Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Volume 11 (part 2 of 3)
“Answer: I know of no specific limitation of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner’s power with regard to the offices which were under the RSHA. On the other hand, I can say that Müller, the Chief of Amt IV, acted independently by virtue of his long experience and did not give to anyone, not even the chiefs of the other offices of the RSHA, any insight into his tasks and methods of his Amt IV. He had, after all, immediate protection from Himmler.
“Question Number 4: Did you ever see any executive orders by Kaltenbrunner?
“Answer: I have never seen any original order—that is to say, something signed in handwriting—from the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. I know quite well that orders for protective custody bore facsimile signatures or typewritten signatures. This was a routine initiated during Heydrich’s time.
“Question Number 5: Did orders for executions rest in Kaltenbrunner’s or Himmler’s hands? Who was responsible for the setting up and running of concentration camps?
“Answer: I know that execution orders rested in Himmler’s hands. So far as I know no other officials of the RSHA could issue such orders without his permission. I know, furthermore, that concentration camps were run by a special main department, namely, the SS Main Office for Economy and Administration, the chief of which was Pohl. The concentration camps had nothing to do with the RSHA. This applies to the whole administration, food, treatment, camp regulations, et cetera. The inspector of concentration camps was Glücks. The official channels were therefore: Himmler, Pohl, Glücks, camp commandant.
“Question Number 6: Did Kaltenbrunner order any of the concentration camps to be evacuated?
“Answer: It is not known to me that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner had issued any orders regarding the evacuation of concentration camps.
“Question Number 7: Did Kaltenbrunner issue the order to arrest all Danish citizens of Jewish religion and transport them to the concentration camp at Theresienstadt?
“Answer: No. The reason why I can answer this question exactly is because I, myself, as a member of the Gestapo, was concerned with this matter in Denmark in September 1943. The Chief of the Security Police and the SD had received the order in September 1943 to arrest all Danish Jews and transport them to Theresienstadt. I flew to Berlin to have this order canceled. Shortly afterwards an order of Himmler arrived in Denmark according to which the anti-Jewish action was to be carried out. Kaltenbrunner, therefore, did not issue the order. I did not speak to him; in fact he was not even in Berlin.
“Read and found correct.
“Nuremberg, 29 March 1946; signed, Dr. Mildner.”
Then follows the certification.
The next affidavit comes from Dr. Höttl.
MR. DODD: We are faced with a new problem. I do not think this question has arisen heretofore. The Prosecution submitted a cross-interrogatory to this man Dr. Mildner, and we are not quite certain as to just how we should proceed. Should we now offer our cross-interrogation, or at a later stage?
THE PRESIDENT: We think you should read it now.
MR. DODD: Very well.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, may I just say one thing about that. This is the first time that I hear that the Prosecution have also put questions which have been answered by the same witness. I think this is the first case of this kind which has been put before the Tribunal.
Would it not have been appropriate to have these answers communicated to me, since I have put my affidavit at the disposal of the Prosecution a very long time ago?
THE PRESIDENT: They certainly should be. The Tribunal thinks they certainly should have been communicated to you at the same time that they were received.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is the answer to be read nevertheless? I would rather like to raise formal objection to that and ask the Tribunal for a decision.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, why were these not submitted to Dr. Kauffmann?
MR. DODD: This cross-affidavit and interrogatory was taken only yesterday, and the material just was not ready until this morning. We regret that, and had it been ready it would, of course, have been turned over to him. If he would like to have some time to look it over, we, of course, would not object.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, in the circumstances we will postpone the reading of these cross-interrogatories in order that you may consider them, and, if you think it right, you may object to any of the questions or answers and we will then consider that matter.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.
May I now read the second and last document:
“Affidavit. I, the undersigned, Dr. Wilhelm Höttl, make the following affidavit in answer to the questions put to me by attorney Dr. Kauffmann for presentation to the International Military Tribunal.”
THE PRESIDENT: Can you give a number to this document?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, Document Kaltenbrunner-2.
“Question Number 1: Give details about yourself. What was your official position in the SD? Where did you know Dr. Kaltenbrunner?
“Answer: I was born on 19 March 1915, in Vienna; by profession, a historian. My occupation up to the time of the German collapse was that of a sub-department chief in Amt VI, Foreign Intelligence Department, of the RSHA. After Austria’s Anschluss in 1938, I voluntarily joined the SD. Coming from the National Catholic Youth Movement, I made it my aim to achieve a moderate political course for my country.
“I made the acquaintance of Kaltenbrunner in 1938; he knew that the above was my aim.
“In 1941, on personal orders of Heydrich, I was called before the SS and Police Court for having religious ties and for lack of political and ideological reliability, and I had to join the ranks as an ordinary private. After Heydrich’s death I was pardoned and, at the beginning of 1943, I was detailed to the office of Schellenberg, Chief of Amt VI of the RSHA. Here I was in charge of matters relating to the Vatican, as well as of matters relating to some states in the Balkans.
“When Kaltenbrunner was appointed Chief of the RSHA at the beginning of 1943, I was continually in touch with him at work, particularly since he was endeavoring to draw the group of Austrians in the RSHA nearer to him.
“Question Number 2: Give an estimate of the numbers involved at the Main Office of the RSHA in Berlin.
“Answer: The Main Office in Berlin, Amt IV (Gestapo) had approximately 1,500 members; Amt V (Criminal Police) 1,200; Amt III and Amt VI (intelligence service at home and abroad) 300 to 400 each.
“Question Number 3: What is understood by SD and what were its tasks?
“Answer: Heydrich organized the so-called Sicherheitsdienst (known as the SD) in 1932. Its task was to give to the highest German authorities and the individual Reich ministries, information on all events at home and abroad.
“The SD was purely an information service and had no sort of executive authority. Only individual persons belonging to the SD were drafted to the so-called special action commands (Einsatzkommandos) in the East. They thereby assumed executive positions, and they resigned from the SD during that period. There were special action groups and special action commands of the Security Police and the SD up to the last; also in Africa, and in Hungary, and Czechoslovakia even up to 1944. These Kommandos had nothing to do with executions. Their tasks had in the meantime assumed the nature of general security police matters. As far as I know, executions were carried out only in Russia, due to the so-called ‘Commissar Order’ by Hitler. Whether these Kommandos stopped or continued their activity after Kaltenbrunner was named Chief of the RSHA, I do not know.
“Question Number 4: Do you know about the ‘Eichmann Operation’ to exterminate the Jews?
“Answer: I learned details of the Eichmann Operation only at the end of August 1944. At that time Eichmann himself gave me detailed information. Eichmann explained, among other things, that the whole action was a special Reich secret and was known to only very few people. The total number of members of this Kommando, in my opinion, could hardly have exceeded 100.
“Question Number 5: What do you know about the relations between Eichmann and Kaltenbrunner?
“Answer: I know nothing about the official relations between the two. However, Eichmann may well have had no direct official contact with Kaltenbrunner. He often asked me to arrange a meeting with Kaltenbrunner for him. Kaltenbrunner always refused.
“Question Number 6: What was the relationship between Kaltenbrunner and Müller, the Chief of the Secret State Police (Gestapo)?
“Answer: I cannot give any details about their official relations. It is certain, however, that Müller acted quite independently. He had gained great experience in Secret State Police matters over a period of many years. Himmler thought a great deal of him. Kaltenbrunner did not think very much of him. Kaltenbrunner had neither technical schooling in police problems nor any interest in them. The intelligence service took up the main part of his attention and all his interest, especially insofar as it concerned foreign countries.
“Question Number 7: Who was in charge of the concentration camps?
“Answer: The SS Main Office for Economy and Administration had sole charge of the concentration camps; that is, not the RSHA, and therefore not Kaltenbrunner. He, consequently, had no power to give orders and no competency in this sphere. According to my opinion of him as a man, Kaltenbrunner certainly did not approve of the atrocities committed in the concentration camps. I do not know whether he knew about them.
“Question Number 8: Did Kaltenbrunner issue or transmit an order according to which enemy aviators who made forced landings were to be given no protection in the event of lynch justice being carried out by the population?
“Answer: No, I never heard about anything of the kind from Kaltenbrunner, although I was with him a great deal. As far as I can remember, however, Himmler issued an order of this kind.
“Question Number 9: Did Kaltenbrunner issue orders that Jews were to be killed?
“Answer: No, he never issued such orders, and in my opinion, he could not issue such orders on his own authority. In my opinion he was opposed to Hitler and Himmler on this question, that is, the physical extermination of European Jewry.
“Question Number 10: What church policy did Kaltenbrunner pursue?
“Answer: As adviser on Vatican matters, I often had the opportunity of speaking to him officially on this subject. He immediately supported my suggestion, made to Hitler in the spring of 1943, that a change in church policy should be effected so that the Vatican could be won over as a peace negotiator on this basis. Kaltenbrunner had no success with Hitler, as Himmler opposed him violently. Baron Von Weizsäcker, German Ambassador to the Holy See with whom I discussed the matter, failed likewise in his efforts, the result of which was that Bormann had an eye kept on him.
“Question Number 11: Did Kaltenbrunner intervene in foreign policy in the interest of peace?
“Answer: Yes; in the Hungarian question, for example. When, in March 1944, the German troops occupied Hungary, he succeeded in persuading Hitler to be moderate and to prevent Romanian and Slovak units from marching in as planned. Due to his support, I was able to prevent a National Socialist government from being formed in Hungary as planned, for another 6 months.”
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Kauffmann, are you going to call the defendant?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I have committed a small oversight. I did not read Page 5 of my document book. Those are Questions 12 and 13 of the affidavit, which I, inadvertently, did not read. I wish to apologize and ask your permission to finish it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I continue on Page 5:
“Kaltenbrunner wanted the old Austria-Hungary to be re-established on a federative basis. Since 1943 I had told Kaltenbrunner that Germany must endeavor to end the war by a peace at any price. I had informed him about my connection with an American office in Lisbon. I also informed Kaltenbrunner that I had recently made a contact with an American office in a neutral country through the Austrian resistance movement. He also declared his willingness to travel to Switzerland with me and start personal negotiations with an American representative in order to avoid further senseless bloodshed.
“Question Number 12: Do you know that Kaltenbrunner instructed the Commandant of Mauthausen Concentration Camp to hand over the camp to the approaching troops?
“Answer: It is correct that Kaltenbrunner did give such an order. He dictated it in my presence, to be forwarded to the Camp Commandant.
“Question Number 13: Can you say something briefly about Kaltenbrunner’s personality?
“Answer: Kaltenbrunner was a man completely different from Himmler or Heydrich. He was therefore by conviction strongly opposed to both of them. He was appointed Chief of the RSHA, in my opinion, because Himmler did not want to run the risk of having a rival like Heydrich. It would be wrong to call him ‘little Himmler.’ In my opinion, he was never in complete control of the large office of the RSHA and, being very little interested in police and executive tasks, he occupied himself preponderantly with the intelligence service and with exerting influence on general policy. This he regarded as his particular sphere.”
This is followed by signature, date, and certification.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you any more documents?
DR. KAUFFMANN: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Now you wish to call the defendant?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.
[The Defendant Kaltenbrunner took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
ERNST KALTENBRUNNER (Defendant): Ernst Kaltenbrunner.
THE PRESIDENT: Repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing—so help me God.”
[The defendant repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. KAUFFMANN: During the last 2 years of the war, since 1943, you have been the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service and the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, the RSHA. You are aware, of course, that you are under extremely serious charges. The Prosecution charge you with having committed Crimes against Peace, and with having intellectually aided and abetted or participated in the crimes against the law of war and against humanity, and finally, the Prosecution connect your name with the Gestapo terror and the atrocities of the concentration camps. I now ask you, do you assume responsibility for the Counts charged as outlined and which are known to you?
KALTENBRUNNER: In the first place, I should like to state to the Tribunal that I am fully aware of the serious character of the charges against me. I know the hatred of the world is directed against me; that I—particularly since Himmler, Müller, and Pohl are no longer alive—must here, alone, give an account to the world and the Tribunal. I realize that I shall have to tell the truth in this courtroom, in order to enable the Court and the world to fully recognize and understand what has been going on in Germany during this war and to judge it with fairness.
In 1943—that is to say, 2 years before the ending of this war—I was called into an office, which fact I shall explain in detail later on.
Right at the beginning, I would like to state that I assume responsibility for every wrong that was committed within the scope of this office since I was appointed Chief of the RSHA and as far as it happened under my actual control, which means that I knew about it or was required to know about it.
May I ask permission for my defense counsel to put questions to me so as to direct my line of thought?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you briefly describe, in rough outlines, your career until you entered public life, and Austrian politics, that is until about 1934.
KALTENBRUNNER: I was born in 1903. My father and my grandfather were lawyers of repute; for the rest I am a descendant of farmers and scythemakers. My mother is of modest descent. She was adopted by the Belgian Ambassador to Romania and lived there for 25 years. During my childhood, which I spent in the country with a family which took very good care of me, I enjoyed on the one hand the best education and on the other hand I became familiar with the life of the simple people. I attended secondary school, high school, graduated, and in 1921 went to Graz University. First I studied chemico-technical sciences at the Institute of Technology and later on, when my father returned from the war seriously ill and when the possibility arose that I might have to take over his solicitor’s practice, I studied law. I completed these studies with the degree of Doctor of Law and Political Science in 1926.
I had a hard time. I had to earn my own living and the expenses for my studies. I had to work while I studied and for 2 years I worked as a coal miner during the night shift; and I have to thank my fate that thus I got to know the German workman much better than people usually do.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Would you be slightly more brief? Please get as quickly as possible to the period after 1934.
KALTENBRUNNER: After leaving the University I had to complete 7 or 8 years work as a candidate for the bar examination in accordance with the Austrian law, of which I spent one year in court as assistant and the rest of the time in lawyers’ offices in Salzburg and Linz.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am interrupting you for one moment with a question. Is it correct that in 1932 you became a member of the Party?
KALTENBRUNNER: I became a member of the Party in 1932 after I had belonged for several years to the Non-Partisan Movement for the Protection of the Austrian Homeland.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you join the SS in that same year?
KALTENBRUNNER: I think it was at the end of 1932 or maybe at the beginning of 1933.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it correct that even before 1933, as maintained by the Prosecution, you were public speaker of a Gau and legal adviser of an SS sector?
KALTENBRUNNER: That statement requires clarification. It is true that I made speeches in my own home province, the Gau Upper Austria, at National Socialist meetings but primarily—or rather exclusively—to promote the Anschluss movement. I was a legal adviser just as any other lawyer of any party who, at that period of economic emergency, was willing to give legal information and advice free of charge for some hours at the end of the day to the needy, who in this case were National Socialists.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that later, in 1934, the Dollfuss Government had you arrested and that you, together with other leading National Socialists, were sent to the Kaisersteinbruch Concentration Camp? What was the cause for that?
KALTENBRUNNER: That is correct. I think that with regard to this point I must briefly describe the political situation in Austria at the time.
The Government was in the hands of a group of men who had very few followers among the people. There were two large groups of size which did not participate in the Government; the first being the leftist group, that is, the Social Democrats and Austro-Marxists, and the second being the National Socialists, which was at that time a very small group. The Government, then, did put not only the National Socialists but also Social Democrats and Communists into their detention camps in order to eliminate any political strife originating from meetings or demonstrations. I was one of those National Socialists who were arrested at that time, whose number was approximately 1,800.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you have another conflict with them? And were you eventually subjected to a trial for conspiracy against the Government and thereupon discharged from the custody under which you had been placed? Give in a few sentences the reasons for this procedure.
KALTENBRUNNER: This was considerably later. I was arrested in May 1935. I should say first of all that in the meantime the National Socialist attempt at revolt had taken place in Austria in July 1934. This attempt at revolt, which unfortunately also included the murder of Dollfuss, was defeated and avenged by most severe measures against a large number of National Socialists. One particularly severe measure was the law by which many thousands of National Socialists lost their jobs or professional license and the necessity arose to bring about a pacification, I should say a mitigation in principles of the Government policy. That was primarily done by two men: Langot, then the Chief Deputy of Upper Austria, and Reinthaller, a farmer and engineer. That appeasement action started at the end of 1934 in September or October, and I was invited to join that action.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you please, if possible, get to the period of 1938, in rough outlines?
KALTENBRUNNER: I was in no way implicated in this attempted revolt of July 1934 and that is why I was invited to join in that appeasement action. Within that program the Government themselves demanded that certain men should maintain connections with the Party leaders, with the SA, SS, and all organizations of the then forbidden movement. With the knowledge and consent of the Government and the proper police departments, I took up the connection with the SS.
In May 1935 I was arrested, suspected of establishing an illegal connection with the SS and of being engaged in high treason activity. I remained in custody for 6 months and was arraigned before the military tribunal in Wels on a charge of high treason. I was, however, acquitted of this crime since the Government themselves admitted that this assignment had been granted to me with their knowledge. All that was left over was a minor sentence for conspiracy which, however, was served by my custody.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How did you participate in the Austrian revolution which occurred in March 1938 and how did the SS participate?
KALTENBRUNNER: Shortly after my activities in connection with the Reinthaller-Langot appeasement action, I got in touch first with circles of the Anschluss movement clubs and second with those circles whose aim it was to improve conditions in Austria peacefully, by an evolutionary movement and development, and, on the other hand, to enlarge the Anschluss movement so as to win over the government themselves to that idea.
In 1937 and 1938 I attempted to come into closer personal contact with Seyss-Inquart, later Minister, and I completely adopted his political conceptions.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Are you of the opinion that the plebiscite in Austria in April 1938 corresponded with the wish of the nation?
KALTENBRUNNER: The plebiscite of 10 April 1938 was completely in accordance with the will of the Austrian population. The result of 99.73 percent for Anschluss to the German Reich was perfectly genuine.
DR. KAUFFMANN: On the occasion of the Anschluss is it right that you were promoted to SS Brigadeführer and leader of an SS sector?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, but first I would like to add the following to the question of the Anschluss:
The representation and opinion of the Prosecution are completely incorrect when they think that National Socialism in Austria at that time could in any way be compared with the development which had already taken place in Germany. The development of Austrian National Socialism was on the contrary completely different. The starting point was the abnormal economic depression in Austria and beyond that the Anschluss movement, and finally National Socialism made the Anschluss come true. This course, from economic depression via Anschluss movement to National Socialism, was the road of nearly all National Socialists, and the ideology of the Party program of the time was in no way responsible.
I believe this has to be taken for granted and I believe I also ought to say it first, that the Anschluss movement in Austria was backed by the people; the fact that the plebiscite in the various provinces, like the Tyrol or Salzburg, had already in previous years—I believe from 1925 to 1928—shown a result of more than 90 percent of the votes in favor of the Anschluss should now be taken into consideration.
Back in 1928 the National Council of Austria and the Austrian Federal Council signed the decree of the National Council of the year 1918 which said that both these assemblies had resolved to join the Reich; and they did not swerve from that resolution.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, I do not think you need go into these subjects as to reasons why they were in favor of the Anschluss in such detail. Will you try to confine the witness to less detail and get on to the material period?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I thought that the defendant was being held responsible for his participation in the change of regime. Therefore I wanted to have at least a few sentences said about that before this Tribunal, but I am now prepared to change the subject.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness was giving us the figures in particular plebiscites long before the Anschluss, and that seems to be quite irrelevant detail.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then, in September 1938, you were promoted to SS Gruppenführer; is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. After the ensuing Anschluss I had to take over the leadership of the General SS in Austria, namely, the SS Main Sector Danube. At that time I had been promoted to brigade leader without going exactly through the preceding ranks of SS leaders. And I think it was in September that I was appointed Gruppenführer, so that my rank was made the same as that of all the other main SS sector leaders in the entire Reich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I question you regarding your further career in the SS? Were you in 1941 appointed Higher SS and Police Leader in Austria?
KALTENBRUNNER: In March 1938 I became a member of the Austrian Government; that is, I had to take over the position of State Secretary for Security in Austria, which was under the Ministry of the Interior. That Austrian Government was dissolved in 1941; that is to say, their activity was discontinued in favor of such bodies of administration which prevailed in the Reich; consequently, the Office of State Secretary for Security was also dissolved, and in order to retain me at the same level in the budget, I was appointed Higher SS and Police Leader, I think in July 1941.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And on 30 January 1943 you were appointed Chief of the Security Police and the SD, that is, of the so-called Reich Security Main Office. How did that appointment come about? Did you have connections with Himmler? What was said between you and Himmler on the occasion of your appointment?
KALTENBRUNNER: I must describe briefly my activities from 1941 to 1943, that is, 2 years, so as to make it clear why I was called to Berlin.
The Prosecution charge that I had led the Security Police already in Austria. In that respect the Prosecution are mistaken.
The State Police and the Criminal Police as well as the Security Service in Austria were directed centrally from Berlin and were completely removed from the power of Seyss-Inquart, then the responsible Minister, and his deputy, Kaltenbrunner. My activity as Higher SS and Police Leader in Austria—unlike the activity of the same men in the Reich—was therefore limited merely to the task of representing or leading the General SS, which in no way took up all my time.
During these 2 years I therefore followed out my intentions concerning political activity and developed a rather large political intelligence service radiating from Austria toward the southeast. I did that because, in the first place, I regretted that the Reich did not make use of at least the political and the economic resources, of all the resources which Austria could have put at the disposal of the Reich, and because the Reich with unequalled shortsightedness did not fall back upon Austria’s most significant mission as an intermediary with the Southeast. Thus, my reports met with increased interest in Berlin, and since Himmler was continuously reproached by Hitler that his intelligence service, which was run by Heydrich in the Reich, did not furnish adequate reports on political results, Himmler, 8 months after Heydrich’s death, felt obliged to look for a man who could free him from Hitler’s reproaches that he had no intelligence service worth mentioning.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And what did you discuss with Himmler?
KALTENBRUNNER: In December 1942 he ordered me to come to Berchtesgaden, where he resided at the time, because the Führer’s headquarters were in the neighborhood, on the Obersalzberg. He told me first of Hitler’s reproaches and demanded that I create a central intelligence service in the Reich. We had a lengthy discussion on this subject with reference to my reporting activity of the previous years. He was then of the opinion that the best solution would be if I were to take over the Reich Security Main Office as a transition basis for the creation of such an intelligence service. I refused to do that, giving detailed reasons, namely, that I had maintained a watching and critical attitude in Austria toward the over-all development in the Reich, especially the inner political development. I explained to Himmler in detail why the Germans in Austria were disappointed and where I saw dangers that the same Austrians, who 4 years ago had turned with enthusiasm to the Reich, would become tired of the Reich. I have...
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I interrupt you for just one moment. It is correct, of course, that you were made the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office. Are you trying to say that you did not take over the executive powers?
KALTENBRUNNER: I am coming to that immediately. But, I must now describe that first conference with Himmler; the second one took place 2 weeks later. On that occasion I was given the order; I am referring to the first order.
But I should like to state right now—and this is drawn like a red thread through my entire career to the last days of the war—that even then I explained to Himmler on which essential points I differed with National Socialism as to the home policy of the Reich, the foreign policy, the ideology, and the violations of law by the Government themselves. I declared to him, specifically, that the administration in the Reich was too centralized; that Austria was violently criticizing that centralized system, particularly since a federative status had been granted to other countries, such as Bavaria. I told him that the creation of a new German criminal law, the way it was attempted, was wrong, and that German criminal law was casuistic. The Austrian criminal law, based on a tradition of more than one hundred years, had proved to be the best and had also been recognized abroad. I explained to him that the concepts of protective custody and of concentration camps were not approved of in Austria, but that every man in Austria wanted to be tried before a court of law.
I explained to him that anti-Semitism in Austria had developed in a completely different way and also required a different handling. No one in Austria, I said, had ever thought of going beyond the limits of anti-Semitism as laid down in the Party program. I also said that there was hardly any understanding in Austria for the fact that the Nuremberg Laws went beyond the Party program in this respect. In Austria, since 1934, there had been a peaceful, regulated policy to allow the Jews to emigrate. Any personal or physical persecution of Jews was completely unnecessary. I am referring to a document, which is somewhere in the court record. It is a report from the Chief of Police in Vienna, dated, I believe, December 1939, which proves in accordance with statistics that between 1934 and 1939, I think, of a total of 200,000 Jews more than half had emigrated to foreign countries. Those were the problems which I discussed at that time...
DR. KAUFFMANN: And what did Himmler tell you?
KALTENBRUNNER: And I told Himmler at that time that he knew very well that I had not only no training in police matters at all, but that all my activity up to then had been in the field of political intelligence work, and that therefore, when taking over the Reich Security Main Office I did not only refuse to have anything to do with such executive offices as the Gestapo and the criminal police, but that my task to which he was appointing me, namely to set up and cultivate an intelligence service, would in fact be impeded by that. I also said that I was not only extremely different from Heydrich personally but that also material differences existed insofar as Heydrich was an expert in police matters, whereas I was not, and that the policy with which he, Himmler, and Heydrich had already discredited the Reich could not be carried on by me. My name, my honor, and my family were too sacred to me for that.
He reassured me in this respect by saying:
“You know that in June 1942 Heydrich was assassinated and that I, myself, since his death”—and this was about 6 or 7 months after Heydrich’s death—“have been handling his entire office myself. This is to continue insofar that I”—this means Himmler—“will retain the Executive Offices for myself in the future. For this purpose I have at my disposal my well-trained experts, Müller and Nebe. You will not have to concern yourself with it. You take over the Intelligence Service, that is Amt III and Amt VI, as the transition basis for your Intelligence Service.”
I told him at that time that an intelligence service could not be built up on the SD alone. An intelligence service which until that time had been so narrow-minded because of Heydrich, and which had been forced more and more into executive work, is a priori unfit to search for intelligence material.
Secondly, I told him an intelligence service ought to be smaller and, in particular, I considered it madness to have political and military intelligence separated from each other. No country in the whole world except Germany and France has adopted a two-division set-up for an intelligence service. I therefore demanded from him that he first procure a Führer order on the strength of which the intelligence system of the Armed Forces, which rested in the OKW counterintelligence office (Amt Abwehr), should be united with the SD and should be furnished a new body of personnel, which ought to be selected and carefully screened...
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am interrupting you for a moment. Can you tell me in one sentence whether that unification which you just mentioned took place?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, it did.
DR. KAUFFMANN: With Amt VI?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes...
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then another question...
KALTENBRUNNER: [Continuing.] The union was achieved by an order of Hitler dated 14 or 15 February 1944.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, I am asking you: After what you have just explained, did Himmler relieve you of the executive tasks and was it made known to your section chiefs and others within the Reich Security Main Office that you had been so relieved? Did this exemption of executive powers become apparent outside the office; if so, how?
KALTENBRUNNER: After this conference with Hitler in December 1942, he discharged me because I did not want to take over the Reich Security Main Office under those conditions which he had offered to me, namely, that the executive departments should be managed by himself as previously. He was so angry with me that he did not give me his hand and made me aware of his indignation in various other ways during the subsequent weeks. Toward the middle of January, the 16th or 18th, I was ordered by telegram to report to headquarters, which in the meantime had been transferred to East Prussia. I assumed that I was to get a post at the front because I had asked him for such a post. I went to headquarters with complete front equipment because I thought I had finally to expect the same fate that had been the fate of my brothers and of my other male relatives. But I was wrong. He told me:
“I have talked to the Führer and the Führer believes that the centralization and reorganization of the Intelligence Service is the right thing to do. He will initiate the necessary negotiations with the Armed Forces, and you will have to organize and build up this Intelligence Service. It still holds that I, with Müller and Nebe, will have direct charge of the executive offices.”
If you ask me now whether this limitation must have become apparent at once outside of the office, I have to answer that it was not publicized. Therefore, formally the Prosecution are right in charging me: “As far as the outside world is concerned, you never drew a demarcation line.” To that I can say only that I believed I could rely on the words of my then superior. He had stated it to me in the presence of Nebe and Müller and had given them the personal order to communicate with him directly and to report to him and receive the orders from him directly, just as it had been done for the 8 months since Heydrich’s death.
I am stating here emphatically that the special assignments which had been given to Heydrich, such as, for instance, the assignment with regard to the final solution of the Jewish problem, were not only not known to me at the time but were not taken over by me. Nominally I was the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office. As such, I considered the Intelligence Service and the reorganization of this Intelligence Service my proper sphere, as I have said before. The directives were given by Himmler, but in State Police and Criminal Police matters things were often done, as I found out very much later, in the name of the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, that is, in my name, without my knowing of or seeing these orders when they were issued.
The chiefs of the Gestapo office and the Criminal Police office sometimes carried out these orders from Himmler, as I said, in such a way that they also signed my name as Chief of the Reich Security Main Office and, as I probably might have to state in detail later, they so continued routine habits which prevailed during Heydrich’s time, who united all executive powers in his hand and who could delegate the respective powers to Müller and Nebe. But I never had those powers from the beginning, and therefore I could never delegate any partial powers. Perhaps I ought to supplement the declaration of my responsibility in this respect by saying that possibly I have not taken the necessary care to make it clear that no order of the State Police or the Criminal Police should bear my name. That I did not concern myself with that sufficiently is Himmler’s fault but probably also my fault.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I draw your attention to the testimony given by Ohlendorf, Chief of Amt III, on 3 January 1946, here in court. I am putting this testimony to you briefly, and will you please make your comment. This testimony refers to the question of the executive power. The witness Ohlendorf said, in reply to my question:
“If you ask the question whether Kaltenbrunner could bring about executive actions I must answer in the affirmative. If you then name Müller and Himmler, to the exclusion of Kaltenbrunner, then I must point out that according to the organization of the Reich Security Main Office Müller was the subordinate of Kaltenbrunner, and consequently orders from Himmler to Müller were also orders to Kaltenbrunner, and Müller was obliged to inform Kaltenbrunner of them.”
And then he goes on to say:
“I can say that I know absolutely that”—I refer to the expression that often came up, namely—“‘to the last washerwoman’ Himmler reserved the final decision for himself. As to whether or not Kaltenbrunner had no authority at all in this regard, I can make no statement.”
I am asking you now: Are the essential points of Ohlendorf’s testimony correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: It needs clarification. He is right insofar as nothing in the construction, or rather organization of the Reich Security Main Office had changed since Heydrich’s time. Therefore he could immediately assume that there was an official channel Himmler-Kaltenbrunner-Müller. But during the conferences, that is, when Himmler gave orders, it was specifically not the case. And to the other remark, that Himmler reserved for himself the decision to the last washerwoman, that proves that the situation actually had changed insofar as, contrary to that of Heydrich’s time, I, the medium between Himmler and Müller, was not active, so that orders from Himmler went immediately to Müller.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now coming to the individual charges preferred by the Prosecution and first submit to you a document for your statement. It is the Document L-38, Exhibit USA-517. It is now Kaltenbrunner-3. This deals with the charge preferred against Kaltenbrunner...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, has this already got an exhibit number? You do not want to give it another exhibit number.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Very well. If it is not necessary I shall be glad to drop that.
[Turning to the defendant.] The question here is, first, whether all signed orders for protective custody bore your name either in facsimile or typewritten; and the second question is whether you have given such orders—that means whether these orders are authentic; and further, in case both these questions are to be answered in the negative, whether you had knowledge of these orders. Please, will you comment on this document?
KALTENBRUNNER: I must say that not once in my whole life did I ever see or sign a single protective custody order. During the interrogations before the Trial a number of protective custody orders which bear my name were put before me when I was being questioned. Every one of these protective custody orders had this signature, that is, my name, either typewritten or in teletype, and I think in one or two cases it was a facsimile.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You will admit that, naturally, this statement of yours is not very credible. It is a monstrosity that the office chief should not know that such orders were signed with his name. How do you explain this fact, a fact which appears from the documents which bear your signature?
KALTENBRUNNER: I had not finished my explanation. I stated that this signature “Kaltenbrunner” on protective custody orders can only have come about through the fact that the office chief, Müller, signed the name of the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office on these protective custody orders, as he had done during Heydrich’s time when he was allowed to do so, and that in addition he instructed his sections, for instance, the protective custody section. Accordingly quite obviously he continued to do so during my time, because otherwise these orders could not have been put before me now. But he has never informed me of this and he never had authority from me to do this. To the contrary, this was out of the question and, on the other hand, superfluous, because he was immediately under Himmler and he had authority from Himmler, so that he just as well might have written “Himmler” or “By order of Himmler” or “For Himmler.” I admit that this remains a fact about which the Tribunal will not believe me, but nevertheless it was so and Himmler never gave me a cause to define my attitude in this respect, since he had told me that I was not to carry out these executive tasks.
DR. KAUFFMANN: This means you are trying to say that the use of your signature was in fact a misuse?
KALTENBRUNNER: Müller did not have authority to use it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was it known to you that protective custody was possible at all, that it was admissible, and that it has been carried out very often?
KALTENBRUNNER: As I stated, I discussed the concept “protective custody” with Himmler as early as 1942. But I think even before that, already on two occasions in detail, I have had correspondence about this concept once with him and once with Thierack; I consider protective custody as it was handled in the German Reich as being a necessity in the interests of the State, or rather a measure which was justified by the war, only in a small number of cases. Apart from that, I have declared myself against and protested against this concept and against the application of any protective custody as a matter of principle, and have often used profound legal historical arguments as reasons. On several occasions I had reported on that subject to Himmler and also to Hitler. I have, in a meeting of public prosecutors—I think it was in 1944—publicly voiced my views against it, since I have always been of the opinion that a man’s liberty must be counted among his highest privileges and that only a judgment of a court, firmly rooted in a constitution, should be allowed to infringe on that liberty or to deprive him of it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now discussing with you the reasons stated in such orders for protective custody. The following, among others, were given as reasons: activities hostile to the Reich; spreading of atrocity rumors; assault; refusal to work; religious propaganda. Please, will you express your views on the reasons for these protective custody orders. Are they to be approved of?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. I consider these reasons for protective custody to be wrong. I think I had better explain in detail. My attitude is due to the fact that all the offenses which have been enumerated here might just as well have been dealt with by due process of law in the state courts. For that reason I consider protective custody as such to be wrong, and more so if ordered for the reasons mentioned.
DR. KAUFFMANN: So that, if I understand you rightly, I can summarize your attitude as follows: You want to say that you had no knowledge of the protective custody orders, that you had no authority to issue them, and that you did not sign them, but since these protective custody orders were issued within the Amt IV, you ought to have had knowledge of them. Is this summary correct or is it not?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is correct.
DR. KAUFFMANN: We now come to another charge preferred against you by the Prosecution. The Prosecution claim that you are the intellectual principal or accessory in the crimes committed when you, as the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, had civilians murdered and ill-treated by the so-called Einsatzgruppen. I am going to quote a few sentences from the testimony given by the witness Ohlendorf here in this courtroom on 3 January 1946. Ohlendorf’s testimony incriminates you. I wish to have your comment on it. Ohlendorf says with reference to the Einsatzgruppen:
“After his entry into service, Kaltenbrunner had to concern himself with these questions and consequently must have known the background of the Einsatzgruppen which were under his authority.”
He goes on to say with reference to the valuables taken away from the executed persons that these had been sent to the Reich Ministry of Finance or to the Reich Security Main Office, and he finally states that the officer personnel for these Einsatzgruppen were recruited from the leading personnel of the State Police and only in a small percentage from the SD. What do you have to say in answer to the question whether or not you knew of the existence and the significance of these Einsatzgruppen?
KALTENBRUNNER: I had no idea of the existence of these Einsatzkommandos as described by Ohlendorf. Later on I heard that they existed, but this was many months later. With regard to this point I want to say the following: It is known to the Tribunal from Ohlendorf’s testimony and from Hitler’s and Himmler’s decrees which have been discussed here that orders for the killing of people had been given. These Einsatzkommandos have never been reorganized during the time when I was in office. These Einsatzkommandos which had been active up to that time were also dissolved or had been put under different commands before I took over the office. I do not know whether the witness Ohlendorf has stated here just when he returned from his Einsatzkommando.
DR. KAUFFMANN: 1942.
KALTENBRUNNER: That is before I came into office. The Einsatzkommandos must later on have come under the charge of the Higher SS and Police Leaders in the occupied territories or, what is even more probable, under the charge of the chief of the anti-partisan units. I cannot answer your question precisely, since I have, as a consequence of my imprisonment for 1 year, no possibility at my disposal for re-examining the organizational scheme.
I think you also asked me whether it is known to me that valuables, which had been taken away from executed persons, had been sent to my office or the Reich Ministry of Finance. I know nothing of such shipments but I do know that Himmler had given an order to everybody—not only to the Security Police but also to other organizations in the occupied territories, be it the Municipal Police or the anti-partisan units or those sections of the Armed Forces which were under his command—saying that all such property was to be surrendered to the Reich Ministry of Finance.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Were these Einsatzgruppen the result of an order from Hitler or of an order from the Reich Security Main Office?
