Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Volume 11 (part 3 of 3)
I would like to admit, however—and not only to admit, but to emphasize—that the word “superman” (Herrenmensch) came to my attention particularly during my activity as Minister in the East—and very unpleasantly—when used by a number of leaders of the administration in the East. Perhaps when we come to the question of the East, I may return to this subject in detail and state what position I took in regard to these utterances which came to my attention. In principle, however, I was convinced that ethnology was, after all, not an invention of the National Socialist movement, but a biological discovery, which was the conclusion of 400 years of European research. The laws of heredity discovered in the 1860’s, and rediscovered several decades later, enable us to gain a deeper insight into history than many other earlier theories. Accordingly, race...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the defendant is going back now into the origins of the views which he held. Surely, all we have got to consider here is his statement in speeches and in documents and the use to which he put those statements, not as to whether they were 400 years old, or anything of that sort.
DR. THOMA: The defendant just spoke about the racial problem and I will take the opportunity to speak on the so-called Jewish problem as the starting point of this question. I would like to ask the defendant the following question: How was it...
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, already my colleague, Mr. Dodd, pointed out that the Prosecution has submitted to the defendant an accusation stating in concrete terms his crimes: aggressive wars and atrocities. I suppose that the most correct way of carrying on the interrogation of his client on the part of Dr. Thoma would be to ask him questions directly connected with the charges of the Prosecution. I do not suppose that the Tribunal intend to listen to a lecture on the racial theories, National Socialism, or other theories.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I shall deal with the individual questions later; but, since the ideology and the philosophy of the Nazis has been called criminal here, I think the Defendant Rosenberg should be given some opportunity to state his views.
[Turning to the defendant.] Of course, it would be better, and perhaps more appropriate, Herr Rosenberg, if you were a little more brief in some respects.
Now I would like to ask the following question: You believed that the so-called Jewish problem in Europe could be solved if the last Jew left the European continent. At that time you stated it was immaterial whether such a program was realized in 5, 10, or 20 years. It was, after all, merely a matter of transport facilities, and, at the time, you thought it advisable to put this question before an international committee. How and why did you arrive at this opinion? I mean to say, how, in your opinion, would the departure of the last Jew from Europe solve the problem?
ROSENBERG: In order to comply with the wish of the Tribunal, I do not want to give a lengthy exposition of my views as evolved from my study of history—I do not at all mean the study of anti-Semitic writings but of Jewish historians themselves.
It seemed to me that after an epoch of generous emancipation in the course of national movements of the 19th Century, an important part of the Jewish nation also found its way back to its own tradition and nature, and more and more consciously segregated itself from other nations. It was a problem which was discussed at many international congresses, and Buber in particular, one of the spiritual leaders of European Jewry, declared that the Jews should return to the soil of Asia, for only there could the roots of Jewish blood and Jewish national character be found.
But my more radical attitude in the political sphere was due partly to my observations and experiences in Russia and partly to my experiences later in Germany, which seemed to particularly confirm their strangeness. I could not conceive how, at the time when the German soldiers returned, they were greeted by a Jewish university professor who explained that the German soldiers had died on the field of dishonor. I could not understand that lack of reverence could go so far. If it had been but an individual reaction, one could have said that the man had slipped. But in the course of 14 years, it became apparent that it was indeed the expression of a definitely alienating tendency.
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, I believe we should also discuss the fact that opposition was partly due to the contradiction provoked by certain National Socialist newspaper articles.
ROSENBERG: The statements of the opposite side, as they appeared constantly during these 14 years, had in part already appeared prior to the rise of the National Socialist movement. After all, the incidents of the Räte Republic in Munich and in Hungary took place long before the National Socialist movement was in a position to gain influence.
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, what did you have to say to the fact that in the first World War 12,000 Jewish soldiers died at the front?
ROSENBERG: Of course, I have always been conscious of the fact that many Jewish-German citizens were assimilated into the German environment, and that in the course of this development many tragic individual cases appeared, and that these, of course, deserved consideration. On the whole, however, this did not involve the entire social and political movement, especially since the leading papers of the so-called democratic parties recognized the increase of unemployment in Germany and suggested that Germans should emigrate to the French colonies, to the Argentine, and to China. Prominent Jewish people and the chairman of the Democratic Party suggested three times quite openly that, in view of the increase of unemployment, Germans should be deported to Africa and Asia. After all, during those 14 years just as many Germans were expelled from Poland as there were Jews in Germany, and the League of Nations took no effective steps against this violation of the pact in favor of the minorities.
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, you were the leader of the foreign policy office of the Party. What was your function?
ROSENBERG: The Foreign Policy Office was founded in April 1933. After its accession to power, many foreigners came to Germany in order to obtain information about the origin and nature of the National Socialist Party. In order to create an information center for the Party, the Führer assigned me to direct this office. As I said, it was the task of this office to receive foreigners who were interested in these problems, to give them information, to refer them to the proper organizations of the Party and the State, if they were interested in the labor front, the youth problem, the winter aid work, and so forth. We were also interested in working provisionally on certain initial suggestions made to us in the field of foreign trade and, if they deserved support, in transmitting them to those departments of the government particularly concerned.
Furthermore, we studied the foreign press in order to have good archives for future research work and to inform the Party leadership politically by short excerpts from the foreign press. Among other things, I am accused here of having written articles for the Hearst press. On invitation by the Hearst combine, I wrote five or six articles in 1933 or 1934; but, after I had met Hearst once for about 20 minutes at Nauheim, I did not see him or speak to him again. I heard only that the Hearst combine did get into extraordinary difficulties because of the favor shown me by publishing my impartial statements.
DR. THOMA: As the chief of the Foreign Policy Office did you at times take official political steps?
ROSENBERG: In the documents presented here, Document Numbers 003-PS, 004-PS, and 007-PS, the activity of the Foreign Policy Office had been discussed and submitted; and in regard to this activity I could give a brief summary to the Tribunal and read from the documents.
DR. THOMA: But I would like you to tell us what steps you took as the chief of the Foreign Policy Office to reach a positive agreement among the European nations.
ROSENBERG: Adolf Hitler called a meeting at Bamberg, I believe in 1927, at which he stated his foreign political conviction that at least some nations could have no direct interest in the total extinction of central Europe. By “some nations” he meant particularly England and Italy. After that in wholehearted agreement with him, I tried to find a way to an understanding by personal contacts I had made. Frequently, I had conversations with British Air Force officers of the British Air Forces General Staff. On their invitation I visited London in 1931, and at that time had purely informal conversations with a number of British personalities.
And when, in 1932, at a meeting of the Royal Academy of Rome, the topic “Europe” was discussed, I was offered an opportunity to speak, and I made a speech about this problem in which I explained that the development of the last centuries had been determined mainly by four nations and states—namely, England, France, Germany, and Italy. I pointed out that, first of all, these four should define their vital interests so that shoulder to shoulder they would defend the ancient and venerable continent of Europe and its traditions. I believed that these fourfold national roots of the rich European culture represented a historical and political legacy. Excerpts of my speech were published, and parts of it with approval have been translated for the Tribunal.
On the last day of the conference, the former British Ambassador to Italy, Sir Rennell Rodd, came to me and told me that he had just left Mussolini who had told him that I, Rosenberg, had spoken the most important words of the conference.
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, may I ask you, please, to be a little more brief.
ROSENBERG: In May 1933 I was again in London, this time by Hitler’s personal order; and I visited a number of British ministers, whose names are not relevant here, and tried again to promote understanding for the sudden and strange development in Germany. My reception was rather reserved, and a number of incidents occurred which showed that the sentiment was very repellent. But that did not prevent me from keeping up these personal contacts and from inviting a great number of British personalities to come to Germany later. It was not within the scope of my assignment to do that.
THE PRESIDENT: Why don’t you ask the defendant what the agreement[A] was to be about? Why doesn’t he tell us what the agreement was to be about instead of going on talking about an agreement in the abstract?
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[A] The President’s question is in response to the foregoing answer of the Defendant Rosenberg, in which the interpreter said “to bring about an agreement” instead of “to promote understanding”.
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DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I asked the defendant that question because he took steps to come to a positive understanding with England and worked toward that goal. The defendant is accused...
THE PRESIDENT: But what was the understanding about?
DR. THOMA: We were concerned with the fact that the defendant went to London in order to...
THE PRESIDENT: I want you to ask the defendant. I don’t want you to tell me.
DR. THOMA: I have just asked him, Mr. President.
The defendant is accused of having participated in the Norwegian action, in that he advocated the violation of Norwegian neutrality.
[Turning to the witness.] Please answer the question. How did you meet Quisling?
ROSENBERG: I met Quisling in the year 1933, when he visited me, and I had a discussion of 20 minutes’ duration with him. Subsequently, an assistant of mine, who was interested in Scandinavian culture and had written books about it, corresponded with Quisling. It was all of 6 years before I saw Quisling again, and I did not intervene either in the Norwegian political situation or in the Quisling movement until he visited me in June of 1939, when the tension in Europe had increased, and expressed his apprehensions about the situation in Norway in the event of a conflict. He said it was to be feared that Norway would not be able to remain neutral in such a case, and that his home country might be occupied in the North by Soviet troops and in the South by the troops of the Western powers, and that he viewed things with great concern. My staff leader made a note of his apprehensions and then reported them to Dr. Lammers, as it was his duty to do.
DR. THOMA: When was that?
ROSENBERG: That must have been in June 1939. Thereupon Quisling asked one of my assistants to help to maintain German-Norwegian understanding and especially to acquaint his Party with the organization and propaganda of our Party movement.
Thereupon, in the beginning of August there were, I believe, 25 Norwegians in our training school in order to train for this propaganda work and then to return home.
DR. THOMA: What were they trained in, and how?
ROSENBERG: I did not see them, nor did I speak to them individually. They were taught how to carry on more effective propaganda, and how the organization of the Party in this field had been built up in Germany. We promised to assist them in this field.
Suddenly, after the outbreak of the war, or shortly before—I do not remember exactly—Hagelin, an acquaintance of Quisling’s, came to me with apprehensions similar to those expressed by Quisling. After the outbreak of the war, this assistant of Quisling’s reported various details about the activity of the Western Powers in Norway. Finally, in December of 1939, Quisling came to Berlin with the declaration that, on the basis of exact information, he knew that the Norwegian Government was only seemingly neutral now, and that in reality it was practically agreed that Norway should give up her neutrality. Quisling himself had formerly been a Minister of War in Norway and therefore, he should have had exact knowledge of these things.
In accordance with my duty as a German citizen, I recommended that the Führer should hear Quisling. The Führer thereupon received Quisling twice, and at the same time Quisling, with his assistant, Hagelin, visited Navy headquarters and gave them identical information. I spoke once to Raeder after that, and he also recommended to the Führer that he listen to Quisling’s report.
DR. THOMA: Then you personally transmitted only those reports which Quisling had given you?
ROSENBERG: Yes, I would like to emphasize that although Quisling visited me, I had not been engaged on this question—I had not been involved in these political affairs for 6 years. Naturally, I had to consider it my duty to forward to the Führer reports which, if correct, were a tremendous military threat to Germany, and also to make notes of, and report to the Führer, those things which Quisling told me orally—namely, his plan to bring about a political change in Norway and then to ask Germany for support. At this time—I do not know, this development has been described in those documents produced by the Prosecution in words which express it much more precisely than I could summarize it here. In Document Number 004-PS, my staff leader made a short summary of it about 1½ or 2 months after the Norwegian operation.
DR. THOMA: This document—I would like to call the attention of the Tribunal particularly to this document—was compiled immediately after the Norwegian operation while the impression of its success was still fresh, and it describes the measures which were taken quite unequivocally. It states clearly that Quisling was the instigator, that he suddenly turned up at Lübeck and made reports, that he begged that his people be trained further, and that he came back again and again and always informed Rosenberg about the new developments in Norway.
THE PRESIDENT: What document are you referring to?
DR. THOMA: Document Number 004-PS, Exhibit GB-140. That is in Document Book 2, Page 113.
THE PRESIDENT: The document book is not numbered or paged?
DR. THOMA: I believe the number is at the bottom, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Which book is it you are referring to?
DR. THOMA: My Document Book Number 2, Page 113. Document Book Alfred Rosenberg, Page 113, Volume II. It is on Page 72 of the English translation.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, then, what is your question?
DR. THOMA: I would like to point out that on Page 1 it states, “Before the meeting of the Nordic Society in Lübeck, Quisling was in Berlin, where he was received by Rosenberg.”
That was in June 1939, as is shown by the Document Number 007-PS. Then, on the next page, it says that in August a course was given in Berlin-Dahlem. It says further that in December of 1939 Quisling reappeared in Berlin on his own initiative and made his reports—that was on the 14th and 15th of December—and Rosenberg, in line with his duty, transmitted to the Führer these reports which Quisling made to him. He did nothing beyond that in this matter, however. Parallel to this, and entirely independently of each other, the same reports were received by Raeder.
[Turning to the defendant.] Do you have anything to add to Document Number 004-PS?
ROSENBERG: Yes. Please let me have the document. [The document was submitted to the defendant.] On Page 5 of this Document Number 004-PS, it is stated that Hagelin, Quisling’s assistant who moved in Norwegian governmental circles and who had received orders from the Norwegian Government for the purchase of arms from Germany, after the Altmark incident, for instance—that is the incident where a German vessel was fired upon in Norwegian territorial waters—had heard Norwegian deputies of the Storting say that Norway’s reserved attitude was clearly a pre-arranged matter. Further, in the middle of Page 7:
“On 20 March on the occasion of his participation in negotiations regarding German deliveries of anti-aircraft artillery, he made a detailed report on the unceasing activity of the Allies in Norway with the acquiescence of the Nygardsvold Government. According to his report, the Allies were already inspecting the Norwegian harbor towns for landing and transport facilities. The French Commander, Kermarrec who had orders to that effect”—incidentally I also remember this name spelled Karramac, or something similar—“in a confidential conversation with Colonel Sundlo, the Commander of Narvik, who was also a follower of Quisling, had informed the Colonel about the intention of the Allies to land mechanized troops at Stavanger, Trondheim, and perhaps also at Kirkenes, and to occupy Sola airport near Stavanger.”
A little further down it says, and I quote:
“In his report of 26 March he”—that is, Hagelin—“pointed out once more that the speech of the Norwegian Foreign Minister Koht, dealing with Norwegian neutrality and his protests, was not taken seriously either in London by the English or in Norway by the Norwegians, since it was well known that the Government had no intention of taking a serious stand against England.”
DR. THOMA: That is what Quisling reported to you?
ROSENBERG: Yes, these were the reports which Quisling had instructed Hagelin to make. I would like to add further that, some time after the Führer had received Quisling he told me that he had instructed the OKW to consider this case from the military viewpoint, and he asked me not to talk about this subject to anybody else. In this connection, I would like to point out also that—as can be seen from the report Document Number 004-PS—the Führer had emphasized that he wanted the entire Scandinavian North to maintain neutrality at all costs, and would change his attitude only if the neutrality was threatened by other powers.
Later, an assistant of mine was ordered by the Führer to keep up connections with Quisling at Oslo, and he received a certain sum from the Foreign Office to support propaganda friendly to Germany to counteract other propaganda. He also returned to Germany with reports about the opinions of Quisling. Later I heard—and this was entirely understandable—that this assistant, who was a soldier at that time, had also received military intelligence reports which he disclosed after the Norwegian operation.
DR. THOMA: Please be more brief, Mr. Rosenberg.
ROSENBERG: The Führer did not inform me of his final decision, or whether he had actually decided to carry through the operation. I learned of the entire operation of 9 November through the newspaper and thereupon paid a visit to the Führer on that day. Several weeks later, the Führer summoned me and said that he had been forced to make this decision on the basis of concrete warnings which he had received, and documents which have been found gave proof that these warnings had been correct. He said it had been true to the letter that when the last German ships arrived in the fjord of Trondheim, I believe, they had already been engaged by the first of the approaching British vessels.
DR. THOMA: In this connection I have just one more question: Did Hitler ever call on you to attend a foreign political or military conference in your capacity as chief of the foreign policy office?
ROSENBERG: The Führer differentiated strictly between the official foreign policy and the policy followed on account of an initiative or suggestion which was urged upon me from outside. I believe all the documents show that he never asked me to participate in any conference concerning foreign policy or military preparations.
DR. THOMA: That is, you were never called upon to participate in the operations against Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia, et cetera?
I believe, Mr. President, that this is a suitable time to adjourn.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 16 April 1946 at 1000 hours.]
ONE HUNDRED AND NINTH DAY Tuesday, 16 April 1946
Morning Session
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, you were the official appointed by the Führer for the supervision of the entire intellectual and ideological training of the NSDAP and all its affiliated organizations. Did you exert any influence on national lawmaking in that capacity?
ROSENBERG: The Führer once spoke to me in this connection and explained to me that in the leadership of a large movement and of a state three factors had to be considered. There are, for instance, men who by their natures feel they must deal with any rising problems fundamentally through contemplation and then in lectures; then there is the directorate—that is to say, he, himself—who must select that which shows possibilities of realization; and finally, there are those people who have the task of putting the selected problems into practice in the social, political, and economic fields by dint of painstaking labor.
So it was that he originally conceived of my task, and he entrusted me with the supervision of training with the intention of expecting me to adopt a constructive attitude, by reason of my knowledge of the movement. The executive and legislative powers were in the hands of the respective ministries—that is, the Ministry for Education and the Reich Propaganda Ministry—and the general representation of the Party was in the hands of the Party Chancellery. The Party Chancellery occasionally asked me to define my position with regard to this or that question but was not obliged to consider my views.
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, did you have any influence on National Socialist school policies?
ROSENBERG: I did not have any direct influence on school policies. The school systems were an affair of the Reich Ministry for Education—the actual internal organization of the schools is not to be confused with the Party training—and the organization of the universities, the task of the ministry concerned with this problem.
DR. THOMA: There were National Socialist educational institutions. Can you tell me what kind of institutions these were and what your function was in that connection?
ROSENBERG: The so-called National Socialist educational institutions were special foundations under the leadership and direction of the Ministry for Education and the Reichsführer SS Himmler, for the purpose of training a distinct disciplined class; and the inspection of these educational institutions was in the hands of a special SS leader detailed to the Ministry for Education.
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, you are also accused of religious persecution, especially as it finds expression in your Myth of the 20th Century. Do you admit that occasionally you were a little too severe toward the church?
ROSENBERG: Of course I will allow that as far as historically founded creeds were concerned I pronounced severe personal judgment. I would like to emphasize, in this connection, that in the introduction to my book I described it as a work dealing with personal opinions; secondly, that this book was not directed against the religious elements in the public, as is shown in the quotation on Page 125 of the document book, Part I; and thirdly, that I rejected a policy of withdrawal from the church, as can be seen in the document book, Part I, Page 122, and also rejected political interference by the state in purely religious confessions which is also expressed clearly in this book. I further rejected many proposals to have my book translated into foreign languages. Only once a Japanese translation was submitted to me, although I was not able to recall having given my approval for the translation.
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, you were not trained in theological matters. Don’t you believe that in some judgments on theological questions you were wrong?
ROSENBERG: I naturally never assumed that this book, which deals with many problems, does not contain errors. I was, to an extent, grateful to receive criticism, and I made certain corrections; but some attacks I could not consider justified, and I thought that later I would certainly thoroughly revise this work—which, of course, also contained political comments.
DR. THOMA: Did you at any time use State Police measures against your opponents in theology and science?
ROSENBERG: No. I would like to state here that this work was published 2½ years before the assumption of power, and that it was naturally open to criticism from all sides, but that the main criticism arose after the assumption of power. I answered these attacks in two pamphlets, but I never made use of the Police to suppress these attacks or persecute the authors of these attacks.
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, in the RSHA there was an office for the persecution of “political” churches. Did you have any connection with this department?
ROSENBERG: I know only that a co-worker of mine was in contact with many Party offices as a matter of policy and, of course, was also in touch with the SS. Through him I received many circular letters from the church authorities: pastoral letters, the circular letters of the Fulda Conference of Bishops, and many others. No arrests of individual church leaders came to my attention—although, of course, later on I did find out that during the war many monasteries had been confiscated, ostensibly for state political reasons—and so I never was able to find out in detail the political motives involved.
I must mention that in the year 1935 a bishop sent an official letter to the administrative head of his province, asking him to prohibit me from delivering speeches in that city. That, to be sure, was of no avail; this church dignitary was not harmed either by me or by anybody else, however.
DR. THOMA: What was your attitude toward the churches coming within the range of the Ministry for Eastern Territories?
ROSENBERG: After the entry of German troops in the eastern territories, the Wehrmacht of its own accord granted the practice of religious worship; and when I was made Minister for the East, I legally sanctioned this practice by issuing a special “church tolerance” edict at the end of December 1941.
DR. THOMA: The Prosecution have presented a number of documents—almost all of them letters by the Leader of the Party Chancellery—to support their contention of religious persecution. I would like to have you state your attitude toward these documents, which have been submitted under Numbers 107, 116, 122, 129, 101; USA-107, USA-351; 116, USA-685...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, you are going too fast for us to get these numbers down. 107-PS, do you mean?
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly say PS if you mean PS? 107-PS, 116-PS.
DR. THOMA: Yes, I will add the USA exhibit numbers. 107-PS, 351-USA...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would rather have the PS number. If you will give me the PS numbers, or whatever the numbers are, as part of the exhibit number: 107-PS, 116-PS...
DR. THOMA: Yes, Documents 116-PS, 122-PS, 129-PS, 101-PS, 100-PS, 089-PS, 064-PS, 098-PS, 072-PS, 070-PS.
ROSENBERG: The Document Number 107-PS was submitted by the Prosecution as proof of persecution of the churches. This was a circular letter sent out by the Party Chancellery and written by the Chief of the Reich Labor Service. In this circular, on Page 1, it is decreed that denominational discussions were to be prohibited within the Reich Labor Service. I believe that was done so that particularly in the Reich Labor Service, where young people of all classes and backgrounds were taken in, denominational and religious discussions would be avoided.
On Page 2 it says:
“Just as it is of no concern to the Reichsarbeitsdienst to forbid its individual members to have a church wedding or funeral, so the Reichsarbeitsdienst must by all means avoid taking part, as an organization, in church ceremonies which exclude Germans of other beliefs.”
I considered this decree as the strictest adherence to religious freedom: for it meant that members of the Protestant faith could not be forced to attend Catholic services and vice versa; furthermore, that persons who perhaps did not belong to any religious denomination could not, on order of their organization, be forced to attend the services of one denomination or the other. Therefore, I cannot see that in this case we are concerned with religious persecution.
Document Number 116-PS concerns itself with a letter of the Leader of the Reich Chancellery sent to the Reich Minister for Science and Education and is dated 24 January 1939. This document was submitted to me for my information—I emphasize, “for my information.” It refers to correspondence between the Party Chancellery and this Ministry regarding the limitation of theological faculties, in which it is emphasized that the terms of concordats and church agreements would have to be taken into consideration; secondly, that it was necessary methodically to reorganize the entire higher educational system by amalgamation and simplification; and finally, it states that newly created fields of research, such as racial research and archeology, were also to be taken into consideration.
I could not see why, after 6 years of National Socialist revolution, new fields of specialization in scientific research should not find due consideration within the budget. I personally was interested in seeing that the subjects of agrarian sociology and the early history of Germany received proper consideration, specifically in regard to Germanic intellectual and spiritual history.
The same applies to Document Number 122-PS, also dated April 1939, into which I do not need to go in detail. It sets forth similar views by the Minister for Science, Education, and Popular Culture, stating how many theological faculties he deemed necessary to be retained.
Document 129-PS is a letter of the Reich Minister for Churches to a well-known German author, Dr. Stapel, who was especially interested in religious reform. In this letter, the Reich Church Minister expresses the view that a common religious denomination should be especially promoted which would affirm the National Socialist State in particular and, at the same time, could enjoy and rely upon the support of the Reich Church Minister.
In the preliminary interrogation, a letter of mine was submitted to me, written to the Party Chancellery, relative to this matter, in which I declared myself against the calling of such a church congress by the Reich Church Minister on the principal ground that a National Socialist Minister of Churches did not have the function of joining a religious denomination of which he was the direct head, even if undeclared or only in appearance. It is exactly the same viewpoint which has provided the basis for many a reproach against me. If, in addition to publicizing my personal opinion, I had had the intention of providing or leading a religious group, then I would have had to give up all my functions, offices, and activities in the Party. That followed from a point of view of principle which I held. The Minister of Churches, as a National Socialist Minister, was, in my opinion, obliged not to promote a religion to which he was sympathetic, but to be independent of all religious denominations.
Document 101-PS is a letter from the Chief of the Party Chancellery—at that time still Chief of Staff of the Deputy of the Führer—in which the protest is made that many confessional writings tended to impair the resistance of the troops; and he suggested that it would be better to have my office issue such publications. An answer by me has not been presented here—has not been shown to me. My opinion has always been that, being in a Party office, it was not for me to write religious tracts, but that, of course, it could be left to every person as an individual—if one had something pertinent to say, to put it in writing, as others did.
Document 100-PS is a reproach from the former Chief of Staff of the Deputy of the Führer, Bormann, that I had stated in the presence of the Führer that the Protestant Reich Bishop, Müller, had written a very good book for the German soldiers. Reichsleiter Bormann said that this book by Müller did not appear suitable to him, because, after all, it was masked confessional propaganda. I do not believe that the reproach directed at me for unhesitatingly approving Reich Bishop Müller’s expression of opinion given in a proper way—and naturally in keeping with his way of thinking—can be portrayed as religious persecution.
Document 089-PS is a letter by Bormann, which he sent to me for my information, in which he told me that he had proposed to Reichsleiter Amann that, because of the general scarcity of paper, religious writings, which had decreased by only 10 percent, should be further curtailed. I did not know to what extent the curtailment of all periodicals was undertaken at that time. I can only state that in the course of the war even the seven periodicals about art, music, folklore, German dramaturgy, et cetera, which were published by my office, were constantly curtailed and abbreviated along with the rest of the periodicals in the German Reich.
Document 064-PS is a letter of the head of the Party Chancellery, in which I am informed of the letter of a Gauleiter referring to a pamphlet by General Von Rabenau entitled, The Spirit and Soul of the Soldier. This Gauleiter criticized the very denominationally bound viewpoint of General Von Rabenau, and he protested against the fact that this tract appeared in a series of pamphlets published by the Party. In that connection I would like to say that this tract by General Von Rabenau appeared in a series published by my Party office, and that I read this pamphlet personally beforehand and gave him the opportunity to voice his opinion in this series which contained many political tracts of a general historical nature. I did not withdraw this pamphlet.
Document 098-PS contains a new reproach against me by the Chief of the Party Chancellery. He said that Reich Bishop Müller claimed that he had had directives from me to work out basic principles for the organization of religious instruction in the schools.
Bormann set forth at great length that it was not the task of the Party to engage in reform measures with respect to religious instruction in schools. To this I would like to say the following. I could not give any instructions at all to Reich Bishop Müller on this topic. Nevertheless, the Reich Bishop visited me on two occasions, and on one occasion he told me, virtually with tears in his eyes, that he got no proper response to his work. I told him, “Your Excellency, as a military pastor, you are simply not well enough known to the public. It would be quite apropos if you would write a detailed work setting forth your views and your objectives, so that the various groups of the Evangelical Church might get to know your ideas, and in that way you can make your influence felt in the manner you wish.” The Reich Bishop may well have spoken about this, and probably made a few additional remarks. I do not believe that the accusation made here by Bormann can be construed as persecution of the churches either.
Document 075-PS is a special circular letter by the Chief of the Party Chancellery, setting forth his personal views on the relationship of National Socialism to Christendom. As well as I remember, this document deals with the following: I had once heard that Bormann had sent a letter of such contents to a certain Gauleiter and also copies of it to all the Gauleiter. I asked him to let me know about it. After much delay I finally received this circular letter. As a Party circular, I considered it improper in form and substance. I wrote Bormann—and I believe the letter I sent to him should be found in my records—that I did not consider a circular letter of that sort suitable or proper and I added, in my own handwriting so that it would be taken more seriously, that in my opinion the Führer would not approve a circular letter of this sort. Later I spoke with Bormann about this personally and told him that each one of us had the right to define his position towards this problem, but official Party circulars—and especially in this form—were impossible in my opinion. After this conversation, Bormann was greatly embarrassed, and—as I incidentally heard from my Codefendant Schirach—this circular letter, according to him, was rescinded and declared null and void. I can make no statement about this, however.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I would like to call attention to the fact that I gave the Document Number 075-PS to this document, but it should actually be Document D-75.
ROSENBERG: Document 072-PS is a letter from Bormann with reference to the matter of investigating the libraries of monasteries confiscated by the State. I was not told the political reasons involved in each case; but I did hear that the police were demanding the additional right to take over the investigation of this sort of thing. This was a problem which brought me into conflict with Himmler in those years. I considered it completely impossible that such investigation was to be brought under police control as well, and that motivated me, as can be seen from Document 071-PS, to place myself in opposition to Bormann in this matter.
This Document 072-PS gives Bormann’s answer to me, in which he points out that Heydrich insisted absolutely on continuing this research and said—I quote: “The scientific refutation of antagonistic philosophy can only be carried out after preliminary police and political preparation.” I considered this attitude absolutely untenable, and I protested against it.
These are the pertinent comments which I have to make on these numerous documents. I refused to write official Party tracts of religious semblance or to have catechisms written by my Party offices. I always strove to take what I considered to be a National Socialist attitude in not considering my office a “spiritual” police force; but the fact remained that the Führer had charged Bormann with the official representation of the Party’s attitude toward the church.
My answer to all of these letters is missing, and I do not recall whether I replied to everything, or whether I gave these answers orally to Bormann at conferences. But despite the fact that all of these answers are lacking, the Prosecution have stated that both of us, that is Bormann and I, had issued decrees for religious persecution and had misled other Germans into participating in these religious persecutions.
I would like to summarize and state on principle that this is ultimately a thousand-year-old problem of the relationship between secular and church power, and that many states have taken measures against which the churches have always protested. When in modern times we look at the laws of the French Republic under the ministry of Combes, and when we look at the legal system of the Soviet Union, we see that both have supported the officially promoted atheist propaganda in tracts, newspapers, and caricatures.
Lastly, I would like to say that in all cases the National Socialist State, so far as I know, gave to the churches more than 700 million marks annually out of the tax receipts for the maintenance of their organizational work, and that up to the end.
DR. THOMA: Witness, the chief of the Party Chancellery, Bormann, in the course of time, met you in still keener opposition. Was the reason for the, one may well say, enmity between you and Bormann the fact that in church matters you were considerably more tolerant than Bormann, himself?
ROSENBERG: It is difficult to say just which reasons played a role here. That this hostility was as deep as it finally revealed itself to be, specifically when dealing with Eastern problems, I realized only later, much later. Ultimately I had to admit, of course, that in a large movement many temperaments and many views may exist, and I did not except myself from having shortcomings and faults which could be criticized by others. I did not believe that differences and opinions could lead to a hostility of such proportions that it would result in undermining the official position of the opponent.
DR. THOMA: Were religious services in the Third Reich, regular Sunday services, and so forth limited in any way?
ROSENBERG: I cannot tell you that at the moment. As far as I know, religious services were never forbidden in the whole of Germany up to the end.
DR. THOMA: Now I come to the Einsatzstab. I give you Document 101-PS, (Exhibit USA-385) in which the essential matters are summarized, and I refer you to the document book of the French Prosecution, Document Number FA-1, in particular. How did the establishment of Einsatzstab Rosenberg come about?
ROSENBERG: The Prosecution contends that it is a matter of a premeditated plan for the plundering of the cultural treasures of other states. In reality, the following was true: We were dealing with an unforeseen situation. A colleague of mine had accompanied a press delegation when the German troops marched into Paris and noticed that the Parisians were returning almost completely with the exception of the Jewish population, so that all organizations and institutions in that category of ownership were left behind empty, as well as the residences and mansions of these leading personalities, so to say, ownerless. He suggested that research into property, archives, and correspondence should be made. I reported the matter to the Führer and asked whether he approved of the carrying out of this suggestion.
This letter of mine to the Führer was submitted to me in the preliminary interrogation but was not submitted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution. Thus, even though the documentary proof of the reason for this entire transaction is at hand, the Prosecution have still maintained the charge of a premeditated plan.
The order of the Führer was issued at the beginning of July 1940, and since a large number of art objects, in addition to the archives, was found in a dangerous position in many mansions, the safekeeping and the transporting of these objects of art into the German Reich was decreed by the Führer.
DR. THOMA: Did you know anything as to what legal reasons Hitler is believed to have had for these measures?
ROSENBERG: Yes, and I would admit...
THE PRESIDENT: Just one minute. I don’t understand what you are saying. Are you saying that you made a suggestion to the Führer, and that there is proof of your letter making that suggestion, and that the Prosecution are concealing that proof? Is that what you are saying? Will you answer that question? Are you suggesting that they are concealing a proof of the suggestion which you made the Führer for this scheme of taking away Jewish property from France?
ROSENBERG: No, I do not wish to say conceal, but only to say that it was not submitted, even though it was shown to me in a preliminary hearing.
DR. THOMA: May I add a few details, Mr. President. I would like to point out that I repeatedly pointed out in my petitions that this letter must be available, since it was submitted to the Defendant Rosenberg in the preliminary hearings.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you made any application for the document to be produced?
DR. THOMA: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: When?
DR. THOMA: I repeatedly called attention to this document—to the submission of this document.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal are quite unaware of having turned down any such request. Let me see the written request.
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: It probably is not a matter of very great importance. I only wanted to know what the witness was talking about.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I will send for my files.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, you can go on in the meantime.
ROSENBERG: Of course, it was clear that we were concerned with an unusual problem, and for that very reason I did not talk with the military administration but went directly to the Führer, so that I could get his opinion. But I believe the fact in itself can be understood, that we were interested in going into historical research regarding the extent to which, in the course of recent years or decades, various organizations had taken part in the activity which is here under discussion as destructive of peace; secondly, how many prominent persons individually took part in it; and thirdly, I remembered that many works of art, which in past times had been taken from Germany had not been returned to Germany for many decades, despite the agreement of 1815.
Finally, I thought of a measure which in 1914 to 1918 had been recognized by the Allies as being in agreement with the Hague Convention. At that period German citizens of a certain category—they were the racial Germans abroad, in foreign countries, also in occupied German territory—that is, in the colonies—had their property confiscated and later taken from them without compensation to the extent of a value of 25 billion Reichsmark. In the peace dictate of Versailles, Germany was in addition obliged to post security for these dispossessed Germans and to set up a special fund.
The Chief French Prosecutor declared at this Trial that the Versailles Treaty was based on the Hague Convention. Therefore, I drew the conclusion that this measure against a very distinct category of citizens in the midst of unforeseen military measures, with all due respect for private and public property otherwise, appeared justified.
During the preliminary hearing, I was also asked about the legal hypotheses and had started to point them out, but I was interrupted with the remark that we were not concerned with that problem at the time. The record of this interrogation which the French Prosecution presented here contains the remark that I am supposed to have said...
THE PRESIDENT: We are not concerned with the interrogations until the interrogations are put in evidence. These interrogations have not been put in evidence yet. You can give your explanations of them if they are put to you in cross-examination.
