kiev had been abandoned by the Russian armies, and hardly had we occupied the city when tremendous explosions occurred one after another. The major part of the inner city was destroyed by fire; 50,000 people were made homeless; German soldiers were used to fight the flames and suffered considerable losses, because further large masses of explosives went off during the fire. At first the local commander at Kiev thought that it was sabotage on the part of the population, until we found a demolition chart, listing 50 or 60 objectives in Kiev which had already been prepared for destruction some time before; and this chart was in fact correct, as investigation by engineers proved at once. At least 40 more objectives were ready to be blown up, and for most of them a remote-control was to set off the explosion by means of wireless waves. I myself had the original of this demolition chart in my hands. That proved...
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need go into the details of Kiev. This deals with Leningrad. The defendant might briefly state in substance what he says happened at Kiev; but we cannot investigate details of it.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, the defendant wanted to show that it was feared these happenings in Kiev might repeat themselves in Leningrad.
THE PRESIDENT: I quite understand that; but if he said that he had plans of the blowing up of Leningrad, it would be a different matter, and he could give that in more detail. But what I am saying is we cannot go into the details about Kiev.
DR. EXNER: No. I only want to refer without quoting to my Exhibit AJ-15 (Document Jodl-50), on Page 149 of my second volume. That is a report on these explosions in Kiev. We will not delay over this matter any more now. I just wanted to bring it to the notice of the Tribunal.
[Turning to the defendant.] Please continue.
JODL: Then I only need to say in conclusion that the Führer always expected that what had happened in Kiev, in Kharkov, and in Odessa would happen also in Leningrad, and possibly in Moscow. That was the decisive reason why this order, which already had been put into writing, was given by him orally to the High Command of the Army. And the order was given added weight because the Russian radio reported that Leningrad had been undermined and would be defended to the last man.
The purpose of the order was exclusively that of protecting German troops against such catastrophes as had already occurred; for entire staffs had been blown into the air in Kharkov and Kiev. For this reason the Führer issued this order, which I in turn, at his express request, put into writing. Therefore the order began with the words, “The Führer has again decided”—that means “once more,” “for the second time.”
DR. EXNER: What was the reason for the order to leave openings to the east in the encirclement of Leningrad and Moscow?
JODL: We did not want these masses of the population. We had had our experiences in Paris. There it had even been necessary to use the transport space of four divisions and the whole relief train “Bavaria,” which could supply tens of thousands of people, to save the population from starvation. In Leningrad that would have been quite impossible, because in the first place the railways had been destroyed; the rails had not yet been adjusted to our gauge, and the supply situation was very difficult. It would have been impossible to help these millions of people in any way; there would have been a real catastrophe. Hence the idea of pressing them back to the east, into the Russian areas; an idea, incidentally, not in conformity with the assertion which has been made here that we wanted to exterminate the Slavs.
DR. EXNER: I now come to another subject. The French prosecutor has accused you of ordering in Document UK-56—which is Exhibit RF-335 in my document book, the second volume, Page 153—of ordering the deportation of Jews, thereby giving, as chief of a military staff, a political order.
Will you explain how this order came into being?
THE PRESIDENT: I think the translation must have come through wrong. You said—at least, I took it down—Page 153.
DR. EXNER: Page 155. I beg your pardon, it is on Page 155 of the second volume of my document book. The actual order is on Page 156.
[Turning to the defendant.] Please reply.
JODL: I must explain in connection with this document that the deportation of Jews from Denmark was discussed during a conference at which I did not participate. Himmler suggested it to the Führer; and the Führer approved or ordered it. I was informed of it either through General Schmundt or Ambassador Hewel.
Then on instructions conveyed to me by Schmundt, I transmitted to the military commander in Denmark the details of this order. The heading, or rather, the address of this teleprint message shows that it was directed to two offices, namely to the Foreign Office and to the commander of the German troops in Denmark. These are the two principal offices for which it was destined. The Reichsführer SS received the letter only for information purposes, as is noted on it in accordance with our office practice. He did not have to act upon it; it was not an order for him, but it was merely for information. He already knew the Führer’s decision.
I did not in any way order the deportation of the Jews, but I wrote, “The deportation of Jews will be carried out by the Reichsführer SS...”
DR. EXNER: That is under Figure 2?
JODL: Figure 2. Had this been an order, it would have had to be addressed to the Reichsführer SS; and it would have had to be worded like this: “Reichsführer SS is to deport Jews from Denmark.” But it is exactly the other way about. This Figure 2 informs General Von Hannecken in Denmark that he has nothing to do with this affair, but that it is being handled by the Reichsführer SS. But General Von Hannecken had to be told of this, because at that time a state of military emergency existed. He had executive power in Denmark, and if anything like that had been done without his knowledge he might immediately have objected to it and forbidden it.
The matter appeared to me so urgent that, in order to avoid incidents, I informed the military commander in Denmark about it over the telephone, quite openly and without regard to its secrecy. The French Prosecution mentioned an indiscretion which enabled most Jews to escape from Denmark into Sweden; presumably it was this telephone call which made that possible.
Finally, therefore, I repeat that I was far from ordering the deportation of Jews; I merely informed the military commander in question that he was to have nothing to do with the matter. Besides, as I heard afterwards on making inquiries, these Jews were taken to Theresienstadt, where they were cared for and visited by the Red Cross; and even the Danish minister declared himself satisfied with their treatment.
DR. EXNER: May I draw the attention of the Tribunal to what I consider is an inadequate translation into English and French. Under Figure 1 on Page 156 of the second volume the word “volunteers” does not appear in the translation. It says here, “The Reichsführer SS has permission to recruit volunteers from the former members of the Danish forces who are to be released...” The word “volunteers” is missing in the English translation; the French, merely says hommes—“men.”
[Turning to the defendant.] You actually had no dealings with matters in occupied territories; they were outside your jurisdiction. How then did you come to sign this order?
JODL: Actually this affair did not concern me at all. I signed the order because Field Marshal Keitel was away on that day.
DR. EXNER: As we are just talking of the Jews, will you tell the Court what you knew about the extermination of Jews? I remind you that you are under oath.
JODL: I know just how improbable these explanations sound, but very often the improbable is true and the probable untrue. I can only say, fully conscious of my responsibility, that I never heard, either by hint or by written or spoken word, of an extermination of Jews. On one single occasion I had doubts, and that was when Himmler spoke about the revolt in the Jewish Ghetto. I did not quite believe in this heroic fight; but Himmler immediately supplied photographs showing the concrete dugouts which had been built there, and he said, “Not only the Jews but also Polish Nationalists have taken refuge there and they are offering bitter resistance.” And with that he removed my suspicions.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of Warsaw?
JODL: I am speaking of the uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto of which I heard through a personal report from Himmler given in our presence, in the presence of soldiers at the Führer’s headquarters. Himmler spoke only of an uprising and of bitter fighting. As far as the activities of the Police are concerned, of the so-called action groups, Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos—a conception, incidentally, of which I first heard here in detail—there was never any explanation through the Führer himself other than that these police units were necessary to quell uprisings, rebellions, and partisan actions before they grew into a menace. This was not a task for the Armed Forces, but for the Police, and for that reason the Police had to enter the operational areas of the Army. I have never had any private information on the extermination of the Jews; and on my word, as sure as I am sitting here, I heard all these things for the first time after the end of the war.
DR. EXNER: What did you know about concentration camps...
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think it is necessary to point out to you that you cannot speak about there having been no explanation to the Führer; you can only speak about there having been no explanation to yourself. The translation I heard was, as to these Einsatzgruppen, that there had been no explanation to the Führer.
THE INTERPRETER: From the Führer.
THE PRESIDENT: From the Führer?
THE INTERPRETER: Yes, My Lord.
JODL: I said that the Führer had never given us any other reason for the presence of police forces than his statement that police measures were necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: I misheard the translation.
DR. EXNER: Did you know anything about concentration camps, or what did you know about them? Please be brief.
JODL: I can briefly say that I knew there were concentration camps at Dachau and Oranienburg. Some divisional officers visited Oranienburg once in 1937 and gave me very enthusiastic accounts of it. I heard the name of Buchenwald for the first time in the spring of 1945. When the name was mentioned, I thought it was a new troop training camp; and I made inquiries. The inmates were always described as German habitual criminals and certain inveterate political opponents, who however, like Schuschnigg or Niemöller, were held there in a kind of honorable detention. I never heard a single word about tortures, deported persons, or prisoners of war, crematoriums or gas vans, torments reminiscent of the Inquisition, and medical experiments. I can only say that, even if I had heard of these things, I would not have believed them until I had seen them with my own eyes.
DR. EXNER: The French prosecutor read a statement by the German Police General Panke, according to which you were present at a conference with Hitler on 30 December 1942, when terror and counterterror and so on, and reprisal murders in Denmark were said to have been discussed. What do you say to that?
JODL: I think it was on 30 December 1943.
DR. EXNER: Was it?
JODL: In some points that statement is correct; in others it is incorrect. During that conference, at least as long as I was present, the word “murder” was never mentioned. The Führer said:
“I want to fight the terror of sabotage and attacks, now beginning in Norway, with exactly the same weapons. That is to say, if a Danish factory working for Germany is blown up, which has happened, then a factory working solely for the Danes will be blown up also. If some of our strong points are attacked by terrorists, which has also happened, these terrorists will be hunted, surrounded, and wiped out in fighting; and I do not want courts martial, which only create martyrs.”
He did not say or suggest, however, that innocent Danes should now be murdered as a reprisal. I can only say that, in my presence and in the presence of Field Marshal Keitel, that and nothing else was said. Again, it is a very debatable question from the point of view of international law whether an army is not entitled to adopt the fighting methods of its opponents in its countermeasures, particularly in such franc-tireur warfare and in rebellions like these. It seems to me a very moot point.
DR. EXNER: You just said, “as long as I was present.” Were you not present during the entire conference? Can you remember?
JODL: I do not think that even in my absence any other statements were made. Once during the conference I went out to telephone and was away for a short time, perhaps 15 minutes.
DR. EXNER: We now come to the partisan fighting. Partisan fighting and partisans have been mentioned frequently here. Can you say briefly what these partisans were?
JODL: It is not easy to define that clearly, considering all the types of fighting adopted in this world war; but there are five characteristics:
1) A partisan group is a fighting unit formed behind one’s own front; 2) it is not or is only partly in uniform; 3) it is not an organic part of the Armed Forces even though it receives its orders from them; 4) it must be in a position, or it generally is in a position to...
THE PRESIDENT: We don’t require a lecture about this matter.
DR. EXNER: Well, then we know approximately what partisans are. I now want to ask you about the fighting against partisan groups. First of all I must read what we have heard here about partisans, Document L-180, USA-276, which is contained in the second volume of my document book, Page 121. That is a complete report of an Einsatzgruppe in action against partisans; it is Appendix Number 9. What is found on Page 122 is, I think, of importance. First of all under Roman Numeral I, Figure 5, I quote:
“In the larger cities, especially those with industrial works, so-called istrebitelni battalions (i. e. destruction battalions) were formed by the Soviets before the entry of the German troops....”
Then, under Roman Numeral III:
“...the tasks and fighting methods of the various partisan groups have become known ... partly from the captured combat directives of the partisans themselves. This statement of a captured partisan ... is significant: ‘A partisan must destroy everything that he can reach...’”
And then, in one of the “Combat Directives for Partisan Groups” received by us from the commander of the army, rear area North, we find stated:
“Unbearable conditions are to be created for the enemy and his allies in territories occupied by him. All the measures of the enemy are to be opposed.”
And then instructions are given to blow up bridges, to destroy roads, et cetera. I shall not read it all. In the last paragraph, which I have on Page 123, it expressly states that partisans are to disguise themselves cleverly; that they will sometimes appear as farmers or will work in the fields as soon as German forces appear in the vicinity. The witness Von dem Bach-Zelewski stated here that the fight against partisans was carried out in a chaotic manner. He meant by that that it was not directed from higher quarters. You must be informed about that. Is that correct?
JODL: No, that is not correct. This expert on partisan fighting obviously has a bad memory. I draw attention to Document F-665, in Document Book 2, Page 126. Here the first page is given of a directive for partisan warfare. It is called “Instructions for Partisan Warfare,” and was signed by me personally on 6 May 1944. The Tribunal will see that in the second sentence it says that...
DR. EXNER: Page 126.
JODL: ...the instructional pamphlet number so-and-so, “Instructions for Partisan Warfare in the East,” issued by the OKW, Armed Forces Operations Staff, dated 11 November 1942, is canceled. That proves that at least since 11 November 1942, the troops had in their possession instructions issued by the Armed Forces Operations Staff as to how the battle against partisans should be conducted.
DR. EXNER: May I now draw attention to my Document AJ-1, Page 133. It is an affidavit of a Pastor Wettberg; I do not want to read it. Pastor Wettberg contacted me because he himself had been engaged in the warfare against partisans, and he confirmed that the fighting was perfectly well directed even before the new instructions were issued, that is, from 1942 onwards. In 1944 you issued this new directive without Hitler’s permission; is that correct?
JODL: Yes.
DR. EXNER: What made you do that? Was it not an unusual step?
JODL: I want to state that I did not submit this directive either to Field Marshal Keitel or to the Führer, because it was a contradiction of all existing orders. I shall prove in detail later that it gives instructions for all so-called partisans in France and Yugoslavia—partisan areas in Russia were now in front of our lines—to be treated immediately as regular fighting troops, and thus as prisoners of war.
I took this unusual step because I became convinced, after the shooting of the English Air Force officers at Sagan, that the Führer no longer concerned himself with the idea of human rights; and also because after 1 May 1944 I myself felt responsible for questions of international law, as the “Canaris” department had been dissolved on that day and the foreign section, together with the international law department, had come under my command. I was resolved not to tolerate and not to participate in any such violations of international law on our part, and I acted accordingly from that day up to the end of the war.
In this order I declared all partisans and those supporting them, and even those wearing civilian clothes, to be regular troops and prisoners of war, long before Eisenhower—on 7 July 1944 only—demanded that terrorists in France should be given that status.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution asserts that the fight against partisans was only a code name under which Jews and Slavs were killed; is that true?
JODL: The fight against partisans was a horrible reality. In July 1943, to quote some figures, 1,560 instances of railway sabotage occurred in Russia. There were 2,600 in September; that is 90 per day. A book by Ponomarenko was published from which an American paper quoted 500,000 Germans as having been killed by the partisans. If a nought is crossed off from that figure, it is still quite a considerable achievement for a peaceful Soviet population. But the book is also said to have stated that the population became increasingly hostile; that murder and terror became more frequent; and that the peaceful Quisling mayors were being killed. At any rate it was a tremendous fight which was taking place in the East.
DR. EXNER: In this connection, I would like to draw the Tribunal’s attention to an entry in Jodl’s Diary, Document 1807-PS. It is on Page 119 of the second volume of my document book. Under 25 May it says, “Colonel General Halder draws the attention of the Führer to increasing partisan activity...”
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. The defendant stated, I think, that in this directive of his on the 6th of May 1944 there was an order that guerrillas should be treated as prisoners of war. Will you refer us to the passage?
DR. EXNER: Will you name the passage, Defendant?
JODL: It is under Figure 163, on Page 131.
DR. EXNER: Page 131 of the second volume.
JODL: May I read it?
DR. EXNER: Yes.
JODL: “All partisans captured in enemy uniform or civilian clothing or surrendering during combat are to be treated in principle as prisoners of war. The same applies to all persons encountered in the immediate fighting area who may be considered as supporting the partisans, even when no combat action can be proved against them. Partisans in German uniform, or in the uniform of an allied army, are to be shot after careful interrogation if captured in combat. Deserters, no matter how they are dressed”—and, may I add, even if dressed in German uniform—“are, on principle, to be well treated. The partisans must hear of this.”
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. Well, perhaps—it is 1 o’clock—we might break off now.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
DR. EXNER: I have one further question concerning the partisan regulations. The Prosecution brings the charge that you, through Number 161 of the partisan regulations—that, Your Honors, is in the document we used last, F-665, Page 130 of Volume II—were responsible for the destruction of whole villages, and even of the total population of villages in France. Will you please comment on this?
JODL: I believe the opposite is true. Through Number 161, I reduced the collective measures and collective punishments that the Führer had decreed without restraint, to what was permitted by Article 50 of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare. In this article collective punishment is prohibited unless the entire population is equally guilty in terror activities of any kind. Therefore, with this Number 161 I did not order the burning down of villages, not even in exceptional cases, but on the contrary I said that such collective measures might be used only in very exceptional cases, and then only with the approval of a divisional commander, for he would have a tribunal and could make a judicial investigation.
I do not wish to trouble the Tribunal with any other merits of mine, which may be read in this document. I discussed the good treatment of the population; the necessity of leaving them the necessaries of life, et cetera. I believe, at any rate, that this document actually serves as a model of how this sort of war may be brought within the scope of international law. I did this as I was convinced that at that time the French Maquis movement, and also the Tito revolt had gradually begun to develop into a regular war.
Now the case of the 2d SS Panzer Division is cited as an example of things that I caused through this Number 161. I can say only that the behavior of the SS Panzer Division is the responsibility of its commander. I learned about it only months afterwards. I am grateful to the French Prosecution for having submitted this document, and I am grateful also for the statement that the Maquis movement in the beginning was nothing else than franc-tireur warfare, the heroism of which I do not dispute.
DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to a different problem, the low-level fliers. From Document 731-PS, Page 139 of the second document book, and Page 144 of Volume II of my document book—from these documents it can be seen that from various sources proposals had been made as to the treatment of enemy airmen who had made emergency landings. Can you tell us, first of all, the reason for this, and what your attitude was toward these proposals?
JODL: I shall try to be as brief as possible. The reason was that numerous reports had been received of people being attacked by individual enemy aircraft contrary to international law. The Führer demanded countermeasures, and that is the origin of the memorandum 731-PS, Exhibit RF-1407. It is not a draft for an order, still less an order. It is a note containing proposals made by the Luftwaffe in that connection. There was no talk as yet about lynching. The fact that I concerned myself with this problem at all may find its explanation in the responsibility which, as I have previously mentioned, I believed had rested with me since 1 May with regard to questions of international law. The note which I wrote on the document has already been read. I objected to one paragraph—a case which I nevertheless considered entirely admissible according to international law. This was later crossed out and replaced by a statement that it was to be considered murder if one of our soldiers landing by parachute was shot. I wrote this objection on Document 735-PS. The concept of lynching...
DR. EXNER: I should like to state, for the assistance of the Tribunal, where this passage is. The remark made by Jodl in his handwriting is found on Page 144 of the document book. Various proposals are made in this memorandum, and then Jodl adds “To Number 3...”; and then there is a notation.
[Turning to the defendant.] Please comment on this.
JODL: My notation was: “Is the Foreign Office in agreement with Number 3b?”—namely, that the shooting of our own airmen who have been shot down and are parachuting to earth is to be considered a mean terrorist act.
DR. EXNER: This Number 3b is on the same page, at the top.
JODL: I just wanted to add that lynching was suggested in an article by Goebbels, published in the Völkischer Beobachter. The more I concerned myself with this problem, the more it was obvious that nothing at all could be achieved with measures of this kind, for one could never capture a guilty low-flying airman, for he would either escape or he would be dashed to pieces on the ground. This would only lead to a general murder of airmen. Therefore, I decided—and I was in complete agreement with Field Marshal Keitel on this point—to cause this entire action to fail. The Court can see that between Document 731-PS, which was compiled on 21 May, and Document 735-PS, 16 days had elapsed wherein nothing had been done. When on 6 June I received a rather lengthy report, I noted on it, “This is not sufficient; we have to start all over again; how can we be certain that other enemy airmen will not be treated in the same way? Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?” If I wrote that, then, Your Honors, it is absolute proof, if you consider my general method of work, that I had no other intention than to delay and drag things out until the matter had solved itself. And I succeeded in this case. No military authority issued an order. We did not even go so far as to make a draft of an order. The only thing we had were these scraps of paper. It has been proved, and it will be proved further, that many months afterwards the Führer brought the gravest charges against us, and against the Luftwaffe in particular, of having torpedoed his order.
DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to something entirely different. The Chief of the OKW, in a letter written in 1941, called you and Warlimont his representatives for collaborating with Rosenberg’s Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. That is Document 865-PS, Exhibit USA-143. How did that work out in practice?
JODL: Not at all. Apart from one conference in 1943 dealing with an appeal to the peoples of the East, I had no connection with Rosenberg’s Ministry whatsoever. The only collaboration which took place constantly was carried on by my propaganda division, for all pamphlets which it compiled and which were dropped over Russia were discussed first with the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories.
DR. EXNER: Then why were you appointed at all? Why was that necessary?
JODL: That was purely a matter of form, because Minister Dr. Lammers wrote to each of the higher Reich authorities in general asking that a deputy be designated; and so Field Marshal Keitel also designated a deputy.
DR. EXNER: We shall now turn to something new. You have been shown the rather strange Document C-2, Exhibit USA-90. It is not contained in my document book, but the Court will remember it at once. It is a compilation in tabular form in which certain incidents of significance in international law are cited in the first column. In the second column there are examples; in the third and fourth...
MR. ROBERTS: It is Page 163 in the big document book.
DR. EXNER: This is a diagramatic compilation which sets down on one side a certain incident, and on the other enumerates the consequences of this incident: its appraisal in the light of international law, its use for propaganda, and so forth.
Will you explain how this came about? It is really a very strange document. Twelve infringements of international law by our side are set down, and, I believe, 13 infringements by the enemy.
JODL: I do not think this document is so remarkable after all. It was compiled at the end of September 1938, shortly before the Munich Conference. As I, in my department, did not know for certain whether we would have an armed conflict or not, and as at that time the stipulations of international law were not clear to us, I wanted, by taking various examples, to find out from the experts on international law what the present attitude was towards such infractions. Every officer in my division then racked his brain to find an example, and we tried to cover every branch of international law through some specific instance. I consider it worthy of note that even then we concerned ourselves with the conception of international law. There can be no doubt whatsoever that I alone carry responsibility for having thought out these examples. But if one were to take exception to the reply to these examples, that is to the judgment on the lines of international law or to justification according to the rules of warfare, I can only say that this did not come from me; it emanated from the office of Canaris. Apart from that, it shows a very careful and noteworthy attitude toward international law, especially concerning air warfare. At any rate, it was on a much higher level than what took place in actual practice.
DR. EXNER: Therefore, was it the intention to commit these infractions of international law?
JODL: Not at all, but as one conversant with the history of warfare, I knew that there has never yet been in this world a war in which infractions of international law did not occur.
If, perhaps, objection should be raised that quite at the end of the paragraph there appears: “Explanation by the Propaganda Ministry,” I should like to say that that comes at the end, after the justification according to the laws of war and the judgment from the standpoint of international law, and that Admiral Bürckner, who gave the reply, himself referred to it—that propaganda could be put into practice only after the aspects of international law had been clarified. Moreover the whole answer was only a preliminary one, as first the Foreign Office and the various branch chiefs of the Wehrmacht would have had to be heard on the subject.
DR. EXNER: I asked for Admiral Bürckner as a witness on this question, but it really seems to be too unimportant a matter, and I shall therefore forego the calling of this witness.
[Turning to the defendant.] I want to ask you the following question in this connection: What was your attitude in general as to the limitations placed on the conduct of war by international law?
JODL: I recognized and valued international law with which I was well acquainted, as a prerequisite for the decent and humane conduct of war. Copies of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention were always lying on my desk. I believe that by my attitude toward the Commissar Order, toward lynching, and toward the intention to repudiate the Geneva Convention—bluntly rejected by all Commanders-in-Chief and all branches of the Wehrmacht, and by the Foreign Office—I have proved that I tried, as far as it was possible for me, to observe international law.
Of course, there is a wealth of positive proof available. The pertinent documents will probably be submitted by my defense counsel. I will refer only to the behavior of the German Wehrmacht in Norway, a matter in which I collaborated. I refer to the partisan regulations...
DR. EXNER: I submit Document AJ-14, Pages 99 and 100 in my document book, Volume I. These are special directives for conduct during the occupation of Norway and Denmark, directives which, therefore, were issued when those countries were occupied. There are some very characteristic sentences contained in this document, sentences which I should like to read. You will find on Page 98, Figure I:
“The military occupation of Denmark and Norway is taking place for the purpose of ensuring the neutrality of these countries. The aim must be to carry this out in a peaceful way.”
Then on Page 99, at the top it says:
“Directives for conduct in personal intercourse with the Norwegian population.
“Every member of the Armed Forces must remember that he is not entering enemy country, but that the troops are moving into Norway for the protection of the country and for the safety of its inhabitants.
“Therefore, the following is to be observed:
“I. The Norwegian has a strongly developed national consciousness. Moreover the Norwegian people feel themselves closely related to other Nordic peoples.
“Therefore avoid anything that might wound national honor.”
Figure 2 is also very characteristic. Then I shall turn to Figure 4:
“The home of the Norwegian is sacred according to the old Germanic conception. Hospitality is offered generously. Property is inviolable. The house remains...”
THE PRESIDENT: It is not necessary to read all of this. One paragraph is enough to show the nature of the document, isn’t it?
DR. EXNER: Then I will make mention of the remainder of the document which I shall not read, and ask that the Tribunal take official notice of this document.
Then there is a directive here, Document AJ-16...
THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Exner, that last document does not appear to have been signed by the defendant, does it?
DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] What had you to do with this document? Did you...
JODL: It is signed by Von Falkenhorst, but it is well known that we—the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the staff of Von Falkenhorst—comprised one unit for the Norwegian enterprise. I participated in the drawing up of this document, and I submitted it to the Führer and the Führer approved of it. There is even an entry to that effect in my diary.
DR. EXNER: Then comes Document AJ-16, which I submit herewith.
“Special directives for the administration and pacification of the occupied areas of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg.” This is Page 161, Volume II of my document book. I will quote only from Page 162 in order to save time. I will read perhaps the last sentence: “International law must be strictly observed in every case.” But I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the other regulations.
In this connection I should like to mention Document 440-PS, Exhibit GB-107, in my Document Book 2, Page 164—Directive Number 8 regarding the conduct of war, dated 20 November 1939. It says in respect to the tasks of the Air Force—I will read the last paragraph:
“Localities, especially large open cities, and industries are not to be attacked without a compelling military reason, neither in the Dutch nor in the Belgian-Luxembourg areas.—Signed Keitel.”
Did you also draft that?
JODL: I drafted that order.
DR. EXNER: Then we might refer to the regulations for fighting partisans, a matter which has been discussed here also.
JODL: And I should like to refer to something I believe I have stated already, that I ordered an immediate investigation of the Malmédy incident.
DR. EXNER: Did you constantly bear in mind the aspects of international law where your orders were concerned?
JODL: I believe I have already stated that. I studied international law very carefully in its bearing on my orders. I do not wish to detain the Court with the knowledge I gathered from these regulations, for it is only incomplete, but I should like to conclude by saying that owing to the fact that there were no regulations governing air warfare, deplorable confusion in definition arose—for instance between rebellion and legal war force; between franc-tireur, bandit, and scout; between spy and scout; demolition crews and saboteurs. Any time with the help of aircraft a rebellion might be converted into a legal war; and a legal war, on the other hand, might become a state of rebellion. That is the effect that parachute troops and the furnishing of supplies by air have had on international law.
DR. EXNER: In this connection, I should like to submit the affidavit of Lehmann, Exhibit AJ-10 (Document Number Jodl-63). This document has not been submitted to the Court because it was only yesterday that the Prosecution declared itself in agreement with the use of this affidavit. I believe it is the affidavit of the Judge Advocate General, Dr. Lehmann. If the Tribunal will declare this affidavit admissible, I can perhaps merely refer to it...
THE PRESIDENT: Where is it?
DR. EXNER: I submit it herewith but it has not been translated yet, as we received permission for it only yesterday in Court.
MR. ROBERTS: As Sir David said yesterday there is no objection to the affidavit, although there was no actual order granting the affidavit of Lehmann. My Lord, it is very short, especially the copy I had, and I think there is no reason to object to it.
DR. EXNER: Then, in order to save time, I shall just refer to it; and I beg the Tribunal to read these statements of Dr. Lehmann. They seem to me to be significant, as after all it is the highest jurist in the German Wehrmacht, Judge Advocate General Lehmann, who is giving information here.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better give it an exhibit number.