KALTENBRUNNER: It can only be due to an order from Hitler.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You just said that in the course of time you heard about the existence and significance of these Einsatzgruppen. Can you say exactly on which date you gained that knowledge?
KALTENBRUNNER: I assume that this was at the time when I had my first audience with Hitler, or it may have been on the following day when I reported to Himmler, in November 1943.
DR. KAUFFMANN: 1943?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: If you had knowledge at that time of the Einsatzgruppen and their significance, then the question arises what your attitude about them was and, in case you condemned them, what you did to have them abolished? Did you have a possibility to do so or did you not?
KALTENBRUNNER: I said before that an Einsatzkommando was never set up under my direction or my orders. The existence and the previous activities of such Einsatzkommandos became known to me late in the fall of 1943 and I knew that I would have to resist this misuse of the men who were under the Reich Security Main Office. I think on 13 September 1943, I saw Hitler on the occasion of a visit of Mussolini who had just been liberated. However, my attempt to talk to him failed, because of this State visit. Consequently, in November, after Himmler had put it off repeatedly, I had to go again to headquarters to report officially on my activities up to that time. And on that occasion I talked to the Führer about the facts on the Einsatzkommandos which had become known to me; and not only about that, but also I had the first opportunity to approach him about the entire Jewish problem, and about the orders given, by him and by Himmler against the Jews which had also become known to me at that time. However, I would like to make a detailed statement on this subject, if you will go through that problem in detail with me.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now present...
KALTENBRUNNER: I should like only to add that the Einsatzkommandos no longer came into the picture, so far as I was concerned, because the entire personnel was committed to the anti-partisan fighting or rather to the Higher SS Police Leader, I believe, on exactly the same day when I entered my office in Berlin. I believe I can remember distinctly that Von dem Bach-Zelewski was appointed Chief of anti-partisan fighting on 30 January 1943. This may also be the reason for the fact that I did not see any reports from the Einsatzkommandos themselves.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now turning to another document, L-51, Exhibit USA-521. This is an extremely incriminating document on which I want to have your comment.
Zutter is the adjutant of the camp commander of Mauthausen. He reports regarding a...
KALTENBRUNNER: Is this photostat copy the same?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, it is the same.
He is reporting regarding an execution order, referring to 12 or 15 American parachutists who were captured in 1945. Will you please look through the document and state to the Tribunal whether you have given this order, and whether you had authority to issue such an order?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. You have discussed this same document with me only yesterday. Therefore it is known to me. I declare that this incident and this order never did come to my knowledge until this document was put before me or until its presentation by the interrogator.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know Ziereis?
KALTENBRUNNER: As I have already said once, I have never had authority to sign on my own initiative a so-called order for execution, that is to say a death sentence. Apart from Hitler nobody in the whole Reich had such authority except Himmler and the Reich Minister of Justice.
DR. KAUFFMANN: With regard to this point, I wish to mention that the Prosecution have also presented execution orders which bore the signature of Müller. Do you want to say something about that?
KALTENBRUNNER: If an execution order had Müller’s signature, Müller can have signed it only on the strength of an order from Himmler, or on the strength of a sentence submitted by a court.
DR. KAUFFMANN: It suggests itself to say that if Müller had authority to issue execution orders, then you ought to have had such authority to a much higher degree? Is that right?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, that is not so, because Himmler never gave me such power; also the set-up of the chain of command—the State Police remained under Himmler after Heydrich’s death even after I took office—would have contradicted that.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The incident referred to in this document is of such importance, particularly since foreign parachutists are involved, that one ought to suppose that it was known in the high offices in Berlin, that means also in the Reich Security Main Office. Did you receive no knowledge of the matter afterwards?
KALTENBRUNNER: I want to add the following statement: The incident definitely did not come to my knowledge.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished with Document L-51?
DR. KAUFFMANN: No, I am still concerned with Document L-51, but I am about to leave it.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, ought you not to refer him to the particular incident which is referred to toward the end of the document, where it says, “Concerning the American military mission which landed behind the German front in the Slovakian or Hungarian area in January 1945”? It goes on, then, to say that the—I think it was adjutant of the camp said, “Now Kaltenbrunner has approved of the execution. This letter was secret and had the signature, ‘signed, Kaltenbrunner.’”
I think you should put that to him.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, certainly. He knows the document, and I believe he knows every single word of this document, but I will put it to him again.
[Turning to the defendant.] It says here:
“I estimate the number of those persons captured to have been 12 or 15. They were wearing a uniform which was either American or Canadian, brown-green color, and blouse and beret. Eight to 10 days after their arrival, the order for their execution was received by means of a radio message, or a teletype. Standartenführer Ziereis—that is the Camp Commandant—came to see me in my office and said: ‘Now Kaltenbrunner has approved of the execution.’ This letter was secret and had the signature, ‘signed, Kaltenbrunner.’
“These men were then shot on the spot, and their valuables were given to me by Oberscharführer Niedermeyer.”
Would you, very briefly, go into this?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is completely out of the question that this incident was ever brought to my knowledge, or that it happened with my participation. This is not only plainly a crime against the laws of warfare, but it is, in particular, an action which could or necessarily had to produce the most serious foreign political consequences.
Certainly, in such an incident it is out of the question that Müller or even I, myself, as Müller’s superior, could have taken action; but in such a case thorough discussions must absolutely have taken place previously between Himmler, himself, and the Führer.
It is to be assumed, furthermore, that quite definitely someone—maybe the competent section for international law—would have been consulted on the subject first, and that such an action, of course, would have been decreed either by the Führer or by Himmler. In any case, it would have been an order from one of these two personalities. However, even that is unknown to me.
If, therefore, this man Zutter relates here that the order bore my signature, then this can only have been an order which, as I have described before, bore my name falsely since I never had authority to issue an order for execution. Therefore, the signature should have been “Himmler” or “By Himmler’s order, Müller.”
DR. KAUFFMANN: So that you attribute this signature also to a misuse?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I believe that it does not concern my signature at all here, but that Ziereis should have said “Himmler.” It cannot be assumed that Müller would have signed his or my name in such a way.
DR. KAUFFMANN: We are now coming to another subject. I am referring now to Document 1063(b)-PS, Exhibit USA-492, which is a letter from the Reich Security Main Office, dated 26 July 1943. It has the signature, “Signed, Dr. Kaltenbrunner,” and the letter is addressed to all Higher SS and Police Leaders. It refers to the establishment of correctional labor camps.
Will you please look through the letter? The Prosecution charges you with the establishment of correctional labor camps. Please explain what your attitude really was, and state whether that letter originated from you.
KALTENBRUNNER: With regard to this point I have to make the following statement: I conclude from the fact that my name is typewritten that this order had not been shown to me before it went out: otherwise I would have signed it in handwriting.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know of a Himmler order?
KALTENBRUNNER: As far as I can remember, I learned of it afterwards.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What is a correctional labor camp? Is it identical with a concentration camp?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, correctional labor camps were camps in which men were put if they were Germans, if they had dodged the compulsory labor service in spite of repeated reminders, or foreign workers who had left their place of work without permission and had been arrested, or workers who were caught during round-ups on trains, railway stations, and roads, and who had no permanent labor contract. Confinement to such correctional labor camps covered a period of 14 to 56 days.
DR. KAUFFMANN: It says in this letter that these correctional labor camps, so far as administration and orders were concerned, are under the State Police offices and, furthermore, under the commanders of the Security Police and the SD. Did you have knowledge of that?
KALTENBRUNNER: A so-called breach of labor contract in the Reich or an evasion of the Compulsory Labor Service by a German citizen is an offense which actually could have been dealt with by the law courts just as well. The law had provisions to that effect but because of the enormous number of workers employed in the entire Reich—not only Germans, who amounted to 15 or 20 million, but also 8 million foreign workers—it would have been impossible to start hundreds of thousands of proceedings in courts, in hundreds of thousands of cases, for failure to work or breach of contract, or willful desertion from the place of work, et cetera. It goes without saying that furthermore the police departments had no kind of prison accommodations extensive enough to give short-term sentences in such cases. For these reasons such correctional labor camps were established at the headquarters of the State Police or Criminal Police offices.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you, in principle, approve of the establishment of such correctional labor camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, in principle I approved of them although I myself did not participate in issuing this order. I did, however, learn of it later and considered it proper in view of the labor shortage and the conditions then prevailing in the Reich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you have knowledge regarding the treatment of the internees: for what period of time they were confined to these camps, what their food ration was, and how they were employed?
KALTENBRUNNER: As I said, these correctional labor camps were designed to impose confinement for a period not exceeding 56 days. Even this, I believe, was possible only after a man had previously been sentenced for 3 similar offenses. Normally, confinement to correctional labor camps...
THE PRESIDENT: The question was whether you knew the condition in the camps? You are not answering it at all.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you please answer my question?
KALTENBRUNNER: I think you asked me...
DR. KAUFFMANN: I asked you whether you knew anything regarding the treatment, the food, and the employment of the internees in these correctional labor camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: I knew only that correctional labor camps had the task of doing labor for public works, that is, in public construction work like roads, railroad maintenance, and, in particular, for repair of damage due to air raids. The internees of correctional labor camps have been seen by the entire population when so employed. The impression which the appearance of these internees made...
THE PRESIDENT: He still is not answering the question.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I put three exact questions to you. I want exact answers to these questions. Do you know anything about the treatment, the food rations, and the employment? Did you have any knowledge of this, “yes” or “no”?
KALTENBRUNNER: I said with regard to the employment...
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you have knowledge?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I did. The other two factors I did not know from personal observation.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did officers of Amt IV ever report to you on this?
KALTENBRUNNER: Not officers of Amt IV; but this problem has, of course, been discussed repeatedly within the political home intelligence service, namely, about the utilization of such labor for emergency work.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you see no cause to interfere?
KALTENBRUNNER: I had no cause to interfere with these camps for any misuse, since no case of abuse of camp internees was known.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now coming to another document, Document Number 2542-PS, Exhibit Number USA-489. This is a statement, an affidavit by Lindow. He states that until the beginning of 1943, and by order of Himmler, Soviet Russian political commissars and Jewish soldiers were taken out of prisoner-of-war camps and transferred to concentration camps, to be shot. Furthermore, he states that Müller, the Chief of Amt IV, had signed the execution order. If the Tribunal so desire, I shall quote a few sentences from this document.
[To the defendant.] What is your statement with reference to this document?
KALTENBRUNNER: This order of Himmler’s was not known to me, and may I point out that it was used from 1941 until 1943, which means, in the main, during the time when I was not in Berlin.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now reading a particularly incriminating passage—Paragraph 4. Will you please make a statement regarding the question whether this report on these facts also refers to the time after 1943 or to the time before 1943, or whatever you may be able to say about the date.
KALTENBRUNNER: I know the passage.
DR. KAUFFMANN: “In the prisoner-of-war camps at the Eastern Front, there were small Einsatzkommandos which were led by members of the Secret State Police of lower rank. These Kommandos were attached to the camp commandant and had the task of selecting those prisoners of war who were to be executed in accordance with the orders issued, and of reporting their names to the Gestapo office.”
KALTENBRUNNER: About this, I...
DR. KAUFFMANN: One moment. From Paragraph 2, I am quoting the last paragraph: “These prisoners of war were first of all discharged as a matter of form and then taken to a concentration camp for execution.” Now I am asking you what knowledge did you have of these facts?
KALTENBRUNNER: I had no knowledge of these facts. Moreover, it is impossible that I could have gained knowledge of them, of orders which were issued in 1941 and which, as this witness says, continued to be actually in force until the middle of 1943; it is impossible that, in order to stop the execution of these orders, during the last days, I could have in time...
DR. KAUFFMANN: But actually, it cannot be denied that within the Reich Security Main Office there was a Section IV A 1, that is, a part of the Gestapo, and that this section functioned from 1941 until the middle of 1943, and that it carried out such orders. It can be assumed obviously that you, too, must have been informed about this extremely grave situation, which was inhuman and prohibited by international law, does it not?
KALTENBRUNNER: I was not informed of it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now turning to the subject of concentration camps and the responsibility of the defendant in that sphere.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
MR. DODD: Dr. Kauffmann has told me that he had an opportunity to read two cross-interrogatories which we wish to submit—the cross-interrogatories of Dr. Mildner and Dr. Höttl. I told Dr. Kauffmann that it might be well, in order not to disquiet the Defendant Kaltenbrunner, if they were read before he completed his examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you agree that it would be better that this cross-examination should be read now, so that the defendant can deal with any points he wishes to deal with?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, that will be satisfactory.
COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): The first affidavit, if it please the Tribunal is the affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Mildner:
“I, the undersigned, Dr. Rudolf Mildner, made the following affidavit in answer to cross-interrogations by representatives of the Office of United States Chief of Counsel, relating to my affidavit of 29 March 1946, made in response to questions by Dr. Kauffmann for presentation to the International Military Tribunal:
“Question Number 1: Confirm or correct the following biographical data:
“Answer: In December 1939 I became Chief of the Gestapo Office in Chemnitz; in March 1941 I became Chief of the Gestapo Office in Katowice; in September 1943 I became Commander of the Sipo and SD in Copenhagen; in January 1944 I became Inspector of the Sipo and SD in Kassel; on 15 March 1944 I was made Deputy Chief of Groups IV A and IV B of the RSHA; in December 1944 I became Commander of the Sipo in Vienna; in December 1944 I became Deputy Inspector of the Sipo in Vienna.
“All of these appointments after January 1943 were made by Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD.
“Question Number 2: Is it not true that while you were Gestapo leader at Katowice you frequently sent prisoners to Auschwitz for imprisonment or execution; that you had contacts with the Political Department (Abteilung) at Auschwitz during the time that you were Chief of the Gestapo in Katowice with regard to inmates sent from the district of Katowice; that you visited Auschwitz on several occasions; that the Gestapo ‘SS Standgericht’ frequently met in Auschwitz and you sometimes attended the trial of prisoners; that in 1942 and again in 1943, pursuant to orders by Gruppenführer Müller, Chief of Gestapo, the Commandant of Auschwitz showed you the extermination installations; that you were acquainted with the extermination installations at Auschwitz since you had to send Jews from your territory to Auschwitz for execution?
“Answer: Yes, these are true statements of fact.
“Question Number 3: With respect to your answer to Question Number 5 in your affidavit of 29 March 1946, did all orders for arrest, commitment to punishment, and individual executions in concentration camps come from RSHA? Was the regular channel for orders of individual executions from Himmler through Kaltenbrunner to Müller, then to the concentration camp commandant? Did the WVHA have supervision of all concentration camps for administration, utilization of labor, and maintenance of discipline?
“Answer: The answer is ‘yes’ to each of the three questions.
“Question Number 3-a: Is it true that conferences took place between SS Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner and SS Obergruppenführer Pohl, Chief of the WVHA and Chief of Concentration Camps? Was Dr. Kaltenbrunner acquainted with conditions in the concentration camps?
“Answer: Yes, and because of these conferences and on the occasion of discussions with the two Amt chiefs—Gruppenführer Müller, IV, and Gruppenführer Nebe, RSHA, the Chief of Sipo and SD—SS Obergruppenführer Dr. Kaltenbrunner should be acquainted with conditions in concentration camps.
“I learned from SS Gruppenführer Müller, Chief of Amt IV, that regular conferences took place between RSHA and Amt Group D of WVHA.
“Question Number 4: Is it not a fact that in July or August of 1944 an order was issued to commanders and inspectors of the Sipo and SD by Himmler through Kaltenbrunner, as Chief of the Sipo and SD, to the effect that members of all Anglo-American Commando groups should be turned over to the Sipo by the Armed Forces; that the Sipo was to interrogate these men and shoot them after questioning; that the killing was to be made known to the Armed Forces by a communiqué stating that the Commando group had been annihilated in battle; and that this decree was classified top secret and was to be destroyed immediately after reading?
“Answer: Yes.
“Question Number 5: With respect to your answer to Question Number 7 of your affidavit of 29 March 1946, is it not a fact that:
“a) After you sent a telegram to Müller requesting that the Jewish persecution be stopped, you received an order by Himmler that the Jewish actions were to be carried out?
“b) That you then flew to Berlin for the purpose of talking with the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Kaltenbrunner, personally, but that since he was absent you saw his deputy, Müller, Head of Office IV of the RSHA, who, in your presence, wrote a message to Himmler containing your request that the persecutions of the Jews in Denmark be stopped?
“c) That shortly after your return to Copenhagen you received a direct order by Himmler sent through Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Sipo and SD, stating that ‘The Anti-Jewish actions are to be started immediately’?
“d) That for the purpose of carrying out this action the Sonderkommando Eichmann, which was under the Gestapo, was sent from Berlin to Copenhagen for the purpose of deporting the Jews in two ships which it had chartered?
“Answer: Yes, to each question—a), b), c), and d).
“Question Number 6: Is it not a fact that the action of Sonderkommando Eichmann was not a success; that Müller ordered you to make a report explaining the causes for the lack of success in deporting of Jews; and that you sent this report directly to the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Kaltenbrunner?
“Answer: Yes. That is right.
“I have read the above questions and answers as written and swear they are true and correct....”—et cetera.
And now, may it please the Tribunal, the cross-affidavit of Wilhelm Höttl...
THE PRESIDENT: [To the defendant.] Did you want to say something?
KALTENBRUNNER: I wanted to ask the High Tribunal for permission to reply immediately to this interrogatory, so that I...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you will have an opportunity in a moment. The purpose of having it read now was that your counsel might ask you any questions with reference to it, and then you can make any comment that you want to. Colonel Amen will go on and read the other cross-interrogatory, and then your own counsel will continue your examination-in-chief. Do you understand?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I understand. I merely wanted to suggest, since these two matters are treated separately and concern two different spheres, that I may first express my views and then later...
THE PRESIDENT: We cannot have the matter interrupted in that way. You will be able to deal with it in a moment.
Go on, Colonel Amen.
COL. AMEN: The affidavit of Dr. Mildner dated 9 April 1946 will become Exhibit Number USA-791 and the affidavit of Wilhelm Höttl which I am about to read, dated 10 April 1946, will become Exhibit Number USA-792.
“I, the undersigned, Dr. Wilhelm Höttl, make the following affidavit in response to cross-interrogation relating to an affidavit executed by me on 30 March 1946 answering questions put by Dr. Kauffmann for presentation to the International Military Tribunal.
“1) With respect to question Number 3: Please give the following information:
“a) Explain the basis of your statement that when persons belonging to the SD were transferred to the Einsatzkommandos of the Sipo and SD they resigned from the SD. Your attention is invited to the fact that Ohlendorf, the head of the SD, has testified to the contrary.
“b) Explain the basis for your statement that Einsatzkommandos had nothing to do with executions. Your attention is invited to the fact that your testimony in this regard is likewise in direct conflict with the head of the SD, Ohlendorf.
“c) What was Hitler’s so-called ‘Commissar order’ and when did you first acquire knowledge of this order?
“With respect to 1a): In my affidavit I did not speak of a permanent separation from the SD but of a leave of absence for the time of activity with an Einsatzkommando. By that was meant that they did not exercise their SD functions during this time; that this function was inactive.
“With respect to 1b): My affidavit appears to have been misunderstood concerning this point. I did not state that Einsatzkommandos had nothing to do with executions but only that not all Einsatzkommandos were concerned with executions. I mentioned as an example the Einsatzkommandos in Africa, Hungary, and Slovakia. In connection with that, I said that these Einsatzkommandos had nothing to do with executions; by that I meant not directly with the actual executions.
“With respect to 1c): I, myself, do not know the so-called ‘Commissar Order’ of Hitler. Dr. Stahlecker, who commanded an Einsatzgruppe of the Sipo and the SD in Russia, told me in the summer of 1942 that the executions of commissars and Jews were carried out on the basis of the Commissar Order which covered the extermination of the Jews under the reason of their being bearers of Bolshevism.
“2) With respect to question Number 4: Is it not a fact that Heydrich, as Chief of Sipo and SD, gave the initial instructions to Eichmann concerning the extermination of Jews; that in the RSHA Eichmann’s immediate superior was Müller, Chief of the Gestapo; that Müller was first the deputy of Heydrich and later of Kaltenbrunner?
“With respect to 2): Yes, I heard from Eichmann, probably in August 1944, that Heydrich had given him these directives. It is also correct that Müller, Chief of the Gestapo, was Eichmann’s immediate superior. As far as I know, Müller was the deputy of Heydrich and later of Kaltenbrunner only in the field of the Gestapo, as likewise were the other office chiefs in their respective fields.
“3) With respect to question Number 5: Is it not a fact that you know from your discussions with Kaltenbrunner and with Eichmann that they came from the same community in Austria and were exceptionally close friends; that Eichmann always had direct access to Kaltenbrunner and that they frequently conferred together; that Kaltenbrunner was well pleased with the manner in which Eichmann carried out his duties; that Kaltenbrunner was very interested in the extermination work performed by Eichmann; that you personally know that Kaltenbrunner went to Hungary for the purpose of discussing the extermination program in Hungary with officials of the Hungarian Government and with Eichmann and other members of his staff in Hungary? Please confirm or correct these statements and make any statement necessary to clarify your answer.
“With respect to 3): I heard from Eichmann that he knew Kaltenbrunner from Linz and that they served there together in 1932 in an SS Sturm. I do not know that they were particularly close friends or that Eichmann always had direct access to Kaltenbrunner and that they conferred frequently.
“I do not know the details about their official relationship. I do not know whether Kaltenbrunner also had conferences concerning the program of extermination of Jews in Hungary during his stays in Hungary in the spring of 1944. Winkelmann, the former Higher SS and Police Leader in Hungary, must know exactly about that, since, according to my knowledge, he, together with Kaltenbrunner, visited persons in the Hungarian Government.
“4) With respect to question Number 6:
“a) Is it not known to you that Müller, Chief of the Gestapo, always conferred with Kaltenbrunner on matters of importance relating to the functions of his office—particularly with respect to executions of special inmates?
“b) Did you know that Kaltenbrunner was the Higher SS and Police Leader and State Secretary for Security in Austria after the Anschluss until his appointment as Chief of the RSHA, a period of 5 years, during which time his attention was devoted exclusively to police and security matters?
“c) What is the basis of your statement that the intelligence service took up the main part of Kaltenbrunner’s attention and all his interest?
“With respect to 4a): Details concerning the official relationship between Müller and Kaltenbrunner are not known to me. However, I could note on several occasions that Müller was with Kaltenbrunner to report about the work of his department.
“With respect to 4b): Kaltenbrunner was not exclusively occupied with police and security matters during his activity as Higher SS and Police Leader in Austria or as State Secretary for Security respectively. Without a doubt he had political interests besides, since the Higher SS and Police Leaders were the representatives of Reichsführer SS Himmler in all matters.
“With respect to 4c): I could note that by virtue of my official relationship with him. Members of other departments also frequently expressed themselves in the direction that he favored and furthered Amt III, and particularly Amt VI and the Mil (Military Amt).
“5) With respect to question Number 7: Answer the following:
“a) What did you personally have to do with concentration camps and what, therefore, is the basis for your answer to this question?
“b) Did you know that all orders for commitments to, releases from, and executions in concentration camps came from the RSHA?
“c) Did you know that the RSHA gave direct orders to commandants of concentration camps? State such orders of which you have personal knowledge.
“d) What are the atrocities committed in concentration camps to which you refer in your answer to this question, and when and in what manner did you acquire knowledge that atrocities were committed in concentration camps?
“With respect to 5a): Personally, I had nothing at all to do with concentration camps. However, I liberated a number of persons from concentration camps and therefore know the difficulties that were made by the concentration camp staffs who always called attention to orders of the WVHA of the SS in such cases since the inmates were needed for the armament industry.
“With respect to 5b): It is known to me that orders for commitments into concentration camps and discharges therefrom came from the RSHA. I did not know that all such orders came from the RSHA. I have no knowledge of orders for executions by the RSHA.
“With respect to 5c): I do not know any details and do not know personally any orders concerning this. In the cases in which I intervened for discharges I addressed myself either to Kaltenbrunner directly or to Amt IV. When the processing was of long duration, I received the answer several times from officials of Amt IV that difficulties had come about through the WVHA of the SS.
“With respect to 5d): When Hungary was occupied by German troops in March 1944, several of my Hungarian acquaintances went to concentration camps. After I had achieved their liberation, they told me of bad treatment and atrocities in the Mauthausen Concentration Camp. At that time, I sent an official communication concerning this to the director of the Linz Gestapo Office, with the request to inquire into this matter with the concentration camp commandant Ziereis. Ziereis, however, denied this, as I was informed in the reply. In August 1944 Eichmann told me that there were extermination camps (Vernichtungslager) besides concentration camps.
“6) With respect to question Number 9: What is the basis for your opinion that Kaltenbrunner opposed Hitler and Himmler on the program for the physical extermination of European Jewry?
“With respect to 6): Kaltenbrunner told me after his conference with representatives of the International Red Cross in March 1945 that he was against Hitler’s and Himmler’s program on the question of the extermination of the European Jews. In my response to Question 9, that Kaltenbrunner had given no orders for killing of Jews, the words ‘according to my knowledge’ are missing.
“7) With respect to question Number 11: Who was the American whom you told Kaltenbrunner that you had contacted in a neutral country in 1943? Did Kaltenbrunner agree to travel to Switzerland with you to meet a representative of the Allied Powers with whom you were in touch through the Austrian Resistance Movement; and, if so, whom?
“With respect to 7): The American liaison man in 1943 was a member of the United States Legation in Lisbon. I am no longer familiar with his name. The connection via the Austrian Resistance Movement with an American organization in Switzerland existed only from the beginning of fall 1944. Kaltenbrunner agreed to travel there with me about 20 April 1945.
“8) With respect to question Number 12: On what date did Kaltenbrunner order the commandant of Mauthausen Concentration Camp to hand over the camp to approaching troops? At whose insistence did Kaltenbrunner issue this order, and for what reason?
“With respect to 8): I cannot state the exact date of Kaltenbrunner’s order to the commandant of Mauthausen Concentration Camp to hand over the camp to approaching troops. It should have been during the last days of April 1945. It is not known to me at whose insistence and for which reason he gave this order; possibly this was connected with his discussions with SS Standartenführer Becher whom I met with him at the time.
“The above statements are true; I made this declaration voluntarily and without compulsion...”—et cetera—“Dr. Wilhelm Höttl.”
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do the High Tribunal wish the defendant to state his position or reply to these two documents?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I request that I may do so right away.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then please give us your views first on the Mildner document. I shall call your attention, perhaps, to question Number 2 which seems relevant to me. It says:
“Is it not true that...in 1942 and again in 1943, pursuant to orders by Gruppenführer Müller, the Commandant of Auschwitz showed you the extermination installations...?”
It would seem from this that the Chief of Amt IV knew about these matters.
KALTENBRUNNER: Dr. Kauffmann, may I interrupt you.
As far as I could notice in the last sessions a procedure of so-called surprise affidavits is being employed against me. This surprise affidavit is applied for the first time in my case. In spite of that I am glad and grateful, even without having had the opportunity to see this affidavit before, to express my views on the whole and on each point of this affidavit.
As to Dr. Mildner—question Number 1: He is asked about his position which he held in the Security Service. He enumerated the positions which he held from 1939 to 1944. During the time I was in office he served as an inspector of the Sipo and the SD in Kassel, as a deputy in Amt IV, as a deputy inspector in Vienna in 1944, and as a commander of the Sipo in Vienna also in 1944. He said, “All of these appointments after January 1943 were made by Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and the SD.”
That is incorrect. I never appointed anybody to high positions such as these held by Mildner.
Were Mildner asked about this before this Tribunal, he would have to confirm that. He was apparently not questioned on that by the Prosecution. In case of an appointment of an official for the Security Police and the SD I was simply asked and notified in each case of such an appointment of a functionary of the Security Police and SD, because as an inspector of the SD and of the Security Police he had to have in this capacity a strong intelligence section, that is, a subdivision of Amt III and IV which were at my disposal as far as intelligence was concerned, so that as Chief of the intelligence service I had to know who was inspector of a subdivision in Vienna, Kassel, or in Copenhagen. Later he also had to have my intelligence orders for his groups. That was the only reason why I had to be notified of such appointments. It was not within my competence to appoint any official of the Sipo; that is a definite misrepresentation arising from this affidavit of Dr. Mildner.
In reply to Question 2, if it is said that in his positions in Chemnitz and Katowice, in the year 1939 and 1941, he had to transport prisoners to Auschwitz for imprisonment and execution, then, in the first place, this falls into the period before I had assumed office, and, secondly, this was purely an executive measure of those agencies of which I was never in charge and never took over. He therefore can never have acted here as my deputy.
As to question Number 3, here the Prosecution accuses him:
“...That the Gestapo ‘SS Standgericht’ frequently met in Auschwitz and you sometimes attended the trial of prisoners;”—in other words that he attended the executions—“that in 1942 and again in 1943, pursuant to orders by Gruppenführer Müller ... the Commandant of Auschwitz showed you”—that is Mildner—“the extermination installations; that you were acquainted with the extermination installations at Auschwitz since you had to send Jews from your territory to Auschwitz for execution.”
In my opinion, I could perhaps only be incriminated on one point. The question is this: “Did Mildner once, in the year 1943, see such installations or did he attend the shootings?” First of all, the Prosecution did not show whether this “one time” took place before or after I assumed office.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you please be a little briefer and more to the point.
KALTENBRUNNER: Excuse me, Doctor, but I have to be able to refute every single word.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, we do not want the witness to argue upon this document. If he has anything to say about the facts, then he can do it, but not argue on it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, that is my opinion, also.
[Turning to the defendant.] I am asking you—an especially important and incriminating point, it seems to me, is question Number 3; explain if you will, I read: “...did all orders for arrest...”—et cetera—“individual executions from the RSHA”; and then: “Was the regular channel from Himmler through Kaltenbrunner to Müller, and then to the concentration camp commandant?” And then the answer, “yes.”
Please answer briefly.
KALTENBRUNNER: I have already explained today that the authority and power to order executions rested only to a small extent with the Minister of Justice, and with Himmler. Nobody else in the entire Reich had the possibility or the authority to order that. Further, despite the official channels—Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, Müller—such an order from Himmler was never forwarded to me; these orders must have gone from Himmler to Müller. To put this question to Mildner is wrong for the single reason that the man was not with me and cannot know whether I ever received such an order from Himmler. It is only a conclusion which he draws from the normal organizational set-up.
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is a matter for the Defense later on; you need not talk about that.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not looking at the words. What he is asked is, “Was the regular channel...?” That is the question. What is the regular channel for orders from Himmler to you and Müller?
KALTENBRUNNER: Your Lordship, I have already explained the question how Himmler himself ruled on the competencies. Just think of June 1942, of Heydrich’s death. From that day on—it is a written order and was announced publicly—Himmler took charge of the entire RSHA and assumed all the duties which had been Heydrich’s. In January 1943 I was appointed Chief of the RSHA, after it had been announced that the executive power and competence of the State Police and Criminal Police remain with Himmler, no change was to be made, and the Chiefs of Amt IV and V, Müller and Nebe, would continue to be directly under Himmler. For that reason the organizational scheme as it existed at the time of Heydrich was no longer applicable for Amt IV and V when I joined the staff.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, Question 3-a: There it says, “Was Dr. Kaltenbrunner acquainted with conditions in the concentration camps?” Here also it is not explained just what is meant by “conditions” in concentration camps, but it is most likely to be interpreted that those conditions which have been attested by witnesses are meant. The witness said, “Yes.”
KALTENBRUNNER: Dr. Kauffmann, you are overlooking a very important sentence, the last one, on Question Number 3. Here the Prosecution ask: “Did the WVHA have supervision of all concentration camps for administration, the utilization of labor, and maintenance of discipline?” This sentence is tremendously important for the following reasons: The Prosecution endeavor to shift the entire guilt for the destruction of human life from the WVHA to the RSHA, and, if the High Tribunal want to find the truth...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. This is again a long argumentative speech. The only question which arises, it seems to me, upon this question 3-a, is: Did a conference take place between Kaltenbrunner, Pohl, and the chief of the concentration camps? If he says that they did not, then that is an answer that he makes to the affidavit; that is the only question of fact.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, that was not the question; I am of the same opinion.
[Turning to the defendant.] Please answer “yes” or “no” to the question which was just put to you. Did such conferences between Pohl, Müller, and yourself take place?
KALTENBRUNNER: I never had conferences with Pohl and Müller. I had to have semi-annual conferences with Pohl because Pohl was, as Chief of the WVHA, the Finance Minister for the entire SS and Police and the funds for my entire intelligence service had to come from Pohl insofar as the Reich Finance Ministry did not provide for all the personnel.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, please answer one further question: Who was responsible for the administration of concentration camps, the general treatment, food, et cetera?
KALTENBRUNNER: The entire competence and jurisdiction in concentration camps, from the moment an internee stepped through the gate of a concentration camp until his release or his death in the concentration camp, or—the third possibility—until the end of the war at which time he was liberated, rested exclusively with the WVHA.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now another question for the complete clarification. I am assuming that these things were exclusively under the jurisdiction of the WVHA, which had nothing to do with the RSHA. But it is correct, is it not, that only through measures of the Secret Police—by issuing orders for protective custody—that internment in these camps could take place. I just want to define clearly these limitations.
KALTENBRUNNER: There is no doubt that that is correct in respect to individual internments on the basis of individual orders for protective custody which, I admit, were partly based on illegal reasons, as I have already stated. However, most of the internments did not take place on orders from the RSHA but came from the occupied territories—and from there came, for instance, the big transports which Fichte mentioned in the first document.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But then these are, without doubt, the offices which were in charge of internments: the Gestapo offices or the Gestapo regional head offices.
KALTENBRUNNER: No, not alone.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But they did participate?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, not alone. One way for internment was the order for protective custody by the Gestapo, another one was the order for protective custody by the Kripo or the courts.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, a further statement. Will you please make a statement to Question Number 5, the action in Denmark?
THE PRESIDENT: Have you dealt with Question Number 4 yet?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Not yet, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] I go over to Question Number 4. “Is it not a fact that in July or August of 1944 an order was issued to commanders...by Himmler through Kaltenbrunner, as chief...to the effect that members of all Anglo-American commando groups should be turned over to the Sipo by the Armed Forces?”
Mr. President, I wanted to deal with this question comprehensively at a later time and by means of documents, but, if you wish me to, I can deal with it now.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not care how you deal with it. I thought you were taking him through this document.
KALTENBRUNNER: High Tribunal, may I perhaps answer it right away? The answer to this question is very simple. The Prosecution itself, through a document, has, in a completely different form, charged that the State Police had incriminated themselves by falsifying the facts. In that document the Prosecution states that Müller gave the approval; but here the deponent is told, “issued...by Himmler through Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Sipo and SD.” And that document, as far as I recall—I do not know the number—is signed by Müller.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I will submit that document to you. It is Document 1650-PS, Exhibit USA-246. This document is headed, “Gestapo office, Cologne; Branch Office Aachen.” It is a teletype and dated “4 March 1944; top secret”:
“Subject: Measures against escaped prisoners of war who are officers or nonworking, noncommissioned officers, with the exception of British and American prisoners of war.”
THE PRESIDENT: Surely that has nothing to do with it. This is a document of March, and the document that the question refers to is in July or August.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I cannot hear.
THE PRESIDENT: The document you have now put forward is a document in March 1944. The Question Number 4 relates to a document in July or August 1944.
DR. KAUFFMANN: July or August 1944? I have no such document, Your Honor. Perhaps the defendant can tell us now whether such an order by Himmler existed and whether such a Himmler order was transmitted by him—“yes” or “no.”
KALTENBRUNNER: I heard about the existence of such an order for the first time here. I believe it is a mistake on the part of the Prosecution that the question was put to Mildner as July or August. I believe the Prosecution means the document of 4 March 1944.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then you are saying that this order from July is not known to you?
KALTENBRUNNER: I did not know this order nor did I know about it during my term of office.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, it is perfectly obvious, isn’t it, that the document to which you are referring has nothing to do with this question at all, because this document of March concerns measures to be taken against captured, escaped prisoners of war who are officers or noncommissioned officers, except British and American prisoners of war. That is the document.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I do not have a document of July or August 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t know whether there is a document of July or August 1944 at all. What I am saying to you is that the document which you put to the witness now—of March 1944—can’t be the document referred to in question Number 4, for it deals with an entirely different subject.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes. That is right, Your Honor. I believe I can explain this, Mr. President. I assume that the testimony by the witness refers to the so-called Commando order of Hitler of 18 October 1942, and that a result of this order is meant here. I believe it is that way.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, can you tell us whether the Prosecution, in putting this question, were referring to a document of March 1944, or whether they were referring to a document of July or August 1942?