ROSENBERG: Mr. President, this document is mentioned here in the document book, and the German translation may be found, although not exactly verbatim, in the French files.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, the defendant only wishes to say that from the beginning he pointed out that the Treaty of Versailles, Article 279, was authoritative, that he did not invent that later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, all I was pointing out to him was that the various interrogations which have taken place very likely are not in evidence. Of course, if he is referring to interrogations which have been put in evidence—but is he?
DR. THOMA: Yes. This is FA-16 (Document Number L-188). That was submitted, Mr. President.
ROSENBERG: That is what I was speaking of. That was submitted. But this interrogation was...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. If he is referring to an interrogation which has been put in evidence, it must have an exhibit number.
DR. THOMA: This interrogation is in the document book, and it is known as Document Number FA-16.
THE PRESIDENT: If he is referring to an exhibit, no doubt he can do it.
ROSENBERG: I would like only to rectify somewhat an error in the translation. I did not say, “Yes, it is true; I remember that this measure was taken;” but I said, “I thought it,” that is to say, I had thought it earlier, not at the moment when I was asked. I saw this only when I received the translation, which I had not seen prior to that time.
As far as Document 1015-PS is concerned, in order not to delay the Court too long, I would like to point to just a few items—namely, that in the work report of 1940-44, on Page 2, it was stated that the origin was determined beyond question, and on Page 3 we see that the taking of inventories was done in a conscientious manner on the basis of a scientific catalog, that a workshop for the restoration was set up in order to ensure their arriving at their destination in good condition.
Finally, I would like to add a few words because they seem important to me in view of the charges of the Soviet Prosecution relative to the treatment of cultural treasures by the Einsatzstab in the former Occupied Eastern Territories. At the end of the work report, there is stated under the title, “Work in the Eastern regions”—I quote:
“The activity of Special Einsatzstab ‘Plastic Art’ was limited in the Occupied Eastern Territories to scientific and photographic recording of public collections, their safeguarding and care in collaboration with military and civilian offices. In the course of evacuation of the area, several hundred of the most valuable Russian icons, several hundred Russian paintings of the 18th and 19th centuries, individual pieces of furniture and household articles ... were recovered and brought to the Reich for safekeeping.”
I only wanted to point out by this that the Einsatzstab in the East did not transport any Soviet cultural and art treasures to the Reich, but only brought them to safety—as may be seen from later documents, when the territories directly menaced by operations were evacuated—first into the rear areas, then further back and partly into the Reich.
From the same document I would like to point to a letter of 5 July 1942 from the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery. I refer to the charge of the Polish Government that the entire removal of works of art and museum pieces was concentrated in the Einsatzstab or in the Rosenberg office in Berlin. I will return again to this Polish accusation. I just want to point to the paragraph in Dr. Lammers’ letter which says that the Führer had decreed that various libraries of the Eastern region were to be confiscated; and then there is stated expressly, “The Government General is not included.”
Furthermore, I refer to the directive of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories of 20 August 1941 to Reich Commissioner Ostler.
DR. THOMA: What page?
ROSENBERG: Page 2 of this document. At the end it says...
THE PRESIDENT: What document are you talking about now? What document number?
ROSENBERG: I am sorry, but the copy I have is not marked in red, and I am, therefore, referring to the document in my hands. At any rate, it is at the end of page 1 of the document. This is no special letter, it is a circular letter dated 7 April 1942.
THE PRESIDENT: I only want to get this clear. What I took down was that he was referring to a decree of the 20th of August 1941.
ROSENBERG: I beg your pardon. It is 20 August.
DR, THOMA: 20 August, that is correct, and the year is 1941. It is Page 78 of Document Book 2, at the end of the page.
ROSENBERG: “I expressly request that you prohibit the removal of cultural objects of any kind from your Reichskommissariat, by any agencies whatsoever, without your approval. What confiscated cultural objects will remain in the Reichskommissariat Ostland and what may possibly be utilized for specialized research work must come under a later regulation. I request that you inform your subordinate general and district commissioners of this directive. The national administration of museums, libraries, et cetera, regardless of the right of inspection and inventory by the Einsatzstab, remain unaffected by this directive.”
I shall come back to this directive later when replying to the accusation by the Soviet Prosecution regarding the administration of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
DR. THOMA: We come now to the furniture operation in France.
ROSENBERG: I am not finished with this matter yet, because exceptionally serious charges have been preferred in this matter. I refer to a second directive of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, dated 7 April 1942, in which, at the end, under I, the fundamental principles I have just read are reiterated. It is in Document Book 2, Page 94. All are told to refrain entirely from independent action.
Under II, it says verbatim:
“In special cases, as an exception, immediate steps can be taken to secure or remove items to a safe place in order to evade threatening dangers—that is, danger of collapse of buildings, enemy action, climatic influences, et cetera.”
I shall come back to this in connection with the accusation of the Soviet Government regarding happenings in Minsk. When Document 076-PS was read, it said at the end that there was never any order given for the protection of cultural objects. This order has been presented here twice.
Further, I would like to refer to a directive of 3 October 1941 by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories to the staff leader of the Einsatzstab in the same document—wherein I again call special attention to the document which I have just read.
In addition, I call the Tribunal’s attention to an order of the High Command of the Army of 30 September 1942, which was issued in agreement with the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Here also it says literally at the end, under I ...
DR. THOMA: Is that Page 89 of the document book?
THE PRESIDENT: Which is that? September ’42?
ROSENBERG: 30 September 1942.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have got that. What about the one of October ’41? Where is that?
ROSENBERG: October ’41?
THE PRESIDENT: October ’41.
ROSENBERG: That is 3 October 1941.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know where it is, Dr. Thoma?
DR. THOMA: It is contained in Document 1015-PS, Exhibit USA-385, but it may be that this document is not listed in this particular index. In my document I cannot locate it at the moment, but it belongs to 1015-PS and was submitted in its entirety.
ROSENBERG: And the order of the Army High Command of 30 September 1942 says, under I:
“Except for special cases, in which the safeguarding of endangered works of culture is urgent, efforts will be made to leave them in their present location for the time being. For this purpose, according to reciprocal agreements between the Quartermaster General of the General Staff of the Army and the Einsatzstab of Reichsleiter Rosenberg, the latter has been granted authority to: c) in order to safeguard against damage or destruction in the operational area of the East also such works of culture which do not fall under paragraph b—especially museum pieces—to protect and/or place them in security.”
At the end of this directive, it says under IV:
“Independent of the missions of the Einsatzstab of Reichsleiter Rosenberg, according to Section I, a, b, c, the troops and all military offices located in the operational area are instructed now, as before, to preserve valuable art objects if possible and to protect them from destruction or damage.”
I believed it my duty to prove, at least very briefly, that my Einsatzstab, as well as the military offices, issued clear directives and orders for the protection, even during these bitter battles, of objects of art of the Russian, Ukrainian, and White Ruthenian people.
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, you know that Hitler and Göring diverted some of the objects of art which were confiscated in France. What part did you play in this matter?
ROSENBERG: In principle the Führer specified, as can be seen from information given by the then Field Marshal Keitel, upon order of the Führer, that he reserved for himself the disposition of these works and any decision related hereto.
I do not wish to dispute in any way that I had the hope that at least a large part of these objects of art would remain in Germany, particularly since, in the course of time, many German cultural works were destroyed by particularly severe bombing in the West. These works of art were to be a sort of security for later negotiations. When Reich Marshal Göring, who by directive of the Führer particularly supported this work of the Einsatzstab, earmarked a number of these works of art for his collection, I was—I must say frankly, as the record states—a little uneasy, because with this commission I had taken on a certain responsibility in my name for the total of the confiscated cultural and art objects, and I was, therefore, obligated to catalog them in their entirety and to keep them available for any negotiations or decisions. Therefore, I directed my deputy to make as complete a list as possible of those things which the Reich Marshal, with the approval of the Führer, was diverting for his collection. I knew that Reich Marshal Göring intended later to give this collection to the German Reich and not to bequeath it privately.
In the interrogation record which was produced and read on this point by the French Prosecution there is also a regrettable error to be found. It says that I had been uneasy because Reich Marshal Göring had misappropriated these works of art. In German, the term “entwendet” means as much as to take illegally (to embezzle). What I said, however, was “verwendet,” which has a different meaning.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I would like to point out in this connection the fact that the French used the word “détourné,” which means “divert.”
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. THOMA: I now turn to the furniture operation in France, and for that purpose I am showing the defendant Document 001-PS, also Volume II of the French Document Book, and I am asking the defendant to state his views with respect to it.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
ROSENBERG: Document 001-PS contains, at the beginning, information to the effect that in the East accommodations were found to be so dreadful that I was proposing that ownerless Jewish homes in France and their furniture should be made available for that purpose. This suggestion was approved in a decree issued, by order of the Führer, by the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery on 31 December 1941.
In the course of the ever-increasing bombardment in Germany, I considered that I no longer could take responsibility for this, and thus I made a suggestion that this furniture should be placed at the disposal of bombed-out victims in Germany—which amounted to more than 100,000 people on certain nights—so that emergency aid would be given to them.
In the report of the French Document Book it is stated in the seventh paragraph how the confiscation was carried out: that these deserted apartments were sealed, that they remained sealed for some time in the event of possible claims, and that then the shipment to Germany was carried out.
I am aware that this, no doubt, was a serious encroachment on private property; but here again, in connection with previous considerations, I thought about the implications and, finally, of the millions of homeless Germans. I want to emphasize in this connection that I kept myself well informed; that the homes, their owners, and the main contents in the way of furniture were recorded in detail in a big book, as a basis for possible negotiations at a later date.
In Germany the matter was so arranged that those people who suffered damage by bombing paid for these furnishings and household goods, which were placed at their disposal; and these deliveries were deducted from the claims which they had against the state. That money was paid into a special fund administered by the Minister of Finance.
The Document 001-PS contains under Number 2 a suggestion which I myself consider a serious charge against me. This is a suggestion that in view of many murders of Germans in France, not only Frenchmen should be shot as hostages, but that Jewish citizens also were to be called to account. I should like to say that I considered these shootings of hostages, since they were announced publicly, a permissible measure under special circumstances in wartime. The fact that this sort of thing was being done by the Armed Forces appeared to me according to the result of the usual investigations, the more so since it was taking place in a territory, a State with which the German Reich had signed an armistice.
Secondly, this happened during a period of excitement, due to the war which had just broken out with the United States of America and to our recollection of the report from the Polish Ambassador, Count Potocki, dated 30 January 1939, which the Tribunal has forbidden to be read.
In spite of everything, however, I must say that I consider this suggestion as a personal injustice. Looking at it from the legal side, I would like to point out that in Document 1015-PS, under letter Y, there is a letter from the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, which is dated 31 December 1941, and in which it says:
“Your memorandum dated 18 December 1941 has been submitted to the Führer. The Führer has agreed in principle with the suggestion under 1. A copy of that part of the memorandum which deals with the utilization of Jewish household goods I have sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands, together with a letter of which a copy is attached hereto.”
In this matter Point 1 was accepted and tacitly, though just as emphatically, Point 2, which deals with this suggestion, was turned down. This suggestion, therefore, had no legal consequences. Later on I never again referred to this suggestion, and I must say that I had forgotten all about it until it was again put before me here.
DR. THOMA: I now turn to the subject, “Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.” The defendant is eager to express his opinion with regard to Molotov’s note—that he, the defendant, was a Czarist spy—since this affects his personal character. I therefore ask the defendant whether he at any time had relations with the Czarist police.
ROSENBERG: No.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, the Indictment which has been presented to the Defendant Rosenberg at no point incriminates him of having been a Czarist spy. Therefore, we consider that this question is irrelevant.
DR. THOMA: The Molotov notes have been submitted to the Tribunal, and so have been put in evidence. Therefore, I think that I may be permitted to put that question.
THE PRESIDENT: He has answered in the negative already, so you can pass from it, can’t you? It has formed no part of the Indictment.
DR. THOMA: Yes.
[Turning to the defendant.] When did you learn that you were proposed for the position of Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and for what reason were you given this commission?
ROSENBERG: May I state with regard to this that at the very beginning of April—as far as I can remember it was 2 April 1941—the Führer summoned me in the morning and explained to me that he regarded a military clash with the Soviet Union as inevitable. As reasons he quoted two points: first, the military occupation of Romanian territory—that is to say, Bessarabia and North Bukovina; second, the continual re-enforcing for a long time and on a gigantic scale of the Red Army along the line of demarcation and in Soviet Russian territory generally. These facts were so striking that he had already given the relevant military and other orders and had decided to assign me as a political adviser in a decisive capacity. Thus I was faced with a fait accompli, and an attempt even to discuss the matter was countered by the Führer with the remark that the orders had been given and that scarcely anything could be altered in the matter, whereupon I told the Führer that, of course, I wished the best of luck to the German arms, and I was at his disposal for the political advice which he desired.
Immediately afterwards I called a meeting of some of my closest assistants, since I did not know whether the military operations would be starting very soon or later on. We made a number of drafts concerning the possible treatment of political problems and possible measures to be taken in the territories to be occupied in the East. These drafts have been submitted here. On 20 April I received a preliminary task, which was to form a central department for dealing with Eastern questions and to get in touch with the highest Reich authorities concerned with these matters.
DR. THOMA: I should like to submit to the defendant the instructions which he drafted after his appointment.
I have just one more request to the Tribunal. These instructions are now crossed out in the photostatic copy and bear all sorts of remarks. I request, therefore, that the Tribunal take personal cognizance of the photostatic copies so that they can see how these instructions have been crossed out. The documents themselves have already been submitted to the Tribunal as numbered exhibits.
ROSENBERG: May I refer to these documents—1017-PS, 1028-PS, 1029-PS, and 1030-PS...
THE PRESIDENT: They have already been put in evidence?
DR. THOMA: Yes, they have been put in.
[Turning to the defendant.] May I ask you to state the exhibit numbers?
ROSENBERG: I have just mentioned the exhibit numbers.
DR. THOMA: What are the USA exhibit numbers?
ROSENBERG: Document Number 1028-PS has Exhibit Number USA-273; Document 1030-PS has Exhibit USA-144. On the others I do not find any USA numbers.
DR. THOMA: Document 1017-PS is Exhibit USA-142; Document 1028-PS is Exhibit USA-273; Document 1029-PS is Exhibit USA-145; Document 1030-PS is Exhibit USA-144. They are contained in the special document book for the Defendant Rosenberg. I state in this connection that these are provisional drafts, with notations by the secretary, from the end of April and the beginning of May. These provisional drafts were not released but, as can be seen, were crossed out and supplemented with written remarks in the margin; and, in addition, they contain viewpoints which later on were not approved by the Führer. For this very reason, as far as the Ukraine is concerned they could not be applied at all. The written instructions which went out to the Reich Commissioners for the East and the Ukraine, after the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories had been formed, were unfortunately not found, so that I cannot refer to them.
DR. THOMA: On 20 June 1941—that is to say, one day before the outbreak of the war against Russia—did you make a speech to everybody concerned with Eastern affairs regarding those Eastern problems? The document concerned here is Exhibit USA-147, from which the Prosecution quoted a single paragraph several times.
ROSENBERG: This is a fairly long impromptu speech made before those who were concerned with, and assigned to deal with Eastern problems. With regard to this, I state that it was my duty, as a matter of course, to consider political measures which would have to be proposed to avoid a situation in which the German Reich would have to fight every 25 years for its existence in the East; and I should like to emphasize that that which I authentically said in a confidential speech does not correspond in any way with the Soviet accusations that I was in favor of a systematic extermination of the Slavic peoples.
I do not wish to occupy the Tribunal’s time by reading very much here; nevertheless I would like to read a few paragraphs to justify myself. It says on Page 3 (Exhibit USA-147):
“Originally, Russian history was a purely Continental affair. For 200 years Moscow-Russia lived under the Tartar yoke, and its face was mainly turned to the East. The Russian traders and hunters opened up the East as far as the Urals. Some Cossack treks went to Siberia, and the colonization of Siberia is no doubt one of the great accomplishments of history.”
I think that this expresses my attitude of respect toward that historic achievement.
On Page 6 it says:
“From this it follows that Germany’s aim is the freedom of the Ukrainian people. This must without fail be made a point in our political program. In what form and to what extent a Ukrainian State can be formed later is of no purport just now.... One must proceed cautiously in this direction. Literature dealing with the Ukrainian struggles must be promoted so that the Ukrainian people’s historical consciousness can be revived. A university would have to be founded in Kiev, technical colleges established, the Ukrainian language cultivated, et cetera.”
I have quoted this as documentary evidence of the fact that it was not my intention to destroy the culture of the peoples of the East.
In the next paragraph I pointed out that it was important to win, in the course of time, the voluntary co-operation of the 40 million people in the Ukraine. On Page 7 reference is made to the possible occupation of the Caucasian territories as follows:
“Here the aim will not be to establish a Caucasian National State but to find a solution on Federal lines which, with German help, might go so far as to influence these people to ask Germany to protect their cultural and national existence.”
Here, too, there is no question of a desire to exterminate.
Now comes a matter which has been described by the American Prosecution as a particularly serious, incriminating factor. It deals with the so-called colonization and the property of German peoples in the East. This paragraph is worded as follows:
“Quite apart from all these problems, there is a question which is of an equally general nature, and which we must all think about—namely, the question of German property. German people have worked in this immense territory for centuries. The result of that work, among other things, was the acquisition of vast lands. The land confiscated in the Baltic countries can be compared in size with East Prussia; the entire real estate in the Black Sea was as great as Württemberg, Baden, and Alsace put together. In the Black Sea area more land was cultivated than is arable in England. These comparisons of size must make it clear to us that the Germans there did not idly exploit or plunder the people, but that they did constructive work. And the result of this work is German national property; irrespective of earlier individual owners. Just how that may one day be compensated cannot yet be considered. But a ... legal basis can be established.”
I wished to quote this so that I can refer to it later on when we deal with the agrarian problem, particularly in respect to the Reich Commission East, where in spite of these reflections the 700-year-old German property was not restored but handed to the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians by law, as has been proved.
In a later paragraph it states:
“We must declare in this connection that even now we are not enemies of the Russian people...”
THE PRESIDENT: Are you still reading from Document 1058-PS?
ROSENBERG: Yes. I continue to quote the following paragraph:
“We must declare in this connection that even now we are not enemies of the Russian people. All of us who knew the Russians before know that the individual Russian is a very likable person, capable of assimilating culture, but lacking only in the strength of character possessed by the Western European... Our fight for a regrouping is conducted quite in line with the right of national self-determination of peoples....”
I shall not read to the Tribunal the end, which they can later take cognizance of in detail if they so wish.
I made that speech fully convinced that, after my first expository remarks to the Führer about the subject, he had essentially agreed with me. I did not know—and he did not tell me—that other military and police orders had already been issued; otherwise it would have been practically impossible for me—and particularly in Heydrich’s presence—to make a speech which obviously contradicted flatly the conceptions of Himmler and Heydrich.
As far as the passage from this document which had been quoted by the Prosecution is concerned, I have the following to say: I heard from people working on the Four Year Plan that, in the event of an occupation of the Moscow industrial region and of far-reaching destruction by war operations, large-scale industries could no longer continue, and that activities would probably be limited to operating a number of key industries only. That would necessarily result in considerable unemployment. Besides, it was not clear how large the supply reserves in the East were, and in view of the general food situation and of the blockade the German food supply had to be a primary consideration.
This is back of the remark that under certain circumstances a large-scale evacuation of Russian territories might be necessary where large numbers of industrial workers might become unemployed. And in connection therewith, I should like to refer to Document 1056-PS, which contains the first directive from the Ministry for Eastern Affairs, according to which the providing of food supplies for the population also was made a special duty.
DR. THOMA: On 17 July 1941 you were appointed, by decree of the Führer, to act as Reich Minister for the administration of the newly occupied Eastern Territories. On the preceding day there had been a conference between Hitler, Keitel, Göring, and Lammers, during which you stated your administrative program in detail. I refer to Document L-221, Exhibit USA-317 and ask you to comment upon it. It is on Page 123 in Rosenberg Document Book 2.
ROSENBERG: This document, which is obviously a final résumé by Bormann, has, of course, been submitted here four or five times. During that meeting I had actually not intended to present a voluminous program, but this session had been called for the purpose of discussing the wording of the intended Führer decrees concerning the administration of the Occupied Eastern Territories and to give all the participants an opportunity to state their views on that subject. I was also preoccupied with a number of questions dealing with personnel, which I wanted to submit to the Führer. I was surprised, therefore, when the Führer began passionately, and at considerable length, to expound this policy in the East while making many unexpected observations for me. I had the impression that the Führer himself was aroused by the unanticipated powerful armament of the Soviet Union and our hard struggle against the Red Army. That had obviously caused the Führer to make some of the statements to which I may perhaps refer at the end.
In the presence of the other witnesses, I countered the unexpected statements of the Führer, and in addition I should like to read from Bormann’s record the following paragraphs which have not been read until now. I quote from the original Document L-221 on Page 4:
“Reich Leader Rosenberg emphasizes that, in accordance with his views, each Kommissariat would require a different treatment of the population. In the Ukraine we would have to initiate a program furthering art and culture. We would have to awaken the historical consciousness of the Ukrainians, and establish a university at Kiev, and the like. The Reich Marshal, on the other hand, points out that we have to think first of guaranteeing our food supply—everything else should be dealt with later.
“(Incidental question: Is there still anything like an educated class in the Ukraine, or are upper-class Ukrainians to be found only as emigrants outside present-day Russia?)”
This is a comment by Bormann. I continue to quote:
“Rosenberg continues that certain independence movements in the Ukraine deserved support as well.”
Then follows on Page 5 a quotation of the intentions of the Führer, where it says—and I quote:
“Likewise the Crimea, including a considerable hinterland (territory north of the Crimea), must become Reich territory; the hinterland must be as large as possible.
“Rosenberg complains about this because of the Ukrainians living there.
“(Incidental question:”—again from Bormann—“It frequently appears that Rosenberg has quite a liking for the Ukrainians; he wants to enlarge the former Ukraine to a considerable extent.)”
Thus there is evidence that I tried to persuade the Führer with all my might to agree to the same points which I made in my speech on 20 June 1941 before the assembled department heads.
The further content of the document shows that the Reich Marshal was interested particularly in the appointment of the former Gauleiter Koch, and that I opposed this candidate since I was afraid that Koch, due to his temperament and being so far removed from the Reich, might not follow my directives. To be sure, while making the protest I could not have known that Koch later on, in disobeying my directives, would go as far as he did and—I shall add—upon special instigation by the head of the Party Chancellery.
Toward the end, on Page 10 of the original of the record, there appears a passage which has not been read; which I am now quoting:
“A lengthy discussion sets in regarding the competency of the Reichsführer SS. Obviously the participants have also in mind the authority of the Reich Marshal at the time.”
I personally wish to add that this is a private remark made by the head of the Party Chancellery and does not by any means represent the actual minutes of a meeting. I quote further:
“The Führer, the Reich Marshal, and others emphasize repeatedly that Himmler shall by no means have greater jurisdiction than he had in Germany proper; this, however, was absolutely necessary.”
These minutes show that this was a rather heated discussion, since, not only during that conference, but before that I had opposed the idea that the police should have legally independent executive authority in the occupied territories—that is to say, that they were to be independent of the civil administration. I also spoke against the presented version of the Führer decree, which had already been prepared. I did not find any support whatsoever for my opinion from anyone present, and that explains to a great extent the later developments and the wording of the decree, signed on the following day by the Führer, which was the ruling applicable to the entire administration in the Occupied Eastern Territories.
DR. THOMA: On 17 July you were appointed Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and at the same time other appointments were made. The question now arises: What was the extent of your competency and of your activities in the Eastern Territories?—Rosenberg Document Book, Volume II, Page 46.
ROSENBERG: May I refer you to Paragraph 2, which deals with the establishment of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, where a Reich Minister is appointed, and Paragraph 3, which reads as follows:
“Military authorities and powers are exercised in the newly occupied Eastern Territories by the commanders of the Armed Forces in accordance with my decree of 25 June 1941. The powers of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan in the newly occupied Eastern Territories, according to my decree of 29 June 1941, and those of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police, according to my decree of 17 July 1941, are subject to special ruling and are not affected by the following regulations.”
Paragraph 6 states, “At the head of each Reich Commission shall be a Reich commissioner...,” and then follow detailed regulations, stating that the Reich commissioners and the commissioners general shall be appointed by the Führer personally, and that consequently they could not be relieved or dismissed by me.
Paragraph 7 rules that the Reich commissioners shall be subordinated to the Reich Ministers and shall receive instructions exclusively from them wherever Article 3 is not applicable—that is, the Paragraph 3 which refers to the commanders of the Armed Forces and the Chief of the German Police.
Paragraph 9 states, “The Reich commissioners are responsible for the entire administration of their territory with regard to civilian affairs.”
In the next paragraph the entire management of the German railways and mails is placed under the jurisdiction of the ministries concerned, as is not otherwise possible in war.
Paragraph 10 requires the Reich Minister, whose headquarters are specified as Berlin, to coordinate, in the highest interest of the Reich, his wishes with those of the other supreme authorities in the Reich, and in the event of differences of opinion to seek a decision by the Führer.
I need not submit to the Tribunal the Führer decree concerning Commands of the Armed Forces, since it is sufficiently clear what we are concerned with, nor the decree regarding the powers of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, dated 29 June 1941, in which it is stated that the Delegate for the Four Year Plan—that is, Reich Marshal Göring—may also issue instructions to all civilian and military services in the Occupied Eastern Territories. Of decisive importance for an estimate of the entire legal relationship, however, and the consequence finally resulting therefrom is the decree of the Führer regarding police protection in the Occupied Eastern Territories, dated 17 July 1941. It says under Provision I as follows, “Police security in the newly occupied Eastern Territories is a matter for the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police.”
By this Paragraph I all security measures in the Eastern Territories were placed under the unlimited jurisdiction of the Reichsführer SS, who thereby, alongside the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories and next to the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, became the third independent central Reich authority in Berlin, with the result that the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories could not install a security or police department in his ministry in Berlin.
Under Provision II it states that the Reichsführer SS is also authorized, apart from the normal instructions to his police, to issue instructions directly to the civilian Reich commissioners under certain circumstances, and that he is obliged to transmit orders of fundamental political significance through the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, unless it is a question of averting an imminent danger. This wording gave to the Reichsführer SS the actual possibility of deciding for himself what he considered politically important in his orders and what not, and what his orders regarding the averting of impending danger concerned.
Provision III is of very great importance, since the quotation of Document 1056-PS (Volume V, Page 60) has given the Tribunal the impression that the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories had units of the SS under his command in the Occupied Eastern Territories. Even though it appears from Provision I, which I have just quoted, that this is incorrect, a wording which is often used in connection with the powers of the SS has led to this misunderstanding. This wording is quoted under III of the Police Security Decree as follows:
“For the carrying out of police security to each Reich commissioner shall be attached a Higher SS and Police Leader who shall be directly and personally subordinate to the Reich commissioner. Leaders of the SS and Police shall be assigned to the Commissioners General, to the chief, and to the area commissioners, and shall be subordinated to them directly and personally.”
Dr. Lammers, who was charged with the drafting of these proposals, has replied upon questioning that this wording was chosen to mean that the civilian Reich commissioner could certainly give instructions to the police on political matters, but that by the choice of the words “personally and directly subordinate” the actual giving of orders was exclusively reserved for the Chief of the German Police. And, as far as I know, Himmler insisted particularly on this wording because it allowed the Reich Commission outwardly to manifest to the population a certain uniformity of administration, while, according to Reich law and in practice, the power to issue orders bypassed the civilian administration. The agreements between Heydrich and the General Quartermaster of the Army here submitted, the contents of which I heard for the first time during this Trial, emphasize that this corresponds to the facts and point out just how these matters developed and how orders and authorizations of the police were worded.
The other decrees deal with the establishment of the Reich commissions themselves, and I do not believe that I need quote them to the Tribunal. They represent the detailed elaboration of that which has preceded.
I should merely like to refer now to the Lammers decree of 9 February 1942, which refers to technical matters and armament. I point out that, due to later wishes expressed by other agencies of the Reich, the departments for technical matters and propaganda, which had been attached originally to the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories and the Reich Commission head offices, were separated from these bodies and subordinated to the corresponding ministries in such a way that Reich Minister Speer had his deputies in the Reich Commissions as liaison officers, just as the Reich Transport Minister also had; and that political propaganda instructions were to be issued by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, but their practical execution left to the Reich Minister for Propaganda.
DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, I think you should be a little briefer.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal hopes you will.
DR. THOMA: The most important thing in the whole matter, apart from the jurisdiction of the Police and SS Leader, is your position with regard to the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor. What were the conditions regarding authority and subordination? Was Sauckel entitled to give you instructions?
ROSENBERG: The authority which the Delegate for the Four Year Plan had received from the Führer is clear-cut; and the Führer decree of 21 March...
THE PRESIDENT: The question was: “Was Sauckel entitled to give you instructions?” Then you begin to tell us about the Four Year Plan. I am sure you can answer that question directly.
DR. THOMA: I believe...
ROSENBERG: The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor had the right to give instructions to all top authorities in the Reich, and that included, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. This was...
DR. THOMA: That is enough. Were you entitled to tell Reich Commissioner Koch that the quotas of laborers which were required would or could no longer be fulfilled—“yes” or “no”?
ROSENBERG: I could not do that as simply as that, since the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor had been given very definite quotas by the Führer, and when these quotas appeared too large to me—and that was always the case—I would call together the Plenipotentiary General and his representatives and the representatives of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories for a conference so as to reduce the figures to a somehow bearable size; and the reduction of these quotas did, in fact, often result from such conferences, even though they still remained very high. Officially, however, I could do no more than make such representations.
MR. DODD: This defendant continues to make a speech. The question was very simple. He was asked whether he was entitled to tell the Reich Commissioner Koch that the quotas of laborers which were required could not be filled. He has now 3 minutes, and I am sure that he will take 30 minutes if he is allowed to go on. He should be kept to all elements surrounding that question.
DR. THOMA: Witness, I must underline Mr. Dodd’s suggestion. I have asked you, were you entitled to tell Reich Commissioner Koch that he should not carry out this drafting of labor?
ROSENBERG: I could not do that.
DR. THOMA: Then the answer is “no.” Did you, nevertheless, do so on one occasion? Did you once tell him that he should make use of his rights and powers and simply not fill these quotas?—“yes” or “no”?
ROSENBERG: Yes, I did that expressly in a letter to the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, and the document has been presented in court. It is dated December 1942; and in that letter I officially drew his attention to many incidents which took place during this labor recruitment drive, and I requested him urgently to help me in putting an end to these intolerable occurrences.
DR. THOMA: May I ask you briefly to refer to this question of labor mobilization on the basis of the documents. They are documents which have already been presented by the United States: Documents Number 016-PS, 017-PS, 018-PS, 054-PS, 084-PS, 294-PS, 265-PS, and 031-PS. I think you can be brief about all these documents since they speak for themselves.
THE PRESIDENT: Are they in the document book?
DR. THOMA: They are partly in the U.S.A. Document Book “Alfred Rosenberg”—the special document book.
ROSENBERG: Document 016-PS is a letter written to me by the Plenipotentiary General, dated 24 April, in which he elaborates his program. It has several times been referred to by the Prosecution, and I would like to refer you to two brief points which relate to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
On Page 17 of the document, under the title, “Prisoners of War and Foreign Laborers,” Paragraph 3 at the end reads literally:
“As far as the beaten enemy is concerned—and even if he has been our most terrible and implacable opponent—it has always been a matter of course to us Germans to refrain from any cruelty and petty chicanery and always treat him correctly and humanely, even then, when we expect useful service from him.”
And then it says, on Page 18, in Paragraph 5:
“Therefore in the Russian camps, too, the principles of German cleanliness, orderliness, and hygiene must be meticulously observed.”
That, as far as I was concerned, was the decisive point; and I fully agreed with this principle of the Plenipotentiary General. My letter—Document 018-PS—dated 21 December 1942, is to be understood on the basis of that agreement.
DR. THOMA: Document Book Rosenberg, Page 64, Volume II.
ROSENBERG: May I summarize and explain briefly? I give therein my agreement to the solution of the problem of the Eastern Workers, and I state that we, Sauckel and myself, hold to the same principles—that is, in reference to the points of Sauckel’s program which have just been quoted.
I further state that, in spite of these common principles, various unfortunate occurrences caused me to draw attention to methods not to be tolerated. On Page 2, I complain that, according to reports received by the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, various hospital barracks and camps for sick Eastern Workers, which were to be erected for allowing them recovery before returning home, had not come up to expectations, and that the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories had of its own accord communicated with the Reich Commissioner for Hospitals and Health.
On Page 3, with reference to the quotas for the Occupied Eastern Territories, I state that my responsibility earnestly bound me, in filling the quotas, to exclude all methods the toleration and practice of which could one day be held against me and my officials:
“In order to attain this end, and to accord the exigencies due to the special political situation in the Occupied Eastern Territories with the measures of the commissions and staffs of your agencies, I have empowered the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, insofar as necessary, to make use of his authority to eliminate recruiting methods which run contrary to the interest of the conduct of the war and war economy in the Occupied Eastern Territories.”
DR. THOMA: Were you aware of the fact that, at the same time when these methods were discontinued, the workers demanded could not be shipped?
ROSENBERG: That I could not readily assume, since I knew also that right at the start of the use of propaganda in many regional commissions, a large number of volunteers from the country—not from the cities, from the country—reported, and at this point a legal basis for the prevention of incidents which had taken place in every camp—as shown by the complaints of this letter—was given the Reich Commissioner.
I might here very briefly refer to the other documents quoted by the Prosecution, Document 054-PS—that is a criticism of abuses which reached me from the liaison officer of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories with Army Group South. It is severe criticism. But I shall refer to Page 1 of the telegram, where it says in Paragraph a:
“With few exceptions, the Ukrainians in the Reich who are working individually—for example, in small workshops, as farmhands or as household employees—are very satisfied with their conditions.”
But in Paragraph b:
“Those accommodated in collective camps, on the other hand, complain very much.”
This was an attempt to exert influence on questions and dealings concerning a region under the authority, not of the civil, but of the military administration with its seat in Kharkov, and to exert influence even in German national territory where I, as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, had no right to issue instructions; but by criticism the lot of all Eastern Workers was always being improved and, to be sure, to the utmost.
Document 084-PS refers to a number of problems and measures for the improvement of the lot of the workers’ families and the energy with which the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories defended a policy of decent treatment of the Eastern peoples with reference to the question of pay, the deduction of taxes, et cetera. But I do not think I need to go any further into detail, since the Plenipotentiary General will probably do that himself. I merely refer to my constant efforts in this direction. I should also like to mention here that there was an agreement between the Plenipotentiary General and the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories according to which Eastern workers, after returning home, were to receive an allotment of land so that they would feel no prejudices against those who had stayed at home.
Document 204-PS also contains complaints regarding insufficient allowances, to which I need not refer in detail, and to which I merely allow myself to draw the attention of the Tribunal.
Document 265-PS is a report from the Commissioner General at Zhitomir, in the Ukraine, in which he states that the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, on his tour through the Eastern territories, had personally pointed out the gravity of the whole labor mobilization program and had transmitted the unconditional orders of the Führer that these quotas must be placed at the disposal of the Reich. The Commissioner General remarks further after this serious portrayal of the situation, he had no other choice during the enrollment process than to assign certain workers to the police force to aid the local authorities which had been set up.