DR. EXNER: Yes, AJ-10 was the exhibit number I gave it, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. EXNER: This gentleman mentions legal discussions, which he had occasion to carry on with Jodl, and he gives us Jodl’s attitude toward legal questions.
And now, General, in connection with crimes against the laws of war there is one last question which comes to our attention. Numerous entries in the war diary, orders, et cetera, are the subject of serious charges against you. Did you have the possibility, before you were captured, of destroying all this material?
JODL: Yes, between 3 May and 23 May I had time and leisure to burn every piece of paper, but I gave instructions to my staff not to destroy a single file, for I felt I had nothing to conceal. I handed the complete files, and above all the especially important ones, all the original Führer directives since 1940, to the American officer when I was captured.
DR. EXNER: And now I shall turn to the alleged Crimes against Peace. First of all we have to make it clear what posts you held during this critical period. Tell us, please, what posts you held from 1933.
JODL: From 1932 to 1935 I was in the division which was later called the Operations Division of the Army. From the middle of 1935 until October 1938 I was Chief of the Department for National Defense in the Wehrmachtsamt, which was later called the OKW.
DR. EXNER: That means the Wehrmachtsamt was actually the OKW?
JODL: Yes, later on. From October 1938 until shortly before the Polish campaign I was artillery commander at Vienna and at Brünn, in Moravia; and from 27 October 1939...
DR. EXNER: Just a moment please. 27 September?
JODL: No—August, rather. On 27 August 1939 I took over the office and the tasks of Chief of the General Staff.
DR. EXNER: Now, let us take that period. Did you concern yourself with war plans in the years 1932-35 when you were in the so-called Truppenamt?
JODL: At that time there were no preparations in the Operations Division, except for combat directives for the improvised Grenzschutz Ost (frontier guard East). This was a militia-like organization, and preparations were made to evacuate the whole German border in case of enemy occupation. That was all.
DR. EXNER: Had you anything to do with the proclamation of general conscription?
JODL: No, I had nothing to do with that. I believe I heard about it the day before.
DR. EXNER: What were your duties as chief of the Department for National Defense from June 1935 to October 1938?
JODL: In this position I had to work out the operational strategic directives according to the instructions of my chiefs, Keitel and Blomberg. I had to study and to clarify the problem of the leadership of the Wehrmacht; to prepare studies and exercises for the big Wehrmacht maneuvers in 1937. I had to supervise the Wehrmacht Academy; I had to work out drafts for laws in connection with the general conscription order and with the unified preparation for mobilization in the civilian sector, that is, of state and people. The so-called Secretariat of the Reich Defense Committee came under me.
DR. EXNER: Tell us, please, what were you at that time? What was your military rank?
JODL: I acquired that position while I was lieutenant colonel; and in 1936—I believe—I became a colonel.
DR. EXNER: Did you take any part in the Reich Defense Law?
JODL: No, that law originated before I entered my office in the Wehrmachtsamt.
DR. EXNER: But the Prosecution is accusing you of participation in it on the grounds of a supplement which you made to the Document 2261-PS, Exhibit USA-24, which is to be found in Volume I, Page 9. In this document it says, “Attached a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935...” The signature is Blomberg’s and it is dated 24 June. Then comes a supplementary paragraph: “Berlin, 3 September 1935. To the Defense Economic Group la, copy transmitted, Signed Jodl.” What can you tell us about that?
JODL: Indisputably that is a valid Reich law of which I had to transmit a copy to one of the other offices. I need not say more than that.
DR. EXNER: You yourself did not participate in the drawing up of the law itself?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Were you a member of the Reich Defense Council?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Were you a member of the Reich Defense Committee?
JODL: I was that automatically from the moment I took over the direction of the National Defense Department. At the tenth session of this meeting of experts, on 26 June 1935, General Von Reichenau designated me as his deputy.
DR. EXNER: What was the purpose of this committee? This has already been discussed, I believe, so please be as brief as possible.
JODL: In a few words: With this committee a unified mobilization, not of the Army, but the mobilization of the State and people, corresponding to military mobilization, was prepared. These plans were laid down in the mobilization books giving final figures and various stages of tension.
DR. EXNER: What were these various stages of tension?
JODL: We had learned about this from France and had adopted it. The French had a system by which mobilization was carried out in five stages according to the degree of tension existing.
THE PRESIDENT: Do we need the detail about this? Is it not sufficient to say it was copied from France?
DR. EXNER: Very well.
[Turning to the defendant.] Perhaps you can tell us what this meant; why we adopted this system of stages of tension? What was the reason?
JODL: The purpose was to have some means at our disposal—as was customary all over Europe at that time—that would achieve an intensified readiness for war before the public order for mobilization was issued.
DR. EXNER: Did the Reich Defense Committee concern itself with armament?
JODL: No. It did not concern itself with armament at all.
DR. EXNER: Did the Reich Defense Committee concern itself with political plans or intentions?
JODL: It had nothing to do in any way with political problems.
DR. EXNER: But how about war?
JODL: It was concerned only with mobilization.
DR. EXNER: That means, a certain particular war...
JODL: Mobilization is a necessity for every possible war.
DR. EXNER: In this committee you concerned yourself with mobilization books. Is that correct?
JODL: Yes. I believe I have already explained that. In these books the details of all the chief Reich authorities were set down and indexed according to degrees of tension.
DR. EXNER: What do you mean by chief Reich authorities?
JODL: I mean all the ministries.
DR. EXNER: You mean the civil authorities?
JODL: Yes, the civil authorities. And the preparations made by them had to be brought into line with the preparations by the military.
DR. EXNER: What were the preparations in the demilitarized zone?
JODL: The preparations in the demilitarized zones were connected solely with evacuation, that is the surrendering of the areas west of the Rhine in case of a French occupation.
DR. EXNER: I believe we have discussed that at length already, and in this connection I should like to refer to Document EC-405, Exhibit GB-160, Page 11 of my document book, the first volume, where the tenth session is mentioned. You are accused of having decreed the utmost secrecy concerning all these preparations, which, according to your description, were of a purely defensive nature. Why all this secrecy?
JODL: Keeping measures of this kind secret is taken for granted all over the world. For us in Germany it was especially important, as for years the civil authorities had no longer been accustomed to concern themselves with military matters, and it seemed to me of particular importance that in foreign countries no misunderstanding should arise by, let us say, the capture of an order of this nature—a very characteristic misunderstanding such as occurred in these proceedings in connection with the “Freimachung” of the Rhine.
DR. EXNER: And why did you decree secrecy? So that foreign countries would not be disquieted?
JODL: At that time we were even weaker than during the period when we had an army of only 100,000 men. This army of 100,000 men had been broken up into hundreds of small groups. It was the time of our very greatest impotence, and at that period we had to be extremely careful to avoid any and all tension with foreign countries.
DR. EXNER: What were the military plans of those days?
JODL: I have already said that there were the combat directives for the Grenzschutz Ost. I had also worked out instructions for the commander in East Prussia in case he were cut off from the Reich through a sudden attack by Poland.
DR. EXNER: Did you know of any German intentions of attack at that time?
JODL: There was no thought or talk of that whatsoever.
DR. EXNER: Well, I should like to quote one sentence from the twelfth session of the Reich Defense Council. It is on Page 14 of Volume I of my document book, Document EC-407, Exhibit GB-247. At that meeting Lieutenant Colonel Wagner of the OKH said—who was he, by the way?
JODL: He later became Quartermaster General.
DR. EXNER: Lieutenant Colonel Wagner said:
“The outcome of the war”—that is, the last war—“has resulted in a completely changed military and political situation in the case of a future war, namely the necessity for waging it in one’s own country.”
He said that on 14 May 1936. What would you gather from this sentence?
JODL: Of course, one can perhaps say...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, surely it is a statement by somebody else, and this statement speaks for itself. It is not a matter that this witness can interpret to us.
DR. EXNER: Very well.
[Turning to the defendant.] Now, were you concerned with armament in the Truppenamt, and later in the Department for National Defense?
JODL: I personally had nothing at all to do with armament in the real sense. That was a matter for the various branches of the Wehrmacht—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force—and it was dealt with and handled by their organizational staffs. The Commanders-in-Chief discussed these matters with the Führer direct. But I hope, and I will not deny, that my work in the General Staff contributed to the reconstruction of the German Wehrmacht.
DR. EXNER: Your diary, 1780-PS, does not contain a word about armament, and it seems obvious that at that time you did not concern yourself with this problem. What were your thoughts and ideas on the question of armament? Were you in favor of it?
JODL: At that time I was of the same opinion as my superiors; and it was characteristic that on the day before the statement was made that 36 divisions were to be formed, Blomberg as well as Fritsch suggested to the Führer that only 24 divisions should be formed. They feared a thinning down of the entire army. Perhaps they also feared too stormy a foreign policy, based on forces existing only on paper.
DR. EXNER: Please answer a question which appears to be important to me: What were the deadlines in connection with the armament in 1935?
JODL: Various stages were provided for. The first deadline set was 1942-43. Most of the West Wall was to be completed by 1945. The Navy’s plan of construction ran on to 1944-45.
DR. EXNER: At that time what did you consider the objective of the armament?
JODL: Since it was not possible to achieve general disarmament, the objective was to establish military parity between Germany and the neighboring countries.
DR. EXNER: In this connection I should like to refer to a document which has already been submitted—the 2-year report of General George Marshall. This has already been submitted as Raeder-19. I have a part of it here before me, a part which I submitted under Exhibit AJ-3, (Document Jodl-56) Page 168. Regarding the problem of rearmament, some sentences seem to hit the nail right on the head.
In the second paragraph on Page 6, or rather the last sentence there, we see:
“The world does not seriously consider the wishes of the weak. Weakness is too great a temptation to the strong, particularly to the brutal who scheme for wealth and power.”
Then on the next page there is another sentence:
“Above all we must, I think, correct the tragic misunderstanding that a security policy is a war policy...”
Can you tell us, please, what the ratio of our military strength to that of foreign countries was at that time?
JODL: In 1935, when we set up 36 divisions, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia possessed 90 divisions for times of peace, and 190 divisions for war. We had hardly any heavy artillery, and tank construction was in its earliest stages. The conception of defensive and offensive armament has been discussed here on various occasions. It would lead us too far afield to go into that in detail. But I should like to say only that as far as Germany was concerned, with her geographical position this conception did not apply. The disarmament conference too, after months of discussion, failed because a proper definition for this conception could not be formed.
DR. EXNER: I should like to quote from an expert, George Marshall again, on Page 168 of my document book, from which I have just quoted; and again just one sentence. It is in the first paragraph: “The only effective defense a nation can now maintain is the power of attack...”
Now, however, the Prosecution asserts that you should have known that such a tremendous rearmament as the German rearmament could serve only for an aggressive war. Will you comment on this, please?
JODL: I believe this can only be explained as an expression of military ignorance. Up to the year 1939 we were, of course, in a position to destroy Poland alone. But we were never, either in 1938 or 1939, actually in a position to withstand a concentrated attack by these states together. And if we did not collapse already in the year 1939 that was due only to the fact that during the Polish campaign, the approximately 110 French and British divisions in the West were held completely inactive against the 23 German divisions.
DR. EXNER: But tell us, when did intensive rearmament actually begin?
JODL: Real rearmament was only begun after the war had already started. We entered into this world war with some 75 divisions. Sixty percent of our total able-bodied population had not been trained. The peacetime army amounted to perhaps 400,000 men, as against 800,000 men in 1914. Our supplies of ammunition and bombs, as the witness Milch has already testified, were ridiculously low.
DR. EXNER: In that connection I should like to read a diary entry of yours, Page 16 of Volume I of my document book, which is 1780-PS, USA-72. On 13 December you said:
“After completion of project for L”—that is the Landesverteidigung, National Defense—“Field Marshal reports on state of war potential of Wehrmacht, indicating chief bottleneck is inadequate stocks of ammunition for Army—10 to 15 days of combat equals 6 weeks’ supply.”
JODL: That is right, we had ammunition for 10 to 15 days of combat.
DR. EXNER: Now I shall turn to the question of the occupation of the Rhineland.
THE PRESIDENT: Let us break off now.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. EXNER: General, when did you first hear of the plans to occupy the Rhineland?
JODL: On 1 or 2 March 1936; that is to say about 6 days before the actual occupation. I could not have heard of them any earlier because before that the Führer had not yet made the decision himself.
DR. EXNER: Did you and the generals have military objections to that occupation?
JODL: I must confess that we had the uneasy feeling of a gambler whose entire fortune is at stake.
DR. EXNER: Did you have legal objections?
JODL: No; I was neither an expert on international law nor a politician. Politically speaking it had been stated that the agreement between Czechoslovakia, Russia, and France had made the Locarno Pact void, which I accepted as a fact at the time.
DR. EXNER: How strong were our forces in the Rhineland after the occupation?
JODL: We occupied the Rhineland with approximately one division, but only three battalions of that went into the territory west of the Rhine; one battalion went to Aachen, one to Trier, and one to Saarbrücken.
DR. EXNER: Three battalions. That is really only a symbolic occupation, is it not?
JODL: Yes, and they acted only symbolically.
DR. EXNER: Did you do anything to avoid a military conflict because of that occupation?
JODL: There were serious reports which came from our military attachés in Paris and London at the time. I could not fail to be impressed by them. We suggested to Field Marshal Von Blomberg then that perhaps he ought to discuss withdrawing these three battalions west of the Rhine on condition that the French would withdraw four to five times as many men from their borders.
DR. EXNER: Was that suggestion ever made?
JODL: Yes, it was made to the Führer, but he turned it down. He rejected very bluntly General Beck’s suggestion that we should declare that we would not fortify the area west of the Rhine. That was a suggestion of General Beck’s, which the Führer turned down very bluntly.
DR. EXNER: Did you think at the time that that action was connected with any aggressive intention?
JODL: No, there could not be any question of aggressive intentions.
DR. EXNER: Why not?
JODL: I can only say that, considering the situation we were in, the French covering army alone could have blown us to pieces.
DR. EXNER: Do you think that the leading men had aggressive intentions then?
JODL: No, nobody had aggressive intentions; but it is of course possible that in the brain of the Führer there was already an idea that the occupation was a prerequisite for actions to be taken later in the East. That is possible; but I do not know, because I could not see into the Führer’s brain.
DR. EXNER: But you did not see any outward signs of it?
JODL: No, none whatsoever.
DR. EXNER: Did you know of the so-called testament of Hitler dated 5 November 1937 which has been presented here?
JODL: The first time I heard it read was here in Court.
DR. EXNER: What did you learn about it at the time?
JODL: Field Marshal Von Blomberg informed Keitel and Keitel informed me that there had been a discussion with the Führer. When I asked for the minutes I was told that no minutes had been taken. I refer to my diary, Document 1780-PS, as proof of this. What I was told was not at all sensational and hardly different in any way from anything contained in general directives for the preparation of a war. I can only assume that Field Marshal Von Blomberg at that time kept these things to himself because he may not have believed that they would ever be carried out.
DR. EXNER: Was there an operational plan against Austria?
JODL: There was no operational plan against Austria. I state that most emphatically.
DR. EXNER: Now we come to Document C-175, a directive which has the Exhibit Number USA-69. It is in Volume I; Page 18 and the following pages. It is a directive for the unified preparation of the armed forces for war of the year 1937. The Prosecution quoted Case Otto only from this directive, so that the impression was bound to be created that the whole was a plan for a campaign against Austria. Please explain what this directive means.
JODL: It was one of those typical standard preparations for war, for every conceivable eventuality. Such directives had come out every year in Germany ever since there was a General Staff and general conscription. These theoretical military studies made a distinction between two cases, namely cases of war which because of their nature were politically probable or might be probable, and cases which were improbable. As far as the former were concerned, a plan of operations was to be drafted by the Army and the Air Force. For the latter appropriate suggestions only were to be brought forward. If the Tribunal would turn to Page 21 of the document, there appears at the end of the page, Part 3, a sentence as follows: “The following ‘special cases’ are to be considered by the High Command in general without participation by regional authorities...” and among such cases, on Page 22, is the special “Case Otto.”
DR. EXNER: On Page 18 of this document is a directive valid from 1 July 1937 until, probably, 30 September 1938, that is a little more than a year. That, in turn, replaces another similar directive which is referred to in the first paragraph, which had been drawn up for the same problems previously. Did you participate in discussions on the Austrian case?
JODL: No, I did not participate in any discussions.
DR. EXNER: It is said in the trial brief that on 12 February 1938 you had been at Obersalzberg. Keitel has already rectified that. Your entry in the diary under 12 March 1938 is, therefore, based only on an account which you received through Keitel; is that right?
JODL: Yes. It is merely a note on a brief account given to me by General Keitel about that day, probably related a bit colorfully.
DR. EXNER: But then it says, evening of 11 February: “General Keitel with Generals Von Reichenau and Sperrle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg and G. Schmidt are being subjected to very great political and military pressure.” In the English and French translations it says that Schuschnigg and Schmidt are “again subjected to very great political and military pressure.” This word “again” does not appear in my German original.
Now, did you suggest deceptive maneuvers against Austria? That is being held against you.
JODL: I did not suggest any deceptive maneuvers. The Führer ordered them; and I do not think that they are illegal, because I believe that in the gambling of world history, in politics and in war, false cards have always been played. But the Führer ordered it and that is stated in the entry in my diary. I supplied military information and documents to Canaris as to where our garrisons were situated, what maneuvers were taking place. Canaris elaborated them and then released them in Munich.
DR. EXNER: What did you think was the purpose of...
JODL: I had been told that the purpose was to exert a certain amount of pressure so that Schuschnigg, when he had returned home, would adhere to the agreement made at Obersalzberg.
DR. EXNER: How long before the actual entry into Austria did you know of such intentions?
JODL: On 10 March in the morning just before 11 o’clock I heard of it for the first time.
DR. EXNER: And the entry took place when?
JODL: On the 12th. It was when General Keitel and General Viehbahn, who was then temporarily Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff, were suddenly ordered to the Reich Chancellery that I heard of the intention for the first time.
DR. EXNER: Then did you have a plan made, or what?
JODL: The Führer surprised them by stating that the question involved was the Austrian problem; and then they remembered, that there was a General Staff plan called “Otto.” They sent for me and for the directive, and learned from me that such a directive actually did exist, but that in practice nothing at all had been prepared. As it had only been a theoretical plan and drafted solely in the event of an Austrian restoration, and as such a restoration was not expected for the moment, the High Command of the Army had virtually done nothing about it.
DR. EXNER: How did you yourself understand the entire Austrian action?
JODL: It appeared to me to be a family squabble which Austria herself would solve through her domestic politics in a very short time.
DR. EXNER: And what made you think that?
JODL: My own extensive knowledge of Austria. Through relatives and acquaintances, through the German-Austrian Alpine Club to which I belonged, as one who knew the Austrian mountains, I had been in closer contact with Austria than with northern Germany, and I knew that in that country there had been a government against the will of the people for a long time. The peasant uprising in Styria was a characteristic example.
DR. EXNER: Was the march into Austria the carrying out of the suggestion, C-175?
JODL: No, it was completely improvised within a few hours with the corresponding result. Seventy percent of all the armored vehicles and lorries were stranded on the road from Salzburg and Passau to Vienna, because the drivers had been taken from their recruitment training to be given this task.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you said just now, didn’t you, that the Führer told them it was the problem of Austria? You said that, didn’t you?
JODL: I said that the Führer had informed General Keitel and General Viehbahn about that on 10 March, in the morning. He did not talk to me, and until that day I had not talked to the Führer either.
THE PRESIDENT: I only wanted to know the date. You said it was 10 March?
JODL: Yes, on 10 March, in the morning.
DR. EXNER: Is it correct that only peacetime formations marched into the frontier districts, into Austrian territory?
JODL: Yes; it is a fact that only peacetime units which were intended for the parade in Vienna actually marched in. All units which might have been necessary for a military conflict, say, with Czechoslovakia or Italy, were stopped at the last moment and did not cross the border.
DR. EXNER: Ammunition columns, for instance?
JODL: No, everything remained behind.
DR. EXNER: Was there any hesitation among the political leaders at the last moment?
JODL: On 11 March, in the afternoon, I had news from the Reich Chancellery that the Wehrmacht was not to move in, but that the Police would pass through the Wehrmacht and move in alone. In the evening, however, on 11 March, at 2030 hours, the final decision reached me, which was that the Wehrmacht was to move in after all. I was unable to find out the reason for that hesitation.
DR. EXNER: So that altogether there was not really an invasion by force?
JODL: No, it was a purely peaceful occupation. It was characterized by my suggestion to the chief of the operations department of the Army that he should have bands marching at the head of the columns and that all drivers should be sure to wear goggles, otherwise they might be blinded by the flowers thrown at them.
DR. EXNER: What was the significance of the order you signed regarding the march into Austria? It has been put before you under Document Number C-182, Exhibit USA-77. You remember it, do you not?
JODL: Yes, I remember. That is nothing other than the written record of something which had previously been ordered orally and which was already being carried out. That written order, you see, would have come much too late.
DR. EXNER: And what is the significance of Document C-103, Exhibit USA-75, referring to a possible clash with Czech troops or Italian troops on Austrian territory? How did you come to that?
JODL: That was based on an inquiry from the General Staff of the Army. They wanted to know, even in the case of the remotest eventuality, how the troops were to comport themselves. I clarified the matter over the telephone, through General Schmundt, with the Führer, and I then put his decision down in writing, by his order.
DR. EXNER: And how did the operation come off?
JODL: It came off exactly as expected. There was jubilation and a triumphal march, such as the world probably has seldom seen—even though no one likes to acknowledge it today. The population came to meet us during the night already; the custom barriers were removed, and all the German troops called that march just a battle of flowers.
DR. EXNER: We now turn to the question of Czechoslovakia. Did you participate in the conferences on 21 April 1938, and 28 May 1938, which the Prosecution have described as conspirators’ conferences?
JODL: I did not participate in any of these conferences.
DR. EXNER: What type of General Staff work were you carrying out for “Case Green”—which is, of course, the Czechoslovakia operation?
JODL: I must refer again to Document C-175, which is on Page 17 of the first volume of my document book. In that general directive for the unified preparation for war two important cases were dealt with, or were to be dealt with: A defensive deployment against France if she opened hostilities—“Case Red” and an offensive deployment—Case Green—against Czechoslovakia. That would have been worked out in just the same way, even if we had not had an acute conflict with Czechoslovakia, because a war on two fronts—which was the problem we always faced—could never be conducted or won in any other way than by means of an attack against the weaker. This directive, as far as the Case Green is concerned, had to be drawn up afresh the very moment that Austria automatically became a new assembly zone. Thus, on 20 May 1938, a new draft was made by me for Case Green which began with the customary words: “I do not intend to attack Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future without provocation...”
DR. EXNER: Just wait a minute. That quotation is Document 388-PS, Exhibit USA-26. It is the document dated 20 May 1938. “I do not intend to attack Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future without provocation...” Now, please continue.
JODL: That was 20 May. On the 21st, the day after, a monstrous incident occurred. Czechoslovakia not only mobilized but even marched up to our borders. The Czechoslovakian Chief of General Staff explained this to Toussaint by saying that 12 German divisions had been assembled in Saxony. I can only state—and my diary entries prove it—that not a single German soldier had been moved. Nothing, absolutely nothing had happened.
DR. EXNER: In this connection I think I ought to draw the attention of the Tribunal to a questionnaire—Exhibit AJ-9 (Document Jodl-62). It is a questionnaire submitted to General Toussaint who at that time was the German military attaché in Prague. He confirms the mobilization of that time. Third volume, 199—Page 201 of the document, at the bottom, there is the following question: “What was the reason for the Czechoslovakian mobilization in May 1938?”
And he answered:
“It is my personal opinion that the Czechoslovakian Government wished to force her political allies to take up a definite position. Krejci, the Czechoslovak Chief of General Staff, informed me, as the reason for the mobilization, that he had exact information that 10 to 12 German divisions had assembled in the Dresden area, and that he could no longer bear the responsibility of not taking countermeasures.”
On the other hand a diary note from Jodl, Volume I, Page 26 should be mentioned:
“The Führer’s intention not to touch on the Czech problem yet is altered by the Czech deployment on 21 May, which took place without any German threat and without even any apparent cause. Germany’s silence thereto would lead to a loss of prestige for the Führer, to which he is not willing to submit again. Hence the issuing on 30 May of the new directive for Case Green.”
[Turning to the defendant.] That is from Jodl’s diary, Page 26, first volume. Now continue, please.
JODL: That was the information which I received, partly through General Keitel and partly through the then Major Schmundt, regarding the impression made on the Führer. The result was that he personally changed my draft of 20 May and put at the beginning the following words:
“It is my unalterable decision that Czechoslovakia must be destroyed within a reasonable period of time by military action. To decide upon the militarily and politically opportune moment is a matter for the political leadership.”
DR. EXNER: These words appear in the Document 388-PS, which I have already referred to, which is Exhibit USA-26. It is the order of 30 May 1939.
[Turning to the defendant.] Please tell us briefly what the contents of these directives were.
JODL: In that order of 30 May three possibilities were mentioned by the Führer as to how a conflict with Czechoslovakia might arise: 1) Without particular cause—politically impossible and out of the question; 2) after a prolonged period of tension—most undesirable, because of the lack of the element of surprise; 3) the best solution, after an incident, such as were happening nearly daily at that time, and which would justify us morally before the world if we decided to intervene.
Furthermore, there was the command that on the first day the Army should break through the fortifications in order to clear the way for the free operation of the mobile forces, the armored divisions, so that after 4 days such a situation would be created that the military position of Czechoslovakia would become untenable.
DR. EXNER: Why was the entire directive redrafted in June?
JODL: The entire directive C-175 was thoroughly revised in June. This was done because on 1 October a new mobilization year began, and because this directive C-175 was in any case planned to be valid only until 30 September 1938. The old directive was, of course, still in force until 1 October, but became invalid on 1 October through that directive which had been drafted by me on 24 June, or 18 June. In that directive the Case Green was mentioned in the sense of the Führer’s intention—namely, that it was the immediate aim of his policy that from 1 October 1938—not on, but from 1 October 1938—every favorable opportunity was to be utilized to solve the problem of Czechoslovakia, but only if France did not interfere or march, or Great Britain either.
I confirm that no date existed in any of the orders for the starting of a war against Czechoslovakia. In the directive of 30 May the date was left open altogether; and the new instructions, C-175, of 18 June stated only from 1 October, on the first favorable occasion.
DR. EXNER: That is on Page 29 of our document book, second paragraph: “I have decided, from 1 October...”
JODL: May I perhaps conclude this whole question by saying, in order to be explicit, that actually before 14 September, as far as the military forces were concerned, nothing happened.
DR. EXNER: I once again refer to an entry in Jodl’s Diary Volume I, Page 32. It is an extract from Document 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72, and is the entry under 14 September 1938:
“At noon it was announced that the general order for mobilization had been posted in Czechoslovakia.... This, however, did not take place, although approximately eight age groups were called up at short notice. As the Sudeten Germans are crossing the border en masse, we request at about 1730 hours, at the suggestion of the OKH, Department 2, the calling up of the strengthened frontier guard (GAD) along the Czech border in military districts VIII, IV, XIII, and XVII. The Führer gives his authorization from Munich.”
THE PRESIDENT: What was it that you were reading from then?
DR. EXNER: I have read from Page 32 of my document book; Volume I, Page 32, and it is an excerpt from Jodl’s diary of 14 September, therefore an entry made in the midst of that critical period.
[Turning to the defendant.] Just what were these military measures which were being introduced?
JODL: On 13 or 14 September the eight age groups were called up in Czechoslovakia. We used the strengthened frontier guard so that the many escaping Sudeten Germans could be taken over.
On 17 September the Führer formed the Freikorps Henlein, contrary to the previous agreement and without telling us beforehand. Previously it had been agreed that these Sudeten Germans of military age were to join the Reserve Army.
Around that time the political discussions started. The first one at the Berghof had already taken place. Beneš ordered mobilization in Czechoslovakia on 23 September and only now, and in accordance with the political discussions, did the military deployment against Czechoslovakia commence.
I had no doubt that it was going to be used in the event of Czechoslovakia not submitting to any agreement we had made with the Western Powers; for the Führer had clearly stated that he would negotiate only if France and England did not intervene politically or militarily.