COL. AMEN: We, Your Lordship, were not referring to any document that was brought up by the witness. But since that time we have confirmed from another document—which I think we have here at the table—referring to this same document or a document of that same date. Now, the witness’ feeling was that that document had been destroyed after reading. But that there was such an order apparently is borne out by another document which we have here which has not come before the Tribunal in any way at all. In other words, this document was brought up in the first instance by the witness himself.
THE PRESIDENT: But has the document to which Dr. Kauffmann has referred of March 1944 got anything to do with it?
COL. AMEN: That is not the document and has nothing whatsoever to do with it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then shall I pass on to the next question, Your Honor?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: It is the question of the persecution of Jews in Denmark. Will you make a statement to that?
KALTENBRUNNER: The statement in the affidavit of Mildner which was read by you this morning is alone correct.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is that your statement?
KALTENBRUNNER: I never had anything to do with the removal of Jews from Denmark. Such an order could have been given only by Himmler; and that this was a direct order given by Himmler was confirmed by Mildner.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Point c) of the question Number 5 says, “That shortly after your return to Copenhagen you”—that is, the witness Mildner—“received a direct order by Himmler sent through Kaltenbrunner, as chief...”
KALTENBRUNNER: I never had an order like that go through my hands and I never received an order like that from Himmler. It is also absolutely impossible, because Denmark had her own Higher SS and Police Leader who was the direct representative of Himmler right there, and who was immediately subordinate to him and not to RSHA. This Higher SS and Police Leader was at the same time Commander of the Sipo. Organizationally I could not give such an order to Denmark.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In Question Number 6 it is asked: “Is it not a fact that the action of Sonderkommando Eichmann was not a success; that Müller ordered you”—that is Mildner—“to make a report ... directly to the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Kaltenbrunner?”
The witness Mildner answered that in the affirmative. Is such a report from Denmark known to you?
KALTENBRUNNER: I not only do not know this report, but I know with certainty—I spoke to Himmler not once but a dozen times about this—that he received every report from Eichmann directly, in many cases without informing Müller.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then let us turn to Höttl’s affidavit. As far as I can see there are no important changes from the affidavit given me. Do the High Tribunal wish for me to put questions on that matter?
Then let us turn to question Number 5b). It states:
“It is known to me that orders for commitments into concentration camps and discharges therefrom came from the RSHA. I did not know that all such orders originated with the RSHA. I have no knowledge of orders for executions by the RSHA.”
What can you say to that?
KALTENBRUNNER: Orders for execution could only have come through RSHA when Himmler had ordered Müller to forward these orders. But I believe that took place only in a few isolated cases and mostly after Müller had informed Himmler that a court had passed judgment.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, the defendant asked me several minutes ago to make a statement with reference to Document 1063-PS which we have discussed. He had contested his signature; I believe that he wishes to say now that it is his signature. It is the document of the RSHA of 26 July 1943. Do you want the document?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, is it 1063-PS? Have you the original there?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I have only a photostatic copy; not the original, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is the question?
DR. KAUFFMANN: [Turning to the defendant.] Are you ready?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. There is a mistake on your part, Dr. Kauffmann. I have not contested my signature, but have stated that I must assume that I received knowledge of this order only after it had been published and that the original order presumably did not carry my signature. That is what I said. But I do remember now, through the clause, “certified-Employee,” that it was apparently an order of which the original was signed by me at the time.
Furthermore I remember from the first few words of the decree, “The Reichsführer SS has approved...” et cetera, that this order was based on a personal report which I must have made to Himmler, and that with this report—I call your attention to the date, 26 July 1943—I apparently made the first attempt with Himmler to mitigate or alleviate the conditions; namely, that in such cases for which people hitherto were committed to concentration camps they should in minor cases no longer be put in concentration camps but in labor education camps and that there was to be a differentiation between concentration camps and labor education camps. Therefore, in my opinion it was the result of my first attempt with him against the system of concentration camps.
And third, I would like to point out that this decree carries the number IIc and thereby is not a decree which came from the Police executive offices such as State Police or Kripo but from the administrative level.
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is a sufficient explanation.
The Prosecution hold you responsible for the commitment of politically and racially undesirable persons into concentration camps. How many concentration camps became known to you after your appointment as Chief of the RSHA?
KALTENBRUNNER: At the time of my appointment I knew three concentration camps. At the end of my official activity there were 12 in the entire Reich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How many were there in all?
KALTENBRUNNER: There was a thirteenth. That was the SS prison camp near Danzig. There were altogether thirteen concentration camps in the Reich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How can you explain the chart which you saw here with the many red dots which were alleged to be concentration camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: That presentation is definitely misleading. I saw this chart hanging here. All the armaments centers, factories, et cetera, in which internees from concentration camps were used for labor must have been characterized as concentration camps. I cannot explain in any other way the deluge of red dots.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you differentiate between the smaller camps and the regular concentration camps, and if so, why?
KALTENBRUNNER: The difference is very obvious for the following reasons: Any worker who worked in armament industries—that is, each internee—worked in the same enterprise, in the same factory, as every other German or foreign worker. The difference was merely that the German worker at the conclusion of his working hours, at the end of the day, returned to his family, whereas the internee of the labor camp had to return to the camp.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You are accused of establishing the Concentration Camp Mauthausen, that you visited this camp repeatedly. The witness Höllriegel, who testified here, said he had seen you in this camp. He also claims to have seen you inspecting the gas chambers while they were in operation. There is an affidavit of Zutter, who has already been mentioned today and who claims to have seen you at the Concentration Camp Mauthausen. From this the Prosecution conclude that you, too, must have known exactly about these conditions which were beneath human dignity. I am asking you now, is this evidence correct or wrong? When did you inspect these camps, and what observations did you make?
KALTENBRUNNER: The testimony is wrong. I did not establish any concentration camps in Austria where I was until 1943. I did not establish a single concentration camp in the Reich from 1943 onwards. Every concentration camp in the Reich as I know today, and as has been proved here with certainty, was established on orders of Himmler to Pohl. This applies also—and I wish to emphasize this—to the Mauthausen Camp. Not only were Austrian authorities excluded from establishing the Mauthausen Camp, but they were unpleasantly surprised because neither was the conception of a concentration camp in that sense known in Austria, nor was there a necessity for establishing concentration camps anywhere in Austria.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And now, in Germany, in the Reich proper?
KALTENBRUNNER: What do you mean by that?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am asking regarding your knowledge of conditions there.
KALTENBRUNNER: I heard gradually more and more about conditions in concentration camps. It is apparent that I must have heard of these things already by way of the entire Reich intelligence service and its news channels for home politics.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you not, as testified by Höllriegel, see the gas chambers in operation?
KALTENBRUNNER: Never; neither while they were operating nor at any other time did I see a gas chamber.
THE PRESIDENT: You are going too fast. Make pauses between your questions and answers and don’t speak too fast. He said that he had gradually by way of Intelligence, heard of the concentration camps in the Reich. Is that right?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.
[Turning to the defendant.] You heard gradually about conditions in the concentration camps, that is what you said, is it not?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you recall my last question?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Whether you saw the gas chambers in operation?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I already answered that I never saw a gas chamber, either in operation or at any other time. I did not know that they existed at Mauthausen and testimony to that effect is entirely wrong. I never set foot in the detention camp at Mauthausen—that is, the concentration camp proper. I was at Mauthausen, but in the labor camp, not in the detention camp. The total complex of Mauthausen, as I remember it today, extends over an area of 6 kilometers. Within this area there is a space of perhaps 4½ or 5 kilometers of labor camps. There are the largest granite quarries in Austria, and they were owned by the city of Vienna.
DR. KAUFFMANN: A picture has been shown in which you appear together with Himmler and Ziereis.
KALTENBRUNNER: I was just coming to that. The quarries belonged to the city of Vienna. The city of Vienna had a vital interest not to be excluded from the deliveries of granite which they used for paving the streets of Vienna. Now, according to a Reich law, as I learned later, this large quarry was expropriated from the city of Vienna by the WVHA—Pohl—and the city of Vienna was excluded from the supply of granite for quite some time. Now, the city turned to me to approach Himmler on this. It happened that Himmler was visiting and inspecting southern Germany and decided to visit Austria and Mauthausen and asked me to see him there. In that way, it came about that I was with Himmler at this quarry. Whether or not I was photographed at that time, I do not know. I have not seen the picture and I cannot say whether I am in it.
I might add something. Neither at this time nor at any other time did Himmler ever take me into a concentration camp or suggest that he do so; as I learned later, he had certain reasons for not doing so. I would not have attended such an inspection for I knew very well that as far as I was concerned, he would, as he did with others whom he had invited on such visits, show me “Potemkin villages” and not conditions as they actually were; and, except for a handful of men in the WVHA, no one else was allowed to see how things really were in concentration camps.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, may I ask you—you are speaking about a handful of men—you did not belong to this group?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I did not. This handful of men were Himmler, Pohl, Müller, and Glücks, and the camp commanders.
DR. KAUFFMANN: As far as Camp Mauthausen is concerned, there is a document on which we would like to have your views. The Document Number 1650-PS, which has already been submitted, dated 4 March 1944, is the so-called Bullet Decree. It deals with Camp III:
“Measures against recaptured prisoners of war, officers and nonworking, noncommissioned officers, with the exception of British and American prisoners of war.”
This document is known to the Tribunal in its contents. I do not believe that I need read it. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner is to make a statement, whether these facts became known to him.
THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear the reference to it, the number.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Document 1650-PS, Exhibit Number USA-246.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be a good time to break off for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, a report is made that the Defendant Göring is absent from this session of the Court.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you the Document 1650-PS, and have you read it?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I have read it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: This, as emphasized, is the famous Bullet Decree. When did you hear of this?
KALTENBRUNNER: I did not know the actual decree; this must have been a decree issued long before I came into office. Neither had I seen this teletype copy of the document given to me here.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am drawing your attention to the signature which reads “Müller.”
KALTENBRUNNER: Actually, the man was entitled to sign such a decree if it did in fact exist. But I have heard—this I would like to add—at the time of 1944-1945 from the liaison officer between Himmler and Hitler by the name of Fegelein when I made my report to headquarters, which at that time, I believe, was already in Berlin, I heard the name Bullet Decree, which to me was an absolutely strange conception. So I asked him what it was. He replied that this was a Führer order and that he knew no more than that, except that he had heard that this was a special type of prisoner-of-war.
I was not satisfied with that reply, and so, on the same day, I sent a teletype message to Himmler in which I asked him to look into an order of the Führer which was called Bullet Decree. At that time I did not know either that the State Police was concerned with the Bullet Decree.
Then a few days later, Müller came to see me on Himmler’s behalf, and gave me a decree to read which, however, did not come from Hitler, but from Himmler, in which Himmler stated that he was transmitting this to me as a verbal order of the Führer. Referring to this, I replied to Himmler that I noticed in this Führer decree that again the most elementary principles of the Geneva Convention were violated, although this had been going on from a time long before I had assumed office and there had been other violations following that. I asked him to intervene with the Führer, and I attached to this letter the draft of a letter from Himmler to Hitler, asking the Führer (a) to cancel that decree, and (b) at any rate, to relieve the subordinate departments of the burden on their conscience.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the result?
KALTENBRUNNER: The result was positive. Although the Bullet Decree and a number of other equally depressing orders were not repealed, it was positive insofar as in February 1945 Hitler permitted me for the first time to get in touch with the International Red Cross, an action which had been strictly prohibited before.
DR. KAUFFMANN: This action with reference to the Red Cross was initiated by you, and did this action refer to the inspection of concentration camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: In that connection I must answer “yes” and “no,” for it coincided with the request made by the Red Cross and its president, Burckhardt, for immediate and direct contact. I would like to say the attempt of both sides coincided.
But please do not misunderstand me. Apart from that there were, of course, numerous attempts—I would almost like to say, behind Hitler’s back—to get in contact with the Red Cross, in which connection I call attention for instance to the continuous contact the Foreign Office had with them.
DR. KAUFFMANN: If I understand you correctly, you want to cite the request to Professor Burckhardt to visit the concentration camps, as an exonerating circumstance for yourself.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, of course, but I should like to talk about that later in greater detail, because it is premature at this stage.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The Prosecution have stated that during the time you were in office two concentration camps had been newly established, Lublin and Hertogenbosch. Did you hear anything about that? Who could have ordered the establishing of these two camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know the date when these two camps were set up. The one in Lublin and the other one in Hertogenbosch were subordinate through the channel of the WVHA to the Higher Police and SS Leader of the occupied countries in which they were situated, so that the main offices in Berlin had nothing to do with them.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, will you please answer this question with “yes” or “no”: Had the concentration camp at Auschwitz been known to you as such?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I did not know about it until November of 1943.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Were you, simultaneously with learning of the camp’s existence, informed of the significance of this camp, namely, that it was exclusively an extermination camp for Jews handed over by Eichmann?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, it could not have been known to anybody as such, for the question put to Himmler, “Why was such a large camp being installed there?” was always answered by him, “Because of the proximity of the large armament works.” And I think he mentioned then Vitkovice and others.
At any rate—and I think this must be emphasized—there was such a complete secrecy regarding what went on in Auschwitz, that the statements of not only the defendants but of anyone else who might be asked by the Americans, “Do you know about it?” and answers in the negative must be believed.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The most atrocious excesses are connected with this camp in Auschwitz. This concentration camp was under the spiritual leadership of the infamous Eichmann. Now I am asking you: When did you get acquainted with Eichmann?
KALTENBRUNNER: I became acquainted with Eichmann in my home town, Linz. The Prosecution have stated—and today the attempt was made to establish from an affidavit—that I was a friend, or at least a close acquaintance, of Eichmann. I would like to make the following statement on this with particular reference to my oath. I have a different conception of a close acquaintance or even a friendship.
I learned of Eichmann’s existence in Linz because his father, as director of an electrical construction company at Linz, consulted my father as a lawyer, and thus they knew each other; and because, he, the son of his father, attended the same high school as my brothers.
Therefore, the statement of Höttl that I had met Eichmann in an SS platoon at Linz is wrong, because when I joined the SS Eichmann had already fled to Germany, as I learned later.
Secondly, the Prosecution state that I met the same Eichmann for the first time in 1932 and for the second time in February or March 1945. Therefore, I did not see him for 13 years and after that last meeting I never saw him again.
On the basis of these two personal meetings, I can draw the conclusion that I was neither a friend of his nor that we were closely acquainted. It is true that on that second occasion he accosted me and said, “Obergruppenführer Eichmann is my name; I come from Linz too.” I said, “Pleased to meet you. How are things back home?” But there was no official contact.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness Lammers stated yesterday that in the RSHA a conference took place regarding the so-called “final solution.” Did you know about it?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. I think that the witness Lammers, and another witness, too, stated that Eichmann, possibly under my name, had called a meeting at the RSHA in Berlin during February or March 1943, a so-called discussion with department chiefs. I have to say to that, that nominally I did commence my services in Berlin on 30 January, but in fact, until May I was not in Berlin except for a few official visits, but in Vienna, where I was enlarging my intelligence service in order to transfer it eventually to Berlin.
DR. KAUFFMANN: One further question to that. When did you hear, for the first time, that the camp at Auschwitz was an extermination camp?
KALTENBRUNNER: Himmler told me that in 1944, in February or March. That is, he did not tell me, he admitted it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was your attitude upon learning this?
KALTENBRUNNER: I did not hear the question.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What attitude did you adopt when you heard about it?
KALTENBRUNNER: I had no knowledge of Hitler’s order to Heydrich regarding the final solution of the Jewish problem at the time I took up my office. In the summer of 1943 I gathered from the foreign press and through the enemy radio...
THE PRESIDENT: This is not an answer to your question. You asked him what he did when he found out that Auschwitz was a concentration camp. He is now making a long speech about Heydrich. You asked for his attitude. I suppose you meant what he did when he first heard that Auschwitz was an extermination camp, in February or March 1944. He is now telling us a long story about something having to do with Heydrich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Please try to give me a direct answer to that question. What was your attitude after you heard about that? Answer quite briefly and very concisely, please.
KALTENBRUNNER: Immediately after receiving knowledge of this fact, I fought, just as I had done previously, not only against the final solution, but also against this type of treatment of the Jewish problem. For that reason I wanted to explain how through my intelligence service I became acquainted with the whole Jewish problem, and what I did against it.
THE PRESIDENT: We still don’t know what you did...
DR. KAUFFMANN: What did you do? I am asking you for the last time.
KALTENBRUNNER: In order to explain what I did I must explain how I reacted, just as I have to tell you what I heard about it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Just explain to us your reactions.
KALTENBRUNNER: First I protested to Hitler and the next day to Himmler. I did not only draw their attention to my personal attitude and my completely different conception which I had brought over from Austria and to my humanitarian qualms, but immediately, from the first day, I concluded practically every one of my situation reports right to the very end by saying that there was no hostile power that would negotiate with a Reich which had burdened itself with this guilt. Those were the reports I put to Himmler and Hitler, particularly pointing out also that the intelligence sector would have to create the atmosphere for discussions with the enemy.
DR. KAUFFMANN: When did the Jewish persecution end?
KALTENBRUNNER: October 1944.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you want to say that this was due to your intervention?
KALTENBRUNNER: I am firmly convinced that this is chiefly due to my intervention, although a number of others also worked toward the same end. But I do not think that there was anyone who kept dinning it into Himmler’s ears every time he met him or that there was anyone who would have spoken so openly and frankly and with such self-abnegation to Hitler as I did.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was that instruction to Eichmann an instruction which came from Hitler and Himmler to the RSHA and then to Eichmann, or was it a strictly personal order outside the competence of the RSHA?
KALTENBRUNNER: Naturally I can only reconstruct the situation today, since I was not there when these orders were issued; but I have reason to assume that the channels for this order were: Hitler, Heydrich, Eichmann; and that Himmler, shortly after Heydrich’s death, kept on working with Eichmann and probably very often even excluded Müller.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The witness Wisliceny, who was examined here—and this I am going to put to you—stated on 3 January that practically the final solution was carried out between April 1942 and October 1944. Wisliceny referred to a personal order from Himmler and stated further that Eichmann was personally charged with the task. But he goes on to say, “The extermination of Jews continued under Kaltenbrunner without any reduction or alleviation.” Reports made by Eichmann to that effect were sent at regular intervals to Kaltenbrunner through Müller. It is stated that in 1944 Eichmann called personally on Kaltenbrunner, and Wisliceny affirms having seen Kaltenbrunner’s signature on such reports to Himmler.
That was Wisliceny’s testimony. Now my question: Is this testimony true in its essential points?
KALTENBRUNNER: The testimony is wrong, but I can clarify it. Wisliceny may have seen my signature once, not on a report to Himmler which I had received from Eichmann and Müller, but on a letter which I wrote to Himmler, a copy of which I passed on to Müller and Eichmann for their information and in which I referred to my last report—verbal report—to Himmler regarding the Jewish question. It was on this occasion that, for the first time, I heard of Eichmann’s activity in that respect, and, in order to make it clear to Eichmann that I did not want to be associated with that activity, I had Müller give this man a copy of the letter to Himmler. In that letter I asked Himmler to define his attitude so that, since the Führer again had ordered me to report to him, I could give the Führer a full report on Himmler’s activities and therefore wanted an early decision.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The witness Höttl has stated in an affidavit that he had heard from Eichmann that a total number of 4 to 5 million Jewish persons had been exterminated, about 2 million of them in Auschwitz. Have you heard any such figures?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have never heard such figures. But I approached Himmler on that subject and asked him whether he had any idea of all these crimes so far. The reason I put that question to him was that he would realize the extent of the catastrophe which was bound to follow. He replied to me that he had no figures. I do not believe it. I believe he had them.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you want to assume a responsibility in this connection or do you want to deny it?
KALTENBRUNNER: I must deny it completely, because I hope to be able to prove through Burckhardt that there was nobody who exposed himself more on this question in favor of another solution.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now referring to a document, which is Document R-135, Exhibit USA-289. It is a letter from the Reich Commissioner for Riga and dated 18 June 1943. It refers to an action against the Jews at the Minsk prison. It is a letter from the commandant of the prison, addressed to the Commissioner General for Bielorussia at Minsk. Please, will you make a statement on that document?
KALTENBRUNNER: I can see from both the signature and the name of the addressee that this letter could not have come to my knowledge. Nor have I knowledge of its contents either. Presumably this is the result about which the person is reporting in June 1943, of events which occurred before I came into office, at any rate this must refer to events which took place previously and which needed a certain amount of time.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, I am coming to the next document, Number D-473, Exhibit Number USA-522. It is a letter from the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, dated 4 December 1944. From this also the Prosecution conclude the Defendant Kaltenbrunner’s great responsibility. It deals with the combating of criminality among the Polish and Soviet Russian civilian workers. As means for their punishment, the letter states, the Criminal Police have at their disposal police detention and transfer to a concentration camp of all asocial or dangerous prisoners. The document has the signature, “Dr. Kaltenbrunner.” What are your views on that?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have no recollection that I have ever signed any such decree.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you deny having signed this letter at all? Or, to be more accurate, do you know anything about the matter?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now submit Document 1276-PS, Exhibit Number USA-525. The Prosecution have referred to this document. It is a consequence of Hitler’s order dated 18 October 1942. According to this, parachutists and sabotage troops are to be exterminated, and Commandos to be surrendered to the SD. In a letter with the signature “Müller,” dated 17 June 1944, addressed to the High Command, it says that such parachutists in British uniform were to be treated in accordance with Hitler’s order. I am now asking you if you knew of this document signed by Müller, dated 17 June 1944, and if you had any knowledge at all of the matter contained in this document?
KALTENBRUNNER: I had no knowledge of the matter or of this document. But I should like to say the following in this connection: Later I received knowledge of this Hitler order and of his basic attitude to this question. I think it was at the Führer’s headquarters in February 1945; and I have there, before witnesses, publicly stated that I was not only personally opposed to such treatment of soldiers and prisoners, but also that I would refuse to carry out any such order from Hitler. I think another defendant here is calling a witness by the name of Koller, and I request that you ask this witness, who was at that time the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, how I expressed it—I believe it was in Hitler’s presence—what my attitude was regarding that question, which came to my knowledge for the first time in 1945. I can do no more than I did before this most powerful and almighty man Germany ever had, who declared, “He who does not obey my orders, no matter who the commander, will be shot.” I can do no more than what I did say in his presence to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and other officers: “I will not obey such an order.”
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to Document 2990-PS, Exhibit Number USA-526. This is an affidavit from the witness Schellenberg. According to it, in 1944 a meeting took place between Kaltenbrunner and Müller. Kaltenbrunner is supposed to have stated that actions of the populations against terrorist fliers must not be interfered with; that, on the contrary, the hostile attitude of the population must be encouraged. I shall quote a few sentences from the examination of the witness Schellenberg on 3 January 1946, where he says:
“In 1944 on some other occasion during a conference I heard fragments of a conversation between Kaltenbrunner and Müller. The following remark by Kaltenbrunner remains clearly in my recollection: ‘All departments of the Security Police and the Sipo must be informed that actions on the part of the population against British and American terror-fliers must not be interfered with; on the contrary, the hostile attitude of the population must be encouraged.’”
Do you know Schellenberg?
KALTENBRUNNER: Regarding Schellenberg I must say...
DR. KAUFFMANN: In a few sentences please.
KALTENBRUNNER: ...with reference to his credibility in the matter of this document, that he was a protégé of Heydrich’s and when I took office he was in charge of...
THE PRESIDENT: He wants to know whether you know Schellenberg. That is a question you can answer.
The question was, “Do you know Schellenberg?” And he goes off into a long speech without answering the question.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you know Schellenberg? “Yes” or “no”?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, of course. He was the Chief of Department VI.
DR. KAUFFMANN: My question: What were the relations between you and the Chief of Department VI? Do you regard this statement as true or not?
KALTENBRUNNER: That statement is not true, and I should like to give you the reason so that the Tribunal can evaluate that statement. Schellenberg was Himmler’s most intimate friend. By Himmler’s order, he remained with him to the last day. He is the man who, on Himmler’s behalf, established contact with the Swedish Count Bernadotte. He was the man who, at the very last minute, through M. Muehse in Switzerland, established a connection which was used to permit a very few Jewish prisoners to go to Switzerland, the purpose of which was to create quickly a favorable impression for Himmler and Schellenberg abroad. He is the man who, together with another friend of Himmler’s, started an action to make an agreement with an organization of rabbis in the United States whereby they were to get him a favorable press in some of the larger newspapers in America. I have criticized Himmler for these tricks and complained and discredited them with Hitler, stating that it was demeaning to the cause and the Reich that in so important a matter these methods should be used by Himmler and Schellenberg. I said the only correct way would be to establish contact with the International Red Cross immediately. Consequently, I prejudiced Himmler before President Burckhardt, and forced him to adopt a different attitude in this question by asking Burckhardt personally to visit these camps.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But I put a completely different question.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, but I had to say this so that you can see how disappointed Schellenberg and Himmler were about what I was doing and why he, now, is interested in accusing me, as has been done in the affidavit, of breaking my word on international matters.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In other words, you want to say that Schellenberg was in opposition to you and against you, and is implicating you unjustly.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now then, in this Schellenberg document the event with reference to these 50 fliers is mentioned; and Schellenberg states that you, together with Müller and Nebe, had a conference and that all of you were trying to find an excuse in order to keep the actual truth of these events from the public. I am asking you: When did you first hear of the shooting of these 50 fliers?
KALTENBRUNNER: That is the Case Sagan.
DR. KAUFFMANN: When did you hear of it? It is a simple question, please.
KALTENBRUNNER: The first time that case became known to me was about six weeks after it happened.
DR. KAUFFMANN: My next question: Do you want to say that you were not involved in the shooting in any way, that to the contrary you were only much later able to investigate the matter?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, that is what I want to say.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you also mean to say that the conference with Schellenberg dealt exclusively with the later attempt to conceal the truth of the matter?
KALTENBRUNNER: It can only have referred to that.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am coming to Document 835-PS, Exhibit Number USA-527. This document also is held against the defendant by the Prosecution. It is the so-called Nacht und Nebel Decree, which is an order from Hitler dated 7 December 1941. Is the expression “Nacht und Nebel Decree” familiar to you? When did you hear of it for the first time?
KALTENBRUNNER: The first time I heard of it was in June 1945 in London.
[A document was handed to the defendant.]
DR. KAUFFMANN: This document which I have submitted to you is a letter from the OKW, dated 2 September 1944, addressed to the German Armistice Commission. It is signed by Dr. Lehmann, and in it is stated:
“According to the decrees all non-German civilians in occupied territories who have endangered the security and preparedness of the occupying forces by means of terror or sabotage or in any other way are to be handed over to the Security Police and the SD.”
In the case of so important a matter, it appears improbable that the matter and the Nacht und Nebel Decree were not known to you.
KALTENBRUNNER: I had no knowledge and I beg to be given permission to clarify the situation. May I first of all say that no document shows better proof than this of the fact that an executive function is wrongfully attributed to the SD. It says here on Line 4:
“...who have endangered...in any other way are to be handed over to the Security Police and the SD.”
First of all, it is complete nonsense to state that one and the same thing should be handed over to two different authorities; either it is the Security Police or the SD.
This error in the use of the German language found its way into the Führer decree because Heydrich, as Chief of the Security Police and SD, was referred to in short as Chief of SD, but it is an absolute mistake. Whereby, God knows, I am not trying to exonerate the SD from other things which it may, perhaps, have committed, but I want to make it clear that it is wrong to conclude from this that it had executive powers.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, but it is not only the question of the SD, but also of the Security Police.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, and to that I want to say the following: This Führer decree from the year 1941 was not known to me. I am asking you to put yourself in my position. At the beginning of 1943 I came to Berlin. With the exception of a few official visits I commenced my activity in May 1943. In the fourth year of the war the decrees and orders within the Reich and also in the executive sector reached the thousands and were accumulating on the desks and the cabinets of the civil servants. It was absolutely impossible for any man even to read them all within a year, and it was quite impossible for me to know of the existence of all these orders even had I considered it my duty to do so. But it was not my duty at all.
Then I am asking you to consider the following fact: The beginning of my activity was February 1943. On 2 February Stalingrad was surrendered and the largest military catastrophe...
THE PRESIDENT: This is a long speech in answer to a question as to whether he had seen this letter. He says he did not see the letter. Then he makes this long speech.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now putting this question to you: When did you realize what significance this Nacht und Nebel Decree had and what it meant regarding the treatment of persons it affected? Please give a precise answer.
KALTENBRUNNER: Dr. Kauffmann, the existence of the decree was unknown to me. Had I known that this matter would be held against me here, then I would have been able to nominate a witness in captivity in London who can prove that even in London I had no idea that it existed. We have talked about that in the cell.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The end result, therefore, is that you did not know?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, absolutely ignorant regarding that decree.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to the Document 526-PS, Exhibit Number USA-502, which has been used by the Prosecution.
[The document was handed to the defendant.]
This refers to the landing of an enemy cutter in Norway on 30 March 1943. That report contains a sentence: “Führer order carried out by SD.” The signature on that document is lacking. It is dated 10 May 1943. It is a secret command matter and the heading is “Note.”
Please, will you make a statement regarding that sentence, “Führer order carried out by SD.”
KALTENBRUNNER: The execution of such a Führer order is unknown to me. I want to point out that this note is obviously one made by a military department regarding an event which took place shortly after I had come into office but at a time before I had come to Berlin. I could not have had knowledge of it at all.
DR. KAUFFMANN: It says at the end of the document, “Armed Forces report dated 6 April 1943.” It states further as follows: “In northern Norway an enemy ship carrying sabotage troops was forced to fight when approaching the coast and was destroyed.”
Do you know anything about the connection of this Armed Forces report—as far as you knew of it at all—with the actual decree?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. Of course, I read, daily, practically every incoming Armed Forces report. But from its composition I am unable to determine any participation of any military agency within my sphere.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now turn to the next document which has been held against the defendant by the Prosecution, Document L-37, Exhibit Number USA-506. This is the so-called “responsibility of relatives,” that is to say, it refers to crimes committed against relatives of the guilty persons. This document refers to a letter from the commander of the Security Police to the SD at Radom, dated 19 July 1944, according to which male relatives of saboteurs are to be shot and female relatives to be sent to concentration camps.
What is your explanation to the Tribunal with reference to that document and the whole matter?
KALTENBRUNNER: The report commences with the words: “The Higher SS and Police Leader East has ...” and so on and so forth, and then, “ordered” or “issued the following order.”
The Higher Police Leader East is a department, which, as a department in an occupied territory, is directly under the jurisdiction of the Reichsführer SS and not under any central department in Berlin. Therefore I could not have had knowledge of that order. The police leaders in occupied territories were immediately subordinate to Himmler.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to the next accusation of the Prosecution regarding the concentration camp at Dachau. A document exists which has the number Document 3462-PS, Exhibit Number USA-528. It is a statement by the Gaustabsamtsleiter Gerdes.
The Prosecution are accusing the defendant of contemplating the wiping out of the concentration camp at Dachau and its adjoining camps at Mühldorf and Landsberg by bombs or poison. I shall read a few sentences from that document. They are on Page 2 of the German text, near the end of the page:
“In December 1944 or January 1945 I was in the office of Gauleiter Giesler in Munich, Ludwig Street 28, and had the opportunity of learning about a secret order from Kaltenbrunner. Gauleiter Giesler received that order in my presence through a courier and, after I had been given permission to read it, it was destroyed in accordance with the remark on the document; ‘To be destroyed after cognizance has been taken.’ The order which was signed by Kaltenbrunner was worded roughly as follows:
“‘In agreement with the Reichsführer SS I have instructed all higher police departments that every German who participates in the future in the persecution and destruction of enemy fliers will remain unpunished.’
“Giesler told me that Kaltenbrunner was in constant contact with him since he was considerably worried over the attitude of foreign workers and particularly the inmates of the concentration camps at Dachau, Mühldorf, and Landsberg, which were in the path of the approaching Allied armies.
“On a Tuesday in the middle of April 1945 I had a telephone call from the Gauleiter ordering me to keep myself available for a night conference. In the course of our conversation that evening Gauleiter Giesler disclosed the fact to me that Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner had given him instructions, in accordance with an order from the Führer, that there should be made an immediate plan regarding the liquidation of the concentration camp at Dachau and the two Jewish work camps at Mühldorf and Landsberg. The instructions stated that these two Jewish work camps at Landsberg and Mühldorf were to be destroyed by the German Air Force, since the sites of those two camps had lately and repeatedly been affected by hostile bombing attacks. The action was given the camouflage name ‘Cloud A-1.’”
KALTENBRUNNER: May I say something to that?
DR. KAUFFMANN: First, please, do you know Gerdes?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know Gerdes and I have never seen him.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know Giesler?
KALTENBRUNNER: The last time I saw Giesler was in 1942, in September.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was an order of Hitler in existence regarding the destruction of concentration camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you give a reasonable explanation regarding this document?
KALTENBRUNNER: To give a reasonable explanation for that document is almost humanly impossible, because from the beginning to the end it is an invention and a fake. I brand this document a complete and utter lie coming from Gerdes, and I can only refer you to the deposition supporting my statement by the Higher SS and Police Leader who was the sole competent authority in Bavaria, Freiherr Von Eberstein, who himself calls Gerdes’ statement completely incredible. I would like to refute these accusations in detail as follows: He says:
“On a Tuesday in the middle of April 1945 I had a telephone call from the Gauleiter ordering me to keep myself available for a night conference.”—He—“... disclosed ... that Kaltenbrunner had given him instructions, in accordance with an order from the Führer ...”—and so on.
Nobody in the Reich knew better than Hitler who was responsible for concentration camps and how he had to give an order. He would never have given me such an order and he could not have given it to me because I was, on Hitler’s personal order, in Austria from 28 March until 15 April. As to the time from 10 April until 8 May, when I was captured, including the few days when I was in Berlin I can state exactly just where I have been and what I have done, so that the question of giving an order in this connection is impossible. And, anyway, it must have happened earlier, if the witness is talking about the middle of April, which would mean that I would have had to talk to Hitler about this before the middle of April, since otherwise he could not have been asked to be available for a night conference by the middle of April.
The existence of Jewish work camps in Bavaria as branches of Dachau, was completely unknown to me. And I am asking you to recognize the absurdity of my sponsoring in April of 1945 such an order, when I tried in March 1945 to start discussions with the President of the International Red Cross, Burckhardt, regarding the release and help to be given to all Jews, and when I made all efforts to have him personally look after the Jewish camps—in which I succeeded.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you have any possibility at all to exert influence on the German Air Force in this respect?
KALTENBRUNNER: I neither had the possibility of giving the Air Force orders—I could only have asked the Chief of the Air Force to give them and there, of course, it would have been turned down, because you must realize that at this point, when everyone knew that the war had come to an end, the Air Force would not have lent its hand to a terrible crime.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And now, with the permission of the Tribunal, and because it is a terrible accusation, I am quoting a few sentences from this document, because the Prosecution, too, have read these sentences into the record. The document goes on to say:
“I was aware that I would never carry this order out.”—this is Gerdes talking—“Since the action ‘Cloud A-1’ was supposed to have been carried out already, couriers from Kaltenbrunner kept arriving, and I was supposed to have discussed the details of the Mühldorf and Landsberg action with the two district leaders concerned. The couriers, who in most cases were SS officers, mostly SS Untersturmführer, made me read and initial brief and sharp orders. I was threatened with severe punishment including execution in case of disobedience. I could always excuse the failure to carry out the plan with bad weather for flying or with lack of petrol or lack of bombs.
“Therefore, Kaltenbrunner ordered that the Jews should be marched from Landsberg to Dachau, so that they should be included in the poisoning action which was going on in Dachau, whereas the action at Mühldorf was to be carried out by the Gestapo. For the Dachau Concentration Camp Kaltenbrunner ordered the action ‘Cloud Fire,’ which stipulated that the inmates of the concentration camps at Dachau, with the exception of the Aryan members of the Western Powers, were to be liquidated with poison.