Document 031-PS appears to me personally to be of particular importance since the Prosecution has stated with reference to this document that I am accused of having approved of the planning and carrying out of the biological weakening of the Eastern peoples, according to a statement at the end of this document. Only the first and last portions of this document have been quoted; and I must ask that I be permitted to inform the Tribunal of the true state of affairs.
At the beginning of the document is the observation that the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, after he had once turned down the suggestion that young people should be transferred from Army Group Center to the Reich, was once more presented with the problem and under very special conditions and prerequisites. In the actual record it states that, in view of the fact that a large number of adults were working and had to leave the young people behind without any care, Army Group Center had the intention of resettling these youths and taking care of them in a proper manner. At the end of Page 1 of this document and at the beginning of Page 2, it states that the Minister was afraid that this action might have very unfavorable political repercussions, that it would be considered as deportation of children, and that he desired it to be greatly curtailed.
Under Point 4 it states that if the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories would not support that action and carry it out, then Army Group Center—which, of course, was in no way subordinate to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories—would carry out the action on its own authority. This army group, however, was addressing itself to the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories in particular, because in their opinion—as it says literally, “the guarantee for correct political and fair dealing would be assured.” The army group would like to see this action carried out under the most inoffensive conditions. As far as possible these children should be accommodated in villages, in groups, or collected in small camps. Later on, from there they were to be placed at the disposal of small workshops.
Then, later on, it states:
“In the event of a reoccupation of the territory, the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories can then in a proper way return these youths, who then, together with their parents would surely be a positive political factor in the reconstruction of that territory.”
At the end it states that under these conditions the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories agreed to take care of these youths. I agreed because I was fully conscious of the fact that through the Youth Department of the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories I would, wherever possible, be able to guarantee the greatest care for these children. I want to add that on one occasion I paid a visit to the great works at Dessau, where four and a half thousand youthful workers were employed, and where there was a separate children’s camp under the care of White Ruthenian mothers. I could ascertain that these workers were wearing very good clothes, that they were being taught mathematics and languages by Russian women teachers, and that the children’s camp tended by Russian women had a kindergarten which was looked after by the Hitler Youth. In the evening of that day the White Ruthenian woman who cared for the children thanked me, with tears in her eyes, for the humane care being given them.
I would like to point out a phonetic error which has appeared in this record. This city—as I said—was Dessau, and not Odessa as is stated in the record. I never visited Odessa in all my life.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, we have finished the labor problem, and I am coming to the Reich Commissioners. Perhaps this would be a suitable moment to break off.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you indicate to the Tribunal how long you are likely to be with your examination?
DR. THOMA: I am of the opinion that we may be through by 3:30. However, the Defendant Rosenberg is shaking his head, and, therefore, I cannot tell you for certain.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Court will recess until 5 minutes past two.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1405 hours.]
Afternoon Session
DR. THOMA: First, I wish to submit to the Court as Exhibit Rosenberg-11, Document 194-PS, the secret order of Rosenberg to Koch of December 1942 on the fitting treatment of Ukrainian civilians—dated 14 December 1942.
Witness, please give us your opinion on this general instruction in connection with your directions in Document 1056-PS.
ROSENBERG: Document 1056-PS is not a direct instruction of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories but it was the result of discussions with various central agencies of the Reich Government officially interested in the East. In this document there are contained directions of the Eastern Ministry itself, and agreements with the various technical agencies such as the Transportation Ministry, the Post Office Department, and also the Police, in order to manifest, at least in the East, a certain unified civil administration. For the reasons which I have enumerated at the beginning this was no longer possible, and as far as the other questions of the subordination of the SS and Police Leader are concerned, to which I have referred the Prosecution on the basis of this document, I might indicate what I took the liberty of saying at the beginning in connection with the comment on the staffing of the administration of the Eastern territories, dated 17 July 1941.
However, as far as Document 1056-PS is concerned, I would like to point out that among the seven points which are especially stressed here, only the third point, “Care of the Population,” is quite expressly mentioned. Then, further along in the document it is again explained that this supplying of the population with foodstuffs and so forth is to be given special attention and that the problems of medical and veterinary help are to be given special consideration, even calling upon military authorities if necessary. Except for that I do not wish to go into this document further.
The Document 194-PS is unfortunately the only piece of instruction of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories to the Reich commissioners that could be found. It is an instruction dated 14 December 1942, in which once again the humane and political attitude to be taken is prescribed. It is emphasized in the beginning—I permit myself a few short references—that German behavior should never give the impression that the Ukraine had no hope at all for the future; that directives of German offices were to be executed but should be given great thought. It says further:
“The people of the East have at all times seen in Germany the bearer of a legal order, which although bound by severity, is not an expression of arbitrariness. If one is able to make it clear to the peoples of the East by appropriate legal measures that although the war brings fearful hardships, yet transgressions will be justly investigated and judged, then these peoples will be easier to govern than if the impression of an arbitrary tyranny such as theirs is given.”
It continues:
“The elementary school with its 4-year curriculum should be strictly adhered to and should be followed by a proper technical school training for practical life. The German administration needs men for veterinary work, transportation, farming, geological research, et cetera, whom the German people is not in a position to supply. In these fields, the Ukrainian youth taken away from the streets can be roused to the consciousness of collaboration in the reconstruction of their country. In doing this, it would be inadmissible for German offices to confront the population with contemptuous remarks. Such an attitude is not worthy of the German.”
Then further:
“One becomes master by adopting a fitting attitude and behavior but not by overbearing conduct. Not by pretentious speech does one govern peoples, and not by ostentatious disdain of others does one win authority.”
Then, several other questions are dealt with in this directive, but I do not wish to take up the time of the Tribunal too much with these details. I was interested in showing in what sense I wanted to form the attitude of the civil administration, and in order not to have this directive shelved in the large offices I decreed that it was to be read in all offices.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I should like now to turn to the special charge of the Soviet Prosecution and in particular to refer to those documents that pertain to Rosenberg’s Einsatzstab in the East and to the alleged destructions. Therefore, I will submit to the defendant Exhibit USSR-376 (Document 161-PS), Exhibit USSR-375 (Document 076-PS), Exhibits USSR-7, 39, 41, 49, 51, and 81.
[The documents were submitted to the defendant.]
THE PRESIDENT: Are any of these in your document books?
DR. THOMA: The documents of the U.S.S.R., the ones I mentioned last, I do not have in a special document book. But I assumed and ascertained early this morning that these documents had been submitted to the Tribunal: USSR-39, 41, 251, 89, 49, and 353.
THE PRESIDENT: I was asking only for what purpose you were referring to them now. Of course we haven’t all the books here. They are not in your books?
DR. THOMA: Number 161-PS is in Document Book 3, Page 34. Nothing else is mentioned in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
ROSENBERG: The Document 161-PS deals with an order for the bringing back of certain archives from Estonia and Latvia. The Soviet Prosecution have concluded from this that there was a plundering of the cultural treasures in these countries. I would like to state that the instructions which I had read from Document 1015-PS requested in an unequivocal manner that all these cultural objects were to remain in the country. And that was done. I permit myself to refer to the date of that document, which is 23 August 1944, when combat activity had spread over this territory, and when these cultural objects and archives were to be safeguarded from combat activities. It was here a matter of having the afore-mentioned archives sheltered in Estonian country estates. That is, they were still to remain in the country itself, even in the midst of combat activity. As far as I know some of these archives were still brought to Germany later and I believe they were safeguarded in Schloss Höchstadt in Bavaria.
Document 076-PS has been used by the Prosecution as proof of a plundering of the library treasures in Minsk. We are concerned here with a report which a deputy of the commander of the rear area had issued and which was directed to the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. From this report we can see in fact that some destruction had taken place in certain libraries, but that that was a consequence of troops having been quartered there, because the city of Minsk had been destroyed and the billeting facilities were overburdened.
But then under Number 1, and again under other paragraphs, it is expressly shown that posters had been put up everywhere, and that these things were put under control and were not to be touched after that. It is added that any further removals would have to be considered as plundering.
Under Number 2, I would like by all means to point out that it has been confirmed here that the most valuable part of this library of the Academy of Sciences came from the library of the Polish Prince Georg Radziwill, which the Soviet authorities had taken from the occupied Polish territory to Minsk and had incorporated into the library of the Academy of Sciences long before any other state or other German offices were active in that area. There are a number of other documents, namely, 035-PS and several others already submitted to the Tribunal, which make statements about the taking back of cultural objects from the Ukraine too. The date on these documents, that is, the year 1943, shows also that these cultural objects remained in the country until then, as had been ordered, and that only when combat activity made it necessary, was a withdrawal carried out. Document 035-PS says, on Page 3, Number 5:
“The infantry division”—concerned—“attaches great importance to the further evacuation of valuable institutions since the Armed Forces can in no way protect this area sufficiently and bombardment by artillery is to be counted on shortly.”
DR. THOMA: I would like to submit this document under Rosenberg-37; it has not yet been submitted.
ROSENBERG: It then adds: “Wehrmacht equipment, means of transportation, et cetera, shall be provided as far as possible by the ... infantry division.”
DR. THOMA: May I have the document again? [The document was handed to Dr. Thoma.] I would like to submit it to the Tribunal.
ROSENBERG: The evacuation then actually took place under artillery bombardment, and hence cultural objects which had come from Kharkov and other cities also during combat, were transferred only then to Germany.
Now I would like to deal with the documents which the Soviet Prosecution have given in detailed presentation of the Extraordinary State Commissions for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. I would like, in this connection, to discuss just a few concrete details:
On Page 1 of the Document USSR-39 it states:
“From the beginning of their occupation of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Germans and their accomplices destroyed the independence of the Estonian people and then tried to establish a ‘new order’; to demolish culture, art, and science; to exterminate the civilian population or to deport them as slave labor to Germany; and to lay waste and plunder cities, villages, and farms.”
I should like to remark in that connection, first of all, that the 20-year independence, after the Soviet attack in 1919, was broken by the marching in of the Red Army in 1940, a standpoint that is...
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, it seems to me that the document which is now being looked over by the Defendant Rosenberg, naturally gives him a basis for replying to the concrete accusations of his criminal activity while he was Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. However, I am of the opinion that what the Defendant Rosenberg has said just now is plain fascist propaganda and has naturally nothing to do with the matter.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, if the Defendant Rosenberg makes a few introductory remarks to his statement on the document from which he wants to quote, I ask that he not be interrupted right away. We will deal with a few pertinent statements taken from the document.
ROSENBERG: So far as Point 2 is concerned, I would like to remark...
THE PRESIDENT: Is this document he is dealing with, a document that he wrote himself or had anything to do with? I haven’t got the document before me.
DR. THOMA: The document has been submitted by the U.S.S.R. and it contains charges against Rosenberg—charges of having undertaken demolitions and expropriations in these territories, and he is entitled to state his position with regard to this.
THE PRESIDENT: But when you say “his question,” can’t he say what he did in connection with the document, or the subject of the document? I mean, when you say “state his position,” it is such a very wide phrase it may mean almost anything. If you ask him what he did in connection with the subject of the document it is different, but it is more concrete and special.
DR. THOMA: What did you do in these occupied areas, contrary to the assertion of the Soviet Prosecution?
ROSENBERG: To refute the assertion that I destroyed culture and art and science in Estonia, I must point out that one of the first directions of the Eastern Ministry was to establish indigenous administrations in these three countries and to have the German administration in principal serve as a supervisory body. The limitations due to the war conditions were naturally given in times of war; they applied to spheres of war and armament economy, to the sphere of police security, and naturally to the political attitude in general.
A complete cultural autonomy was enjoyed by Estonia and Latvia as well as by Lithuania; their art and their theaters were active all through these years; many faculties of the university at Dorpat functioned and so did some faculties in Riga; the judicial sovereignty of these countries was under the power of the indigenous administration—national directorates as they were called—with all the authoritative departments necessary for the administration. The entire school system remained untouched. I visited these territories twice, and I can say only that the commissioners in charge there did everything to work as closely as possible in accordance with the desires of the indigenous administration which often expressed itself with criticism regarding the German administration, although, frankly speaking, we could not quite fully recognize the political sovereignty in the midst of war.
On Page 2 of this document it is stated, under corporal punishment for office employees, that the intruders had prescribed corporal punishment of Estonian workers in accordance with the regulation of the railway administration of 20 February 1942, for neglect of work or if the employee came drunk to work. This regulation of the director of the railway administration corresponds with the facts. But when this regulation was made known, of course it aroused the indignation of the German civil administration. Reich Commissioner Lohse at once annulled it, and we asked the Reich Minister of Transportation to have this impossible official removed. This took place immediately; he was disqualified and called home, and the fact that he was recalled was to be made known in the press. However, I cannot say whether it actually appeared in the press.
On Page 5 of this document, in Paragraph 2, it is set forth that the Germans destroyed historical edifices, that they had searched through and destroyed the Tartu—that is, the University of Dorpat which had a glorious past of more than 300 years, and was one of the oldest seats of higher learning.
Now I would like to add that these houses dating from the 17th and other centuries were constructed by Germans exclusively, and that German troops would certainly not be interested in destroying arbitrarily the houses of their own people. Secondly, this 300-year-old University of Dorpat was a German university for 300 years, which in fact supplied Russia and Germany with scholars of European repute.
THE PRESIDENT: That is quite irrelevant, quite irrelevant. The question is whether it was destroyed.
ROSENBERG: In the year 1942 I was once in Dorpat. A large part of the city had been destroyed through combat activity, but the university buildings were still standing. In this connection I had the opportunity to learn that the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in the Ukraine could confiscate 10,000 to 12,000 volumes belonging to the University of Dorpat and restore them again to their rightful owner.
I consider it out of question that an arbitrary destruction of this old German university could have been carried out by German troops and I can assume only that it was the result of combat activity, if a destruction actually had taken place.
As far as the other details of the document are concerned, I cannot define my position. It deals with many shootings of a police nature, matters clearly connected with combat activity, and I cannot make any statement about this, since it obviously refers to the time of the retreat.
The Document USSR-41 deals with the report of the Extraordinary State Commission on matters in Latvia. I would like to correct and say that the headquarters of the Foreign Minister were not at Riga, but that he had his regular office exclusively in Berlin.
In Paragraph 4 it is said:
“The Germans confiscated the country of the Latvian peasants for their barons and landowners, and mercilessly exterminated the peaceful population—men, women, and children.”
I would like to state in this connection that not a single farm was given up to the German barons of former times during the period of civilian administration, but the German administration of the country issued a decree which, in my opinion, was a singular, progressive piece of legislation. For this land, belonging to Germans for 700 years and expropriated by the young Estonian and Latvian Republics almost without compensation, could certainly have been returned easily to the Germans. But I signed a law in March, either 1942 or 1943—I do not know—the so-called Restitution Law (Reprivatisierungsgesetz), which legally guaranteed the Estonian and Latvian peasants the German property ceded to them at that time and handed over by solemn charters. With the occupation by the Soviet Union, a collectivization of this private farm property was introduced, and what it deals with is that this collectivization was abolished and therefore the former owners of 1919 came again into possession of their property.
I would like to mention the following in explanation of this statement. On Page 2 it is stated:
“For more than 3 years the Germans have made it their task to destroy factories, public works, libraries, museums, and homes in the Latvian cities.”
I myself have been in Latvian art museums, have seen a great Latvian art exhibition; I have been in the Latvian State theater, in which all performances were in the Latvian language, with just a few German guest conductors and singers. Factories were not destroyed in these 3 years of administration but their productivity was increased by numerous German machines. Of course this caused many protests from the native owners, because it was accompanied by an uncertainty about their own participation; but in any event there was no destruction, rather an increase in productive capacity.
And finally, as far as the archives and libraries are concerned, I have already said what is necessary in connection with Document 035-PS.
In regard to the extermination of 170,000 civilians, I cannot take any position as to what transpired in the police camps on grounds of police security. I would like to point out, however, that according to official statements of the indigenous administration, in the first place more than 40,000 Estonians in Estonia and more than 40,000 Latvians in Latvia were deported to the interior of Soviet Russia after the Red Army occupied these countries. And further that a large number of Latvians and Estonians volunteered to fight the Red Army and that at the retreat hundreds of thousands of Estonians and Latvians asked to be taken, to the Reich and many actually arrived there. The entire population of Latvia was about 2 million. That the German authorities should have shot 170,000 Latvians seems improbable in the highest degree.
However, regarding other alleged destructions committed during combat activity, I am not able to take a stand.
The third document, USSR-7, deals with the reports of the Extraordinary Commission on Lithuania. On Page 1, Paragraph 2, it states that Reich Minister Rosenberg tried to germanize the Lithuanian people and to exterminate the national culture. Lithuania was proclaimed a part of the German “Ostland Province.”
In Lithuania the peasant question was treated the same way as in Estonia and Latvia. Of course there was one difference insofar as Lithuania had a larger number of small German peasant farms which at the end of 1939 were taken into the German Reich, and when the Germans marched into Lithuania they were returned to their original farms and were settled in as concentrated a manner as possible in certain settlement districts. That corresponds to the facts; to the rest I cannot agree.
As far as the extermination of national culture is concerned, that does not seem to me a true representation either. On the contrary, I know that the staff of my office was very much interested in collaborating with the representatives of the Lithuanian folklore research, and that many studies were written on this exemplary folklore work in Lithuania and Latvia, and I cannot imagine that any arbitrary destruction took place here. I can remember only that administrative officials from the capital, Kauen or Kaunas (Kovno), came to me at the time of the withdrawal and said that they had worked in Kauen for 5 days, even though the city was already under Soviet artillery fire, by which, of course, many buildings were destroyed in combat activity; I am not able to say anything about that from personal experience.
Now I pass to Document USSR-51. In the Note of the Peoples’ Commissar for Foreign Affairs, of 6 January 1942, the destruction of cultural values of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is also given introductory mention. I refer to what I have already said in reference to the documents that were just submitted. On Page 2, Column 1, it is also stated that the Germans pillaged and murdered the peasant population without restraint. Here, too, I would like to refer again to the declarations I have just made. On Page 6, Column 1, at the beginning, it says that the Germans in their rage against Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia destroyed all national cultures, national monuments, schools, and literature. But this, as I have just stated, is not in accordance with the facts. The Note of the Peoples’ Commissar for Foreign Affairs of 27 April 1942, which has been read here repeatedly and in detail, makes on Page 1, Column 1, the same assertion that here the pillage of the territory of the Soviet State had been carried out. I refer to the statement I have just made.
On Page 7 it is stated that the Germans intended and actually executed wholesale robbery of the land given free of charge by the Soviet Government to the collective farms (Kolkhozes) for their permanent use. I do not wish to make any statements on this special question here. State Secretary Riecke, whom the Tribunal has approved as witness, will make his expert statements on the law for the new agrarian order issued to strengthen farming in White Ruthenia and the Ukraine.
As the Soviet Prosecution withdrew the charge against me of having been a former Czarist spy, I do not need to go into that. I also cannot, of course, check in detail the various quotations which have been submitted here. But in one case it is possible for me to give an explanation here. It is on Page 9, Column 1, at the top, where the Foreign Commissar’s so-called “Twelve Commandments” for the behavior of the Germans in the East is mentioned. There follows a quotation from which it can be concluded only that it is an unbroken quotation from a German directive. These 12 commandments have been submitted by the Soviet Prosecution to the Tribunal, under Exhibit USSR-89 (Document USSR-89). It deals, as it has been established, with a directive of the State Secretary Backe, of the beginning of June 1941, a directive which I have learned of only here. This apparently unbroken quotation of the Foreign Commissar proves to be a compilation of fragments of sentences which were actually dispersed over a page and a half of the document, and these fragments, moreover, have not been given in their proper sequence, but in a completely different sequence from that in the document. But I would like to call your attention to a few changes in the wording.
Under Point 6 of the commandments:
“You must therefore”—this is directed to the agricultural leaders—“you must therefore carry out with composure the most severe and ruthless measures that are demanded by the national requirements. Deficiencies in character on the part of the individual will lead to his recall as a matter of principle. Anyone who is recalled for such reasons can no longer have an authoritative position in the Reich.”
In the quotation of the official note it says:
“Therefore, you yourself will have to take with composure the most cruel and ruthless measures that are dictated by German interests. Otherwise you cannot have any responsible positions at home.”
Therefore, instead of the word “severe” the word “cruel” has been substituted: in place of “national requirements” it says very generally “German interests”; and in place of the reference to a “lack of character” it is set down quite generally that if one does not thus take the most cruel measures one cannot have any responsible positions. I would not want to identify myself otherwise in any way with these 12 commandments, but I would like to state that on Page 3 under Point 7 it says:
“But be just and personally decent, and always set a good example.”
And in part 9:
“Do not spy on Communists. The Russian youth has been trained for communism for two decades. Russian youth does not know any other education. It is therefore senseless to punish them for the past.”
I believe that also there, Herr Backe who otherwise used stronger language, does not mean any regulation for extermination.
Now, I am passing to the charge by the Polish Government. It concerns me in one point only. On Page 20, under Point 5, it is stated that the exploitation, plundering, and the carrying off of art objects, et cetera, from museums and collections of all kinds, was centralized under the office of Rosenberg in Berlin. That is incorrect, as has been shown by the report of State Secretary Mühlmann, which has been read here many times and which shows that an entirely different department was set up for the safeguarding of these works of art. Furthermore, I read today a decree by Dr. Lammers, dated, I believe, 5 July 1942, in which the Government General was expressly excluded.
I must, however, admit that in one case in the beginning, the Einsatzstab confiscated a German collection of music and it was taken to the Reich for purposes of research. This action was not right, and from a correspondence with the then Governor General Frank that must also be here in my file, it is shown that we had agreed that this collection was to be returned to the Government General as a matter of course after a scholarly survey had been made, which I, to be sure, requested.
The incorrectness of this charge may be seen also from the fact that it is contended here that I had in the Einsatzstab among the various departments also an office “East” for Poland. The incorrectness of this statement may be gathered from the fact that the so-called special purpose staffs which were established for music and the plastic arts in the East were actually expert special staffs, and besides them the so-called working groups had regional tasks. I could, therefore, not have had an office “East” for Poland and at any rate the term “Poland” was never used in official circles—only the term “Government General.” I believe I can limit myself to this explanation. In addition, there have been presented a number of other general documents from Smolensk and from other cities, referring to much destruction and police measures. I cannot testify here concerning these points.
In conclusion I would like to refer only to Document 073-PS, which a few days ago was submitted to the witness Dr. Lammers. This document is concerned with the transmission of a document of the Foreign Office, in which some mistaken information was given after it had been said that the Soviet prisoners of war were under the command of the Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern countries.
In the introduction, it can be seen that here we are concerned exclusively with the doctrinary care and propaganda work which Minister Goebbels considered his province, rather than that of the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office stated, that it had leading jurisdiction over all prisoners of war with the exception of this moral and propaganda care of the Soviet prisoners of war, which in this respect were attended to by the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, because these prisoners did not come under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. This statement, that they were not bound by the Geneva Convention, was the legal opinion issued by the Führer’s headquarters for the setting up of the administration in the Occupied Eastern Territories.
DR. THOMA: Witness, in the course of these proceedings you have been accused at least four times in the matter of gold dental fillings in the prison in Minsk. In this connection a document has even been submitted, regarding the handling of the Jewish question, and a further document deals likewise with an arson and anti-Jewish “action,” also in the district of Minsk. Will you please tell us what you have to say in that connection?
ROSENBERG: I might perhaps give the following general answer about the many files and reports from my office: In the course of 12 years of my Party office and 3 years in the Eastern Ministry, many reports, memoranda, carbon copies from all sorts of divisions were delivered to my office. I know of some of them, of some I received oral knowledge which was then entered in detail in the files, and there are a great number of more important and some entirely unimportant things which I was entirely unable to take note of during these years.
As far as these documents are concerned, I must say with regard to Document 212-PS, that this clearly represents a submission to my office—which is without heading, without signature, and without any other details—which I never received personally, but which I assume was probably delivered from police circles to my office. Thus, with the best intentions I cannot state my position as to the contents of this document.
As far as Document 1104-PS which deals with the terrible incidents in the city of Sluzk is concerned, that is a report from October 1941, and I must say that this report was submitted to me. This report aroused indignation in the Eastern Ministry, and as is seen here, my permanent representative, Gauleiter Meyer, sent a copy of this complaint of the civil administration, together with all the criticism of the civil administration, to the Police, to the Chief of the Security Police, at that time Heydrich, with the request for investigation. I must say that the Police had their own jurisdiction, in which the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories could not interfere. But I am unable to say here what measures Heydrich took. Yet, as may be seen from this, I could not assume that an order—which was attested to by the witness here yesterday—was given to Heydrich or Himmler by the Führer. This report, and many other communications which came to my ears, regarding shootings of saboteurs and also shootings of Jews, pogroms by the local population in the Baltic States and in the Ukraine, I took as occurrences of this war. I heard that in Kiev a larger number of Jews had been shot, but that the greater part of the Jews had left Kiev; and the sum of these reports showed me, it is true, terrible harshness, especially some reports from the prison camps. But that there was an order for the individual annihilation of the entire Jewry, I could not assume and if, in our polemics, the extermination of Jewry was also talked about, I must say that this word, of course, must make a frightful impression in view of the testimonies we think are available now, but under conditions prevailing then, it was not interpreted as an individual extermination, an individual annihilation of millions of Jews. I must also say that even the British Prime Minister, in an official speech in the House of Commons on 23 or 26 September 1943, spoke of the extermination in root and branch of Prussianism and of National Socialism. I happened to read these words from this speech. However, I did not assume that in saying this he meant the shooting of all Prussian officers and National Socialists.
Regarding Document Rosenberg-135 (Exhibit USA-289) I would like to say the following: It is dated 18 June 1943. On 22 June, I returned from an official visit to the Ukraine. After this official visit I found a pile of notes about conferences. I found many letters and, above all, I found the Führer decree of the middle of June 1943 which had already been given verbally, in which the Führer instructed me to limit myself to the basic principles as far as legislation was concerned, and not to interest myself too much with the details of the administration of the Eastern Territories. I was dejected when I returned from this journey and I did not read this document. But I cannot assume that this document was not at all mentioned to me by my office. My subordinates were so conscientious that I can assume only that in the course of their reporting to me about many documents, they told me that another great disagreement between the Police and Civil Administration was again at hand, as there had been many disagreements of that nature before and I perhaps said, “Please give this to Gauleiter Meyer or give it to the police officer, to the liaison officer so that he can investigate these matters.” Otherwise these terrible details would have remained in my memory. I cannot say any more in regard to this subject than I was able to say when it was brought up in the interrogation.
DR. THOMA: I submit do the Tribunal the Exhibit Rosenberg-13, a memorandum from Koch to Rosenberg, a complaint about Rosenberg’s criticism and justification of his policy in the Ukraine, dated 16 March 1943, and a letter from Rosenberg to Reich Minister Lammers dated 12 October 1944, in which he states to the Führer his wish to resign. May it please the Tribunal, regarding Rosenberg-13, memorandum from Koch to Rosenberg...
THE PRESIDENT: What number?
DR. THOMA: Rosenberg-13, Document 192-PS, Document Book Number 2, Page 14; I would like to read this to the Tribunal personally and to make the following introductory remark.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a very long thing, Dr. Thoma. You do not need to read it all, surely?...
DR. THOMA: I shall not read all of it, Your Honor. But I have unfortunately only the opportunity of presenting State Secretary Riecke as an official of the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories. The Tribunal, however, even from this witness, who will appear before them, will be able to see that the best officials which the German Reich had, were used in the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories and that every individual complaint was conscientiously checked. It is not so, that in addition to what we have heard today numerous other crimes have been committed which have not come to the knowledge of the Tribunal, but I believe that everything has been exhaustively presented of the “admittedly terrible things” that happened in the East during these 4 or 5 years. And the question now is how Gauleiter Koch responded to it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal are simply asking you not to read the whole of the document which covers many pages. That means you can go ahead and read the essential parts of it.
DR. THOMA: Therefore, I would like to assert that each and every complaint which was received by the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories was followed up. Gauleiter Koch writes:
“Various recent decrees of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, in which my work was criticized in an exceptionally severe and offensive manner and from which have resulted misinterpretations of the policies as well as my legal position, have induced me to present this report to you, Mr. Reich Minister, in the form of a memorandum.”
And then follow remarks which show that the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories investigated the complaints. He complains:
“On 12 January 1943, for example, I was informed by the Ministry that Anna Prichno of Smygalovka, an Eastern Worker, had objected that her parents who remained in the Ukraine could not pay their taxes. I was asked to cancel these taxes or to reduce them by half and also to report how I decided.”
On Page 13:
“Lately numerous individual complaints from Eastern Workers employed in the Reich have been passed on to me and on each single case I have been asked to give a report, usually on such short notice that it was impossible to comply with the request.”
On Pages 15 and 16:
“Hence, I found it strange”—writes Gauleiter Koch—“to have the decree I/41 of 22 November 1941 state that the Ukrainian people were strongly permeated with German blood, which fact is to account for their remarkable cultural and scientific achievements. But when on top of this a secret decree of July 1942, to which I will refer more closely at the end of this section, declares that very many points of contact exist between the German Ukrainian people, one is no longer only surprised but astonished. This decree demands not only correct but even amiable manners in dealing with Ukrainians.”
Then:
“In the following I would like to give a few more examples of lack of reserve towards Ukrainians. For instance, by decree of 18 June 1942, II 6 f 6230, I was informed that you were procuring a total of 2.3 million Reichsmark worth of Ukrainian schoolbooks, charged to my budget without even contacting me about it previously.”
THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it necessary to read all this? I am not quite sure how far you have gotten because I have been reading on.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, may I make a remark in this connection? I have already limited my selection. This memorandum is quite a thick copybook; however, I will try to be still more brief, and want only to emphasize that on every page you will find a complaint about the conscientiousness with which Rosenberg followed up all these individual complaints. But I will be very brief:
“It is not necessary that your Ministry stress over and over again as it does by many written and telephone protests that any violence in recruiting of workers has to be discontinued.”
And then there is one further very brief remark:
“And if I issue more decrees against floggings than actually take place, I will make myself ridiculous.
“That happened a few times, and every single case was strongly censured.”
And now we come to something very important, Your Honors, namely, how Gauleiter Koch threatens representations to the Führer, and says:
“Nobody has ever asked me, as an old Gauleiter, to submit to him articles I write, for nobody but the Führer can ever absolve me of the political responsibility that I bear for an article signed with my full name...
“Finally, in addition to these statements on my responsibility I should like to allude to the relations between the Führer and the Reich commissioners. As an old Gauleiter I am accustomed to go to my Führer directly with all my problems and requests, and this right, in my capacity as Oberpräsident, has never been denied me even by my superior minister...
“By decree I 6 b 4702/42, I was ordered to abstain from referring to the wishes of the Führer in my reports to you, as the forwarding of the Führer’s wishes were your affair exclusively. I must state here that in my position as an old Gauleiter the Führer has repeatedly given me his political directives...
“If one takes away or curtails the position of the Reich commissioners in relation to the Führer, then very little remains in keeping with the position of the Reich commissioner.”
On Page 50 he says:
“I have to state expressly that I must, under these circumstances, refuse to accept responsibility for the success of the labor recruiting and the spring planting.”
Rosenberg recommended to him to go on with the recruiting of labor.
At the end he says:
“My position has been encroached upon by you so often in the last 3 weeks that it can be restored only by the Führer.”
Thereupon a conflict developed in Hitler’s presence at the Reich Chancellery among Rosenberg, Bormann, and Koch, and the result was that Bormann and, in the main, Koch, were upheld and the Defendant Rosenberg was notified to limit himself to matters of principle only.
Thereupon the defendant submitted his resignation.
Now, I ask the defendant to go into this in more detail. It is in Document Book 2, Page 27.
ROSENBERG: I would like to remark...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, I think we had better adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. THOMA: Witness, some days ago the document was mentioned from which it becomes clear that the forest district of Zuman was to be the private hunting ground for the Reich Commissioner, and that hundreds of people were shot, because resettling them would have been too complicated and take too much time. Will you make a statement about that?
ROSENBERG: As time went by I received much information regarding instances of acts of violence committed in the East. Upon investigating, it was found very often that these reports did not conform with the facts. In this case this report appeared to me quite credible so I took the opportunity to report it to the Führer directly, considering that I was having trouble with Gauleiter Koch.
Apart from other questions—schools in the Ukraine, establishment of technical schools, and certain personal statements of Koch which I submitted as a complaint—I also submitted this report.
At the audience with the Führer, Reich Commissioner Koch submitted an opinion of the Chief of the Forest Administration of the Ukraine. From this it appeared that these forest districts had to be used for supplying timber either for railway ties or other emergency needs. And since various guerrilla units and partisans had flocked together in these wooded districts and such a task was extremely dangerous owing to the insecure situation, it was established that Koch, not in the interest of the hunting earlier contemplated, but for this reason, had ordered a cleaning up of this district; and in the course of this cleaning up a considerable number of partisans had been found and they had been shot. The remaining population from these forest districts had been resettled, and, as Koch added, in addition to this statement of the Chief of the Forest Administration, a number of these resettled persons had even expressed gratitude for the fact that they had received better soil to work than they had in these forest areas. On receiving these reports from Koch the Führer shrugged his shoulders and said:
“It is difficult to decide here. According to the statement of the Forest Administration for the Ukraine that I have here, I must leave the matter alone, and the other decisions regarding Ukrainian policy will be sent to you.”
This happened in July in the shape of a decree which is also in my files, but which, unfortunately, has not been found. It is a decree about which the witness Lammers has spoken and which in principle states that the Reich Minister should cause no obstruction, the Minister for the East should confine himself to basic matters, should submit his decrees to the Reich commissioner for his opinion and, in the event of conflict, the decision of the Führer must be secured.
After this decree of the Führer I made a renewed attempt to represent the views which I considered right. But, of course, I will not deny that on several occasions, due to pressure from the Führer’s headquarters, I became a little weary. And when it was said, and said in clear-cut terms, that I was apparently more interested in these Eastern peoples than in the welfare of the German nation, I made some appeasing statements; but my decrees and the further application of my instructions continued in the old way. As I have now been able to ascertain, I reported to the Führer personally on eight different occasions on this matter, and I submitted written petitions and formulated my decrees with this aim in mind.
When then, in 1944, the Reichsführer SS, too, occupied himself not only with police affairs, but also with policy in the Eastern territories, and when I had not been able any longer to report to the Führer’s headquarters, since the middle of November 1943, I made one last attempt to make a suggestion to the Führer regarding a generous Eastern policy. At the same time, I asked very clearly, in the event of a refusal, to be relieved from any further work. This document (Document Rosenberg-14) is a letter to Dr. Lammers of 12 October 1944, at the beginning of which it is said that:
“In the face of current developments in the Eastern problem, I beg you to submit the accompanying letter to the Führer personally. I consider the way and manner in which the German policy in the East is being handled today as very unfortunate; while I have not participated in the negotiations, I am nevertheless made responsible for them. Therefore I beg you to submit my letter to the Führer as soon as possible for his decision.”