DR. EXNER: You made two more entries in your diary, on 22 and 26 September, which prove that you were worried at the time. Statement made by Captain Bürckner, in the first volume of my document book, on Page 34; again an excerpt from 1780-PS, dated 22 September:
“Captain Bürckner, chief of the foreign section, reports that according to an intercepted long-distance telephone conversation between Prague and the local Czech Legation Counsellor, the German Embassy in Prague has just been stormed. I am immediately having connection made by telephone and wireless with Prague through Colonel Juppe.
“1050 hours: Bürckner reports that the incident has not been confirmed. The Foreign Office has spoken with our Embassy.
“1055 hours: I establish liaison with Prague and with Toussaint. To my question as to how he is getting along, he replies, ‘Thanks, excellently.’ The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces, who had been informed of the first report with the suggestion that he should think over what measures would have to be taken if the Führer should wish for an immediate bombardment of Prague, is informed through Ic about the false report which may have had the purpose of provoking us to a military action.”
Then, on 26 September, it says:
“It is important that false reports do not induce us to military actions before Prague replies.”
The Prosecution have stated that 1 October had long before been decided on as the date for aggression. Will you tell me what significance that date, 1 October 1938, had for Case Green?
JODL: I have already said that, I believe. I explained that the new mobilization year had started, and that no order contained a fixed date for the beginning of the campaign against Czechoslovakia.
DR. EXNER: Did you believe that the conflict might be localized?
JODL: I was certainly convinced of that, because I could not imagine that the Führer, in the position we were in, would start a conflict with France and Britain which had to lead to our immediate collapse.
DR. EXNER: And the entries in your diary probably show your concern about incidents?
JODL: Yes. In my diary on 8 September there is reference to a conversation with General Stülpnagel. According to that, Stülpnagel was at the moment very worried lest the Führer should depart from his oft-defined attitude and allow himself to be dragged into military action, in spite of the danger of France’s intervention.
According to the entry in my diary I replied that actually at the moment I shared his worries to some extent.
DR. EXNER: This is an entry which the Tribunal will find on Page 26 of the first volume of my document book. Once again it is an extract from Document 1780-PS, and it is the entry of 8 September 1938.
[Turning to the defendant.] You have already said, have you not, what your worries were? Our weakness?
JODL: It was out of the question with five fighting divisions and seven reserve divisions in the western fortifications, which were nothing but a large construction site, to hold out against 100 French divisions. That was militarily impossible.
DR. EXNER: On 24 August, in a letter addressed to Schmundt, you referred to the importance of an incident for the tasks of the Wehrmacht in this case. You have been gravely accused of that, and I want you to tell me what the significance of that statement is.
Your Honor, it is 388-PS, and it is on Page 35 of the first volume. It is an extract from the often quoted Document 388-PS: It is a report made at the time of the “X” Order and the preliminary measures.
[Turning to the defendant.] Please, will you state what you intended in this work of the General Staff?
JODL: The Führer’s order of 30 May which I have already explained, assuming that it ever came to this action, left no other choice than to attack on a previously decided date. This could only follow as the result of an incident, because without provocation the operation was out of the question; and it was not to be attempted if too long a time had passed.
The Army, in order to be ready for such a surprise break-through of the Czech fortifications, required 4 days of preparation. If nothing happened after those 4 days, the military preparations could no longer be kept secret and the surprise element would disappear. Therefore, nothing else remained but either a spontaneous incident in Czechoslovakia, which would then 4 days later have resulted in military action, or a date which had to be decided on previously. In that case an incident had to happen during those 4 days which the Army required for deployment.
The Führer’s demands could, in fact, not be solved in any other way from the point of view of the General Staff. My letter to Major Schmundt was meant to explain that difficult situation to the Führer.
At that time incidents occurred every day. May I remind you that since the first partial mobilization in Czechoslovakia the Sudeten Germans liable to be called for military service had mostly evaded the order. They escaped over the border into Germany, and the Czechoslovakian border police shot at them. Bullets were shot over daily into Germany. All together, more than 200,000 Sudeten Germans crossed the border in that manner.
From that point of view the conception of an incident was not so mean and criminal as it might have been, for instance, if peaceful Switzerland had been involved. If I said, therefore, how keenly interested we would be in such an incident, that was meant to express that if one resorted to military action at all—all this is, of course, purely theoretical—one might use just such an incident as a casus belli.
DR. EXNER: And how do you explain this remark of yours: “...unless the intelligence department is ordered to organize this incident in any case”?
That is at the end of Page 38 in the second paragraph. It is an extract from 388-PS.
JODL: Yes, I had too much knowledge of European military history not to know that the question of the first shot—the apparent cause of war, not the inner cause of war—has played an important part in each war and on each side.
The responsibility for the outbreak of war is always attributed to the enemy; it is not characteristic of Germany alone, but of all European nations who have ever been at war with one another. In the case of Czechoslovakia the deeper cause of the war was quite apparent. I need not describe the condition in which 3½ million Germans found themselves who were supposed to fight against their own people. I myself was able to watch that tragedy in my own house. In this case, the deeper cause of the war, was firmly established, and Lord Runciman, who came on that mission from London, left no doubt about it whatsoever. In such a situation I certainly had no moral scruples about exaggerating one of these incidents, and, by means of a counteraction in vigorous reply to the Czech doings and activities, extending and enlarging such an incident in order that if the political situation allowed it, and England and France did not interfere—as the Führer believed—we might find a really obvious reason for taking action.
DR. EXNER: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, there is one point to which I wish to draw your attention. In my opinion it is once more a mistake in translation. I refer to the second paragraph from the bottom on Page 36. It is the report about the incident. The second but last paragraph on Page 36 states: “...that Case Green may be set in motion as a result of an incident in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation (Anlass) for military intervention.” The translation in English of these last words is a “provocation”; “Anlass” is translated as “provocation.”
THE PRESIDENT: What are you saying? What is the alteration?
DR. EXNER: I believe that the translation is not correct. I am not absolutely certain but I would like to call the Tribunal’s attention to it. “Anlass” means “prétexte” in French—which as far as we know is “pretext.”
THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Exner, there is no difference in the meaning of the words, whether it is “provocation,” or whether it is “cause.”
DR. EXNER: “Provocation” sounds a bit more aggressive, does it not? I just want to call your attention to it. In the German it is “cause” and not “provocation.”
[Turning to the defendant.] Now the Prosecution calls these considerations, which we have just talked about, criminal ideas and connects them with the supposedly planned murder of the German Ambassador in Prague. We are said to have planned that murder so as to have a cause for marching into Czechoslovakia. What do you have to say to that?
JODL: This, of course, is grotesque. The example that the Führer allegedly mentioned in his talks with Field Marshal Keitel, that the German Ambassador had been murdered by the people of Prague, was not even known to me. General Keitel did not tell me; I only heard of it here. Apart from that, I think it is useless to go on discussing it as we did exactly the opposite. We gave the order to General Toussaint to protect the German Embassy in Prague and to protect the lives of the people in it, because, in fact, at one stage it had been seriously threatened.
DR. EXNER: This is proved by Exhibit AJ-9, Document Jodl-62, third volume of the document book, Page 200. That again is the interrogatory of General Toussaint, who was a military attaché in Prague at that time. The third question is as follows:
“Is it true or not that in the summer of 1938 you received the order to defend the German Embassy at Prague and to protect the lives of all the Germans in the Embassy?”
And his answer is:
“Yes, it is true. I remember this order was given to me by telephone probably in September 1938...”—and so on and so forth.
Then in Question 4...
“It is true that the German Embassy...”
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has already said once it was so.
DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] Then I shall only refer to the testimony of Toussaint. In addition it has been said that the incident had been staged by us. We need not go into that in detail. Did the incident really happen?
JODL: No, there was neither a preparation for the incident, nor was it necessary. Incidents kept multiplying day after day, and the solution was a political one and entirely different.
DR. EXNER: So that this note, which we have often read, remained purely theoretical, did it?
JODL: It was merely work on paper, an idea, which was not really necessary at all.
But it has already been made clear that as soon as the political discussions started I made continuous efforts to prevent the provocations, apparently desired on the part of the Czechs, from leading to any military measures on our part.
DR. EXNER: Did the signatory powers in Munich at the end of September know of Germany’s military preparations? Did the statesmen there know that we were militarily prepared?
JODL: The Prosecution gave me the distinct impression that that had become known only today, and that it was unknown in the autumn of 1938 at Munich. But that is quite impossible. All the world knew of the calling up of the eight age groups in Czechoslovakia in September. The whole world knew of the total mobilization on 23 September. A political correspondent of The Times wrote an article on 28 September against this Czechoslovakian mobilization. Nobody was surprised that immediately after the signing of the Munich Pact, on 1 October, we marched into...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner...
DR. EXNER: Well, that ends this subject.
Is it true that in August 1938 you prepared a new operational plan of which you had already spoken on 7 July? A new plan based on the previous one?
JODL: Yes. Already before the solution brought about by the Munich Pact, I, on my own initiative, drew up a secret operational plan for the protection of all the German borders. It was so arranged that the borders only were to be protected while the bulk of the Army was to be kept in reserve in the center of Germany. That complete plan was available here during my interrogation. It is now no longer contained in Document 388-PS, but there is a reference made to it.
DR. EXNER: On Page 40, Volume I of our document book, I again read an extract from 388-PS. At the very end the following is stated:
“...after the conclusion of Green, it must be made possible to put a provisional deployment into action soon.”
And then:
“...first the Wehrmacht will guarantee the protection of the German frontiers, including those of the newly acquired lands, while the bulk of the Army and of the Air Force will remain at our disposal. Such a future ‘frontier protection’ deployment should be executed separately on the various fronts.”
Why did you prepare this “frontier protection” deployment? What was the cause of it?
JODL: The reason was that once the necessity for an operation against Czechoslovakia had become superfluous, through the problem being solved in some way, we would no longer have had any deployment plan at all. And as no other intention of the Führer was known to me, I on my own initiative drew up a plan for this operation which would be suitable for any eventuality.
DR. EXNER: Did you know anything about the intentions of the Führer, after the Munich Agreement, to go even further and occupy Bohemia and Moravia?
JODL: No, I had no idea of that. I knew of his speech of 26 September where he said: “Now we are facing the last problem to be solved.”
I believed in that assurance, and this is proved by the fact that during those days—it was about 10 or 11 September—I suggested to Field Marshal Keitel, than General Keitel, that he should ask the British Delegation, whose arrival had been announced, to come to Iglau in Moravia, because many Germans who were living there had been threatened by armed Czechoslovakian Communists. This of course was a suggestion which I would never have made if I had had any idea that the Führer nourished any further intentions concerning Bohemia and Moravia.
DR. EXNER: These further intentions of the Führer were recorded on 21 October 1938 in a directive. Did you know about that in the OKW, or what was the position?
JODL: No, I did not know about it. I did not see it. I only saw it here in this courtroom during my preliminary interrogation.
DR. EXNER: Then were you transferred to...
JODL: I was transferred to Vienna as Artillery Commander of the 44th Division stationed there.
DR. EXNER: That was the end of October, was it not?
JODL: The end of October.
DR. EXNER: How did you imagine further military developments would be? But, of course, you have already answered that.
JODL: Actually, I expected an easing of the political tension and a period of peace. I can certainly say that.
DR. EXNER: And what happened to you then?
JODL: As I knew of no other plans, I transferred my home to Vienna taking all my furniture with me. Naturally I would never have done that if I had had the faintest idea that war was pending, because I knew that in the event of war I was to become the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and so would have to return to Berlin. I asked General Keitel to help me to become the Commander of the 4th Mountain Division in Reichenhall, from 1 October 1939, a request which again it would never have entered my mind to make if I had any idea of what was going to come.
DR. EXNER: Did you as Artillery Commander in Vienna remain in contact with the OKW?
JODL: No, hardly at all. I had no connections with the OKW. I received no military documents from the OKW during all that period.
DR. EXNER: And who informed you then about the situation during that time?
JODL: Nobody. During that time I knew no more about what was going on or what was intended than any lieutenant in my artillery.
DR. EXNER: Did you have private correspondence with Keitel?
JODL: I received one letter from General Keitel. It was, I think, at the end of July 1939. He personally gave me the good news that quite probably I would become Commander of the 4th Mountain Division in Reichenhall on 1 October, and that General Von Sodenstern would become Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, now on peacetime footing, on 1 October.
DR. EXNER: Did you help to draw up the plan for the occupation of the remaining parts of Czechoslovakia?
JODL: No, I did not. During this occupation I remained in Vienna for the time being and temporarily became Chief of Staff of the 18th Army Corps at Vienna. Then, later on, I was transferred to Brünn in Czechoslovakia together with the entire 44th Division.
DR. EXNER: When did you hear about the whole thing?
JODL: It was through the orders of my divisional staff that I heard of that operation in March of 1939, some 2 or 3 days beforehand.
DR. EXNER: Was this move into Czechoslovakia the carrying out of Case Green which you had originally drafted?
JODL; No; it had no longer anything to do with that. There were completely different troop units, and not even half of the troops provided for in 1938 were actually used for the march into Czechoslovakia in 1939.
DR. EXNER: Now, during that period when you were in Vienna there was a conference with the Führer on 23 May 1939, which has often been mentioned here, concerning the disregarding of neutrality, et cetera. It has often been stated that Warlimont was present there as your representative. What was the position? Was he your representative?
JODL: With great persistence it has been said again and again that General Warlimont took part in the conference as the representative of Jodl, or even, it was once said, as his assistant. There is no question of that. He was my successor but not my representative. And even if it is repeated again and again, it still does not make it true. He was my successor.
DR. EXNER: You had left the OKW, had you not?
JODL: Yes, I had completely left the OKW. The fact that quite accidentally Warlimont became my deputy later on has nothing whatsoever to do with the events of May 1939.
DR. EXNER: When did you hear for the first time of this meeting in May 1939?
JODL: Here in Nuremberg in 1946.
DR. EXNER: Did you have any contact with Party leaders meanwhile, or with Austrian National Socialists?
JODL: No, not at all; with nobody.
DR. EXNER: Or with these defendants here?
JODL: No, not with them either.
DR. EXNER: Once during that time the Führer went to Vienna with Keitel. I think they were there 2 days or so. Did you have to report to him on that occasion?
JODL: Yes, coming from Prague he visited Vienna quite unobtrusively, and on that occasion I spoke a few words to General Keitel, but I did not talk to the Führer.
DR. EXNER: You were not presented to him?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: What was your war appointment to be?
JODL: As I have already said, in the event of a war I was to become Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: What about your private personal plans for that summer?
JODL: For that summer I already had tickets for a cruise in the eastern Mediterranean on 23 September 1939.
DR. EXNER: On 23 September 1939 the voyage...
JODL: The voyage was to start at Hamburg; I had already paid for the tickets.
DR. EXNER: When did you buy the tickets? Do you remember?
JODL: I bought them about the second half of July.
DR. EXNER: When did you return to Berlin?
JODL: I am not absolutely certain about the exact date, but I imagine that it was on 23 or 24 August—according to a telegram which reached me unexpectedly in Brünn.
DR. EXNER: If you had not received that telegram, when would you have had to go to Berlin?
JODL: In case of a general mobilization I would have had to go to Berlin anyway.
DR. EXNER: And did you now have to report to the Führer in Berlin?
JODL: No, I did not report to him, either. I only reported, of course, to General Keitel and to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army and the Air Force and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I have now completed that subject, and I thought that this would be a convenient time to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us how long you are likely to be?
DR. EXNER: I very much hope—certainly it will be in the course of tomorrow morning; but shall we say until noon?
DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Mr. President, as Counsel for Dr. Seyss-Inquart, I have to ask on behalf of my client that he may be permitted to be absent from the session for 2 days, to prepare his defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 5 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH DAY Wednesday, 5 June 1946
Morning Session
[The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand.]
THE MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that Defendant Seyss-Inquart is absent.
PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Mr. President, in agreement with the Prosecution I ask permission to submit a memorandum by Hitler, concerning the Four Year Plan of 1936. It is a certified copy, certified by a British officer in Dustbin Camp. I have numbered it Exhibit Schacht-48. In the afternoon session of 1 May my friend Dr. Dix referred to this memorandum, which could not at that time be incorporated into the record. Dr. Schacht then quoted a few passages from this memorandum. The President stated that we could submit the memorandum at a later date on condition, of course, that the Prosecution agreed. The Prosecution has acquiesced and I therefore trust that I may now be permitted to submit it.
Furthermore I am handing in a number of English translations. I regret I have not yet been able to have translations made in the other languages, and I ask permission to supply those translations later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kraus, until the other translations are actually made, the documents will not become part of the record.
DR. KRAUS: No. The English translations are available, and the others are not yet ready. May I submit them later?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. And they will then become part of the record.
DR. KRAUS: Yes, as a supplement to the document book.
DR. EXNER: Generaloberst, you told us yesterday that you were the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the war and that your main task consisted in the preparation of military operational plans. That is correct, is it not?
JODL: That is correct.
DR. EXNER: Then, where did you get the plans? Who decided what plans you had to make?
JODL: It was the same as in any other military staff. The Commander-in-Chief—in this case the Führer personally—received data for the decisions to be made: maps, strength returns of both our own and enemy forces, and information about the enemy. He then made his own decisions, and thereupon I would set my general staff to work, giving these decisions the military form necessary for the entire machinery of the Wehrmacht.
DR. EXNER: Now, in the course of these tasks and studies you also had to work on operations which were never actually carried out?
JODL: I have prepared a great number of such operations. Of the total number of operations for which I prepared orders and instructions there was only one which I definitely knew would be carried out; that was the operation against Yugoslavia. In the case of all the other operational plans, the decision as to whether it would be carried out or not remained undecided for a long time.
As an example of operational plans which had been drafted in every detail but which were never carried out, I mention the invasion of England, the march into Spain, the seizure of Gibraltar, the seizure of Malta, the capture of the Fischer Peninsula near Petsamo, and a winter attack on Kandalakscha on the Murmansk Railway.
DR. EXNER: Then, did these tasks of yours cover all the theaters of the war?
JODL: At the beginning of the war the work of my general staff did not apply to theaters of war at all, but the Führer’s instructions went only to the branches of the Wehrmacht—that is to the Army, the Navy and the Air Force; and it was only in the Norwegian campaign that circumstances developed for the first time so that the Armed Forces Operations Staff was made responsible for a theater of war. And this condition changed completely when in the beginning of 1942 the Führer himself assumed supreme command in the Army. Kesselring has already been asked about this, but did not answer. However, it stands to reason that the Führer, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, could not issue orders through Jodl to himself in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Army and then have them carried out through Generaloberst Zeitzler. Consequently a separation came about. From that moment on he, with the General Staff of the Army, directed the entire Eastern Front, while the Armed Forces Operations Staff became responsible for the general staff work of all the other theaters of war.
DR. EXNER: Now, the witness Field Marshal Paulus stated before the Tribunal that the OKW was responsible for the order to hold Stalingrad; and, as a matter of fact, both Keitel and Jodl have been repeatedly accused by the foreign press of having given that disastrous order. Is that true?
JODL: No, that is not true. The witness, for whom I feel the deepest sympathy and with whom I have worked in the most comradely fashion possible, could not have known anything at all about it. The facts are as follows: The moment danger threatened, the decision that Stalingrad must be held was made by the Führer during a private conversation with Generaloberst Zeitzler and contrary to the latter’s advice. Zeitzler told me so himself on his return from this interview. At a later stage, when blizzards were already raging across the steppes of the Don, the question of a break-through by the Stalingrad garrison was discussed again. Field Marshal Keitel, Generaloberst Zeitzler, and I were present on this occasion.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, I do not quite see how that is relevant, although Field Marshal Paulus may have said something about it. I mean, he may have given some evidence on the fighting at Stalingrad, and he undoubtedly did; but I do not see how it bears upon the case before us, or how it bears upon the case for Jodl.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, this has already settled the matter. It was necessary to clear up Field Marshal Paulus’ error. But this has already settled the matter.
[Turning to the defendant.] We now come to the time when you were recalled from Vienna to Berlin in 1939. What state of affairs did you find in Berlin on your arrival?
JODL: I found a completely incomprehensible state of affairs in Berlin—at least it was incomprehensible to me. Nobody knew what was really true or what was bluff. The pact with Russia sustained all our hopes for the preservation of peace, hopes which were immensely increased and strengthened by the surprise cancellation of the attack ordered for 26 August. None of the soldiers to whom I spoke expected a war with the Western Powers at that time. Nothing had been prepared except the operations for the attack on Poland.
There was only a defensive deployment of troops on the West Wall. The forces stationed there were so weak that we could not even man all the pillboxes. The actual efforts for the preservation of peace, however, efforts I have heard about here from the Reich Marshal, the name of Dahlerus—all these negotiations remained unknown to me insofar as they were not published in the press. But there is one thing I can say in conclusion. When the declaration of war was received from England and France it was like a blow from a cudgel for us soldiers who had fought in the first World War. And I heard in confidence from General Stapf—today the matter is no longer confidential—that the Reich Marshal reacted in exactly the same way.
DR. EXNER: Do you know when Poland mobilized?
JODL: That I cannot say. I only know that at the moment when I arrived in Berlin and was being informed by General Von Stülpnagel for the very first time about the situation and our own strength, a Polish deployment was already in progress along the frontier, as well as the German one.
DR. EXNER: That in itself already answers the accusation brought against you in the trial brief, namely “planning against Poland.”
Had you prepared a plan against Poland?
JODL: No. Not by a single stroke of the pen did I participate in the preparations for the Polish war.
DR. EXNER: Then I am right in saying, to sum up, that when you left Berlin there was not yet a plan of operations against Poland?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: And when you returned to Berlin the plan was ready?
JODL: Yes. The plan of attack was completely worked out.
DR. EXNER: Did you hear the Führer’s speech of 22 August 1939 which has been so often quoted here?
JODL: No; on that day I was still in Vienna.
DR. EXNER: When did you hear of that speech?
JODL: For the first time here in Nuremberg.
DR. EXNER: Do you remember the meeting in the Führer’s special train on 9 September 1939, described here by General Lahousen? Can you remember that?
JODL: Yes, I remember that meeting perfectly.
DR. EXNER: What was the subject of conversation during that meeting while you were on the Führer’s train?
JODL: I met the Führer in the so-called command car, in the chartroom, where Field Marshal Keitel, Canaris, and Lahousen were; and then Canaris made a brief report on the information he had received from the West and expressed the opinion that a French attack in the Saarbrücken sector was imminent. The Führer contradicted this, and so did I. Apart from that nothing else was discussed.
DR. EXNER: Then Lahousen’s statement is correct that you were only present during that particular part of the discussion?
JODL: As far as I am concerned I have not a word of objection to raise against Lahousen’s statement. Absolutely correct.
DR. EXNER: Frequent mention has been made during this Trial of the artillery and air bombardment of Warsaw. Did you participate in the giving of the orders for this?
JODL: Yes, I participated insofar as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army had applied to the Führer for permission for the artillery to bombard Warsaw as soon as the deployment of artillery units had been completed. The Führer refused this. He said, “What is happening here because of the Poles is madness.” He ordered me to draft new leaflets—which I did personally and immediately—and have them dropped again over the city of Warsaw. It was only when this renewed demand to cease the hopeless resistance had proved absolutely unsuccessful that he sanctioned artillery bombardment and air attacks on the fortress of Warsaw—and I emphasize the word “fortress.”
DR. EXNER: When issuing orders, did you have anything to do with the co-ordination of German and Soviet Russian operations?
JODL: Yes. When we were still 3 days’ march away from the Vistula, I was informed to my great surprise—by, I believe, the representative of the Foreign Office—while I was entering the Führer’s headquarters, that Soviet Russia would occupy the Polish territories...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, if it is convenient to you, I think you might speak a little faster.
JODL: ...that the Polish territories east of an agreed demarcation line would be occupied by Soviet Russian troops at the appointed time. When we were approaching this agreed demarcation line, which was shown to me on a map—the line was the East Prussian Lithuanian border, Narew, Vistula, San—I telephoned to our military attaché in Moscow and informed him that we could probably reach individual points of this demarcation line in the course of the following day. Shortly afterwards I was informed over the telephone that the Russian divisions were not yet ready.
When, the day after the next, we reached the demarcation line and had to cross it in pursuit of the Poles, I once again received news from Moscow, at 0200 hours, that the Soviet Russian divisions would take up their position along the entire front at 0400 hours. This maneuver was punctually carried out, and I then drafted an order to our German troops that wherever they had contacted the troops of the Soviet Union, and in agreement with them, they were to withdraw behind the demarcation line.
DR. EXNER: Do you know on what day all this happened?
JODL: I cannot tell you exactly when the troops reached the line, but I would say it was about 14 or 15 September.
DR. EXNER: We shall now deal with aggressive wars against the neutral countries...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, now all that the defendant has just been telling us seems to be to me a simple waste of our time, with absolutely no relevance to this case at all; and why you let him do it, I do not know.
DR. EXNER: You have been accused of having used your personal influence and your close relations with the Führer to attack a whole series of neutral countries. Tell me, is that true?
JODL: No, it is untrue. I remember that a witness here spoke of a sinister influence, of a key position of a sinister kind—at any rate, something sinister. But my influence on the Führer was unfortunately not in the least as great as it might, or perhaps even ought to have been in view of the position I held. The reason lay in the powerful personality of this despot who never suffered advisers gladly.
DR. EXNER: When did you first hear of a plan for a possible occupation of Norway?
JODL: The Führer first spoke to me—I think it was in mid-November 1939—at any rate, a fairly long time after Grossadmiral Raeder had first spoken to him. At that first conference, which I believe took place on 10 October, I had not yet heard of anything nor did the Führer give me any information. But in the middle of November he spoke to me about it. I first learned the details during the oral report made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, which took place on 12 November and at which I was present.
DR. EXNER: In this connection I would draw your attention to Document C-64, Exhibit GB-86, Page 46 of the document book. But I do not need to read it aloud. Volume I, Page 46.
What was the Führer’s point of view?
JODL: The general attitude of the Führer at that time was—it is also established in writing: “I am not at all interested in extending the theaters of war, but if the danger of an occupation of Norway by England really exists and if that is true, then the situation would be quite different.”
DR. EXNER: Was anything ordered at that time?
JODL: Nothing was ordered at that time, but he merely instructed me to think this problem over generally. The preliminary work, as has been proved by documents, began on 27 January 1940.
DR. EXNER: That may be seen from Document C-63, Exhibit GB-87.
Were you at that time of the opinion that the assurance given by Hitler in December and October 1939 that Norwegian neutrality would be respected—were you of the opinion that this assurance was given for the purpose of lulling Norway into a state of security, as has been alleged by the Prosecution?
JODL: That allegation can be definitely refuted, and by means of a few dates which I shall now enumerate. These assurances, these political assurances, were given by the Führer—or by the Reich Government, I do not know which—on 2 September and 6 October. On 9 October the Führer read and signed the famous memorandum known as Document L-52. I do not know whether the Tribunal is aware of the fact that it is a personal memorandum by the Führer.
DR. EXNER: That is Document L-52, Exhibit USA-540. It is printed on Page 48, Volume I, of my document book.
In this memorandum—for whom was the memorandum prepared?
JODL: This memorandum, as I think is obvious from the document, went out to the three Commanders-in-Chief and to the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. It was dictated word for word by the Führer himself and was completed in 2 nights.
DR. EXNER: I shall read Paragraph 2, printed on Page 48 of my document book:
“The Nordic States.
“Their neutrality, provided no completely unforeseen circumstances arise, may be assumed also for the future. The continuation of German trade with these countries appears possible, even if the war is of long duration.”
JODL: It is quite out of the question that the Führer, in this extremely secret memorandum, could have mentioned anything but his true purpose at that particular time. That, however, is all the more comprehensible since it was not until 1 day later, namely 10 October, that Grossadmiral Raeder first mentioned these fears to the Führer.
DR. EXNER: Was the occupation of Norway a very weighty decision for the leadership?
JODL: It was a terribly weighty decision. To put it shortly—it meant gambling with the entire German fleet. The result of it was that we had to defend a coastline of over 3,000 kilometers, and that meant that nearly 300,000 men were lying idle there. The decision, therefore, depended on really reliable information that Norway was threatened by actual danger. That is the reason why no definite date was fixed for this operation “Weserübung,” and the reason why I at a later date suggested that the forces for the Norway operation, in case it became necessary, and for an attack in the West, should be completely separate from each other.
DR. EXNER: What were the reasons why the occupation had to be prepared in every detail?
JODL: The reasons are quite openly and definitely stated in the order of 1 March 1940 which is Document C-174...
DR. EXNER: That is Exhibit GB-89.