“Gauleiter Giesler received that order directly from Kaltenbrunner and in my presence he discussed with the health officer of the Gau, Dr. Harrfield, the procurement of the necessary amount of poison. Dr. Harrfield promised that the necessary quantity, in accordance with the order, would be obtained, and he received instructions to wait my further orders. Since I wished to prevent this action from being carried out in any event, I gave no further instructions to Dr. Harrfield. The inmates of the camp at Landsberg had hardly arrived at Dachau when a courier from Kaltenbrunner brought the order for the action ‘Cloud Fire’ to be carried out. I prevented the execution of the two actions, ‘Cloud A-1’ and ‘Cloud Fire’ by telling Giesler that the front line was too near and to convey that reason to Kaltenbrunner.
“Kaltenbrunner gave written instructions to Dachau that all internees who were members of the Western European Powers were to be loaded on lorries and transported to Switzerland, whereas the remaining inmates were to be marched afoot into the Ötztal territory (Tyrol), where the final liquidation of the internees was to be carried out, in one way or the other.”
Perhaps you can explain in a few words, without going into detail, whether or not this document contains the truth.
KALTENBRUNNER: This document is completely untrue.
DR. KAUFFMANN: It is completely untrue?
KALTENBRUNNER: But, Doctor, I must have an opportunity to define my views. I must be given an opportunity to clarify the details.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You have already defined your attitude. If you have to say anything important in addition to that, you can state it now.
KALTENBRUNNER: The following appears to be important to me: According to his statement, I must have had dozens of couriers during my stay in Austria. Two persons were in my company, my driver and my administrative adjutant, his name was Scheitler, a man who had nothing to do with intelligence and police. There were three of us. I had not even the possibility of dispatching so many couriers.
Secondly, as far as Bavaria was concerned, there was no need for me to carry out any preparations, not even under pressure from Himmler. Why? Because, as far as Bavaria is concerned, plenipotentiary powers were given to Obergruppenführer Berger, the same day I was given plenipotentiary powers for Austria. So that there was no reason for me to take such action.
Thirdly, I could not even have carried such insane orders regarding a concentration camp in my heart when, at the same time, I was ordering exactly the opposite. I am thinking of Mauthausen. I had given an order to Mauthausen that the camp was to be completely handed over to the enemy. If you can put yourself in Himmler’s place, then this would have been completely wrong, since the real criminals were in Mauthausen, whereas the people in Dachau had nothing or little against them. So that even if you thought as Himmler—that the exact opposite would have been necessary—from that point of view, too, it is completely insane to accuse me of any such action.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Finally, the Prosecution hold you responsible for the fact that you, as Chief of the Security Police and the SD, tolerated the persecution of the church, particularly the Catholic Church, by the Gestapo. I recall to you in this connection that the Department B-2 of Amt IV was concerned with education and confessional questions, and Department 1 of Amt IV with political Catholicism. Do you know anything regarding the fact that within that department there was a twofold policy regarding the churches with a so-called “immediate goal” and a “distant goal”? By “immediate goal” they meant that the churches would not be allowed to regain a single inch of ground; “distant goal” signified the final destruction of the churches in Germany at the end of the war. What do you know about these aims?
KALTENBRUNNER: All I can say to these theoretical statements is that they were completely unknown to me. The church policy of the Reich, as I had to recognize in 1943, was different. In 1943, to maintain Hitler’s policy meant to achieve a covert truce with the churches, at least for the duration of the war; that is, to refrain as much as possible from attacks and to proceed only against individual misdemeanors by the clergy, if express authorization had been forthcoming.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I interrupt you? I am asking you: Did you in the spring of 1943...
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I want to come to that.
DR. KAUFFMANN: ...did you undertake anything with Hitler, and what was the result?
KALTENBRUNNER: Well, I just wanted again to give you a picture of the state of affairs which I found. In spite of Hitler’s policy, I found that Bormann was actively continuing the fight against the churches. Therefore as early as March, I think, I wrote to Hitler, and later requested verbally a full clarification of the church policy. I asked him to alter it with a view to effecting a rapprochement. Above all I wanted to bring about a different policy toward the Vatican.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I do not think there is any need for you to go into too much detail.
KALTENBRUNNER: But I was blocked. First of all, Himmler opposed the idea to Hitler, and, secondly, I had the very strong resistance of Bormann against me. He even went so far as to undermine completely the reputation of the German representative to the Vatican, Weizsäcker, by sending a man to shadow him.
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is enough about that.
Mr. President, do you want me to go on, because it is now 5?
THE PRESIDENT: If you can finish in a short time, we would like you to go on. How long are you going to be?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I would say it would take me about another hour, since I must discuss those documents which have been submitted by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Before we adjourn, I will say the Tribunal will sit on Saturday in open session until 1 o’clock.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 12 April 1946 at 1000 hours.]
ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTH DAY Friday, 12 April 1946
Morning Session
[The Defendant Kaltenbrunner resumed the stand.]
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, yesterday the case of Sagan was dealt with by the defendant, but regarding his own participation he said only a few sentences. The Prosecution are assuming that he was an immediate participant even before the fliers had been shot. The two witnesses, Westhoff and Wielen, in my opinion, produced evidence in favor of the defendant, and I am now asking the Tribunal to tell me whether the defendant may have permission to speak in detail regarding the manner in which he was actively involved in the affair, or whether the Tribunal is satisfied with the treatment this problem has been given.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that if the defendant has knowledge of the facts connected with it, he had better give them. He need not give them in any greater detail than is necessary, but in view of the evidence of the witness Wielen, I think he ought to deal with it.
DR. KAUFFMANN. [To the defendant.] You stated yesterday that you heard about the Case Sagan for the first time after the event had taken place. Do you maintain that position today?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In what manner did you become acquainted with the Case Sagan later on, and what did you do about it?
KALTENBRUNNER: I was never officially informed of Case Sagan, but roughly 6 weeks after this event I received knowledge of it. At the time these fliers escaped and at the time the orders were given—which in my opinion went this way: Hitler-Himmler-Müller-Nebe, or possibly Himmler-Fegelein-Nebe—I do not know, as at the time I was not present in Berlin but was in Hungary and, with a number of stops, finally finished up in a visit to Minister Speer in Dahlem. On 2 or 3 April I returned to Berlin. Up to that time, no one had informed me of it. The first time I heard of the affair was when the Foreign Office made complaints, or rather, demanded from Nebe and Müller that the case should be clarified so that they could answer a note which, I believe, had been sent to the Foreign Office by the protecting power.
The description of the witness General Westhoff is, in my opinion, misleading. I think he said something about mentioning the Case Sagan approximately 4 weeks after the shooting, during another conversation with me. I think that it was at least 6 weeks afterwards. It should be possible to ascertain when the Foreign Office made that inquiry. Then it would be possible to ascertain the exact date.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Later on, when you talked to Müller and Nebe, what was devised as a camouflage for this matter and what was thought of?
KALTENBRUNNER: No camouflage was devised nor discussed in our office, but when Müller and Nebe said that they would have to reply to the Foreign Office’s inquiry and in that connection informed me of that dreadful order for the first time, I asked them who had given that order and they replied, “Himmler.” I told them that they ought to get in touch with this superior immediately and ask him how the case should be dealt with further. I refused to have any connection with that matter. It had been unknown to me up to that time, and I considered it a dirty affair.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But was it not mentioned in that connection that it would be said that the fliers had lost their lives through bombs or that they had been shot while trying to escape? What do you know in that respect? The witness Schellenberg has stated that there were such conversations.
KALTENBRUNNER: Such words may have been said, yes. It has been described here how the large-scale searches were handled; and in connection with these manhunts, there were shootings. Even Germans were shot in that connection. An SS Oberführer in Alsatian territory was shot when he did not answer a stop signal at a road block which had been erected in the course of this search. Two or three of the fliers were killed by bombs, as I was told. I think that was along the Baltic coast in Kiel or Stettin, and I understand that two Criminal Police officials also lost their lives in this accident. Their widows received pensions subsequently. That is something that ought to be ascertainable. In this connection bombing and losses through bombing were certainly mentioned, but a camouflage of the whole affair was not discussed in our office; in any case the answer was prepared by Müller, Nebe, and Himmler, in Himmler’s headquarters. I know that immediately after the inquiry from the Foreign Office these two left by air for Himmler’s headquarters.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Are you trying to say then that the statement according to which these fliers had lost their lives by bombs, or had been shot while escaping, did not originate from you?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, certainly not; it did not originate from me.
DR. KAUFFMANN: With reference to the church policy of Department IV, the Prosecution are charging you with the following: so-called Bibelforscher, or International Bible Students, had often been sentenced to death on the strength of their inner convictions, only because they refused to serve in the war in any way. My question to you is this: Do you know of this state of affairs, and in what manner did you participate in that matter?
KALTENBRUNNER: German jurisdiction used as a basis for proceedings against this sect of International Bible Students was the law for the Protection of the Defense of the German Nation. Under this law any one who was interfering with German defense strength by refusing to serve in the forces could be penalized with detention or death. According to this law, military as well as civilian courts pronounced even the death sentence also against these International Bible Students. Death sentences, of course, were not pronounced by the Secret State Police.
In this connection it was often spoken of as an unjust harshness against the attitude dictated to these sectarians by their creed. I approached the Party Chancellery as well as the Ministry of Justice and Himmler and Hitler during my reports, and pointed out these facts to them; during several conferences with Thierack I demanded that this kind of jurisdiction should be discontinued. As a result two things were done. On the occasion of the first conference, after Thierack had made an inquiry at the office of Bormann and Hitler whom he evidently did not see personally, a directive was at once issued to the Public Prosecutors’ offices stating that sentences which had already been pronounced were to be stayed.
During a further conference another step was taken, which was that the public prosecutors in general were given instructions not to demand the death sentence any longer.
The third step was that International Bible Students were no longer brought before the court.
I consider it a definite success of my personal intervention with Thierack—which later had been discussed with Hitler himself—that this jurisdiction against these sects was completely abolished.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now submitting a Document 1063...
KALTENBRUNNER: May I supplement my statement by saying the following: These developments and this alteration of German law became also known abroad at that time. I remember quite well that a very well-known Swedish medical man thanked me personally and stated that this deed had been well received in Sweden.
THE PRESIDENT: This really is an unnecessary detail about what happened with some Swedish person outside of Germany, as to what they thought of his actions.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.
I am now coming to Document 1063(d)-PS, Exhibit Number USA-219. This is a directive from the Chief of the Security Police and SD, dated 17 December 1942. It is a secret letter, and it is addressed to all commanders of the Security Police and SD; and it goes for information to Pohl, to the Higher SS and Police Leaders, and the inspectors of concentration camps. It is a directive according to which at least 35,000 persons capable of work are to be transferred to concentration camps by the end of January 1943 at the latest. The letter is signed by Müller.
I am asking you, do you know of this letter, or do you know of any such affair at all?
KALTENBRUNNER: I neither know the letter, nor do I know about the affair.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the number again?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Document 1063(d)-PS, Exhibit USA-219.
KALTENBRUNNER: From the date of the letter, it becomes apparent that this was written before I came into office. It was not made known to me afterwards either. The signature is “Müller,” who acted on Himmler’s behalf, as is shown from Line 2. It is a typical case, which proves how unlimited Müller’s authority was and the extent to which he enjoyed confidence, if he could issue a decree like this.
I gather from the whole content of this letter—it refers to a day at the end of January 1943—that it is impossible that this affair had been reported to me.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The Prosecution hold you responsible in the following connection: There was an agreement between the former Minister of Justice Thierack and Himmler, dated 18 September 1942, according to which Jews, Poles, and so forth, were to be subjected to penal police proceedings instead of being dealt with by ordinary law courts. I ask you: Did you know of this agreement; and, if so, what attempt did you make so as to reinstate ordinary law proceedings so far as that was possible?
KALTENBRUNNER: Such an agreement between Thierack and Himmler is not known to me. As you said, it was made in the autumn of 1942, I believe. But repeatedly, again and again, I worked towards the end and submitted proposals that all police courts should be done away with in favor of proper law proceedings. I am legally trained, and for that reason I have more respect for the courts than Himmler. This was one of the main reasons why we never understood each other, and it was one of the main reasons for differences which cropped up even during our first discussions in 1942 at Berchtesgaden.
I cannot understand Thierack either, his making such an agreement with Himmler, because later on, as I know myself, he repeatedly spoke against the police court system.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to the question of whether you had knowledge of the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, which was carried out in 1943. A report is available on this from the SS and Police Leader in Warsaw, whose name was Stroop. The report is addressed to the General of the Police Krüger, and refers to the so-called solution of the Jewish question in Galicia.
Now I ask you: When did you hear of this solution of the Jewish problem in Galicia, and did you exhaust every possibility so as to possibly prevent that solution?
KALTENBRUNNER: First of all, in this connection, I must state that I perhaps did not know enough about the tremendous instrument of power which Himmler had created by putting under his direct command the Higher SS and Police Leaders, in the occupied territories. For SS and Police Leaders, Stroop in this case, were subordinated to the Higher SS and Police Leaders—in this connection for instance, General Krüger in the Government General. No department in the Reich was informed of or participated in any action, neither before nor afterwards, which was ordered by Himmler through Krüger to Stroop. Certainly, Berlin did not know anything of such an order in advance.
Afterwards—I cannot tell you how long afterwards—they wrote and talked regarding the Warsaw Ghetto both in this country and abroad. Most serious accusations were made in foreign countries.
Yesterday, I started to state here that in this connection I had delivered to Reichsführer Himmler the first file documents which I had in my possession on his measures and policies. I did that after reporting to the Führer in November 1943. On that occasion I certainly talked to him about Warsaw, too, since for one thing, he and his “final solution of the Jewish question” were being criticized abroad.
DR. KAUFFMANN: When was the date of that report in comparison to that action against the Jews in Galicia?
KALTENBRUNNER: I cannot remember when that action was. My reports, first to Hitler and a day later to Himmler, were in November 1943.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to a document which has already been mentioned by the Prosecution, Document L-53, Exhibit Number USA-291. The Prosecution hold the defendant, as Chief of the Security Police and SD, responsible for the cleansing—as it is put—at Security Police and SD camps and concentration camps. This document is a letter from the Commander of the Security Police and SD at Radom, dated 21 July 1944, according to which the Commander of the Security Police and SD in the Government General had ordered that all the prisons which are mentioned must be cleansed and that their inmates must be liquidated. Look at this document, sender and signature, and then make a statement in this connection particularly regarding the question of whether you knew of these events.
KALTENBRUNNER: I draw your attention to what I have just said. This channel of command falls into the jurisdiction of the Higher SS and Police Leader for an occupied territory. The channel for orders—Himmler, Higher SS and Police Leader, his expert, Commander-in-Chief and commander of the Security Police and SD—that channel has nothing whatever to do with the centralized channel of orders coming from Berlin.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In other words, you want to say that these Higher SS and Police Leaders were immediately subordinate to Himmler?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, indeed.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you also want to say that you as Chief of the RSHA had no possibility of interfering with orders and directives of such Higher SS and Police Leaders?
KALTENBRUNNER: It was out of the question for they were immediately subordinate to Himmler. There was no other way for opposing such men, as is quite obvious from the interrogation of the Defendant Frank. Repeatedly I have of course received information about wrongdoings and crimes committed through these channels of orders. For instance, Krüger in the Government General was most violently attacked by me. It was due to me, too, that Krüger was removed from his position in Kraków, a fact which must also be shown by Frank’s diary.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now turn to another document—Number 1573-PS, Exhibit USA-498. The Prosecution are holding the defendant as Chief of the RSHA responsible that, under alteration of existing methods, slave workers had been used in the armament industry. This document before us is a secret order, which once again is signed by Müller. It is addressed to all police service departments. The date is 18 June 1941. The order refers to measures against emigrants and civilian workers from Russian territories. It states that for the prevention of their unauthorized return and any interference on their part, the persons concerned will be arrested if the occasion arises. Until further notice these people cannot change their place of residence unless they receive permission from the Security Police; and if they leave their place of work without this permission they will be arrested.
Were such events known to you?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. In this respect, too, I can only point out that this is an order from Müller which was given 1½ years before my appointment. Müller, receiving orders from Himmler directly and enjoying tremendous power and authority, saw no reason to inform me of this, even later on.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How can you explain it that Müller was in a position to exercise such power, and that even during your term of office, 1943-45, this state of affairs continued without your having the possibility of stopping the man? Therefore I now ask you: Was it generally known to you that Müller had this power? In this connection, will you tell the Tribunal what the size of Department IV of the Secret State Police was and how it might be explained that you were not informed about those hundreds or even thousands of orders and instructions?
KALTENBRUNNER: Müller was the Chief of the Secret State Police Department. I do not know when he was appointed, but I must assume that it must have been in 1933, 1934, or at the latest 1935. But much earlier, as I know today, he had the closest contact with Himmler and later with Heydrich. He came from the Bavarian Landespolizei, where Himmler met him. He had his personal confidence for at least 12 or 15 years. He participated in and carried out, with him, every action which in the domain of State Police Himmler ordered in his eagerness for power or in pursuance of his aims as Chief of the German Police. This confidence I might say was continually increased for 12 or 15 years and remained unshaken to the very last days of the war. Müller also remained in Berlin after he had the order to remain with Himmler. Himmler relied on him as his blind and trustworthy instrument.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, the question that you have put to him, or the questions which you put—you put several—he does not seem to be answering. The main question was whether he knew of these actions of Müller. He is giving us a long speech now about how much confidence Himmler had in Müller. He has not said anything else yet.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I think that this question particularly ought to be dealt with at some length, because what the Gestapo and Müller are being accused of, is what Kaltenbrunner is accused of as Chief of the Gestapo.
THE PRESIDENT: What I was pointing out to you was that you had asked him several questions in one, and the main part of the question was whether he knew that Müller had these powers and was exercising them.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Answer that question right now briefly and clearly.
KALTENBRUNNER: The relations between Himmler and Müller were so direct that there was no cause for him to give me any reports. I had no knowledge, and as early as December 1942 Himmler stated clearly that the chiefs of Departments IV and V were his immediate subordinates, as had been the case since Heydrich’s death.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now it is going to be put to you that, based on certain statements of witnesses and other evidence, it must be assumed that conferences of department chiefs must have taken place between you and Müller, and that it appears improbable that you were not aware in general of the things which Müller decreed. Is that accusation justified?
KALTENBRUNNER: It appears to be justified, but it is not. What is called a conference of department chiefs here, was a joint luncheon which was not taken every day but let us say three or four times a week, a joint luncheon of adjutants, department chiefs, and any guests who might have been in Berlin at the time. That personal atmosphere alone made it impossible that internal or rather secret events might have been discussed in front of all these people.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In 1943 and the following years, were you always in Berlin—or I think I had better say—were you mostly resident in Berlin? Or did your work as Chief of the intelligence service make it necessary for you to leave Berlin often?
KALTENBRUNNER: I was frequently absent from Berlin. I think I can say that half of all the working time was spent away from Berlin. I was constantly in Berlin only from the moment the headquarters were transferred there.
DR. KAUFFMANN: When was that?
KALTENBRUNNER: That was in the months of February and March 1945. I was not in Berlin even in April 1945 in two long periods from 28 March until 15 April, then from 19 April until the last day of the war. During the years 1943 and 1944 I did not come to Berlin until May 1943, because up to that time I had my own services in Vienna to reorganize so that they could be transferred to Berlin. I think only once during the first or second week in February 1943 did I stay in Berlin so as to pay visits, and from the middle of February 1943 to February 1945 I was away on trips for at least half the time. I have covered more than 400,000 kilometers by plane and car in my duties.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What were your activities when you were absent from Berlin? Did you have no direct contact with Müller during that time?
KALTENBRUNNER: Certainly not with Müller. During all these journeys of mine in the entire Reich, I never entered one single service department of the Secret State Police. An exception is the Secret State Police office in Linz where my family was living for a short while and from where I could send teleprints to Berlin; taking advantage of the Local State Police office for purely technical reasons. I had no other teleprint facilities there.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now going to discuss an affair of which you are accused by the Prosecution. In a few words, these are the facts concerned: During the suppression of the revolt in Warsaw in 1944, inhabitants of the city of Warsaw were taken to concentration camps. The Prosecution put the figure at about 50,000 to 60,000. Further deportations are supposed to have ceased due to an intervention of the Defendant Frank with Himmler, you personally having been involved by the fact that Defendant Frank and his State Secretary, Bühler, had asked you to get these people out of the concentration camps and return them to their homes. To begin with, I ask you, did such a conference on that subject take place in your office?
KALTENBRUNNER: A conference between Bühler and myself took place. The subject was something quite different and I am asking you to let me state it clearly. The so-called uprising of Warsaw was quelled in a purely military action. I think that this fight took place under the command of the chief of the anti-partisan units, Von dem Bach-Zelewski. I do not know which fighting units he was commanding, but I must assume that there were mixed troop units of the Armed Forces and the Police. Any participation of my office in this purely military action is out of question from the start. What Himmler and the troop units did with the prisoners was naturally not reported to me. The reason why Bühler came to see me was quite a different one. Frank, I think, for 1½ years or even longer, had been trying to get Hitler to employ a different policy in the Government General. Frank was in favor of increased autonomy for the Polish people. In October 1944, I think on the occasion of a Polish National holiday, Frank had been planning to announce the increase of their autonomy. Hitler’s refusal, in which he was encouraged by Himmler, and also other factors, was apparent. Therefore he sent Bühler to me with the proposal that I should make suggestions through the information service to the same end, that is, the participation of the Poles in the district administration and in the high positions of the Government. I promised Bühler both these things. He went on to say, “On this occasion Frank wants a generous amnesty to be pronounced in Poland and that includes the release of the prisoners from the Warsaw uprising. Can’t you help us with that?” I asked him, “Where are those prisoners?” He replied, “Himmler has, at all events, sent them to prisoner-of-war concentration camps.” My answer could only have been, “Then he must have employed them in any case in the armament industry and it will be hard to get them out from there, but I shall favor an amnesty.” According to my knowledge that was the state of the case.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Would it have been possible for you to bring about a release by asserting your full influence?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, during the time I was in office, as I have repeatedly stated during interrogations before the Trial, I have received at least 1,000 individual applications for release and every single case was put before Himmler or sent to him—put before him mostly, since I put them in my report file and discussed them with Himmler during my periodical reports to him. In perhaps two-thirds of all the cases I was successful to the extent that he arranged a release. But to such an extent as Frank wanted to achieve from Himmler with the help of Bühler, I never had the possibility of making a decision or of bringing about a decision; that was entirely in Himmler’s hands and was determined by the policy which he and Hitler agreed upon regarding Poland.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now put before you a statement from the witness Schellenberg. On 3 January this witness stated before this Tribunal that the evacuation of the Buchenwald concentration camp had been ordered by Kaltenbrunner. “Kaltenbrunner,” he said, “had stated yes, this is correct; this evacuation is due to a Führer order which had been confirmed to him, Kaltenbrunner, by the Führer.” Can you give an explanation of this?
KALTENBRUNNER: The statement is quite definitely incorrect. It is incorrect by the mere fact that Hitler quite definitely never ordered an evacuation or a nonevacuation of concentration camps. Such an order could only originate from Himmler.
THE PRESIDENT: Was there an affidavit or did he give the evidence—Schellenberg?
DR. KAUFFMANN: It was a statement of a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: It was given in evidence, was it?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, it is a statement of a witness on 3 January.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But, then, who did actually give such an order?
KALTENBRUNNER: It could certainly have been an order only from Himmler himself. The channel of command is quite clear: Himmler, Pohl, Glücks, and the camp commandant. It is not impossible that Himmler may have given the order direct to the commandant of the camp. That I do not know.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I want to interpose a question. Did you gain knowledge of this order?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I neither heard of it nor could these orders be in any way connected with me, since I had ordered exactly the contrary regarding Mauthausen. I shall explain later why, in the case of Mauthausen, I was able to give an order for the first and only time. It has to do with the powers given to me on 19 April 1945. Until then, I never had any possibility at all of giving any such order in the name of Himmler.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In the same connection I am mentioning the statement made 3 January by the witness Berger. I read one or two sentences:
“The commandant of Dachau”—says Berger—“or his deputy, telephoned about 12 o’clock and stated to me that he had received this order, that is, the order for the evacuation from Kaltenbrunner after he had been summoned by the Gauleiter of Munich, the Reich Commissioner.”
I ask you: Do you know anything about the evacuation of Dachau?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. This statement of Berger must be doubted quite definitely because he was the man who had been given full authority by Himmler, concerning Bavaria and all the territory west of it. That was given to him the same day I received full power regarding Austria. Therefore it would be for me...
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did the concentration camp at Dachau come under Berger’s sphere of power just mentioned by you, or did it come under your sphere of command?
KALTENBRUNNER: Since Dachau is near Munich in Bavaria, of course it was only Berger’s sphere of command.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was Dachau evacuated at all?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know; I have never been to Bavaria after 19 April.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The witness refers to the date 23 April 1945, or a little later, he says.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I forgot about that.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Where were you at that time?
KALTENBRUNNER: On 19 April, at 3 o’clock in the morning, I left Berlin and went via Prague to Linz, my goal being Innsbruck where I wanted to meet Burckhardt’s representative again. From that moment onwards, I no longer had any connection with Berlin nor did I ever set foot on Bavarian soil or give orders there. My sphere of duty stopped at the Austrian border.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How can you explain such a statement?
KALTENBRUNNER: The only way I can explain it is that this must be a mistake and if I am put face to face with Berger, I am completely convinced that it can be cleared up.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Could it have been an evacuation order bearing the signature of Himmler?
KALTENBRUNNER: Certainly; perfectly possible.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Among other things you have been accused by the Prosecution of having committed a crime against peace. Will you tell the Tribunal whether you did anything, and if so, what during your time of office, to bring the war to an end?
KALTENBRUNNER: I started my duty on 1 February 1943. The situation which I found in the Reich was such that on this day—to be more exact, 2 February 1943, with the case of Stalingrad—it was my conviction that the war was to be regarded as absolutely lost for Germany. The conditions which I found, coming from a completely different atmosphere, from Austria, only confirmed this point of view. I recall that I paid my inaugural visit to Under Secretary of State Luther in the Foreign Office—I think it was on 2 or 3 February. I talked to him from half past 11 in the morning until 2 o’clock in the afternoon, suspecting nothing. We were talking about foreign political intelligence tasks which we would have to carry out together. At 4 o’clock in the afternoon the same Under Secretary of State Luther was arrested by the Gestapo and taken to a concentration camp.
I do not think I can explain with a more drastic example the situation in which I was put and how such events...
THE PRESIDENT: What is this in answer to? What is the question it is in answer to?
DR. KAUFFMANN: You ought to come to the point a little more quickly. The question was what you did to bring the war to the quickest possible end?
KALTENBRUNNER: I could quote a lot of factors in this connection. My first effort was in the spring of 1943; I think it was even in February 1943, when I favored a considerable alteration of the church politics in order to win the Vatican for the first peace mediations. That was my first effort in that direction.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now mention the name Dulles. Did you have direct or indirect contact with him and what was the purpose of your taking up those connections?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I was in contact with him, namely, through Höttl. Since May 1943, I won over step by step, Höttl and other Austrians who were politically in the opposition, and learned of their peace feelers directed to foreign countries. Through these channels I heard of Roosevelt’s representative for central Europe. I think he was his economics expert, a Mr. Dulles, who was reported as being in Switzerland.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I want to interpose a question in that connection. What would have happened if Hitler or Himmler had heard of that attitude of yours?
KALTENBRUNNER: My order to Höttl and my knowledge of his activity was, if you interpret it strictly, high treason since the Führer’s views were known to me at the time. They were that there should be no contact regarding peace and no discussions about peace. Hitler changed his opinion only on 15 April 1945 in a discussion with me in the presence of a certain Wolf.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In the course of this so-called peace policy which you have described, did a representative make journeys to Switzerland so as to make contact with the so-called Mr. Dulles?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, there was a large number of journeys, and indeed not only by Höttl but by several other persons. For instance, I point out a discussion which I had with a Count Potocki, whom I asked to get in touch with such circles and forward the same information to Anglo-American circles in Switzerland.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I think we can leave this subject. In my opinion you have related the essential parts.
KALTENBRUNNER: These were not the only attempts, there were numerous others.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to your relations with the President of the Red Cross, Professor Burckhardt, and I ask you: Is it true that you had a conference with Professor Burckhardt in 1945 with the aim that camps—prisoner-of-war camps and concentration camps—should be opened to the Red Cross so that medical supplies could be taken into these camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I tried for a long time to achieve this with Burckhardt. I was helped by the fact that he himself had asked for a meeting with Himmler. Himmler, however, did not get Hitler’s permission for such a meeting because he was, at the time, the Commander-in-Chief on the northern front of the Vistula River. A meeting with Burckhardt could have taken place only there at the front. I tried, therefore, to take it upon myself to arrange a meeting between Burckhardt and a responsible personality in the Reich. After a lot of ado and in spite of many difficulties I succeeded. A private meeting with Burckhardt was held on 12 March.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you come to an agreement, and within this agreement was any help really given and in what manner?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, considerable help was given. An agreement was reached, according to which all foreign civilian internees, with the help of the Red Cross, were to be taken from all camps in the Reich and released to their home countries. But in the first place, by granting Burckhardt’s request during these discussions I achieved the aim that the leading departments of the Reich were involved to such an extent that they could no longer detach themselves from this agreement, and I think that was my greatest success with Burckhardt.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that to get about 3,000 French and Belgian civilian internees through the front line at that time, you got in touch with General Kesselring’s headquarters?
KALTENBRUNNER: I sent a wireless message to the headquarters asking that as soon as the Americans and British would agree to this, it should also be allowed by the Germans that such internees go through the fighting lines.
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is enough.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, he said 12 March but he did not give the year.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I do not understand—Yes, 12 March.
THE PRESIDENT: What year?
DR. KAUFFMANN: 1945.
[Turning to the defendant.] What is the total number of people who, due to your intervention reached their homeland?
KALTENBRUNNER: You must differentiate here between two different periods: the first period before the private meeting on 12 March and the period after that.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In my opinion you can give me a brief answer to that question. The periods of time do not matter.
KALTENBRUNNER: At least 6,000 civilian internees coming from France and Belgium and all the Eastern European States including the Balkan States were included in these talks. At least 14,000 Jewish internees were handed over to the Red Cross in the town of Gunskirchen for their immediate care. This applies to the whole camp of Theresienstadt.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And finally is it correct—please answer very briefly either in the affirmative or in the negative—that because of your intervention, a special liaison department with the Red Cross was installed at Konstanz for the purpose of facilitating and carrying out this program further.
KALTENBRUNNER: A liaison department with the Red Cross was established in Lindau and at Konstanz.
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is enough.
The Prosecution hold you responsible for a wireless message you are alleged to have sent to Fegelein in which it says:
“Please report to the Reichsführer SS and inform the Führer, that all measures regarding Jews, political and concentration camp prisoners in the Protectorate, have been carried out by me personally today.”
I ask you: Did you send such a wireless?
KALTENBRUNNER: It did not get sent because the technical connection was not re-established.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I did not mention a number. It was not presented in court but it is contained in the trial brief on Page 14.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it is Document 2519-PS. It was presented to the Court.
KALTENBRUNNER: The wireless message was planned—the text probably was written by the adjutant who was accompanying me. I did not write it personally and as I say, it could not be sent.
On 19 April 1945 I had been given authority to act independently in accordance with the discussions with Burckhardt with reference to foreign civilian internees and regarding the entering of all camps by the Red Cross. On that occasion I stated in Hitler’s and Himmler’s presence that my route would be via Prague and Linz to Innsbruck and that I would pass by Theresienstadt. I said that there were not only Jewish prisoners there who were to be looked after by the Red Cross but also Czechoslovak political prisoners. I suggested that their release should also be carried out. That is the explanation for that wireless message. But not until 19 April at 6 o’clock in the evening was I given full power in this connection.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But the Prosecution might assume from that statement, and at first, rightly so, that you might also have had jurisdiction over concentration camp questions. I ask you—and please answer this question with “yes” or “no.” Is it true that the powers you have mentioned as given to you on 19 April 1945 were the first powers in that sphere altogether?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. I would not have needed a renewed authority at all if I had had it up to that time.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In a speech Himmler made on 3 October 1943 at Posen before the Higher SS and Police Leaders, you are called Heydrich’s successor. The Prosecution consider that this is a confirmation of the entire executive power and your extraordinary powers in this sphere.
Does this formal expression, which was certainly used in this connection, do justice to the situation or not?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I protest strongly—I have done so during all the interrogations—against being called Heydrich’s successor. If in my absence Himmler referred to me as such, or if earlier such a notice or announcement coming from him was once published in the press then this was done without my knowledge and without my wish. The first time, in connection with that press notice, there was a violent reaction to Himmler on my part. The day which you mentioned here I was ill in Berlin with an inflammation of the veins and in plaster, and therefore I did not join this discussion.
Neither the extent of my power nor outward appearance permitted the slightest possibility of comparison with Heydrich. I want to say quite briefly now that to the very last day of my activity I was paid 1,820 Reichsmark, which is the salary of a general of the police, and that Heydrich’s income from his office was more than 30,000 Reichsmark, not because he was paid for a higher rank but in recognition of his completely different position. Any comparison is completely unjust.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, my next question: Is it correct that Himmler feared Heydrich and this was because Heydrich had been given too much authority from his point of view, and that for that reason he thought that by appointing you he had found the very man who would be completely safe for him, Himmler? In this connection the Prosecution have drawn a parallel between you and Heydrich, and, as I have already just said, they have described you as the second Heydrich.
KALTENBRUNNER: The relationship between Himmler and Heydrich can be characterized shortly as follows: Heydrich was by far the more intelligent of the two. He was at first an unusually docile and obedient...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, we do not want to know anything about Heydrich’s intelligence. The witness has said over and over again that he was not his successor.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In that case I will repeat the question which I put earlier, and which is the following: Did Himmler, by calling on you, want a man who was completely safe for him, Himmler?
KALTENBRUNNER: He never again wanted to give away such executive power out of his own hands to the extent that Heydrich had it. The moment Heydrich was dead, Himmler took over the entire department and after that never let the executive powers out of his hands. He had once had the experience, in the person of Heydrich, of how dangerous a Chief of the Security Police could become to him. He did not want to run that risk a second time.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In other words, what you want to say, finally, is that after Heydrich died, Himmler wanted to and did retain the whole executive power in his hands?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, another question. You stated yesterday that you learned of the conception of the so-called “final solution” only later on. In effect, such instructions went from Himmler to Heydrich and to Eichmann as early as 1941 or 1942. Is it true that you frequently met Himmler? Were you a friend of Himmler’s?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is utterly wrong to call the relation between Himmler and myself friendly. Just like every other official, I was treated by him in an extremely cool and reserved manner. He was not a man who could enter into personal relationship with anyone.
DR. KAUFFMANN: It is natural to assume, if I place myself in the position of the Prosecution, that you must have had knowledge of the “final solution” and of that idea, if you met Himmler frequently. I therefore ask you again: Did not Himmler at some time put to you clearly what this “final solution” was?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, not in this form. I said yesterday that on the basis of all information which accumulated during the summer and autumn of 1943, including reports from enemy broadcasts and foreign news, I came to the conviction that the statement regarding the destruction of Jews was true, and that, thus convinced, I immediately went to see Hitler, and the next day Himmler, and complained to both of them saying that I could not for one single minute support any such action. Beginning with that moment...
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, well, you said so yesterday. You need not repeat it again.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, he told us that before and you told us that you would finish in an hour; you have now been nearly an hour and a half.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I have only two or three questions.
[Turning to the defendant.] The trial brief of the Prosecution contains a statement of Schellenberg, and it runs as follows: “What am I going to do with Kaltenbrunner? He would have me completely under his thumb in that case.”
This is stated by Schellenberg in an affidavit, and it is supposed to have been said by Himmler. Please, will you give a very brief statement regarding the fact whether you would consider such a statement by Himmler at all probable?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not consider such a statement probable. If he did say it, then it can have been only in connection with...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that is a possible question to put to the witness.
DR. KAUFFMANN: [To the defendant.] In the trial brief a document of this kind has been presented and charged against you but, if the President does not wish that question, I shall be glad to withdraw it.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to be merely a matter of argument, and you cannot criticize this affidavit, if the affidavit is in evidence.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to the last question. I ask you whether the possibility existed that you, after you gradually became aware of conditions within the Gestapo and concentration camps, et cetera, could have brought about a change? If that possibility did exist, can you say that by staying on in your position you achieved any alleviation in this sphere and an improvement of conditions?
KALTENBRUNNER: I repeatedly asked to join troops at the front, but the most burning question which I personally had to decide was: Will conditions be thus improved, alleviated? Or will anything be changed? Or is it my personal duty in this position to do everything necessary to change all these sharply criticized conditions?