Dr. Lammers then immediately transmitted this letter to the Führer’s secretary, Bormann. In the letter to the Führer it says on Page 2:
“For observation and the steering of this development I have created regional offices for all the Eastern peoples in the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, which can now, after many tests, be regarded as suitable for their purposes and well set up. They also contain representatives from the various regions and races concerned, and if it seems in the interest of German policies, these may be recognized as a special national committee.”
These central offices mentioned here had the task of seeing to it that the representatives of all Eastern peoples received personally the complaints of their countrymen who were in sovereign German territory and presented them to the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories which in turn would take up these complaints with the German Labor Front authorities, with the Police, or the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.
On Page 5 it says then:
“I have informed the Reich Minister and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery what the Eastern Ministry has done in the sphere of political direction in a letter dated 28 May 1944, and I am asking you, my Führer, to have the contents read to you.”
This is a reference to a further statement.
On Page 6 it states:
“I am asking you, my Führer, to tell me whether you still desire my activity in this field, for since it has not been possible for me to report to you orally, and the problems of the East are brought to you and discussed from various sides, I must, in consideration of this development, assume that you perhaps consider my activity as no longer necessary.
“In addition rumors are spread by sources unknown to me of the dissolution of the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories; in fact it is said that these rumors are used in official correspondence to the highest Reich authorities because of various demands which have been made. Under such circumstances fitting work is not possible, and I ask you to give me directives as to how I should act in view of the state of affairs which has developed.”
In the middle of the next paragraph, I point out the following, from ideas that I voiced first in my speech of 20 June and in my protest during the meeting of 16 June. And it says here literally:
“This plan provided that in order to mobilize all the national forces of the Eastern peoples, they should be promised in advance a certain autonomy and the possibility of cultural development, with the aim of leading them against the Bolshevist enemy. This plan, which in the beginning I ventured to assume you approved of, has not been carried out, because the peoples were treated in a way which was politically opposite to this.
“Solely and only because of the agrarian order of 1942, approved by you, has their willingness to work been maintained to the end in view of a certain hope of acquiring property.”
Attached to this letter to the Führer there is the suggestion for the adjustment of the Eastern policy, which is reiterated for the last time. And in Paragraph 2 in the middle of Page 2 it says:
“These regional and local offices for the peoples of the East, attached to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, are, in the name of the Reich Government, to be recognized by him as national committees at a date to be fixed by the Führer. The term ‘National Committee’ is to be understood by the Reich Government to mean that these authorized spokesmen can submit the wishes and complaints of their peoples.”
On Page 2 in the middle, it says:
“In the leadership of the peoples of the East...”
THE PRESIDENT: Is the Tribunal interested in all this detail? The substance of it has been given by the witness, has it not? He summarized the whole letter before he began to read any of it. There is nothing new up to now.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, the defendant wanted to summarize again briefly what his ideas were for the Ukraine, namely, autonomy, free cultural development; and that was the core of the difference with Koch, namely, that Koch stressed mainly the idea of exploitation; therefore the defendant wanted to say once more what was the whole plan of his intentions towards the Soviet Union. But this topic can now be dropped.
Before I make a statement about the question of the willingness to do construction work in the Ukraine I want to have the defendant make a statement on the subject of the treatment of prisoners of war. Document 081.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it anywhere in your books? Is it Document 081-PS?
DR. THOMA: It has been submitted under a USSR exhibit number.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
Have you got it, Defendant?
ROSENBERG: It is Exhibit USSR-353. The complaints regarding prisoners of war came from various sources. Fairly near the beginning they were already lodged with the Eastern Ministry; then later on, particularly during the winter 1941-1942, they were brought by passing officers or soldiers and were reported to me by my political department. We then passed these complaints on to the competent military offices with a request that, for obvious reasons, they should be given consideration.
These complaints were received frequently and my staff, as time went by, stated to me that they encountered a great deal of understanding for these wishes, particularly for the wish expressed by us that prisoners from this large number of Soviet prisoner-of-war camps should be selected according to their nationality and taken to small camps, because through this national segregation, good political and humane treatment would be best guaranteed. In view of the numerous complaints about the death of many thousands of Soviet prisoners, I received more than once reports that during battles of encirclement, units of the Red Army had defended themselves in the hardest way and had not surrendered. In fact they were completely exhausted from hunger when they finally were captured by the Germans, and even numerous cases of cannibalism had been established, born of their tenacity not to surrender in any case.
The third complaint I received was to the effect that political commissars were shot. This complaint too was passed on by us. That an order existed in this connection was unknown to me. We concluded from other reports that here clearly there must have been a political or police reprisal, since we heard that many German prisoners, who later were freed, were most of them found, again dead or mutilated. Later on I was informed that such shootings were prohibited, and thus we assumed that the political commissars also belonged to the regular Red Army.
Now here is Document 081-PS. It has been stated by the Prosecution that this is a letter from the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories to the Chief of the OKW. The document was also found in my files. But it is not a letter from me to the Chief of the OKW, Keitel; on the contrary, it was obviously deposited in my office by the sender. In the left-hand top corner on Page 1, it can be seen that there is a figure “I.” That means Department “I.” In the case of letters originating from me such a reference would always be absent, since “I” was not a department of my own office. Furthermore, letters of mine to the Chief of the OKW were always of a personal character, either beginning with the name of the addressee, or a personal address. Chief of the OKW is the office. In the same way the ordinary address, “Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories,” would not be a personal letter to me, but would mean the office.
I will not go into these details, but I will take the liberty of reading one final paragraph in connection with which I may also state that it is in keeping with the spirit which I endeavored to instill in my collaborators. And likewise, they thought that they ought to act and express themselves in this spirit. It states, literally, on Page 6:
“The main demand...”
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date?
ROSENBERG: The letter is dated 28 February 1942. That is to say, it was in the winter, in that dreadful cold period. On Page 6 it states literally:
“The main demand will have to be that the treatment of prisoners of war be carried out in accordance with the laws of humanity and as befits the dignity of Germany...
“It is understandable that the numerous cases of inhuman treatment of German prisoners of war by members of the Red Army which have been recorded have so embittered the German troops that they wish to pay them back in their own coin.
“Such reprisal measures, however, in no way improve the situation of German prisoners of war but must ultimately result in both sides no longer taking any prisoners.”
I merely wanted to quote this letter because I have no other documents at my disposal on the activity of my political department, and this is only an example of the work, which I think touches on these problems.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I wanted to bring to an end questions relating to the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories by submitting an affidavit from Professor Dr. Dencker on the employment of agricultural machinery in the Ukraine. Document Rosenberg-35 has already been granted me by the Tribunal. This affidavit concerns the following...
THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished your examination now?
DR. THOMA: I have finished the questions relating to the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. I have only a few more brief questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has seen this affidavit recently so there is no need to read it. Now, if you will, give us the exhibit number.
DR. THOMA: Rosenberg-35. This deals with machinery which had a value of 180 millions and was delivered to the Ukraine—agricultural machinery.
Witness, were you a member of the SA or the SS?
ROSENBERG: No, I belonged neither to the SA nor the SS.
DR. THOMA: So you have never worn an SS uniform?
ROSENBERG: No.
DR. THOMA: Do you know anything about concentration camps?
ROSENBERG: Yes. This question, of course, has been put to everybody and the fact that concentration camps existed became known to me in 1933. But although this may appear a repetition, I must nevertheless state that I knew by name only two concentration camps, Oranienburg and Dachau. When these institutions were explained to me I was informed, among other things, that in one concentration camp there were 800 communist functionaries whose previous sentences averaged 4 year prison terms or partly also penitentiary terms. In view of the fact that this involved a complete revolution and even though it had legal basis it was still something revolutionary, I considered it comprehensible that protective custody should be for some time decreed by this new State for these hostile persons. But at the same time I saw and heard how our toughest opponents, against whom otherwise no charges of a criminal nature were made, were treated so generously that, for example, our strongest opponent, the Prussian Minister Severing was retired with full ministerial pension, and I considered this very attitude as National Socialistic. Thus I had to assume that these arrangements were politically and nationally necessary, and I was thoroughly convinced of this.
DR. THOMA: Did you participate in the evacuation of the Jews from Germany?
ROSENBERG: I should perhaps add one thing: I visited no real concentration camp, neither Dachau nor any other one. Once—it was in 1938—I questioned Himmler on how things really were in the concentration camps and told him that one heard from the foreign press all sorts of derogatory atrocity reports. Himmler said to me, “Why don’t you come to Dachau and take a look at things for yourself? We have a swimming pool there, we have sanitary installations—irreproachable; no objections can be raised.”
I did not visit this camp because if something actually improper had been going on, then Himmler, upon being questioned about it, would probably not have shown it to me. On the other hand I desisted from going for reasons of good taste; I simply did not want to look at people who had been deprived of their liberty. But I thought that such a talk with Himmler made him aware that such rumors were spreading.
A second time, later on—I cannot say, however, whether it was before or after the outbreak of the war—Himmler himself spoke to me about the matter of the so-called Jehovah’s Witnesses, that is, about a matter which has also been submitted by the Prosecution as a religious persecution. Himmler told me only that it was certainly impossible to put up with conscientious objections, considering the situation the Reich was in, that it would have incalculable consequences; and he went on to say that he had often talked personally to these internees in order to understand them and eventually convince them. That, he said, has been impossible, however, because they replied to all questions with quotations—quotations from the Bible which they had learned by heart, so that nothing was to be done with them. From that statement by Himmler I gathered that since he was telling me such a story he could not possibly want to plan or carry out executions of these Jehovah’s Witnesses.
An American chaplain has very kindly given me in my cell a church paper from Columbus. I gather from that that the United States, too, arrested Jehovah’s Witnesses during the war and that until December 1945, 11,000 of them were still detained in camps. I presume that under such conditions, every state would answer in some way such a refusal of war service; and that was my attitude too. I could not consider Himmler wrong on this point.
DR. THOMA: Could you intervene in the case of Pastor Niemöller?
ROSENBERG: Yes. When the case of Pastor Niemöller was being tried in Germany I sent one of my staff to the trial because I was interested in it both from an official and humane point of view. This official—his name was Dr. Ziegler—made a report to me from which I concluded that this arraignment was based partly on misunderstandings on the part of the authorities, and furthermore that he was not as seriously incriminated as I had assumed. I then submitted that report to the Deputy of the Führer, Rudolf Hess, and I asked him whether he could not give this case consideration also, and after some time, when I was with the Führer once, I brought the conversation around to this subject, and stated that I thought this whole trial and the subsequent handling most unfortunate. The Führer told me:
“I have asked only one binding statement from Niemöller—that he, as a clergyman, will not challenge the State. He has refused to give that and hence I cannot set him free. Apart from that, I ordered that he receive the most decent treatment possible, that he, being a heavy smoker, receive the best cigars, and that he have the means for carrying on all learned studies, if he wants to do this.”
I do not know on what reports the Führer based this statement, but as far as I was concerned it was clear that I was not in a position to intervene any further in this matter.
DR. THOMA: We come now to the last question but one: Is it true that after the seizure of power, you made a certain examination of your attitude towards the Jews, and that the whole treatment of Jews immediately after the seizure of power underwent a certain modification? Further, that originally it had been intended to settle the Jewish question in quite another way?
ROSENBERG: I will not deny that during that time of struggle up to 1933, I too had used strong polemic arguments in my writings, and that many hard words and suggestions appeared in that connection. After seizure of power I thought—and I had good reason to think that the Führer thought so too—that now one could renounce this method, and that a certain parity and a chivalrous treatment of this question should be observed. Under “parity” I understood the following—and I stated it in a public address on 28 July 1933 and also at the Party rally in September 1933 publicly over all the broadcasting systems—that it was not possible, for example, that the communal hospitals in Berlin should have 80 percent Jewish doctors when 30 percent was their ratio. I stated further at the Party rally that we had heard of conditions that the Reich government, in connection with all these parity measures and beyond that, were making exceptions for all those members of the Jewish people who had lost a relative, father or son, during the war; and I used the expression that we would now have to make efforts to solve this problem in a chivalrous way. That it turned out otherwise is a tragic destiny, and I must state that the activities following in connection with the emigration and the support of this emigration in many countries abroad had as a result the aggravation of the situation; then things occurred which were regrettable and I must say robbed me of the inner strength to continue petitioning the Führer for the method I favored. As I said, what was stated here recently in the veiled phraseology of the police and made known here, and what has been testified to here the other day, I considered simply impossible and I would not have believed it even if Heinrich Himmler himself had related it to me. There are things which, even to me, appear beyond the humanly possible, and this is one of them.
DR. THOMA: I have one last question. In connection with this question I should like to submit Exhibit Rosenberg-15, Document 3761-PS. This is contained in the document book but it has not yet been submitted to the Tribunal as an Exhibit. It contains a letter from Rosenberg to Hitler, written in 1924, containing the request that he should not be nominated as a candidate for the Reichstag.
Witness, you have taken part in all phases of the development of National Socialism from its beginning to its dreadful end. You have participated in its meteoric rise and its dreadful descent, and you know well that everything centered in this one person. Will you inform the Tribunal what you did yourself, and how much you were able to accomplish to avert having all the power centered in this one single person, and what you did to have the effect in every way alleviated? I am showing you first this document given to you, and then Document 047-PS, which has also already been submitted to the Tribunal under the Exhibit Number USA-725.
[The documents were submitted to the defendant.]
ROSENBERG: I did actually serve this National Socialist movement from its very first days on and I was completely loyal to a man whom I admired during these long years of struggle because I saw with what personal devotion and passion this former German soldier worked for his people. As far as I personally am concerned, this letter refers to an epoch...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, exactly what is your question to the witness? We don’t want him to make a speech. We only want to know what question you are putting to him.
DR. THOMA: What suggestions did you make, and did you publicly advocate suggestions to restrict the authority of the Führer?
ROSENBERG: I must say that at that time I advocated—and this in full agreement with Adolf Hitler—and I advocated in my book, Myth of the 20th Century, the view that the Leadership Principle did not consist of one head but that both the Führer and his collaborators are to be bound by common duties. Further, that this Leadership Principle concept should be understood to mean the establishment of a senate or, as I described it, Ordensrat, which would have a correcting and advisory function.
That point of view was emphasized by the Führer himself when he had a senate hall with 61 seats built in the Brown House in Munich, because he himself considered it necessary. Then I again advocated this policy in a speech in 1934, but...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think this is in answer to the question as to what he did to limit the Führer’s power. We want to know what he did, if anything, to limit the Führer’s power.
DR. THOMA: In a public meeting he pointed out that—I draw your attention to Document Book 1, Volume II, on Page 118...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, I didn’t want you to point it out to me, I wanted the witness to point that out to the Tribunal.
DR. THOMA: In that case, will you concentrate on those two speeches which you made at that time.
ROSENBERG: I can quote the speeches, but they are not a direct answer to the question either. They signify that I stated that the National Socialist State may not be a caste which reigns over the German nation and that the Führer of a nation must not be a tyrant. However, I did not see in Adolf Hitler a tyrant, but like many millions of National Socialists I trusted him personally on the strength of the experience of a 14-year-long struggle. I did not want to limit his own full power, conscious though I was that this meant a personal exception for Adolf Hitler, not in keeping with the National Socialist concept of the State. Nor was this the Leadership Principle as we understood it or a new order for the Reich.
I served Adolf Hitler loyally, and what the Party may have done during those years, that was supported by me too. And the ill effects, due to the wrong masters, were branded by me, in the middle of the war, in speeches before political leaders, when I stated that this concentration of power as it existed at that moment, during the war, could only be a phenomenon of the war and could not be regarded as the National Socialist conception of a State. It may be opportune for many, it may be opportune for 200,000 people, but to adhere to it later on would mean the death of the individuality of 70 million.
I said that in the presence of the Higher SS leaders and other organization leaders or Gauleiter. I got in touch with the heads of the Hitler Youth, together with my staff, fully conscious that after the war a reform would have to be carried out here in the Party, so that the old demands of our Movement, for which I too had fought, would find respect. However, that has not been possible any more; fate has finished the Movement and has taken a different course.
DR. THOMA: Witness, can you state a concrete fact from which it arises that the Party, from the beginning, did not have the idea of coming to power alone but also by collaborating with other parties?
ROSENBERG: That, of course, is a historical development of 14 years, and if I can evaluate that letter here, then I would like to say that at the end of 1923, after the collapse of the so-called “Hitler Putsch,” when the then representatives of the Party either were arrested or had emigrated to Austria, and when I remained in Munich with a few others, I advocated that a new development must take place and that the Party should prove itself in a parliamentary contest.
The Führer, who was then in prison at Landsberg, turned that suggestion down. My collaborators and I continued to try to influence him, however, whereupon the Führer wrote me a long, handwritten letter, which is also in the files, in which he once more developed his reasons for not wanting to comply with my suggestion. Later on, nevertheless, he agreed.
And here in this letter I asked him—he later agreed—not to nominate me as Reichstag candidate, because I felt not entitled to the privileges of a Reichstag deputy by favoring a Reichstag election, and secondly, because I felt myself too new in Germany for exposing myself in such a way after only a few years of activity.
DR. THOMA: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendant’s counsel want to ask any questions?
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, in September and October 1942 you received various reports regarding unbearable conditions in connection with the recruiting of workers in the Occupied Eastern Territories. Did you investigate to find out whether the statements contained in these reports were true?
ROSENBERG: These allegations, which were received by the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, have been constantly checked by Main Department of Labor and Social Policy during all these years and I asked the Tribunal to hear as a witness here the official who always had charge of this question, Dr. Beil. This request has been granted by the Tribunal, but I now hear that Dr. Beil is ill and that he can give a report of his experiences only by a written statement. From my knowledge I can say the following:
These matters were reported to me frequently by Dr. Beil and the so-called Central Department for People of Eastern Nationalities. In a letter which has already been mentioned I transmitted them to Sauckel. Then they were always sent to the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine or some other administrative officials for investigation and comments. A part of these proved to be correct, a part proved to toe untrue and exaggerated; and as far as I know, the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, Sauckel, even made the complaints received from me an occasion for his own intervention, as did the German Labor Front, which was responsible for the welfare of all foreign workers in Germany. There was constant negotiation with the head of this Labor Front, and the Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories made requests here continuously, until eventually, at the end of 1944, Dr. Ley, as the chief of this welfare department, thought that he could inform me that now after considerable difficulties, really lasting and good conditions had been achieved. I replied to him even then that I could express my pleasure about it, but that I still received reports that here and there things were going wrong. In practice the members of my ministry, together with inspectors of the German Labor Front, went to inspect a number of labor camps in order to investigate the complaints and then have them adjusted by the Labor Front.
DR. SERVATIUS: You are talking here mainly about conditions in Germany, which did not come under your jurisdiction. What did you do regarding Koch? Is the memorandum of 16 March 1943, which has already been mentioned here, a reply to these complaints? In that memorandum you write Koch that he must use legal means only and that he must call the guilty to account. Was this an answer to these reports?
ROSENBERG: Yes, it was an answer because by December 1942 there had been quite a number of complaints already.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what did Koch reply?
ROSENBERG: Koch replied to me that he, for his part, also wanted and would employ legal means, but in the document read today, in his report dated 16 March 1943, he complained several times that I did not always believe these assurances, but that in every case the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories not only intervened, but even demanded of him a report on the carrying out of these instructions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Thus he denied considerable abuses?
ROSENBERG: Yes, he denied considerable abuses. He referred in the document to one particularly serious case, namely, that individual houses had been burned down in Volhynia because those who had been called upon to work had resisted the recruiting by means of force, as he explained, and he said that he had no other way of doing it. He added that this case in particular had caused new complaints on the part of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was he entitled to such measures, in your opinion?
ROSENBERG: Reich Commissioner Koch had jurisdiction over the execution of all orders coming from the highest Reich authorities. He was responsible for the execution of all measures within the bounds of the instructions. He had, I now believe, often overstepped the bounds of these instructions and acted on his own initiative in taking, as he thought, exclusively war economic measures. Sometimes I heard of these measures, and often I did not, as appears from the document.
THE PRESIDENT: The question you were asked was whether in your opinion he was entitled to burn houses because people refused to work, and you have given a long answer which seems to me to be no answer to the question.
ROSENBERG: In my opinion he did not have the right to burn down houses and therefore I intervened, and he tried to justify himself.
DR. SERVATIUS: In order to carry out the labor recruiting, there were to be recruiting measures which, it is true, had to be applied with a certain amount of administrative coercion. How far was coercion permissible, is there legal and illegal coercion, and how do you judge the measures that were carried out in practice?
ROSENBERG: I myself insisted up until 1943 on a voluntary recruitment. But in the face of the urgent demands from the Führer I could not maintain this stand any longer and I agreed therefore—in order to have a legal form at least—that certain age groups should be called up. From these age groups all those working who were needed in the Occupied Eastern Territories were to be excluded. But the others were to be brought from all sides with the help of their own administrations in the regional commissariat, that is, the little burgomasters in the Occupied Eastern Territories, and there is no doubt, of course, that to give force to these demands the police stood at the disposal of the administration in the execution of this program.
DR. SERVATIUS: If there were abuses, could Koch stop them? Did you have no influence in the matter?
ROSENBERG: It was the duty of the Reich commissioner to whom the regional government of the Ukraine was subordinated to investigate and to take action, in accordance with the instructions which he had received from me.
DR. SERVATIUS: But why did you go to Sauckel as well? Was it Sauckel’s duty also to stop this?
ROSENBERG: Sauckel, as the deputy of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, had the right to give instructions to me, as Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and over and above that, he had the right to bypass me and give instructions to the Reich commissioners, a right which, he used a few times in giving lectures in the general districts of the Ukraine and of the Eastern territories.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was he—was Sauckel responsible for the conditions in the Ukraine?
ROSENBERG: Sauckel was not responsible for the execution of these demands, but of course on the basis of the authority given him by the Führer he made the demands so harsh and exact that the responsible regional governments of the commissioner general felt themselves bound by conviction and appearance to back up the recruiting of labor by force as appears, for example, from the report, Document 265-PS, from the Commissioner General in Zhitomir. I think this can also be seen from the report of the District Commissioner in Kovno, of which I cannot give the exact number.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have an organization of his own?
ROSENBERG: Yes, he had a staff, but I cannot make a statement on the size of it. He took care only that the civil administration had labor offices attached to it, and his requirements as to the civil administration in the East for the direction of these labor offices were forwarded to the administrative offices. To my knowledge he did not have a large organization.
DR. SERVATIUS: Before Sauckel came into your ministry was there not already a department of “Labor,” which had its corresponding subordinate departments on the middle and lower levels?
ROSENBERG: I cannot give you a precise answer to that. At any rate, I think a department “Labor and Social Policy” was set up almost at the beginning of the ministry, but at the moment I am not able to tell you the exact date. Perhaps Dr. Beil’s statement will contain some details.
DR. SERVATIUS: Thus, you are not informed regarding the organization of this recruitment of workers?
ROSENBERG: No, I am informed as far as I have just told you, but I cannot give you exact information about the date of the foundation of this main department “Labor and Social Policy” in the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did labor offices for the Occupied Eastern Territories exist, which had their head in your ministry?
ROSENBERG: The work—yes, insofar as the Main Department of Labor and Social Policy did of course co-operate with the civil administration; that is, both Reich commissioners had continuous contact and had correspondence with the appropriate department, namely the labor office attached to the Reich commissioner. A correspondence with the lower agents, with the general districts, was naturally not carried on, but there was continuous consultation with the appropriate department attached to the Reich commissioner.
DR. SERVATIUS: In your letter you speak of “Sauckel offices.” What offices do you mean by this?
ROSENBERG: Well, I mean, first of all, his immediate deputy Peuckert, who later, in order to guarantee smooth co-operation, formally took over the direction of this main department of “Social Policy.” He was but very rarely at the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories since he was officially working especially for Sauckel; and apart from that, Sauckel had a few other gentlemen with whom my main department negotiated continuously regarding the reduction of the quotas...
THE PRESIDENT: Surely, the witness Sauckel will give all this information. What is the good of wasting our time putting it to Rosenberg?
DR. SERVATIUS: It is important in order to ascertain the responsibility. Later I cannot call on Rosenberg as a witness again; a number of questions will arise, to which I...
THE PRESIDENT: I understand that, of course, but these are all details of Sauckel’s administration which Sauckel must know himself.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, but I will have no opportunity later on to question the witness Rosenberg regarding the individual authorities within the organization, namely: Who was responsible, who had the right to supervise, who had the duty to intervene? Why were letters addressed to individuals? Why has he to answer them? One cannot understand that, if one does not ask the witness—if he is not first asked about it before. I would suggest that the witness Rosenberg should be called again in connection with Sauckel’s case, after Sauckel has spoken; that would save time.
THE PRESIDENT: There is no issue with the Prosecution about it. If there is no issue with the Prosecution, then Sauckel’s evidence about it will be quite sufficient.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the witness Rosenberg, in his letter—in a letter addressed to Sauckel—mentioned the fact that his offices were using these objectionable methods. Since in my opinion such offices did not exist, and thus Rosenberg was addressing the wrong person, I must establish what offices there really were. It is a complaint about conditions that were oppressive to Rosenberg and he addressed himself to Sauckel, instead of Koch.
THE PRESIDENT: Ask him some direct question, will you?
DR. SERVATIUS: What did Sauckel do upon receiving the letter you addressed to him?
ROSENBERG: I did not receive a letter in reply to it; but I heard that Sauckel, then at a meeting of his labor offices in Weimar, went into these complaints in detail and that he tried to do his best to remove the grounds for these complaints.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did not that meeting take place a fortnight later, that is on 6 January 1943, and were you not present also?
ROSENBERG: Possibly. I spoke at a meeting at Weimar once; whether or not it was this one, I am not able to say.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you hear Sauckel’s speech at this meeting?
ROSENBERG: No, I have no recollection of it.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you get the speech in writing later?
ROSENBERG: I cannot remember that either.
DR. SERVATIUS: Later on I want to submit the speech as a document in connection with Sauckel’s case. I have a number of further questions.
Did other departments, too, in the occupied territories, concern themselves with the recruitment of laborers?
ROSENBERG: Yes, I received indeed some reports that also, for its part, the so-called Todt Organization engaged workers for the carrying out of their technical tasks, and I think also the railway administration and other offices in the East were making efforts to get new workers for themselves.
DR. SERVATIUS: Is it not correct that the Armed Forces were demanding workers, that workers were demanded for road construction, were needed by the domestic industry, and that there was a general effort to keep manpower at home and not let them go to Germany?
ROSENBERG: That is correct, and it is a foregone conclusion that the Armed Forces, the Todt Organization, and other offices wanted to keep as many laborers as possible in the country for the growing amount of work there and they probably did not like to part with their workers. That goes without saying.
DR. SERVATIUS: Sauckel repeatedly pointed out that workers must be supplied under all circumstances and that all obstacles must be removed. Did that refer to the resistance of the local offices which did not want to give up these workers?
ROSENBERG: It certainly referred to this local manpower, and in a conference which I had with Sauckel in 1943 and which is also in evidence as a document here but which was not submitted today, reference was made to it. Sauckel stated that by order of the Führer he would have to raise a large number of new workers in the East and that in this connection, I am thinking of the Armed Forces most of all who had been, as he expressed it, hoarding workers who might instead have been active in Germany.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have anything to do with the recruitment of workers, which took place in connection with the germanizing of the East?
ROSENBERG: I cannot quite understand this question. What do you mean in this case by “germanizing”?
DR. SERVATIUS: The SS undertook the resettlement in the East. In connection with this manpower was shifted. Was this manpower allotted to Sauckel upon his request?
ROSENBERG: First of all I do not know exactly which resettlement you are talking about.
DR. SERVATIUS: A report has been presented to me which concerns the Jews who were sent into Polish territory. I assume that they reached your territory, too.
Do you not know about that?
ROSENBERG: Based on my own knowledge, I can say only that this concentration of the Jewish population from Eastern Germany, in certain cities and camps in the East, was carried out under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the German Police, who also had this assignment for the Occupied Eastern Territories. In connection with the resettlement in camps and with the concentrations in ghettos, there probably also developed a shortage of labor or something like that. I merely do not know what that has to do with Germanization.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Before we adjourn, I should like to know what the position is about the Defendant Frank’s documents. Does anybody know anything about that?
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I wish to say that insofar as we are concerned, we have been in consultation with Dr. Seidl for the Defendant Frank as well as the representatives of the Soviet prosecuting staff. We are prepared to be heard at any time that the Tribunal would care to hear us on the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Then, Dr. Thoma, how many more witnesses have you got and how long do you think you will be in the Defendant Rosenberg’s case?
DR. THOMA: I have only one witness, Your Honors, the witness Riecke. I believe that as far as I am concerned, he can be examined in one hour at the most; I do not think it will take as long as that. After that, it depends on the cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, yes; then you may finish the Defendant Rosenberg’s case tomorrow?
DR. THOMA: It depends upon the cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, of course. Then, Dr. Seidl, will you be able to go on at once in Frank’s case? Supposing we finish Rosenberg tomorrow—tomorrow is Wednesday, is it not? Will you be able to go on on Thursday morning in Frank’s case?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I can start with Frank’s case as soon as Rosenberg’s case is finished. As far as the documents are concerned, there was difficulty regarding only one document and I have foregone the presentation of this one document. But apart from that, these documents have for the greater part already been presented by the other side.
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one document in question, we can hear you upon it now. As I understand you, you have only one document about which there is any difference of opinion.
DR. SEIDL: That has been settled already because I have given up presentation of this document.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. There is no further difference of opinion?
DR. SEIDL: There is no further difference of opinion.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then you are perfectly ready to go on?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Have the documents been translated yet?
DR. SEIDL: As far as I know, they already have been all translated.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, thank you.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 17 April 1946 at 1000 hours.]
ONE HUNDRED AND TENTH DAY Wednesday, 17 April 1946
Morning Session
[The Defendant Rosenberg resumed the stand.]
MR. DODD: Just before recess yesterday afternoon the Tribunal inquired as to the status of the Frank Document Book, and when I informed the Tribunal that we were prepared to be heard Dr. Seidl advised that we had a pact to which we had agreed. I was not aware of that at the time. I think we were both a little bit in error. The situation is that last night about 6 o’clock we did reach an agreement so that there is no difficulty at all about the Frank books.
DR. THOMA: I would like to make a brief correction. Yesterday I spoke about the request for a document on the setting up of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg. My client has repeatedly asked me to bring in this document. However, there is a possibility that I confused this document with other documents which I requested, but which were not granted. I just wanted to make that correction.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You do not want to do anything more than just make that verbal correction? Very well.
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other defendant’s counsel who wishes to ask any questions?
DR. HAENSEL: Witness, you were the Plenipotentiary of the Führer for the ideological objectives of the NSDAP and its affiliated organizations. Are you of the opinion that what you did as Plenipotentiary of the Führer in carrying out your duties and everything you said and wrote for these aims and for the systematic so-called ideological combating of Jewry may be considered as an official outline of the activity of the Party and its affiliated organizations?
ROSENBERG: If I may answer this long series of questions one by one I would like to say the following: My office, as far as ideological education was concerned, worked with the SS Main Office for Political Training. We were, of course, in constant contact with them. The so-called “guiding pamphlets” of the SS, which appeared as an instruction periodical, were read in my office. I myself had it repeatedly in my hands, and during these years I found that in this Office for Political Training, in these periodicals, a great number of very valuable articles with mostly very decent ideas was contained. This is one of the reasons why, through all these years, I did not enter into any conflict with the SS.
As far as the Jewish question is concerned, the objective as to this problem was expressed in the program of the NSDAP. That is the only official statement which guided the Party members. Anything which I said about it, and what others wrote about it, were just reasons that were set forth. Certainly much of that was accepted, but as far as the Führer and the State were concerned these proposals were not binding rules.
DR. HAENSEL: Was the objective of your fight against Jewry limited? Did you envisage that the Jews were to be eliminated from economic and State administration, or did you from the first have a vague notion of stronger measures, such as extermination, et cetera? What was your objective?
ROSENBERG: In agreement with the Party program, I had the one objective in mind—to change the leadership in the German State as it existed from 1918 to 1933! That was the vital aim. As to elimination, even from economic life, we did not talk about it at that time; and yesterday I already referred to two of my speeches—which are available in print—in which I declared that after the end of this harsh political battle an investigation or examination of the problem would have to take place. There was even earlier talk about the demand for Jewish emigration from Germany, quite rightly. Later, when matters became more critical, I expressed this idea again in conformity with the proposals of very prominent Jewish leaders that German unemployed be deported to Africa, South America, and China.
DR. HAENSEL: Then, following your train of thought of yesterday and today, one could differentiate three kinds of measures against the Jews: First, until 1933—up to the seizure of power—were the propagandistic measures; second, after 1933, those measures which found their expression in the anti-Jewish laws; and then, finally, after the outbreak of the war certain measures which without doubt can be considered as Crimes against Humanity. Do you agree with this tripartite arrangement?
ROSENBERG: Yes, it is approximately right.
DR. HAENSEL: Then I would like to call your attention to Group 2, that is, to those measures which were instituted after the taking over of power, and which were laid down in laws against the Jews. Did you participate in the formulating of the laws?
THE PRESIDENT: You are counsel, are you not, for the SS?
DR. HAENSEL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What have those questions got to do with the SS?
DR. HAENSEL: The questions concern the SS in the following way: If the Party as a whole had the objective of a clearly formulated anti-Jewish legislation, which was in the beginning quite orderly, then the SS was bound to this objective and for the time being had none beyond that point. I wanted to establish when the legislation and the measures against Jews turned into criminal acts, and that up to that time the SS in no manner took criminal measures against the Jews.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, he said already that the Jewish problem was contained in the Party program, and that is all that you want, is it not?
DR. HAENSEL: I wanted only to show that the fact that the Jewish problem was contained in the Party program does not prove that it was in the Party program as a Crime against Humanity. In the Party program there was simply a general sentence which I do not believe can be construed as a Crime against Humanity. In addition to that, there must be...
THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of construction of the Party program. It is not a matter for him to give evidence about. It is in a written document—the Party program is contained in the written documents.
DR. HAENSEL: But, in addition to the Party program, a great number of decrees and laws were issued later which expanded the Party program, and the question...
THE PRESIDENT: They are also documents which this Tribunal has to construe—not for this witness to construe.
DR. HAENSEL: The question is, insofar as the defendant can tell us, how far the SS participated in the carrying out of these regulations.
THE PRESIDENT: He can tell us the facts. He cannot tell us the laws or the interpretation of documents. If you are asking him about facts, well and good; but if you are asking him to interpret the Party program or to interpret the decrees, that is a matter for the Tribunal.
DR. HAENSEL: Very well.
[Turning to the defendant.] In your books you advocated the objective that all Germans should be unified in a Greater Germany, and that point is also set down in the Party program?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
DR. HAENSEL: Did you believe that this was possible only through the preparation for a war, or did you believe that it was just as possible through peaceful means?
ROSENBERG: In the beginning of my testimony I referred to a speech of mine made before an International Congress in 1932. Here this proposal was expressly approved by the Führer to the effect that the four great powers should investigate and examine the entire European problem. This proposal said that we would give up all claims to German colonies, to Alsace-Lorraine, to the Southern Tyrol as well as claims to the separated German...