JODL: Yes; we had to be prepared in any case.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that Document 174-PS, or what?
DR. EXNER: It is not printed in my document book. It refers to a document which the British Prosecution has submitted under Exhibit GB-89.
THE PRESIDENT: But 174 must mean something, must it not? The document said Document 174.
DR. EXNER: Document C-174.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is C-174.
THE PRESIDENT: C-174. Very well.
MR. ROBERTS: And it was put in by Mr. Elwyn Jones, in Document Book 3.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. EXNER: Now, you say in your diary that the Führer was searching for a justification. The meaning has already been explained here; but you yourself should know best what the meaning is, since you wrote it yourself. What does it mean?
JODL: The Führer said in those days, when I wrote it—not in a diary, but in my notebook, my memorandum book—he said: “To carry out a decision of this kind I need absolutely reliable information with which I can really justify this decision before the world and prove that it was necessary. I cannot tell, I only heard the following from Herr Quisling...” And for this reason he kept the Intelligence Service in particular very busy at this time, in order to get even more precise information for the Führer about these many reports which we received...
DR. EXNER: Now, Grossadmiral Raeder has explained the facts from which England’s plans could be deduced. Have you anything to add to that, or is the question settled?
JODL: On the whole, Grossadmiral Raeder has already submitted all the information. There is one thing which remains in my memory and which is also written in my notebook. That is the special insistence, quite openly advocated in the French press, that under all circumstances Germany must be cut off from the Swedish ore supplies. Then came the mine-laying in Norwegian territorial waters; and then came the Altmark case which, according to my study of international law, was a flagrant breach of the agreement ruling the rights and duties of neutral states in naval warfare, and Articles 1 and 2...
DR. EXNER: Regarding the first two points which the witness has mentioned, I should like to draw attention to Document 1809-PS—that is, his diary, Exhibit GB-88, Page 53 of Volume I of my collection. There is an entry on 10 March:
“The news about the Finnish-Russian negotiations is very gratifying from a political point of view. The French press is furious about it, because it considers it necessary to cut Germany off from Swedish ore.”
And then the entry of 25 March:
“The English have begun to molest or to fire on our merchantmen in Danish and Norwegian territorial waters.”
Now, please tell us what gave rise to the decision to attack?
JODL: The Führer’s final decision was made on 2 April and was made on the basis of two pieces of information. First, the reports from the Navy regarding repeated firing on German merchant ships both in Norwegian and Danish territorial waters. Second, a report from Canaris that British troops and transports were lying in a state of readiness in the northern part of the English east coast.
DR. EXNER: What would have been the consequences for us if England had got there first?
JODL: As to that I can refer to Grossadmiral Raeder’s testimony, and can only say that once Norway was in British hands the war would have been half lost for us. We would have been strategically encircled on the northern flank and because of the weakness of our fleet we would have been incapable of ever rectifying this again.
DR. EXNER: Was indisputable proof found later that the British plan really existed?
JODL: We captured the entire records of the British brigade which landed in Namsos and in other places. We surprised and captured the British war correspondent Romilly in Narvik, where he expected anything rather than the arrival of German ships, otherwise he could have escaped capture. To the question what he wanted to report about the war in peaceful Narvik he could not give us any information at all.
Later on we captured all the records of the French General Staff, a part of which have already been presented by Admiral Raeder’s counsel. Particularly instructive, and of great interest to me, were the diaries carried by the English officers and some of the noncommissioned officers whom we captured in Norway. At least they proved one thing, namely, that all these troops had already been embarked and had been put ashore again the moment our German fleet advanced towards Norway.
DR. EXNER: I should like to refer again to two entries in the diary, Page 54, Volume I of my document book, the entry of 24 April and the entry of 26 April. There it says:
“Major Soltmann reports on the interrogation of the Englishmen and submits additional important documents, among them the secret Army list. At noon the first prisoners arrived in Berlin. They are being interrogated in the Alexander Barracks and confirm the authenticity of the orders. All the material is being handed over to the Foreign Office.”
In conclusion, I also draw your attention again to Soltmann’s interrogatory. It is Document AJ, Number 4, Exhibit Jodl-57, which I now present; Page 173 of Volume II. I need not read it aloud; I merely draw your attention to Soltmann’s answers to questions 4 and 5.
Now, one last question about this Norwegian affair. The English representative of the Prosecution has said that this shows how honorable the soldiers were who attacked Norway and then made use of lies and excuses. What do you say about this?
JODL: The Prosecution has thereby placed a purely operational problem on the level of soldierly or human honor. Until now that has never been the custom in this world. I can only say that I neither attacked Norwegians, nor did I resort to lies or excuses. But I did use all my strength to contribute to the success of an operation which I considered absolutely necessary in order to forestall a similar action on the part of the English. If the seals of the archives are ever broken, the rightness of my attitude will then be clearly shown. But even if it were wrong, the honesty of my own subjective opinion at that time cannot for that reason be changed in any way.
DR. EXNER: We will now talk about the war in the West. After the end of the Polish campaign, was there already an operational plan for attacks in the West?
JODL: No. To begin with, there was no plan of attack in the West; but, on the contrary, there was, particularly in the Army, a widespread opinion that the war would die a natural death if only we kept quiet in the West. That went so far that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army transformed even mobile infantry divisions into fortress divisions, and took away all their mobile equipment from them.
DR. EXNER: Did you already know during the Polish campaign what the Führer’s intentions were concerning the West?
JODL: The Führer himself had his doubts during the Polish campaign. He too could find no plausible explanation for the complete inactivity of the French and English forces in France, who only staged a kind of a sham war with the help of their war communiqués. In reality not a single shot was fired at the front. But by the end of September, if I remember rightly, the Führer did realize that once England enters a war she fights it out to the bitter end.
DR. EXNER: As an officer of the General Staff you should be able to answer the following questions better than anybody else. Could we, from a purely strategical viewpoint, have remained purely on the defensive as far as the West was concerned?
JODL: I shall be very brief since such problems are not directly connected with the Trial. I will only say that it would have been the greatest possible error of strategy, because the superiority we possessed at that time would necessarily have diminished in proportion to our delay in making aggressive use of it; for England was continually bringing further divisions over to France, just as the French were from their colonial empire.
I believe I need say no more about that.
DR. EXNER: I draw your attention to Document C-62, Exhibit GB-106, Volume I of my document book, Page 56. I need not, however, read it aloud. It is a directive for the conduct of the war, and contains the basic ideas which we have already heard expressed.
JODL: One thing more is perhaps important. The Führer took such a serious view of this danger, that we might not maintain our superiority in the long run, that he actually wanted to attack in the winter, although all soldiers without exception advised him against it.
DR. EXNER: Here attention might be drawn to our document, Volume I, Pages 48 and 49. It is a memorandum of the Führer on the conduct of the war in the West, from which Jodl has already quoted Document L-52, Exhibit USA-540. A detailed justification of this is on Page 49 of my document book.
Why then was France not attacked without violating the neutrality of Holland, Luxembourg, and Belgium?
JODL: It was no trifle for the Führer to create new enemies possessing a strength of 500,000 men, which the Dutch and Belgian forces represented. It resulted in our having to make the attack in the West with actually inferior forces, namely, with 110 divisions against approximately 135 of the enemy. No military commander would do that except in an emergency.
DR. EXNER: Now, what were the reasons?
JODL: We were not in a position to break through the Maginot Line at its strongest points, which would then have remained uncaptured—namely, between the Rhine and the Luxembourg border, or the Upper Rhine where the Vosges mountains were an additional obstacle in breaking through this West Wall at these points, this Maginot Line. For this purpose heavy artillery was lacking. But that was not a moral reason; it was, in fact, rather an unmoral one.
The great danger lay in the fact that so protracted an attack on the fortifications exposed us to an attack in the rear by the combined English and French mobile forces thrusting through Belgium and Holland; and they were north of Lille with their engines already running, one might say, for this very task. And the decisive factor was that owing to the many reports which reached us, the Führer and we ourselves, the soldiers, were definitely under the impression that the neutrality of Belgium and Holland was really only pretended and deceptive.
DR. EXNER: How did you arrive at that conclusion?
JODL: Individually the reports are not of great interest. There was, however, an endless number of reports from Canaris. They were supplemented and confirmed by letters from the Duce, Mussolini. But what was absolutely proved and completely certain, which I could see for myself on the maps every day, were the nightly flights to and fro of the Royal Air Force, completely unconcerned about neutral Dutch and Belgian territory. This necessarily strengthened the conviction in us that even if the two countries wished to—and perhaps in the beginning they did so wish—they could not possibly remain neutral in the long run.
DR. EXNER: What danger would the occupation of Belgium and Holland by the English and French have meant to us?
JODL: Those dangers were quite clearly indicated by the Führer, first, in his memorandum, Document L-52, which has been repeatedly quoted. There, on Page 48 of the document book, in the last paragraph of the page, is a reference to the enormous importance of the Ruhr—of which, incidentally, there seems to be quite sufficient evidence even today.
In his address of 23 November 1939 to the Commanders-in-Chief—Document 789-PS, or Exhibit USA-23—he describes once more, on Page 59, Volume I of the document book, precisely how that danger would be for the Ruhr district if one day British and French forces were to appear by surprise in that region. He referred to it there as the “Achilles’ heel,” and that is just what it was for German war strategy.
DR. EXNER: And he said there, on Page 59 of our document book:
“We have an Achilles’ heel: the Ruhr district. The strategy of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr district. If England and France thrust through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the very greatest danger.”
JODL: I cannot, of course, or could not at the time, swear to the absolute accuracy of the numerous reports from Canaris, but the material we captured afterwards—and in this connection I would draw your attention to the conference of the Supreme War Council in London of 17 November 1939—confirmed on the whole the accuracy of the intelligence reports.
DR. EXNER: Presumably you had no reason at that time to doubt Canaris’ honesty, had you?
JODL: No. At that time there was not the slightest reason for doubt.
DR. EXNER: Yes. But now some doubt has arisen as to his honesty.
Now, the German attack was originally planned for November 1939. Why did the Führer postpone it over and over again? We have before us no less than 17 orders postponing the attack time and again.
JODL: It is not quite correct to say that the Führer had ordered the attack for mid-November, but rather he wanted to order the attack for a time when the meteorologists could predict about 6 or 7 days of clear, frosty weather. But the meteorologists failed completely in this. At times they thought they could predict such a state of the weather, and then all preparations would be made for the attack. Then they would cancel their weather forecasts again, and the final preparations for attack would be discontinued once more. That is why we so often prepared for the attack and then refrained from carrying it out.
On such an occasion I received a report from Canaris to the effect that one unit of the French Army had already crossed one part of the Belgian frontier. I do not know if that is true.
DR. EXNER: You have been accused by the Prosecution of first deceiving these countries and then invading them. Please tell us what you have to say on that subject.
JODL: The same applies here as I said before. I was neither a politician, nor was I the military Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht. I was under the impression—and, indeed, an impression which could be proved—that in actual fact the neutrality of these two countries was no longer being respected. And as for the ethical code of my action, I must say that it was obedience—for obedience is really the ethical basis of the military profession. That I was far from extending this code of obedience to the blind code of obedience imposed on the slave has, I consider, been proved beyond all manner of doubt by my previous testimony. Nevertheless, you cannot get around the fact that, especially in operational matters of this particular kind, there can be no other course for the soldier but obedience.
And if the Prosecution today is in a position to indict German officers here at all, it owes this only to the ethical concept of obedience of its own brave soldiers.
DR. EXNER: We now come to the Balkans. In your diary, Document 1809-PS, on 19 March you made the following entry: “The Balkans should and must remain quiet.” That is on Page 61 of Volume I of my book, Exhibit GB-88, Document 1809-PS, the entry of 19 March. It says first:
“The Führer has returned beaming with joy and highly satisfied from the conference with the Duce. Complete agreement. ... The Balkans should and must remain quiet.”
What does that mean?
JODL: Herr Professor, I must correct you. This is not my diary.
DR. EXNER: Yes. Well then I must put in another question here. Your diary and your diaries are always being talked about. Explain just what this is—what we are dealing with here. Is one a real diary and the other not?
JODL: There is only one diary, and that is Document 1780-PS, which is from the year 1937 to 1938, and I used to make entries in it every evening.
DR. EXNER: And now this diary, Document 1809-PS, what was that?
JODL: I kept no diary at all during the war, but, of course, I filled up dozens of small notebooks. When one of these notebooks was full I marked important passages in red on the margin, and my secretary copied them out later, as they might be important for writing the history of the war and for the official diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. An example would be Document 1809-PS.
DR. EXNER: Did you check what your secretary had compiled?
JODL: No, I did not check it, and never saw it again. It fell then into the hands of the Prosecution.
DR. EXNER: Now, there is still a third one which is always quoted here as a diary. That is the Diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: You said it fell into the hands of the Prosecution. Do you mean it was not one of the documents that you handed over to the Prosecution?
JODL: No. I did not know at all where those extracts from my notebook had gone. The Prosecution captured it somewhere or other. The remainder are extracts, and partial extracts, from the official Diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: And who kept this, the official Diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff? Not you?
JODL: No. It was always kept by a highly qualified expert of my own selection.
DR. EXNER: Did you check it?
JODL: The final check was made by Dr. Schramm, a professor at the Göttingen University.
DR. EXNER: We shall hear him as a witness.
Did you check the entries made in that official diary, or did you not?
JODL: I usually did not have the time; but if General Scherff read through it and discovered anything in particular he would draw my attention to it.
DR. EXNER: Well, so much for clearing that up.
We now come back to the Balkan question again. It says in your so-called diary, “The Balkans should and must remain quiet.” What was meant by that?
JODL: That was a brief note on the statement by the Führer—namely, that he was in perfect agreement with Mussolini that the Balkans must be kept quiet.
DR. EXNER: And did we not actually try to keep the Balkan states as quiet as possible?
JODL: Yes. We made unremitting endeavors for that. Our attitude toward Yugoslavia was as considerate as if we were dealing with a prima donna. Matters went so far that when we had to prepare the Greek campaign the Führer even refused a proposal from the Quartermaster General of the Army that sealed trains—the supply trains—should be sent through Yugoslavia, which would have been permissible according to international law. Moreover, we brought pressure to bear on Bulgaria so that she should not participate in the impending campaign against Greece, above all so as not to alarm Turkey. And even after the Greco-Italian campaign, the Führer still hoped that a conflict, an actual war, between Germany and Greece could be avoided.
DR. EXNER: I refer here to Directive Number 18, printed on Page 66 of Volume I of our document book, which contains an extract from Document 444-PS, Exhibit GB-116, and here we find the following statement in the paragraph before the last:
“The preparatory measures of the High Command for the conduct of the war in the near future are to be made in accordance with the following guiding principles...”
And it is then stated in the last but one paragraph of that page:
“The utilization of the railway through Yugoslavia may not be counted on for the deployment of these forces...”
Well, what forced us to give up this program?
JODL: That program was completely wrecked by Italy’s arbitrary act, about which the Reich Marshal and the Grossadmiral have already made statements. I have only a brief addition to make. Italy was beaten, as usual, and sent the Chief of the Operational Staff of the Supreme Command to me crying for help. But in spite of this calamity the Führer did not intervene in the war in Albania. He did not send a single German soldier there, although the matter had been under consideration. He ordered only an operation against Greece, starting from Bulgaria, to be prepared for the following spring. Even that was for the primary purpose of occupying the Salonika Basin, thereby giving direct relief to the Italians and only in the event, which to be sure was feared, of English divisions now landing in the Balkans as the result of Italy’s madness. In that case it was decided to consider the whole of Greece as an operational area, since we could not possibly tolerate a Royal Air Force base in the immediate vicinity of the Romanian oil fields. And this contingency is shown very clearly in the order which has been submitted to the Tribunal as Document 1541-PS, Exhibit GB-117, Pages 63 and 64 of the document book. I should like to quote two passages, two very brief passages from it. In Paragraph 2, Subparagraph b of Page 63, it says:
“‘Operation Marita.’ My plan therefore is”—I am quoting—“... to send these forces straight through Bulgaria, for the occupation of the north Aegean coast and, if necessary, the entire mainland of Greece.”
I then quote from Page 64, Paragraph 4, Subparagraph a:
“The primary objective of the operation is the occupation of the Aegean coast and the Salonika Basin. The continuation of the attack by way of Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth may prove necessary.”
It is quite obvious from these conditional orders that the occupation of the whole of Greece was intended only if we should be forced to take this measure by the landing of English troops, which at that time was not yet the case.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. EXNER: You said we had planned to leave Yugoslavia neutral. Now this plan was apparently changed by the Simovic Putsch. Why did this event alter our policy toward Yugoslavia?
JODL: This Putsch against a legal government, by officers meddling in politics, immediately after Yugoslavia had joined the Tripartite Pact had necessarily an anti-German tendency. We stood directly on the verge of the campaign against Greece, against the whole of Greece, for in the meantime English divisions had landed there, and this campaign could only be waged with a safely neutral Yugoslavia behind us.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, various other members of the defendants—Defendants Göring and Keitel—have dealt with the political aspects of the entry of Germany into Yugoslavia. Unless there is anything new for this defendant to give evidence about it seems to be entirely cumulative.
DR. EXNER: Then kindly just tell us, if you have anything new to add—some documents, et cetera.
JODL: I have something to add which concerns myself personally.
THE PRESIDENT: Nothing is coming through—the English was not coming through. Please, try it again. Repeat what you said.
JODL: I have something else to add which concerns me personally with regard to the Yugoslav problem...
THE PRESIDENT: No. There is nothing coming through to us. Go on then, Defendant. You were asked if there is anything new to say.
JODL: Yes, I have something personal to add.
DR. EXNER: Yes, do so.
JODL: On this morning when the Führer spontaneously ordered the immediate preparation of an attack on Yugoslavia, I proposed to him, or at least I mentioned to him, that after concentrating our troops we ought first to clarify the real situation, the political situation, by an ultimatum. He refused to do so. He said, “That will not be of any use.” Field Marshal Keitel has already confirmed this.
DR. EXNER: Tell me, was that on 27 March?
JODL: Yes, that was on the 27th. May I give proof of this. On the evening of the 27th the order was issued...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary if the Defendant Keitel said it, and you say it, and there is no cross-examination about it.
DR. EXNER: But I feel that there is something important.
JODL: A document was submitted, Document 1746-PS, Exhibit GB-120, on Page 70 of the document book.
DR. EXNER: Page 71.
JODL: Yes, the text is on Page 71. If the Court will compare this sentence on Page 71, Paragraph 1, with the sentence on Page 69 of the document book a difference will be noticed. Page 69 contains the order signed by the Führer, and it begins with this sentence which I shall quote:
“The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political situation in the Balkans. Even if she makes a declaration of loyalty, Yugoslavia must be considered as an enemy and therefore beaten as quickly as possible.”
This, as appears from the date, was issued on 27 March. I worked that whole night at the Reich Chancellery, which is another proof of the sudden nature of the whole case. At 4 o’clock on the morning of the 28th, as stated on Page 71, I put the following aide-mémoire, this operational aide-mémoire, into the hand of General Von Rintelen, our liaison officer with the Italian High Command. In it I had written—I quote:
“Should political developments call for armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention...” et cetera.
I must admit that, in this instance, I ventured a little into the political field, but in so doing I thought that if Germany did not clarify the political situation beyond any doubt, Italy perhaps might do it.
DR. EXNER: The next document is also evidence of the suddenness of this decision, and I have had it printed on Page 73, Volume 1. That is the order issued by the High Command of the Army on the basis of these directives—the order for deployment of troops for the operation. That is Document R-95, Exhibit GB-127, Page 73, of Volume I, as I have already stated, and it says there:
“As a result of the change in the political situation...” et cetera—and then—“there will be concentrated...”—and then the last paragraph states—“The operation will be given the code name ‘Project 25.’”
I ask you, Generaloberst, can anything be gathered from this?
JODL: The order issued was not until 3 April...
DR. EXNER: No, 30 March.
JODL: ...30 March.
DR. EXNER: Did the operation receive the code name “Project 25”?
JODL: A code name for this operation was ordered for the first time 3 days after the Putsch, which proves that it had not been planned in 1937 as was once stated here.
DR. EXNER: And now, just one last question on this Balkan matter. Was Greek neutrality still being maintained on 24 March 1941 when we gave permission for the Luftwaffe attack on her territory of Crete? In this connection I refer to Document C-60, Exhibit AJ-13. It is an order of 24 March 1941 which, as I have just stated, sanctioned air attacks on Crete and also on Greek shipping. Now, what about Greek neutrality on 24 March 1941?
JODL: From the point of view of international law it no longer existed at that date. The English had in the meantime landed on Crete and at Piraeus, and we had already learned about this on 5 or 6 March. The order, therefore, was in accordance with all the principles of international law. But to conclude the Yugoslav problem I may add that the allegation made by the Prosecution, that the plan to attack Yugoslavia emanated from Jodl’s office, is a statement which has not been and cannot be substantiated by anything.
THE PRESIDENT: What was that document that you were referring to? 24-March 1941? You said 360, which did not indicate anything to us.
DR. EXNER: 24 March, which is Document C-60, Exhibit AJ-13.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. What page?
DR. EXNER: Page 76, Volume I.
[Turning to the defendant.] We now come to the question of the Soviet Union. How many troops did we have in the East during the Western campaign?
JODL: At first it was 10 divisions, which in the course of the Western campaign were reduced to 6 or 5 divisions.
DR. EXNER: What prompted us to send troops to the East after the Western campaign?
JODL: The notification from the commander in the East that with such weak forces he could neither keep Poland quiet nor guard the demarcation line.
DR. EXNER: In your diary—the so-called diary—Document 1809-PS, Volume I of my document book, Page 83, you write on 24 May: “Situation in the East becomes precarious due to the Russian menace against Bessarabia.” That is on 24 May 1940. That is what you wrote in your diary. How did you come to this conclusion?
JODL: The reason was a dispatch from Canaris reporting the concentration of 30 Russian divisions against Bessarabia. Whether the note expressing anxiety originated with me, or whether it was an idea of the Führer’s which I jotted down, I can no longer say today.
DR. EXNER: Well, on 6 September 1940 you signed an order stating that the regrouping should not give the impression of an offensive preparation. How should that be understood?
JODL: This order signed by me was interpreted as the first attempt to conceal the impending attack on Russia.
DR. EXNER: One moment. I want to point out the order in question to the Tribunal. It is Page 78, Volume I, Document 1229-PS, Exhibit USA-130. It is an order by Jodl, addressed to the Foreign Intelligence Service, and it says there:
“The Eastern area will be manned by stronger forces in the coming weeks. By the end of October, the status indicated on the enclosed map ought to have been reached.”
And now, Your Honors, I am sorry to have to point out an omission in the English and French translations. The next paragraph is missing, and this is very important for the understanding of the entire document. It says, namely, “For the work of our own Intelligence Service, as well as for answering questions asked by the Russian Intelligence Service...”
THE PRESIDENT: It does not appear to be in our document. What paragraph are you reading?
DR. EXNER: It is Paragraph 2 in my document book, Page 78.
THE PRESIDENT: It has not been translated.
DR. EXNER: That is just what I said. That is the error. Therefore I will dictate it now, or read it slowly.
THE PRESIDENT: You want it to be translated?
DR. EXNER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Paragraph 2 is not translated at all. There is nothing here.
DR. EXNER: These three lines were not translated at all, but they are very important.
THE PRESIDENT: Just read it through the earphones, then. Read the passage.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the full document is in the British Document Book 7, Page 102.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Go on.
DR. EXNER: “For the work of our own Intelligence Service, as well as for answering questions asked by the Russian Intelligence Service, the following guiding principles apply...”
And now explain the subject further.
JODL: Instructions such as these to Canaris’ office were issued by me every 6 weeks. They formed the basis for the so-called counterespionage work, which I do not wish to discuss in detail here. In this case what matters to me was that the weak forces which we kept in the East at this time should be made to appear actually stronger. That, for instance, can be clearly seen from Paragraph 3 which says, and I quote:
“In statements on the equipment situation of the forces, especially of the armored divisions, it is advisable to exaggerate if necessary.”
I also pointed out in the next paragraph that antiaircraft defenses should be exaggerated. All this was done because at that time anxiety had already arisen that possibly a Russian operation against Romania might develop. The purpose of this order was to deter them from that, and it was intended for the intelligence only. If on 6 September, I had already known of any aggressive intention against Russia I would have said exactly the contrary; for with this order, as I had issued it, I would have been working in the interests of Gisevius and his friends—namely, I would have been informing the Russians that we were beginning to deploy our troops.
DR. EXNER: Now, when did you first hear of the Führer’s fears that Russia might prove hostile to us?
JODL: For the first time, on 29 July 1940, at the Berghof near Berchtesgaden.
DR. EXNER: In what connection?
JODL: The Führer kept me back alone after a discussion on the situation and said to me, most unexpectedly, that he was worried that Russia might occupy still more territory in Romania before the winter and that the Romanian oil region, which was the conditio sine qua non for our war strategy, would thus be taken from us. He asked me whether we could not deploy our troops immediately, so that we would be ready by autumn to oppose with strong forces any such Russian intention. These are almost the exact words which he used, and all other versions are false.
DR. EXNER: You have just mentioned Hitler’s concern about the seizure of the Romanian oil fields. Did the Führer do anything on account of this apprehension?
JODL: It was precisely on the basis of this conversation—when I protested that it was quite impossible to carry out a troop deployment at that time for it would take 4 months—that the Führer ordered that these deployment arrangements were to be improved. Two orders were then issued immediately. One, I believe, is of 9 August. It was called “Reconstruction East” and included all measures to improve the deployment arrangements in the eastern area. The second order was issued on 27 August. We do not have it here, but it has been recorded in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: Yes, that is Page 85, Volume I of my document book. There is an entry, right at the end of the page, in the Diary of the Naval Operations Staff:
“Transfer of 10 divisions and 2 armored divisions to the Government General, in case prompt intervention should prove necessary for the protection of the Romanian oil fields.”
That is an excerpt from Document C-170, Exhibit USA-136.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you seem to be reading from Page 85. Were you?
DR. EXNER: Yes, from Page 85. It is Page 85 of the German version. Perhaps the numbering of the pages does not quite tally with the numbering of the English version. It is the entry: “Transfer of 10 divisions and 2 armored divisions to the Government General.”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
JODL: This entry is a proof of the Führer’s intentions at that time with regard to this reinforcement in the East.
DR. EXNER: Well, when was the Führer’s order issued to prepare for attack?
JODL: The first order for deliberation concerning an attack, or for the discussion of any aggressive operation at all, was issued in writing by the Armed Forces Operations Staff and submitted to the Führer on 12 November. It is Document 444-PS...
DR. EXNER: It is on Page 66, Volume I of my document book.
JODL: ...and it is already known to the Tribunal. But this first order, which is known to me, had to be preceded by oral instructions from the Führer to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
DR. EXNER: That can be gathered from the document itself, namely from Page 67 which reads:
“Irrespective of the result of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered are to be carried out.”
This is proof, therefore, that oral orders and preparation had preceded.
JODL: I am not in a position to say, however, when these oral instructions had been given to the Army.
DR. EXNER: Tell me, in these statements, which Hitler made to you, was there ever any mention made of such things as the extension of the “Lebensraum,” and of the food basis as a reason for a war of conquest, and so on?
JODL: In my presence the Führer never even hinted at any other reason than a purely strategic and operational one. For months on end, one might say, he incessantly repeated:
“No further doubt is possible. England is hoping for this final sword-thrust against us on the continent, else she would have stopped the war after Dunkirk. Private or secret agreements have certainly already been made. The Russian deployment is unmistakable. One day we shall suddenly become the victim of cold-blooded political extortion, or we shall be attacked.”
But otherwise, though one might talk about it for weeks on end, no word was mentioned to me of any other than purely strategical reasons of this kind.
DR. EXNER: According to the reports received, how did the military situation develop in the East after the Polish campaign?
JODL: When we first contacted the Russians in the Polish campaign, relations were rather cool. We were carefully prevented from gaining any information about their troops or equipment. There were constantly unpleasant incidents on the San. The Russians shot at everything, at fleeing Poles or at German soldiers, and there were wounded and dead; and the demarcation line was flown over in numerous cases. The unusually strong forces employed, by Russia for the occupation of the Baltic states, of Poland and Bessarabia struck us from the very beginning.
DR. EXNER: Did the reports which you received contain indications of military reinforcements for the Red Army?