Upon repeated refusals to my request to be detailed to the front, I had no other alternative than to try myself to alter a system, the ideological and legal basis of which could not be altered by me, as had been proved by all the orders issued before my time and offered in evidence here. All that I could do was to try to modify these methods while striving to have them abolished altogether.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did your conscience permit you to remain in office in spite of it?
KALTENBRUNNER: When I considered the possibility of exerting again and again influence on Hitler and Himmler and other persons, my conscience would not allow me to leave my position. I thought it my duty to take, personally, a stand against wrong.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions of the defendant?
DR. DIX: Do you know, Witness, that Schacht, before he was taken into custody by the Allied Forces, had been in a concentration camp?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. DIX: How long have you known that?
KALTENBRUNNER: Since his wife wrote me a letter; and I believe that she requested me to present a petition so that she might get her husband out.
DR. DIX: And about when was that?
KALTENBRUNNER: I assume around Christmas 1944.
DR. DIX: Do you know or have you any idea at whose suggestion Schacht was interned in a concentration camp?
KALTENBRUNNER: I believe that on the very same day I sent this letter from Herr Schacht’s wife by courier to the office of Hitler’s adjutant, and I believe I received word through Fegelein or one of Hitler’s adjutants, that Hitler was to be consulted in this matter. Some time later I learned that Schacht had been interned on Hitler’s order, because he was suspected of working together with Goerdeler or in any case was one of the instigators of the high treason plan and of the assassination attempted on Hitler on 20 July 1944.
DR. DIX: I have a letter I received a short time ago, written by a former concentration camp inmate, who was told by Obersturmbannführer Stawitzky—Do you know him?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
DR. DIX: He was the last commander of the concentration camp at Flossenbürg. In this letter I am told that this Stawitzky had told him that he had been ordered to murder Schacht along with the other special internees like Canaris, et cetera. Do you know anything about an order for the murder of Schacht?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
DR. DIX: Do you consider it possible that Stawitzky might have decided on such a step through his own authority?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
DR. DIX: If I interpret your answer correctly, such an instruction could have come only from the highest level, that is, either from Hitler or Himmler?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, you may assume that. As far as Schacht is concerned, it could only have been an order from Hitler himself.
DR. DIX: Thank you.
DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for Gestapo): I have some questions to put to the witness.
Witness, the Indictment contends that the Secret State Police in the years 1943 to 1945 had about 40,000 to 50,000 members. What can you remember about this?
KALTENBRUNNER: I believe that this figure is slightly too high.
DR. MERKEL: What do you estimate the figure was?
KALTENBRUNNER: I would rather assume 35,000 to 40,000.
DR. MERKEL: Approximately how many Gestapo officials were active in the occupied countries?
KALTENBRUNNER: That I cannot tell you even approximately, but I believe I have heard a figure of 800 people, for example, for the occupied region in France.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know to whom these officials in the occupied countries were subordinate?
KALTENBRUNNER: In the occupied countries, to the commander of the Security Police, who in turn was subordinate to the Higher SS and Police Leader of the occupied territory.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know at all whether in the offices of the commanders of the Sipo and SD, Kripo officials, that is, officials of the Criminal Police, were carrying out tasks of a state political nature?
KALTENBRUNNER: That is possible.
DR. MERKEL: What approximately was the number of the Gestapo officials assigned in the East to the Einsatzgruppen A to G?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know.
DR. MERKEL: Can you tell me whether these officials, when assigned to the Einsatzgruppen, were released from the authority of the State Police and were acting as a special body in the Einsatzgruppen engaged in tasks with which the State Police themselves had no more to do?
KALTENBRUNNER: I believe one can assume that. Personnel affairs were still attended to, that is, their salaries were paid as usual, but the powers to issue orders, the authority to give orders was certainly different.
DR. MERKEL: Approximately how were the members of the State Police organized, that is, proportionally according to their functions? First, officials who had purely administrative functions?
KALTENBRUNNER: At least 20 percent.
DR. MERKEL: Officials with purely Security Police functions?
KALTENBRUNNER: The same number; for the greater part were in any case the subordinate personnel, that is, the technical personnel...
DR. MERKEL: This is what I intended to ask you.
The technical personnel, that is radio men, teletypists, drivers, and office personnel, how many were they altogether?
KALTENBRUNNER: The first group is 20 percent, that is the administrative group, and the so-called executive personnel is 20 percent, then the remaining 60 per cent fall into two equally large groups of 30 percent each, the technical auxiliary personnel and the office personnel.
DR. MERKEL: Tell me in one brief sentence the aims and tasks of the State Police.
KALTENBRUNNER: They have been explained here repeatedly. The State Police had for their main function, as in every other country, the protection of the State from any attack coming from within.
DR. MERKEL: The Prosecution contend that the membership in the State Police was voluntary. What can you say to that?
KALTENBRUNNER: I believe that contention can in no way be maintained nor proved. I would like to say that obviously the official staff in existence in 1933 could be made up only of officials who already had been police officials at that time.
DR. MERKEL: In what way did they come to the State Police?
KALTENBRUNNER: They were ordered.
DR. MERKEL: Ordered or transferred?
KALTENBRUNNER: There was a State Police in existence prior to that time; to be sure, they were not called the State Police at that time, but the Political Police Department.
DR. MERKEL: Then the personnel of the State Police was later on apparently completed, just like the personnel of every other State office, in conformity with the principles of the German Government Employees Law?
KALTENBRUNNER: Absolutely, yes.
DR. MERKEL: Did the Führer Decree Number 1 regarding secrecy apply to the service in the Reichssicherheitshauptamt? You certainly know it—that no one was to know more about a matter than absolutely necessary for his job? Did this rule also apply in the office of the Gestapo?
KALTENBRUNNER: This decree applied not only to the Wehrmacht but also to the entire internal executive power, for all administrative offices, and it was posted in every office throughout the Reich. So, of course, we were especially strict in observing this order in the Police.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about the 1 October 1944 decree, according to which the entire Customs and Border Protection, which had been under the Reich Finance Office until that time, was transferred to Amt IV, that is, the Gestapo, of the RSHA?
KALTENBRUNNER: The Customs and Border Protection was transferred to Himmler and taken out of the sphere of the Reich Finance Ministry—I believe in September—by order of Hitler in the fall of 1944.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know about how much personnel was involved in that transfer?
KALTENBRUNNER: In the beginning the Customs and Border Protection comprised 50,000 people. At this time I think there must have been at least 10,000 people less, because recruiting by the Wehrmacht had taken place several times, that is, younger men were put into the fighting forces.
DR. MERKEL: Can you sum up in one sentence the function of the Customs and Border Protection?
KALTENBRUNNER: As the name implies, the Customs and Border Protection had to guarantee the financial sovereignty of the Reich through border security measures.
DR. MERKEL: Can one say at all that these estimated 40,000 officials joined the Gestapo voluntarily?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, by order.
DR. MERKEL: The Border Police (Grenzpolizei) is different from the Customs and Border Protection (Zollgrenzschutz). Do you know that as early as 1935 it already formed part of the State Police?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. Müller was General Border Inspector of the Reich.
DR. MERKEL: Sum up in one sentence the tasks of the Border Police.
KALTENBRUNNER: The Border Police checked passports at borders, airports, railways, highways. It was entrusted with the entire normal border control.
DR. MERKEL: Was this task different from what it was in the years before 1933; had anything changed?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
DR. MERKEL: Did it vary from the tasks of the Border Police in other countries?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, that is not true.
DR. MERKEL: How were the relations between the members of the State Police, their officials and employees, and the SS; did they mostly enter the SS voluntarily or was it on the basis of an order?
KALTENBRUNNER: Voluntary enlistments must have been comparatively few. I know that later Himmler, as far as promotions were concerned, was more hesitant if the official did not belong to the SS, so for that reason enlistments occurred, if not from inner conviction, at least from a desire to be promoted.
DR. MERKEL: Thus, the larger part then joined because of this.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, it was based on Himmler’s promotional system.
DR. MERKEL: Did the members of the State Police, particularly the officials, have any possibility of leaving their posts when they wanted to?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
DR. MERKEL: A large part of the members of the State Police were so-called “Notdienstverpflichtete.” Will you very briefly explain the term to the Tribunal?
KALTENBRUNNER: That is not true of those officials who had executive standing. As far as the other personnel were concerned there were more of that kind among them, especially as the war went along, because losses ran very high, as of course, in all branches of the Police and Wehrmacht. Thus towards the end, the personnel could be kept up only by recruiting Notdienstverpflichtete. That is true in any case of the technical and office personnel.
DR. MERKEL: Did those Notdienstverpflichtete join the State Police voluntarily?
KALTENBRUNNER: They had nothing to say in the matter. After consultations with the competent labor offices they were put into the Notdienst positions wherever the Reich ordered it.
DR. MERKEL: What happened to the members of the State Police who at interrogations committed excesses or trespassed on foreign property?
KALTENBRUNNER: The same rules were followed which applied to all organizations subordinate to Himmler. They had their own SS and Police courts. In one sentence I may characterize this system by stating that the penalties were much more severe than in a civil court.
DR. MERKEL: A certain man has asserted that for an offense of taking away a few unimportant things from a prisoner, he had to serve a long period in the penitentiary. Was that the ordinarily normal and just punishment?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know who was taken to the SS Concentration Camp Danzig-Matzkau?
KALTENBRUNNER: Anyone who had been sentenced to imprisonment by SS and Police courts was put into the Danzig-Matzkau SS Concentration Camp, which was called an SS punishment camp rather than a concentration camp.
DR. MERKEL: Could a Gestapo member, especially of a higher rank, visit a concentration camp?
KALTENBRUNNER: Only with the express approval of Pohl or Glücks.
DR. MERKEL: Is that also true of the Higher SS and Police Leaders for the camps which were situated within their districts?
KALTENBRUNNER: I could not say that with certainty. In any case, I assume they also applied or had to apply to make these visits.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know of the so-called “severe interrogations?” Are these in force in other countries, too?
KALTENBRUNNER: I was President of the International Criminal Police Commission, and in this capacity I had the opportunity to speak about this topic at a meeting in the autumn of 1943. From this conference and also from my reading of the foreign press over a number of years I gathered that the police system of each state also makes use of rather severe measures of interrogation.
DR. MERKEL: Could a State Police official...
THE PRESIDENT: What happened at some international police commission does not seem to be relevant to anything in this case.
DR. MERKEL: I only wanted to question him as to whether these “severe interrogations” were applied not only in Germany but also in other states.
THE PRESIDENT: We are not concerned with that.
DR. MERKEL: However, the severe measures of interrogation are used as a charge in the trial brief against the State Police, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] Could a State Police officer, when executing a protective custody order of limited duration, consider corporal punishment or even the putting to death of the prisoner upon his commitment into the camp?
KALTENBRUNNER: Emphatically no when a custody of limited duration was concerned.
DR. MERKEL: Did a so-called proceedings for investigating the reasons for imprisonment apply also to the inmates of the concentration camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: Every case of protective custody underwent investigation; in time of war twice, in time of peace, of course, more often...
DR. MERKEL: One last problem...
KALTENBRUNNER: ...but this investigation was not just a matter of the State Police. It had to be made by the camp commander, who had to report on the behavior of the prisoner. This report had to be given by the camp commander to the Inspector of the Concentration Camps. Then the State Police had to decide on the matter.
DR. MERKEL: The Prosecution have put in evidence a considerable amount about ill-treatment and torture during the questionings which took place in occupied Western countries, especially France, Holland, Belgium, Norway. Were there any instructions from the RSHA in this connection to use torture?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, certainly not.
DR. MERKEL: How do you explain the fact of this ill-treatment?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have heard nothing about such ill-treatment with which the State Police is charged. In my opinion it concerns only excesses of individuals. A decree to that effect certainly was never issued.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know that in the occupied countries members of the resistance movement and also criminal elements masqueraded as members of the German State Police in order to facilitate their tasks?
KALTENBRUNNER: That has been repeatedly stated, but I also cannot remember in detail having seen any exact records about that.
DR. MERKEL: Thank you, Mr. President, I have no further questions.
DR. CARL HAENSEL (Counsel for the SS): Witness, in the year 1932 you joined the Austrian SS, according to your testimony.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. HAENSEL: Was there a difference between the Austrian SS and the German SS, or was it a similar group?
KALTENBRUNNER: There was a certain organizational similarity, which took effect only after the Anschluss. Up to the time of the Anschluss, the SS in Austria could hardly be differentiated from the Party or from the SA itself.
DR. HAENSEL: Sum up with a number the strength of the Austrian SS, to which you belonged; first of all, before the Austrian Anschluss in 1938 and then at the time when you joined. How did the development take place approximately, expressed in figures?
THE PRESIDENT: Too fast.
DR. HAENSEL: Did the development of the Austrian SS, to which you belonged, take place in 1938 as in 1932?
KALTENBRUNNER: I believe that at the time of the Austrian Anschluss, the maximum membership was perhaps 7,500.
DR. HAENSEL: Did that group play the role of a Fifth Column in Austria? Is “Fifth Column” a concept at all as far as you are concerned?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, “Fifth Column” became a concept to me through the statements of the enemy, but to term the Austrian SS a Fifth Column is entirely wrong. The Austrian SS never had the task of being an intelligence unit or a sabotage unit or anything like that.
DR. HAENSEL: Did there exist in the Austrian SS, to which you belonged, the slightest intention to bring through force the annexation of Austria to Germany or was this to be brought about through a plebiscite, through legal measures?
KALTENBRUNNER: There was by the SS neither such a plan of annexation by force nor do the facts of the political development comply with this. There was never any necessity for any such step, for the Anschluss Movement, without any such outside urge, was conclusively strong enough in itself.
DR. HAENSEL: It has been asserted that the SS Standarte 86—That must have been the one at Vienna...
KALTENBRUNNER: You are thinking of the Dollfuss Putsch?
DR. HAENSEL: Right. Can you tell me something about that? Did the work of this corps have any connection with the assassination of the Austrian Chancellor?
KALTENBRUNNER: I consider that incorrect. I must say that this corps later on did not have the number 86 but 89. In addition the group which had entered the Chancellery on 25 July 1934 was not a group of the SS, but a group of former members of the Austrian Army who, because of National Socialist activity, had been discharged from the Army.
I do not know the matter in detail. However, the chief of the Austrian Police at that time, Dr. Skubl, who as far as I know is demanded here as a witness in another case, should be able to give you exact information about that. I ask that you question him about this matter.
DR. HAENSEL: Try to remember the entry of the troops on the night of 11 March 1938. What kind of troops marched in, according to your recollection? I ask: Were they SS units or were they other units? Were they Army units? Were there SS Verfügungstruppen? What is your recollection?
KALTENBRUNNER: My recollection is that, first of all, there were Wehrmacht units, the Luftwaffe of course, and there was one regiment of the Waffen-SS—I cannot recall which one, probably the Standarte Deutschland—participating in the entry.
DR. HAENSEL: Can you compare the size of the Wehrmacht and the Standarte Deutschland approximately?
KALTENBRUNNER: The Standarte Deutschland at that time had 2,800 men perhaps. So far as the Wehrmacht is concerned, I do not know how many units took part.
DR. HAENSEL: In order to establish the relationship and according to your idea, what is the entire number of SS men? I would like to make it a little easier for you. I have seen a communication in which it is stated that, in all and in the course of time, 750,000 to 1 million men have passed through the SS. Is such a figure correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: One million certainly is too high. All branches of the SS taken together, including the General SS and the Waffen-SS and including the SS members in the various police activities, I believe add up to 720,000 to 750,000 men. Out of that number at least 320,000 to 350,000 men died in action. These losses might even be a little higher than what I just stated, but I believe a more precise figure might be obtained from one of the defendants who belonged to the Wehrmacht. I do not know it exactly.
DR. HAENSEL: According to your knowledge how many men of this entire number do you believe were connected with concentration camps, that is, with the supervision, administration, and so forth? Can you give me any figure as to just how many were so connected?
KALTENBRUNNER: That is a rather surprising question to me, which I cannot answer immediately. I would have to have pencil and paper in order to make calculations.
DR. HAENSEL: Could you, through your own knowledge...
KALTENBRUNNER: Of course, it is only a fraction, a very small fraction of the entire figure.
DR. HAENSEL: Did those SS members, no matter how many or how few they were, who were not connected with the administration of concentration camps have any insight into these conditions or in this administration and the things that took place in the camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: Certainly not.
DR. HAENSEL: How can you tell me that with such certainty?
KALTENBRUNNER: From my own personal knowledge that Himmler and his organization kept the concentration camps behind an iron curtain.
DR. HAENSEL: Were the officials of the office which you headed, for example the Main Security Office, recruited only from the SS or mostly from the SS?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, not at all. The proportion of the SS members to those who did not belong to the SS was 5 percent if I consider only the confidence men and the staff of the SD inside Germany.
DR. HAENSEL: Therefore, for 100 officials, there were 5 who had gone through the SS?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. HAENSEL: According to your knowledge were there regulations prohibiting the physical ill-treatment of concentration camp inmates and were these regulations known in the SS?
KALTENBRUNNER: They were issued in print: that is, contained in nearly every gazette of the Reichsführer SS and the Chief of the German Police. Every SS man knew these regulations were laws, and they were punished heavily if ill-treatment was reported or became evident.
I do not know to what extent and in what state the SS Punishment Camp Danzig-Matzkau fell into the hands of the enemy, but I am convinced that all those who underwent a term of imprisonment there will give information about this severe punishment in connection with any ill-treatment which may have occurred.
DR. HAENSEL: I have finished, Your Honors.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
COL. AMEN: Defendant, in order to shorten as much as possible the time of this cross-examination, I want to be sure that we understand each other as to just what your position is as to several specific items.
Now, first, you concede that you held the title of Chief of the RSHA and Chief of the Security Police and SD from the end of January 1943 up to and including the end of the war. Is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, it applies with those limitations which I enumerated yesterday with regard to my authority in the State and Criminal Police.
COL. AMEN: And when you speak of those limitations, you are referring to this supposed understanding with Himmler? Is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: It was not a supposed understanding with Himmler but a well-established fact which existed from the very first day, that I had the task of establishing a centralized intelligence service in the Reich and that he would retain command in the other sectors.
COL. AMEN: Well, in any event, you concede that you held that title, but you deny that you exercised some of the powers? Correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And this title which you held was the same title which was previously held by Heydrich, who had died on 4 June 1942? Is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: There was no change in title?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: And you testified that you assume responsibility for all of the things which you did personally or knew about personally. That is correct, is it not?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. I could add one thing, that my title was extended on 14 February 1944, when the Military Intelligence Service of the OKW, Amt Abwehr, was transferred to Himmler by Hitler. Then my title as Chief of the entire Reich Central Intelligence Service became known in other departments.
And I might add also, perhaps, that the capacity of a man or his duties in an intelligence service which not only comprised a big country like the Reich but also extended to foreign countries were not made public. I might refer to England, where the Chief of the Secret Service over other...
COL. AMEN: Defendant, will you please try to confine yourself to answering my questions “yes” or “no” whenever possible, and making only a brief explanation, because we will come to all these other things in due time. Will you try to do that?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, very well.
COL. AMEN: Did you have any personal knowledge or anything personal to do with any of the atrocities which occurred in concentration camps during the war?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: And therefore you assume no responsibility before this Tribunal for any such atrocities? Is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I do not assume any responsibility in that regard.
COL. AMEN: And, in that connection, such testimony as has been given here, by Höllriegel for example, to the effect that you witnessed executions at Mauthausen, you deny? Is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: I was already told yesterday of the testimony of Höllriegel. I consider the statement that I ever saw a gas chamber, either in operation or at any other time, wrong and incorrect.
COL. AMEN: Very good. You had no personal knowledge of and did nothing personal about the program for the extermination of Jews; is that correct—except to oppose them?
KALTENBRUNNER: No—except that I was against it. From the moment I knew of this as facts and had convinced myself of it, I raised objections with Hitler and Himmler, and the final result was that they were stopped.
COL. AMEN: And therefore you assume no responsibility for anything done in connection with the program for the extermination of the Jews, right?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And does the same thing apply to the program for forced labor?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And the same thing applies, does it not, to the razing of the Warsaw Ghetto?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And the same thing applies to the execution of 50 fliers in connection with Stalag Luft III?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And the same thing applies to the various orders with respect to the killing of enemy fliers, correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And, as a matters of fact, you made all these same denials in the course of your interrogations before this Trial, correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And you still make them today?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. But as far as the preliminary interrogations are concerned, may I make a statement again in the course of the cross-examination?
COL. AMEN: Well, when we come to the proper place let us know.
Is it or is it not a fact that the Gestapo, Amt IV, RSHA, prepared reports on concentration camps which were submitted to you for signature and then passed on to Himmler?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. I do not recall any such reports. The normal channel was that Müller reported to Himmler directly.
COL. AMEN: Do you likewise deny...
KALTENBRUNNER: I would like to add that of course certain matters existed of which I had to be informed for several reasons, for instance the great domestic political event, the plot of 20 July 1944 of course; I was informed in such cases, not through Amt IV but through...
COL. AMEN: I am speaking of the general course of activity and not of any special exceptions, you understand.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: You likewise deny that Müller, as chief of Amt IV, always conferred with you with respect to any important documents?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. I not only deny it but the facts speak against it. He had direct authority from Himmler. He had no reason to discuss this matter with me beforehand.
COL. AMEN: I ask that the defendant be shown a document, L-50, which will become Exhibit Number USA-793.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
THE PRESIDENT: Hasn’t this been put in before?
COL. AMEN: No, Your Lordship, I am told it has not.
[Turning to the defendant.] By the way, were you acquainted with Kurt Lindow, who makes this affidavit dated 2 August 1945?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: Although he was an official in the RSHA until 1944? Let us read together Paragraphs 2 and 4 only. I won’t take the time of the Tribunal to read Paragraphs 1 and 3. 2, you will note, reads as follows:
“On the basis of general experience as well as individual cases I can confirm that the Gestapo (Amt IV) wrote reports about practices of the administrative authorities in the concentration camps and that these were given by the Chief of Amt IV to the Chief of the Security Police who submitted them for signature to Reichsführer Himmler.”
KALTENBRUNNER: May I reply to that immediately? It might be important perhaps to read Paragraph 1, too.
COL. AMEN: Please make it as brief as you can.
KALTENBRUNNER: Paragraph 1 seems to be important to read, for in Paragraph 1 it is said that the witness Lindow, from 1938 until 1940, was in the section in which such reports were written. From 1940 to 1941 he was in counterespionage; in 1942 and 1943 he was in the section for combating of Communism; and later he was in the section for educational matters. I believe, therefore, that his testimony in Paragraph 2—that he knew of the custom of the State Police, that is that via the Chief of Department IV, through the Chief of the Security Police, reports were sent to Himmler about happenings in concentration camps—holds true only for the period 1938 to 1940. Judging from his own testimony, he has no personal experience about the later periods.
COL. AMEN: Well, in other words he is not telling the truth as it was at the time when you were active in RSHA; correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have not read anything about that. He maintains that...
COL. AMEN: I am calling your attention to two paragraphs. We have already covered 2, and now we will read 4:
“To my knowledge no chief of office or any of the officials of the RSHA authorized to sign had the right to sign in any fundamental affairs of particular political significance without consent of the Chief of the Security Police, not even during his temporary absence. From my own experience I can furthermore declare that particularly the Chief of Office IV, Müller, was very cautious in signing documents concerning questions of a general nature of possibly greater importance, and that he put aside documents of such nature in most cases for the return of the Chief of the Security Police, whereby, alas, often much time was lost.”—Signed—“Kurt Lindow.”
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. I would like to make two statements: First, this assertion is completely contrary to the testimony of several witnesses who spoke of the extraordinary authority and independence exercised by Müller and testified to it.
Secondly, the description of Lindow is applicable to that period of time in which Heydrich was active, that is, the time between 1938 and 1940, in which Lindow could obtain experience. But this does not apply to the period in which Himmler gave direct orders to Müller. That was Himmler’s prerogative, for my tasks were of such scope that it was almost impossible for one man to handle the work that I did.
COL. AMEN: I don’t want to spend too much time on it now, Defendant, but the paragraphs which I read you conform to the testimony of Ohlendorf before this Tribunal, do they not?
KALTENBRUNNER: The testimony as given by Ohlendorf was shown to me yesterday by my counsel. But also the testimony as given by Ohlendorf, I believe, leads us clearly to see that any executive order, even for protective custody—and he used the term “down to the last washerwoman”—needed the direct consent of Himmler, who could delegate this authority only to Müller. He did add, however, that he did not know whether my authority suffered any such restrictions and whether, perhaps, I might not have had such powers, but he could not state that with certainty. And the rest of his testimony contradicts the assumption that I had such broad authority.
COL. AMEN: We all know what Ohlendorf’s testimony was. I merely want to ask you if you accept the testimony of Ohlendorf. You told us in the course of interrogations that you had the most contact with Ohlendorf and that you would trust him to tell the truth before any of your other associates; is that not correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not recall the last statement. The first statement, that he was one of my chief collaborators, is justified and is proved by the fact that he was chief of the Intelligence within Germany, which became a part of my Intelligence Service. All domestic political reports, reports about all German spheres of life, I received mostly from this Amt III, in addition to the news from the other departments which I organized myself.
COL. AMEN: Shortly after Easter 1934 you were under arrest in the Kaisersteinbruch Detention Camp?
KALTENBRUNNER: What year did you say, please?
COL. AMEN: 1934.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, from 14 January until the beginning of May.
COL. AMEN: Did you ever, in company with other SS functionaries, make an inspection of the Mauthausen Camp?
KALTENBRUNNER: With other SS officials, no. To my recollection I went there alone and had to report there to Himmler, who, as I stated yesterday, was conducting an inspection tour through southern Germany.
COL. AMEN: And you went only in the quarry? Right?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with Karwinsky, the State Secretary in the Dollfuss and Schuschnigg Cabinets from September 1933 to October 1935—Karwinsky?
KALTENBRUNNER: I saw Karwinsky once. I believe he visited us in the Kaisersteinbruch Detention Camp at that time during our hunger strike. Otherwise I never saw him. It might be that one of his representatives visited us. That I cannot say.
COL. AMEN: I ask that the defendant be shown Document Number 3843-PS, which will be Exhibit Number USA-794. I would like to say to the Tribunal that there is rather objectionable language in this exhibit but I do feel that in view of the charges against the defendant, I do feel it is my duty to read it nonetheless.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
If you will turn to Page 3, defendant.
KALTENBRUNNER: On Page 3 there are just a few lines. May I read the entire document first, please?
COL. AMEN: It would take much too much time, Defendant. I am only interested in the paragraph which is on Page 3 of the English text, and commences, “Shortly after Easter...” Do you have it?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: “Shortly after Easter 1934 I received the news that the prisoners in the Kaisersteinbruch Detention Camp had gone on hunger strike. Thereupon I went there myself, in order to inform myself about the situation. While comparative calm and discipline prevailed in most of the barracks, one barrack was very disorderly. I noticed that one tall man seemed to be the obvious leader of the resistance. This was Kaltenbrunner, at that time a candidate for attorney-at-law, who was under arrest because of his illegal activity in Upper Austria. While all the other barracks gave up their hunger strike after a talk which I had with representatives of the prisoners, the barracks under Kaltenbrunner persisted in the strike.
“I saw Kaltenbrunner again in the Mauthausen Camp, when I was severely ill and lying on rotten straw with several hundred other seriously ill persons, many of them dying. The prisoners, suffering from hunger oedemata and from the most serious intestinal sicknesses, were lying in unheated barracks in the dead of winter. The most primitive sanitary facilities were lacking. The toilets and the washrooms were unusable for months. The severely ill persons had to relieve themselves in little marmalade buckets. The soiled straw was not renewed for weeks, so that a stinking liquid was formed, in which worms and maggots crawled around. There was no medical attendance or medicines. Conditions were such that 10 to 20 persons died every night. Kaltenbrunner walked through the barracks with a brilliant suite of high SS functionaries, saw everything, must have seen everything. We were under the illusion that these inhuman conditions would now be changed, but they apparently met with Kaltenbrunner’s approval for nothing happened thereafter.”
Is that true or false, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: I can refute this document, evidently presented in order to surprise me, in every point.
COL. AMEN: I ask you—first, I ask you to state whether it is true or false?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is not true and I can refute each detail.
COL. AMEN: Make it as brief as possible.
KALTENBRUNNER: It is not possible to me to take less time in refuting it, Mr. Prosecutor, than you took in reading it. I have to refute each word which is incriminating me. Here Karwinsky maintains...
COL. AMEN: Just a moment. Perhaps you will wait until I have read to you two more exhibits I have along the same line. Then perhaps you can make your explanation of all three at the same time. Is that satisfactory to you?
KALTENBRUNNER: As you wish.
COL. AMEN: I ask that the defendant be shown Document Number 3845-PS, which will become Exhibit Number USA-795.
[The document was handed to the defendant.]
You have already denied, I believe, having visited or going through the crematorium at Mauthausen; correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Do you know Tiefenbacher, Albert Tiefenbacher?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: If you have the document you will note that he was at Mauthausen Concentration Camp from 1938 until 1 May 1945 and that he was employed in the crematorium at Mauthausen for 3 years as carrier of dead bodies. You note that?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Now, passing to the lower half of the first page, you will find the question:
“Do you remember Eigruber?
“Answer: Eigruber and Kaltenbrunner were from Linz.
“Question: Did you ever see them in Mauthausen?
“Answer: I saw Kaltenbrunner very often.
“Question: How many times?
“Answer: He came from time to time and went through the crematorium.
“Question: About how many times?
“Answer: Three or four times.
“Question: On any occasion when he came through, did you hear him say anything to anybody?
“Answer: When Kaltenbrunner arrived most prisoners had to disappear. Only certain people were introduced to him.”
Is that true or false?
KALTENBRUNNER: That is completely incorrect.
COL. AMEN: Now I will show you the third document and then you can make a brief explanation. I ask that the defendant be shown Document Number 3846-PS which will become Exhibit Number USA-796.
[The document was handed to the defendant.]
I might ask you, Witness, do you remember ever having witnessed a demonstration of three different kinds of executions at Mauthausen at the same time? Three different kinds of execution?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, that is not true.
COL. AMEN: Are you acquainted with Johann Kanduth who makes this affidavit?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: You will note, from the affidavit, that he lived in Linz; that he was an inmate of the concentration camp at Mauthausen from 21 March 1939 until 5 May 1945; that besides the work in the kitchen he also worked in the crematorium from 9 May, and he worked the heating for the cremation of the bodies. Now, if you will turn to the second page, at the top:
“Question: Have you ever seen Kaltenbrunner at Mauthausen on a visit at any time?
“Answer: Yes.
“Question: Do you remember when it was?
“Answer: In 1942 and 1943.
“Question: Can you give it more exactly, maybe the month?
“Answer: I do not know the date.
“Question: Do you remember only this one visit in the year 1942 or 1943?
“Answer: I remember that Kaltenbrunner was there three times.
“Question: What year?
“Answer: Between 1942 and 1943.
“Question: Tell us, in short, what did you think about these visits of Kaltenbrunner which you described? That is, what did you see, what did you do, and when did you see that he was or was not present at such executions?
“Answer: Kaltenbrunner was accompanied by Eigruber, Schulz, Ziereis, Bachmeyer, Streitwieser, and some other people. Kaltenbrunner went laughing into the gas chamber. Then the people were brought from the bunker to be executed, and then all three kinds of executions: hanging, shooting in the back of the neck and gassing, were demonstrated. After the dust had disappeared we had to take away the bodies.
“Question: When did you see the three different kinds of executions? Were these just demonstrations or regular executions?
“Answer: I do not know if they were regular executions, or just demonstrations. During these executions, besides Kaltenbrunner, the bunker leaders, Hauptscharführer Seidl and Duessen, were also present. The last named then led the people downstairs.
“Question: Do you know whether these executions were announced for this day or if they were just demonstrations or if the executions were staged just for pleasure of the visitors?
“Answer: Yes, these executions were announced for this day.
“Question: How do you know that they were set for this day? Did somebody tell you about these announced executions?
“Answer: Hauptscharführer Roth, the leader of the crematorium, always had me called to his room and said to me, ‘Kaltenbrunner will come today and we have to prepare everything for the execution in his presence.’ Then we were obliged to heat and to clean the stoves.”
KALTENBRUNNER: May I answer?
COL. AMEN: Is that true or false, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: Under my oath, I wish to state solemnly that not a single word of these statements is true. I might start with the first document.
COL. AMEN: Could you note, Defendant, that none of these affidavits were taken in Nuremberg, but that they all appeared to have been taken outside of Nuremberg in connection with an entirely different proceeding or investigation. Did you note that?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, but it is irrelevant as far as the testimony itself is concerned. May I now start to talk about this document?
COL. AMEN: Yes, go ahead.
KALTENBRUNNER: The Witness Karwinsky states having seen me in the year 1934 in connection with the hunger strike in the Kaisersteinbruch Detention Camp. He singles out the barracks in which disorders were taking place at which a tall man, meaning myself, was present. According to him, I was interned there because of my illegal activity in Austria. As far as these statements are concerned, up to now, they are completely wrong.
First of all, I was not interned there because of National Socialist activities. The note of imprisonment we had received in writing, which must have been known to Herr Karwinsky, who was then Austrian State Secretary for Security, stated literally that we were arrested to prevent us from performing National Socialist activities. So there was no prohibited activity at this time charged against me. Then, further, when Karwinsky came, the hunger strike was in its ninth day. We had not...
COL. AMEN: May I interrupt you just a moment, Defendant. I am perfectly satisfied if you testify that these statements are false. If you are satisfied, I am perfectly satisfied with that answer. I do not need an explanation of all of these paragraphs when we have no way of verifying what you say.
KALTENBRUNNER: Mr. Prosecutor, I cannot be satisfied if the High Tribunal and the whole world is presented with testimony and documents which are pages long and which you contend are the truth, and which incriminate me in the gravest manner. I must certainly have the opportunity to answer with more than “yes” or “no.” I simply cannot just like some callous criminal only...
THE PRESIDENT: You’d better let him go on. We do not want to argue about it. Go on, make your comments on the document.
KALTENBRUNNER: Karwinsky arrived on the eighth day of the hunger strike. He did not come into our barracks, but we were brought on stretchers into the administrative building of this Austrian detention camp. None of us were even able to walk any more. And for this fact, there are a great many more witnesses—490 internees who had been confined in this camp with me. Karwinsky talked with us in this administration building and stated that if the hunger strike were to stop the Government would be willing to consider a dismissal of all internees. We had been interned without having committed any offense at all, and prior to that the Government had already given their promise three times to release us but had never kept these promises.
Therefore, we requested a written statement from Karwinsky, either signed by him or signed by the Federal Chancellor. We wanted this statement so that we could believe the promise, then we would immediately end the strike. He refused. The hunger strike went on and we were taken to a hospital in Vienna. On the 11th day, the hunger strike stopped because even the giving of water was prohibited on that day. These were the facts, and not that we created disorder.
THE PRESIDENT: When I said you could make your comments, I did not mean you could go on giving the details of the hunger strike.
KALTENBRUNNER: My Lord, I just wanted to point out that what has been testified by the witness is incorrect—that I was the leader in the resistance and that I was still in my barracks. I had to be carried on a stretcher all through the camp; none of us could walk any more at that time.
Point 2; I talked with the cousin of Karwinsky again and again later on. His cousin was in charge of the social insurance department at Linz. He told me that his cousin, that is the witness mentioned here, never had been at Mauthausen, that he was at Dachau from the first day of his detention. There is a difference whether it is Mauthausen or Dachau, for he was sent there as a former member of the Austrian Government who had committed crimes against National Socialists. He was arrested by the RSHA, which already existed, I believe by Heydrich in Berlin, and not by some Austrian office. I also never saw this man afterwards. I also never visited Dachau. It should, therefore, be easy to ascertain whether this man was in Dachau from the beginning of his detention or in Mauthausen. If he was in Dachau, as I am charging, then everything is a lie. If he were in Mauthausen, it must be first proved whether he does not confuse me with another man. This first proof, whether he has erred in the person, is not up to me. If the Prosecution endeavor to find out whether he was in Dachau from the very beginning—for I know he was in Dachau; he was arrested in Innsbruck when trying to escape to Switzerland, his cousin had let me know that when asking me to intervene on his behalf. I could not intervene because the man was transported to Dachau directly via Innsbruck-Mittenwald. Thus, he was completely out of my sphere and power as the then State Secretary for Security of the Austrian Government.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, I suppose the defendant wants to say something about these other documents. He had answered the one, had he not?