THE PRESIDENT: We have heard all this before from the Defendant Göring and the Defendant Ribbentrop, and we said that we did not want to go into it again. In any event, it has nothing to do with the SS—nothing directly to do with the SS.
DR. HAENSEL: [To the defendant.] Just one more question. Do you know that the SS, as far as the Jews were concerned, followed secret aims and objectives, others than those that were published officially?
ROSENBERG: That I learned here.
DR. HAENSEL: You do not know that from your own knowledge?
ROSENBERG: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I have one single question to put to you. Under Document 091-PS the Prosecution submitted a letter which you, as the Chief of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, sent to Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands. In that letter you demanded that the library of the so-called Social Institute at Amsterdam be handed over to you. I do not know whether you recall this library. It was rather voluminous and of Socialist-Marxist content. The Prosecution did not submit the answer given by my client. Therefore, I have to ask you: Do you remember this matter and what answer did Seyss-Inquart give you?
ROSENBERG: I remember this library very well, for I was told about it. To my knowledge it represented the establishment of a spiritual center of the Second International in Amsterdam, in which the history of social movements in various countries was to be summarized in a library, so that on the basis of this scientific material now a spiritual political fight, a scientific fight...
DR. STEINBAUER: Very well. We want to be brief, and you know what I am talking about. What answer did you receive? Did Seyss-Inquart permit this library to be transferred to Germany, or did he demand that it remain in Holland?
ROSENBERG: It was at first agreed that this library would remain in Holland, and that the cataloging and classifying of this collection, which was not yet classified, was to take place in Amsterdam. In the course of the next few years this took place in Amsterdam. Only in the year 1944, when either the invasion had already begun or was surely imminent, when bombing attacks also increased in this area, part of this library was taken to Silesia; the other part, to my knowledge, did not get through, but remained in Emden; and the third part, I believe, was not removed.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it then correct that Seyss-Inquart prevented the taking away of this library from the Dutch working class?
ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
MR. DODD: Before we begin our discussion of some matters that we would like to go over, I wonder if you would be good enough to write your name a few times on these pieces of paper, both in pen and in pencil.
[Paper, pen, and pencil were handed to the defendant.]
Would you write “A. Rosenberg,” please, with pen, and “Alfred Rosenberg” with the pen; and would you handwrite the first initial of your last name with a capital?
Now, would you do the same thing with pencil on another piece of paper, “A. Rosenberg” in pencil, “Alfred Rosenberg,” and the first initial of your last name?
And then would you do one thing more, please. Would you print the first initial of your last name?
[The signatures were passed to Mr. Dodd.]
Now, yesterday afternoon, while you were on direct examination through your own counsel, you stated before the Tribunal that you did have a discussion with Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsführer SS, about concentration camps, and if I remember correctly, you said that that was some time in 1938; is that so?
ROSENBERG: Yes. I testified that I discussed the concentration camps with him once, but I cannot say with certainty that it was in 1938, as I did not make a note of it.
MR. DODD: Very good. He offered to have you go through one or the other of these camps, Dachau or some other camp; is that so?
ROSENBERG: Yes, he then told me that I should take a look at the Dachau Camp.
MR. DODD: And you declined the invitation?
ROSENBERG: Right.
MR. DODD: And I understood you—if I recollect correctly, you said because you were quite sure that he would not show you the unfavorable things that were in that camp?
ROSENBERG: Yes, I assumed more or less that in case there really were unfavorable things, I certainly would not see them anyway.
MR. DODD: You mean that you simply assumed that there were unfavorable things; that you did not know there were unfavorable things?
ROSENBERG: I heard this through the foreign press and it is about...
MR. DODD: When did you first hear that through the foreign press?
ROSENBERG: That was already in the first months of 1933.
MR. DODD: And did you continuously read the foreign press about the concentration camps in Germany from 1933 to 1938?
ROSENBERG: I did not read the foreign press at all for unfortunately I do not speak English. I received only some excerpts from it from time to time, and in the German press there were occasional references to it with the strict declaration that these allegations were not true. I can still remember the statement by Minister Göring in which he said that it was beyond his comprehension that something like that could be written.
MR. DODD: But you thought they were true to the extent that there were unfavorable things in that place that Himmler might not show you.
ROSENBERG: Yes, I assumed that in such a revolutionary process surely a number of excesses were taking place, that in some districts also on occasion there might be conflicts, and that the fact that murders of National Socialists in the months subsequent to the seizure of the power continued most probably resulted in sharp countermeasures here and there.
MR. DODD: Did you think that was still going on in 1938, these measures against the National Socialists?
ROSENBERG: No. The chief reports upon the continuance of murders of members of the Hitler Youth, of the Police, and of members of the Party were made especially in 1943 and 1944, but I do not remember that many reports still were published about this in subsequent years...
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 1943 and 1944 or 1933 and 1934? Which is it?
ROSENBERG: 1933 and 1934, excuse me.
MR. DODD: But, in any event, in 1938 you had some knowledge in your own mind which made you think that it would not be profitable for you to inspect these camps because some things were going on there that would not be shown to you. Now, that is so, isn’t it?
ROSENBERG: No; but I said very frankly that under some circumstances excesses might be taking place, and I talked to Himmler about this matter so that he in any case knew that we were informed about such things from abroad and that he should watch his step. Only once did I receive a complaint directly myself.
MR. DODD: Now, turning to another matter, we also understood you to say yesterday that when you wrote your book, The Myth of the 20th Century, you expressed your personal opinion and you did not intend it to have any great effect upon state affairs. Is that a fair statement of your testimony of yesterday with respect to your book?
ROSENBERG: I did not quite follow the last sentence. I must say, I wrote The Myth of the 20th Century during the years 1927 and 1928 approximately, after certain historical and other preliminary studies. It was published in October 1930 with an introduction to the effect that this was a purely personal opinion, and that the political organization of which I was a member was not responsible for it.
MR. DODD: Very good. I will ask that you be shown Document 3553-PS. That is also, if Your Honor pleases, Exhibit Number USA-352. It is already in evidence.
[Turning to the defendant.] Now, you wrote a preface or a little introduction for that edition of that book. It is right there before you. You said in it:
“To the 150,000th copy: The Myth has today drawn deep, ineffaceable furrows into the emotional life of the German people. Every new edition is a clear indication that a decisive spiritual and mental revolution is growing into a historical event. Many things which in my book seemed to be a peculiar idea have already become a reality of State policy. Many other things will yet, I hope, materialize as a further result of this new vigor.”
You wrote that?
ROSENBERG: That is certainly entirely correct. This book of 700 pages does not concern only those points of which I am accused here. This book deals with a large number of problems, the problem of the peasants, of the world states, of the concept of socialism, of the relation between leadership, industry, and labor, a presentation of the judgment...
MR. DODD: Now, just a minute. I don’t think it is necessary for you to give us a list of the table of contents of the book. I simply asked you if you wrote that introduction.
ROSENBERG: Yes, of course.
MR. DODD: Now, with respect to the well-known forced labor program. I think it is perfectly clear to everyone who has been in attendance at these sessions before this Tribunal, and of course to yourself, that there was a forced labor program in effect, or a so-called slave labor program, both in the East and in the Western occupied countries. Isn’t that a fact?
ROSENBERG: Yes, the law of 21 March is concerned therewith with workers from the occupied countries who were to be taken to Germany. In Germany there was also a compulsory labor law.
MR. DODD: Now, there are only two possible offices under the then German State which can, by any stretch of the imagination, be held responsible either in part or altogether for that forced slave labor program. Isn’t that so? Two principal offices, at least.
ROSENBERG: Yes, indeed.
MR. DODD: And they were your own ministry and the office of the Defendant Sauckel. That is pretty simple. Is that true or not?
ROSENBERG: It is correct that Gauleiter Sauckel had been given the authority to pass orders to me and to all the supreme Reich authorities. It was my duty to make known and carry through these orders in the Occupied Eastern Territories according to my powers, my judgment, and my instructions.
MR. DODD: Did you carry out the compulsory labor directives under your ministry, force people to leave their homes and their communities to go to Germany and to work for the German State?
ROSENBERG: I fought for about three-quarters of a year for this recruitment of workers in the East to be put on a voluntary basis. From my record of a discussion with Gauleiter Sauckel still in the year 1943, it is very evident that at all times I made efforts to do this. I also mentioned how many millions of leaflets, of posters, and pamphlets I distributed in these countries so that this principle would be carried through. However, when I heard that if the number of German workers who had to go to the front could not be replaced, the German Army reserves would be at an end, then I could not protest any longer against recruitment of certain age-classes, or use of local authorities and forces of the gendarmerie to assist in this work. Yesterday I already ...
MR. DODD: What you are telling us is you tried to get them voluntarily and you found they would not go, so then you forced them to go. Isn’t that so?
ROSENBERG: That coercion took place here is true and is not disputed. Where an excess took place—and some terrible excesses took place—I did my utmost to prevent it or alleviate it.
MR. DODD: All right. You, of course, had promulgated an order in your own ministry concerning compulsory labor, had you not?
ROSENBERG: Yes. In the beginning, a general compulsory labor service law was promulgated.
MR. DODD: That’s right, on the 19th of December 1941.
ROSENBERG: It may be that it was promulgated about that time.
MR. DODD: Well, you can accept that as being so, I think, that that is the date of your decree concerning compulsory labor, the compulsory labor, significantly—I want to make this very clear to you—in the Occupied Eastern Territories.
ROSENBERG: Yes.
MR. DODD: That order was promulgated by you as the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
ROSENBERG: Yes.
MR. DODD: I ask that you be shown Document 1975-PS. It is Exhibit Number USA-820, already in evidence—not in evidence, I’m sorry. I am now offering it.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
I don’t care to stress this document too much except to have you verify the fact that this is the order which you promulgated, and in the first paragraph with the small Figure 1, you stated, “All inhabitants of the Occupied Eastern Territories are subject to the general liability for work according to their capacity.” And I wish to point out the paragraph under that small Number 1, with the Number 3, where you say, “A special ruling is drawn up for Jews.” That is the 19th day of December 1941.
ROSENBERG: The document which has been submitted to me is signed by the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine and is concerned with a skeleton law of the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. I ask that I be shown the skeleton law of the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories in order that I may judge correctly the carrying-out provisions issued by the Reich Commissioner.
MR. DODD: Well, we can make that available to you. This is taken from the official gazette of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. You are not disputing, are you, the fact that you promulgated this order and that these two paragraphs I read to you were in it?
ROSENBERG: That I am not disputing.
MR. DODD: All right. If you care to look at all at the other paragraphs and at other parts, I will see that they are made available to you, but for the present purposes I can assure you there is no trick in connection with this.
I want to move on to another document.
ROSENBERG: I would like to refer to just one point. Under Paragraph 1 it says expressly that people not completely able to work are to be used according to their capability for work. This shows the state of health had been considered.
MR. DODD: Yes, I read that to you.
Now, you had a permanent state secretary by the name of Alfred Meyer, isn’t that so?
ROSENBERG: I do not find anything here regarding the laws about Jews. There was a point mentioned about the directive for Jews, only it is not here.
MR. DODD: You will find it just below the sentence to which you made reference a minute ago, two paragraphs below it. There is a Figure 3 in parentheses and then this statement: “A special ruling is drawn up for Jews.”
Don’t you find that there?
ROSENBERG: I do not find it here—oh, on this page, yes. That refers to another law, yes.
MR. DODD: That’s all right. I just asked you if it was there, and it is. Let’s go on.
I asked you if you had a permanent staff secretary by the name of Meyer, Alfred Meyer, M-e-y-e-r.
ROSENBERG: Yes.
MR. DODD: I want to show you Document 580-PS, which will become Exhibit Number USA-821. Now, this is an order from your Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and it is signed by your permanent staff secretary, Alfred Meyer, and it is addressed to the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland, a man by the name of Lohse, L-o-h-s-e, and also to the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, a man by the name of Koch about whom we have heard a good deal in this Trial.
I want to have you agree, if you will, that the order calls for 247,000 industrial workers and 380,000 agricultural workers.
Now, I want you to turn specifically to Page 2 of the English translation and to Page 2, as well, of the German text, and Line 14 of the English text and Line 22 of the German text. The paragraph has before it the Figure 6, and it says:
“The workers are to be recruited. Forced enlistment should be avoided; instead, for political reasons, the enlistment should be kept on a voluntary basis. In case the enlistment should not bring the required results and there should be a surplus of workers still available, use may be made in case of emergency, and in agreement with the Commissioner General, of the decree dated 19 December 1941 concerning the introduction of compulsory labor in the Occupied Eastern Territories. Promises...”
So that this order, signed by Meyer of your staff, directing the Reich commissioners in the Eastern Occupied Territories, was founded on your decree of 19 December 1941 for compulsory labor.
ROSENBERG: Mr. Prosecutor, you read the introduction, and from that we can see also that my deputy clearly tried in every way to avoid forced enlistment and, as he says, the enlistment was to “be kept on a voluntary basis.” That is proof of what I already said yesterday, that Meyer, my permanent deputy, most emphatically tried to work along these lines, and lastly this does not refer to arbitrary measures but rather to a general compulsory labor law in the Occupied Eastern Territories which would prevent hundreds of thousands who could neither work nor study from wandering about idly in the streets. I would however like to read also the end of the paragraph, and that says:
“Promises which cannot be kept may not be given, neither in writing nor verbally. Therefore, the announcements, posters, and appeals in the press and over the radio may therefore not contain any untrue information in order to avoid disappointment among the workers employed in the Reich, and thus reactions against future recruitment in the Occupied Eastern Territories.”
I think a more legal attitude in the midst of war is not at all thinkable.
MR. DODD: Very good. All I am trying to indicate here, and to see if you will not agree with it, is that you, nevertheless, despite these remonstrances and these objections which we do not deny that you made, did authorize your people in the Eastern Occupied Territories actually to conscript and force people to come to work in Germany, and you did it on the basis of your own decree. That is the point I am trying to make with you.
ROSENBERG: A compulsory labor law was issued by me at the end of 1941 for the territory of the Reichskommissariat concerned, that is, for the Ostland and for the Ukraine. The compulsory recruitment of this manpower for the Reich was not taken until much later, and compulsory labor service in the occupied countries was, in my opinion, legally necessary so that on the one hand no wildcat recruitment would take place, and also to prevent chaos resulting from the hundreds of thousands loitering in the streets.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering the question. You are giving a long paraphrase for the one word “yes,” which is the answer you ought to have made.
ROSENBERG: When compulsory labor service was also instituted for the Reich, I said that I was in favor of voluntary enlistment. I could not persist in this attitude for long and therefore, of course, I agreed that then also compulsory labor laws would have to be instituted. I already admitted that three times yesterday; I have not disputed it.
MR. DODD: Yes, I know you repeated it three times yesterday and again this morning. In your own defense document—Rosenberg-11, I think it is—which is the letter that you wrote to Koch on the 14th of December 1942—I don’t think it will be necessary to show it to you again; I think you saw it yesterday—you specifically mentioned to Koch the matter of picking up people from lines in front of theaters and off the streets, those people who were attending movies and matters of that sort. You knew that was going on under your decree of compulsory labor, didn’t you? You were objecting to it, but you knew it was going on.
ROSENBERG: Excesses are connected with every law, and as soon as I learned of excesses, I did take steps against them.
MR. DODD: Very good. Now, finally, with respect to this forced labor matter, would you say as a matter of fairness and honesty that your ministry was not very largely responsible for this terrible program of forcing people from their homes into Germany, or do you say that you must accept a very considerable responsibility for what happened to these hundreds of thousands of people out of the Eastern occupied areas?
ROSENBERG: I, of course, will take the responsibility for these laws which I issued, and for any framework of directives which were issued by my ministry. The territorial governments were legally responsible for their execution. Where they went beyond these measures—they were 1,500 kilometers away from me—I concerned myself with every case. Many exaggerations were made and excesses also took place. I admit that terrible things did occur. I tried to intervene, to apply punitive measures and because of this quite a number of German officials were taken to court and were sentenced.
MR. DODD: Leaving aside the terrible things that happened to people, assuming that no great violence took place, the very fact of forcing them against their wills to leave is something else that you will accept responsibility for, I assume.
ROSENBERG: Yes, indeed.
MR. DODD: And you also feel that a considerable part of this...
ROSENBERG: [Interposing.] I accept the responsibility due to a State law which empowered Gauleiter Sauckel to place these claims to me which I applied in legal form to the Eastern territories.
MR. DODD: Briefly, I want to remind you, while we are on this subject, that you acknowledged yesterday that you did consent to the taking of children as young as 10, 12, and 14 years old and removing them to Germany, and I think you told us that at first it did disturb you, but when you found out there were happy recreational circumstances, your mind was eased. Is that a fair statement of your position on forcing those children from the East?
ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct. I do not know just what the translation of the document was, but the opposite was true. I wanted to prevent anything from happening in any action in the operational zone which might, under certain circumstances, be of gravest importance for many children. Then, upon the request of the Army Group Center—which anyway would have done it on its own—I took over the care of these children on condition that I take most scrupulous care of them and care for their own mothers, that they have contact with their parents, and so that they might be returned to their homeland again later on. That is certainly the exact opposite of what the Prosecution has submitted from this document here.
MR. DODD: Well, I don’t want to dwell much longer on it except to remind you that that document which you have seen and which you discussed yesterday states, among other things, that by removing these children out of the East you will be doing more than one thing; you will be destroying the biological potentiality of those people in the East. That is what you approved among other things, isn’t it?
ROSENBERG: Yes. That is contained in the first point of the Prosecution and it was already read. I have made it clear by reading the whole document that my approval did not depend at all on that point, that in the first report I definitely refused that as an argument, and that only after hearing other information did I find a method, for which the women thanked me despite the fact that not I but the Hitler Jugend in Dessau and elsewhere deserve the credit for taking care of them in this way.
MR. DODD: Actually, I understand from all your testimony that, with the possible exception of the little while of which we have been talking, you have been very benign and humane towards these people under your jurisdiction in the Occupied Eastern Territories. You wanted to be very kind to them.
ROSENBERG: I do not want at all to claim for myself any such sentimental phraseology. However, in the midst of this terrible war in the East, which brought with it the continual murder of German employees and German agricultural officials, I only tried to carry on an intelligent policy and to induce the people to heart-felt voluntary co-operation.
MR. DODD: Yes. Now I ask that you be shown Document 1058-PS, which is (Exhibit USA-147.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
You now have that before you. It is an extract from a speech which you made with your closest collaborators, and it has been referred to before. It is a speech that you made on the 20th of June 1941, the day before the attack was launched against Soviet Russia. I want to refer to the very first paragraph, and the only one on the paper. It says: “The job of feeding the German people stands in these years without a doubt....”
ROSENBERG: What page is that?
MR. DODD: It is the first page; there is only one page. Oh, you have the whole document. You referred to it yesterday; I think you will be able to find it. It is at Page 8, Line 54. You may recall it; you talked about it yesterday. As a matter of fact, you said it was an impromptu speech. Do you find it on Page 8?
ROSENBERG: Yes, I have found it.
MR. DODD: In that paragraph you say, among other things—and I want to call it to your attention for a specific purpose—you say that the job of feeding the German people is at the top of the list, and that the southern regions and the northern Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. And you go on to say that you see no reason why there is any obligation to feed the Russian people with the surplus products of the territory. Then you say, “We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings.”
You then go on to say, “A very extensive evacuation will undoubtedly be necessary and the future will hold very hard years in store for the Russians.”
Now, you read us some parts of that speech yesterday that you seemed to think were quite to your credit. Were all parts of the speech impromptu or are you suggesting that only the parts that seem damaging to you now were impromptu?
ROSENBERG: I just used a few key words and gave the speech that way. This paragraph has been read by the Prosecution three or four times. Yesterday when we discussed this speech I myself expressly referred to this paragraph. Beyond that, I admitted that I was told by people connected with the Four Year Plan that it was not certain whether the industry of the Moscow industrial region could be fully maintained after its conquest—here the “wagon factories” are mentioned. Restriction might be necessary to some key industries, and through that a difficult problem in the supply of this area would arise. My remarks pointed out that, of necessity, these unemployed would probably have to be evacuated. I expressly referred to this document, namely, the first document of the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories on this question where, under seven most important points for the civilian administration, Point 3 concerns the feeding of the civilian population. Later in the document it says that famines are to be avoided in any event and that in such a case the population was to receive special rations. I believe that in these hard times, in view of the laws and directives, it was impossible for me to do more than that. My entire political and spiritual position is to be concluded from what I said yesterday about the demand for liberty and culture in the Ukraine, about the sovereignty of the Caucasians, and also about the Russian State and its big...
MR. DODD: All right. I don’t want you to go into all that. I understand you thoroughly, and I think everyone else does. I merely wanted to point out to you that on that early date you did say there would be harsh necessities and that there would be very many hard years for the Russians. That is all. And if you don’t want to acknowledge that you were serious in saying that, as you were in saying the other things, then I won’t press you on it.
I want to turn to document...
ROSENBERG: Mr. Prosecutor, I believe that not much more could have been done for this problem than by planning beforehand how to master the difficulties rather than afterwards. Other occupation forces have had the same experience.
MR. DODD: All right.
I ask that you be shown Document 045-PS, Exhibit USA-822.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
ROSENBERG: Perhaps I might say something more about the translation of this passage. It was translated to me that these measures were to be carried through “without any feeling.” In the original it says “beyond feeling,” or “above feeling.”
MR. DODD: All right, I accept your interpretation; we won’t have any trouble about that. Now, will you please look at this document? This is a memorandum found in your files, for your information.
ROSENBERG: Yes.
MR. DODD: You set out there, in the second paragraph, what you call the aim of German politics, notably in the Ukraine, as having been laid down by the Führer. They are, you say, exploitation and mobilization of raw materials, a German settlement in certain regions, no artificial education of the population towards intellectualism, but the preservation of their labor strength; apart from that, an extensive unconcern with the interior affairs.
Then, moving down a little bit—because I don’t think it is necessary to read all of it, much of it has been referred to in another document—we come down to the 12th line from the bottom of that paragraph. Beginning at the 14th line:
“After continuous observation of the state of affairs in the Occupied Eastern Territories, I am convinced that German politics may have their own, possibly contemptuous opinion of the qualities of the conquered peoples, but that it is not the mission of German political representatives to proclaim measures and opinions which could eventually reduce the conquered peoples to dull despair instead of promoting the desired utilization of manpower to capacity.”
Then, in the next paragraph, you say:
“If at home we had to announce our aims to the whole nation most openly and aggressively, in contrast to the others, the political leaders in the East must remain silent where German policy calls for necessary harshness. They must remain silent as to any derogatory opinions which they may form about the conquered peoples. Yes, a clever German policy may in certain circumstances do more in the German interest through alleviations which do not affect policy and certain humane concessions, than through open, inconsiderate brutality.”
Were you honestly expressing your views when you wrote that memorandum on the 16th of March 1942?
ROSENBERG: This document is correct. It was also submitted to me in the preliminary interrogation. It shows that, although I knew that the Führer had not accepted my more far-reaching proposals, I continued to fight for these more far-reaching proposals. And it shows, further, that I saw the Führer personally, so that a few crazy middle-class people in the East would not make derogatory remarks about other nations whose standard of living may to all appearances have been poor at the time. From the many thousands who came in there, I could not expect either sympathy or antipathy, but I could demand one thing of them if their attitude was contemptuous, and that was to keep it to themselves and to act decently.
In conclusion I would like to add something which is extraordinarily decisive, namely, it says here in the last paragraph, “I ask that the Führer rule on this record and the draft decree.” This instruction is unfortunately not attached to the document; I believe that much would have been proved from it.
MR. DODD: All right. Now let’s turn to Document R-36, Exhibit USA-699.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
You have seen this document before, haven’t you?
ROSENBERG: Yes, I have seen it.
MR. DODD: Now, this is a memorandum submitted to you by one of your subordinates, Dr. Markull, and directly submitted to you by Leibbrandt, also one of your subordinates, one of your top men, on the 19th of August 1942. I want you to follow along with me while I read you certain passages from it.
The first few lines are dated the 5th of September 1942, and it says, “To the Reich Minister; on the premises.” It states that there is enclosed a memorandum containing the opinion of Dr. Markull on the matter of the Bormann letter of the 23rd July.
Before we go into this just for a minute—if you will just pay attention to this—you told us yesterday that you were in disagreement with Bormann about some matters. Is that so?
ROSENBERG: I said...
MR. DODD: Just answer the question. Did you tell us that yesterday?
ROSENBERG: On decisive points I did not agree with Bormann. I testified that in the course of years I was assailed in such a way that, on occasion, I had to give him an appeasing answer. My whole policy was to...
MR. DODD: All right. Let’s look at this document, which is, as I say, a memorandum about a Bormann letter to you, dated the 23rd of July, I assume 1942:
“On 23 July 1942, Reichsleiter Bormann sent the Minister a letter which enumerates in eight paragraphs the principles which the Minister is to follow in administering the Occupied Eastern Territories.”
It goes on to say that you, in a message to the Führer dated the 11th of August 1942, explained in detail to what extent these principles are already being put into practice or used as a basis of policy.
The next paragraph says:
“Any person reading this correspondence is struck, first of all, by the complete agreement of concepts. The Minister”—that is you—“apparently was particularly concerned about two points. The first relates to the protection of German rule against the pressure of the Slav race; the second to the absolute necessity of simplifying the administration. These are indeed decisive problems, of which more will have to be said.”
Then there is this statement:
“For the rest, the Minister”—referring to you—“not only raises no objections against Bormann’s principles or even his phraseology; on the contrary, he uses them as a basis for his reply and endeavors to show that they are already being put into practice. When, however, Bormann’s letter was read out by Captain Zimmermann in a conference of the department chiefs, grave concern was shown at once, both on account of the phraseology of the letter and the future conduct of our Eastern policy.”
Then it goes on to say:
“In order to find out whether this concern is justified, it is best to start from a supposition which clearly shows the prevailing situation.”
Then, under the Number 1, Markull writes:
“Let us suppose Bormann’s letter were issued to the Reich commissioners as a ministerial decree. This supposition is by no means unrealistic since the Minister”—and that again refers to you—“appears to hold identical views. Since the Ostland presents a special case, and moreover the Ukraine is, or will become probably the most important region politically, the following discussion will mainly be based on that region.”
Then, going on:
“The consequences of a decree of this kind will best be judged by its effect on those men whose duty it is to put it into practice.”
Moving down a little bit, he says:
“Imagine the formulas of Bormann’s letter translated into the language of a member of the German civilian administration, and you will get, roughly, the following views:
“The Slavs are to work for us. Insofar as we do not need them, they may die. Therefore, compulsory vaccination and German health service are superfluous. The fertility of the Slavs is undesirable. They may use contraceptives or practice abortion, the more the better. Education is dangerous. It is enough if they can count up to 100. At best an education which produces useful coolies for us is admissible. Every educated person is a future enemy. Religion we leave to them as a means of diversion. As for food, they will not get any more than is necessary. We are the masters; we come first.”
Then it goes on to say:
“These sentences are by no means overstatements. On the contrary they are covered, word by word, by the spirit and the text of Bormann’s letter. Already at this point the question arises whether such a result is desirable in the interests of the Reich. It can hardly be doubted that these views would become known to the Ukrainian people. Similar opinions prevail already today.”
Moving on, the next paragraph, with the Number 2, says:
“But there is no real need to assume a fictitious decree as was done in Paragraph 1. The above-mentioned concept of our role in the East already exists in practice. The Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine has expounded his views of the Ukrainian people governed by him in three successive speeches at the inauguration....”—et cetera.
And he goes on to quote those speeches, which have been referred to before this Tribunal.
Then, in the next paragraph, he says that every visitor and every member of the local civil administration can confirm this from his own observations, and they show particularly clearly how well the soil is prepared for the Bormann letter. Then he goes on to quote statements that have been made by saying, “To be exact, we are here among negroes; the population is just dirty and lazy,” and so on.
And then, passing on, he says:
“I may add that Kreisleiter Knuth, whom the Gauleiter still retains in spite of the gravest accusations against his professional integrity, declared, in conversations on the Kiev question, that Kiev ought to be depopulated through epidemics. Altogether it would be best if the superfluous part of the population starved to death.”
Moving on further we come to the third paragraph down. It says:
“Finally among the district commissioners 80 percent oppose the views described above. In many conferences with the general commissioners they emphasized that the population ought to be treated decently and with understanding.”
And, that statements opposing such policies as referred to above will result in a catastrophe. That is what the next paragraph says.
And then Markull goes on to say:
“For the rest the only effect of the false concepts of the ‘master race’ is to relax the discipline of our officials.”
I will not take the time to read all of it. I am sure you are reading it. Then we move on and we come to this very significant paragraph, with a Number 5:
“However, it must be examined whether there is not in fact an agreement between the policy hitherto pursued and the Bormann letter in the sense that the decrees quoted above and the other instructions of the ministry are to be understood merely as tactical moves, whereas in fact there is no divergence of opinion. The Minister’s reply”—I remind you each time the Minister refers to you—“of 11 August might be considered to point in this direction.”
Then he goes on to say:
“In answer to this it should be pointed out that the Minister knows very well that it is not possible to reorganize a continent of the size of Russia by means of political tactics and by wearing the mask of a liberator, but only by applying a statesmanlike conception appropriate to the political conditions.”—And so on.
And finally he says:
“Another reason why...”
I want to be fair about this document with you. He indicates that perhaps it should not be interpreted merely as a tactical maneuver, because of the inconsistency which this would imply. For in that case the word “liberation” ought never to have been mentioned and no theater should be allowed to stay open, no trade school, no Ukrainian university should be allowed to function.
And finally I would like to read you—not finally—but I would like to read you this significant paragraph. It states—and I think you will allow me to summarize it—that this letter of Bormann’s, which originated from the field headquarters, simply cannot be issued as a ministerial decree, since it would disavow the entire policy hitherto announced by the Minister—yourself.
And in this connection, a few sentences down, says Markull:
“It is necessary to point once more to the obvious similarity between the opinions professed by Koch and the instructions given in the Bormann letter.”
Then, about halfway down the paragraph, it says only you can decide upon this question and he suggests certain considerations which might be useful, recounting some difficulties.
And finally you come, under Number II to the second paragraph:
“Without wishing to criticize in any way the statements of Reichsleiter Bormann it is yet necessary to point out that the wording of his letter does not always bring out clearly the importance of the issue at stake. A phrase like ‘brisk trade in contraceptives’ had better not be brought into connection with the name of the Führer. In the same way abrupt phrases like ‘vaccination of the non-German population is completely out of the question,’”—and so on—“would hardly seem to be entirely in keeping with the importance of the historical problems involved here.”
Finally, to go on, I want to read you this, under Number III, Markull states:
“The statements set out above may appear very sharp. They are, however, dictated by concern and duty.”
And finally—well, I don’t think there is any necessity to read the last paragraph. It merely talks about the political philosophy which is being raised in a grandiose manner by the Japanese ally in his new districts.
Now, you remember this memorandum that you received through your assistant, Leibbrandt, from your subordinate, Markull? You can answer that “yes” or “no,” by the way; that is all I want to know right now—whether or not you remember it. Will you wait just a minute?
ROSENBERG: Yes, I received this report from Dr. Leibbrandt, and I would like to make the following explanation.
MR. DODD: Just before you do that—you will have an opportunity; I won’t shut you up on any explanations or even attempt to—I have one or two things I would like to ask you about it, and then if you feel the need to explain them or anything else I feel sure the Tribunal will permit you to do so.
You had written a letter in answer to the Bormann letter, hadn’t you?
ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct.
MR. DODD: And you had agreed with these—if I may use the term—shocking suggestions of Bormann? In your letter you had agreed with these shocking suggestions of Bormann? “Yes” or “no”?
ROSENBERG: I wrote an appeasing letter so that I could bring about a pause in the constant pressure under which I was kept, and I would like to anticipate and say that my activity, and the decrees which I issued after this letter, did not change in any way; but, on the contrary, decrees were issued setting up a school system and for the further continuation of health control. I will discuss it further in my reply.
MR. DODD: You wrote this letter to the Führer; you did not write it to Bormann, did you? Your answer went to Hitler?
ROSENBERG: I wrote my reply to the Führer, yes.
MR. DODD: And you were appeasing the Führer as well, were you, when you mouthed back the phrases such as are repeated in this letter about the use of contraceptives and abortion?
ROSENBERG: No; besides...
MR. DODD: Wait until I finish. I was saying, in your letter to the Führer you wrote back those horrid suggestions of Bormann, didn’t you—those nasty, horrid suggestions of Bormann, I might say? You wrote them to Hitler?
ROSENBERG: I wrote a letter to the Führer, but did not use the wording of Bormann’s letter. I wrote appeasingly to the Führer that I was not doing any more than could and had to be done. I wanted to ward off an attack from headquarters for I knew it would come because I did more for the Eastern peoples than for the German people—that I was demanding more doctors than the German people had for their sick, that I was doing more in my capacity as Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories for the health problem and thereby for the Eastern people than German doctors could do for the German people. The attack had reached such proportions that Koch finally accused me of promoting a policy of immigration. That was the reason why the conflict arose shortly thereafter and was brought to the Führer.
MR. DODD: Just so there will be no doubt about this—I don’t want there to be any misunderstanding and nobody else does—are you telling us that you did not write back almost word for word what Bormann wrote to you?
ROSENBERG: I do not have the letter here verbatim.
MR. DODD: But you have the Markull memorandum here, which says that the Minister not only raises no objections against Bormann’s principles or even his phraseology. Now surely one of your subordinates would not be impertinent enough to write you a memorandum like that unless it was perfectly true that you had done so?
ROSENBERG: I welcomed very much that my collaborators always had the courage to contradict me and give me their opinion, even concerning something I myself requested. Dr. Leibbrandt came and said to me, “Herr Reich Minister, that certainly is not in accord with what we are all doing here.” I said, “Dr. Leibbrandt, please calm yourself. I have written an appeasing explanation. Nothing will be changed. Later I will also speak to the Führer personally about these matters.”
MR. DODD: Your subordinate was not afraid to tell you that you had written such a letter in which you agreed word for word with Bormann. I have no trouble with you on that score. That is all I am trying to get you to tell this Tribunal, because it is true that you did write back expressing these word-for-word sentences.
ROSENBERG: That is not correct. The author—I rather say Dr. Leibbrandt—when he gave me this memorandum, read it through in a hurry saying, “There seems to be a gentleman who believes that I cannot do anything else but what I consider right.” But in this case I am facing a serious conflict, and I will maintain my position as I consider it right. That may be seen in the documents covering a period of 3 years which I read yesterday. May I give my opinion now on this document?
MR. DODD: Answer this question: Who were you appeasing, Hitler or Bormann? Or both of them?
ROSENBERG: First, I concurred with my collaborator, Dr. Leibbrandt, in the idea that ministerial decrees in that sense would never be released by me. Second, I regulated by a decree the school system in the Ukraine including a 4-year elementary school, trade school, and professional colleges.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. That is not an answer to the question. You said that you wrote an appeasing answer. The question is whom were you trying to appease. Was it Hitler or was it Bormann or was it both?
ROSENBERG: Yes, both of them; yes.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, would this be a convenient time to break off?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have stated yesterday that the document books for Frank have already been translated. However, it appears—I have just found this out—that the document books are not yet bound because the office authorized to do that has not yet received permission from another competent office. Perhaps the Tribunal could order the binding of the document books, or else the whole translation is useless.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: I did not know there was any delay, but I will see to it right away that they get it as far as we are able to do it.