JODL: From maps which were submitted every few days, which were based on intelligence reports and information from the radio interception section, the following picture was formed: In the summer of 1940 there were about 100 Russian divisions along the border. In January 1941, there were already 150 divisions; and these were indicated by number, consequently the reports were reliable. In comparison with this strength, I may add that the English-American-French forces operating from France against Germany never, to my knowledge, amounted to 100 divisions.
DR. EXNER: Did Hitler attempt to clear up the political situation by diplomatic means?
JODL: He attempted to do so by the well-known conference with Molotov; and I must say that I placed great hopes on this conference, for the military situation for us soldiers was as follows: With a definitely neutral Russia in our rear—a Russia which in addition sent us supplies—we could not lose the war. An invasion, such as took place on 6 June 1944, would have been entirely out of the question if we had had at our disposal all the forces we had used and lost in this immense struggle in Russia. And it never for a single moment entered my mind that a statesman, who after all was also a strategist, would needlessly let such an opportunity go. And it is a fact that he struggled for months with himself about this decision, being certainly influenced by the many contrary ideas suggested to him by the Reich Marshal, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, as well as the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
DR. EXNER: On the basis of the reports which you received, what did the further military situation on both sides look like?
JODL: The Intelligence Service was put to work as from January 1941. The divisions on our borders and also along the Romanian frontier grew rapidly. On 3 February 1941 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army informed the Führer of the operations which he himself intended to carry out. At the same time he presented a map showing the Russian troop deployment. This map indicated—and this has been proved by documents—that there were 100 infantry divisions, 25 cavalry divisions...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, do we need all these strategic details of plans which were drawn up by the German General Staff?
DR. EXNER: It is of very great importance to establish the picture facing the General Staff at that time. If an overwhelming concentration of Russian troops had not...
THE PRESIDENT: But that is not what he tells about. He is telling us about February 1941. The OKW had produced plans to show the deployment of German troops.
DR. EXNER: That is a plan which was developed by...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary to go into such details as to tell us how many cavalry regiments they had there.
DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] Please tell us on general lines how Halder pictured the situation to you after the February 1941 reports. One figure only: how many divisions were deployed?
JODL: I have already said that 150 Russian divisions were deployed against us in February.
THE PRESIDENT: He said that already.
DR. EXNER: And how many were there on our side?
JODL: I should like to say in reply that at this same time our deployment, as reported by General Halder, had only just begun. And furthermore, I should like to point out that according to Document C-39, Exhibit USA-138, Page 92 of the first document book, it is clear from a study of this document book—it is the timetable for the deployment—that it was not until 1 June that the actual attack formations, consisting of 14 armored divisions and 12 motorized infantry divisions, were brought up. In fact they were not actually moved until 10 June. I mention this so that it cannot be said that the German intention to attack was already obvious in February 1941. Such was not the case.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution has especially emphasized that this plan for the attack on Soviet Russia had been drawn up long before then. Can you perhaps say anything more about that?
JODL: I will explain the matter in a few words. We had to use 10,000 trains for this deployment. If one could have run 100 a day it would have taken 100 days; but we never reached that figure. So for purely technical reasons this deployment had already taken 4 months.
DR. EXNER: Did events in Yugoslavia have any influence on the Führer’s decision?
JODL: They gave it the final impetus. Until that time the Führer still had doubts. On 1 April, not earlier, he decided to attack; and on 1 April he ordered the attack to be made ready for about 22 June. The order for the attack itself—that is, the real opening of the campaign—was issued only on 17 June, which is likewise proved by documents.
DR. EXNER: Then, in your opinion, the Führer waged a preventive war. Did later experiences prove that this was a military necessity?
JODL: It was undeniably a purely preventive war. What we found out later on was the certainty of enormous Russian military preparations opposite our frontiers. I will dispense with details, but I can only say that although we succeeded in a tactical surprise as to the day and the hour, it was no strategic surprise. Russia was fully prepared for war.
DR. EXNER: As an example, could you perhaps tell the Tribunal the number of new airfields which were discovered in the Russian-Polish area?
JODL: I recall approximately that there had been about 20 airfields in eastern Poland, and that in the meantime these had been increased to more than a hundred.
DR. EXNER: Quite briefly, under these conditions what would have been the result of Russia’s having forestalled us?
JODL: I do not want to go into the strategic principles, into the operations behind the front; but I can state briefly that we were never strong enough to defend ourselves in the East, as has been proved by the events since 1942. That may sound grotesque, but in order to occupy this front of over 2,000 kilometers we needed 300 divisions at least; and we never had them. If we had waited until the invasion, and a Russian attack had caught us in a pincer movement, simultaneously, we certainly would have been lost. If, therefore, the political premise was correct, namely that we were threatened by this attack, then from a military point of view also the preventive attack was justified. The political situation was presented to us soldiers in this light, consequently we based our military work accordingly.
DR. EXNER: Now, a few questions concerning Japan. What significance did Directive 24 of 5 March 1941 have for co-operation with Japan? It has already been mentioned, but the matter is not quite clear. That is Page 94, Volume I of our document book, which is Document C-75, Exhibit USA-151. Grossadmiral Raeder, in the witness stand, has already said something about this directive. Can you tell me anything new?
JODL: The document is very important. First, I must make a confession. So far I have been accused of merely having received this document. But it emanated from me; I authorized it. It was worked out by my staff in the Navy group. Consequently, I knew this document better than anybody else. It is not an operational order, it is a guide for German officers.
DR. EXNER: What does that mean?
JODL: All German officers who officially or unofficially came into contact with Japanese officers were to be told exactly what the aims of German policy were, namely, to attack England even in the Far East and precisely thereby to keep America out of the war.
DR. EXNER: In Paragraph 3, Subparagraph a, of this directive we read:
“It must be emphasized that the common aim in this war is to crush England as soon as possible and thereby keep the United States out of the war.”
JODL: Such a directive was necessary in order that careless statements on the part of German officers should not be used by officers of the Japanese Army and Navy for their own political purposes. For this reason the Foreign Office also received a copy, as is shown in the distribution list on the bottom of Page 96. This would never have happened in the case of an operational order. Also that is why the Führer did not sign it.
DR. EXNER: The objectives of the German Navy are also stated on the top of Page 96. They read as follows:
“Moreover, attacks on other British bases—on American naval forces only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented—are capable of shattering enemy forces in those places.”
And so we again find the endeavor to prevent the entry of the United States into the war and to attack them only if nothing else should prove possible.
JODL: I should like to add that the purpose of this document was not to exert influence on Japan, as that would have been a political action; it was merely a directive for all officers telling them what to say in such a case.
DR. EXNER: Grossadmiral Raeder has already told us by what naval orders he had endeavored to keep the United States out of the war. Have you anything to add to that?
JODL: Only one point, which the Grossadmiral did not mention. It comes from Document C-119 and Exhibit Jodl-37. It can be read on Page 98 of Document Book Number 1.
DR. EXNER: Page 98 of Volume I, Exhibit Jodl-37, which we submit. There we find: “Special regulations on deportment during the occupation of Denmark and Norway.” And then...
JODL: Only the last sentence need be read.
DR. EXNER: Please read it.
JODL: “All warships and merchant vessels under the U.S.A. flag, as well as aircraft, are excepted from the prohibition to sail or take off.”
DR. EXNER: And that is the last sentence at the bottom of Page 98. The paragraph speaks of prohibiting warships, merchant vessels, aircraft, et cetera, from leaving port, with the exception of the Americans.
JODL: And so, in all the war measures of the Naval Operations Staff, America was granted an exceptional position for a long time.
DR. EXNER: Before Japan’s attack on America, did you have any official dealings with Japanese officers?
JODL: No, not before.
DR. EXNER: None at all?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Did you expect the attack on Pearl Harbor?
JODL: The attack came as a complete surprise. It was a complete surprise to me, and I had the feeling it was also a surprise for the Führer; for he came, in the middle of the night, to my map room in order to give the news to Field Marshal Keitel and myself. He was completely surprised.
DR. EXNER: Now, I should like you to clear up an erroneous interpretation of this letter of Falkenstein’s. It is Page 81, Volume I, of our document book. A letter, Document 376-PS, Exhibit USA-161, can be found there. There is a letter from Falkenstein to yourself, I believe?
JODL: No, no.
DR. EXNER: No?
JODL: No, to General Von Waldau, of the Air Force Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: It states:
“With a view to a future war against America, the Führer is considering the question of the occupation of the Atlantic islands.”
That can be interpreted to mean that he intended to attack America: “With a view to a future war against America, the Führer is considering...” What is meant by that, and how did you interpret it?
JODL: That is perfectly obvious. At that time consideration was actually being given to the occupation of the Atlantic islands, a thing the Führer had always wanted to do.
DR. EXNER: For what purpose?
JODL: As a certain security base, thus an outpost in case of American intervention; and so we had to take this idea into consideration. Although the Navy as well as the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces definitely rejected it, we had to consider these matters in theory at least; and this is what he tells General Von Waldau in this letter.
Furthermore, the same thing was then written in a document, later in an order, Document 444-PS, exactly as written here.
DR. EXNER: Did we have any interest at all in extending the war?
JODL: I, personally, none. I can only say that the expanse from the North Cape to Tobruk, and from Brest to Rostov-on-the-Don was too great for my liking.
DR. EXNER: And were we interested in having Japan at war with America?
JODL: No, we would have much preferred a new and powerful ally without a new and powerful enemy.
DR. EXNER: Did we drag Italy into the war?
JODL: I do not know what was done politically; but after the collapse of France, when Italy also wished to take an active part in the war, we tried to prevent this, we soldiers in the OKW. But we only succeeded in delaying her intervention by 4 to 6 days; the Führer could not refuse altogether. But during the whole of the war Italy was of no help to us, rather only a burden; and this will be confirmed by subsequent histories of the war.
DR. EXNER: As to all the accusations concerning Crimes Against Peace, I should like to refer to the relevant documents which have been submitted by Göring, Ribbentrop, Raeder, and Dönitz. I do not know whether such a reference is at all necessary according to the rules of procedure.
Now one final question. The Prosecution has represented this whole series of campaigns as a long premeditated and concerted plan of conquest which you, as a conspirator, both instigated and carried out. What have you to say to this?
JODL: I believe I have already corrected this completely distorted picture by my testimony. The war against Poland broke out without my having taken any part in its preparation. It developed into a World War contrary to the hopes of all soldiers. Everything had to be improvised for this war. There was nothing ready except the plan of attack against Poland. There were neither enough bombs nor enough ammunition. At that time not a single soldier thought about Norway, Belgium, Holland, Yugoslavia, Greece, or even Russia. No military agreements had been reached with Italy or with Japan.
I acknowledge the statement of the American Chief of General Staff, General Marshall, to be absolutely correct in almost every point.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to ask.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions?
DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): General, as Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, you were for many years the leading General Staff officer of the German Armed Forces?
JODL: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: In the course of your military activity you were also for a fairly long time a teacher at the War Academy?
JODL: Not exactly at the War Academy but at the General Staff courses which preceded the War Academy and which at that time were held at the individual district headquarters.
DR. LATERNSER: As all our higher military leaders came from the professional class of General Staff officers, I ask you to tell us briefly how these officers were trained at the War Academy. Please confine yourself exclusively to the following points:
How was, or rather how much time was allotted to instruction on attack; then for propaganda for wars of aggression; and the attitude toward international law and politics?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think this question is completely irrelevant.
DR. LATERNSER: If the Court considers these questions to be irrelevant, I will dispense with the answers to these questions.
Generaloberst, you know the standpoint of the Prosecution, that the military leaders are supposed to have formed a group with the aim of unleashing wars of aggression and, in the course of these wars, committing crimes against military law and the laws of humanity. Please explain to the Tribunal your attitude toward this point, particularly as to whether the higher military leaders ever actually formed such a group.
JODL: I never understood the idea of such a group, and I never shall understand it. It is just as if the passengers of a passenger ship were to meet on an ocean liner and there form a unit—or be obliged to form a unit—under the authority of the captain. This so-called group of high-ranking officers might possibly have existed in imperial times as an absolute entity, but not entirely even then. But here, after the National Socialist revolution, these groups broke up completely in all spheres of life, politically, philosophically, and ideologically. The goal that united them was the military profession and the necessary obedience.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn at this time.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, before the occupation of Czechoslovakia there was a meeting on 10 August 1938 at the Berghof between Hitler and the military leaders, at which you were also present. Up to now that conference has not yet been discussed here, and I want to ask you what was the subject of that conference.
JODL: During that conference, the Führer spoke to General Staff officers only, and gave them a talk that lasted for about two and a half hours on the whole military and political situation. In particular, he dealt with the Sudeten-German problem, and said that it would have to be solved no matter what happened. He described the various possibilities and, in particular, made it clear that he intended to solve the question without interference from France and England and was confident he would succeed.
DR. LATERNSER: That was the subject of that conference?
JODL: Yes, that in the main was the subject.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know for what reason the Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces and their chiefs were not there?
JODL: I know the reason because the Chief Adjutant, Major Schmundt, informed me of it before the conference. He told me that it was the Führer’s intention to speak directly to the senior General Staff officers at a time when they would not be under the influence of their too-critical Commanders-in-Chief and thus not inclined to balk or criticize.
DR. LATERNSER: But then, during that conference there was, nevertheless, considerable criticism on the part of those officers, was there not?
JODL: I could not say that there was criticism; but one of the generals believed that he could or should draw the Führer’s attention to the possibility that France and England might interfere after all, if he did something against Czechoslovakia. That was General Von Wietersheim.
DR. LATERNSER: Did Hitler later on again follow the principle of excluding the highest military leaders from such conferences?
JODL: The Führer did that quite often. I would say that he did it on principle. For instance, after our unsuccessful attack on the bridgehead at Nettuno, southwest of Rome, he ordered the junior officers, who were taking part in these battles, from the regimental commanders down to the company commanders, to come to the Führer’s headquarters. For days he personally interrogated each one of them alone without their superiors being present. He did the same thing very, very often with Air Force officers, whom he interrogated without the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force present.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, you were present during most of the Hitler conferences on the situation. Could the commanding generals present at the Führer’s headquarters at the time take part in such conferences without difficulties?
JODL: As long as during these orientation conferences on the situation only things which had already happened were discussed, the Führer was very generous about who took part in them; but as soon as something was discussed which dealt with future operations—for instance, the attack on Russia in 1942—commanding generals of an army group from the Western Front could not take part; nor was it possible the other way round, so that so far as his intentions were concerned, he would only initiate such officers as had to be informed for official reasons.
DR. LATERNSER: In such cases then, the so-called “smallest circle” was summoned to a situation conference?
JODL: That is right. And so it was that the chief adjutant would announce, on behalf of the Führer, that a discussion among the smallest circle would now take place in which only such and such officers could take part.
DR. LATERNSER: During such situation discussions, did you often hear energetic remonstrances on the part of the commanding generals of an army group? Who made these remonstrances, and on what occasion? Please limit yourself to the most important instances.
JODL: I can only give you a very short answer to that question; otherwise, I would have to speak about it for an hour. I can say that not a single conference took place without the old traditional conceptions, if I may call them so, regarding operations coming into conflict with the revolutionary conceptions of the Führer. Therefore, apart perhaps from single operations during the first part of the war, I can state that whenever such a report was made by a commanding general of an army group, there was a clash of opinions. I could mention the names of all the commanding generals of army groups who ever held a post. I know of none to whom this would not apply.
DR. LATERNSER: Of course, you knew all the commanding generals of army groups, did you not?
JODL: During the first half of the war I knew all the commanding generals down to, and including, commanding generals of army groups. During the second half of the war, there were commanding generals of army groups in the East whom I did not know. For the most part they did not come from the General Staff, but were line officers, so that I did not know some of them.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, could, for instance, a commanding general of an army group report for a discussion with Hitler without difficulties?
JODL: The commanding general of an army group could not do that. The commanding general of an army group would, first of all, have to ask the Commander-in-Chief of the Army as long as there was one. When the Commander-in-Chief of the Army no longer existed, the commanding generals of army groups then applied to the military adjutant’s office, or they applied to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army for permission to make a report, which the commanding generals could not do themselves.
DR. LATERNSER: So that, if a commanding general of an army group intended to protest against some measure which he did not consider right, then he had to go to the commander-in-chief of his army group, who in turn would have to go to the commander-in-chief of the particular branch of the Armed Forces; so that this was practically the only channel through which objections could be made to Hitler in the normal official way?
JODL: That is perfectly correct. All military departments did that, and it had been done for a number of years.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about Himmler’s attempt to set Hitler against the generals? When I say “generals” I mean the ones who are of the “group.”
JODL: I have perhaps already answered that in part when I complained that we were not in a position to prevent military reports and news of irresponsible sources from reaching the Führer. It was a standing rule that police circles particularly continually used the opportunity through Himmler to criticize the traditional, or—as they called it—the reactionary, humanitarian, chivalrous attitude of the higher military leaders, so that the severe orders of the Führer for brutal action—as he called it—might be stayed. This was a constant state of affairs. All of them were by no means involved and it was not directed against all the commanding generals, but it was against quite a few.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, you still have not quite answered my question. I asked you whether you knew anything about Himmler’s attempt to make Hitler hostile, for reasons which I hope you will tell me.
JODL: Well, the outcome of what I have just described was that Himmler went to the Führer and reported to him, privately of course. He complained about certain commanding generals, all of them of the Army; and we knew about it, because the following day the Führer suddenly began to raise some objections to some commanding general without our knowing why, and would cause bad feeling.
DR. LATERNSER: How were the relations between the OKW and the OKH?
JODL: Before the war and during the first part of the war the relationship between the High Command of the Armed Forces and the High Command of the Army was made difficult by considerable tension. The reason, however, was exclusively an internal military one. Because in the creation of the High Command of the Armed Forces a general staff group had come into being which was outside the jurisdiction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and which was, I should say, even above the General Staff of the Army and gave orders to them. This constellation was, of course, regarded with a great deal of distrust by the General Staff of the Army. I might add, however, that Field Marshal Keitel and I, and many reasonable officers, succeeded in completely overcoming this tension as the war went on.
DR. LATERNSER: I think, Generaloberst, that that is enough on that point.
The military leaders are accused of having delayed the end of a hopeless war unnecessarily. What do you know about the efforts of Field Marshal Von Rundstedt and Rommel after the invasion had succeeded?
JODL: I remember a conference with these two commanding generals when the Führer and I flew to the headquarters which had been prepared north of Reims. That was about July 1944. During that conference, both Field Marshal Von Rundstedt and particularly Rommel described in an unmistakable manner the seriousness of the entire situation in France, characterized by the tremendous superiority of the Anglo-Saxon Air Force, against which ground operations were powerless. I remember quite clearly that Field Marshal Rommel asked the Führer at the end, “My Führer, what do you really think about the further development of the war?” The Führer was rather angry at this remark, and he answered curtly, “That is a question which is no part of your duty. You will have to leave that to me.”
DR. LATERNSER: Did you read the letter which Field Marshal Von Kluge wrote to Hitler shortly before he died?
JODL: I stood next to the Führer when he received this letter. He opened the envelope, read the letter, and then gave it to me to read. It said exactly the opposite of what I had expected. Field Marshal Von Kluge began his letter with fulsome praise for the Führer’s personality and steadfastness in the conduct of the war. He said that he was much more in sympathy with his ideals than the Führer assumed. He had begun his task in the West full of confidence. But as the promised support of our own Air Force had not been given he was now convinced that the situation was hopeless, and his dying counsel was to make peace now. That briefly, was what the letter contained.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, can you give further examples regarding the efforts of the commanding generals to end the hopeless war?
JODL: No commanding general could touch upon the political question, because the ending of a war is not a military but a political decision. But indirectly I must say that there was not one officer in a responsible position who did not tell the Führer soberly, honestly, and openly what the military situation was and describe it as hopeless—as indeed it turned out to be at the end. I, myself, too, expressed this view in writing in a memorandum to the Führer.
DR. LATERNSER: I have a few questions regarding the various campaigns.
What was the attitude of the High Command of the Army, particularly Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, regarding the Austrian campaign?
JODL: The evening before the march into Austria, at about 2 o’clock in the morning, I was with Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. I found him in a dejected mood. I saw no reason for it; but apparently he was convinced that this march into Austria might possibly lead to a military conflict either with Italy or with Czechoslovakia. Or perhaps from a political point of view he was not quite pleased about this impending increase of the south German element in the Reich. I do not know. But at any rate he was most dejected.
DR. LATERNSER: What were the reasons for the tension which existed between Hitler on the one hand and the military leaders on the other after the Polish campaign?
JODL: The conflict was particularly serious at that time because the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and many of the higher generals held the view I described this morning—namely, that we should remain quiet in the West to end the war. As this again was a political argument, which they could not use, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army presented a military argument to the Führer at that time. This argument was that considering the conditions in which our Army was at the time, it would not be in a position to defeat the French Army, strengthened by the British Army, in an offensive. That made the Führer extremely bitter, and this bitterness expressed itself repeatedly in every speech to the commanding generals. The entire speech of 23 November, the entire memorandum which he wrote on 10 October can only be explained in the light of that conflict.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution, as a basis for the Indictment of the group, have presented a number of affidavits. I should like to ask you to state your views in connection with Affidavit Number 12, Document 3710-PS, Exhibit USA-557, which was made by Walter Schellenberg. There on Page 1 Schellenberg testifies that in the front zone the SD special task groups were entirely under the command of the armies—that is to say, tactically, technically, and from the point of view of troop service, as he says in his affidavit. Is that true, Generaloberst?
JODL: It is only true to a very limited extent. I must start my answer by saying I was not familiar with the idea of the Einsatzgruppe and Einsatzkommando until I came here to Nuremberg. I must say that quite openly, even at the risk of being called a “Parsifal,” but it is a fact. I only knew about the Police. The operational territory of the Army was divided into three sectors. The front line was called the fighting zone, and that went back approximately as far as the enemy artillery could fire. In that sector everything, that was anything at all, was in all respects subordinate to the Army. But in that sector there was no Police—except the Secret Field Police, who were in any case completely under the jurisdiction of the Army.
DR. LATERNSER: The Secret Field Police were actually a part of the division, were they not?
JODL: Yes, they were divisional troops which carried out police work among the troops. Then came the rear area of the armies which was under the commanding generals of the armies, and behind that were the lines of communication of the Army which comprised all the supply units and services of the Quartermaster General of the Army. In this main sector—which was by far the largest sector as it comprised 97 percent of the entire operational area—the entire Police and everything which did not belong to the Army organically was not under the command of the Army, as far as tasks were concerned, but under the Police, under the Reichsführer SS Himmler. Only from the standpoint of servicing the troops—that is, with regard to their supplies or movements during advance or retreat—did the Army, of course, have the right to give orders to the troops regarding their movements and their accommodation.
DR. LATERNSER: Schellenberg states that in the rear operational areas and in the rear areas of the Army these special task groups came under the Army only as far as supplies were concerned; and as far as orders and tasks were concerned, under the Reich Security Main Office. Is that correct?
JODL: That is correct. The entire Police received orders about what they were to do from Himmler only.
DR. LATERNSER: Schellenberg also states further in his Affidavit Number 12, Document 3710-PS, Exhibit USA-557, that this subordination as regards troop servicing also included the question of discipline. Is that true?
JODL: That is wrong. An officer of the Army could never punish a member of the Police or the SS.
DR. LATERNSER: As has been established, the chief task of these special task groups was to carry out mass extermination of Jews and Communists. Schellenberg states in his Affidavit Number 12 that he was convinced that the commanding generals of the army groups and armies had been clearly informed of these tasks through official channels. Since Schellenberg has stated his conviction in this affidavit I ask you to give us yours, because I think I am right in assuming that you were with the best informed officers of the Armed Forces.
JODL: I cannot, of course, judge exactly what the commanding generals actually experienced while they were together at the front; but I can say with absolute certainty that I have never seen an order which revealed that these police units had been sent into the operational zone for any other purpose than that of maintaining quiet and order, from the police point of view, and uncovering revolts and partisan activities. I have never seen a report or an order which contained anything other than that.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you believe, Generaloberst, that the commanding generals of the armies or army groups would have tolerated those conditions without protest?
JODL: I consider that out of the question, because even in the case of much smaller incidents they raised the most violent protests. Hundreds of documents which have been offered by the Prosecution here show how the troops at the front had objected to measures which they considered inadmissible from a humane point of view or dangerous to peace and order in the occupied territories. I have only to remind you of Blaskowitz’ memorandum, which was one of the first.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you read that memorandum?
JODL: No, I did not read it. I only heard about it.
DR. LATERNSER: Furthermore, the Prosecution have submitted Affidavit Number 13 from Rittmeister Wilhelm Scheidt. It is Document 3711-PS, Exhibit USA-558. Scheidt says in this affidavit, and I quote from Page 2: “It was a generally known fact that the partisan fights were conducted with cruelty on both sides.”
I skip a sentence. He goes on to say:
“There is no question but that these facts must have been known to the leading officers in the Armed Forces Operations Staff and in the General Staff of the Army. It was also known that it was Hitler’s view that in the fight against partisans only the use of cruel, intimidating punishment could be successful.”
Is Rittmeister Scheidt’s statement correct, namely, that the leading officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the General Staff of the Army knew of the cruelty employed by both sides in the partisan fighting?
JODL: What we knew about the conduct of partisan warfare has already been submitted to this Tribunal. I refer to the instructions which I signed regarding the combating of partisans in Document F-665, Exhibit RF-411. It begins with a lengthy discourse on how the partisans conducted this war. Of course, we did not invent this. This was extracted from hundreds of reports. That troops in such a fight, seeing the methods employed by the enemy, would on their part not be exactly mild can readily be imagined. In spite of that the directives which we issued never contained a word to the effect that no prisoners were to be taken in these partisan fights. On the contrary, all reports showed that the number taken prisoner was larger by far than the number killed. That it was the Führer’s view that in their fight against the partisans the troops should in no way be restricted is authentically proved by the many arguments which I, as well as the General Staff of the Army, had with the Führer on this subject.
DR. LATERNSER: What if the commanding generals received reports about cruelties committed by their own soldiers?
JODL: Then they would be court-martialed. That again is established in the documents. I remind you of an order, issued by the Führer, which begins with the sentence, “It has been reported to me that individual soldiers of the Armed Forces have been dealt with by court martial because of their behavior when fighting partisans.”
DR. LATERNSER: And that was the only thing the commanding general could do in a case like that?
JODL: There was no other way open. And even on these orders, he always acted in accordance with his own legal judgment. Who could stop him from doing that?
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution have also submitted Affidavit Number 15, by General Röttiger, Document 5713-PS which is numbered Exhibit USA-559. In this affidavit General Röttiger states, in the middle of Page 1:
“Only now, on the strength of documents put before me, do I realize that in issuing the order to employ the severest measures to combat partisans, the highest levels might possibly have had in mind the final aim of using this combating of partisans by the Army to achieve the relentless extermination of Jewry and other undesirable elements.”
Did the military leadership at the highest level hold any such point of view, and was that their final aim?
JODL: No. Of course, one is wise after the event. I too have learned many things today which I did not know before. However, this knowledge does not apply at all here, because there were next to no Jews among the partisans. In the main, these partisans were fanatical Russian fighters—mostly White Russians—and were as hard as steel. And, to a question put by my counsel, even the witness Bach-Zelewski had to admit that there were just about no Jews among these partisans.
As regards the extermination of Slavs, I can only say that the Slavs who were killed in the partisan fighting amounted to no more than one-twentieth or one-thirtieth of the numbers which in the normal, large-scale battles with the Soviet Russian armies the Russians lost in dead or wounded. As far as figures are concerned, that carries no weight at all. Therefore that is a completely erroneous view.
DR. LATERNSER: A further Affidavit, Number 16, by the same General Röttiger, was submitted by the Prosecution under Document 5714-PS, Exhibit Number USA-560. In the last sentence General Röttiger states the following, and I quote:
“Although generally speaking one knew what the special tasks of the SD units were, and although this apparently happened with the knowledge of the highest leaders of the Armed Forces, we opposed these methods as far as possible since it meant endangering our own troops.”
In other words, General Röttiger, in his affidavit, maintains that the special tasks of the SD units were apparently carried out with the knowledge of the highest military leaders. If that is correct, then, you, Generaloberst, must have known about the tasks and these questions you have already...
JODL: Yes, I have already answered. I have never spoken to a single officer who had knowledge of these matters and told me about them.