COL. AMEN: I do not know whether he had finished, Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: [Turning to the defendant.] Had you finished with the affidavit or the statement of Karwinsky?
KALTENBRUNNER: Your Lordship, not quite.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on then.
KALTENBRUNNER: I have no longer the document before me and I request that it be given back to me. May I please ask you to return the document to me?
COL. AMEN: Yes, it is coming.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
KALTENBRUNNER: This document has not been shown to me during previous interrogations before the Trial. Otherwise, I would have immediately answered with a request that the cousin of the witness Karwinsky, who was chief of the Social Insurance Department at Linz and who bears the same name, be called as a witness and be asked whether it is correct that he expressly told me that this Karwinsky was detained at Dachau and never at Mauthausen. May I add that the witness Dr. Skubl, who will appear before the Tribunal in another matter, can probably make a statement on the same matter, particularly regarding the fact that this witness Karwinsky was arrested near the Swiss border when he escaped after the Anschluss and that he was taken from there to Dachau.
The reason he was taken to Dachau is not exactly known to me, but Dr. Skubl will be able to give information on that subject, presumably to the effect that the intention was to prevent any intervention from Austria in connection with this former member of the Austrian Government, since Himmler was of the opinion that something might be attempted by the new Austrian Government in favor of Karwinsky.
THE PRESIDENT: Your counsel can apply to call any witnesses that you want in rebuttal. He can make application for that request. It is not necessary to go into that now.
KALTENBRUNNER: Very good, Your Lordship. I should like to make the following statement regarding the other two documents. I declare their entire contents to be untrue and incorrect. Had they been put before me in the interrogations, then, as I did in other cases—I refer to the testimony of the witness Zutter—I would have made an urgent request that this witness be brought face to face with me. Regarding the witness Zutter, at least twice I have asked the prosecutor, who holds the rank of major and is sitting at the table over there next to Colonel Amen, that this witness who is making such serious statements against me be brought face to face with me. Today Prosecutor Colonel Amen was also present when I made that request at the time the question of Mauthausen was discussed. These gentlemen retired to consult with a third officer and discussed in English whether or not Ziereis and Zutter could be called in. Both are in this prison. All this was untrue.
THE PRESIDENT: I have already told you that your counsel can apply to call any witnesses that you wish in rebuttal.
KALTENBRUNNER: I shall ask my counsel to apply for the calling of those two witnesses.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, who was responsible for the order to kill all inmates at Mauthausen Concentration Camp shortly before the end of the war?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, may I say a few words in connection with these two documents? Only now have they been introduced into the Trial for the first time, and only now is it possible for me to discuss these serious accusations with the defendant. He also said to me that he denies the truth of these statements. I think I should be neglecting my duty as a defense counsel if I did not ask immediately that these witnesses be heard. It might be that the Prosecution later on...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, what is the point of delaying the Trial? I have just said that you might make application and you know perfectly well that application has to be made in writing.
I have said twice to the witness that you, Dr. Kauffmann, his counsel, can apply for the calling of any witnesses you like in rebuttal. What is the good of delaying the Trial by getting up and making your application verbally now?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Far be it from me to cause delay, but I wanted to state here and now that I want to call these witnesses and I shall certainly make application in writing.
COL. AMEN: Did you understand the question, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. You asked me who had given the order for the killing of the inmates at Mauthausen at the end of the war, and to that I reply that such an order is unknown to me. I gave only one order with regard to Mauthausen and that was to the effect that the entire camp and all internees were to be surrendered to the enemy without any ill-treatment. This order was dictated by me in the presence of the witness Dr. Höttl, and taken to Mauthausen by a courier-officer. I draw your attention to the statement of Dr. Höttl in which he confirms that fact. A questionnaire has been sent to a second person by my Defense Counsel. I requested a similar statement from him, but it is still unanswered.
COL. AMEN: I did not ask you about that order. I asked you about an order to kill all inmates at Mauthausen Concentration Camp shortly before the end of the war. Who was responsible for that order? Were you?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: You are acquainted with the person who tells the story, Ziereis?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I knew Ziereis.
COL. AMEN: And you had your picture taken with him and with Himmler, and this is now in evidence before this Tribunal. Do you recall that?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have not seen the picture. It was handed to the Tribunal while I was in the hospital.
COL. AMEN: Well, never mind the picture then.
I ask to have the defendant shown Document Number 3870-PS, which will be Exhibit Number USA-797.
Now, if the Tribunal pleases, this is a fairly long document which I do not propose to read at length, but it is one of the more important documents in the case, and so I hope that the Tribunal will read the entire statement, even though I do not bring it all out today in the interest of saving time.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a new document?
COL. AMEN: A new document, Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it in German?
COL. AMEN: Yes.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
This, you will note, Defendant, refers to a dying confession of Ziereis, as reported to the individual making the affidavit, and I call your attention first to the last two paragraphs on the first page, which we will read together:
“There was one SS man for 10 prisoners. The highest number of prisoners was about 17,000, not including the branch camps. The highest number in Mauthausen Camp, the branch camps included, was about 95,000. The total number of prisoners who died was 65,000. The complement was made up of Totenkopf units numbering 5,000 men, comprising guards and the command staff.”
And, now, at the middle of the next page, the paragraph begins:
“According to an order by Reichsführer Himmler, I was to liquidate all prisoners on the instructions of SS Obergruppenführer Dr. Kaltenbrunner; the prisoners were to be led into the tunnels of the Bergkristall works of Gusen and only one entrance was to be left open.”
KALTENBRUNNER: I have not yet found the passage.
COL. AMEN: It is in the middle of Page 2. Have you got it?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, sir.
COL. AMEN: “Then I was to blow up this entrance to the tunnels with some explosive and thus cause the death of the prisoners. I refused to carry out this order. This meant the extermination of the prisoners in the so-called ‘mother camp’ Mauthausen, and in the camps Gusen I and Gusen II. Details of this are known to Herr Wolfram and to SS Obersturmführer Eckermann.
“A gas chamber camouflaged as a bathroom was built in Mauthausen Concentration Camp by order of the former garrison doctor, Dr. Krebsbach. Prisoners were gassed in this camouflaged bathroom. In addition to that, there ran, between Mauthausen and Gusen, a specially built automobile in which prisoners were gassed during the journey. The idea for the construction of this automobile was Dr. Wasiczki’s, SS Untersturmführer and pharmacist. I, myself, never put any gas into this automobile; I only drove it. But I knew that prisoners were being gassed. The gassing of the prisoners was done at the request of the physician, SS Hauptsturmführer Dr. Krebsbach.
“Everything that we carried out was ordered by the Reich Security Main Office, Himmler or Heydrich, also by SS Obergruppenführer Müller or Dr. Kaltenbrunner, the latter being Chief of the Security Police.”
Then, passing on to Page 5, just below the center of the page, the paragraph commencing, “In the early summer of 1943...” Have you the place?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: “In the early summer of 1943, SS Obergruppenführer Dr. Kaltenbrunner visited Mauthausen Concentration Camp. Camp Commandant Ziereis, Gauleiter Eigruber, Chief of the Detention Camp Bachmeyer, and several others accompanied Dr. Kaltenbrunner. I saw Dr. Kaltenbrunner and the people who accompanied him with my own eyes. According to the testimony of the ‘corpse carriers’ at that time, the former prisoners Albert Tiefenbacher”—whose affidavit has been read—“present address Salzburg; and Johann Polster, present address Pottendorf near Wiener-Neustadt, Austria, about 15 prisoners under detention were selected by the detention chief, Unterscharführer Winkler, in order to show Dr. Kaltenbrunner three ways of extermination; by a shot in the neck, hanging, and gassing. Women whose hair had been shorn were among those executed and they were killed by shots in the neck. The above-mentioned ‘corpse carriers’ were present at the execution and had to carry the corpses to the crematorium. Dr. Kaltenbrunner went to the crematorium after the execution and later he went into the quarry.
“Baldur von Schirach visited the Mauthausen Concentration Camp in the autumn of 1944. He, too, went to the detention building and also to the crematorium.”
Do you still say that you had nothing to do with the order referred to or the matters set forth in the affidavit?
KALTENBRUNNER: I maintain that most emphatically, and I want to draw your attention to the fact that you, sir, have said that this statement was taken when Ziereis was on his deathbed, but you did not say that what you read from Pages 7 and 8 does not come from Ziereis, but from Hans Marsalek, who is responsible for these statements. This Hans Marsalek whom, of course, I have never seen in my life, had been an internee in Mauthausen as were the two other witnesses. I have briefly expressed my views as to the value of a statement concerning me from a former concentration camp internee and my inability to speak face to face with this witness who now confronts me, and my application will be made through my counsel. I must ask here to be confronted with Marsalek. Marsalek cannot know of any such order. In spite of that he states that he did.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, Marsalek is merely the individual who took the dying confession from Ziereis. Do you understand that?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I do not, because thus far it is new to me that the Prosecution were using internees from concentration camps for the interrogation of Ziereis, who had been shot in the stomach three times and was dying. I thought that such interrogations would have been carried out by a man who was legally trained and who would be in a position to attach the right value to such statements.
COL. AMEN: Well, perhaps, Defendant, if you were conducting the Prosecution, you would do it differently; but, in any event, your testimony is that everything in that affidavit which was read to you is false; is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is false. I have never given an order to the Mauthausen Camp with the exception of that one order which I was entitled to do on the strength of special powers and for the contents and transmission of which I have offered sufficient evidence. Mauthausen was never under my jurisdiction in any other way, and I could not issue any such orders. The Prosecution know perfectly well, and it must have been proved to them by dozens of testimonies, that I had never had any authority over Mauthausen.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you do not seem to understand what this document is. It is an affidavit of Hans Marsalek, and Paragraph 2 shows the fact that he made the interrogation of Ziereis, who was about to die, in the presence of the commander of an armored division; and he then sets out what Ziereis said, and then he goes on to declare, in addition, what is contained in Paragraph 3; and it is perfectly obvious to the Tribunal that what is said in Paragraph 3 is not what Ziereis said, but what Marsalek said—the person who was making the affidavit.
KALTENBRUNNER: My Lord, may I say in reply that Marsalek, as an internee in the camp, was of course not in a position to know that Ziereis was never under my command. For that reason alone, it appears likely that Marsalek, when he questioned Ziereis, could not possibly know the facts of the case. I have proved to the Tribunal, and proved it to the Prosecutor, that authority was not given to me until 9 April.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; that is only a matter of argument. I was only drawing your attention to the fact that it is perfectly obvious from the document itself that what Colonel Amen was reading was a statement of Marsalek and not a statement of Ziereis, which was the point you were making.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, do you recall having given an order to the commandant of the Mauthausen Concentration Camp on the 27th of April 1945, that at least 1,000 persons should be killed at Mauthausen each day? Is that true or false?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have never given such an order. You know...
COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with SS Colonel Ziereis, the same person we have just been speaking of?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And were you acquainted with Kurt Becher or Becker, a former colonel in the SS?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: I ask to have the defendant shown Document Number 3762-PS, which will become Exhibit Number USA-798.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
KALTENBRUNNER: You asked, sir, whether I knew an SS Colonel Becker, and I answered, “No”; but the man is Kurt Becher.
COL. AMEN: That is all the better. You do know him then, do you?
KALTENBRUNNER: I know him, yes.
COL. AMEN: Very good.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, have these documents been translated into all languages?
COL. AMEN: I believe they have, every one of them, yes. No, I am told that all of them have not; some of them have. This one is in English and German, Your Lordship. We did not have time to get them translated into the Russian and French, although it is now in process.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, then it will be done?
COL. AMEN: Yes, Sir; it is being done, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
KALTENBRUNNER: May I reply to it?
THE PRESIDENT: In order that the record should be properly complete, the Tribunal would like the Prosecution to state when the translation has been done, so that the matter should be thoroughly in order.
COL. AMEN: Precisely.
Defendant, we will now read this document together:
“I, Kurt Becher, former SS Standartenführer, born 12 September 1909, at Hamburg, declare the following under oath:
“1. Between the middle of September and the middle of October 1944 I caused the Reichsführer SS Himmler to issue the following order, which I received in two originals, one each for SS Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner and Pohl, and a copy for myself:
“‘By this order, which becomes immediately effective, I forbid any extermination of Jews and order that, on the contrary, care should be given to weak and sick persons. I hold you—and here Kaltenbrunner and Pohl were meant—‘personally responsible even if this order should not be strictly adhered to by subordinate offices.’
“I personally took Pohl’s copy to him at his offices in Berlin and left the copy for Kaltenbrunner at his office in Berlin. Therefore, in my opinion Kaltenbrunner and Pohl bear the responsibility after this date for any further killings of Jewish prisoners.
“2. When visiting Mauthausen Concentration Camp on 27 April 1945 at 0900 hours, I was told in the strictest secrecy by the camp commandant, SS Standartenführer Ziereis, that ‘Kaltenbrunner gave me the order that at least a thousand persons would still have to die at Mauthausen each day.’
“The facts mentioned above are true. These statements are made by me voluntarily and without any coercion. I have read them through, signed them, and confirmed them with my oath.”
Is that true or false, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: In part it is correct and in part it is not. I shall explain it sentence by sentence.
COL. AMEN: No, suppose you simply tell us what you claim to be false, because we must get on with this.
KALTENBRUNNER: I quite believe that you want to save time, but this is a question of establishing my guilt or my innocence and to do that I must be given an opportunity to make a statement in detail. Otherwise neither you nor the Tribunal would know the truth; and that is what we want here, I hope. I am glad that this witness, Becher, was found and that this statement is available, because it proves, first that in September or October 1944 Himmler was forced to issue this order—that same Himmler about whom it has been definitely established that since 1939 or 1940 he had become guilty of the crime of killing Jews on the largest scale.
And now we must find out why in September or October Himmler had given such an order. Before I had seen this document I stated yesterday and today that this order was issued by Hitler on my representations, and obviously this order from Himmler is based on another order which he received from Hitler.
Secondly, it is clear to me that Himmler gave such an order to Pohl as the person responsible for those concentration camps in which Jews were kept; and thirdly, that he has informed me, Kaltenbrunner, of this as the person who opposed Himmler. As to Becher, I have to go farther back.
Through this man Becher Himmler did the worst things which could possibly be done and brought to light here. Through Becher and the Joint Committee in Hungary and Switzerland he released Jews in exchange, first, for war equipment, then secondly, for raw material, and thirdly, for foreign currency. I heard about this through the intelligence service and immediately attempted to stop this, not through Himmler because I would have failed but through Hitler. At that moment any personal credit of Himmler with Hitler was undermined, for this action might have changed the reputation of the Reich abroad in the most serious manner.
At the same time my efforts in connection with Burckhardt had already been going on, and now you understand why the witness Schellenberg stated that Himmler had said to him, “I am alarmed; now Kaltenbrunner has got me under his thumb.” This means that Kaltenbrunner had completely revealed all the things Himmler was doing in Hungary and had told Hitler about it.
By this order Himmler attempted to camouflage it and to get out of the whole thing by pretending that the responsibility rested on Kaltenbrunner and Pohl anyhow. Even according to this document the responsibility rested on Himmler and Pohl, but Kaltenbrunner had to be included and be told about it because otherwise he might bring the subject up with Hitler any day. That is the sense of the document.
This witness, Becher, is now in Nuremberg. I beg absolutely to be confronted with him here. I am quite able to prove to the public with the help of this witness how, starting with the transfer of the so-called Weiss A.G. in Hungary up to that day, Himmler, with Pohl and Becher and the two committees in Hungary and Switzerland were running this business. And I can prove how I fought against it.
There is yet another accusation in this document, that on 27 April I am supposed to have given a strictly secret order to Ziereis that 1,000 Jews had to be exterminated in Mauthausen every day. I ask you to have the witness Höttl, who is also here, called in immediately, so that I may ask him on what day I dictated and sent by courier-officer to Mauthausen the order that the entire camp with all its inmates be surrendered to the enemy. This witness will confirm to you that this order was given several days before 27 April and that I could not have given orders to the contrary on 27 April.
I ask you, sir, not to take me unawares and maneuver me into a position where I might go to pieces. I shall not break down. I swear to you and I have sworn that I want to help you establish the truth.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, you have heard evidence at this Trial with respect to the meaning of the phrase “special treatment,” have you not? Have you heard that in this courtroom?
KALTENBRUNNER: The expression “special treatment” has been used by my interrogators several times every day, yes.
COL. AMEN: You know what it means?
KALTENBRUNNER: It can only be assumed, although I cannot give an accurate explanation, that this was a death sentence, not imposed by a public court but by an order of Himmler’s.
COL. AMEN: Well, the Defendant Keitel testified that, I think, it was a matter of common knowledge. Have you not at all times known what was meant by “special treatment”? “Yes” or “no,” please.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. I have told you; an order from Himmler—I am referring to Hitler’s order of 1941, therefore also an order from Hitler—that executions should be carried out without legal procedure.
COL. AMEN: Did you ever discuss with Gruppenführer Müller of Amt IV the application of “special treatment” to certain individuals? “Yes” or “no,” please.
KALTENBRUNNER: No; I know that the witness Schellenberg said...
COL. AMEN: I ask to have the defendant shown Document Number 3839-PS which will become Exhibit Number USA-799. By the way, were you acquainted with Joseph Spacil?
THE PRESIDENT: Answer the question.
COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with Joseph Spacil?
KALTENBRUNNER: Spassel? No.
COL. AMEN: He is the person who makes the affidavit now before you.
KALTENBRUNNER: The name which is mentioned here is Joseph Spacil, and that man I know, yes.
COL. AMEN: Now, will you look at the center of the first page, a paragraph commencing “In regard to ‘special treatment’...” Have you the place?
KALTENBRUNNER: Not yet, no. In order to understand the document I shall have to read all of it.
COL. AMEN: Well, if you have to read all of these documents, Defendant, we would never get through, because the first part has nothing to do with the part which I am interested in or with you.
KALTENBRUNNER: I beg your pardon, sir, I am sure that you are interested in expediting the procedure as far as possible as we defendants are anxious not to delay the proceedings; but it is necessary for my defense that I should at least be allowed to read a document on which I have to make a statement.
COL. AMEN: But, Defendant, your lawyer is receiving copies of all these documents, and I am sure that whatever is there, which should be brought out on your behalf, he will see to it that it will be brought out at the proper time, which will be after I get through asking you these questions. Is that not satisfactory?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, that is not enough for me. I must know, at any rate, what is contained in that document, since you are asking me to make a statement on it now.
COL. AMEN: Well, go ahead and read it then.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, not only your own counsel will look after your interests, but the Tribunal will look after your interests; and you must answer the question, please.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Very well. Now let us read along in the center of the page, commencing with:
“In regard to ‘special treatment’ I have the following knowledge:
“On occasion of meetings of the office chiefs, Gruppenführer Müller frequently consulted Kaltenbrunner as to whether this or that case should be specially treated or if ‘special treatment’ was to be considered. The following is an example of how the conversation went:
“Müller: Case Obergruppenführer B, please, ‘special treatment’ or not?
“Kaltenbrunner: Yes, or submit it to the Reichsführer SS for decision.
“Or:
“Müller: Obergruppenführer, no answer has arrived from the Reichsführer SS in regard to ‘special treatment’ for Case A.
“Kaltenbrunner: Ask once more.
“Or:
“Müller handed a paper to Kaltenbrunner and asked for instructions, as described above.
“When Müller had such a conversation with Kaltenbrunner, he only mentioned the initials, so that the persons present at the table never knew who was involved.”
And then the last two paragraphs:
“Both Müller and Kaltenbrunner proposed in my presence ‘special treatment’ or submission to the Reichsführer SS for approval of ‘special treatment’ for certain cases which I cannot specify in detail. I estimate that in approximately 50 percent of the cases ‘special treatment’ was approved.”
Are the contents of that affidavit true or false, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: The contents are not correct, when given the interpretation you are giving to the document. You will see immediately that the tragic expression “special treatment” is given here an absolutely humorous turn. Do you know the meaning of Winzerstube in Godesberg, and of Walsertraum in the Walsertal, and their relation to the term “Sonderbehandlung”? Walsertraum is the smartest and most fashionable Alpine hotel of the whole German Reich, and the Winzerstube is a very famous hotel in Godesberg in which many international meetings were held. Especially qualified and distinguished personalities were accommodated there—I would mention M. Poncet and M. Herriot and many more. They had three times the normal ration for diplomats, which is nine times the ration of the ordinary German during the war. They were daily given a bottle of champagne. They were allowed to correspond freely with their families in France and to receive parcels. These internees were allowed to receive visits on several occasions, their wishes were cared for wherever they were. That is what is meant here by “special treatment.”
I can only state here that it may well be that Müller may have talked about this to me, since I was extremely anxious from the point of view of foreign policy and intelligence that the Reich should now follow my suggestion and treat foreign persons in a more humane manner. It is in this connection that Müller may have spoken to me, but Winzerstube and Godesberg, these two final achievements of this so-called “special treatment,” were the places where political internees upon parole were accommodated and received preferential treatment.
COL. AMEN: Did you have frequent meetings with your section heads, including Müller, as indicated in this document?
KALTENBRUNNER: I stated yesterday and today that, of course, I met Müller when we were lunching together, which we had to do because all our 38 buildings in Berlin had been destroyed or damaged by bombs, but I did not talk to him about official matters concerning Amt IV.
This document makes it clear that these were matters of extreme interest to me as Chief of Intelligence.
May I ask you not to leave this document just yet. It must be put on record before this Tribunal that these two establishments are used as I wished for the preferential and better treatment than that enjoyed by the Germans. That is of great importance to me for my defense, and I am asking you—I shall ask you through my counsel—that you make detailed inquiries about these two hotels, and I also request that you ask M. Poncet, as the leader of the French detainees, about the treatment he received there. He had such a good time there that he gave French lessons to the wife of a criminal investigation official, and taught her French when they went for walks for hours without being guarded at all.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, did you or did you not issue instructions to Müller, as Section Chief IV, as to whether certain individuals who were in confinement at Berlin should be transported to southern Germany or be shot? And for your assistance, I will suggest to you that it was in February 1945 when the Russian armies were closing in on Berlin. “Yes” or “no”, if you can.
KALTENBRUNNER: No, the Russian Army was not very near Berlin in February 1945. I think military persons here would be able to give you more precise information as to where the fighting was going on at the time. I do not believe that there was a reason for the evacuation of any camps to the south at that time.
COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with Martin Sandberger, Group Leader VI A of the RSHA?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. He was the first assistant of this Schellenberg who has been mentioned several times, and he acted as intermediary with regard to intelligence news between Himmler and Schellenberg.
COL. AMEN: I ask to have the defendant shown the Document 3838-PS, which will become Exhibit USA-800.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
I call your attention only to the first two paragraphs of that affidavit:
“In my capacity as Group Leader VI A at the RSHA, the following became known to me:
“In February 1945 I was told by Group Leader VI B, SS Standartenführer Steimle, that he had to represent Schellenberg at the daily office chief meetings. On that occasion, Müller, Chief of Amt IV, presented to Kaltenbrunner a list of persons who were in confinement in or close to Berlin, for Kaltenbrunner to decide whether they were to be transported to southern Germany or whether they were to be shot, because the Russian armies were closing in on Berlin. Steimle did not know who these people were. Kaltenbrunner made his decisions in an extremely hasty and superficial manner and Steimle expressed his indignation to me about the frivolity of this procedure. From this I inferred that Kaltenbrunner had ordered a number of shootings, because if evacuation had been ordered there would have been no talk about the frivolity of the procedure.”
Is that affidavit true or false?
KALTENBRUNNER: The statement is not correct, and although it surprises me I can immediately refute it. Perhaps I may draw attention to the following points:
First, the document was prepared at Oberursel on 19 November 1945 by the witness Sandberger. In the second half of the first paragraph he states that he had been in England together with Schellenberg. I beg your pardon; he states this in the second paragraph. “As I was informed by Schellenberg at an internment camp in England when taking a walk....” You can gather from the second part that he, together with Schellenberg, was in an interrogation camp near London, in which I also was kept for 10 weeks, where they had detailed discussions. Therefore it is important, because something more will have to be said about this man Schellenberg, to know whether Sandberger received this information from Steimle before February 1945, or whether he got it through Schellenberg in London when they were interned together. That can be ascertained only by having Sandberger questioned here directly through my defense counsel. Until then, I must refute this statement altogether.
COL. AMEN: All right.
KALTENBRUNNER: No, Sir; I have by no means finished what I have to say. Secondly, Sandberger states that he had heard from Steimle what Steimle had heard. Personally I would not attach too much credit to any information at third or fourth hand, and I would strongly challenge a statement such as Steimle has made. I had not the authority to make such decisions; nor could Steimle, Sandberger, or Schellenberg ever have had any doubt of the fact that only Himmler could have made such decisions.
Thirdly, only once did I hear of such treatment of witnesses. I personally intervened and made that known here. This was in the case of Schuschnigg, who was in one such camp which was threatened by the Russians. On 1 February 1945—I remember this date very well and it can be confirmed by another defendant here—I replied to this other defendant when he asked, “Could we not do something for Schuschnigg so that he will not fall into the hands of the Russians? Will you or shall I make the suggestion to the Führer to have him released from detention or at least to take him somewhere where he will not fall into the hands of the Russians but rather into American hands?” Whereupon, one of us—I cannot remember who, possibly both of us—took this proposal to Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely you are going very far afield. The Tribunal quite understands that you point out, which is obvious, that this is hearsay evidence. The only question for you is whether Müller did on this occasion present a list of names to you, and we understand that you say he did not. We do not want to hear argument about it.
KALTENBRUNNER: No, Your Lordship, Müller did not submit such a list to me, but I must define in some way my attitude to this document which has just been shown to me for the first time. I do not want it to appear to the Tribunal that I can defend myself only after I have been in consultation with my lawyer for hours. I want to tell the prosecutor to his face that this is not true. And I do; somehow I must defend my veracity. I cannot give an answer straight away and I cannot make it easier for the prosecutor except by requesting him to bring this witness, Sandberger, into court; he can discuss with him at length in the meantime, so as to tell him why I do not consider it credible. I must tell the Tribunal beforehand why these things are untrue.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, are you familiar with the so-called “bullet” order that was directed to the Mauthausen Concentration Camp? “Yes” or “no”?
KALTENBRUNNER: I made a detailed statement on this bullet order yesterday and I stated that I did not know of that order.
COL. AMEN: Did you ever issue any oral orders supplementing the so-called “bullet” order—you yourself; did you ever issue any such?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: I ask to have the defendant shown Document 3844-PS, which will become Exhibit USA-801.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
Were you acquainted with Josef Niedermeyer, Defendant? Josef Niedermeyer?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I do not recollect having known him.
COL. AMEN: Well, perhaps this will bring it back to you—Paragraph 1:
“From the autumn of 1942 until May 1945 the so-called call-barracks of the Mauthausen Concentration Camp were under my supervision.
“2. At the beginning of December 1944 the so-called ‘bullet’ orders were shown to me in the political department of the Mauthausen Concentration Camp. These were two orders, each of which bore the signature of Kaltenbrunner. I saw both of these signatures myself. One of these orders stated that foreign civilian workers who had repeatedly escaped from labor camps were, when recaptured, to be sent to the Mauthausen Concentration Camp under the ‘bullet’ action.
“The second order stated that the same procedure was to be followed with officers and noncommissioned officers who were prisoners of war, with the exception of British and Americans, if they repeatedly escaped from prisoner-of-war camps. These prisoners of war were also to be brought to the Mauthausen Concentration Camp.
“3. On the strength of the ‘bullet’ orders and the oral instructions of Kaltenbrunner which accompanied them, 1,300 foreign civilian workers, officers, and noncommissioned officers were brought to the Mauthausen Concentration Camp. There they were lodged in Block 20 and fed so badly, according to orders, that they had to starve. Eight hundred of them died from hunger and illness. The bad food and the lack of medical care were the result of the personal oral orders of Kaltenbrunner.”
Is that statement true or false, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, sir, that is not correct. I believe that I can invalidate this document right now. May I draw your attention to Page 2. On Page 2, Paragraph 3, it says in the third lines “1,300 foreign civilian workers, officers, and noncommissioned officers were brought....” From the words “civilian workers”...
COL. AMEN: Defendant, I am primarily interested in Paragraph 2, which has to do with the fact that the person who makes the affidavit saw two “bullet” orders bearing your signature. Is that, so far as you know, true or false?
KALTENBRUNNER: No; I said yesterday, and I repeat it today under oath that these bullet orders were not known to me. To dispute the veracity of the witness and the evidential value of the document, I must be able personally to raise my arguments on those points where it is particularly obvious that the Prosecution is wrong, that is, in the third line of Paragraph 3. Here the witness—whose signature differs completely from the writing of the statement, and this is a fact to which I would like to invite the attention of the Tribunal—the witness completely forgot that the bullet orders, the text of which has been read here repeatedly, referred to officers and noncommissioned officers, but not to civilian workers. How, on the basis of a false order, could such a thing happen at all? I cannot pass the death sentence for murder on the strength of a civilian paragraph such as 820 of BGB (Code of Civil Law), nor can I on the strength of the bullet orders lock civilian workers up in a camp. The witness, in his haste and anxiety to oblige, had forgotten these details.
Nor do I believe that this man has ever seen a document which bears my signature. Such a document was never submitted to me either.
Once again, I must ask that this witness—and I am sure there will be others on the Mauthausen question—that this witness and all the others should be brought here and questioned as to how their statements came to be made.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, do you recall the testimony of the witness Wisliceny with respect to your participation in the forced labor program on the defenses below Vienna?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have not quite finished answering your last questions. Excuse me, but I still have something vital to say on this matter.
COL. AMEN: I thought you were through with that.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I thought so, too, but I have just remembered something important.
COL. AMEN: All right.
KALTENBRUNNER: It is very relevant that I should refer you to what I said about the bullet orders yesterday. I stated that it became known to me in December or January 1944-45, and what my reaction was, and how I opposed it. These circumstances, too, explain the fact that I could not, shortly before that, have signed the order myself.
Apart from that, it is totally impossible for a Kaltenbrunner to sign a bullet order, when it is clear to the Prosecution here that it was signed already in 1941 by Hitler. This is why I wanted to make that final remark about the document.
Now, will you please be good enough to repeat the next question?
COL. AMEN: I want to call your attention to the testimony of Wisliceny with respect to your participation in the forced labor program on the defenses below Vienna. Are you familiar with what he said in this court?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: Well, I will read it to you. It is very short:
“Question: With reference to the Jews who were left in Budapest, what happened to them?
“Answer: In October-November 1944 about 30,000, perhaps a few thousand more, were taken out and brought to Germany. They were to be used for work on the defenses in Vienna. They were mostly women. A large number of these people were put into the labor camps on the lower Danube, and they died there from sheer exhaustion. A small percentage, perhaps 12,000, were taken to Vienna, the western boundary, and about 3,000 were taken to Bergen and Belsen and then to Switzerland. Those were Jews that had come from Germany.”
Now, Defendant, do you recall having had any correspondence with the Bürgermeister of the city of Vienna with respect to the assignment of this forced labor in the city of Vienna?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have never written a single letter to the Bürgermeister of Budapest, and I should very much like to ask you to show me any such letter.
COL. AMEN: I did not say Budapest; I said the Bürgermeister of the city of Vienna, or I intended to, if I did not.
KALTENBRUNNER: The Bürgermeister of Vienna? I cannot remember having had any correspondence with him either. I think perhaps I can explain the matter to you by saying that these frontier fortifications which must be meant here did not come under the city of Vienna, but under the Gau of the lower Danube. I did not know that Vienna had a joint frontier with Hungary.
COL. AMEN: Well, you have already testified that you had nothing to do with participating in this forced labor program; is that not correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: All right.
I ask to have the defendant shown Document 3803-PS, Exhibit Number USA-802.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
I call your attention to the first three paragraphs. You will note that the letter comes from yourself, and reads as follows:
“To the Bürgermeister of the city of Vienna, SS Brigadeführer Blaschke.
“Subject: Assignment of labor to essential war work in the city of Vienna.
“Re: Your letter of 7 June 1944.
“Dear Blaschke: For the special reasons cited by you I have in the meantime given orders to direct several evacuation transports to Vienna-Strasshof. SS Brigadeführer Dr. Dellbruegge had, as a matter of fact, already written to me concerning the same matter. At the moment it is a question of four transports with approximately 12,000 Jews. They will reach Vienna within the next few days.
“According to previous experience it is estimated that 30 percent of the transport will consist of Jews able to work, approximately 3,600 in this case, who can be utilized for the work in question, it being understood that they are subject to removal at any time. It is obvious that these people must be assigned to work in large, well-guarded groups, and accommodated in secured camps, and this is an absolute prerequisite for making these Jews available.
“The women and children of these Jews who were unable to work, and who are all being kept in readiness for a special action and therefore one day will be removed again, must stay in the guarded camp also during the day.
“Please discuss further details with the State Police head office in Vienna, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr. Ebner and SS Obersturmbannführer Krumey of the Sondereinsatzkommando Hungary, who at present is in Vienna.
“I hope these transports will be of help to you in carrying out the urgent work you have in view.
“Heil Hitler. Yours, Kaltenbrunner.”
Now do you recall that communication?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: Do you deny having written that letter?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Well, I think, Defendant, that this time your signature is affixed to the original of this letter. Have you the original?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Is that not your signature?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, that is not my signature. It is a signature either in ink or it is a facsimile, but it is not mine.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, I want to show you samples of your signature which you gave in the course of your interrogations, and I ask you to tell me whether or not these are your signatures.
[Documents were submitted to the defendant.]
KALTENBRUNNER: I have already made hundreds of such signatures, and they are probably right. The one in pencil, the document signed in pencil, has been signed by me.
COL. AMEN: Well, will you indicate them in some way, so that the Tribunal can look at the signatures which you admit are your own, and compare them with the signature on this Document 3803-PS, Exhibit USA-802?
KALTENBRUNNER: The signatures on these papers which are written in pencil are mine; they are my own.
COL. AMEN: All of them?
KALTENBRUNNER: All three.
COL. AMEN: All right.
KALTENBRUNNER: But not those in ink.
COL. AMEN: Very good.
[The documents were submitted to the Tribunal.]
Shall I continue, Your Lordship?
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, please.
Go on, Colonel Amen.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, you have heard the evidence with respect to the establishment of the Warsaw Ghetto and the clearing of the ghetto.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from this document?
COL. AMEN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE TRIBUNAL: We had better adjourn for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I have to begin submitting my evidence in the next few days, and I do not know yet whether my Document Book 1 is admissible. Will you please also tell me on what day and at what time this can be discussed.
[There was a pause in the proceedings.]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the Tribunal think that, subject to anything you have to say, half past 12 tomorrow—that is Saturday morning—would be a good time at which we could decide the admissibility of your documents.
DR. THOMA: Thank you very much indeed.
COL. AMEN: If the Tribunal please, I want to revert for a moment to Document 3803-PS with the signature.
Defendant, have you the original of that exhibit before you?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Will you look at the signature and tell me whether you do not find, written by hand just above the signature, the letters D-e-i-n?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And as I understand it, that word means “yours”; in other words, it is an intimate expression used only between close personal friends, is that not correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: In German there are only two forms of concluding a letter: either “Ihr,” I-h-r, or “Dein,” D-e-i-n. We use the latter, “Dein,” if we are on close terms, friendly terms. Blaschke, the Mayor of Vienna, is a friend of mine and apparently...
COL. AMEN: Now, would it not be an absolutely ridiculous and unthinkable thing that a stamp or facsimile would be made up which contained not only a signature but the expression “Dein” above the signature?
KALTENBRUNNER: That would be nonsensical, I wholly agree with that; but I did not say that it must be a facsimile signature. I just said that it is not my signature.
It is either a facsimile or it has been put underneath with another signature. The author of this letter—you did not allow me to finish before—as it can be seen from the code in the upper left-hand corner, is to be found in Section IV A and B. Everyone in the department and the entire German Reich knew that the Mayor of Vienna, Blaschke, and myself had been close personal friends since our common political activity in Vienna, that is for about 10 years, and had used the familiar form of address, “Du.” Therefore, if, for instance, I had been absent from Berlin, and the letter was urgent—as I assume to be the case from the contents—the official might have considered it justifiable to write in this form. I did not authorize him and, of course, it is quite impossible, but that is the only way I can explain it.