ROSENBERG: May I say something about this document? This memorandum, as I stated in the beginning, is based on the supposition of a possible ministerial decree. It obviously uses phrases which Bormann had used in his letter, but my letter which I sent to the Führer cannot possibly contain these phrases. It may have contained appeasing statements to the effect that I did nothing in the Occupied Eastern Territories for which I was reproached; that is to say, that I did nothing for the German population but that I established large health departments, school departments, education departments, et cetera; and that now I was absolutely compelled to simplify these administrative departments. But that Bormann made these statements, that he used these phrases! It is regrettable that he expressed himself in this way; and during the last few years we were compelled to observe an unnecessarily large number of similar instances.
I may add briefly that he himself stated that the Minister apparently intervened to clarify these things there, but I want to indicate one decisive point, and that is that the opinions advanced by Bormann were also familiar to Koch’s circle. During these tragic years my entire efforts were directed against Koch’s personal circle, especially in the training of administrative leaders; and that can be seen from Paragraph 3, where it says, “Moreover, at least 80 percent of the district commissioners are opposed to the views described.”
MR. DODD: I think we all know what is in it. If you have any explanation, I think you ought to make it.
ROSENBERG: Yes. On Page 4, it says the great majority of the administrative leadership corps set their hopes in the Minister—that is, myself—and I endeavored and tried to fulfill these hopes of the administrative leadership corps, which I attempted to educate by means of my decrees because these thousands of people could not know the vast Eastern territories, these thousands who, even in the fight against Bolshevism, sometimes had no very clear conception of the state of things in the East; and I must emphasize the fact that the author here says that the decree issued by the Minister on 17 March 1942 re-emphasizes his former decrees in a more rigorous form. The decree of 13 May 1942 attacks the view that the Ukrainians were not a race at all and attacks the false conception of superiority. Thus, these are two decrees which I have not received and which are here; and furthermore, Mr. Prosecutor, I say that he points out quite correctly that of course the Minister—that is, myself—knows very well that such a continent has to be treated differently than in accordance with these suggestions which we have heard. As a consequence of these proceedings, however, I have positively established that after that correspondence between Koch and Bormann I introduced the orderly set-up of a school administration in the Ukraine by issuing a detailed decree. Secondly, I requested the extension of the...
MR. DODD: I am not interested in that. Just a minute.
ROSENBERG: Well, I have to answer these accusations.
MR. DODD: That is no answer to this, if Your Honor pleases, and no explanation of this document. He is launching off on one of these long speeches again about what he did after the document was received or after he wrote the letter, and I ask that he be instructed to answer that question and not to go on into statements about what he did in the administration in the Ukraine. I don’t think it is pertinent.
ROSENBERG: I spoke to the Führer personally about this and told him—that decree of May 1943 is in my file—I told him that it was impossible to work in the East with this kind of talk from Koch and his following.
THE PRESIDENT: If there is a letter in your file or if there is not a letter in your file, your counsel can re-examine you upon cross-examination, but you cannot in cross-examination go into long explanations. You must answer the question “yes” or “no” and explain, if you must explain, shortly. You have been explaining this document for a long time.
MR. DODD: When did you first meet Erich Koch?
ROSENBERG: Erich Koch?
MR. DODD: Yes.
ROSENBERG: In the twenties. It may have been 1927 or 1928...
MR. DODD: Apparently you have known him, then, a great many years?
ROSENBERG: I have not seen him often, but as Gauleiter I talked to him personally now and again.
MR. DODD: When did he become a Gauleiter?
ROSENBERG: I believe in the year 1928 he became Gauleiter in East Prussia, but I cannot give the exact date when he became Gauleiter.
MR. DODD: That is all right. I want an approximate date. Did you have much to do with him from the time that he was appointed Gauleiter, let us say, until 1940?
ROSENBERG: During the fighting years, I had practically nothing at all to do with him. Then later, after 1933, I talked to him several times.
MR. DODD: You had a pretty good knowledge, I assume, in any event, of his general reputation among his friends and acquaintances?
ROSENBERG: I knew Koch had a very excitable temperament, going from one extreme to the other and hard to keep steady, and therefore not reliable in carrying out a steady policy.
MR. DODD: I take it from your answer, that you were not aware, however, before he became the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, of his temperament in this way, that you did not know that he did these terrible things, which he did do while Reich Commissioner in the Ukraine, did you?
ROSENBERG: No, and...
MR. DODD: That is an answer and there is no need to explain that.
ROSENBERG: I even knew that Koch had expressed the opposite opinion previously, and that he had said that the youth of the East embraces also the German youth. He previously wrote that.
MR. DODD: So I take it you were surprised when this man turned out to be the kind of man that he did turn out to be. Is that a fair statement?
ROSENBERG: That only came to light gradually later on. Another person could not foresee that this temperament would involve such results and it would not have gone so far had he not been supported by somebody else.
MR. DODD: You don’t think he was quite so good a man as appears from the record, but was rather encouraged by some others; is that what you are trying to tell us?
ROSENBERG: Yes, that, of course, contributed.
MR. DODD: I am going to ask that you be shown Document 1019-PS; it becomes Exhibit USA-823. By the way, before we look at that document, Koch is the man whom you blame to a very great extent for many of these terrible things that happened under your ministry in the Ukraine, isn’t he? There isn’t any doubt about that. You told us about that all day yesterday.
ROSENBERG: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, could you go just a little bit slower?
MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor, I will.
[Turning to the defendant.] If you look at this document, you will see that it is a memorandum about your recommendations as to the personnel for the Reich commissions in the East and for the central political office in Berlin; and it was written on the 7th day of April 1941, and I take it that that was only a few days after Hitler talked to you about your new assignment in the East, 4 or 5 days at the most; isn’t that so? Will you answer that question?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
MR. DODD: Now, in this memorandum you set out that you recommended Gauleiter Lohse and we know from the documents and the testimony that he was appointed; isn’t that a fact?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
MR. DODD: All right. Now, turn to the next page of the English text; it is the paragraph beginning as follows:
“In addition it will eventually become necessary to occupy with troops not only Leningrad, but also Moscow. This occupation will probably differ considerably from that in the Baltic provinces, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus. It will be aimed at the suppression of any Russian and Bolshevik resistance and will necessitate an absolutely ruthless person both as regards the military representation and also the eventual political direction. The problems arising from this need not be detailed here. If it is not intended to maintain a permanent military administration, the undersigned would recommend the Gauleiter of East Prussia, Erich Koch, as Reich Commissioner in Moscow.”
Did you recommend Koch for that job as a particularly ruthless man in April of 1941? “Yes” or “no”?
ROSENBERG: Yes...
MR. DODD: Just a minute. You have done a lot of talking here for the last day and today if you will just give me a chance once in a while.
He is the same man you told us a minute ago you did not know to be particularly ruthless until after he did these terrible things in the Ukraine. Now, it is very clear you did know it in April of 1941, isn’t it? What is your answer to that?
ROSENBERG: That is not correct; that is not laid down here. I have stated that I know from Koch’s writings from 1933 and 1934 that he had a special liking for the Russian people. I knew Koch as a man of initiative in East Prussia. I had to expect that at the center of Moscow and around Moscow a very difficult job would have to be done. For here was the center of gravity of Bolshevism and here under certain circumstances the greatest resistance would arise. Then I did not want to have Koch in the Eastern territories and not in the Ukraine because I did not believe I had to fear such resistance there. There was, on one side, Koch’s devotion to the Russians, on the other side he was a man with economic initiative; finally I knew he was supported in such a manner that he was intended for some job in the East by the Führer as well as by the Reich Marshal.
MR. DODD: When you were looking for a ruthless man you suggested Koch as early as April of 1941.
ROSENBERG: This expression refers here rather to initiative and, of course, to the view that he would fight any Bolshevik resistance ruthlessly; but not in the sense that he would suppress a foreign race or try to exterminate foreign cultures.
MR. DODD: The truth of the matter is that you had some peculiar and odd interest in the Ukraine and you had somebody else in mind for that job but you knew Koch was a bad actor and you wanted him in another part of Russia, is it not?
ROSENBERG: No, for the Ukraine I wanted State Secretary Backe or my Chief of Staff Schickedanz, as can be seen from this document. I wanted State Secretary Backe because he is a German from the Caucasus and speaks Russian, knows the entire southern territory and probably could have worked very well there. I did not get him and I was forced to accept Koch, I would like to say, against my personal protest in the meeting of 16 July 1941.
MR. DODD: Well, if that is your answer I do not care to go any further with it.
With respect to your attitude towards the Jewish people, in your Frankfurt speech in 1938 you suggested that they all had to leave Europe and Germany, did you not?
ROSENBERG: This phrasing was used.
MR. DODD: All you need to say is “yes” or “no.” Did you do that or not in your speech in Frankfurt in 1938?
ROSENBERG: Yes, but I certainly cannot answer “yes” or “no” on an incorrect quotation!
MR. DODD: I do not think you need to explain anything at all. I merely asked you whether you said that in Frankfurt in your Party Day speech.
ROSENBERG: Yes, in substance that is correct.
MR. DODD: Now, in your Party Day speech to which you made reference yesterday, you said you used harsh language about the Jews. In those days you were objecting to the fact that they were in certain professions, I suppose, and things of that character. Is that a fair statement?
ROSENBERG: I said yesterday that in two speeches I demanded a chivalrous solution and equal treatment, and I said the foreign nations might not accuse us of discriminating against the Jewish people, so long as these foreign nations discriminate against our nation...
MR. DODD: Yes, very well. Did you ever talk about the extermination of the Jews?
ROSENBERG: I have not in general spoken about the extermination of the Jews in the sense of this term. One has to consider the words here. The term “extermination” has been used by the British Prime Minister...
MR. DODD: You will get around to the words. You just tell me now whether you ever said it or not? You said that, did you not?
ROSENBERG: Not in a single speech in that sense...
MR. DODD: I understand the sense. Did you ever talk about it with anybody as a matter of State policy or Party policy, about the extermination of the Jews?
ROSENBERG: In a conference with the Führer there was once an open discussion on this question about an intended speech which was not delivered. The sense of it was that now a war was going on and that this threat which had been made should not be mentioned again. That whole speech was also not delivered.
MR. DODD: When was it you were going to deliver that speech? Approximately what was the date?
ROSENBERG: In December 1941.
MR. DODD: Then you have written into your speech remarks about the extermination of Jews, haven’t you? Answer that “yes” or “no.”
ROSENBERG: I have said already that that word does not have the sense which you attribute to it.
MR. DODD: I will get around to the word and the meaning of it. I am asking you, did you not use the word or the term “extermination of the Jews” in the speech which you were prepared to make in the Sportpalast in December of 1941? Now, you can answer that pretty simply.
ROSENBERG: That may be, but I do not remember. I myself did not read the phrasing of the draft any further. In which form it was expressed I can no longer say.
MR. DODD: Well then, perhaps we can help you on that. I will ask you be shown Document 1517-PS. It becomes Exhibit USA-824.
[Document 1517-PS was submitted to the defendant.]
Now, this is also a memorandum of yours written by you about a discussion you had with Hitler on the 14th of December 1941, and it is quite clear from the first paragraph that you and Hitler were discussing a speech which you were to deliver in the Sportpalast in Berlin, and if you will look at the second paragraph, you will find these words:
“I remarked on the Jewish question that the comments about the New York Jews must perhaps be changed somewhat after the conclusion (of matters in the East). I took the standpoint not to speak of the extermination (Ausrottung) of Jewry. The Führer affirmed this view and said that they had laid the burden of war on us and that they had brought the destruction; it is no wonder if the results would strike them first.”
Now, you have indicated that you have some difficulty with the meaning of that word, and I am going to ask you about the word “Ausrottung.” I am going to ask that you be shown—you are familiar with the standard German-English dictionary, Cassell’s, I suppose, are you? Do you know this word, ever heard of it?
ROSENBERG: No.
MR. DODD: This is something you will be interested in. Will you look up and read out to the Tribunal what the definition of “Ausrottung” is?
ROSENBERG: I do not need a foreign dictionary in order to explain the various meanings “Ausrottung” may have in the German language. One can exterminate an idea, an economic system, a social order, and as a final consequence, also a group of human beings, certainly. Those are the many possibilities which are contained in that word. For that I do not need an English-German dictionary. Translations from German into English are so often wrong—and just as in that last document you have submitted to me, I heard again the translation of “Herrenrasse.” In the document itself “Herrenrasse” is not even mentioned; however, there is the term “ein falsches Herrenmenschentum” (a false master mankind). Apparently everything is translated here in another sense.
MR. DODD: All right, I am not interested in that. Let us stay on this term of “Ausrottung.” I take it then that you agree it does mean to “wipe out” or to “kill off,” as it is understood, and that you did use the term in speaking to Hitler.
ROSENBERG: Here I heard again a different translation, which again used new German words, so I cannot determine what you wanted to express in English.
MR. DODD: Are you very serious in pressing this apparent inability of yours to agree with me about this word or are you trying to kill time? Don’t you know that there are plenty of people in this courtroom who speak German and who agree that that word does mean to “wipe out,” to “extirpate?”
ROSENBERG: It means “to overcome” on one side and then it is to be used not with respect to individuals but rather to juridical entities, to certain historical traditions. On the other side this word has been used with respect to the German people and we have also not believed that in consequence thereof 60 millions of Germans would be shot.
MR. DODD: I want to remind you that this speech of yours in which you use the term “Ausrottung” was made about 6 months after Himmler told Hoess, whom you heard on this witness stand, to start exterminating the Jews. That is a fact, is it not?
ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct, for Adolf Hitler said in his declaration before the Reichstag: Should a new world war be started by these attacks of the emigrants and their backers, then as a consequence there would be an extermination and an extirpation. That has been understood as a result and as a political threat. Apparently, a similar political threat was also used by me before the war against America broke out. And, when the war had already broken out, I have apparently said that, since it has come to this, there is no use to speak of it at all.
MR. DODD: Well, actually, the Jews were being exterminated in the Eastern Occupied Territories at that time and thereafter, weren’t they?
ROSENBERG: Then, may I perhaps say something about the use of the words here? We are speaking here of extermination of Jewry; there is also still a difference between “Jewry” and “the Jews.”
MR. DODD: I asked you if it was not a fact that at that time and later on Jews were being exterminated in the Occupied Eastern Territories which were under your ministry? Will you answer that “yes” or “no”?
ROSENBERG: Yes. I quoted a document on that yesterday.
MR. DODD: Yes, and after that you told the Tribunal or, as I understood you at least, you wanted the Tribunal to believe that that was being done by the Police and without any of your people being involved in it; is that so?
ROSENBERG: I have heard from a witness that a district commissioner is said to have participated in these things in Vilna, and I have heard from another witness that in other cities the report came through that the Police would carry it out. From Document 1184 I gathered that a district commissioner opposed in every possible way and protested against this so-called “Schweinerei” (scandalous doings).
MR. DODD: Dr. Leibbrandt was your subordinate; he was in charge of Division II in your Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, wasn’t he?
ROSENBERG: Yes, for a time.
MR. DODD: Now, for the second time, I’ll ask that you be shown Document 3663-PS, Exhibit USA-825.
[Document 3663-PS was submitted to the defendant.]
Now, this document consists of three parts as you will notice. The first page is a letter written by Dr. Leibbrandt on the stationery of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories and it is dated 31 October 1941; that’s not too many days before you had your conversation with the Führer about your speech, and it is addressed to the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland in Riga. That was Lohse, the man whom you recommended. The letter says:
“The Reich Security Main Office has complained that the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland has forbidden execution of Jews in Libau. I request a report in regard to this matter by return mail. By order”—signed—“Dr. Leibbrandt.”
Now, if you will turn to the next page, you will see the answer. Turn that document over if you have the original—do you? You will see the answer, dated Riga, the 15th of November 1941, to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Berlin. “Subject: Execution of Jews, re: Decree.” It refers to the letter of Leibbrandt, apparently, of the 31st of October 1941, and it says:
“I have forbidden the wild execution of Jews in Libau because they were not justifiable in the manner in which they were carried out. I should like to be informed whether your inquiry of 31 October is to be regarded as a directive to liquidate all Jews in the Ostland. Shall this take place without regard to age and sex and economic interests of the Wehrmacht, for instance in specialists in the armament industry?”
And there is a note in different handwriting:
“Of course, the cleansing of the Ostland of Jews is a main task. Its solution, however, must be harmonized with the necessities of war production.”
It continues:
“So far, I have not been able to find such a directive, either in the regulations regarding the Jewish question in the ‘Brown Portfolio’ or in other decrees.”
Now, that has the initial “L” for “Lohse,” doesn’t it, at the bottom of it? And then, if you’ll look at the third page—no, it is another document. There are only two parts to that document.
Now, I wish that you would look at Document 3666-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-826.
THE PRESIDENT: That has on it the initial “L,” has it?
MR. DODD: The original has, Your Honor; yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And the defendant agrees that that is the initial of Lohse; is that right?
ROSENBERG: That could hardly be Lohse. I do not know Lohse’s initial. I do not know.
MR. DODD: Well, it’s very...
ROSENBERG: It could also be Leibbrandt; I do not know.
MR. DODD: You’re not willing to say that that second letter was from Lohse and that that is his initial on the bottom of it?
ROSENBERG: That I cannot say.
MR. DODD: All right.
ROSENBERG: That I cannot say because usually typewritten letters are sent anywhere.
MR. DODD: Well, we’re...
ROSENBERG: This note in the back is not quite clear to me. Essentially, however, it means that this was a protest against police measures which had become known and that an instruction...
MR. DODD: We will go into what it means in a minute. We’re just talking about the initial “L.” While we’re talking about the initial, will you look at it and see if there are any “R’s,” capital “R”?
ROSENBERG: Yes, here is an “L.”
MR. DODD: Yes, “R”?
ROSENBERG: Yes, here are two “R’s.”
MR. DODD: Did you put those on there?
ROSENBERG: No.
MR. DODD: You initialled them, did you?
ROSENBERG: I cannot decipher that as my “R.”
MR. DODD: You say that it is not your “R”? We will have to be clear about this. You’d have to know your own initial when you saw it anywhere.
ROSENBERG: I never made such a pointed “R” on the top. You can compare it with my handwriting.
MR. DODD: We’ll do that; don’t worry. I just want to ask you now if that is your initial or not?
ROSENBERG: I cannot identify that as my initial.
MR. DODD: Do you say that it is not your initial?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
MR. DODD: All right. Now, I wish you’d look at Document 3666-PS, which is also related to these other documents, and that is also a letter written on the stationery of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and it is dated December 18, 1941. Subject: Jewish Question. Re: Correspondence of 15 November 1941. This is an answer then to the letter marked “L,” inquiring whether or not execution of the Jews is to be understood as a fixed policy.
“Clarification of the Jewish question has most likely been achieved by now through verbal discussions. Economic considerations should on principle remain unconsidered in the settlement of the problem. Moreover, it is requested that questions arising be settled directly with the Higher SS and Police Leader. By order (signed) Bräutigam.”
Have you seen that letter before?
ROSENBERG: No, I have not seen it; in my opinion no. Here I see again such an “R,” pointed on the top, and I cannot identify that as my “R” either.
MR. DODD: So that you do not identify that as having your initial, either?
ROSENBERG: Well, I could simply not identify that as my “R” because this was a letter, signed by Bräutigam sent from the Ministry of the Eastern Occupied Territories to the Ostland, and the notes on the top are from an office that has received that letter.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, may I draw your attention to an explicit error here? This “R” is in connection with a “K.” That apparently means “Reichskommissar.”
MR. DODD: I am not discussing the “R” on the top of the letter; I am discussing the one of the handwritten letter.
ROSENBERG: Well, it can be seen from this “R” now quite unequivocally that this concerns the man who received the letter. “Received on 22 December—R.” And it is addressed from the Ministry to the “Ostland.” That note, therefore, was written by a person living in Riga, and that is the same “R” which can be found also on the other document.
MR. DODD: Who is your Reich Commissioner in the East for Riga?
ROSENBERG: Lohse.
MR. DODD: His name didn’t begin with “R,” did it?
ROSENBERG: Yes, but it is clear that this letter obviously was initialled in his department.
DR. THOMA: May I also help the Tribunal in this matter? In the handwritten thing with the German “L” you will find on the left margin “WV 1/12/41,” which means to be presented again (Wiedervorlage). And then you find “presented (vorgelegt) 1/12/41 R.” That appears to have taken place in the office of the Reich Commissioner and it is a first draft and therefore it was marked only with the first letter of his name.
MR. DODD: We do not accept that as being any statement with which we can prove this at this Trial. I think the matter as to whose initial it is will be presented later for determination.
THE PRESIDENT: What do the words at the top mean, “The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories”?
MR. DODD: That is the stationery upon which it is written. It is handwritten on this particular paper because this whole letter was handwritten on the back of the first letter. These were both found in this defendant’s office in Berlin.
[Turning to the defendant.] Well, now, I’d like to call your attention to another document, Number 36.
ROSENBERG: I maintain emphatically that that initial “R” was put down by the person who received the letter, to whom the letter was addressed.
MR. DODD: Well, we’ll get around that. Document Number 36—I ask that you be shown Document Number 3428, which becomes Exhibit USA-827.
THE PRESIDENT: Give me the number again, will you?
MR. DODD: I am sorry. 3428-PS becomes 827, USA-827.
[Turning to the defendant.] Now, this is a letter written from Minsk in the occupied area on July 31, 1942, and it is written by Kube, K-u-b-e. He was another one of your subordinates, wasn’t he? Will you answer that please?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
MR. DODD: And it is written to Lohse, the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern territory, isn’t it?
ROSENBERG: Yes, that’s right.
MR. DODD: Now, then, let’s look at it: “Combating of Partisans and Action against Jews in the District General of White Ruthenia.” It says:
“In all the clashes with partisans in White Ruthenia it has been proved that Jewry, in the former Polish part”—and so on—“is the main exponent of the partisan movement. In consequence, the treatment of Jewry in White Ruthenia is mainly a matter of political concern....”
Then, moving down a sentence or two:
“In exhaustive discussions with the SS Brigadeführer Zenner and the exceedingly capable leader of the SD, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr. jur. Strauch, it was ascertained that we have liquidated in the last 10 weeks about 55,000 Jews in White Ruthenia. In the area of Minsk, Jewry has been completely eliminated, without endangering the manpower commitment. In the predominantly Polish district of Lida, 16,000 Jews; in Slonim, 8,000 Jews”—and so forth—“have been liquidated. Owing to an encroachment by the Army supply and communications zone already reported to you, the preparations made by us for liquidation of the Jews in the Glebokie area, have been disturbed. The Army supply and communications zone, without contacting me, has liquidated 10,000 Jews, whose systematical elimination had been provided for by us in any event. In the city of Minsk approximately 10,000 Jews were liquidated on 28 and 29 July, 6,500 of them Russian Jews, predominantly aged persons, women and children; the remainder consisting of Jews unfit for commitment to labor, the greater majority of whom were deported to Minsk in November of last year from Vienna, Brünn, Bremen, and Berlin, by order of the Führer.
“The area of Sluzk, too, had been relieved of several thousand Jews. The same applies to Novogrodek and Vileika. Radical measures are imminent for Baranowicze and Hanzewitschi. In Baranowicze alone, approximately 10,000 Jews are still living in the city itself; of these, 9,000 Jews will be liquidated next month.”
And it goes on to say:
“In the city of Minsk 2,600 Jews from Germany are left over. In addition, all 6,000 Russian Jews and Jewesses who during the action stayed with the units to which they were assigned for work are still alive. Even in the future Minsk will still retain its character as the strongest center of the Jewish labor commitment, necessitated for the present by the concentration of the armament industries and by the rail problems. In all other areas, the number of Jews to be drafted for labor commitment will be limited by the SD and by me to 800 at the most, but if possible to 500...”
And so on. It tells of other situations with respect to Jews, all of which I do not think it is necessary to read. But I do want to call your attention to the last paragraph, the last sentence:
“I fully agree with the Commander of the SD in White Ruthenia, that we shall liquidate every shipment of Jews which is not ordered or announced by our superior offices, to prevent further disturbances in White Ruthenia.”
And up above I did omit one sentence or two that I wanted to read:
“Naturally, after the termination of the economic demands of the Wehrmacht, the SD and I would like it best definitely to eliminate Jewry in the District General of White Ruthenia. For the time being, the necessary demands of the Wehrmacht, which are the main employers of Jews, are considered.”
I ought to tell you as well that this document was also found in your office in Berlin. Now, that is a letter...
ROSENBERG: That seems very improbable to me, that it has been found in my office in Berlin. If so, it can be at most only that the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland had sent all his files to Berlin, packed in boxes. It was not in my office at that time, and this letter was also never presented to me. There is stamped here, “The Reich Commissioner for the Ostland,” not the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. I stated yesterday, however, that a number of such happenings were reported to me as individual actions in the fighting, and that I received this one report from Sluzk personally, and Gauleiter Meyer was immediately charged to protest to Heydrich and to order an investigation. That presupposes that he, the Gauleiter Meyer, did not know of and did not think of such a general action on order of a central command.
MR. DODD: Well, I only want to suggest to you that it is a strange coincidence that two of your top men were in communication in this tone in 1942 without your knowledge.
Did you also tell the Tribunal yesterday that you understood that most of the difficulty or a large part of the difficulty in the East for the Jewish people came from the local population? Do you remember saying that yesterday?
ROSENBERG: I did not receive this translation.
MR. DODD: I asked you if it was not a fact that yesterday you told the Tribunal that much of the difficulty for the Jews in the East came from the local population of those areas.
ROSENBERG: Yes. I was informed about that in the beginning by returning personalities, that it was not due to local authorities but to parts of the population. I knew the attitude in the East from before and could well imagine that this was true.
Secondly, I have stated that I had been informed that along with executions of various other nests of resistance and centers of sabotage in various cities, a large number of Jews were shot by the police. And then I have treated the case of Sluzk here.
MR. DODD: I think you will agree that in the Ukraine your man Koch was doing all kinds of terrible things, and now I don’t understand that you dispute that Lohse and Kube were helping to eliminate or liquidate the Jews, and that Bräutigam, an important member of your staff, and that Leibbrandt, another important member of your staff, were informed of the program. So that five people at least under your administration were engaged in this kind of conduct, and not small people at that.
ROSENBERG: I should like to point out that a decree by the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland is at hand, which in agreement...
THE PRESIDENT: Will you answer the question first? Do you agree that these five people were engaged in exterminating Jews?
ROSENBERG: Yes. They knew about a certain number of liquidations of Jews. That I admit, and they have told me so, or if they did not, I have heard it from other sources. I only want to state one thing: That according to the general law of the Reich, the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland issued a decree according to which Jewry, which of course was hostile to us, should be concentrated in certain Jewish quarters of the cities. And until the end, until 1943-1944, I have heard that in these cities such work was still carried out in these Jewish ghettos to a very large extent.
And may I supplement this with still another case which came to my knowledge, namely that a district commissioner...
MR. DODD: I don’t want you to point out anything else. You have answered the question, and you have explained your answer. I don’t ask you further...
ROSENBERG: What I wanted to add explains another part of my answer in a very concrete case, namely, a district commissioner in the Ukraine had been accused before the court of having committed blackmail in a Jewish community and having sent furs, clothes, et cetera to Germany. He was brought before court, he was sentenced to death, and was shot.
MR. DODD: Well, that is very interesting, but I don’t think it is a necessary explanation of that answer at all. And I would ask that you try to confine these answers. I would like to get through here in a few minutes.
You are also, of course, the man who wrote the letter, as you told the Tribunal yesterday, suggesting the out-of-hand execution of 100 Jews in France, although you said you thought that was what? a little bad judgment, or not quite just, or something of the kind? Is that right?
ROSENBERG: I made my statement about that yesterday.
MR. DODD: I know you have, and I would like to talk about it for a minute today. Is that what you said about it, that it was not right, and that it was not just? “Yes” or “no,” didn’t you say that to the Tribunal yesterday?
ROSENBERG: You have to quote literally, word for word, if you want me to answer “yes” or “no.”
MR. DODD: I will ask you again. Didn’t you say yesterday before this Tribunal that your suggestion in that letter, in Document 001-PS, was wrong and was not just? Now, that is pretty simple and you can answer it.
ROSENBERG: I stated that it was humanly unjust.
MR. DODD: It was murder, isn’t that what it was, a plan for murder? “Yes” or “no”?
ROSENBERG: No. But I considered the shooting of hostages, which was publicly made known by the Armed Forces, as an obviously generally accepted fact under the exceptional conditions of war. These shootings of hostages were published in the press. Therefore, I had to assume that according to international law and certain traditions of warfare this was an accepted act of reprisal. Therefore, I cannot admit...
MR. DODD: Well, were you talking then as the benign philosopher or as a soldier? When you wrote this letter, 001-PS, in what capacity were you writing it, as a benign, philosophical minister on ideology and culture, or were you a member of the Armed Forces?
ROSENBERG: As can be seen from the document, I have spoken about the fact that certain sabotage and murder of German soldiers was being committed here, so that good future relations, which I also aimed for, between Germany and France would be poisoned forever. For that reason this letter was written, although I regret it from the human point of view.
MR. DODD: It comes a little late, don’t you think?
The witness Hoess—you were in the courtroom when he testified, Hoess, H-o-e-s-s?
ROSENBERG: Yes, I heard him.
MR. DODD: You heard that terrible story of 2½ to 3 million murders which he told from the witness stand, very largely of Jewish people?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
MR. DODD: Although it was not brought out here, you can take it from me as being so. If you care to dispute it, you may, and we will establish it later. You know that he was a reader of your book and of your speeches, this man Hoess?
ROSENBERG: I do not know whether he read my books. Anti-Jewish books have existed for the last 2,000 years.
MR. DODD: Now, you offered to resign in October 1944 from your position as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories?
ROSENBERG: October 1944.
MR. DODD: You did not have very much to resign from on that date, did you? The Germans were practically out of Russia, isn’t that a fact? On October 12, 1944, the German Army was practically out of Russia. It was on the retreat, isn’t that so?
ROSENBERG: Yes. It was the question of my further tasks for the political end psychological treatment of several millions of Eastern workers in Germany; it was furthermore a question of refugees who came from the Eastern territories and from the Ukraine to Germany, and of the settlement of economic problems, and above all I still had the hope even at that hour that a military change also might still occur in the East.
MR. DODD: And everybody, pretty nearly everybody who was informed at all in Germany knew that the war was lost in October of 1944, isn’t that so? You knew that the war was lost in October of 1944.
ROSENBERG: No, I did not know that.
MR. DODD: You did not know that?
ROSENBERG: No, I did not know that.
MR. DODD: I will accept that answer. That is all. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, do you wish to re-examine?
[There was no response.]
General Rudenko, have you got some additional questions you want to ask?
GEN. RUDENKO: I have some questions to ask in connection with the defendant’s activities in the Eastern territories.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, General.
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, at what time did you begin, personally and directly, to participate in preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union?
ROSENBERG: Not at all.
GEN. RUDENKO: Was your appointment of 20 April 1941 to the post of the Führer’s Commissioner in central control for all questions relating to the Eastern European territories not directly connected with Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union?
ROSENBERG: That was no longer a planning in which I took part, but it was the consequence of a decision which had already been made and about which my advice had not been asked. I was notified that a decision had been made and military orders had been given. Therefore I have nothing... Well, if I have to answer the question as much as possible with “yes” or “no,” I have just answered this, on the basis of the wording, with “no.”
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny the fact that this appointment took place in April 1941?
ROSENBERG: That is evident, that I received a task.
GEN. RUDENKO: With this nomination Hitler gave you very wide powers. You collaborated with the highest authorities of the Reich, received information from them and summoned the Reich authorities to meetings. In particular you collaborated with Göring, with the Minister for Economy, and with Keitel. Do you confirm this? Please reply briefly.
ROSENBERG: There are, again, three questions. As to the first question, whether I received wide powers, plenipotentiary powers, I had not received plenipotentiary powers at all. The answer would be “no.”
To the second question, whether I had conferences, the answer is “yes.” As a matter of course, I conferred with the supreme Reich authorities who were concerned with the East, as was my duty in connection with my task.
GEN. RUDENKO: Please reply briefly to the following question: Immediately after your appointment of 20 April 1941, did you hold a conference with the Chief of the OKW?
ROSENBERG: Yes, I visited Field Marshal Keitel.
GEN. RUDENKO: Did you have a conversation with Brauchitsch and Raeder in connection with your appointment, regarding the solution of the Eastern problems?
ROSENBERG: According to my recollection I did not speak to Brauchitsch and I also have no recollection of having had any conversation at that time with Raeder.
GEN. RUDENKO: Did you have a conference with the Defendant Funk, who appointed Dr. Schlotterer as his permanent representative?
ROSENBERG: The then Reich Minister Funk, of course, was shortly informed of this task given me and he named Dr. Schlotterer for purposes of liaison.
GEN. RUDENKO: You had several conversations with General Thomas, State Secretary Körner, State Secretary Backe, and Ministerial Director Riecke, regarding the economic exploitation of the Eastern territories?
ROSENBERG: I do not believe that I spoke to Thomas, and I met the other gentlemen gradually, one by one. Later I took over Riecke as liaison man to the Economic Staff East in the Ministry. I must have met Backe also later on, as is natural in the course of time. I do not know at all whether I ever met General Thomas personally, maybe I met him in passing.
GEN. RUDENKO: Then I shall have to produce documents where you yourself speak about it.
You were negotiating with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and, as a result, the Defendant Ribbentrop appointed Grosskopf to act as permanent liaison officer with your organization, and placed on the other hand Dr. Bräutigam in charge of the political section. Is that correct?
ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct, because the Foreign Minister was, of course, informed briefly and appointed the then Consul General Grosskopf as ambassador...
GEN. RUDENKO: You received competent representatives of the Ministry of Propaganda such as: Fritzsche, Schmidt, Glasmeier, and others?
ROSENBERG: Yes, that may have been so. I met most of these gentlemen for the first time then, and it goes without saying that I had to inform myself about the task.
GEN. RUDENKO: You negotiated with the Chief of Staff of the SA and requested him to place at your disposal the most experienced of the SA leaders.
ROSENBERG: Of course I also spoke to the Chief of Staff of the SA about possible capable assistants in the event of an occupation of the Eastern territories.
GEN. RUDENKO: In this connection, therefore, you will not deny that a co-ordinating center did actually exist for preparing measures of attack against the Soviet Union.
ROSENBERG: Not in that form, because all the tasks connected with the conflict with the Soviet Union were divided up from a military point of view. They were assigned to Göring in the field of economic planning; they were, as became evident later on, clearly defined with the Police. I had been given a political liaison office in order to discuss the political problems of the East, and to give the different offices ideas about the eventual political administration and the direction of this policy. In the main I did that in the sense which you find in my speech of 20 June.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. One and a half months before the treacherous attack by Germany on the Soviet Union, you drafted a directive for all Reich commissioners in the Occupied Eastern Territories. You do not deny that?
ROSENBERG: I already mentioned that yesterday. In the line of duty, some provisional drafts were worked out by myself and my assistants. These drafts which we have here, or which have been shown to me up to now, were not sent out in this form.
GEN. RUDENKO: I shall return to this question later.