DR. LATERNSER: Also, in the case against the General Staff and the OKW, the Prosecution have submitted Affidavit 17, Document 3715-PS, Exhibit Number USA-562. This affidavit comes from SS Leader Rode. Rode states, at the top of Page 2:
“As proof, one can quote the OKW and OKH order which stated that all members of partisan groups who had been captured, such as Jews, agents, and political commissars, were to be handed over by the troops to the SD for ‘special treatment’ without delay. Apart from that, this order contained instructions that in guerrilla fighting no prisoners, apart from the above-mentioned, were to be taken.”
Generaloberst, was there such an order that in guerrilla fighting no prisoners were to be taken?
JODL: Such an order never existed. I have never seen such an order. It was not contained in the instructions regarding guerrilla fighting. Apart from that, practically every word in that statement is untrue. There never was an order from the OKW-OKH—that is, an order which came from both departments. Jews among the guerrillas. I have already dealt with that. Agents among the guerrillas. Agents—that is a chapter by itself. Political commissars. That is quite another point. They were never handed over to the SD for special treatment—if they were handed over at all—because the task of the SD was an entirely different one. They may have been handed over to the Security Police. In other words, every word is untrue.
DR. LATERNSER: There is an Affidavit Number IS, by the same SS Leader Rode, which the Prosecution have submitted under Document 3716-PS, Exhibit Number USA-563. Rode states as follows in this affidavit:
“As far as is known to me, the SD special task groups, attached to the various army groups, were under the jurisdiction of the latter in every way—that is to say, tactically, as well as in every other way. For that reason, the tasks and methods of these units were fully known to the commanding generals. They approved of the tasks and methods, since apparently, they never raised any decisive objections to them.”
Do you know SS Leader Rode?
JODL: No, I do not know him. I do not think it is necessary to say much about this, because the General of the Police Schellenberg, who led such a special task group himself, and who really must know, has stated quite clearly on this witness stand what jurisdiction he was under and from whom he received his orders.
DR. LATERNSER: That was not the witness Schellenberg; that was Ohlendorf.
JODL: Ohlendorf? Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have a few questions about the Commissar Order. Were you present at the conference when Hitler gave the Commissar Order orally to the commanding generals?
JODL: As far as I remember, right at the beginning he spoke only to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, or the Chief of the General Staff and a few officers of the OKW, about this Commissar Order. As far as I recollect he referred to that order of his at a later date when addressing the commanding generals. I believe that it was during that second conference that he used the words, “I cannot expect that my generals understand my orders, but I must demand that they obey them.”
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know any commanding generals who resisted that order?
JODL: Later on someone told me—I do not know whether it is true—that Field Marshal Rommel had burned this order. But...
DR. LATERNSER: Does not that recollection of yours refer to the Commando Order? General Field Marshal Rommel was...
JODL: Oh, yes, that was the Commando Order. You are talking about the Commissar Order, are you not?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that is right.
JODL: I remember that there were constant objections from the High Command of the Army which, unfortunately, had to carry out this order, and these went on for a long time. Officers of the General Staff told me confidentially that for the most part it was not being carried out. I know of one official application made to the Führer to have this order officially withdrawn. That was done, although I cannot remember when.
DR. LATERNSER: Who made that application?
JODL: The High Command of the Army. Whether it was the Chief of the General Staff or the Commander-in-Chief, I cannot say.
DR. LATERNSER: When was this application made?
JODL: I believe it was in the spring of 1942.
DR. LATERNSER: The spring of 1942? And to that application...
JODL: I know for certain, the order was withdrawn.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you talk to any commanding general who approved of that order?
JODL: No. All the officers to whom I spoke considered, first, that the order should be turned down from the humane point of view and, secondly, that it was wrong from the practical point of view.
DR. LATERNSER: When Hitler gave his reasons for this order orally—and you have already told us some of them—he is supposed to have mentioned additional reasons for making it. I should like you to tell us what they were so that we may get this matter quite clear.
JODL: He gave a lengthy explanation—as he always did when he felt it necessary to convince somebody.
DR. LATERNSER: Did he state...
THE PRESIDENT: Have not these reasons already been given?
DR. LATERNSER: As far as I am informed, Mr. President, they have not yet all been given.
[Turning to the defendant.] During that conference did Hitler state...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Haven’t you already given the reasons which, you say, Hitler gave for this order?
JODL: I have not given some very important reasons, which the Führer also pointed out. They were...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.
Dr. Laternser, I have already had to ask you to be more brief on many occasions in which you have examined witnesses, and really you have spent over an hour already on this High Command Staff. Every witness who comes to the box you take a very long time over, and the Tribunal think that a great deal of their time has been wasted by you. Now, this witness can give any further reasons, but I do not want any argument about it. He can give his explanation now.
JODL: I have only to add that the Führer said on that occasion: “If you do not believe what I am telling you, then read the reports from Counterintelligence which we have received regarding the behavior of the Russian commissars in the occupied Baltic states. Then you will get a picture of what can be expected from these commissars.”
He also stated that.
DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put a question to you about the report in Document 884-PS, submitted under Exhibit USSR-351.
THE PRESIDENT: Repeat the number please.
DR. LATERNSER: Number 884-PS, it is a document submitted by the Russian Prosecution on 13 February, and it is on Page 151 of the second document book for General Jodl. Under Number II of this report, Page 153, there is the following statement. I quote, “To this, Reichsleiter Rosenberg in Memorandum 3 suggests...” I do not want to read further. The next is a suggestion.
I would like to ask you for what reason this Number II was brought out in this report.
JODL: I can only guess because I did not write it. But I have no doubt...
THE PRESIDENT: We do not want his guesses, you know. If he can only guess, then he had better not guess. We want evidence, not guesses.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I will dispense with this question. I assumed that the witness would have personal knowledge about that.
Witness, you said yesterday that the Commando Order of 18 October 1942 had been changed—that is, partially revoked by application of the Commander, West. Who was that Commander, West who had applied for that change?
JODL: General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, and he applied to have the entire order withdrawn.
DR. LATERNSER: You know the order by General Von Reichenau which the Russian Prosecution submitted on 13 February as Document USSR-12? It is dated 10 October 1941. Do you know the reasons this order was issued?
JODL: Yes. Reichenau, at that time, was commanding general of the 6th Army, and in his army sector was the town of Kiev. This morning I already started to describe events that took place in Kiev at the end of September, and that was the reason for this order.
DR. LATERNSER: How did the commanding generals exercise their jurisdiction—strictly, or not so strictly?
JODL: I know this because Dr. Lehmann...
THE PRESIDENT: That has nothing to do with the charge against the High Command. There is no charge against the High Command for having arranged courts martial or administering their courts martial improperly.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I believe I am of a different opinion on this point. If the commanding generals heard of any breaches of discipline or atrocities...
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know of anything in the Indictment, or anything in the evidence, which charges the High Command, or any member of the High Command, with improper behavior at a court martial, or in connection with a court martial?
DR. LATERNSER: No. I merely want to discover the typical attitude of the High Command.
[Turning to the defendant.] What do you know about the reasons for the mass deaths which occurred among Russian prisoners of war during the winter of 1941?
JODL: I am informed on this subject because several adjutants of the Führer were sent there personally, and they reported to the Führer in my presence. We were mostly concerned with the mass deaths after the last great battle for the Vyazma pocket. The reason for the mass deaths was described by the Führer’s adjutants as follows: The half-famished encircled Russian armies had put up fanatical resistance during the last 8 or 10 days. They literally lived on the bark of trees and roots because they had retreated to impenetrable wooded country, and when they fell into our hands they were in such a condition that they could hardly move. It was impossible to transport them. The situation as regards supplies was critical, because the railway system had been destroyed, so that it was impossible to take them all away. There were no accommodations nearby. Only immediate careful hospital treatment could have saved the majority of them. Soon afterwards the rain started, and then the cold set in, and that is the reason why such a large number of those prisoners—particularly these prisoners of Vyazma—died.
That is the report of the Führer’s adjutants who had been sent there to investigate. Similar reports came from the Quartermaster General of the Army.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the shelling of Leningrad by German artillery? You remember that a witness has been examined here on that point?
JODL: I was present during two conferences which the Führer himself had with the German artillery commander who was in charge of the artillery before Leningrad. He brought along the exact target chart, and it showed a very carefully worked-out system, according to which only key plants in Leningrad were marked as necessary targets, so as to cripple the power of resistance of the fortress. They were mostly factories which were still producing munitions. The ammunition for this heavy artillery, only a small portion of which could reach the center of Leningrad, was so scarce that one had to be extremely economical in its use. They were mostly captured guns from France, and we only had as much ammunition as we had captured.
DR. LATERNSER: You know that the witness has asserted that in his opinion the artillery deliberately destroyed the castles in Leningrad. You have seen the target chart for this artillery?
JODL: Yes; I myself had the artillery target chart in my brief case for many weeks. Only the armament industry was marked on it. It would have been insane to shoot at anything else. Of course, every artilleryman knows that through dispersion the shots can fall elsewhere.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the order from Hitler and the OKH to destroy dwellings and fireplaces during the retreat in the winter of 1941? What was the reason for that order?
JODL: The reasons are that...
DR. LATERNSER: I refer to the Order USSR-130. Unfortunately, I have not been able to ascertain on what day the Prosecution presented this order. I shall ascertain it later and have the Tribunal informed.
JODL: During that frightful winter battle, with a temperature of 48 degrees of frost, the commanders at the front reported to the Führer in his headquarters that this battle was exclusively a battle for warm shelter. Those who did not have some sort of heating arrangement—that is to say, a village with serviceable stoves—could not hold out and would not be able to fight the following day. One could say it was really a fight for stoves. And when, because of this, we were forced to retreat, the Führer then ordered that those fireplaces must be destroyed—not only the houses but also the fireplaces were to be blown up—because in such a critical situation that alone would prevent the Russians from pursuing. Since, in accordance with the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare, every type of destruction is permissible which is absolutely necessary from the military point of view, I believe that for this type of winter warfare—and it happened only during the winter—that order can be justified.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the case of Katyn?
JODL: Regarding the finding of these mass graves, I received the first report through my propaganda department, which was informed through its propaganda company attached to the army group. I heard that the Reich Police Criminal Department had been given the task of investigating the whole affair, and I then sent an officer from my propaganda department to the exhumation to check the findings of the foreign experts. I received a report which, in general, tallies with the report which is contained in the White Book issued, I think, by the Foreign Office. I have never heard anyone raise any doubts as to the facts as they were presented.
DR. LATERNSER: You have also seen the film which the Russian Prosecution have shown in this courtroom, and which showed atrocities committed in the Yugoslav theater of war. Can you explain any of the pictures which you perhaps still recollect?
JODL: I believe that every picture shown in this courtroom is, and was, perfectly truthful as a picture. These were captured photographs. But it has never been said what the photographs represented. It was not clear from the film whether the dog that was mauling a human being was not photographed in an army dog training center.
THE PRESIDENT: That is mere argument.
DR. LATERNSER: I was about to stop him.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: I was thinking of certain photographs which you might be able to clarify with a statement as: “I remember one photograph of a police dog jumping at a human being or a dummy.” Can you say...
THE PRESIDENT: You asked him about these photographs, and he says that they were all true—in his opinion—true pictures; and he didn’t take them. He doesn’t know anything about them, and anything that he can say upon them appears to us to be argument.
DR. LATERNSER: I will withdraw that question.
Generaloberst, was Louvain captured in the manner as testified by the witness Van der Essen? The witness Van der Essen said that Louvain was taken without fighting.
JODL: I have ascertained that the Armed Forces communiqué of, I think, 18 May contains the sentence, “Louvain taken after heavy fighting.” But I do not believe...
THE PRESIDENT: What was the place that you are asking about?
DR. LATERNSER: I asked the witness in what way Louvain was captured: whether it was only evacuated by the enemy, and then occupied, or whether the town had to be fought for. The witness has stated that there was no fighting for Louvain, and that therefore it was a particularly despicable act.
THE PRESIDENT: How did it affect the General Staff?
DR. LATERNSER: Well, in that case, Mr. President, I do not know who should be blamed for this event. I cannot see any connection with any one of the defendants; and if nobody can be blamed for it, we must strike out the whole event.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it one of the events which is charged in the Indictment?
DR. LATERNSER: No, the Indictment does not refer to it.
THE PRESIDENT: And the evidence, did the evidence deal with it?
DR. LATERNSER: There is no reference to it in the Indictment; but in the evidence, a witness was produced who stated that the University of Louvain was willfully destroyed by the German artillery although there was no reason to fire on the town.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t catch the place—but go on.
JODL: I know that the Armed Forces communiqué of 18 May 1940 contained the sentence, “Louvain captured after heavy fighting.” Even though the German Armed Forces communiqué was silent on some things, it certainly never stated deliberate untruths. I can say that because I edited it.
DR. LATERNSER: You already spoke yesterday about the case of Oradour. I merely wanted to ask you what Field Marshal Von Rundstedt did about this event when it was reported to him.
JODL: Many weeks afterwards I learned that an investigation had been started by Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, and that there was correspondence about the case of Oradour between Field Marshal Keitel, the Armistice Commission, and Field Marshal Von Rundstedt.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the Commander, West begin court-martial proceedings?
JODL: He must have done so, because I read a statement of an SS court in connection with this event.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the outcome of those proceedings?
JODL: I cannot say.
DR. LATERNSER: Then I come to the last points. How many conferences were there before the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944?
JODL: There were four conferences about the Ardennes Offensive.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you attend all of them?
JODL: I took part in all of them.
DR. LATERNSER: Was there ever any request for an order, or was an order ever issued at one of these conferences to shoot prisoners during this offensive?
JODL: No. And I can also add that not once during any one of those conferences was a single word mentioned which did not deal with purely operational considerations. There was no talk at all about the conduct of the troops.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, would you have known if such an order had been issued by—let us assume—Field Marshal Von Rundstedt?
JODL: There can be no question of such an order. It never could have been issued through the military channels. It could have been issued only through the Police—that is to say, Himmler or the SS.
PR. LATERNSER: But then it would not have been binding on the units of the Armed Forces—that is, of the Army?
JODL: It is quite out of the question that any commanding general of the Army would even have accepted such an order; and I know of no order of the Führer which was directed against ordinary prisoners in this way.
DR. LATERNSER: I merely put that question because the witness Van der Essen also stated in this courtroom that, judging by the way the prisoners were treated, he had to draw the conclusion that it was the result of an order from a higher level. That is why I asked that question.
Do you know the case—the Commando case?
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had put your last question. You said that was your last question.
DR. LATERNSER: The last questions. Mr. President, I shall be through in about 5 minutes. I ask you to take into consideration the fact that Generaloberst Jodl is a member of the indicted group, and that he is the officer who is best informed, and that an hour and a half for such an examination is not an excessive amount of time.
[Turning to the defendant.] Do you know the Commando case in which the son of the British Field Marshal Alexander was a participant?
JODL: Yes, I know the case.
DR. LATERNSER: Please tell us about it.
JODL: I heard about this affair through a report—I cannot quite remember whom it came from. I discussed it with Field Marshal Keitel, and I expressed the view that it was not necessary to take court proceedings against a lieutenant just because he was wearing a German cap during an action of this kind. Court proceedings were in progress against him, and Field Marshal Keitel gave the order that these proceedings be discontinued.
DR. LATERNSER: And the proceedings were discontinued?
JODL: Yes, they were.
DR. LATERNSER: Well now, regarding the extent of the group, two more questions: What was the jurisdiction of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff?
JODL: The Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff—I would say—directed, in practice, the general staff work of my entire staff, from which, of course, I was separated to a certain extent because I was in the so-called Security Circle Number 1, and my staff was in Security Circle Number 2—that is to say, outside; and the whole of this general staff work within the inner staff was directed by him, and if necessary, he acted, of course, as my deputy.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution have stated that the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff was responsible for strategic planning. Is that correct?
JODL: No. I was primarily responsible.
DR. LATERNSER: Is the significance of the position of this Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff equal to the significance of the other positions which are comprised in the indicted group?
JODL: No, it is far below that. He did not have the position of a commanding general of an army, nor the position of a General Staff chief.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much; I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel want to ask any questions.
DR. STAHMER: Were you present, Generaloberst, when toward the end of March 1944 Himmler reported to Hitler, during the situation conference, that about 80 Royal Air Force officers had escaped from the camp, Stalag III, at Sagan?
JODL: At the moment when Himmler reported this fact, I was not in the big hall of the Berghof. I was in the next room telephoning. Hearing a very loud discussion, I went over to the curtain to hear what was going on. I heard that they were talking about the escape of the English airmen from the Sagan Camp.
DR. STAHMER: Was Reich Marshal Göring present at this situation conference?
JODL: The Reich Marshal was not present at this situation conference. I am absolutely certain about that.
DR. STAHMER: In later talks with the Reich Marshal, did you find out what he thought of the shooting of some of the escaped officers?
JODL: From talks with the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, I learned that the Reich Marshal was indignant at this shooting, and I knew that particularly in situations such as these the former officer in him who did not approve of such incredible acts came to the surface. One must give him his due. There were repeated arguments over this between him and the Führer, which I witnessed personally.
DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions.
HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): With the permission of the Court, I will ask the witness a few questions.
Witness, you were Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and the units at your disposal were known to you. The Prosecution assert that you expected to find in the SA a fighting unit in the first days of aggressive war on the basis of the so-called Commando unit (Kommandotruppe). Now I should like to ask you if the term Commando unit is known to you in connection with the use of the SA by the Wehrmacht.
JODL: No, that is not known to me. I heard the word Commando unit for the first time in connection with the undertakings of the English Ranger battalions. We never used this term.
HERR BÖHM: There can be no question then that the SA was used as a Commando unit behind the regular troops in the entry into Austria or in the occupation of the Sudetenland?
JODL: I know of no case where formations of the SA co-operated in the occupation of another country—with the exception of the Henlein Free Corps; but that, however, consisted primarily of Sudeten-German refugees. In the Henlein Free Corps there were, I believe, a few SA leaders who had formerly been officers.
HERR BÖHM: Was the Feldherrnhalle Regiment used as an SA unit or as a Wehrmacht regiment in the war?
JODL: The Feldherrnhalle Regiment was definitely a Wehrmacht regiment. I should like to say that it embodied the traditions of the SA, and it was recruited primarily from the SA, but it had nothing whatever to do with the Supreme SA Command. It was a Wehrmacht regiment in every sense of the word.
HERR BÖHM: Do you know anything about the fact that in 25 group schools, and in 3 Reich leader schools of the SA, 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders were trained annually for the front, and that these 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders were used as such in the Wehrmacht?
JODL: I know nothing about this, and I consider it impossible that the Wehrmacht had its leaders and assistant leaders trained by anyone else than by its own personnel.
HERR BÖHM: Would not the position be that all the SA members were drafted into the Wehrmacht as ordinary soldiers, and had to rise from the ranks in the same way as any Wehrmacht soldier?
JODL: The SA were drafted into the Wehrmacht the same as any other German. I know of many cases where high SA leaders started their service in the Wehrmacht in the very lowest positions as soldiers or as noncommissioned officers.
HERR BÖHM: Then, the Prosecution also assert that after 1934 the SA trained not only 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders, but that 25,000 officers, commissioned and noncommissioned, were trained by the SA for the Wehrmacht. Do you know anything about this?
JODL: What I said before about assistant leaders is true to an even much greater extent among the officers. The officers were trained only in the military schools of the Army and nowhere else.
HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution assert further—and I ask whether you know anything about this—that in the course of extending the war effort, 86 percent of the professional leadership corps were made available.
JODL: I cannot give a binding answer to that. I do not know about that.
HERR BÖHM: And the Prosecution assert further that the SA sent 70 percent of its millions of members straight to the Wehrmacht. It may be that 70 percent of the SA members did their military service. I want to ask you whether these 70 percent were taken straight from the SA or whether they were called up in the ordinary groups which applied to the able-bodied male population?
JODL: No importance whatsoever was attached to the SA when men were drafted into the Army. The SA man was drafted like any other German who was called up for military service. Whether or not a man had been in the SA previously, did not matter in the slightest.
HERR BÖHM: Did the Wehrmacht ever take SA signal units (Stürme), engineer units, or cavalry units, or medical units, and use them in action inside or outside a division of the Wehrmacht?
JODL: I personally knew of no case where any SA unit appeared in action outside Germany during the war.
HERR BÖHM: Did the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff have a liaison man with the SA?
JODL: No. From time to time an officer came to me from the Supreme SA Command, and he generally inquired as to the fate and well-being of the Feldherrnhalle Regiment, which had come primarily from the SA, or was composed mainly of members of the SA, and later, about a Panzer formation which also continued the tradition of the Feldherrnhalle of the SA.
HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution have submitted a newspaper which shows that on the occasion of the mustering of SA members, Field Marshal Brauchitsch was present. They want to show from this the close connection between the training of the SA and the Wehrmacht. Can you explain this photograph?
JODL: I believe it can be explained by the fact that Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch accompanied the Chief of Staff Lutze once when the latter inspected an ordinary SA unit, and he was accompanied by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch because, as I have already said, after the Röhm Putsch we no longer had any cause for conflict with the SA. At the outbreak of war the SA placed all their equipment, including all tent squares, at the disposal of the Wehrmacht. I remember very clearly.
HERR BÖHM: Could this visit of Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, when he inspected the SA members, be part of the official activity of the Field Marshal?
JODL: No, in my opinion that was an act of courtesy.
HERR BÖHM: From the point of view of conspiracy with which the SA is charged here, do you know that it was said to have always been the task of the SA, especially in the years 1933 to 1939, to prepare Germany, and especially the youth, for a difficult war of conquest by instilling, increasing, and maintaining a warlike spirit in Germany, especially among the youth? Do you know anything in this connection from personal observations?
JODL: I do not know anything about that. That the SA, as a branch of the Party, also endeavored to foster the patriotic spirit within its ranks, to carry on physical training, is a matter of course. As to preparing for wars of aggression, no one ever did that.
HERR BÖHM: But that was asserted here in regard to the SA. You are of the opinion that it is not true?
JODL: I have no reason to think that it is true.
HERR BÖHM: I have no more questions.
DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Generaloberst, the 26th of August 1939 was fixed as X-Day for the attack on Poland. Is it true that on 25 August the order to attack was withdrawn upon the urgent request of Ribbentrop because, according to the communication which reached the Foreign Office, Great Britain had ratified the Treaty of Alliance concluded with Poland on 6 April 1939, and Ribbentrop told the Führer that the advance of German troops would therefore mean war with Great Britain?
JODL: I cannot answer the whole of your question, but I do know something about it. When, on the 25th, to our great surprise we received the order, “The attack fixed for the 26th will not take place,” I telephoned to the then Major Schmundt—Field Marshal Keitel was not there—and asked him what was the matter. He told me that shortly before the Reich Foreign Minister had reported to the Führer that Britain had concluded a pact—a mutual assistance pact—with Poland, and for that reason he could expect British intervention in the war with Poland. For this reason the Führer had withdrawn the order for attack. That is what I learned at that time.
DR. HORN: In the spring of 1941, after the Simovic Putsch, the Führer held a conference with the Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht and the Defendant Von Ribbentrop was called in to this conference later. Is it true that at this conference Von Ribbentrop represented the point of view that before military action was taken, an attempt should be made to settle the differences with Yugoslavia by diplomatic means? How did Hitler react to this suggestion?
JODL: I recall this incident especially well because about 1 hour before I had said the same thing to the Führer, that we should clear up the situation with an ultimatum. An hour later, without knowing about this, the Reich Foreign Minister made the same remark, and he fared considerably worse than I did. The Führer said:
“Is that how you size up the situation? The Yugoslavs would swear black is white. Of course, they say they have no warlike intentions, and when we march into Greece they will stab us in the back.”
I recall that statement very exactly.
DR. HORN: Generaloberst, is it true that the Foreign Office from the very outbreak of the Russian war was completely eliminated from Eastern questions, that Ribbentrop complained personally and through his liaison man, Ambassador Ritter, and that he had no success with his suggestions to the Führer?
JODL: I know that Ambassador Ritter, who came to see me very often, repeatedly complained in private talks about having such a large part of its field of activity taken away from the Foreign Office, and I must assume that that was not only the opinion of Ambassador Ritter but also the opinion of the whole Foreign Office as well as of the Foreign Minister.
DR. HORN: In your testimony you have already mentioned the fact that the Wehrmacht was against Hitler’s intention to renounce the Geneva Convention. Do you know that Ribbentrop also energetically opposed Hitler’s intention, and that after the objections of the Wehrmacht had been rejected at the beginning, Ribbentrop then succeeded in inducing Hitler to give up his intention?
JODL: Put that way, I cannot confirm it fully. One thing I know for certain: the Foreign Office informed me in writing of its unfavorable attitude toward this suggestion or idea of the Führer. For me that was conclusive proof that the Reich Foreign Minister held this point of view. I recorded this unfavorable attitude of the Foreign Office—together with the unfavorable attitude of the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe—in a short memorandum, and submitted it to the Führer. To what extent the Reich Foreign Minister personally remonstrated with the Führer about the matter, I cannot say with certainty.
DR. HORN: Is it true that Von Ribbentrop spoke against the chaining of English prisoners of war as reprisal for the chaining of German prisoners of war, and in agreement with the OKW induced Hitler to discontinue this measure?
JODL: That is true. The Reich Foreign Minister, the Foreign Office, repeatedly remonstrated with the Führer to withdraw the order concerning the chaining of Canadian prisoners, and it must be assumed that these many objections, which were also supported by the OKW, finally succeeded in having the order withdrawn.
HERR BÖHM: In the Tuesday afternoon session you discussed the question of terror-fliers. In this connection you stated that by making inquiries and observations you wanted to prevent the ‘cause’ for the decision regarding the intended treatment of this question. The Prosecution submitted two documents on this question. One was the record of an alleged talk between Ribbentrop, Göring, and Himmler at Klessheim, the other an opinion by Ambassador Ritter, who has already been mentioned. I would like to hear from you as to whether you know anything about Ribbentrop’s attitude toward the handling of the question of terror-fliers, especially whether Ribbentrop advocated that this question be dealt with according to the Geneva Convention, and whether he thought that it was possible to deviate from this Convention only if decisive military necessities demanded it, and even in that case only by expressly indicating beforehand to the protective powers that it intended to depart from the Geneva Convention?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, can’t you put that question more shortly; what does he know about it?
DR. HORN: Is it true, Generaloberst, with regard to the question of terror-fliers, that Von Ribbentrop, in the same way as the Wehrmacht, was against departing from the Geneva Convention, and he put this view to Hitler?
JODL: To this I can say—again from talks with Ambassador Ritter—that I knew that the Reich Foreign Minister advocated official procedure, that is, official notice that we could no longer consider certain acts of terror as belonging to regular warfare. That was the original point of view of the Foreign Office. To this I said at the time that the Führer would probably not be interested as I had concluded from his oral instructions. As it turned out, the suggestion, such as the Reich Foreign Minister intended to make, was never put forward, or at least I never saw it.
DR. HORN: Do you know anything of a peace feeler by English officers on behalf of General Alexander, backed up by the English Government, in 1943?
JODL: I know very well that at that time, in Athens, an Englishman—I believe it was an English captain—established contact with us. This captain said that he came from English headquarters in the southeastern area. I was present when the Reich Foreign Minister reported to the Führer about this matter, and I know he suggested that this contact be tried to see what results it might bring. That was done; the Führer agreed; but I heard nothing more about the matter, and apparently nothing came of it.
DR. HORN: Do you know anything about any further peace attempts of Ribbentrop, especially after the Polish campaign, after Dunkirk and 1943?
JODL: I only knew of the attempts and intentions after the Western campaign. At that time the Führer spoke quite openly and frankly with everyone. I myself, as well as the Reich Foreign Minister, heard the Führer agree that peace would be concluded with England at any time only if part of our former colonies were given back to us.
DR. HORN: Is it true that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop suggested to Hitler that Hungarian Jews, insofar as they wished to do so, be permitted to emigrate?
JODL: I recall that too. Shortly after the occupation of Hungary by our troops, at about the beginning of May 1944, there was a conference at the Berghof, at which a decision was to be reached. The Führer wanted to hear our views as to whether the Hungarian Army should be dissolved, or whether it should be left as it was. At the end of this discussion, which was of a purely military nature, the Reich Foreign Minister said to the Führer, “Can we not send all the Hungarian Jews by ship to some neutral country?” The Führer answered, “That is easier said than done. Do you think that is possible? No one would take them. Besides, it is technically impossible.” That is my recollection of this talk.