COL. AMEN: Then, Defendant, at least you agree that it is not a facsimile signature, is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: It would be most unusual to have made a stamp with the words, “Dein.” It would be entirely out of the question. Therefore, the official himself must have written the signature. Everybody knew that I was on familiar terms with Blaschke and therefore the word “Dein” had to appear, if he used my signature at all.
Please look also at the figure 30 on the top. From many samples of my writing you can see that I do not write like that at all.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, is it not equally ridiculous to think that a person, or an official, as you term him, in signing such a letter on your behalf would try to imitate your signature?
KALTENBRUNNER: Quite right, but, sir, it would be a matter of course, when writing to the Mayor of Vienna, a man with whom the official perhaps knew quite well that I was on familiar terms, to put my name typewritten under a personal letter. That would be impossible as well. If I were not in Berlin he had only two possibilities open to him: either to type it in or to make it seem as though I, Kaltenbrunner, were actually there.
COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact that you are simply lying about your signature on this letter, in the same way that you are lying to this Tribunal about almost everything else you have given testimony about? Is not that a fact?
KALTENBRUNNER: Mr. Prosecutor, for a whole year I have had to submit to this insult of being called a liar. For a whole year I have been interrogated hundreds of times both here and in London, and I have been insulted in this way and even much worse. My mother, who died in 1943, was called a whore, and many other similar things were hurled at me. This term is not new to me but I should like to state that in a matter of this kind I certainly would not tell an untruth, when I claim to be believed by this Tribunal in far more important matters.
COL. AMEN: I am suggesting, Defendant, that when your testimony is so directly contrary to that of 20 or 30 other witnesses and even more documents, it is almost an incredible thing you should be telling the truth and that every witness and every document should be false. Do you not agree to that proposition?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. I cannot admit that because I have had the feeling each time a document has been submitted to me today, that it could at first glance be immediately refuted by me in its most vital points. I ask, and I hope that the Tribunal will allow me, to refer to single points and to come into closer contact with individual witnesses, so that I may defend myself to the last. Throughout the preliminary interrogations your colleague has always adopted the attitude unjustly that I was refuting and opposing insignificant points. The conception of expeditious trial proceedings has been unknown to me in this form. Had he talked to me in broad lines about the ways to find out the real truth, I believe he would have sooner arrived at considerably larger and more important issues. I am perhaps the only defendant who, on receiving the Indictment and being asked, “Are you ready to make any further statements to the Prosecution,” stated “Immediately,” and I signed it—please produce the signature—“from today on after receiving the Indictment I am at the disposal of the Prosecution for any information.” Is it not so? Please confirm it. That gentleman [pointing to an interpreter] interrogated me. I have always been ready, that is, during the last 5 months, to give information on any question, but I have not been asked any more.
THE PRESIDENT: You must try to restrain yourself. And when you see the light, speak slower. You know about the light, do you not?
COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact, Defendant, that on the occasion of your last interrogation you stated that you did not wish to be interrogated any more because the questions seemed to be designed to help the Prosecution rather than to help your case, and that you were told that in that event you would not be questioned any more; that you were also informed that there were other documents and other material with which you had not been confronted and that if you desired at any time to come back and be interrogated with respect to those matters, you should tell your lawyers so and send a note and that the interrogator would be very happy to continue interrogating you? Is that not a fact, “yes” or “no”?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, sir, that was not the case. I made that statement repeatedly when I was being interrogated on points of detail. It was in the evening and it was getting very late. I believe it was about 2000 hours; I can remember the room very well. I was led out of the room. This interpreter, whom I saw here this morning, I believe, was sitting at a long table with two or three other officials. They said, “You have received the Indictment today,” and I said, “Yes, I have.” They said, “Are you aware that from now on you will have to speak with the General Secretary about your defense? Do you wish to be interrogated further?” To which I said, “Yes, certainly I am at your disposal at any time.” Whereupon this officer here looked at me in a very startled manner, for he did not expect that answer from me; obviously all the others appeared to have said, “No, we are glad that these interrogations have come to an end and we can work now on our defense.”
COL. AMEN: Now, Defendant, I want to read to you from your last interrogation. After a question as to whether the testimony was being helpful to you sufficiently so that you wanted to continue, you spoke as follows:
“This would at least be as important for my defense as the material which is helping the Prosecutor’s case and about which the Interrogator has asked me repeatedly; therefore, I have the feeling that I am still in the hands of the Prosecutor and not in the hands of a judge in charge of a preliminary hearing. As the Indictment has been served, I find myself now in a position where I can prepare my own defense, and I therefore do not find it proper that you continue to look for material which would incriminate me. Please do not regard this as any criticism or rebuttal, because I have never been informed about the procedure to be followed in these hearings and I do not know about it; but according to my knowledge of legal procedure this is incorrect. I have never been given the possibility of confronting other witnesses and of reminding them that this or that did not happen in this or that way, et cetera.
“Question: Is your statement made in the form of an objection to further questioning?
“Answer: If, as I stated it now, there is a possibility of my being confronted with witnesses and to do something about testimony in my favor, I would be very glad to continue, but even so I have the feeling that it would be better to do this during the evidence at the Trial itself. I believe I should discuss this first with my defense counsel.
“Question: Well, if there is any question in your mind about whether you should go further in any interrogation by the Office of Chief of Counsel, or the U.S. representative to the International Military Tribunal, I think you should talk to your counsel, too. You have never been under any compulsion to answer either before or since this Indictment was served. I think you will agree your treatment has been fair in all circumstances.”
Is that not correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, Mr. Prosecutor, it confirms exactly what I have been telling you. The material that you just read states that I did not agree that interrogations and discussions should be broken off suddenly. I said that I had never had any opportunity of speaking with the witnesses with whom I was confronted. It confirms that I have asked you to bring me face to face with the witnesses, so that I might talk with them. I do not deny at all that I also said that I was glad that now I could start preparing my defense. Actually, that is so. But I did not say in the course of such a lengthy statement—it has not been read to me—and worded as no other interrogation has been worded with the exception of perhaps two or three, that I no longer place myself at the disposal of the interrogator. I stated just the opposite and you read that, too, that I am at the disposal of the interrogator.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, let us get to the Warsaw Ghetto. Do you recall from the evidence before this Tribunal that some 400,000 Jews were first put into the ghetto and then in the final action SS troops cleared out about 56,000, of which more than 14,000 were killed. Do you recall that evidence?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not recall any details of this statement; what I know about this matter, I have already stated today.
COL. AMEN: Did you know that substantially all of these 400,000 Jews were murdered at the extermination plant at Treblinka? Did you know that?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: What did you have to do with the final razing of the Warsaw Ghetto, nothing as usual?
KALTENBRUNNER: I had nothing to do with it, as I already stated.
COL. AMEN: I ask to have the defendant shown Document Number 3840-PS, which will become Exhibit Number USA-803.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
Were you acquainted with Karl Kaleske?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, that name is not known to me.
COL. AMEN: Does it help you to remember if I suggest to you that he was the adjutant of General Stroop?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know the adjutant of General Stroop; the name which you just mentioned to me, “Kaleske,” I do not know either.
COL. AMEN: Let us get to his affidavit. Have you got it before you now?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: “My name is Karl Kaleske. I was adjutant to Dr. Von Sammern-Frankenegg from November 1942 until April 1943, while he was SS and Polizeiführer of Warsaw. I then became adjutant to SS and Polizeiführer Stroop until August 1943. The action against the Warsaw Ghetto was planned while Von Sammern-Frankenegg was SS and Polizeiführer. General Stroop took over the command on the day of the commencement of the action. The function of the Security Police during the action against the Warsaw Ghetto was to accompany the SS troops. A certain number of SS troops were assigned to the task to clear a certain street. With every SS group there were from four to six Security Policemen, because they knew the Ghetto very well. These Security Policemen were under Dr. Hahn, Commander of the Security Police of Warsaw. Hahn received his orders not from the SS and Polizeiführer of Warsaw, but directly from Kaltenbrunner in Berlin. This applies not only to the Ghetto action but to all matters. Dr. Hahn frequently came to our office and told the SS and Polizeiführer that he had received such and such an order from Kaltenbrunner, about the contents of which he wanted to inform the SS and Polizeiführer only. He would not do this for every order but only for certain ones.
“I remember the case of 300 foreign Jews who had been collected in the Polski Hotel by the Security Police. At the end of the Ghetto action Kaltenbrunner ordered the Security Police to transport these people. During my time in Warsaw the Security Police were in charge of matters concerning the underground movement. The Security Police handled these matters independently of the SS and Polizeiführer, and received their orders from Kaltenbrunner in Berlin. When the leader of the underground movement in Warsaw was captured, in June or July 1943, he was flown directly to Kaltenbrunner in Berlin.”
Are these statements true or false, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: These statements are, without exception, wrong. I will...
COL. AMEN: Just like all the other statements of all the other persons that have been read to you today? Is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: This statement is not correct. It is not true and can be refuted.
COL. AMEN: That is what you have said about all the other statements I read to you today, is that not so?
KALTENBRUNNER: Mr. Prosecutor, I must...
COL. AMEN: Is that so?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. If you bring false accusations against me I must declare them to be false. I cannot say “yes” to everything of which you accuse me just because the Prosecution is wrong in determining who is Himmler’s representative here.
COL. AMEN: All right, go ahead and say whatever you want.
KALTENBRUNNER: I ask you to bear in mind what I have said about the competency and rules regarding subordination of all Higher SS and Police Leaders in the occupied territories. All of them were directly subordinated to Himmler. The SS and Police Leaders of a smaller territory were subordinated to the Higher SS and the Police Leader. The branches of the Order Police and of the Security Police were assigned to these SS and Police Leaders, who had the exclusive right to give them orders. The entire organization which thus operated in the occupied territories was excluded from the command jurisdiction of the central office of the Reich.
There are men here who can testify to the truth of what I have said. Bach-Zelewski, who was questioned here, was only in the occupied territories and knows conditions there. There is also the Defendant Frank who had to work with such a Higher SS and Police Leader who later became his State Secretary.
COL. AMEN: Your lawyer can call these people. All I am asking you is whether or not this document is true or false and then asking you to make any brief pertinent explanation that you might wish to.
KALTENBRUNNER: This document is not correct...
COL. AMEN: We know about potential witnesses all over Germany, and we know all these defendants in the box have knowledge about most of these affairs, but that is not what I am asking you about.
I am merely asking you whether what was in that paper was true or false and you have said it is false; now, is there anything else you feel you have to say about it?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is not correct and this witness does not know...
COL. AMEN: Well, you said that six times.
KALTENBRUNNER: ...does not know the conditions.
COL. AMEN: Well, how about General Stroop? Did he know anything about it?
KALTENBRUNNER: If he was SS and Police Leader of Warsaw—and you have also shown me his diary and his film-report—then, of course, yes. Stroop was subordinated to the Higher SS and Police Leader of this place. Stroop had to carry out the action on the order coming from Himmler via the Higher SS and Police Leader.
COL. AMEN: Stroop was a pretty good friend of yours, was he not?
KALTENBRUNNER: I probably have not seen Stroop more than two or three times in my life, at Reichsführer Himmler’s.
COL. AMEN: Well, if Stroop were here he at least would be in a position to tell the truth, would he not, about this Warsaw Ghetto affair?
KALTENBRUNNER: He would have to confirm my statement at least that he was subordinated to the Supreme SS and Police Leader in the Government General and that he was not subordinated to me. I should be very glad if he could confirm that immediately. From your words I must assume that he is in custody here.
COL. AMEN: Well, he is not in custody here, but fortunately we have an affidavit from him on exactly these matters about which I have been questioning you.
I ask to have the defendant shown Document Number 3841-PS, which will become Exhibit USA-804.
We will find out whether Stroop confirmed what you are trying to tell the Tribunal. You will accept what Stroop says, will you, Witness?
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
KALTENBRUNNER: I have not read the document.
COL. AMEN: No; but I say, knowing Stroop and knowing the position which he held, you do not question but what he would tell the truth about the happenings in the Warsaw Ghetto, is that not what you have just said, in effect?
KALTENBRUNNER: The truth of a witness’ testimony has been questioned before and rightly so. But as I do not know the document I cannot define my position as to Stroop’s statement.
COL. AMEN: All right, we will read it:
“My name is Jürgen Stroop. I was SS and Polizeiführer of the Warsaw District from 17 or 18 April 1943, until the end of August 1943. The action against the Warsaw Ghetto was planned by my predecessor, SS Oberführer Dr. Von Sammern-Frankenegg. On the day when this action started I took over the command and Von Sammern-Frankenegg explained to me what was to be done. He had the order from Himmler before him, and in addition I received a teletype from Himmler which ordered me to evacuate the Warsaw Ghetto and raze it to the ground. To carry this out, I had 2 battalions of Waffen-SS, 100 soldiers of the Wehrmacht, units of the Order Police and 75 to 100 men of the Security Police. The Security Police had been active in the Warsaw Ghetto for some time, and during this program it was their function to accompany SS units in groups of six or eight, as guides and experts in Ghetto matters. Obersturmbannführer Dr. Hahn was Commander of the Security Police of Warsaw at that time. Hahn gave the Security Police their orders concerning their tasks in this action. These orders were not given to Hahn by me, but came from Kaltenbrunner in Berlin. As SS and Polizeiführer of Warsaw I gave no orders to the Security Police. All orders came to Hahn from Kaltenbrunner in Berlin. For example, in June or July of the same year, I was together with Hahn in Kaltenbrunner’s office and Kaltenbrunner told me that while Hahn and I must work together, all basic orders to the Security Police must come from him in Berlin.
“After the people had been taken out of the Ghetto—they numbered between 50,000 and 60,000—they were brought to the railway station. The Security Police had complete supervision of these people and were in charge of the transport of these people to Lublin.
“Immediately after the Ghetto action had been completed, about 300 foreign Jews were collected at the Polski Hotel. Some of these people were already there before the action, and some were brought there during the action. Kaltenbrunner ordered Hahn to transport these people away. Hahn himself told me that he had received this order from Kaltenbrunner.
“All executions were ordered by the Reich Main Security Office, Kaltenbrunner.
“I have read this statement and I have understood it completely. I have made the statement freely and without compulsion. I swear before God that this is the full truth.”—Signed—“Jürgen Stroop.”
Do you say that that statement of Stroop is true or false?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is untrue and I request that Stroop be brought here.
COL. AMEN: You will find that instead of its bearing out your story it confirms in substantially every detail the story told by Kaleske, who was Stroop’s adjutant at the time. Is that not true, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is not true, insofar as witness Stroop is one step closer to my story, for on Page 1 he declares he had received the orders regarding the Warsaw Ghetto from Himmler and this is something which Kaleske has never said anywhere.
COL. AMEN: I will accept that, Defendant.
KALTENBRUNNER: An interrogation of General Stroop will clarify this point completely, also that Hahn had, of course, received orders from the Gestapo in Berlin; whether in this matter, too, I do not know, since as a matter of course the offices of the Security Police had also to be at the disposal of Amt IV, particularly as far as support in legal proceedings was concerned. But what matters here, in an action taking place in the Government General and in Warsaw, is the question of what organizations were involved in this action and all witnesses versed in these matters will have to agree that this was within the jurisdiction of the Higher SS and Police Leader in the Government General, not to the Reich Security Main Office. It is completely incorrect that these Security Police forces in Warsaw and officials such as Hahn were not subordinate to the SS and Police Leader.
It can be testified to and ascertained that all Security Police offices, especially where an action of this kind was involved, could have only one leader and that was the local leader. But if, Mr. Prosecutor, you would give me again the opportunity of defining my position to these witnesses’ statements more comprehensively through my defense counsel I could come back to this matter properly.
COL. AMEN: And now, Defendant, I want to refer you to Document 3819-PS, which is already in evidence as GB-306, which are notes of a conference in the Reich Chancellery on 11 July 1944, signed by Lammers and the subject of testimony before this Tribunal the other day. You recall having attended that meeting I presume.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know yet. I do not know the purpose of that meeting.
COL. AMEN: You do not deny that you were there, do you?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know. This is the first time I have seen this document.
COL. AMEN: Now, look at Page 12, in the middle of the page, the sentence there, “In Paris, the evacuation of which was considered...”
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, may I ask for clarification of the question, whether it might have been more appropriate and correct if the Prosecution had questioned Lammers about this matter when Lammers was here on the witness stand.
THE PRESIDENT: Was this put to Lammers?
COL. AMEN: Frankly, Your Lordship, I do not know. The document was introduced and identified, and I am not sure whether he was asked about it or not. Sir David says that he introduced the document with Keitel, at the foot of Page 9.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.
COL. AMEN: Have you found the place, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I have found the place.
COL. AMEN: “In Paris, the evacuation of which was considered, 100,000 to 200,000 workers could be recruited. In this connection...”
KALTENBRUNNER: No, Mr. Prosecutor, I have not found the place.
COL. AMEN: Well, it is just above the paragraph which commences, “The Chief of the Security Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner.” Can you find that spot?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I have it now.
COL. AMEN: Well, passing to that sentence:
“The Chief of the Security Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, declared himself willing, when asked by the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, to place the Security Police at his disposal for this purpose, but pointed out their numerical weakness. For the whole of France he had only 2,400 men available. It was questionable whether entire age groups could be recruited with these weak forces. In his opinion, the Foreign Office must exercise a stronger influence on the foreign governments.”
Is that a true reflection of what took place at that meeting, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: I cannot say that concerning the wording of the document, but I might say in explanation that according to the introduction on Page 1 it was a “Chefbesprechung” (discussion of chiefs), and that does not mean me, for I was Chief of the Reich Security Main Office. “Chefbesprechung” means the ministries and the chief Reich departments.
By questioning the witness Lammers it would have to be determined whether I was there on the orders of the Ministry of the Interior and Chief of the German Police, Himmler. That would have been possible. That I was there on the instruction of Himmler seems to become evident for me from the number mentioned. It mentions here that only 2,400 men were at our disposal. Neither the Security Police nor the SD, nor both together, ever had any number like that at their disposal. It must have included all the forces, even the Order Police and other small organizations, which were subordinate to Himmler.
Therefore, one thing, at least, is missing in this document; that is the explanation that Kaltenbrunner, on orders of Himmler, was giving Himmler’s views; that at least is missing. But by questioning the witness Dr. Lammers, I am sure we can clarify this matter.
In any case, I would like to point out that it was my opinion that I could not be helpful in this matter because, first of all, negotiations between the Foreign Office and the competent foreign—that is, the French Government, were necessary. Measures to be taken there could not be introduced without the consent of the French Government.
COL. AMEN: All right, Defendant. Now, do you recall evidence given before this Tribunal about efforts made by Germany to incite the Slovaks to revolt against Czechoslovakia and that Hitler used the insurgency of the Slovakians as one of the excuses for occupying Czechoslovakia in March of 1939?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know who testified to that.
COL. AMEN: Well, in any event, during the year 1938 to 1939 it is a fact, is it not, that you were the State Secretary for Security in Austria? Is that right?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I was not State Secretary for the Security Police. I was State Secretary for the security system of the Austrian Government at Vienna, and there is an essential difference, because the Security Police in Austria was instituted and directed from Berlin.
COL. AMEN: Well, all right.
KALTENBRUNNER: And in Austria I had not the slightest influence—nor even my Minister—on the Security Police.
COL. AMEN: When did you become Supreme SS and Police Leader for Upper Austria with your headquarters in Germany?
KALTENBRUNNER: That is a complete misstatement. In Upper Austria there was no Supreme SS and Police Leader, only in Austria.
COL. AMEN: Well, when was it?
KALTENBRUNNER: That was after the liquidation of the Austrian Government and after its affairs had been settled; that can be verified exactly from the Reichsgesetzblatt. It was probably in the summer of 1941.
COL. AMEN: And is it not a fact that you, yourself, directed the activity of the Slovakian rebels and assisted them with explosives and ammunition? Answer that “yes” or “no,” please.
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall having participated in any conference with respect to a plan for instigating this revolt of Slovakia?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is not correct; I did not participate in instigating anything like that in Slovakia. I did take part in the first Government conferences in Slovakia and in the presence of the Delegate of the German Reich.
COL. AMEN: Did your friend Spacil assist you in carrying out these plans?
KALTENBRUNNER: That I cannot recall today. In any case, they were not German plans. If you investigate the political situation in Slovakia at that time, you will clearly see that it did not need any instigation on the part of the German Reich. The Hlinka movement then under the leadership of Dr. Tuka and also of Dr. Tiso, I believe, had made this decision a long time ago.
COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with Obersturmbannführer Fritz Mundhenke?
KALTENBRUNNER: I did not quite catch the name.
COL. AMEN: Well, you will see it on this exhibit which I ask you to be shown now, Document Number 3942-PS, which will become Exhibit Number USA-805.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
Defendant, this is a fairly long exhibit, which I do not want to go through in detail; but I first call your attention to the opening lines:
“With respect to the occupation of Czechoslovakia, I recall that there were two different actions taken: the first one for the occupation of the Sudetenland and the border districts inhabited by German nationals; the second one for the occupation of Czechoslovakia proper....”
And the following lines:
“Some time before the second action, officers of Hlinka Guard (the illegal organization resembling the SS in the Slovakian part of Czechoslovakia) came to the office of SS Corps Area Danube, which at the time may still have had its original name of SS Oberabschnitt Österreich.”
Then follow the details of the plans for inciting this revolt. Then, coming to the end of the first paragraph, you will find the following:
“There were secret meetings to which I was not invited. I felt that I was not fully trusted. I saw the gentlemen only in Kaltenbrunner’s anteroom and, as far as I can remember, in the dining room. I was told nothing about the object of the discussions which referred, without doubt, to the imminent action.”
Then he gives his reasons. And, passing to the second page, in the center, you will find the following:
“Kaltenbrunner alone was responsible for this action. In charge of the action was SS Standartenführer Spacil (nicknamed Spatz) as far as the General SS is concerned. He was chief of the administration of SS Corps Area Danube and was called later on by Kaltenbrunner to Berlin and made administration chief at the Reich Security Main Office. Spacil was one of Kaltenbrunner’s most intimate friends.”
Then, at the close, Paragraph 1 and 2, and subdivisions:
“I have made this statement:
“(1) Not from a feeling of revenge or because I want to be an informer, but in the knowledge that in so doing I can serve in detecting crimes which I, as a German, am ashamed of;
“(2) With the full consciousness that because of my statements I will be slandered by the other side. I know the men who for years have been after me. But this shall not deter me from helping the spirit of justice to a victorious end.”
I ask you whether the substance of that document, as I have given it to you, is true or false?
KALTENBRUNNER: Neither true or false; it is ridiculous and consequently untrue. The document can best be characterized by drawing attention to the fact that on the first page in the introduction it says:
“...the second one for the occupation of Czechoslovakia proper (called afterwards the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia and the Slovakian State).”
The fact that the Republic of Slovakia has never, in the course of history, been occupied by the German Reich is sufficient to reveal the ignorance of this witness, Mundhenke, who comes from North Germany and knows nothing about history or about politics. But this document contains so many details which can be clarified almost humorously that it becomes utterly worthless.
I would like to call your attention to Page 3 of the German text and explain to you who were the men responsible for the individual big political actions which led to the occupation of Czechoslovakia.
The first is a Franz Kourik who was a chauffeur. The second is Karl Spitt also a chauffeur. The third is an SS man whose name is Apfelbeck, son of an innkeeper and a butcher by trade, and who worked as an assistant official in the administration after he had suffered a grave skull injury in a motor accident. Stadler, a small bookkeeper, and the man Petenka are unknown to me.
These men are supposed to have prepared, with me, the occupation of Slovakia by the Reich. That is utter nonsense. Excuse me for calling it so, Mr. Prosecutor, but it is and remains...
COL. AMEN: Very good, Defendant. All right. That is nonsense.
KALTENBRUNNER: One thing is true in this document and I want to come to that. I was with members of the Hlinka Guard in this house in Vienna, Park Ring 8, and I did hold a conference with them. This dealt with the union of the group of racial Germans in Slovakia and the Hlinka Guard, with a view to nominating joint candidates in the Slovakian Government. Documents prove it and files, in Pressburg at least, where my name was sufficiently known. Everybody knows, it there and can confirm it, including this man Mundhenke, the leader of the racial group. But as an occupation of Slovakia never took place at all, in my opinion there is no need for me to defend myself against this accusation.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, in the course of this Trial the order of Himmler to the effect that the civilian population should not be punished for lynching Allied airmen has been introduced in evidence, and you have heard the sworn statement of Schellenberg and Gerdes to the effect that you, in your capacity as Chief of the Security Police and SD, issued such instructions to your subordinates. Do you deny these statements? “Yes” or “no,” please.
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not wish to deny them, but I emphatically state that I never gave any such instructions, and I ask the Tribunal to allow my counsel to read the paper which I gave to him at the beginning of the session. This contains literally the testimony of the witness Koller, the Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, defining my general attitude towards this problem—that even in the presence of Hitler I declared, “I will not obey such an order.” That took place somewhat later, but it shows my own personal feelings about the matter. I made a statement to my counsel already yesterday about this question.
COL. AMEN: All right, Defendant; now take a look at Document Number 3855-PS, which will become Exhibit Number USA-806. This bears your own name at the bottom, whether it be a signature, facsimile, or anything else you choose to call it. Have you the document before you?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: You will note that it comes from the Chief of the Security Police and of the SD, and according to the notes in the upper left-hand portion was prepared for your signature by Amt IV A 2 B, Number 220/44 g RS.
KALTENBRUNNER: That is, Mr. Prosecutor, the first and a very grave mistake.
COL. AMEN: All right.
“a) To all commanders and inspectors of the Security Police and the SD (for oral communication to the subordinated offices);
“b) To Groups IV A and IV B, Sections IV A 1, IV A 3, IV A 4 - IV A 6, IV B 1 - IV B 4;
“c) To Office V, Reich Criminal Police Office, for information to the Higher SS and Police Leaders, to the Chief of the Under Police;
“d) To Chiefs of Offices I-III and IV of the Reich Security Main Office.
“Subject: Treatment of enemy airmen who have bailed out.
“Reference: none.
“A series of questions dealing with the treatment of enemy airmen who have been shot down needs clarification:
“I. As a general rule captured enemy airmen are to be shackled. This measure is necessary and is made with the full consent of the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces; a) in order to prevent frequent escapes, and b) in view of the severe shortage of personnel at the collecting stations.
“II. Enemy air crews, who a) offer resistance when captured, or b) wear civilian clothes under their uniforms are to be shot at once when captured.
“III. Most enemy airmen, especially of the Anglo-American air forces, carry with them escape bags filled with daggers, various kinds of maps, ration coupons, tools for escape, et cetera.
“It is absolutely necessary that escape bags be secured by the Police, as they are of the greatest assistance when making a search. They must be given to the Luftwaffe.
“IV. The order of the Reichsführer SS of 10 August 1943”—which I believe you also testified you know nothing about—“is not being carried out in full, as it has probably not been passed on orally, as ordered, to the subordinate police offices.
“It is therefore repeated: It is not the duty of the police to interfere in conflicts between the Germans and English and American ‘terror-fliers’ who have bailed out.
“V. Near the body of an English airman who had been shot down a brassard with the inscription ‘Deutsche Wehrmacht’ and an official stamp was found. This brassard is only worn by combat troops, and it gives the bearer access to all military and strategically important points in the various operation zones. Parachuted enemy agents will probably make use of this new means of camouflage.
“VI. During the past months individual cases have shown that the German population does seize enemy airmen but afterwards, while waiting for them to be handed over to the police or the Armed Forces, it does not use the proper restraint. Too strict measures on the part of the State Police against these citizens would keep them from seizing enemy airmen without restraint, since these cases must not be confused with the criminal act of helping escaped enemy airmen.
“Reichsführer SS has ordered the following measures to be applied to citizens who conduct themselves in a dishonorable manner towards captured enemy airmen either out of bad intentions or misunderstood pity:
“1) In especially severe cases, transfer to a concentration camp; announcement in the newspapers of the district.
“2) In less severe cases, protective custody for not less than 14 days at the competent State Police office; employment in the clearing of damaged areas. Should there be no damaged area affording such employment within the jurisdiction of one State Police office, the short-term protective custody sentence is to be served at the nearest State Police office, et cetera.
“The Reichsführer SS has contacted Reichsleiter Bormann in this matter and has pointed out that it is the duty of the Party officials to instruct the population to observe absolutely necessary restraint towards enemy airmen.
“3) I leave it to the commanders and inspectors of the Security Police, and the SD to notify in writing the subordinated offices of Sections V and VI of the above decree.
“Signed: Dr. Kaltenbrunner; Certified: Rose, office clerk.”
Do you deny having had anything to do with the issuance of that document? Do you deny that you signed it?
KALTENBRUNNER: This order was never submitted to me. I refer you to what I said yesterday concerning questions of direction and issuing of orders in the Secret Police office, Amt IV A which appears at the head of the letter indicating that it formulated it. In these matters this Amt was directly subordinated to Himmler.
THE PRESIDENT: I have not heard the answer to the question. Did you sign it?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: You deny your signature and you deny knowing anything about this document bearing your name, is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Mr. Prosecutor, I have...
COL. AMEN: Will you answer that, Defendant? You deny this document just like you have denied every other document that has been shown to you today, is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: I already stated yesterday, and also told my defense counsel, that these documents were never submitted to me. I should know it today. To a certain degree I am to blame for not having paid more attention as to whether such orders were issued in my name. I never denied yesterday that I was partly to blame in this respect but my position to this question can be clearly seen from Koller’s testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not understand. Are you saying that the signature on the document is not yours, or that you may have signed it without looking at the decree? Which are you saying?
KALTENBRUNNER: Your Lordship, this document and this decree were never submitted to me. To sign such a document would have been completely against my inner attitude towards the entire problem. My attitude in this matter can be seen from Koller’s testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not asking you what your inner attitude is. I am asking you whether the name on it is written by your hand.
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to look at the document.
COL. AMEN: It is a typewritten signature, Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; let us look at the document.
Defendant, who is Rose?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know, Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, can you give any idea how long you will be with your cross-examination?
COL. AMEN: Perhaps half an hour, depending on the answers of the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the Tribunal will adjourn. We will sit tomorrow at 10 o’clock to continue this part of the case, and will adjourn at half past 12 in order to hear Dr. Thoma and the Prosecution upon his documents.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 13 April 1946 at 1000 hours.]
ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH DAY Saturday, 13 April 1946
Morning Session
COL. AMEN: Defendant, as I recall, you have testified that you had no knowledge of the Hitler Commando Order of 8 October ’42 until some time in 1945. Is that not correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not think that I said so. I believe that concerns the order...
COL. AMEN: Well, that was your testimony yesterday, according to the record, that you had no knowledge of the Hitler Commando Order of 8 October ’42 until some time in the year 1945. Is that not correct? Is that not now your position?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not believe that I made such an answer. The order is...
COL. AMEN: Well, what is the fact? When did you first have knowledge of the Hitler Commando Order of 8 October 1942? I am speaking of the order of 18 October ’42, not 8. When did you first have knowledge of that?
KALTENBRUNNER: I cannot tell you that now, exactly.
COL. AMEN: All right.
KALTENBRUNNER: In any case, this order, if it were read to me, would probably be the same one which appeared in a Wehrmacht report or in the press.
COL. AMEN: All right. And you have also denied the testimony of your own witness, Mildner, concerning the existence of a decree issued in July or August ’44, under which the Security Police were to execute members of Allied commando groups after questioning them. That is correct, is it not?
KALTENBRUNNER: I was never asked about that.
COL. AMEN: Well, I beg your pardon; but never mind, anyway. I will show you Document Number 535-PS, which will become Exhibit USA-807; and, before anything else, I want to ask you whether it is your own signature, in your own handwriting, that appears at the bottom of that document.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. That is my signature.
COL. AMEN: Oh, it is your signature, is it?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: You admit that? Is that right?
KALTENBRUNNER: That is my signature, yes.
COL. AMEN: Now, when you were interrogated before this Trial, you denied that that was your signature, did you not?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I do not believe so.
COL. AMEN: Well, I will read you your testimony on that point, to see whether that helps you to remember whether you denied it or not.
“Answer: ‘From that it can only be seen that the Wehrmacht intended to write a letter to me; whether rightly or wrongly, and whether I was the right authority to write to is very questionable. In any case, the Wehrmacht wanted to get in touch with the Gestapo, as can be seen from this exchange of letters, and I am convinced that an officer of the Gestapo, namely, the one mentioned at the beginning of the letter, is the one who wrote this document.’
“Question: ‘Well, this is the letter that you know nothing about, but which, nevertheless, established just how you accomplished your desires by writing to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. That is very clear.’
“Answer: ‘But I deny that I wrote this letter.’
“Question: ‘Just a moment ago, you didn’t know about it, but now you deny it?’
“Answer: ‘I not only did not know about the Hitler Order, but I also knew nothing about this letter.’
“Question: ‘But you acknowledged your signature?’
“Answer: ‘I did not say that this is my signature. I only said it resembles my signature; and I also said it is possible that it is only a facsimile. I cannot recall a letter of such contents signed by me.’
“Question: ‘Would it be any more convincing to you if you saw the original letter, signed in ink?’
“Answer: ‘It would certainly be more convincing, but it still would not prove that I signed in ink.’”
Did you make those answers to those questions, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: Naturally, I do not remember whether I made these answers literally. But, I would like to make the following remarks to you. Questions concerning my signature have naturally always been put to me hundreds of times during interrogations, especially to confuse me. Today—I believe this is the first time I have seen this document—I immediately declared, “Yes, this is my signature.” I certainly know my own signature; I can recognize it. However, you have also shown me signatures which certainly were not mine.
Besides, you can see from the date of the letter, 23 January 1945, that it is correct that I learned about it in 1945, as you have already stated. I could not have the faintest notion of a Hitler order issued in the year ’42. And if, in your interrogation which you just read to me, I stated that I did not write this letter, then this is confirmed by the very figures which appear on top, where you read IV A 2 a, plus numerals and letters which obviously indicates that the letter was written in a section which was in charge of these matters.
That is what I mean when I say that I did not write this letter. That it may have been submitted to me for my signature among thousands of other papers which I might have had to look into possibly in the course of one day, I cannot, of course, deny. From this, however, you cannot draw the conclusion that I undoubtedly knew about the matter. You cannot imagine the extent of the official functions which I took over in complete ignorance of police background, without instructions for carrying out police functions, but rather for organizing and directing the vast intelligence service.
THE PRESIDENT: Answer questions and do not make speeches.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, is not the signature on that document before you, Document Number 535-PS, USA-807, precisely the same and identical with your signature as it appears on Document Number 3803-PS, USA-802? Just look at the two signatures, and tell the Tribunal if they are not identical.
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I never signed in that way. I always signed, “Dr. K.,” as on this document, even in informal letters.
COL. AMEN: How about the handwriting? Does that look the same to you, Defendant, or does it look different?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, certainly there is a kind of resemblance, but I think it has happened to every person in this courtroom that in his absence any one of his assistants at times signed a particularly urgent letter using his name.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal will be able to see the signatures and judge for themselves.
COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir.
Now, do you have the exhibit before you, 535-PS?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: You will note that that emanates from IV A 2 a, as appears in the upper corner under Chief of the Security Police and of the SD.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, and at the beginning you said the letter was written by me.
COL. AMEN: That it is addressed to the High Command of the Armed Forces, right?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And that it refers to the Führer Order of 18 October ’42, as well as to the other Führer orders referred to in the testimony of Mildner, namely, the Führer orders of 18 August ’44 and 30 July ’44, correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: I did not know that Mildner testified on this point. Such a statement is not known to me, nor has it been submitted to me. But, I believe, it proves...
COL. AMEN: All right. Do you note that this document refers to the Führer decrees of 18 October ’42, 18 August ’44, and 30 July ’44. Yes or no, please.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. It says so here.
COL. AMEN: So that on 23 January ’45 when you wrote this letter, you obviously had knowledge of those decrees, right? I mean...
KALTENBRUNNER: That is incorrect inasmuch as, in my opinion, the most important item in this letter is contained in the sixth, fifth, and fourth lines from the end: Here it says that they can make no claim upon the allowances for prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Convention. If, then, under the pressure of work this letter was submitted to me, it is evident that my eyes would first fall on the spot where I had to sign and also on the last lines. Here...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is not an answer to the question. The question was whether you knew the order of the 18th of October ’42, of 30 July ’44, and 18 August ’44, when you wrote this letter. Did you know?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I did not know of these orders, Mr. President.
COL. AMEN: All right...