In your report which you submitted to Hitler on 28 June 1941, regarding the preliminary work on questions connected with the Eastern territories, you stated that you had had a talk with Admiral Canaris, during which you asked Canaris, in the interests of counterintelligence work, to choose certain persons who, while working on counterintelligence, would also be able to do political work. Do you confirm this statement?
ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct. But I heard that Admiral Canaris had organized a certain group of Ukrainians, I believe, and other nationals for some sabotage or other work. He visited me once and I asked him not to meddle with the political work, that is with the political preparatory work, and he assured me he would not.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny your meeting Canaris?
ROSENBERG: The meeting—no.
GEN. RUDENKO: And the conversation in which you asked him, in the interests of Intelligence, to select certain people to help you. Do you deny that?
ROSENBERG: No—yes, I deny that. However, I do not deny the fact that, of course, if Canaris had an interesting political report it would be proper for him to inform me about it on occasion. I had no counterintelligence organization or espionage organization. During these years I never...
GEN. RUDENKO: We are going to submit this document to you.
[Turning to the President.] Mr. President, perhaps we can declare a recess now, because I still have a series of questions to ask.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn the hearing of this case at 4 o’clock in order to hear supplementary applications for witnesses and documents. The Tribunal hope, therefore, that we may be able to conclude the case of the Defendant Rosenberg before that. I mean, to conclude the case of the Defendant Rosenberg, including his only other witness, or any other witness.
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, you replied to me that the conversation with Admiral Canaris did not take place.
ROSENBERG: On the contrary, I said that such a conference with Admiral Canaris did take place.
GEN. RUDENKO: Then maybe this was wrongly translated.
ROSENBERG: Probably.
GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you whether you requested Canaris in the course of your conversation, in the interests of the counterintelligence service, to choose men who, while working as counterintelligence agents, would be able to do simultaneously political work. Do you remember my question?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Was that the main subject of your conversation?
ROSENBERG: That is not correct. Admiral Canaris had...
GEN. RUDENKO: That is not correct? Well, let us not go into that in detail.
In order to speed up the interrogation, I will show you a document, and I will read this passage into the record.
Show this document to the defendant. [Turning to the Tribunal.] I mean, gentlemen of the Tribunal, Document 1039-PS, on Page 2. The part is underlined. I will read this passage.
[Turning to the defendant.] This is your report on the preliminary work concerning the organization of the territory of Eastern Europe. I read:
“A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that, under the existing confidential circumstances, my office could in no way negotiate with any representatives of the peoples of Eastern Europe. I asked him to do this insofar as counterespionage work required it and then to name persons to me who, over and above counterespionage service, might be regarded as political personalities, in order to determine their possible utilization later. Admiral Canaris said that of course he would take into consideration my request not to recognize any political groups among the emigrants, and that he intended to act in line with my statements.”
ROSENBERG: That is in accord with what I said.
THE PRESIDENT: General, I think you are going a little too fast.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] I ask you, do you confirm this quotation?
ROSENBERG: Yes, in the German wording but not in the Russian translation. I understand Russian also and can, therefore, determine that the translation is not entirely correct; for it says here that I, under the existing confidential circumstances, naturally could not negotiate with other countries for eventual collaboration in a civilian administration. That is the first point. And point two is that, since Admiral Canaris had to do with various groups of Ukrainians, Russians, and other people, I was asking him—apart from counterintelligence, that is—not to do espionage work for me or ask me to do espionage work but that he should point out to me people of other nationalities whom I could use later—under given conditions—in civilian administration. That was the meaning; and furthermore, at the end it is quite correct that he agreed not to carry on any political work himself.
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, this absolutely follows the Russian text. What you just told us now means exactly the same in Russian.
ROSENBERG: According to the German translated into Russian it must have been that. I can recognize only the German text, not the Russian translation, which is not in accord with this meaning. You interpret this text as though I were trying to carry on espionage work. I asked Admiral Canaris, since I could not carry on political negotiations with representatives of the Eastern people, simply to tell me from his personal knowledge, apart from his official capacity, what people of the Eastern regions, under certain circumstances, might later work in the civilian administration for me. That is the meaning. The translation is, therefore, not entirely correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well; but you confirm the German text?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: It means you were connected with counterespionage?
ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct. I only received Admiral Canaris and told him that, in his official capacity in which he had to function, he should not deal with political negotiations and plans, because I was now being given that task.
GEN. RUDENKO: You heard the admonition of the President of the Tribunal about answering briefly, and I beg you to do so.
ROSENBERG: I would answer more briefly if the questions were put to me factually.
GEN. RUDENKO: I will put to you several questions concerning the aims of the war against the Soviet Union. Do you admit that Nazi Germany, having prepared and pursued war against the Soviet Union, aimed at plundering the economic riches of the Soviet Union, the extermination of her people, the enslavement of the peoples of the Soviet Union, and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union? Answer briefly. Do you admit this, or not?
ROSENBERG: Five questions are being put to me again, and if...
GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you please answer briefly: Do you admit the aims of the aggression as I have put them to you? You will be able to give your explanation later.
THE PRESIDENT: You can answer that question “yes” or “no.”
ROSENBERG: I must answer “no” to all four questions.
GEN. RUDENKO: You deny it. All right. Let us turn to a new document in this connection. I mean the Document 2718-PS, which is in the minutes of the morning session of 10 December 1945. That is your memorandum dated 2 May 1941. [The document was handed to the defendant.] Will you please follow? This document reads as follows:
“1) The war can be continued only if all the Armed Forces are fed with stocks from Russia in the third year of the war.
“2) There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people will die of starvation if we take out of this country everything that we need.”
I ask you now, did you write that?
ROSENBERG: I neither wrote that nor did I participate in this session, and I cannot determine whether any one of my collaborators knew anything at all about this meeting. It says here, “Senior officers only, two copies, one for the files (I-a) and the second General Limbert.” Therefore, only two people in the Armed Forces knew about this.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do not go into that in detail, Defendant. You do not know about this?
ROSENBERG: This document has been submitted twice already.
GEN. RUDENKO: Let us go on to the next one.
THE PRESIDENT: The question was whether you knew of this document.
ROSENBERG: No.
GEN. RUDENKO: We come to the next document, which determines the aims of the war. This is your instruction to the Reich Commissioner for the Baltic countries and for Bielorussia. You stated the following—I mean now the Document 1029-PS; the part which I will read is marked in the margin:
“The aim of a Reich Commissioner for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bielorussia must be to strive for the creation of a German protectorate, with a view to transforming these regions later into a part of Greater Germany by the Germanization of racially admissible elements, the colonization of Germanic peoples, and the resettlement of undesirable elements.”
Do you remember these instructions? Please reply first.
ROSENBERG: Yes, I am familiar with this document. I already remarked yesterday that at the beginning all sorts of drafts were made in my office which were not approved by me. The corrections were made by me.
GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you very clearly, do you know these instructions or not?
ROSENBERG: But I still heard the wrong translation. Nothing is mentioned about “destruction,” but “incorporation,” and the Russian translation again said “destruction.” If it is translated that way, then my question appears in the Russian language as an approval of destruction; and that is a wrong translation which is being made here, which I can follow only because I speak Russian.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you can be heard perfectly well without shouting.
ROSENBERG: I beg your pardon.
GEN. RUDENKO: You are only correcting an error in the translation. Now as regards the rest—Germanization and colonization—is that right? Does that sound right in German? Answer me. Is that right or not?
ROSENBERG: Even in that way it is not translated quite correctly. Here it says “colonization of German peoples,” and now you are translating “Germanization and colonization.” These are two substantives which again give correspondingly different sense, and I would like to add that these drafts made by a collaborator of mine were not actually issued, and that they in no way constitute instructions.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not ask you, was it issued or not; but I ask you was there such a draft? Will you deny that?
ROSENBERG: I am not disputing that such a draft was submitted to my office.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. We pass on.
These instructions concern the aims of the war. They are instructions for all Reich Commissioners of the Occupied Eastern Territories, dated 8 May 1941. This is Document 1030-PS. I will read only a short excerpt, which states—I quote from Page 4. This excerpt is marked in the margin. In these instructions you state that this coming struggle would be a struggle for the supplying of Germany and all of Europe with raw materials and foodstuffs. Do you confirm this?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Then you confirm that.
ROSENBERG: Yes, of course. This document was presented in my office as a draft. That is correct, and I am not disputing it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do not go into details again. I will remind you once more, please reply briefly. You confirmed this point, and that is enough.
ROSENBERG: This document, yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. This statement was made by you previous to the attack on the Soviet Union. I will remind you, but I will not submit the document to you since it has already been presented to the Tribunal several times and is at the disposal of the Tribunal. I mean a conference which took place in Hitler’s office on 16 July 1941.
[Turning to the Tribunal.] This is Document L-221, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] You were present at this conference, were you?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Hitler said then that the Baltic States would have to become an integral part of the Reich, and the same applied to the Crimea with adjacent territories as well as to the Volga districts and also the Baku area. Do you recall these statements of Hitler?
ROSENBERG: I have seen this document, purporting to be Bormann’s observations, here for the first time. At that time the Führer made very long, passionate statements. I did not take any exact notes at that conference, but he did in fact speak about the Crimea, and he said that, because of the tremendous power of the Soviet Union, no bearers of arms should be allowed there later and...
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not ask why. I ask you: did he say that?
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, you are going too fast. You must wait until the man is finished.
GEN. RUDENKO: He is going into too many details, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] Well, you admit the Crimea. You agreed with Hitler’s idea concerning the seizure of these territories?
ROSENBERG: You can see from the document and you can see from my speech how I pictured the self-determination of all the peoples in the East in a new order of states; and I controverted the declarations of the Führer. That can be seen here. That was how I argued.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not ask you about that. I am asking you whether you agreed with these ideas of Hitler, or whether you objected to them.
ROSENBERG: Yes, it can be proved that I protested, and it is even shown in the record.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal are not concerned with whether or not it can be proved. The question is: did you agree or not. You can answer that, I suppose. Did you agree, or did you not agree?
ROSENBERG: I agreed with many points and rejected other points; but this is a compilation of at least 10 to 15 points.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is an answer.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. We will return to this question in a few minutes.
I am now passing on to your own directives, which you issued as Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. These documents were already presented to the Tribunal as 1056-PS and EC-347. First of all, I would like to ask you one question: What is this “Brown Folder”?
ROSENBERG: The Brown Folder was compiled by the administrative department of the Eastern Ministry in response to certain requests of industry, of my political department, of the personnel department, and of the technical supply department for officials in the Baltic States and in the Ukraine. Thus it was the first attempt at a general regulation.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right, then that is a sort of “Green Folder.” It is quite clear.
Now, let us turn to your directives, Document EC-347. We will show you this document right away. Will you note the passage which has been underlined, on Page 39 of the document, if I am not mistaken. I will read this paragraph:
“The first task of the civilian administration in the Occupied Eastern Territories is to represent the interests of the Reich.”
I omit a few lines.
“The stipulations of the Hague Convention regarding land warfare, which deal with the administration of territories occupied by a foreign power, do not apply, since the U.S.S.R. can be considered as nonexistent....”
Then further:
“Therefore, all measures which the German administration deems necessary or suitable in order to carry out this extensive task are admissible.”
Do you agree that this exposes your secret designs, although you somehow too hastily proclaimed the Soviet Union as destroyed?
ROSENBERG: In the Russian translation I again heard the word “plundering,” but the word “plundering” does not appear in this German text. If the German text is translated in such a way that the word “plundering” appears everywhere, although in the German...
GEN. RUDENKO: I interrupt you and say that the word “plundering” is not in the Russian text, which I just read into the record; so I believe you are simply inventing, or at least you did not hear rightly.
ROSENBERG: May I say a few words in this connection?
GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you, did you write this?
ROSENBERG: I did not, in fact, write it, but it was a circular letter which was issued by the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories, and, therefore, I am officially responsible for this Brown Folder. But I would like to say a few words of explanation in regard to this—the explanation about the status of international law in the East I received from the Führer’s headquarters. It stated that, in accordance with the attitude of the Soviet Union toward certain conventions, as far as the Hague Convention was concerned, it did not apply to the Soviet Union in this instance. Furthermore, as this document contains many pages, I was not able to read it in its entirety at the time; but on the second page I have already found a paragraph which shows very obviously what lines the wording followed. It states as follows...
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, one minute, please.
ROSENBERG: But I must be allowed to read from the document.
THE PRESIDENT: We must try and conduct this cross-examination in an orderly fashion. Now, what is the question?
[Turning to General Rudenko.] What is your question?
GEN. RUDENKO: I put to him the question, whether he admitted that he knew of the tasks put before the civilian administration in the occupied territories as they are set forth in the quotation which I just read. He said that he did know. I have exhausted my questions in this particular sphere. The document is in possession of the Defense and the Defense will be able to quote other parts of this document which have not yet been read into the record. This is a very long document. If I had tried to quote it to the Tribunal in its entirety it would have taken too much time.
THE PRESIDENT: [To the defendant.] You answered the question. I understood what the question was, and that you were told that the Hague Convention did not apply to Russia.
ROSENBERG: Yes. May I quote this one paragraph on Page 40, the next to the last paragraph:
“The most important prerequisite for this”—that is, for the development of the East—“is the treatment of the country and of the people in a corresponding manner. The war against the Soviet Union is—with all necessary regard to the securing of foodstuffs—a political campaign with the establishment of lasting order as its objective. The conquered territory as a whole is, therefore, not to be considered an object of exploitation, even if the German food and war economy must lay claim to considerable areas on a large scale.”
And I believe I may say that the fact that the necessities of the inhabitants are taken into consideration cannot be expressed more clearly.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I will put to you a few more questions as to how you treated the population, although we have heard quite a lot about this treatment, as you have too. We pass on.
I asked you about the Crimea and you said, “Yes, Hitler proposed to annex the Crimea to Germany.” Do you remember that you did not only approve of these plans, but you also invented new names for towns—for instance, Simferopol was to be called “Gotenburg” and Sevastopol was to become “Theodorichshafen.” Do you remember that?
ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct. The Führer told me that I should think of a change of names for these cities. The renaming of very many other cities was discussed, too.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, of course.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I am expected to conclude my entire presentation of evidence with respect to Rosenberg by 4 o’clock. I do not know how I can do that.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has not laid that down as a condition. I did not make any order about it. I said only that the Tribunal hoped, and the “hope” was addressed more to the Prosecution than it was to the Defense.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, if I may be permitted to say so, the Soviet Prosecutor has submitted documents again which I already submitted yesterday, and on which the defendant has already given answers. I am referring to Documents 1029-PS and 1030-PS. The defendant himself already said...
THE PRESIDENT: You are wasting the time of the Court by making this entire interposition.
GEN. RUDENKO: Thus you admit the change of the names of Simferopol and Sevastopol.
Next question: You also worked on the reorganization of the Caucasus, and you had organized a special staff. Will you answer “yes” or “no”?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Furthermore, you favored Prince Bagration-Mukhransky, an adventurer from the emigré circle, as candidate for the throne of Georgia. Is that true? Answer briefly.
ROSENBERG: Yes, that is true. We did mention that—we spoke about him—but we turned down such a candidacy.
GEN. RUDENKO: He was turned down. Is that so? Very well.
As regards the reorganization of the Caucasus, on 27 July 1942 you compiled a special report; is that true?
ROSENBERG; It may be that a report was made. Yes—yes, naturally, it is quite a lengthy report. It has been submitted here.
GEN. RUDENKO: And I will show you this report in order to draw your attention to one short quotation.
[Turning to the President.] I have in mind, Mr. President, a document which has already been submitted as Exhibit USSR-58.
[Turning to the defendant.] Defendant Rosenberg, please pay attention to Page 7, a passage which is marked, which says first that the German Reich must seize all the oil. Have you found this passage?
ROSENBERG: On Page 7 of the text I find the passage—yes, I have found it.
GEN. RUDENKO: The text reads:
“From the economic point of view the German Reich must take control of the total oil supply. The necessary participation in the riches could be discussed in the future.”
Do you confirm that this statement was made by you?
ROSENBERG: This document is a memorandum of my office, and I confirm that it is true.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well.
ROSENBERG: May I make a remark in addition? Here we are not talking about the oppression of a people but of an assurance of autonomy and of every possible mitigation for these people. Only I cannot locate that at once from a document which has 14 pages if I only read one sentence.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have just questioned you concerning the tasks of the German Reich with regard to this matter of oil. Now if you look at Page 14 of this same report you will find it at the very end—this is how you define the tasks:
“The problem of the Eastern territories consists of a transference of peoples from a Baltic to a German field of culture and the preparation for the military frontiers of Germany on a vast scale. The task of the Ukraine is to provide Germany and Europe with foodstuffs and the continent with raw materials. The task in the Caucasus is, above all, of a political nature and represents the decisive extension of continental Europe, under German direction, from the Caucasian isthmus to the Near East.”
Did you read this passage?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny that these were the actual plans?
ROSENBERG: I affirm that this is set down correctly, and that it is in accord with our hope that eastern continental Europe might, some time, be incorporated into the total economic system and economic supply of the rest of the continent, as had been the case before 1914; for at that time the Ukraine was an important country of exports of raw materials and foodstuffs.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, your plan concerning the Ukraine is well known. In this connection I will put the last question concerning aggression. After having seen these documents, which you do not deny, do you admit the aggressive and plundering character of Germany’s war against the Soviet Union and your personal responsibility for the planning and carrying out of this aggression? Answer briefly. Do you admit this, or do you not?
ROSENBERG: No.
GEN. RUDENKO: No? Very well.
ROSENBERG: No, because I did not consider this a war of aggression on our part but just the opposite.
GEN. RUDENKO: Of course; but we will not go into details.
I have a few more questions to put to you concerning the German administration and the German policy in the Occupied Eastern Territories.
Who was the highest official in the civil administration in the Reich Commission?
ROSENBERG: The Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories was responsible for the administration and legislation in the Eastern Territories, and the Reich Commissioner, for the territorial governments.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, the Tribunal have already heard all about the administration—the former administration—and personnel of the administration.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I have only two or three more questions in this particular sphere.
[Turning to the defendant.] Did the Reich Commissioner have the authority to issue orders for the arrest and execution of hostages?
ROSENBERG: At this moment I cannot recall whether he had such authority by law, or whether that came under direct police jurisdiction. I cannot answer this question with assurance, for at the moment I do not recall a decree to that effect, but it is not entirely impossible; I do not know.
GEN. RUDENKO: It was possible? Very well.
I would like to remind you that you foresaw in your directive this authority of the commissioners to shoot hostages. We will pass right on.
A lot has been said here about German policy in occupied territories. I will, therefore, put only a few questions to you.
First of all, as regards the Ukraine, you have here described the situation in such a light as to show that Koch was the sole person responsible, whereas you have always assented that, on the contrary, you were the benefactor of the Ukrainian people.
ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct; I never said that I was a benefactor.
GEN. RUDENKO: In your document, which has been submitted by your defense counsel and which I will therefore not submit to you, Document Rosenberg-19, Riecke wrote, in a letter to all Reichsleiter of the press in November 1942:
“Koch has declared ‘that the Ukraine is for us only an object of exploitation, and that it must pay the expenses of the war, and that in a certain way the population must, as a second-rate people, be utilized for the tasks of the war, even if they have to be caught with a lasso.’”
This was the policy of Koch in the Ukraine. This document was submitted by your counsel. I will ask you now: Did you write to Koch on 14 December?
ROSENBERG: May I reply to that? I do not have the verbatim document in front of me. I only know that it was a letter written by Riecke to me with the big complaint which so many others had also had, and that he requested me...
GEN. RUDENKO: Koch?
ROSENBERG: Yes—to complain, and that he used rather drastic language, and that we both strove to reach orderly methods of work here.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have been all over this matter of Koch as to the Ukraine today, and so it is not helping the Tribunal to go over it again.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] Yesterday you stated here repeatedly in your explanations as regards the atrocities and extermination of the Soviet population that you were not informed, and that these were police measures. Did I understand you correctly?
ROSENBERG: No, that is not exactly true. I was informed of many combats with partisans and of bands and, as I have stated, of some shootings; and also I was told about the fact that German agricultural leaders, German officials and policemen, and peaceful Soviet farmers were attacked by these partisans and bands and were murdered by thousands.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. We know that the partisans who fought against the enemies of their country were called bandits by you and treated accordingly. I do not argue that. But I am speaking of the extermination of the civilian population, of old men, women, and children. Did you have knowledge of this?
ROSENBERG: In these combats we tried especially to protect the farming population and others too; and when we heard about what appeared to us to be excessive measures by the Police, we put the most severe demands to them that even in the full heat of battle these matters were to be considered; and the Police told us that it was easy to make those demands from behind a desk, but, if in White Ruthenia the partisans murder and burn 500 White Ruthenian burgomasters with their families in their houses and we are shot at from the rear, then terrible conflicts must follow.
GEN. RUDENKO: I will remind you that, in your directive concerning occupied territories and organization of administration and the primary task for administration, you personally planned the police measures as your first task. Do you deny this now? I ask you, do you deny this now?
ROSENBERG: If it is Document 1056-PS, I proposed seven urgent measures. I cannot tell you at the moment which is the first one here. I ask that you submit this document to me.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. I will ask that one paragraph of this document be shown to you, “Police measures,” which is in the very first place.
THE PRESIDENT: Has this document been put to him?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the use of going into it again?
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, Defendant Rosenberg asked for it. I would like to say simply that the defendant tried to make me believe that he was not informed and that these were purely police measures. I am going to prove that he put as his primary task the carrying out of these police measures.
ROSENBERG: It goes without saying that in an occupied territory in the middle of such a war the Police are responsible for police protection measures. And the third point is “the supply of the population with foodstuffs in order to avoid famine.” I repeat, “supply of the population in order to avoid famine.”
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Very well. We heard about this in detail yesterday. I have a few last questions to put to you. First of all, I would like to ask you about the Zuman incident. The document has already been submitted to the Tribunal, but I consider it my duty as a representative of the Soviet Union to put to you this question concerning the shooting of Soviet citizens for the sole purpose of obtaining a stretch of land needed as a hunting ground. You remember this document?
ROSENBERG: Yes, I gave an extensive explanation on it yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, this has been gone into before before the Tribunal. Why should the Tribunal’s time be taken up by going over and over again on the same grounds? We have said that we would not have things done cumulatively.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, a few details of this question are of great importance, and the defendant did not explain them; therefore, I would like very much to ask this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will adjourn to consider the matter.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: First of all, the Tribunal will rise tomorrow afternoon at half past 4.
Now, as to this question, the Tribunal think that the matter has been sufficiently gone into; but, if there is a particular point which has not been dealt with before, a question may be asked in that connection.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] Defendant Rosenberg, on 2 April 1943, you addressed a letter to Himmler regarding this incident regarding the shooting of hundreds of Soviet citizens in the region of Zuman, because this place was needed as a hunting ground. Did you not address such a letter to Himmler? Until June 1943, furthermore, you were interested in receiving a reply. What were the results of this letter?
ROSENBERG: First, I wrote to the Chief of the German Police; and I had to wait for what he, as the official responsible for the measures of security in the Ukraine, might cause to be done. When I did not receive any further information, I brought this case as a personal complaint before the Führer.
GEN. RUDENKO: When did you report it to Hitler?
ROSENBERG: This complaint to the Führer was dealt with in the middle of May 1943 and, since it was a rather lengthy complaint, probably reached him several weeks in advance, that is, 5 or 6 weeks elapsed between 2 April and the day it was dealt with, the middle or end of May. I believe that is a very short time for dealing with a complaint because: First it had to be investigated rather thoroughly by Lammers and Bormann; then it had to be reported to the Führer; the Führer then had to make his decision and give his directives; and then I was summoned.
GEN. RUDENKO: When was this complaint discussed for the last time?
ROSENBERG: In May—between the middle and the end of May 1943.
GEN. RUDENKO: Was it discussed in the presence of Koch?
ROSENBERG: Yes, indeed.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yesterday you told the Tribunal that Koch presented a report to Hitler—a memorandum from the Forestry Office. Is that true?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore, this memorandum confirmed that it was a fight against the partisans?
ROSENBERG: Not quite exactly like that, but it said that this forest district had to be utilized for the necessary supply of lumber for the Armed Forces or the Administration and that these needed forests harbored many restless partisans and guerrilla bands. Therefore there was great danger for the workers in these districts and it had come to shootings between them and partisans and guerrilla bands; and, since one could not watch over all of them, a transfer of certain groups from these forest districts into forest areas farther south took place. Koch added that then many of these people who had been transferred expressed their thanks for having received better land than they had had before. That was the information that Koch had given.
GEN. RUDENKO: They were grateful that one December night they were evicted from their houses and taken away hundreds of kilometers and hundreds of them shot. They appreciated that very much. I should like to ask you the following, however. In your letter to Himmler on 2 April 1943, you also attached a memorandum from the Forestry Office; and in this memorandum it is stated—I am going to read this passage—you should remember this incident—this terrible incident when men were shot because hunting ground was needed. In the memorandum of the Forestry Office it is stated, “There is no doubt that several villages located in the forest region of Zuman were evacuated principally in order to create a hunting area.” This is stated in the memorandum of the Forestry Office.
ROSENBERG: I only want to point out that we are dealing here with an assistant of the Forestry Office in Berlin, who had added that on the basis of his reports. What Koch had produced was a report from the Chief of the Forest Administration in the Ukraine, himself.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. The last question in connection with this incident: Did you believe Koch when he stated that?
ROSENBERG: If I am asked on my conscience, that is hard to answer; but there was a...
GEN. RUDENKO: It is exactly on your conscience, if you like.
ROSENBERG: A description of actual conditions by the Forestry Administration was included, and I could not protest against such a presentation since it appeared well-founded, and I had to admit to myself that I had made a mistake in protesting.
GEN. RUDENKO: You did not protest against that, I quite understand. I shall finish by just reminding you of one quotation from your letter:
“Hundreds of people in and around Zuman were shot by using a whole police company ‘because they were communistically inclined.’ No Ukrainian believes that. The Germans are also astonished by this argument; because, if this was done for the safety of the country, then the communist-infected elements in other regions should have been executed at the same time.”
I have here to put to you the last question. Here in the Tribunal yesterday you declared several times that you wanted to resign from your post. Moreover, you spoke about your letter to Hitler, dated 12 October 1944, where you asked for directives for the future. Regarding this my colleague, Mr. Dodd, has already reminded you that at that date, 12 October 1944, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories no longer had any territories, because the Germans were out of Russia by that time. I would like to ask you the following question: How could you ask to be relieved of your post, you, who for years had dreamed about getting this position of Reich Minister and even becoming a member of the Secret Cabinet? You asked Hitler to grant you this position of Reich Minister. Do you remember that?
ROSENBERG: In the first place I was never a member of the so-called Secret Cabinet. That is not correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: Well, I shall correct myself. You dreamed of becoming a member of the Secret Reich Cabinet.
ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: And also dreamed of becoming Reich Minister; is that also true?
ROSENBERG: When the question as to my task became acute, there was a long discussion one way and another about the form of that task. Dr. Lammers, commissioned by the Führer, told me that the Führer intended either to appoint a Reich inspector because he wanted both Reich Commissioners to...
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, please. So that we shall not linger too long on that question, I am going to submit to the Tribunal a document: This is your personal letter—the last document...
THE PRESIDENT: In the first place, I do not know what the question is, and you are interrupting the witness before he has answered any question.
GEN. RUDENKO: No, Mr. President. I have but one aim here, because I should also like to shorten my interrogation in accordance with the desire of the Tribunal. So I am going to submit the letter of Rosenberg of 6 February 1938, addressed to Hitler, wherein he requests the post of Reich Minister from Hitler. That is a short letter. I ask permission to submit this document as Document USSR-117.
[Turning to the defendant.] Defendant Rosenberg, I am going to read this document into the record. It is not very long:
“6 February 1938. My Führer, because I was unable...”
THE PRESIDENT: The document is translated into German, is it not?
GEN. RUDENKO: The original is in German.
THE PRESIDENT: It is in German to start with. It is not necessary to read it all; you can put it in like other documents.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well.
[Turning to the defendant.] In this letter you expressed your resentment in connection with the appointment of the Defendant Ribbentrop as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Is that correct?
ROSENBERG: Yes, yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You thought that the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Hitler Cabinet could have been filled by yourself, Defendant Rosenberg; is that correct?
ROSENBERG: Yes, and I do not find it so extraordinary that I should not have expressed my wish to be used in the State service of the German Reich after so many years of activity.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. You speak in this letter of the existence of a secret cabinet; is that correct?
ROSENBERG: Well, may I read through this letter a little? Because I cannot answer fragmentary questions.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, yes. [Handing the document to the defendant.] Please read it through.
ROSENBERG: Yes, I have read this.
GEN. RUDENKO: Everything that is contained in it is correct?
ROSENBERG: Certainly, yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: This is your own letter?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You asked to be appointed into this secret Reich Cabinet?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You asked for the position of Reich Minister?
ROSENBERG: I reported that I had spoken to Party Member Göring about the question of this appointment; and since the Führer had charged me with the ideological education of the Party and since the foreign political office of the Party still existed and the impression might thereby arise in the Party that I had somehow been refused by the Führer, I therefore asked the Führer to receive me personally to discuss this matter. I think it quite understandable that I should express the wish to speak about a matter which was important to me personally.
GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore—here is my last question—you were the closest collaborator of Hitler in carrying out all his plans and his ideas?
ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct; that is absolutely wrong.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, let us consider it as a reply to my question. I have finished, Mr. President.
M. HENRI MONNERAY (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): I have only a few questions to ask the defendant.
[Turning to the defendant.] Defendant Rosenberg, is it correct that the deportation and the execution of the Jews in France put your organization in a position to seize furniture and valuables which belonged to these Jews?
ROSENBERG: It is quite true that I received a governmental order to confiscate archives, works of art, and later, household goods of Jewish citizens in France.
M. MONNERAY: The mass deportation of Jews could only increase the profits of your confiscation and seizures; is that not so?
ROSENBERG: No. The deportation of Jews has nothing to do with that. The suggestion for these measures was given only when I was informed that the Jewish people in question no longer inhabited their institutions, castles, and apartments—that they had left Paris and other places and had not returned.
M. MONNERAY: Once the Jews were deported they were absent; is that not true?
ROSENBERG: When the German troops marched in, Paris was almost entirely depopulated. The rest of the Parisians and inhabitants of cities in the north of France returned in the course of time; but, as I have been informed, the Jewish population did not return to these cities—particularly not to Paris. Therefore they had not been deported, but they had fled. I believe the number of those who had fled was given as 5, 6, or 7 millions or more.
M. MONNERAY: Do you mean to say by that, Defendant Rosenberg, that in the time that followed, when new deportation measures were carried out in the course of the German occupation of France, the apartments and homes of people deported were not seized by your organization?
ROSENBERG: No, I cannot express it that way. It may very well be that the apartments of Jewish persons who had been arrested had also been confiscated under certain circumstances, but I cannot give any exact information about that.
M. MONNERAY: One can, therefore, say that the deportation measures gave to your organization a greater chance of success in seizures and confiscations; is that not true?
ROSENBERG: No, that does not agree with the facts; but, as may be seen from the report which the French Prosecution made here, what actually happened was that confiscated apartments generally were sealed by the Police. Two months were allowed to elapse to see whether or not the owners of these apartments would return, and only after the fact had been established that this was not the case were the household goods transferred to Germany for those whose homes had been damaged by bombs. That can be seen from the report which the French Prosecution has submitted here.
M. MONNERAY: I suppose that there are very few cases—and I am sure you would agree with me on this—of people who had been deported returning after two months?
ROSENBERG: On the contrary! I was informed about such cases. Even in Document 001-PS, regrettable as it is from the humane point of view, it is clearly stated that we had heard that a large number of Jewish personalities, who had been formerly arrested, had been released again.
M. MONNERAY: You remember, certainly, the memorandum which you sent to Hitler on 3 October 1942, which has already been presented to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-1327. In that document you remind Hitler of your jurisdiction and your powers; and you say that it is a matter for you, as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, to seize the homes of Jews who had taken flight, who were absent, or who were called upon to leave. I can submit this document to you in order to refresh your memory if necessary.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
The first lines of that document are the ones I am referring to. I emphasize the words “the Jews who were called upon to leave later.” It is a document of 3 October 1942, which has already been submitted.
ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct—that is according to the facts. And as I have already said before, it is possible that a number of apartments of arrested people—other people who were absent—were included in that; but as I said before, in the other report there was more detailed information. But this document as such corresponds to the facts; it is a letter from me.
M. MONNERAY: The consequence of this act was that you were entrusted not only with the seizure of apartments which you found vacant at the time of the arrival of the Germans in Paris but also of apartments of people who were, as you say, “called upon to leave” in the following period.
You surely know, Defendant Rosenberg, under what conditions, in territories occupied by the Germans in the West as well as in the East, Jews were called upon to leave—namely, in special trains which generally led directly to concentration camps?
ROSENBERG: No, I did not know about those trains. We definitely dealt with deserted apartments, and I was probably informed that eventually also the apartments of people who had been arrested, people who were still living, or had long since fled would be taken into consideration. Nothing more is stated here, and I could not give you any further information. As to the reports which have been submitted here at the Trial, I have seen them here for the first time. I can only tell you that in the end I was informed that, before the conquest of Paris by Allied troops, all available furniture and household equipment was turned over to the French Red Cross.
M. MONNERAY: Do you agree with me on the following point: That your organization had the right to seize valuables and apartments which had become vacant after the arrival of the German troops in Paris? Do you agree with me on that point?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
M. MONNERAY: Defendant, you have just said that you had no knowledge whatsoever of the deportations in special trains to special destinations. Do you know—and I suppose you do know it since the document to which I am referring has already been produced before the Tribunal—that in Paris every Tuesday since 1941 and until the end of the German occupation conferences called “Tuesday meetings” brought together the representatives of the various German organizations in Paris—that is to say, the experts in Jewish affairs in the different German administrative organs—to be exact, a representative of the German Military Command, a representative of the Civilian Administration, a representative of the Police Department, and a representative of the Economics Department? At these meetings there was also present a representative of the German Embassy in Paris and also a representative of your Special Staff.
I am referring to Document Number RF-1210, which is a report of Dannecker of 22 February 1942. He was the responsible chief and the main expert on anti-Jewish terrorist action in Paris during the occupation. If you wish, I will submit that document to you.
ROSENBERG: I remember these declarations made during the Trial very well, but I have never received a report about these Tuesday conferences which took place regularly. The fact that my deputy for the furniture action had to maintain closest liaison with the Police was a matter of course, since the confiscations of such articles could not be carried out by my office, that being an exclusive right of the Police. Therefore, one had to speak to the Police about these matters. It was not reported to me that there were regular Tuesday conferences. I believe that if such a report had been consistently turned in it would have been submitted to me.
M. MONNERAY: You agree, however, that these Tuesday meetings were extremely useful to the interests of your organization. As a matter of fact, the various collective actions which were taken against the Jews—that is to say, arrests, police raids, and deportations—were discussed in those meetings. Did it not, therefore, seem completely logical and natural for your organization to be regularly informed of these actions in order that it might take the resulting economic steps—namely, seizures of property?