DR. HORN: You spoke yesterday of the expulsion of the Danish Jews, and you said that this expulsion took place on Himmler’s orders. An affidavit by a Colonel Mildner has been submitted to me, in which it is asserted that this expulsion took place on the orders of the Reich Foreign Minister. Is that statement true?
JODL: Before this Himmler-Führer conference, which caused me to send my teletype message to the Wehrmacht Commander in Denmark, I never heard a word about the Jews being deported from Denmark, and I never heard that the Foreign Office had any part in it.
DR. HORN: Did you ever get to know anything about the basic attitude of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop toward the Jewish question?
JODL: Apart from this suggestion about the Hungarian Jews, I do not recall any talk by the Reich Foreign Minister, at which I was present, in which there was any mention of Jews.
DR. HORN: Thank you. I have no further questions.
DR. KRAUS: Did I understand you correctly, Generaloberst, when you testified yesterday that in 1935 it was decided to set up 36 divisions?
JODL: That is true, yes.
DR. KRAUS: I am interested to know how many divisions were ready by 1 April 1938? I am interested in this key date because on that day the financial aid of the Reichsbank stopped. Can you tell me how many divisions were ready on 1 April 1938?
JODL: At that time there were about 27 or 28 divisions actually ready—that is, as regards personnel and materiel.
DR. KRAUS: Can you tell me, Generaloberst, how they were made up?
JODL: I cannot say with certainty.
DR. KRAUS: Approximately?
JODL: I do know that only one Panzer division was ready at that time, one cavalry division, one mountain division, and the rest were probably infantry divisions. The other Panzer divisions were not yet equipped, and they existed only as skeleton formations.
DR. KRAUS: I would like to know to what extent this armament was increased between that date and the outbreak of the war on 1 September 1939—that is, increased from 27 divisions?
JODL: From the autumn of 1938 on, the picture became much more favorable because the preparations in the armament industry were now producing results, and plenty of equipment was being delivered for the divisions; also, because from this time on, the trained age groups were beginning to come in. Therefore, in the late autumn of 1938, we were in a position to set up approximately 55 divisions—including reserve divisions—even though some of them may have been only poorly equipped. In 1939—as I said before, according to my recollection—there were between 73 and 75 divisions.
DR. KRAUS: Therefore, the number of divisions set up after March or April of 1938, after President Schacht left the Reichsbank, increased by 200 percent in 15 or 16 months, whereas it took more than 3 years to set up 27 divisions?
JODL: That is true, except that these 55 divisions, or rather these 75, were still very short of equipment in the same way as the small number in the spring of 1938, or in April 1938, which I mentioned. But the fact that from that time on armament went much faster was due—as I have said—to the very nature of things.
DR. KRAUS: Thank you, I have no further questions.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you testified yesterday that the Intelligence Service during Kaltenbrunner’s time was better organized than before. Please tell me, what position did Kaltenbrunner hold during your time in the OKW?
JODL: I met Kaltenbrunner when...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. Dr. Kauffmann, you have asked a general question. We have had all of Kaltenbrunner’s positions given to us more than once. What is it you want to know?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, Kaltenbrunner only testified quite generally to the fact that his intelligence service was connected with the military Intelligence Service. This witness can tell us what this connection of the military Intelligence Service with the other intelligence service amounted to, especially as regards its scope and its influence on policy as a whole.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t understand you to ask him anything about the Intelligence Service. You asked him a quite general question about what relations he had had with the OKW during the time that the defendant was connected with the OKW, in perfectly general terms. It might have involved an answer which would take about an hour.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I restate the question which apparently did not come through properly?
Witness, you testified yesterday that in Kaltenbrunner’s time the whole Intelligence Service was better organized than before that time—that is, under Canaris. Now, I ask you what position did Kaltenbrunner have within the Intelligence Service?
JODL: Kaltenbrunner...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the particular question that you want to ask? The Tribunal do not think that you ought to ask general questions of this nature. If you have got anything particular that you want to know about, you can ask it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What did Kaltenbrunner do during the situation discussions which took place daily?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, it is scarcely possible to imagine any more general question than that with reference to Kaltenbrunner: What was his activity over a number of years?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I said, during the situation report, that is, the daily military conferences—how did Kaltenbrunner conduct himself? What did he do? What did he say? Did he report? What did his reports consist of? That, in my opinion, is a concrete question.
THE PRESIDENT: What time are you asking about?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am asking about the time after his appointment as Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, the time from 1943 on. That is the only time which is in question.
THE PRESIDENT: You can ask him with reference to particular conferences, certainly. Why not ask him with reference to particular conferences, if you know any?
DR. KAUFFMANN: That was my intention.
Witness, do you understand what the question is? Will you please tell me?
JODL: As far as I recall, until the spring of 1945 when the headquarters were finally moved to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, Kaltenbrunner did not take part in any situation discussions. I cannot recall ever seeing him at a discussion in the Führer’s headquarters.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Excuse me, do you mean 1944 or 1945?
JODL: 1945. From the spring of 1945—that is, from the end of January, I frequently met Kaltenbrunner in the Reich Chancellery. Before that time he came to the Führer’s headquarters, from time to time, and talked to me there—especially about taking over the Canaris Intelligence Service—but he was not present at the situation conferences of the Führer.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did he submit written military situation reports?
JODL: Before he took over the Intelligence Service from Canaris—he took it over on 1 May 1944—before he took over the Intelligence Service, he sent me from time to time very good reports from the southeastern area, and these reports first called my attention to his experience in the Intelligence Service. He then took over the Intelligence Service, and although I was against it at first, after I had expressed my views to him I even supported him, for I had the impression that the man knew his business. After that, of course, I constantly received reports from Kaltenbrunner as I previously had received them from Canaris. Not only did I receive the daily reports from agents, but from time to time he sent what I should call a political survey on the basis of the individual agent’s reports. These comprehensive situation reports about the political situation everywhere abroad attracted my special attention because they summed up our whole military situation with a frankness, soberness, and seriousness which had not been at all noticeable in Canaris’ reports.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you also testified yesterday that after the daily military situation conference was ended, Hitler gathered around him his trusted confidants and his political men. I ask you now: Was Kaltenbrunner in this circle of confidants?
JODL: I never heard of Kaltenbrunner being in this private circle of the Führer, and I never saw him there. What I saw was a purely official attitude.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you, I have no more questions.
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): Generaloberst, Grossadmiral Dönitz is accused of calling on the Navy to continue to fight in the spring of 1945. Did you yourself, as a responsible military adviser, advise the Führer at that time to capitulate?
JODL: I did not advise him to capitulate at that time. That was completely out of the question. No soldier would have done that. It would have been of no use.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Not even after the failure of the Ardennes Offensive in February 1945?
JODL: Not even after the failure of the Ardennes Offensive. The Führer realized the situation, as a whole, as well as we did, and probably much sooner than we did. Therefore, we did not need to say anything to him in this connection.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the reasons for not doing this?
JODL: In the winter of 1944 there were many reasons for not doing this, apart from the fact that the question of capitulation or discontinuing resistance concerns only the Supreme Commander. The reasons against it were, primarily, that we had no doubt there could be only unconditional surrender, for the other countries left us in no doubt on that score; and even if we had had any doubt as to what faced us, it was completely removed by the fact that we captured the English “Eclipse”—the gentlemen of the British Delegation will know what that is. It was exact instructions about what the occupying power was to do in Germany after the capitulation. Now, unconditional surrender meant that the troops would cease to fight where they stood on all the fronts, and be captured by the enemy facing them. The same thing would happen as happened in the winter of 1941 at Vyazma. Millions of prisoners would suddenly have to camp in the middle of winter in the open. Death would have taken an enormous toll.
Above all, the men still on the Eastern Front, who numbered about 3½ million, would have fallen into the hands of the enemy in the East. It was our endeavor to save as many people as possible by sending them into the western area. That could only be done by drawing the two fronts closer together. Those were the purely military opinions which we held in the last stages of the war. I believe that in years to come there will be more to say about this than I can say or wish to say today.
DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, how long have you known Field Marshal Keitel?
JODL: I believe I met him in 1932 when he was chief of the organizational department of the Army.
DR. NELTE: And from that time, except for the time you were in Vienna, you always worked with him?
JODL: There was a time when Field Marshal Keitel was not in the War Ministry but in the field. I believe that was in 1934-35. I then lost sight of him. Otherwise I was with him all the time.
DR. NELTE: Was your work with him only official, or did you have personal relations with him?
JODL: In the course of the years, as a result of all we went through together, these relations became very personal.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have characterized Field Marshal Keitel as one of the most powerful officers of the Wehrmacht. They charge him with using this position to influence Hitler. Other circles represented here called Keitel, weak, and accused him of not being able to achieve his purpose in his position.
I do not want to ask any questions which have previously been asked and answered; but there are questions which have been previously answered in various ways—as you have heard—and only a person like you can answer them, a person who worked with the Field Marshal for more than a decade. Therefore, please tell me briefly—making your sentences short—what the official relations were between Keitel and Hitler.
JODL: The official relations between the Führer and Field Marshal Keitel were exactly the same as between the Führer and me, but on a somewhat different level. They were purely official, especially in the beginning. They were interspersed, just as in the case of all other higher officers, by constant clashes between a revolutionary and a Prussian officer bound by tradition.
DR. NELTE: Then, these clashes, the result of differing opinions, were a daily occurrence?
JODL: They were a daily occurrence and in effect led to extremely unpleasant scenes, such scenes as made one ashamed, as a senior officer, to have to listen to such things in the presence of young adjutants. The entry in my diary proves that on 19 April 1940, for instance, Field Marshal Keitel threw his portfolio on the table and left the room. That is a fact.
DR. NELTE: May I ask what the reason was?
THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Nelte. If you want him to confirm the evidence which the Defendant Keitel has given, why don’t you ask him whether he confirms it?
DR. NELTE: These are questions, Mr. President, which I have not submitted to Field Marshal Keitel. My line of questioning became necessary because between the questioning of the defendant...
THE PRESIDENT: The question you put to him was: What were his relations with the Führer? You could not have put it any wider than that, and you certainly covered that with the Defendant Keitel.
DR. NELTE: I discussed it with Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: You have put the question to Keitel, and Keitel answered it at great length.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, after Keitel was questioned, a witness appeared here who would discredit the statement of Field Marshal Keitel, if what he says is true. Therefore, in order to clarify, I must...
THE PRESIDENT: That is the very reason why I asked you whether you wanted this witness to confirm what the Defendant Keitel said, and—if you did—why you didn’t ask him whether he did confirm the evidence of Keitel.
DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, you have heard that we can simplify the question on this matter. I submit to you that which the witness Gisevius said here, in this room, about Field Marshal Keitel. It was, for the main part, in contradiction to what Field Marshal Keitel, and the other witnesses questioned about Keitel, had said. I point out that Gisevius did not speak from his own knowledge, but that he was given information from the OKW. If you want to consider that, please answer the question now: According to your knowledge of these things, is it true what Field Marshal Keitel said under oath—and which was confirmed by others, with the exception of Gisevius—or is it true what Gisevius said?
JODL: Only that is true which Field Marshal Keitel said. I experienced it on thousands of days. What the witness Gisevius said in this connection are general figures of speech. Apart from Hitler, there was no powerful man; there was and could be no influential man next to him.
DR. NELTE: The witness Gisevius mentioned an example to prove that Keitel prevented certain reports from being presented to Hitler. Since you had a part in this document, I should like to have this one document presented to you, and ask you to comment on it. It is Document 790-PS. This document is not an actual set of minutes, but a note for the files, as you see. It is about the White Book which was prepared on the alleged Belgian and Dutch violations of neutrality. And in this connection, the witness Gisevius said:
“I believe that I should cite two more examples which I consider especially significant. First of all, every means was tried to incite Keitel to warn Hitler before the invasion of Belgium and Holland, and to tell him—that is, Hitler—that the information which had been submitted by Keitel regarding the alleged violation of neutrality by the Dutch and Belgians was wrong. Counterintelligence”—that is Canaris—“was to produce these reports which would incriminate the Dutch and Belgians. Admiral Canaris, at that time, refused to sign these reports.... He told Keitel repeatedly that these reports, which were supposedly produced by the OKW, were wrong.
“That is one instance when Keitel did not transmit to Hitler that which he should have.”
Generaloberst, I ask you to confirm, after you have looked over this document, that these notes show that Field Marshal Keitel and you were expected to cover false reports, and that on the basis of the Canaris report—contained in Part A—the OKW refused to cover this White Book. Is that true?
[There was no response.]
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you understand the question, will you answer it?
JODL: I understand the question, and I should like to establish the facts here briefly, and tell how it really was as far as I can without being choked with disgust.
I was present when Canaris came to the Reich Chancellery with this report to Field Marshal Keitel, and submitted to him the draft of the White Book of the Foreign Office. Field Marshal Keitel then looked through this book and listened carefully to the essential remarks which Canaris made, at the wish of the Foreign Office, to the effect that the intelligence needed perhaps some improvement, that he was to confirm that military action against Holland and Belgium was absolutely necessary, and that, as it says here, a final really flagrant violation of neutrality was still lacking. Before Canaris had said another word, Field Marshal Keitel threw the book on the table, and said, “I will not stand for that. How could I assume responsibility for a political decision? In this White Book are, word for word, the reports which you yourself—Canaris—gave me.”
Whereupon Canaris said, “I am of exactly the same opinion. In my opinion, it is completely superfluous to have this document signed by the Wehrmacht, and the reports which we have here, as a whole, are quite sufficient to substantiate the breaches of neutrality which have taken place in Holland and in Belgium.” And he advised Field Marshal Keitel against signing it.
That is what took place. The Field Marshal took the book with him, and I do not know what happened after that. But one thing is certain, that the imaginary reports of this Herr Gisevius turn everything upside down. All these reports about the violations of neutrality came from these people who now assert that we had signed them falsely. This is one of the most despicable incidents of world history.
DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, Admiral Canaris played a part in this case. Gisevius said, “It was not possible for Admiral Canaris to submit an urgent report to Hitler on his own initiative.” He asserts that Canaris gave reports to Field Marshal Keitel who did not submit them. I ask you, is that true?
JODL: Of course, I did not follow up every document that came to Field Marshal Keitel; but Field Marshal Keitel submitted everything which was considered necessary for the Führer to know about. I have already said that if Canaris had not been satisfied in this connection, he could have gone to the Führer directly. He had only to go into the next office and inform the Führer’s chief adjutant, or he had only to tell me.
THE PRESIDENT: If you don’t know, why don’t you say so? If you don’t know whether he gave it to the Führer or not, say so.
DR. NELTE: I only asked whether the testimony is true, that Admiral Canaris could not go to Hitler. I wanted you to answer that question.
JODL: In fact, he went to the Führer dozens of times.
DR. NELTE: If he wanted it, he had access at any time?
JODL: Absolutely, at any time.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, will you tell me what page in the shorthand notes this evidence is of Gisevius?
DR. NELTE: The evidence about Keitel is in the transcript of the session of 26 April 1946 (Volume XII, Pages 265 to 271).
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. NELTE: I now want to show you two affidavits which you signed together with Field Marshal Keitel, which have also been submitted to the Tribunal. These are the Affidavit Number Keitel-9, High Command of the Wehrmacht and General Staff, and the Affidavit Number Keitel-13, Development of the Conditions in France, 1940 to 1945, and the military competencies.
You remember that you signed these affidavits?
JODL: I did so, yes.
DR. NELTE: And if you are sure of that, do you remember the contents?
JODL: Yes.
DR. NELTE: You confirm the accuracy of your affidavit?
JODL: I confirm this statement.
DR. NELTE: I will not read these affidavits or parts of them. On the subject of rearmament—that is, regarding General Thomas, who was also given here as a source of information—I should like to ask you a few questions.
You know that the Prosecution submitted a voluminous book here, Document 2353-PS, which is a description of the rearmament, written by General Thomas. As General Thomas was also given by the witness Gisevius here as a source of information, I must question you about Thomas. In his affidavit, which is attached to Document 2353-PS, he said that on 1 February 1943 he was released from the OKW. Do you know whether that is true or not?
JODL: As far as I can recall, he was assigned to the group of officers for special employment by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. He was therefore at the disposal of Field Marshal Keitel.
DR. NELTE: Did he not have a special assignment when he was made available for special employment?
JODL: He took over several assignments after that, I believe.
DR. NELTE: I only wanted to ascertain that also after 1 February 1943, General Thomas was still given assignments by the OKW, especially that of writing this book which has been submitted here, is that true?
JODL: That is true, that he was engaged in writing what might be called the “History of Rearmament.”
DR. NELTE: What was his relation to Field Marshal Keitel?
JODL: I know of that from the time when the two men worked together—that was only before the war and at the very beginning of the war, and the relations were good.
DR. NELTE: Do you know the reports of General Thomas concerning rearmament?
JODL: I have no exact recollection of any reports about our own rearmament. I can only recall reports about the war potential of our enemies. I remember those.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, are you going to be much longer, because it is 10 minutes past 5, and if you are not going to conclude tonight we had better adjourn.
DR. NELTE: I will need a quarter of an hour yet.
THE PRESIDENT: Then we will adjourn at this time.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 6 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHTH DAY Thursday, 6 June 1946
Morning Session
[The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand.]
DR. NELTE: General, yesterday in answer to my last question about General Thomas you said that he regularly made reports on the war potential of enemy powers to you and Field Marshal Keitel. Were these important reports always submitted to Hitler?
JODL: These reports, with detailed graphic descriptions, sketches, and drawings, were regularly submitted to the Führer and often occasioned violent disputes, because the Führer considered this representation of the enemy potential as greatly exaggerated.
DR. NELTE: Did you and Field Marshal Keitel hold the point of view that the representations of General Thomas were well-founded?
JODL: Field Marshal Keitel and I were both of the opinion that, after a very careful study of enemy achievements in armament production, these statements of Thomas were doubtless on the whole completely accurate.
DR. NELTE: You heard the witness Gisevius say that Thomas was supposed to have been an opponent of Hitler’s war leadership. In the course of years and in the reports made, did you ever realize this fact?
JODL: I did not observe this. The only thing that I observed was that he objected to this exaggerated optimism in which the Führer habitually indulged, and that perhaps in his basic attitude he was of a pessimistic rather than an optimistic nature.
DR. NELTE: Was General Thomas dismissed from his position as head of the Economic Armament Office of the OKW through Keitel’s efforts?
JODL: No, at the time he retired from active service General Thomas was under Minister Speer, but Minister Speer no longer cared to work with him and requested the Führer that he be dismissed from the armament office which Minister Speer had taken over. And that was done by the Field Marshal on the order of the Führer.
DR. NELTE: I can therefore establish...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, how is the evidence about General Thomas relevant to the case of Keitel—how is the question of whether General Thomas was acting against the supposed interests of Germany or not relevant to the cases of either Keitel or Jodl? The evidence of Gisevius was relevant to the case of the Defendant Schacht. It seems to me—and I think, to the Tribunal—to be entirely irrelevant to the case of either the defendant whom you represent or the case of the Defendant Jodl. What does it matter to us whether General Thomas was acting in order to try and overthrow Hitler or not?
DR. NELTE: The question which concerns the Defendant Keitel is whether Field Marshal Keitel submitted and supported the reports handed in by Thomas. The witness Gisevius said here, referring to Thomas as a source of information, that these reports of Thomas were kept from Hitler. Therefore this evidence...
THE PRESIDENT: We went into that yesterday and now the Defendant Jodl has said that the reports of Thomas were submitted to the Führer. But what I was pointing out to you was that the question whether Thomas was making his reports honestly or not is a matter which is entirely irrelevant.
DR. NELTE: Not as to the credibility of Gisevius’ sources of information, in my opinion; but I will withdraw this question. However, in this connection I must ask one more question with regard to the other source of information, Canaris.
[Turning to the defendant.] Canaris was a regular and frequent guest in the Führer’s headquarters and a guest of yours. What were the relations of Field Marshal Keitel to his oldest office chief?
JODL: The relations between Field Marshal Keitel and Canaris from the first day to the last were remarkably friendly, and unfortunately one of too much blind confidence.
DR. NELTE: May I ask what the relations were after the 20th of July?
JODL: I know that even after the 20th of July Field Marshal Keitel did not believe the charges against Canaris and that after the arrest of Canaris he supported his family with money.
DR. NELTE: How were the relations between Canaris and Heydrich?
JODL: I mentioned that once before. Canaris always tried to maintain especially good relations with Himmler and Heydrich so that they would not distrust him.
DR. NELTE: What can you say about the attitude of Field Marshal Keitel to Hitler’s plan in October 1939, the plan to attack in the West?
JODL: I know that Field Marshal Keitel was apparently strongly impressed by the attitude of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the General Staff of the Army and also raised a warning voice against this attack in the West. I know it, although I did not experience it personally; but Schmundt told me about it later—I know that during this time he also had a controversy with the Führer which led to the first request to resign. This is what I can report according to what Schmundt told me; I did not witness it myself, nor did Field Marshal Keitel tell me about it personally then.
DR. NELTE: In Document 447-PS, which the Prosecution submitted—these are the guiding principles for special tasks issued with Directive Number 21—under I, 2b, is the now famous paragraph according to which, in the operational area of the Army, the Reichsführer SS is given special tasks on behalf of the Führer in connection with the preparation of a political administration, resulting from the inevitable conflict between two opposing political systems. So much for the brief citation. I will not hand the document to you since you are certainly well acquainted with it, and to make the matter brief I will only ask you to tell the Court how Field Marshal Keitel reacted to the issuing of this order.
JODL: The claim of the Führer to infringe upon the sovereignty of the Army in its operational area with Himmler and the Police led to days of bitter disputes with the Führer. The same disputes had already taken place when Terboven was appointed in Norway. One need only read my entries in my diary, 1780-PS. Of course I know today why the Führer insisted on this point of view under all circumstances and why he forced the Police, under Himmler, into the operational area. It was against all our rules. It was against all previous agreements with the Police and with Himmler, but in the end the Führer put this measure through in spite of resistance all along the line.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution asserted here that in 1940 Field Marshal Keitel gave the order to kill General Weygand, at that time Chief of the General Staff of the French Army. This statement is based essentially on testimony of the witness General Lahousen. I have a few brief questions to put to you on this matter. Was Field Marshal Keitel competent to order the killing of a general?
JODL: No. Any death sentence at all had to be confirmed by the Führer.
DR. NELTE: Well, I naturally do not mean a death sentence—in this connection.
JODL: Well. No one at all has the authority to order murder to be committed.
DR. NELTE: I ask this because Lahousen’s testimony made it appear as if this order had been given by Field Marshal Keitel to Admiral Canaris. If we assume that such an order was issued by Hitler, this would have been a politically highly important act considering the importance of Weygand.
JODL: Undoubtedly.
DR. NELTE: Would it not also have been a foolish act in terms of policy?
JODL: It would first of all have been a crime...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, this is all argument, and you are putting your questions in an entirely leading form. The real objection to it is that it is argumentative. Go on.
DR. NELTE: If such an order had been given, could it have remained unknown to you?
JODL: I cannot imagine that Field Marshal Keitel, charged with the ordering of the murder, would not have spoken about it to me.
DR. NELTE: What exactly did you hear about the Weygand case?
JODL: I never heard a single word about the Weygand case. I heard only one thing when Himmler reported to the Führer in my presence: “I have given Weygand a very nice villa in Baden. He is completely provided for there in such a way that he can be satisfied.” That is the only thing I ever heard in which the name of Weygand figured.
DR. NELTE: The witness Lahousen was also heard in the case of General Giraud. Did you also know anything of this case of Giraud which attracted much attention?
JODL: I heard a little more about the Giraud case. Shortly after the successful flight of Giraud, Field Marshal Keitel told me once in a conversation that he was having Giraud watched by Canaris so that he would not, as the Führer always feared, go to North Africa and there direct the formation of the Colonial Army against us or, so that he could be arrested in the event that he should rejoin his family in the territory actually occupied. That is what he told me. Several months later he said to me again, “I have now withdrawn this assignment to Canaris because the Führer has given it to Himmler. If two agencies are concerned with it there will only be difficulties and differences.” The third time I heard about the Giraud case was when Field Marshal Keitel told me that a deputy of Giraud—I believe it was about the end of 1943 or in the spring of 1944—approached the counterintelligence service and said that Giraud, who could not agree with De Gaulle in North Africa, asked whether he might not return to France. I told Field Marshal Keitel then that we absolutely must agree to that immediately because that was extremely favorable for us politically. That is the only thing I ever heard about the Giraud case. Nothing else.
DR. NELTE: The day before yesterday you spoke about the talks in the Führer’s train in September 1939, at which General Lahousen was also present. In this connection you said, “I have no objections to Lahousen’s statement.” But to avoid misunderstandings, I should like you to say whether you mean by that that all the testimony of Lahousen, which also referred to Giraud and Weygand, is credible and correct, or only the part regarding your presence in the Führer’s train?
JODL: Of course, I meant only those statements of Lahousen which he made about me. As for the other statements which were made here, I have my own opinion, but perhaps that is not appropriate here.
DR. NELTE: Yesterday, in answer to a question by Dr. Stahmer, you spoke about the dispute on the occasion of the 80 RAF officers who escaped. In order to clarify this question, which weighs heavily against Field Marshal Keitel, I should like to know the following: Did you hear that Keitel objected violently because the recaptured RAF officers were turned over to Himmler, that is, to the Gestapo?
JODL: When I stood at the curtain for those 1 or 2 minutes, I heard the Führer say first of all:
“That is unheard of. That is the tenth time that dozens of officer prisoners have escaped. These officers are an enormous danger. You don’t realize”—meaning Keitel—“that in view of the 6 million foreign people who are prisoners and workers in Germany, they are the leaders who could organize an uprising. That is the result of this careless attitude of the commandants. These escaped Air Force officers are to be turned over to Himmler immediately.”
And then I heard Field Marshal Keitel answer:
“My Führer, some of them have already been put back into the camp. They are prisoners of war again. I cannot turn them over.”
And the Führer said, “Very well, then they can stay there.” That is what I heard with my own ears at that moment, until a telephone conversation called me away again.
DR. NELTE: Afterwards did you speak again with Field Marshal Keitel about this incident?
JODL: We drove back to Berchtesgaden together from the Berghof. Field Marshal Keitel was beside himself, for on the way up he had told me that he would not report the escape of these fliers to the Führer. He hoped that on the next day he would have them all back. He was furious with Himmler, who had immediately reported it to the Führer. I told him that if the Führer, in view of the total situation in Germany, saw such a great danger in the escape of foreign officers, then England should be notified so that the order might be rescinded—all officers who were prisoners had to make an attempt to escape.
I must say openly that at this moment neither of us had any thought that these recaptured fliers might be shot. For they had done nothing except escape from a camp, which German officers had also done dozens of times. I imagined that he wanted to remove them from the disciplinary action of the Army, which certainly, in his opinion, would be far too lenient, and wanted to have them work as punishment for some time in a concentration camp under Himmler. That is what I imagined.
DR. NELTE: In any case, in your presence and in your hearing, Hitler’s orders to Himmler to shoot these officers were not issued?
JODL: I know that with absolute certainty for I know how I felt when I suddenly received the news that they had been shot.
DR. NELTE: Now I should like to ask you a few brief concluding questions.
The Tribunal asked the Defendant Keitel on the witness stand whether he had submitted written applications asking for his resignation. You were present. What can you tell the Court about Keitel’s efforts to resign from his position?
JODL: The first case that I mentioned a while ago must have been in the spring of 1940, because of the Western campaign. Schmundt told me about it, but I did not see it myself. The second case about which I know exactly, was in 1941, November, when there was an enormous controversy between the Führer and Field Marshal Keitel, and the Führer chose to use the expression, “I am only dealing with blockheads.”
THE PRESIDENT: We do not want the details. I mean, if he can tell us when Keitel attempted to resign...
JODL: This second case was in the fall of 1941. After the controversy, Field Marshal Keitel wrote his request for his resignation. When I entered the room his pistol lay before him on his desk, and I personally took it away from him.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I have told you that the Tribunal does not want the details, and now we are being told about details about the resignation, about the way in which it was made.
DR. NELTE: Can it be of no importance to the Court to know how serious the matter was to the Defendant Keitel that he even wanted to use his pistol?
THE PRESIDENT: He is going into details about the particular desk on which the document was put, or something of that sort. He made his efforts to resign in writing. That is of importance.
DR. NELTE: You can testify about this case when Field Marshal Keitel handed in his resignation in writing?
JODL: I myself saw him writing it, and I read the introduction.
DR. NELTE: If things like this occurred frequently, as you have stated in the course of your testimony, and went as far as the pistol incident indicates, how did it happen that Keitel always remained?
JODL: Because the Führer would not separate from him under any circumstances. He absolutely refused to let him go. I believe that various attempts were made in this direction from other sources, too; but the Führer did not let him go. In the second place, of course our mutual attitude was that we were, after all, engaged in a war for existence in which an officer, in the long run, could not stay at home and knit stockings. Over and over again it was the sense of duty that won the upper hand and caused us to bear all the difficulties.
DR. NELTE: You will understand that one must hold up to the generals “loyalty unto loyalty” and that duty can only go to the point where it does not injure human dignity. Have you ever thought of that?
JODL: I have thought a lot about it.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely that is not a question for counsel to put. It is an argument, is it not? It is argument, not evidence. It is not a proper question to put.
DR. NELTE: I have finished.
DR. THOMA: Witness, is it true that Rosenberg, in the middle of January 1943, gave you and General Zeitzler the draft of a proclamation to the peoples of eastern Europe?
JODL: That is true. It was after the discussion on the situation. Rosenberg was present in headquarters. He asked me and Zeitzler to step into the next room for a moment and said that he wanted to report to the Führer a proclamation to the Eastern peoples and that he would like to submit it to us first. I recall that.
DR. THOMA: Do you still recall the contents?
JODL: It was a very extensive concession in regard to the sovereignty of these individual eastern states. It was an outspoken attempt, through a policy of reconciliation, to combat unrest and antagonism to the German system.
DR. THOMA: Did you express to Rosenberg your pleasure at this proclamation?
JODL: We said then that this had always been our idea, but that we had doubts whether it was not already too late.
DR. THOMA: What was the success of this memorandum?
JODL: As Rosenberg told me after the conference, the Führer, as he often did, pigeonholed the matter; that is, he did not reject it, but he said, “Put it aside.”
DR. THOMA: Did you have the impression that Rosenberg’s suggestions arose from concern about the dangers caused by Koch’s methods?
JODL: Undoubtedly it was an attempt to counteract these methods which were gradually used by Himmler and particularly by Koch.
DR. THOMA: Thank you, I have no more questions.
DR. CARL HAENSEL (Counsel for SS): Was the strategic assignment of the divisions of the Waffen-SS under you?
JODL: The divisions of the Waffen-SS, in regard to assignment, were generally treated like the divisions of the Army.
DR. HAENSEL: How many Waffen-SS divisions were there, according to your recollection? Please mention the number of Wehrmacht divisions also so that we have a means of comparison.
JODL: At the beginning of the war, I believe, we began with three SS divisions. The number increased until the end of the war to an estimated 35 to 37 divisions, as against a number of Army divisions which varied, but which one can give approximately as about 280, 290, 300.
DR. HAENSEL: What was the procedure in setting up new divisions? Who decided whether such a new division would be a Waffen-SS division or a Wehrmacht division?
JODL: As soon as the Führer had ordered the establishment of a new series of divisions he said, after consulting Himmler, that so-and-so many divisions were to be set up and so-and-so many Waffen-SS divisions. He determined the number.
DR. HAENSEL: Was there a certain standard, or was that done arbitrarily?
JODL: I had the impression that in setting up the SS divisions, the Führer wanted to go as far as he absolutely could.
DR. HAENSEL: And what do you consider—when you say “could,” what do you consider the limit?
JODL: The limit was in the fact that the soldiers of these Waffen-SS divisions were to be volunteers; and the time came very soon when Himmler had to report, “I do not get any more replacements for the divisions;” and from that time on the situation arose that, when the men came for military duty, the cream of the crop was taken by the SS, and these people, even if they were strict Catholic peasants’ sons, were drafted into the SS divisions. I myself received bitter letters from peasants’ wives about this.
DR. HAENSEL: In connection with this drafting into the Waffen-SS that you have just described, were political viewpoints taken into account? Was a recruit first questioned politically in some way before he was turned over to the Waffen-SS, or was no consideration taken of this?
JODL: No, the decisive thing was that the fellow was big, looked healthy, and promised to become a good soldier. That was the decisive thing.
DR. HAENSEL: You said yesterday that in the drafting of recruits no consideration was given to whether a man belonged to the SA or not. Is the same thing true of membership in the General SS? I mean in this sense, was no consideration given to whether the recruit belonged to the General SS, either in drafting, in training, or in promotion?
JODL: Not to such a pronounced extent as in the case of the SA. I believe that the majority of the men in the General SS came to the Waffen-SS and volunteered. But I also know that very many did not do that and were drafted in the normal way by the Army, so that they were treated in the Army just like any other German.
DR. HAENSEL: If I understand you correctly then, there were many members of the General SS on the one hand who served in the Army; and on the other hand, there were many who belonged neither to the Party nor to the SS but served in the Waffen-SS?
JODL: That is true; it does not apply to the very beginning of the war, but it is absolutely true for the second half of the war.
DR. HAENSEL: And this second half of the war contained the greater number?
JODL: Undoubtedly, that—the second half—I always call that part after the big losses in the first Russian campaign of 1941.
DR. HAENSEL: How strong was the total Waffen-SS at the end of the war, approximately?
JODL: About 480,000 men.
DR. HAENSEL: And the losses, that is the dead and captured, would be added to this number?
JODL: Yes, they would be added.
DR. HAENSEL: And do you have any figures in mind about that?
JODL: It is hard to give an estimate in regard to the SS.
MR. ROBERTS: Witness, you told the Tribunal 2 days ago that you had soldiering in the blood, is that right?
JODL: Yes, this is true.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. And you said yesterday that you were here to represent the honor of the German soldier, is that right?
JODL: Yes, I do that to a high degree.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, yes. And you put yourself forward as an honorable soldier.
JODL: With full consciousness, yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And you put yourself forward as a truthful man.
JODL: I represented myself as such a man, and I am.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Because of the things you say you have been made to do in the last 6 or 7 years, do you think your honor has become at all soiled?
JODL: My honor was certainly not soiled, for I guarded it personally.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, you say your honor is not soiled.
Have you—during the last 6 or 7 years, when causing to be said the things which you say you had to circulate—has your truthfulness remained at the same high standard?
[There was no response.]
Can’t you answer that question?
JODL: I believe I am too dull for that question.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, then if you are too dull, I won’t persist in it; I will go on. I will leave the question and I will go on.
In 1935 you were lieutenant colonel at the head of the Home Defense Department of the Wehrmacht, is that right?
JODL: Absolutely right.
MR. ROBERTS: That is Department L, Landesverteidigung, is that right?
JODL: Yes, that is correct.
MR. ROBERTS: And was Field Marshal Von Blomberg your superior?
JODL: Field Marshal Von Blomberg was not my direct superior, but one of my superiors.
MR. ROBERTS: Did you work a good deal with Field Marshal Von Blomberg?
JODL: On various occasions I reported to him personally, of course not nearly so much as the Chief of the Armed Forces Department.
MR. ROBERTS: Did you attend staff talks with him?
JODL: I did not attend large conferences with Blomberg. I believe that there were seldom more persons than General Keitel and I and perhaps one other chief of a department.
MR. ROBERTS: And would they be called staff talks?
JODL: No, those conferences took place in the Office of the Chief of the Armed Forces Department.
MR. ROBERTS: Did you go to staff talks?
JODL: Of course, since I belonged to the staff.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good; I thought that.
Now, will you please look at the Document C-139, Exhibit USA-53. First look at the signature, will you. That is signed by Blomberg, is it not?
JODL: That is signed by Blomberg, yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, that is dealing with “Operation Schulung.” Do you remember what Operation Schulung was?
[There was no response.]
That is the reoccupation of the Rhineland, isn’t it?
[There was no response.]
Can’t you answer me?
JODL: I can answer you as soon as I have read that.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the question was whether you remember what Operation Schulung was. It isn’t necessary to read the document in order to answer that question.
JODL: According to my recollection—I do not know whether it comes from studying the documents here in Nuremberg—the term Schulung meant preparations for the occupation of the Rhineland after evacuation of the West Rhine territories in the case of French sanctions...
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, I agree.
JODL: But—there is more to be said in that connection.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, wait a moment. That is then dealing with the reoccupation of the Rhineland; do you agree with that?
JODL: No, that does not deal with the reoccupation of the Rhineland. That is absolutely false, but it...
MR. ROBERTS: Now, just let us look at this document together and see what it says. Now, first of all, it is dated the 2d of May 1935.
“For the operation...” I am reading it to you if you will follow it, and might I make this point first: It is apparently so secret that it couldn’t be entrusted to a stenographer, isn’t it? The whole document is written in manuscript, handwriting, isn’t it?
[There was no response.]
MR. ROBERTS: You can answer that question surely. Can’t you see whether it is in handwriting or not?
JODL: It is in handwriting, yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, why not say so?
Now then, let’s just look at the document. It is from the Reich Minister of Defense; that is Von Blomberg, isn’t it? It is the second copy, “By hand only.” It is, to the Chief of the High Command, Chief of the Naval High Command, and the Reich Minister for Air.
“For the operation suggested in the last staff talks”—that is why I asked you whether you went to staff talks, you see—“of the Armed Forces, I lay down the code name, ‘Schulung.’”
Then, may I just refer briefly to the contents:
“This is a joint undertaking of the three branches of the Wehrmacht... The operation must be executed”—and this is a phrase we have become familiar with later—“by a surprise blow at lightning speed.
“Strictest secrecy is necessary ... only peacetime strength....”
And Number 3:
“Every improvement of our armaments will make possible a greater measure of preparedness....”
And then:
“The High Command of the Army is asked: How many divisions ready for action?”
Not one token battalion as you said yesterday.
“Reinforcement of the necessarily inadequate forces there”—that is in the West—“by the East Prussian divisions which will be brought here at once by rail or sea transport... High Command of the Navy to look after the safe transport of the East Prussian troops by sea, in case the overland route is closed.”
What could that refer to, that secret instruction—so secret it had to be in manuscript—if it wasn’t the reoccupation of the Rhineland?
JODL: If you will permit me to make quite a brief explanation, then the Tribunal will be saved a tremendous lot of time.
MR. ROBERTS: Please, Witness, answer my question first and then make an explanation after, if it is brief. The question is, what could it refer to except the reoccupation of the Rhineland?
JODL: I am not here as a clairvoyant; I do not know the document; I have never read it; at this time I was not in the Armed Forces Department—that has entirely different signatures—I was in the operations section of the Army. I neither saw nor ever heard of this paper. If you look at the date, 2 May 1935, it is proven there in writing, for I entered the Armed Forces Department only in the middle of June 1935. Thus, only on the basis of my general staff training can I give you some assumptions; but the Court do not want assumptions.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, if that is your answer. And are you saying that you, who heard General Field Marshal Von Blomberg’s staff talk, cannot help the Court at all as to what that secret operation order is about?
JODL: It was before my time. I was not with Von Blomberg then.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, will you look, please at EC-405. Now—let him see the German book, Page 277.
My Lord, that is Page 26. Hasn’t he a German book?
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you did say, did you not, that you remember that the Operation Schulung was the preparation for the occupation of the Rhineland?
JODL: No, I said the contrary. I said that I heard the word, Schulung, for the first time here in the Court; and then I wondered what that could have been.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Court will be able to judge as to what you said by the shorthand notes. You say, do you, that you did not say Schulung meant the preparation for the occupation of the Rhineland? Is that right?
JODL: I mean, that as General Staff officer of the operations section at that time I had to know what military preparations were made.
THE PRESIDENT: But, that is not what I asked you. What I want to know is what you said just now when you were asked if you remembered what Operation Schulung meant. What did you say? It is suggested that it may have come through wrongly to us in the translation. What did you say?
JODL: I said, “I believe I recall, but I am not certain whether this recollection did not result from studying the documents here or earlier, that the word, Schulung, meant the preparations for the evacuation of the western Rhine territory and occupation of the Rhine boundary in case of French sanctions, for that was the only thing with which we were concerned at that time.”
All the evacuation measures which I later mentioned anyway in Document EC-405 were part of that.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, you remember the date of that first document, 2d of May 1935. Now I refer to EC-405 which is in the big Document Book 7, Page 261, and it is on Page 277 of the German book, 277. Now this, Witness, is a meeting—I want you to look, please, at Pages 43 and 44 of the original which you have. Have you got 43 and 44?
JODL: 43 and 44, yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Well, now, you see there—it is a meeting of the working committee of the Reich Defense Council. It is dated the 26th of June 1935 and at letter “F:” “Lieutenant Colonel Jodl ... about ‘participation in Mobilization Preparations,’” and the first three paragraphs deal with general mobilization; and I do not want to read them, but the fourth paragraph reads:
“Demilitarized zone requires special treatment. In his speech of 21 May 1935 and other utterances the Führer has stated that the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pact regarding the demilitarized zone are being observed. To the aide-mémoire of the French Chargé d’Affaires of 17 June 1935 on ‘Recruiting Offices in the Demilitarized Zone,’ the German Reich Government has replied that neither civilian recruiting authorities nor other offices in the demilitarized zone have been entrusted with mobilization tasks such as the raising, equipping, and arming of any kind of formations for the event of war or in preparation thereof.”
Now, if Von Blomberg’s handwritten letter of the 2d of May 1935 did refer to preparations for reoccupying the Rhineland by surprise, it was highly dishonest of the Führer, 19 days later on the 21st of May, to say that the Locarno and Versailles treaties were being observed, wasn’t it?
JODL: No, it wasn’t dishonest, for if it is true at all that the term, Schulung...
THE PRESIDENT: I think that is a matter of comment, if you please.
MR. ROBERTS: I shall, of course, My Lord, have to make certain comments on the witness as I proceed. No doubt Your Lordship will realize that I am not endeavoring to depart from this particular ruling which is only for this particular question, presumably.
THE PRESIDENT: I think—the Tribunal think that you ought not to make comments but you ought to confine yourself as far as possible to cross-examination about the facts.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, My Lord I—about your Lordship’s ruling—I have had, of course, a very extensive experience in cross-examination in many courts, and I bow entirely to Your Lordship’s ruling; but it is very difficult for a cross-examiner to confine himself entirely to the facts. But I shall do the very best I can.
[Turning to the defendant.] Then I shall read on:
“Since political entanglements abroad must be avoided at present under all circumstances, only those preparatory measures that are urgently necessary may be carried out in the demilitarized zone. The existence of such preparations or the intention of making them must be kept strictly secret in the zone itself as well as in the rest of the Reich....
“Weapons, equipment, insignia, field-gray uniforms, and other items stored for mobilization purposes must be kept from sight.”
And now I want to refer to the last paragraph:
“Commitment to writing of directives for mobilization purposes is permissible only insofar as it is absolutely necessary to the smooth execution of the measures provided for the demilitarized zone. Without exception such material must be kept in safes.”
You were collecting weapons and uniforms in the demilitarized zone, were you?
JODL: They were weapons and items of equipment of the Landespolizei, the Order Police, and the Gendarmerie. There were no troops there. Consequently, there were no weapons there for them.
MR. ROBERTS: Did the Police wear field-gray uniforms?
JODL: To my knowledge the Police wore a gray-green uniform or a green uniform.
MR. ROBERTS: Then what was the need of this great secrecy if this was only police equipment?
JODL: It was the equipment in addition for the reinforced border guards—the customs inspectors—about which I have already said that it was intended...
MR. ROBERTS: My question, Witness, was what was the need for secrecy? What was the need for secrecy if you were not breaking the Treaty of Versailles? Can’t you answer that?
JODL: I have already testified to the reasons for keeping all these measures secret in detail during my direct examination, and I confirm that in all these preparations it was a question—in case of an occupation of the western Rhenish territory by France—of setting up a blockade along the line with the aid of the Police, the Gendarmerie, and the reinforced border guards. That was the intention at that time, only for this eventuality. I have already testified under oath that I learned about the occupation of the Rhineland only 6 or 8 days beforehand.
MR. ROBERTS: I know you have, you see, and I am suggesting to you that your evidence was quite untrue on that point; and I am going to suggest it is quite untrue on many points. Now then, will you please go back to the first paragraph that I read. You say:
“To the aide-mémoire of the French Chargé d’Affaires ... the German Reich Government has replied that neither civilian recruiting authorities nor other offices ... have been entrusted with mobilization tasks such as the raising, equipping, and arming of any kind of formations for the event of war....”
Doesn’t that subsequent paragraph about the weapons, equipment, insignia, and field-gray uniforms show that the truth was not told to the French Chargé d’Affaires?
JODL: I only repeat the answer that was given to the French Chargé d’Affaires. I believe that that was essentially true: No mobilization tasks, such as disposition, equipment, and arming of formations for the event of war. There was no thought of war, no one mentioned it with even one word.
MR. ROBERTS: I will not repeat the point, I submitted—may I just remind you—and I think there are copies for the Tribunal too—of Article 43 of the Versailles Treaty.
Article 42 defines the area, the left bank of the Rhine and the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the east. Article 43:
“In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently of temporarily, and military maneuvers of any kind; as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.”
I suggest to you the step you were taking—mentioning at that meeting—was a clear breach of Versailles. Do you agree, or don’t you?
JODL: No, I do not agree to that. They were taken in the event that the enemy should not abide by the treaty and should attack us again, as that time in the Ruhr district.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now I propose to refer to you a document which has been described as your speech, L-172, from time to time—and I want to make it quite clear first as to what you say the document is, because you wouldn’t say one thing one day and the opposite the next, would you, Witness? That document has your writing in places, has it not? I can refer you to the pages if you like. If you look at page...
JODL: That is unnecessary. It contains many handwritten corrections and notations by me. But I have...
MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Witness, for saving me that trouble then. And is that a speech—the notes of a speech—which you delivered at Munich to the Gauleiter in 1943?
JODL: I have already clearly said that this was the rough draft, not the speech that I made but parts of the first draft and most of the contents consist of notes by my staff, which they sent me for the preparation of this speech. I crossed out whole pages and sent the whole rough draft back again and only then did I make my speech.
MR. ROBERTS: Well now, I want to examine that, because you said quite differently, did you not, when you were interrogated by one American officer on two separate occasions? You said quite differently, did you not?
[There was no response.]
Were you interrogated on this matter on the 8th of October last year by Colonel Thomas Hinkel? Do you remember that? Perhaps you would not remember the date.
JODL: No. Oh, we spoke about this matter a few times.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, and you were sworn when you gave your answers to the interrogators?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Well now, may I read, to refresh your memory, a copy from the shorthand notes of the interrogation?
“I show you a photostatic reproduction of a number of pages of a lecture, which was purported to have been given by you on the 7th of November 1943, and ask you if those pages represent the lecture that was delivered. For the record, that is identified as L-172.”
Then you answer:
“Yes. A number of things are not contained therein, which I explained with the map.
“Question: ‘You interpolated the remarks that do not appear in the written part; is that correct?’
“Answer: ‘Yes, many particulars I set forth just with the map at hand.’
“Question: ‘Is that your handwriting appearing on the cover page?’
“Answer: ‘No, it is not mine.’
“But the remaining sheets you identify as the written version of a lecture at Munich?
“Answer: ‘I cannot say whether it was actually my lecture as it was, because I see the signature of Buttlar. It isn’t the lecture itself. That is the materials of the brochures which had been furnished to me.’”
Then:
“Do you identify...”
Just follow this, will you, Witness?
“Do you identify the first 29 pages as constituting the lecture that you delivered?
“Answer (after examining the document): ‘Yes, that is my lecture.’”
Do you want to alter that sworn answer now? Do you?
JODL: I have not read the transcript of the notes which were taken here. I do not know the translation. I made several other statements in that regard. I observed in the second interrogation that that was not actually my speech, and that...
MR. ROBERTS: I will read the second one, Witness. I have that for you. This was on the 16th...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, had you finished what you wanted to say?
JODL: No, I had not finished. I was interrupted.
THE PRESIDENT: Then finish what you want to say.
JODL: I wanted to say that before I had looked over the whole document, at the first moment, of course, I had the impression that that was the copy from which I delivered my speech. However, when I looked at it more carefully in the course of the interrogations, I noticed that it was only the material collected for this speech, and I said clearly and distinctly:
“It contains the first draft, the outline and the conclusion by me. The whole middle part is only material furnished by my staff, and the whole thing is not at all the speech which I gave.”
That is word for word what I told Colonel Hinkel.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. Let me read now what I was going to read, the second interrogation. This is the 16th of November 1945, 4 days before the Trial:
“This document is identified for the record as L-172. I show you the photostatic reproduction in order to refresh your recollection concerning it.
“As I remember your previous testimony, it was to the effect that the first part of the document is the speech that you wrote for delivery to that meeting. The second part consists of various thoughts on the basis of which this speech was prepared; is that right?
“Answer: ‘One moment, please. This is not my real lecture. This is a conglomeration of the pieces of writings which are partly drafts of my own, that is, the introduction; but all the appendices are the basis of my lecture furnished me by my staff.
“‘The photostats appended to the original lecture—it was a photographed copy—and also a number of maps which were drawn up were included.
“‘This is not my lecture as such; and the annotations made here, in this calligraphic manner, were not mine. I made them in my own handwriting.
“‘I do not know the origin of this copy. Most likely it was furnished me by the OKW for the purpose of my giving this lecture. It is altogether a conglomeration of various pieces of writing, and it is usable only with limitations. However...’”
And just listen to this, will you?
“‘...as to the broad lines of it, this is what I have used as a lecture.’”
Then the next question was:
“I believe you stated before that the written speech that you had was not given as set forth in the text because you interpolated various remarks in the course of the speech, particularly whenever you referred to one of the maps that you placed before the audience, in order to follow the campaigns which you discussed. Isn’t that correct?”
Now listen to this:
“What I have written down I have actually spoken and I followed this text written down by myself. But in regard to the momentary situation on the various fronts”—and that is Part 3 and 4, where you will find a note “delivered extemporaneously”—“I had that so clearly in mind that I did not need to base my speech on any written statements. Also, I referred to the maps freely.”
Then the last question on this point:
“Is it not true, however, that the document before you represents, in general, the speech that you gave at Munich in November 1943 to this meeting?”
The answer is:
“Yes; much, without doubt, is the same. All the appendices with regard to these various theaters of war and other appendices I had not used during my speech. I had returned them.”
Do you agree with your answer to that interrogation?
JODL: On the whole, you have confirmed just what I said. However, I do not know why we have to talk so long about it. The case is completely clear. It is...
MR. ROBERTS: Well, please do not worry yourself. I know I am stopping you; but I apprehend that I am stopping you from saying something quite irrelevant, and in the interest of time I regard it as my duty to stop you. Please do not worry about why I should do something.
I want to know whether that document roughly represents what you said in the speech. It is quite a different thing to being in a wastepaper basket.
JODL: The introduction and the conclusion, as contained here in the first draft were, of course, basically retained in the speech in this form. However, the whole speech was only finally worked out on the basis of this first draft; it was shortened, changed, parts were crossed out, and mistakes were eliminated. And only then came the main part of the speech for which only the material is here. There is no proof, and I am not in a position to say whether I actually spoke even one sentence of those which are here in the form in which it is found in the first draft.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good; I will accept that.
JODL: If you give me a copy of my actual speech I will recognize it.
MR. ROBERTS: That is all we can give you, Witness, because that is all we found.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we might as well adjourn now.
MR. ROBERTS: If Your Lordship please.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I should like to call attention to the following: When my client was interrogated here, he was heard through an interpreter, since he does not understand the English language. On the basis of this testimony the minutes were, as I have just heard, set down in the English language. These minutes he never saw and he did not sign them. And now these minutes, which were compiled in English, are submitted to him in a German translation. In my opinion it is quite impossible under such circumstances to tie the defendant down to specific words which are contained in the minutes. He abides by what he said, but he cannot recognize everything that is in those minutes when...
THE PRESIDENT: That is true. We will keep these facts in mind. The Tribunal will keep these facts in mind, if you will draw them to their attention.
MR. ROBERTS: If it please the Tribunal, I am passing from that point. The witness, I think, said the document was the basis of his speech; and I accept that answer and I pass to another point.
Would you please give the witness his diary, 1780-PS, German C-113. And it is Page 133 in the large document book, Page 133.
Witness, I think you have seen this entry. My Lord, it is the 5th of November 1937 I am dealing with:
“Führer develops his ideas about intentions for future course and conduct of policy....”
Page 133 of the large book.
THE PRESIDENT: When you say, large book, you mean Number 7?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, Number 7; I am sorry. I should have given it a number.
[Turning to the defendant.] 5th of November 1937:
“Führer develops his ideas about intentions for future course and conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces...”—et cetera.
There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the chief of Armed Forces and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
“...the intention of L...”—does that mean your department, Landesverteidigung—its intention to have these thoughts put on paper?
[There was no response.]
MR. ROBERTS: Please answer my question, Witness.
JODL: “Intention of L,” that means the intention of the Department of National Defense (Landesverteidigung) to have these thoughts put down on paper and transmitted to the branches of the Wehrmacht.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, the meeting that you were talking about was what we have called the Hossbach Conference, was it not, which is 386-PS? The Tribunal is very familiar with it. You remember the conference, do you not? You have read it many times here?
JODL: Yes, but I was not present at this conference. I do recall the things that were read here.
MR. ROBERTS: I know you were not present. But presumably you, as head of the Home Defense Department, were told of what was said at the conference?
JODL: I have already stated with regard to that that the report which I received was in no way sensational. The directives for the preparations after this time are available to the Court in writing; what we prepared and worked out at the time is proved thereby. We have the orders of 20 May and of 14 June; they are available.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you were only asked whether you were told what happened at the conference. It was not necessary to make a long statement about that.
MR. ROBERTS: You see, I try to put simple questions, and I am asking for simple answers. The last thing I want is to interrupt you.
Were you told that at that conference Hitler said that Germany’s problem was a question of space?
JODL: No, not one word.
MR. ROBERTS: Were you told that Hitler said that the German question could only be solved by force?
JODL: No.
MR. ROBERTS: And were you told that Hitler said that German rearmament was practically complete?
JODL: No.
MR. ROBERTS: And the last question I will ask you: Were you told that Hitler said that the first aim in the event of war would be Austria and Czechoslovakia?
JODL: The report about the more active preparations for the march against Czechoslovakia was, I believe, contained in these statements. But I can only say that the details which I received from Field Marshal Keitel are not in my recollection at present. I recall only one thing, that it was no surprise or sensation for me, and only small corrections of the directives which had been given out up to that point were necessary.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Thank you. Now then, you were not present at Obersalzberg when Keitel was there with Schuschnigg the following February, were you?
JODL: No, I was not present.
MR. ROBERTS: But Keitel later told you what had happened?
JODL: He made a few brief remarks about that in narrative form, for after all, I had no further concern in this matter.
MR. ROBERTS: Did you make that entry in your diary; that is, the next entry to the one I was referring to, Page 133, Book 7, the same page, under 11th of February 1938:
“Evening 12 February General Keitel, with General Reichenau, and Sperrle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg and Schmidt were again put under severest political and military pressure.”
Did Keitel tell you that?
JODL: Yes. You have only inserted the word “again.” That is not in my diary. This entry I made personally, because Keitel told me that during lunch Reichenau and Sperrle had carried on warlike conversations, that they had talked about the new rearmament of Germany.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, in March—I think this is common ground—you signed or initialed one or two orders for the “Operation Otto.”
JODL: Yes; but at that time it was not called Otto but “For the March into Austria.”
MR. ROBERTS: Hitler, when he heard that Schuschnigg was going to obtain the opinion of the people by plebiscite, decided to invade at once, did he not?
JODL: Yes, I was told, when he heard that there was to be a grotesque violation of public opinion through the trick of a plebiscite, he said that he would certainly not tolerate this under any circumstances. This is what I was told.
MR. ROBERTS: He would not tolerate public opinion being ascertained?
JODL: No; he would not tolerate public opinion being abused through this trick. That is how it was told to me.
MR. ROBERTS: So the Armed Forces of Germany then marched into Austria? That is right?
JODL: That is right; the Wehrmacht marched in.
MR. ROBERTS: And Austria, from that day, received all the benefits of National Socialism, is that right?
JODL: That is a political question. At any rate it could perhaps have become the happiest country on earth.