ROSENBERG: In my opinion that is not logical at all, because if that certain Chief of Police sent secret transports of that kind into these camps, as has been revealed here, then it does not follow that he would report about that every Tuesday to the other gentlemen. Neither do I believe that this Chief of Police informed the representative of the Foreign Office about these things in detail.
M. MONNERAY: You are perhaps badly informed on this point, but I would like to read again the concluding passage of the report which says, “The conference had as a result an alignment of Jewish policy as complete as could be realized in the occupied territory...”
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has said, has he not, that he does not know anything about these Tuesday meetings—he received no reports of them?
M. MONNERAY: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Then why are you asking about them?
M. MONNERAY: The agencies in Paris collaborated actively in the terrorist policy of the Police and benefited by it through the economic step which followed—namely, the seizure of valuables.
THE PRESIDENT: You have not been able to connect him with these reports—with the document. He has not signed the document. Nothing shows on the document that he received it—at least, I suppose not—or you would have put it to him. He says he did not know the document.
M. MONNERAY: Allow me, Mr. President, in that case to ask, whether he contests the reality of the evidence concerning the representation of his Paris organization at this meeting.
[Turning to the defendant.] Do you deny its presence at this meeting?
ROSENBERG: I cannot give any information about that, because I have not received any report.
M. MONNERAY: I would like to conclude this cross-examination by reminding you of a document which has already been produced, quoted, and discussed—that is Document 001-PS. In that document the defendant proposes, in the first paragraph, the transport of all seized household goods to the East, and in Paragraph 2 he suggests to Hitler that French Jews instead of other Frenchmen should be shot as hostages.
Considering, as a result of the questions and answers, that the organization of the defendant could benefit by these measures of execution and deportation, it seems that the real motive of this document is very clear. It is necessary—is not that your opinion, Defendant—first to get rid of the people in order to be able afterwards to seize their property?
ROSENBERG: No, that is not true.
M. MONNERAY: I have no more questions to ask, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to ask anything of the witness, Dr. Thoma?
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, may I quite briefly ask the defendant whether he wants me to ask him another question? I believe I shall have finished immediately.
ROSENBERG: No.
DR. THOMA: Thank you. The defendant does not want any more questions. Then, with the permission of the Court, I should like to call the witness Riecke.
THE PRESIDENT: Will he be long or not?
DR. THOMA: Half an hour at most.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. Well then, the defendant may retire.
[The witness Riecke took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
HANS JOACHIM RIECKE (Witness): Hans Joachim Riecke.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
Dr. Thoma, will you spell the name, please?
DR. THOMA: R-i-e-c-k-e.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, what position did you have in the Economic Staff East and in the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories?
RIECKE: I held both positions upon orders from Göring. I was in charge of the food and agriculture department.
DR. THOMA: What was the task of these offices?
RIECKE: The first main task of this office was the reconstruction of Russian agriculture; the second task was the utilization of the surplus areas in the south for the Armed Forces and for nutrition purposes.
DR. THOMA: What offices were established for administration in the Occupied Eastern Territories?
RIECKE: In addition to the Foreign Ministry there existed a number of special assignments: Göring for agriculture, Himmler for police, and Sauckel for the recruitment of manpower.
DR. THOMA: Who was in charge of agriculture?
RIECKE: Agriculture—and also the entire economy—was under Göring. He gave his instructions directly or through State Secretaries Körner and Backe.
DR. THOMA: Were the figures for delivery—the quota in agriculture—higher than those imposed under the Soviet administration?
RIECKE: The figures imposed for delivery were adjusted to the former Russian figures. During the first year the actual quantities delivered were lower than during the Russian era. In the next year, as far as crops were concerned, they were lower; as far as livestock was concerned, higher.
DR. THOMA: Were the actual deliveries according to Göring’s directives?
RIECKE: No, Göring had expected considerably higher figures.
DR. THOMA: Did Germany ship agricultural machinery—scythes and so on—into the Occupied Eastern Territories and in what quantities?
RIECKE: A large-scale program for agricultural machinery under the name of the Eastern Agricultural Program was set up in Germany whereby, with regard to war conditions, large amounts of agricultural machinery and equipment were shipped into the occupied Russian territories. The reason for that was the removal and large-scale destruction of agricultural machinery and equipment by the Russians during their retreat.
DR. THOMA: On 5 February 1942 an agricultural decree was issued. What were the reasons for that?
RIECKE: The main purpose of that agricultural decree was to get the population to co-operate voluntarily. In the beginning it was intended to maintain the collective economy. That proved to be impossible, because—as has been mentioned—part of the heavy machinery, especially tractors, was no longer available. On the other hand, it was not possible to resort to individual farming, as some of the population wished, because smaller equipment was also lacking. Therefore a compromise solution was reached by so-called agricultural co-operatives whereby the Russian peasants got a share of the land to work, but a part of the work was still carried on collectively.
DR. THOMA: What was the result?
RIECKE: The result of the agricultural decree was generally favorable. The extent and quantity of the tillage increased. A particularly good example of the results was the conditions in the so-called Kharkov Basin, where in the spring of 1942 the farms which had been converted to agricultural co-operatives had already achieved more than 70 percent of the spring tillage, whereas the unconverted collective farms had achieved only about 30 percent.
DR. THOMA: On 3 June 1943 the so-called private property declaration was issued. What were the principles involved?
RIECKE: The basic purpose of the private property declaration was to turn over to the Russian peasants as personal property the shares of land which had been allotted to them by the agricultural decree.
DR. THOMA: How was the vegetable supply of large cities handled—for example, in the Ukraine?
RIECKE: Around the large cities considerable lands for garden plots were allotted to the working population.
DR. THOMA: Now some questions about Latvia. Did the German Administration in Latvia confiscate the land of the Latvian peasants?
RIECKE: No; on the contrary. The nationalization measures taken by the Russians during the occupation were discontinued. The land which had been separated from the farms for purposes of settlement was returned to the former owners. To say it in one sentence: The conditions existing before the Russian occupation were re-established.
COL. POKROVSKY: I beg to be excused, but I cannot understand—with the best of wishes—what all these questions, even in the remotest way, have to do with the case of the Defendant Rosenberg. It seems to me that further questions of the defense counsel, if they are along these same lines, should not be allowed.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, you ought to show that what the witness is testifying about is connected in some way with the Defendant Rosenberg.
DR. THOMA: With this question I want, first, to refute the Soviet assertion that after the occupation the Barons had their land returned to them—I refer to the Soviet Prosecution’s document, Document Number USSR-395, which I submitted to the Tribunal yesterday. Secondly, I want to prove with it that that area was supposed to be administered in an orderly way and in such a manner that the population co-operated voluntarily. Thirdly, I want to prove that during the entire German occupation not one Ukrainian nor one citizen of the Soviet Union starved, because the agricultural work was conducted accordingly. But I can demonstrate this proof only through statements of an expert. I believe that I have only a few more questions, and then I shall have finished with this subject of evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Thoma.
DR. THOMA: Did the German Administration in Latvia confiscate the land of the Latvian peasants?
RIECKE: I have answered that question already. On the contrary, socialization was revoked, and the land separated for settlement purposes was returned to the Latvian peasants. In a word, conditions as existing before the Russian occupation were re-established.
DR. THOMA: Were former large German estates reinstated?
RIECKE: No. On the contrary, Latvian peasants’ property—which after 1919 had been created at the expense of large German estates—was left in their hands. It remained their property.
DR. THOMA: What were the ideas behind the so-called reprivatization?
RIECKE: Reprivatization was intended to give the Latvian peasants the feeling of security derived from working their own property.
DR. THOMA: Did this law also apply to Estonia and Lithuania?
RIECKE: The law applied in a similar manner also to Estonia and Lithuania.
DR. THOMA: Do you know about a statement of Darré’s to the effect that the local small farmers should be removed from their property and be proletarianized?
RIECKE: I do not remember any such statement.
DR. THOMA: Do you know about the Society for the Administration of the Eastern Territory?
RIECKE: There were two societies by that name. I assume that the one you are referring to was the one founded in order to take care of the state-owned property and the plants which were shown to have been formed during the Russian occupation in the Baltic provinces, and which were still left after the return to private ownership. In the former Russian territories of the so-called Reich Commission, the MTS organization also took care of these areas.
DR. THOMA: What was the attitude of Rosenberg toward the various measures, such as labor recruitment, delivery of foodstuffs, et cetera?
RIECKE: Rosenberg could not escape the orders given by the Führer. Yet he always advocated that these measures be carried out without coercion against the population, and that they be co-ordinated with each other.
DR. THOMA: Who took care of the Eastern Workers in the Reich?
RIECKE: To my knowledge the Labor Administration, through its labor offices.
DR. THOMA: How were the Eastern Workers quartered in the country in the Reich? Do you know anything about it?
RIECKE: The provisioning and quartering of the Eastern Workers in the country in the Reich were quite satisfactory on the whole. I received reports directly by way of the offices of the Reich Food Estate.
DR. THOMA: Can you tell us something about Rosenberg’s general attitude toward the Eastern people?
RIECKE: As I have said before, Rosenberg personally wanted to get the Eastern people to co-operate. This was true especially in the matter of cultivating and maintaining their cultural life. For instance, Rosenberg, as far as I know, always intervened for the re-opening of the colleges and special schools.
DR. THOMA: Did Rosenberg have any restrictions in this sphere? Did he have to oppose other points of view to attain this goal?
RIECKE: Strong forces were at work counteracting Rosenberg’s efforts; and especially in the Führer’s headquarters there were Bormann and Himmler, whose opinions were strongly supported by Reich Commissioner Koch, and who in turn was supported by Bormann and Himmler in his work. That led to the fact that a large proportion of the measures which Rosenberg had planned, especially in the Ukraine, were sabotaged by Koch.
DR. THOMA: Now one last question: What do you know about the concentration camps and about the treatment of the inmates in protective custody?
RIECKE: I, of course, knew of the existence of concentration camps but not their number and what happened in them. During the years of 1933 and 1934 various representations were made about individual cases of maltreatment. Later, persons who visited concentration camps turned in definite, positive reports. In the last days of April of last year, near Berlin, I met inmates of concentration camps being marched to the rear. Conditions were so terrible that I immediately saw Himmler and asked him not to let these people go on marching but to turn them over to the enemy. That discussion took place in the presence of Field Marshal Keitel. Himmler unfortunately gave only an evasive answer.
DR. THOMA: There is one more question that just came to my mind. In addition to providing food for the Armed Forces, were measures taken in the Occupied Eastern Territories to get foodstuffs for the German people?
RIECKE: About two-thirds of the supplies of foodstuffs from the Occupied Eastern Territories went directly to the Armed Forces. The remaining third was shipped to Germany, and we always considered it as compensatory for the feeding of the foreign workers, whose number was increasing continuously.
DR. THOMA: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions?
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you were State Secretary in the Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture; is that correct?
RIECKE: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Chief of the Main Department for Food and Agriculture in the Government General was frequently in Berlin in order to try to fix quotas there which would be bearable to the population?
RIECKE: As I recall, he several times expressed that opinion during the regular negotiations which took place with the Government General.
DR. SEIDL: According to your own observations, what was the food situation of the population of the Government General?
RIECKE: According to my own observations and the reports which I received, the rations which had been fixed were far lower than in the Reich, but considerable compensation was achieved through both the black market and the open market.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that every effort was made by the administration of the Government General to increase agricultural production?
RIECKE: Considerable efforts were made by the Government General to promote agriculture; and one can even say that the entire remaining industry, insofar as it was not used for armament, worked exclusively for the production of food. Furthermore, fertilizer was shipped from the Reich, although only in limited quantities, as well as machinery and equipment, in accordance with the program for the Eastern territory.
DR. SEIDL: What percentage of the total German food supply did the occupied countries deliver?
RIECKE: According to the calculations which were made independently by our Ministry, the deliveries from occupied territories in 1942 and 1943 amounted to about 15 percent of the total food supply of Germany, during the other years around 10 percent, usually less.
DR. SEIDL: Now one last question: The Soviet Prosecution have submitted a document, Document USSR-170. It deals with a meeting of the chiefs of the German offices in the occupied territories which took place on 6 August 1942 under the chairmanship of the Reich Marshal. I will have this document handed to you, and I want you to tell me whether the description given in that document correctly characterizes the relations between Germany and the occupied territories. You were present at that meeting yourself.
[The document was submitted to the witness.]
RIECKE: The document represents the minutes of the meeting in which I took part. First, I have to say that the document—that is to say, the minutes—principally contains the speech of the Reich Marshal, and does not indicate the actual relations between Germany and the occupied territories with regard to the food situation. The demands which Göring made in this meeting were so high that they could not even be taken seriously. It was also clear to us, engaged in the food sector, that in the long run we could never achieve anything by force. The additional demands which Göring made in that meeting were actually never fulfilled. I do not think that Göring himself believed that these quotas could be fulfilled. As far as I know, Göring’s additional demands were never submitted at all to France; Belgium in spite of a prohibition received grain; and Czechoslovakia got fats in spite of another prohibition.
On the day before that meeting, there had been a conference of the Gauleiter which—as well as I can remember—was dominated by the increasing air attacks in the West and the augmenting difficulties, especially for the population, resulting therefrom. The western Gauleiter were of the opinion that the food supply for Germany was becoming insufficient in view of the increasing burdens for the population, but that, on the other hand, a large part of the occupied territories was still enjoying a surplus. The Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture and the representatives of the occupied territories themselves were in a certain sense accused of not demanding and delivering enough from the occupied territories. Göring followed up these demands; and, due to his disposition and his temperament, this led to the strong exaggerations contained in the minutes and in this document.
DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, how were foreign workers fed in Germany?
RIECKE: All groups of foreign workers, with the exception of the Eastern Workers, received the same rations as the German population.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what about the supplies for the Eastern Workers?
RIECKE: For certain items the Eastern Workers received less than the others; and in the case of bread and potatoes, higher rations.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was the food supply such that the state of health of the workers was endangered?
RIECKE: That question cannot be answered in a clear-cut fashion. It must be considered in connection with the performance demanded of the workers. For normal work these rations should have been entirely sufficient.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel intervene especially for better nutrition of these workers?
RIECKE: As far as I know, Sauckel appealed several times to my minister on behalf of a better supply of food, whereupon Backe always answered with the counter demand that no additional workers should be brought to Germany. Backe repeatedly suggested that the number of workers be limited and that they be supplied with better food instead.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, in your capacity as State Secretary for Agriculture, did you not also go to Holland at the end of 1944 or the beginning of 1945?
RIECKE: Yes; at that time I was in the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: On that occasion, was it not the case there that the Wehrmacht offices and the Police raised serious complaints about sabotage of Dutch agriculture, particularly about the responsible government agencies in Holland?
RIECKE: I do not remember a conversation of that kind.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that the Defendant Seyss-Inquart intervened for the reduction of food exports from Holland to Germany?
RIECKE: Yes, on various occasions, and also in that meeting which this document describes.
DR. STEINBAUER: And also, in spite of complaints, that he left the Dutch officials in the Food Department?
RIECKE: Yes, that is the case.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is all.
DR. HANS FLÄCHSNER: (Counsel for Defendant Speer): Mr. President, may I put several questions to the witness?
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, could you give me information about the following questions? Did the inmates of concentration camps who worked in the armament industry get the same supplementary rations for heavy and very heavy labor as the other workers?
RIECKE: During the time when I was charged with these problems, it was decided to give all prisoners, including concentration camp inmates, the same rations as the rest of the population, if they were working. Therefore, they should have received the same rations.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Was the Defendant Speer, or the Ministry under his direction, competent for the orderly maintenance of the rations in the plants insofar as the latter—the plants—were in charge of the food supply?
RIECKE: No, Speer’s Ministry was not competent in these matters. As far as delivery upon demand was concerned, the food offices were competent. The distribution of delivered foodstuffs in the plants, however, was the affair of the camp or plant administrations.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: And one further question: What measures had Speer taken in order to prevent a general food catastrophe which would have affected the millions of foreign workers in Germany in an equal manner?
RIECKE: Beginning in December 1944, Speer purposely subordinated armament tasks to the problem of nutrition with the idea in mind of a change-over to a new regime, a new administration, an occupying power. From this time on, Speer gave food transport priority over armament transport. He saw to it that seed for the spring tillage was distributed with the transportation means at his disposal. Speer emphatically advocated reconstructing food processing plants damaged by air attack even before armament plants. And above all, during that last phase, Speer helped us prevent the senseless destruction of food processing plants, against the instructions issued by Hitler. He did this with complete self-abnegation and without consideration for any possible consequences.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, did you participate in the Western campaign?
RIECKE: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: In what capacity?
RIECKE: As commander of a battalion in the field.
DR. LATERNSER: During the Western campaign, did you receive any dubious orders—I mean to say, orders which were in violation of international law?
RIECKE: I received no such orders.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you have any reason to believe, or did you establish, that looting was tolerated by higher military authorities?
RIECKE: No. On the contrary, looting was most severely punished.
DR. LATERNSER: Later you were also in the East, but—as I have heard not as a soldier. Could you look into the operational areas there, as well as the regions governed by the commissions?
RIECKE: Both were open to my observations.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the treatment of the local population by the German soldiers?
RIECKE: Taken as a whole it can be said that, especially in the Ukraine, the treatment of the civilian population in the army’s sector—in the operational area—was better than elsewhere; consideration was shown for the necessities of the civilian administrative sector.
DR. LATERNSER: And what do you think is the reason for that difference?
RIECKE: I attribute it to a different basic attitude of the soldier who was free of political tendencies and also to the fact that the troops, of course, wanted to have peace and quiet in the rear areas.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution want to cross-examine?
MR. DODD: I can be through in 2 minutes, if Your Honor please.
[Turning to the witness.] Were you a member of the Nazi Party?
RIECKE: Yes.
MR. DODD: When did you join?
RIECKE: In 1925.
MR. DODD: 1925?
RIECKE: Yes.
MR. DODD: You were also a member of the SA?
RIECKE: Yes.
MR. DODD: What rank did you hold in the SA?
RIECKE: My last rank was Gruppenführer of the SA.
MR. DODD: Previously, you were an SA Sturmführer, were you not?
RIECKE: In 1930, yes.
MR. DODD: When did you become an SS Gruppenführer?
RIECKE: In October 1944.
MR. DODD: That is all. I have no other questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you any questions to ask in re-examination?
DR. THOMA: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that concludes your case in behalf of the Defendant Rosenberg, does it not?
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I should like to state that the Document Rosenberg-19, which General Rudenko referred to, was not submitted to the Tribunal as an exhibit by me. Furthermore, I should like to inform the Tribunal that a number of affidavits, which have been approved, have not as yet been received.
THE PRESIDENT: You can mention them later, of course.
DR. THOMA: I should further like to make the request that my document book Number 1 be not accepted in evidence but considered the same as before, that is, as having general probative value according to the decision of 8 March 1946; therefore, not as evidence, not as a matter of proof, but just as argument. I assume that it had been approved in this sense previously, and that it was only rejected as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: I anticipate that we shall not interfere in your argument.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I should like to give an explanation—that is, about the fact that Document Rosenberg-19 represents a letter from Riecke addressed to Rosenberg, dated 12 March 1943. This document was submitted by the defendant’s counsel, Dr. Thoma. It is found in the Rosenberg Document Book Number 2, Page 42, and has been translated into all four languages. It is in the possession of all the prosecutors and is also in the document book which has been submitted to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal has ruled to accept this document from the Defense.
THE PRESIDENT: General Raginsky, the position is this: That a document does not go into evidence unless it is offered in evidence. Dr. Thoma has not offered this document in evidence, and I understand that the Soviet Prosecution has not offered it in evidence. If you want to offer it in evidence, and the document is an authentic document—which I suppose it is—you can offer it in evidence.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: We did not offer it as evidence, only because we thought that it was already contained in the document book presented by the Defense; and, therefore, we had no need to present it again. If the defendant’s counsel, Thoma, refuses to present it, then we shall do so.
THE PRESIDENT: You are wrong in assuming this. You see, documents do not go into evidence unless they are offered in evidence. The fact that they are in the books does not mean that they are in evidence; therefore, if you want to offer it in evidence, you must do so.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In that case, Mr. President, we are going to offer it in evidence now.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; you will give it a USSR number.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, we are going to give it a USSR exhibit number and, with your permission, will offer it in evidence tomorrow.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, we will proceed to deal with the supplementary applications. The witness can retire.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, the first application is that of Dr. Seidl’s with regard to two witnesses. First of all witness Hilger, who was previously granted as a witness for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop but withdrawn by counsel on the 2nd of April. I believe that the witness is in the United States and that there is a report that he is too ill to travel. But apart from this, My Lord, the purpose of the witness is to give evidence as to the discussions and treaty negotiations which took place in the Kremlin at Moscow before the German-Soviet agreement of the 23rd of August 1939; and the allegation states the conclusion of the alleged secret agreement dealt with in the affidavit of the witness Gaus.
My Lord, the other application is for a witness Von Weizsäcker, who is going to deal with the same point.
The Prosecution, of course, loyally accept the decision of the Tribunal on the admissibility of the Gaus affidavit, but they respectfully submit that that does not affect this point. What is desired is to call witnesses as to the course of the negotiations before these treaties—before an agreement was arrived at in respect to these treaties—and that is a point which we have had several times; and, of course, while all circumstances have a slight difference, the Tribunal have—as far as I know—ruled universally up to now that they will not go into antecedent negotiations which have resulted in agreements.
There is also the position that, of course, Dr. Seidl has put in the Gaus affidavit, and he has had his opportunity to examine the Defendant Von Ribbentrop; and the Prosecution respectfully submit that to call two secondary witnesses—without any disrespect to their position in the German Foreign Office, they are witnesses of a secondary importance compared with the Defendant Von Ribbentrop—to discuss these negotiations seems to the Prosecution to be going into irrelevant matter and entirely unnecessary for the purposes of this case.
I confess I do not myself appreciate any special relevance that these witnesses could have to the case of Hess, but I do not put it so strongly on that ground; I put it on the ground which I have just outlined to the Tribunal.
With regard to the third application of Dr. Seidl, I am not quite sure whether he means that he wants the Prosecution to provide him with an original or certified copy of the secret agreement, or whether he desires to tender a copy himself. But with regard to that, again the Prosecution take the line that that point—which, after all, is only one tiny corner of one aspect of the case—is sufficiently covered by the evidence which has already been brought out before the Tribunal from the affidavit of Ambassador Gaus and the evidence of the Defendant Ribbentrop.
That is the position of the Prosecution with regard to that.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the affidavit of the Ambassador Dr. Gaus, which has been accepted by the Tribunal as Exhibit Hess-16, describes only a part of the negotiations. Ambassador Dr. Gaus was not present at the negotiations which preceded the conclusion of the pacts. I have, therefore, made the additional application to call Embassy Counsellor Hilger as a witness after his having already been approved as a witness for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop.
I have, furthermore, requested that the Tribunal procure the text of that secret supplementary appendix. I have to admit, however, that this request no longer has the importance it had at the time it was made. In the meantime we have received a copy of that secret supplementary appendix.
Furthermore, I have a copy of the secret appendix to the German-Soviet border pact of 28 September 1939; and I have an affidavit by Ambassador Dr. Gaus of 1 April of this year certifying that these copies are identical with the text of the secret agreements drafted on 23 August and 28 September 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, have you any objection to that document being produced for the consideration of the Tribunal?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not at all, My Lord. As I say, the Tribunal have considered our objection on relevance, and we have lost on it; and, therefore, it is not really open to me to argue any question of the relevance of the document in view of the decision of the Tribunal.
The only point that I make is that if Dr. Seidl produces an alleged copy of the treaty, supported by an affidavit of Ambassador Gaus, then it immensely strengthens my argument, I submit, against him being allowed to call the witness.
COL. POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution, on the question which is now being discussed by the Tribunal, have submitted today a document to the General Secretariat of the International Military Tribunal. If this document is already in your possession, then I need not talk about our position here; but, if you find it necessary, Your Honors, I am going to set it forth here. We object on the ground of considerations, which are set forth in this document signed by General Rudenko.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you presenting an argument or a document of some sort?
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I am not going to argue about it nor return to this question if you have this document.
THE PRESIDENT: You misunderstood me. You mentioned a document which you asserted was in the possession of the Tribunal. I am not aware that we have any document from the Soviet Prosecution. It may be that it has been received; and, if so, we will consider it of course.
What I wanted to know is whether it was an argument or an original document of some sort.
COL. POKROVSKY: The document deals with the official answer of the Soviet Prosecution on the question as to whether we consider it necessary to grant the request of Dr. Seidl regarding a group of questions connected with the German-Soviet Pact of 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: We will consider the document.
COL. POKROVSKY: You think it would be possible to be content with just the document which is in your possession now?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, certainly—unless you wish to say anything. We will consider the document.
COL. POKROVSKY: There is going to be no further information regarding it. Our position has been defined in detail in this document signed by General Rudenko; and, if you have this document before you now, I have nothing more to add regarding it.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, on 13 April I made a written motion to be permitted to submit a documentary supplement as Exhibit Hess-17. I submitted six copies of this document with the request to have it translated. The following documents are included:
1) The German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, which was already submitted by the Prosecution under Exhibit GB-145; 2) the related supplementary protocol of the same date; 3) the German-Soviet Friendship and Border Pact of 28 September 1939; 4) the secret supplementary protocol of the same date which is related to it; and 5) the second affidavit by Ambassador Dr. Gaus, mentioned before.
Furthermore, on 15 April I made the motion to call the witness Dr. Gaus—who is in Nuremberg—here before this Court if the Tribunal do not consider the affidavit sufficient. I ask the Tribunal to make its decision about these motions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the matter.
Now, with reference to Von Neurath.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, this is an application for a witness Dieckhoff, in regard to whom interrogatories have already been granted. As I understand, the reason is that the witness Tschirschky has been found to have retired from the German Foreign Office some 18 months earlier than was thought. Baron Von Lüdinghausen has suggested that, to balance the calling of Dieckhoff as a witness, he will give up the calling of the witness Zimmermann and have an affidavit or interrogatory instead. My Lord, that seems to the Prosecution a very reasonable suggestion, and we have no objection.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean, no objection to Dieckhoff as a witness and Zimmermann for an affidavit or interrogatories?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is all with regard to the Defendant Von Neurath.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, with regard to the Defendant Schacht, it is only the petition of the witness Huelse; and the Prosecution do not really mind whether Dr. Dix calls him or puts in an affidavit. I think that it is only a question of whether the witness will be available to come here from Hamburg; and, if he is available, we have no objection to him being called as a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, My Lord, the next one on the list is an application on behalf of the Defendant Sauckel: Withdrawal of interrogatories for Mende granted on 23 March, as the prospective witness is not located; and interrogatories for Marenbach in place of Mende, who can give the same testimony. Dr. Servatius believes that Marenbach is located at the Garmisch internment camp. The Prosecution have no objection to that.
My Lord, I think there was a formal one from Dr. Thoma with regard to the use of the sworn statement by Professor Denker, but there is no objection to that.
THE PRESIDENT: We have already allowed that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have already allowed that; this is only the formal application.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. Then we will consider those matters. There are a number of documents for the production of which the Defendant Sauckel’s counsel is applying.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: It has been suggested to us that counsel for the Defendant Sauckel and Counsel for the Prosecution could help us over that matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, my friend, Mr. Roberts, has been dealing with Dr. Servatius upon this point; so, perhaps he could help the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, will it take a long time for that or not?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not think so. The Tribunal, I understand...
COL. POKROVSKY: I should like to inform the Tribunal that the Soviet Prosecution did not receive any documents which the British Prosecutor has just mentioned, and we ask that these documents not be discussed until the moment when we shall have the opportunity to get acquainted with them.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand that these documents have not been translated yet. The question really is the preliminary one of which documents should be translated, and we were only going through the documents in order to see which documents were sufficiently relevant to be translated; so that it would not be...
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the Tribunal—I understand—have made a preliminary order of just striking out the documents which Dr. Servatius and I agree should not be presented. My Lord, that leaves a very large number of documents, of which I think the Tribunal has a list. My Lord, the first 68 documents—or rather from documents 6 to 68—are regulations dealing with the conditions of the employment of labor in Germany. My Lord, I have seen Dr. Servatius’ proposed document book, and he has marked certain passages which he would desire to read, and which would have to be translated, My Lord; and that does cut down the bulk of the documents very considerably.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, of course, we have not read all these documents yet, and they are not translated. Can you indicate to us whether you have any objection to them being translated?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not think I could object to those first documents from 6 to 68—the passages marked “being translated,” because from their description they appear to be relevant.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, 6 to 68.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the passages which are actually marked?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Then will you go on?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: 69 to 79 he has already struck out.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. My Lord, 80 and 81 I object to. They are documents making allegations of breach of the Hague Regulations by the Soviet nation. My Lord, I submit that that is not relevant.
THE PRESIDENT: The allegations of illegal acts by the Soviet Government with reference to individuals?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. My Lord, I submit that that could not be relevant at all.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and 82 to 89; you do not object to these?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not object to these—the passages as marked.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Dr. Servatius promised, as far as he could, to cut down the passages which were going to be marked.
My Lord, 90 and 91 I object to. Dr. Servatius wants to put in, under the description of documents, a large number of affidavits, the number of which I think is not yet ascertained—affidavits by various persons as to the conditions of labor and the conditions under which foreign workers were employed. My Lord, the Defendant Sauckel has been allowed a certain number of witnesses and also affidavits or interrogatories from other people. My Lord, I submit that this application under 90 and 91—two files of affidavit—is not really an application for documents at all, and it should be disallowed.
My Lord, Number 92...
THE PRESIDENT: Number 92 he has struck out.
MR. ROBERTS: 92 has been struck out.
My Lord, Number 93 is, in fact, a book which was referred to by the French prosecutor; and, therefore, of course, Dr. Servatius would be entitled to refer to it in his case.
THE PRESIDENT: Are the passages marked in that or not?
MR. ROBERTS: Well, he has not marked any yet. There are some pictures, My Lord, of...
THE PRESIDENT: He only wants the pictures?
MR. ROBERTS: I think so, My Lord, showing the cherubic happiness of the foreign workers in Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, 94 is an affidavit of Sauckel’s son. It is only required, I understand, if one of three other witnesses who have been allowed is not available. My Lord, it is to deal with the allegation that Sauckel ordered the evacuation of Buchenwald; and, My Lord, I cannot object to this very short affidavit, if Dr. Servatius cannot produce one of the three witnesses who have been allowed to him.
My Lord, 95 is Sauckel’s speeches, and Dr. Servatius again has promised to cut down the passages which he has marked. It is difficult to object to that in view of the allegation of conspiracy.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, 96 and 97 are books in which there are very short extracts which have been marked, and, again, as it deals with a relevant period of the alleged conspiracy, My Lord, I do not see how I can object to that.
THE PRESIDENT: In the same category, yes. Does that meet with your views, Dr. Servatius?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, I discussed the matter with a representative of the Prosecution and that represents in principle the result. I would like to add, however, something with reference to a few documents—namely, Documents 80 and 81. One is the photostat copy of a deportation order in the city of Oels, the other an affidavit concerning forced labor in Saaz. I need the first document in order to prove that the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare was obsolete—that is to say, that before the armistice, while fighting was still going on, the population of the Eastern German provinces was sent to Russia for forced labor. I supplemented the motion orally at that time, because I considered the proof for the deportation of a large part of the population for forced labor, obtained by questioning the mayors of cities from Upper Silesia to East Prussia, as insufficient. I believe that this is of great importance for the defense of my client, as it proves that the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare was considered nonexistent in the East.
Document 81 deals with the state of affairs after the armistice—but which appears as only a continuation of what previously occurred in the Eastern territories—and confirms the fact that, under the occupation of the Soviet Army, such conditions generally continued to exist—namely, the recruitment of the population for work not in the sense of the Hague Convention for the repair of local roads, for instance, but rather for the purpose of working in industry and for activities outside the framework of the Hague Convention and for work outside the country. I do not believe that I should be refused this evidence.
Now as to Documents Number 90 and 91, their contents have already been presented. They are two folders with a collection of affidavits. The attempt is made to bring evidence in refutation of a government investigation such as we have met up with here. We have received reports from the Soviet and French Prosecution; we have received reports from Czechs; all of which constitute a huge quantity of material of mosaic-like patterns that can only be dealt with in this manner.
I once before explained that I do not have a government at my disposal which could prepare such a report, and so I suggest bringing a collection of affidavits. Now I do not intend to read every one of these affidavits here. My motion is that the Court appoint a deputy who would study that folder and prepare a brief report about it for presentation to the Tribunal. A similar problem will arise later when questions concerning the political organizations are dealt with—namely, the problem as to how these immense quantities of material can be presented to the Tribunal.
If I bring one witness, one witness only, it will be said, “Well, one witness cannot, of course, cover the entire ground.” On the other hand, I cannot have a hundred or more witnesses. So this would be a middle way: That a person appointed by the Tribunal study these affidavits and then give a report. That is the content of these two folders.
THE PRESIDENT: How many affidavits have you in mind or have you obtained?
DR. SERVATIUS: So far I have received very little. It proves that those who could give information are very reticent, because they are afraid that they might be prosecuted on that account. I hope, however, to be able to make a selection of reasonable statements, which I believe will amount to about 20 or 30 affidavits. I would limit it to that, because I do not care to take up the Court’s time with unnecessary work dealing with these affidavits. Judging from the present state of my collection, I may even have to consider withdrawing my motion altogether, because I have to admit myself that the amount of material reaching me is very small; but I ask to be given another chance, and at the appropriate moment I shall present the case to the Court again.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Is that all you want to say?
DR. SERVATIUS: There is still Document Number 93, the illustrated booklet, Europe Works in Germany. I should like...
THE PRESIDENT: Did the Prosecution object?
DR. SERVATIUS: No, the Prosecution does not object. I should like to project some pictures on the screen for the purpose of showing particularly under what conditions these people from the East arrived and what their condition was later, insofar as it can be shown from a propaganda pamphlet.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you.
MR. ROBERTS: There was one other point which I ought to mention. Perhaps Dr. Servatius would be good enough to listen.
My Lord, Dr. Servatius has applied in writing to the Tribunal, by letter dated 5 March 1946, for all medical reports of Dr. Jäger, who was a chief camp doctor at Krupp-Essen; secondly, all monthly reports of a man called Groene, who was a colleague of Dr. Jäger; thirdly, all minutes of monthly conferences which the chief camp leader held with his subordinate camp leaders at Krupps.
My Lord the position is this: That the French put in—oh, I think our American colleagues put in—an affidavit of Dr. Jäger, and Dr. Jäger himself has been granted as a witness for Sauckel, and so he will be seen in the witness box.
My Lord, the Prosecution have no objection to Dr. Jäger being asked, I suppose, to bring his reports with him if they are available. We do not have them, and I do not think we know where they are.
THE PRESIDENT: But the witness is being called.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have received a portion of these documents already, and I assume that the rest may also reach me. I believe the material which I have now is sufficient for my purposes so that the Prosecution need not take further pains.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean we need make no order?
DR. SERVATIUS: It is not necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 18 April 1946 at 1000 hours.]
TRANSCRIBER NOTES
Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus “Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: hence Führer, Göring, Kraków, and Ljoteč etc. throughout.
Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations between the German, English, French, and, most specifically with this volume, Russian documents presented in the trial.
An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as possible to the original document presentation and layout.
[The end of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal Vol. 11, by Various.]