KALTENBRUNNER: But please, would you let me defend myself on this point. It was clear to me that this dealt with the treatment of agents to whom the provisions of the Geneva Convention for prisoners of war are not applicable; and you cannot deny a power at war the right to let its security police take in hand those men who do not come under the regulations of the Geneva War Convention. That is the perfect right of any power at war. There were also German agents who were engaged in hostile activity in England and other countries.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you are not here to argue your case now; you are here to answer questions.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, you testified, did you not, that you first acquired knowledge of the case of the British fliers who escaped from Stalag Luft III in March of 1944, some 6 weeks after the escape occurred; is that not correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, now I assume it was about 6 weeks afterwards; at any rate, it was just when, in consequence of the speech in the House of Commons, the Foreign Office took a stand. The department chiefs turned to me, but I in turn sent them to Himmler.
COL. AMEN: But when you were interrogated about this matter before the Trial, you testified as follows, did you not?
“Question: ‘You remember the case of the 80 British fliers who escaped from Stalag Luft III, which took place in March ’44?’
“Answer: ‘That case is unknown to me.’
“Question: ‘General Westhoff attempted to find out from the Gestapo what had happened to these men.’
“Answer: ‘If he had negotiations with the Gestapo, he did not negotiate with me.’
“Question: ‘What do you say about the general proposition that escaped prisoners were turned over to the Gestapo?’
“Answer: ‘Such cases are not known to me.’”
Did you make those answers, yes or no?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is possible that I did; but I wish to point out to you that naturally I was completely confused by the manner in which these questions were put. I never really heard of 80 escaped airmen. Here, too, mention was made of 50 only.
COL. AMEN: For your information, 80 escaped and 50 were killed.
KALTENBRUNNER: And in addition, General Westhoff stated here that he did not discuss the Sagan case with me, but that he tried to obtain information from the State Police, that he spoke to me about the transfer of prisoner-of-war affairs to Himmler, who was the Commander of the Reserve Army, and that Sagan was referred to on this occasion.
COL. AMEN: Now, Defendant, you testified that you had no knowledge whatever of the fact that Einsatz groups of the Security Police and SD were operating in the U.S.S.R. until long after you had become Chief of the RSHA in January ’43, is that not correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And you still say that that is correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: You deny that you ever knew that these Einsatz groups carried out the extermination of Jews in the U.S.S.R. until long after you had become Chief of the RSHA?
KALTENBRUNNER: I only discovered this during the arguments I had with Himmler and Hitler—I believe later in 1943—probably in November.
COL. AMEN: And you admit, I take it, that you were a Higher SS and Police Leader in Austria in 1942, right?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And Schirach was a Reich Defense Commissioner in Vienna at that time, was he not?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know when he was appointed, but I must point out that the Higher SS and Police Leaders received those powers with which they finally were invested in three different stages. In 1941, when I became Higher SS and Police Leader, the authority of such a leader was considerably less than it was at the end of the war.
COL. AMEN: Now, if the Tribunal please, I have a document which arrived by airplane yesterday, of which there is only one original copy and which, therefore, we have not been able to get translated. So I have arranged, if it is satisfactory to the Tribunal, for the interpreter to read the excerpts from that original document, which was taken from Schirach’s personal files in Vienna, and then submit the original document to the Court and have it processed just as quickly as we are able to do so. Or perhaps the Tribunal would like to see the document first. It is an original document.
THE PRESIDENT: You will read it so that it will go through into German?
COL. AMEN: Yes, Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. AMEN: This is Document Number 3876-PS. It is a report issued by Heydrich to all the Higher SS and Police Leaders and Reich Defense Commissioners on the activities of the Einsatz groups in the U.S.S.R. during the month of January 1942, and on the distribution list appears the name of this defendant.
Will you read the Exhibit USA-808?
THE INTERPRETER: The right-hand side of the document bears the initials in ink, “Sch,” and then several symbols, “Z-RV-K 4030-519/41 g,” and below that, “1320-C.” At the left on top:
“The Higher SS and Police Leader attached to the Reichsstatthalter in Vienna and in Upper and Lower Danube, within Wehrkreis XVII; the Inspector of the Order Police.”
Below that there are several file numbers. The document bears the heading, “Secret.” It is dated, “Vienna, 14 October 1941... Subject: Technical report on the battles in the East.”
THE PRESIDENT: Is that right, 14 October 1941?
THE INTERPRETER: Yes, 14 October 1941.
THE PRESIDENT: The previous date that was given was January 1942. What is the explanation of that?
COL. AMEN: It covers the month—I think there are two different documents there. You are giving the date on one. There is a different date on the other. Is that not correct?
THE INTERPRETER: That is correct.
COL. AMEN: Well, give us the date on the other document so the record will be clear.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, we shall be able to understand when we see the document.
COL. AMEN: Yes, Your Lordship. [Turning to the interpreter.] Go right ahead.
THE INTERPRETER: The date of the other document is April 23, 1942.
COL. AMEN: Go ahead.
THE INTERPRETER: I continue:
“Subject: Technical report on the battles in the East. Reference...”—and then come series of file numbers—
“The above decree of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Ministry of the Interior, and also one copy each of the technical reports of the Army Command North and the SS Police Division, are herewith forwarded to you for your information and use.”
The order is signed “Miegel.”
COL. AMEN: Now, will you just go on to the distribution list and read, if you find it on the list, this defendant’s name.
THE INTERPRETER: The name of the defendant is not on this distribution. I am coming to the next document.
COL. AMEN: Well, it is!
THE INTERPRETER: No, it is not contained in this document, and I am now reading the second document:
“Berlin, 27 February 1942. The Chief of the Security Police and the SD, IV A 1 ...”—and then several different file references—
“Top secret. Subject: Activity and situation report Number 9 of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the SD in the U.S.S.R. Attached hereto...”
COL. AMEN: Just a minute. He is reading the wrong document, Your Lordship. We will have it straight in a minute.
THE INTERPRETER: I am told I am reading the right document. It is the right document, I continue:
“Herewith attached, I submit to you the ninth comprehensive report regarding the activities of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and of the SD in the U.S.S.R. In future these reports will be sent to you currently as they appear. Signed, Heydrich.”
Then there is a stamp, “The Reich Defense Commissioner for the Wehrkreis XVII, received 5 March 1942;” and then follows the distribution, of which Number 13 reads, “To the Higher SS and Police Leader, SS Gruppenführer, Dr. Kaltenbrunner.”
COL. AMEN: His name is on the list, is it not? Now, if you will skip to “C” on that document.
THE INTERPRETER: I now read from Page 9 of the document, an extract under the heading “C. Jews:”
“The attitude of the Jews towards the Germans is still clearly hostile and criminal. It is our aim to cleanse the Eastern countries of Jews as completely as possible. Everywhere the executions are to be carried out in such a manner that they will hardly be noticed by the public. Among the population, and even among the remaining Jews, the conviction is widespread that the Jews have merely been resettled. Estonia has already been cleared of Jews. In Latvia the 29,500 Jews who remained in Riga have been reduced to 2,500. In Dünaburg there still live 962 Jews who are urgently needed for work.”
I am now skipping several paragraphs and I continue:
“In Lithuania there are now in Kaunas still 15,000 Jews, in Schaulen 4,500, and in Vilna another 15,000 who are also needed for work. In White Ruthenia the Jews are being cleared out. The number of Jews in the part of the country which has so far been turned over to the civilian administration amounts to 139,000. In the meantime 33,210 Jews have been shot by the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the SD.”
I now skip the rest of this extract and continue by reading another document. This is dated, “Berlin, 23 April 1942,” and shows an illegible initial in ink. It bears the heading, “The Chief of the Security Police and the SD, IV A 1,” and several file numbers. It bears the designation, “Top secret.” This document, which is signed by Heydrich and which shows as the date of receipt 28 April 1942, lists in the distribution in the 14th place, “To the Higher SS and Police Leader, SS Gruppenführer, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, Vienna.”
I now read from Page 11 of the report, and I read an extract headed “C. Jews”:
“Different methods were used in solving the Jewish problem in the various front sectors. Since the greater part of the Eastern territory is free of Jews, and since the few remaining Jews, who are required for most urgent work, have been put into ghettos, it was the task of the Security Police and the SD to round up those Jews who were hiding mainly in the country. Many times Jews who had left the ghetto without permission or who were not wearing the Jewish Star have been arrested. Among others, three Jews who had been sent from the Reich to the ghetto in Riga and who had escaped, were captured and publicly hanged in the ghetto. During large-scale anti-Jewish operations 3,412 Jews in Minsk, 302 in Vileika, and 2,007 in Baranowicze were shot.”
I now skip three paragraphs and continue:
“In addition to taking action against individual Jews who were known for their political or criminal activity, it was the task of the Security Police and the SD, to clean up generally the larger towns in the remaining territories of the Eastern Front. Thus, in Rakow alone 15,000, and in Artenowsk 1,224 Jews were shot, so that now there are no more Jews there. In the Crimea 1,000 Jews and Gypsies were executed.”
That is all.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, do you still have the temerity to tell this Tribunal that you knew nothing about the operations of these Einsatz groups until after you took over as Chief of the RSHA?
KALTENBRUNNER: At the top left hand corner of the document can clearly be read, “The Higher SS and Police Leader...”
THE PRESIDENT: Answer the question and then you can look at the document afterwards. Do you still say that you knew nothing about these Einsatzgruppen?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have no knowledge of the contents of this document. I want to point out that the Office of the Inspector of the Public Police dispatched this letter on 22 October 1941. Technical reports on the fighting on the Eastern Front and on the operations of the Security Police and SD, which were drafted at that time, are based on orders issued by Himmler or Heydrich and not on my orders. In no way can this document show how I regarded the entire question. If the distribution lists all the Higher SS and Police Leaders and all the offices to which these technical reports were sent, I do not regard that as proof that these offices, that is to say all the men who were working in these offices—must necessarily have known of it. You cannot assume that cognizance was actually taken of reports concerning territories over which the official in question had no jurisdiction or influence whatsoever. There is no doubt at all today that these crimes were committed in the East. But it is to be proved whether they are in any way due to my influence, either intellectually, legislatively, or administratively, and whether I approved of them, and whether I could have stopped them; all this I must absolutely deny.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, that was just one of a regular series of monthly reports, a copy of which went to you every single month. Is that not a fact, yes or no?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know how often such reports came. I see this report today for the first time. Of course, it cannot be denied that such technical reports from all battle zones concerning either the Security Police, or the Order Police operations, or the experiences of the Wehrmacht were issued and distributed all over the Reich.
COL. AMEN: All right, that is enough for me. Did you know about a letter written by your attorney, seeking evidence on your behalf at this Trial?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have not yet discussed such a letter with my Defense Counsel. Please ask him if he has informed me of this letter.
COL. AMEN: Well, are you not familiar with the fact that he wrote a letter to the Mayor’s office in Oranienburg near Berlin and received a reply to that letter to be used on your behalf?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. Please ask him. He has not told me anything about it.
COL. AMEN: Now, then I will refer you to document number...
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, are you entitled to go into professional matters between the defendant and his counsel?
COL. AMEN: I believe so in this instance, Your Lordship, because the letter was sent to us directly by the recipient of the letter, with the expectation that it would be used by us. This is no confidential communication. It was a letter...
THE PRESIDENT: Will you let the Tribunal see the letter?
COL. AMEN: Yes, Sir.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, this is the first time that I have heard of this matter. If the document is addressed to me, may I perhaps have a look at it before it becomes an item in this Trial?
COL. AMEN: Sure.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, let him look at it first.
COL. AMEN: If Your Lordship pleases...
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I explain it, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we had better hear from Colonel Amen first because he wants to introduce the document.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I say something first?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kauffmann, what do you want to say now?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Perhaps the Tribunal has already noticed that I...
THE PRESIDENT: We have not seen the document.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I have seen the document.
THE PRESIDENT: I said we have not seen it yet. We have allowed you to see it first in order that you can make any objection to it that you want to make before we see it, and then we will look at it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, I see. Mr. President, I am of the opinion that this is an unfair infringement on the rights and duties of the German Defense. The whole world may read this document. It is an inquiry which is addressed to the Mayor’s office at Oranienburg. Oranienburg was a large concentration camp. Since, according to an agreement with my colleagues, I had the task of clarifying the question of the “awareness of the German people,” I sent this letter containing questions which everybody may read to the Mayor’s office and requested that these questions be answered. It was my intention to submit these answers, if the occasion arose, to the Tribunal. The same questions have been sent out to other towns, and I have already submitted these documents for translation and shall later submit them to the Tribunal. But it is an impossible state of affairs that a letter of a defense counsel and the reply given to that defense counsel should be disclosed here by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Dr. Kauffmann. But the document that Colonel Amen was offering in evidence was not your letter to the Mayor of Oranienburg nor his answer to you.
COL. AMEN: Yes, it was.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, I thought you said it was a letter that has been sent to the Prosecution.
COL. AMEN: I said that a copy was sent to the Prosecution. As I understand it, not only by the person who received it—there was no covering letter—but also turned over to the British Prosecution in a letter dated 2 April ’46 from Major Wurmser.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand now. I do not think you said before it was a copy. What I understood was it might have been sent to you by mistake. If it were a copy of a letter which was sent to Dr. Kauffmann, then the position is clear as to what it was.
COL. AMEN: That is my understanding of it, Sir. And, of course, it is a copy of his letter but I know of no privilege whatsoever of a confidential...
THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by “a copy of his letter”? A copy of the letter sent to Dr. Kauffmann?
COL. AMEN: Sent by Dr. Kauffmann to the Mayor of Oranienburg and a copy of the reply made by the Mayor to Dr. Kauffmann; and I think you will see, if Your Lordship reads the reply, how it is that it came directly to our attention.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I add one more thing, only two or three sentences, please? I consider the presentation of these two documents a particularly severe infringement of the rights of the Defense. The Defense has had no opportunity to look at the documents of the Prosecution, and it would never have occurred to us to submit to the Tribunal documents of the Prosecution which are to our advantage. This is exclusively a matter between me, the sender of the letter, and the office answering it; how is it possible for the Prosecution to be allowed to interfere in such entirely personal matters? I do not think that is fair.
COL. AMEN: Now, if Your Lordship pleases, I think I can clear the whole thing up. This is a letter dated 2 April ’46 from Major Wurmser to the British Prosecution, and it reads as follows:
“Attached please find the original correspondence regarding Oranienburg. In accordance with your request, I have ascertained that this correspondence was received in the following way. It came addressed to the Prosecution and was delivered to the General Secretary. The original was apparently sent directly to Dr. Kauffmann and the sender, the Mayor of Oranienburg, a Mr. Klaussmann, dispatched at the same time a carbon copy to the Prosecution which not only consisted of his answer but also of the letter which was sent to him by Dr. Kauffmann.”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think we understand the circumstances now.
COL. AMEN: So I think it was sent to the Prosecution for the very purpose for which I am now endeavoring to utilize it.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, apart altogether from the question of privilege between counsel and his client, how do you say that this document, which is a letter apparently from a private individual addressed to Dr. Kauffmann, copy of which is sent to you, is evidence at all?
COL. AMEN: Because, Your Lordship, there is included in this defendant’s document book a letter which is on precisely this same point. In other words, this defendant has raised this point in his own defense. He did not read the letter.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not quite the point. This letter to Dr. Kauffmann, of which you have a copy, is not as I understand a sworn statement.
COL. AMEN: It is not sworn; no, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: How does it become evidence then? The witness is not here.
COL. AMEN: It has the same probative value that many letters introduced here in evidence have. In fact, I think it has considerably more than many of them, because it is a letter from an official, from the mayor who has conducted an inquiry and has ascertained what I consider to be one of the most important matters in the case—namely, whether...
THE PRESIDENT: No, I do not want to hear at the moment what is in the letter.
COL. AMEN: I cannot think of a thing that was more pertinent than this letter, or more important, to be brought out at this Trial, particularly when it—well, you do not want me to go into that—particularly when it is something which the defendant has sought to interpose as his own defense, and which now turns out...
THE PRESIDENT: But he has not sought to introduce it for his own defense.
COL. AMEN: Well, I say he has sought to introduce that issue by the letter in his document book so that, even were it not otherwise perhaps relevant, it surely becomes so when the defendant has raised that precise issue in his own documents. But even aside from that, it seems to me that it is one of the most important issues in this case.
I will not characterize it in words since Your Lordship does not wish me to, but I can hardly think of anything more pertinent than the matter set forth there in the form of an official communication.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen the only question I was asking you was how the particular document, which is an unsworn document, came to be competent evidence. Has it been seen by the witness who is under cross-examination?
COL. AMEN: Well, as an official communication, Sir, to his counsel. In the course of the discharge of his official duties as a mayor—it is a part of his job.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kauffmann.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I do not wish to speak now about the question of procedure. I merely want to mention that this letter...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I do not want to deal at great length with the question of procedure which we touched upon just now, but I wish to emphasize that these two documents have nothing to do with the case of Kaltenbrunner as such. As I have just said, anyone may look at the document; but, since this document has nothing to do with Kaltenbrunner, it has from the very outset no value as evidence.
COL. AMEN: Well, it has even further probative value, Your Lordship, in that, if the matters referred to in this letter were known, as described in the letter to the people in Oranienburg, surely the person who occupies the position as Chief of the RSHA in Germany must certainly have the knowledge which the smallest local civilian appears to have.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the document is inadmissible.
COL. AMEN: That was to have been my last document, Your Lordship; so that concludes the cross-examination, except for one point. There is a witness named Hoess, who is called on behalf of the defendant, and through whom I would like to introduce two exhibits. If he is not to be called, however, then I would like to introduce those exhibits through the defendant. So I am wondering whether we could obtain a definite statement as to whether or not the witness Hoess is actually to be called by the Defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, are you proposing to call Hoess?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You are.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions to put to the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid I did not hear what you said, Dr. Kauffmann.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to his seat. Wait a minute, wait a minute!
CHIEF COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE L. N. SMIRNOV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Just a minute—stay! Mr. President, we have a few questions to put to the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, we understood the other day that the Counsel for the Prosecution had agreed that there should be only one cross-examination of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: We wish to request the Tribunal to allow us to put to the defendant a few questions, which will not take very long but which are quite indispensable for further questioning.
THE PRESIDENT: In the opinion of the Tribunal, I think you know counsel ought to settle beforehand what questions are indispensable and then have them put by the counsel who cross-examines. That is the whole object of the scheme.
Sir David, when we saw you on this subject, did you not tell us that all the prosecutors had agreed that so far as this defendant was concerned he should only be cross-examined by one?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that was the position. I understand that the Soviet Delegation have some special points, and they were going to ask, as a matter of grace of the Tribunal, whether they could put them. That is what my Soviet colleagues have informed me.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost?
M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): My explanation will be very brief, Mr. President. In principle, the Prosecution entrusts one man to ask all these questions. It is impossible, however, for the entire investigation and examination to be carried out by one member of the Prosecution only because we do represent four different nations which have not divergent but certainly individual interests. The only person qualified to speak in the interests of a nation is the representative of that nation. I think, therefore, that the Tribunal should permit us to ask questions from time to time when we ask to be allowed to do so.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, you are not applying now, are you, for leave to have a third cross-examination; you are just speaking on general principles?
M. DUBOST: Mr. President, it is a question of principle. The Prosecution has limited itself in order to economize on time, but it requests the Tribunal for authorization to intercede when it is necessary to do so in order to represent the interests of a country.
I will not ask any questions which might have occurred to me following the interrogation by my colleague of the United States; I do not wish to retard the proceedings. I think, however, that the Tribunal could tell us that in principle we remain free to ask questions which concern our countries, especially since we alone are competent to represent the interests of our countries and cannot transfer this competency to one of our colleagues.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, could you inform the Tribunal upon what questions, what points you want to cross-examine?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yesterday, when the defendant was replying to Colonel Amen’s questions and denying his participation in the extermination of the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto, he stressed that the Chief of Police in occupied Poland, Krüger, was allegedly directly subordinated to Himmler and had no connection with Kaltenbrunner at all. In the Polish documents which have just reached me, and in connection with which the Soviet Delegation has changed the order which it has primarily intended to observe, in these Polish documents there is...
THE PRESIDENT: I understand that point. Are there any other points?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The second point refers to another document already submitted by the Soviet Delegation, and this point has not been covered by the preceding question; but it is of intense interest from the viewpoint of the documents previously presented. It is in regard to these two questions that I wish to examine the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: You are aware that we are going to adjourn at half past 12 for the purpose of dealing with the documents of the Defendant Rosenberg, but you may certainly cross-examine upon these points if you will do it as shortly as you can.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I believe, Mr. President, that we shall be able to finish the cross-examination in 15 minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, Colonel Amen yesterday submitted to the Tribunal a document which disclosed your active participation in the liquidation of the Warsaw Ghetto. Perhaps you can tell us under whose orders the police were. Rebutting this document you dwelt at great length on the fact that the Police Chiefs in the occupied territories were directly subordinated to Reichsführer SS Himmler and had nothing to do with you.
Do you stick to this statement?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, but it should be supplemented. I also said yesterday that the Higher SS and Police Chief in the Government General was subordinate to Himmler and that, in turn, the SS and Police Leaders of the smaller districts were subordinate to him.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you can tell us to whom the police officials were subordinate?
KALTENBRUNNER: The commanders of the Security Police, the Order Police, and the Waffen-SS were subordinate to the Higher SS and to the Chief of Police. They were also subordinated to the Chiefs of Police and SS in the smaller districts.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you can remember your second statement as well, when you declared yourself opposed to Krüger’s extreme tendencies towards the Polish Jews, and that you had even attempted to restrain him?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have stated that I agreed with Frank in favoring the release of Krüger—that is, his transfer from the Government General.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like to hand Frank’s diary to the defendant.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
Let him turn to Page 13, where Krüger is mentioned, and then to Page 16. From this Page 16, I shall read three paragraphs. Read and follow if it has been carefully translated, “There is no doubt”—says Krüger—“that the removal of the Jews has had a favorable effect on pacification...”
KALTENBRUNNER: That passage has not been submitted to me here. I have Page 13 of the document in my hand.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well then, we shall show you Page 16, beginning with the words “There is no doubt...” I begin again:
“There is no doubt but that the removal of the Jews has also had a favorable effect on pacification. It was for the police one of their gravest and most unpleasant tasks; but it had to be carried out by order of the Führer, since it was necessary in the interests of Europe.”
I omit one paragraph and would ask you to do the same:
“One was forced to remove the Jews from the armament industries and from all industries and factories of military and economic interest unless they are exclusively employed on important war work. In such cases the Jews were collected in the large camps and from there sent by day to the munition factories. The Reichsführer SS, however, desires that the employment of these Jews stop, too. He had a long conversation on this subject with Lieutenant General Schindler and is of opinion that this wish of the Reichsführer SS cannot be carried out in full. There are among the Jewish workers specialists, skilled mechanics, and other qualified artisans who cannot at present be replaced by Poles.”
I draw your attention to the next sentence:
“He therefore requests the SS Obergruppenführer, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, to describe the situation to the Reichsführer SS and to request him to refrain from removing these skilled Jewish workers. The physically best-conditioned of the Jews had been retrained by the industries, the so-called ‘Maccabeans,’ who worked magnificently, as well as female workers who had proved physically stronger than the male Jews. We experienced the same conditions in the clearing of the Warsaw Ghetto. By the way, this task had been very difficult.”
I omit a sentence and quote the following:
“It has been proved that here, too, the Jewesses, arms in hand, had fought the men of the Waffen-SS and the police to the end.”
Do these passages not prove that Krüger considered you as his commanding officer, and that when the majority of Jews had already been murdered in Poland and only a very small number of good specialists were left, Krüger appealed to Himmler—through you, as his chief—to allow these Jews to live? Does this not bear witness to the fact that Krüger considered you as his chief and acted through you?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, Mr. Prosecutor. This document, on the contrary, proves something quite different. In the first place, he himself says here that the evacuation of the Warsaw Ghetto had previously taken place; in the second place, he says that he begs me to go to Himmler and to remonstrate with him. What I said to Himmler is not contained in the document; and the fact that, on that occasion, I told Himmler for the first time, “Now I know what is going on,” and protested against it, does not appear in this document. But surely I must be given the opportunity to declare and prove here that I took steps against this action; and if you cross-examine Frank or the witnesses...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One moment, you have already mentioned this, Defendant.
KALTENBRUNNER: I have not finished. I have not yet finished this point. If you question the witnesses on the subject of “Government General,” you will discover exactly how, on that occasion, I paid my first and only visit to the Government General, and that what I experienced and learned there became the subject of a discussion with Himmler. You cannot accuse me, on the one hand, of knowing of all these things without giving me, on the other hand, the opportunity to describe what were my reactions. In the last 2 years of the war, circumstances placed me in a position where I was able to see what was happening in the Reich and later on, near the end, in the Government General as well. But you are not giving me an opportunity to explain how I reacted, I the man who had the misfortune to get such a position at the end of the war.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One little moment. But why did Krüger act through you?
KALTENBRUNNER: And further, this document does not indicate in any way in what capacity I was there; not once does he mention that I was there as his police superior. He knows only that naturally, as Chief of the Intelligence Service, I had to report very often to Himmler. So he asked me on this occasion to make these reports. But Krüger was—as it surely appears in the document—State Secretary for the security system in the Government General. He was State Secretary there, and as State Secretary he was subordinate to the Governor General, and as State Secretary...
THE PRESIDENT: You are going too fast, and you are making far too much of a speech.
KALTENBRUNNER: ...and as State Secretary for police matters in the Government General, he was, of course, immediately subordinate to Himmler. That must be...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I beg you to answer briefly: Did Krüger ask you to report to Himmler on this subject or not? That is the only thing I am asking you.
KALTENBRUNNER: As far as I know, this meeting was a large meeting of administrative officials and everyone asked all those who were closest to the Führer or Himmler...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me, “yes” or “no”: Did he ask you to report, or not?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know that.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So you do not know. Then I will ask you a second question.
KALTENBRUNNER: From the wording I can only take...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One moment.
KALTENBRUNNER: You are not allowing me to finish.
THE PRESIDENT: What did you say to the last question? Was not the question, “Did you go there?” Colonel Smirnov?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I had another question to put, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you what your last question was.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I asked the following question, Mr. President: Did Krüger report to Himmler through Kaltenbrunner? I was asking the defendant to answer “yes” or “no” and to abstain from making speeches.
THE PRESIDENT: What was your last question?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did Krüger ask Kaltenbrunner to report to Himmler on this subject. My second question—Mr. President, are you asking about my second question?
THE PRESIDENT: I wanted him to answer your question. Will you tell him what question you want him to answer. Don’t ask him two; ask him one question. Can’t you hear what I said?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Ask him one question, and see whether you can try and get him to answer it.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did Krüger ask for this to be reported to Himmler, and what did he say?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is possible that he did ask me but not as a superior. You must realize what type of assembly it was; that must also become apparent from the diary. I did not go there as the Chief of the Security Police, or as Krüger’s superior; but Krüger, like dozens of other people, reported on the food situation, the administrative system...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would ask you to refrain from further explanations. You answered my question, and it is not worth continuing on the subject.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the matter, Dr. Seidl?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, a quotation from Frank’s diary has been read to the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. Frank’s diary consists of 42 volumes and I should like to suggest that the prosecutor give the place and the volume and the date of the entry, so that one can determine in what connection that occurred.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Here we have a precise indication: This is a conference of 31 May 1943 in Kraków. There it is headed “Technical Conference...” The document is registered as Exhibit Number USA-613, Document 2233(aa)-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: This diary presumably got a date.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is correct. This conference took place on 31 May 1943; there is the date.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what Dr. Seidl wants to know.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have a second question to put to the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If, as the defendant says, he was exclusively employed on intelligence work and with nothing else, then did he consider the buying over of the Iran elections and the receipt from Ribbentrop of 1 million tomans to send to agents as entering purely within the scope of intelligence work?
KALTENBRUNNER: I certainly had nothing to do with the buying of votes in Iran; but I admit, of course, that agents of my Intelligence Service did work in Iran.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You did not ask Ribbentrop for 1 million tomans for bribery?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I had sufficient means to pay my agents myself.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This letter bearing Kaltenbrunner’s signature has already been submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-178, during Ribbentrop’s cross-examination. Mention is made in this letter of the allocation of 1 million tomans. Does the defendant deny this evidence which Ribbentrop, himself, has admitted?
KALTENBRUNNER: I believe that I did not demand any money from Ribbentrop because I had enough money. Show me this letter. It might be quite possible. I had sufficient funds at my disposal for the intelligence service.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The original of this letter has already been submitted to the Tribunal during Ribbentrop’s interrogatory. We have only the copy but the original, of course, can be brought immediately from the document room. It is said here that:
“In order to exert a decisive influence on the election results, 400,000 tomans would be needed for bribes in Teheran and at least 600,000 tomans for the rest of Iran.”
The letter ends as follows:
“I request you to tell me briefly if it would be possible to obtain 1 million tomans from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
It would be possible to transfer this money by people whom we are sending there by airplane.
“Heil Hitler. Your devoted Kaltenbrunner, SS Obergruppenführer.”
The contents of this letter are quite definite. Ribbentrop acknowledged the letter. Are you denying Ribbentrop’s evidence?
KALTENBRUNNER: Not in the least, but I would like to add the following as far as this document is concerned. I cannot remember it easily because it was written in Office VI. I do not know the contents—did not know them until now. I am absolutely sure that I signed it, because it is a letter to a Minister of the Reich which, of course, for reasons of tact, I had to sign personally. As to the subject itself, I am grateful that the last question in this cross-examination is a question which actually refers to my sphere of activities proper. You are the first prosecutor to whom I must be grateful on that account, and who at last can no longer conceal the fact that my agents and my activities extended as far as Iran.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Is that your signature?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions to put to this defendant, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: What document is that you put to him then?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This is Exhibit Number USSR-178, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: 178?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is Kaltenbrunner’s letter addressed to Von Ribbentrop, Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 27 June 1943.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you. Now, the Tribunal will deal with Dr. Thoma’s documents for Rosenberg. Is the Prosecution ready? Are you ready, Mr. Dodd?
MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it be convenient for Mr. Dodd to tell us how the position stands? Would it be agreeable to you, Dr. Thoma, if Mr. Dodd tells us how the position stands?
DR. THOMA: Yes.
MR. DODD: Dr. Thoma has prepared three document books, and there are two volumes to the first book—two parts, two volumes—and I should like to take up first, Volumes I and II of the first document book. In the first, Volume I...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already looked at these volumes.
MR. DODD: Well, there is contained in the book that has been submitted to us a number of authorities, starting with that first document by Falckenberg, The History of Modern Philosophy, and running down to the Introduction into the Psychology of the Nations, by Hellpach; and really, as we understand the ruling of the Court, on the 8th of March, it stated that these books could be used so far as appropriate for the purpose of argument, and to this end they should be produced and made available to Defense Counsel; and the Court went on to say that any particular passage which Counsel for the Defense wish to quote should be incorporated in the document book for translation.
We object to all of these excerpts and for mostly the same reasons, and I think I can discuss them as a group rather than individually.
THE PRESIDENT: We have all read them, and we wish only to hear any arguments which Dr. Thoma desires to make comments upon.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I would like to stress that only the legal points of view prompt me to offer writings of contemporary historians as evidence in this Trial. The Tribunal has to decide whether there is a connection between Rosenberg’s ideology and the war crimes and crimes against Jews.
I assert that, in addition to that ideology, other factors—so-called preliminary conditions, that is, the entire contemporary situation, the philosophical and mental outlook—contributed their part; but the main question is this: Did Rosenberg culpably anticipate the dangerous possibilities of his ideas and nevertheless promulgate them? In what manner can he be considered guilty if Rosenberg was convinced that his ideas were right, and if he was unaware of their dangerous development? I shall therefore indicate facts about the mental outlook of the time which prove that his ideas were perceived, and even partly championed by exact science. I will show that other countries introduced certain National Socialist measures, such as suppressing births of children unfit for life, even before Rosenberg’s books were written. Further, I shall allude to the results of the investigations of natural science on the natural basis for the existence of man and the ensuing limitation of man’s freedom. I shall point to the effects and consequences of a technical age; and I want to refer to the fact that irrational ideas and conceptions have been taken seriously even by rational empirical science; and I want to show how laws govern the development of philosophical concepts and political movements which are often inevitable. On the basis of these scientific conclusions, it is possible that Rosenberg underestimated or overlooked the dangerous side of his ideology—to wit, that all ideas and conceptions degenerate according to the laws governing the human mind. The question of guilt, therefore, must be regarded in a new light and, in my opinion, also the question of carelessness should be examined. These theses will be extracted from works on natural science by Von Eickstedt, Mühlmann, Scheidt, Keiter, and from the philosophical works of Hellpach, Messer, Tillich, Buber et cetera.
Gentlemen of the Tribunal, the belief that a philosophy of the irrational might be applied to politics may sound ridiculous, but I would mention that only 15 years ago in Germany it was preached that a policy based on Christian ethics was nonsensical, because Christian ethics could not be applied in the political sphere. Today we know that this is possible, and, therefore, I am pleading before a Tribunal who, to my conviction, receive their authority from these ethical motives. That is only one example for the importance of the irrational in politics. The belief in the power of the ideal and the moral is, after all, irrational, too.
Gentlemen of the Tribunal, the question of the causal connection between Rosenberg’s ideology and the war crimes must not, or rather should not, be confused with the charge of Rosenberg’s actual participation in the murder of the Jews and the crimes in the East. This has another connection. I will have to try to refute the actual participation of Rosenberg in these matters separately.
I would like to draw your attention to one more important viewpoint. Organizations, whose members formerly had in part been under the influence of Christianity and the so-called youth movement, and who let themselves be won over to National Socialism because they believed that by it their Christian and idealistic interests could be realized, are also indicated. They are now left helpless in their camps, disappointed in this world. They, too, have the right to ask that the Tribunal be told what they believed in and what they had been taught. I believe that I have made it clear that I am not trying to deliver a lecture on aesthetics but that these are very important legal problems.
Gentlemen of the Tribunal, if any of the authors are unsuitable, then I shall forego quoting them. Perhaps Lapouge may not be suitable at all. I withdraw his work, although it is precisely Lapouge who points out that certain biological laws have also been applied in the legislation of other states. But Mr. Justice Jackson objected to a passage from Lapouge, and I withdraw it herewith. There are also one or two works of Martin Buber which I am willing to withdraw. But I particularly wanted to use Martin Buber to prove that we are concerned here with principles which have nothing whatsoever to do with anti-Semitism but merely represent a philosophy which is as justified as the philosophy of rationalism during the last centuries. But I ask the Tribunal that, during the presentation of evidence, cognizance be taken only of actual philosophical-historical proofs and facts. Gentlemen of the Tribunal, if I presented these facts in my address, I would run the risk of presenting only my own knowledge. That is why I need these documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, we understand that you object to all up to that book of Hellpach’s. Then, with reference to the other volumes, the others are all Rosenberg’s own documents, are they not?
MR. DODD: Except the two last.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the two last are in the same category, I suppose, as the ones down to Hellpach, are they not?
MR. DODD: Yes, there are also some quotations from newspapers contained in the document books, on Pages 182 to 185. We also made objection to them.
THE PRESIDENT: Are they in Volume II?
MR. DODD: Yes, they are in Volume II of Book 1.
THE PRESIDENT: I was dealing, at the moment, with Volume I of Document Book 1.
MR. DODD: That was the objection in Volume I.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, you are not objecting to his other books?
MR. DODD: No, Your Honor, we are not.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, in Book 2 there is not an index, is there?
MR. DODD: We have no objection to anything that is contained in Book 2.
THE PRESIDENT: In Volume II to Book 1?
MR. DODD: We were talking about Volume II, Book 1.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; yes, I see. Then in Book 2—you do not object to Book 2?
MR. DODD: No, we do not.
THE PRESIDENT: Nor Book 3?
MR. DODD: No, we have no objection to Book 3. I think our Russian colleagues have an objection to the affidavit of Dr. Dencker. I would prefer, however, that they address the Tribunal on that subject themselves.
THE PRESIDENT: And then, is there a fourth book?
MR. DODD: No, Your Honor, there is not, but we have not talked about the second part of the first book.
THE PRESIDENT: I was told that you had.
MR. DODD: No, I think not. I did mention the newspaper articles.
THE PRESIDENT: Where are these documents that you are referring to, in the second volume of the first book?
MR. DODD: The first one will be found beginning on Page 182 of that second volume of the first book.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, those are the last two in the index.
MR. DODD: Yes, they are.
THE PRESIDENT: We understand that you are objecting to them.
MR. DODD: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: But the index in the first volume of the first book is the index for both the volumes.
MR. DODD: Yes, it is.
THE PRESIDENT: And what you are objecting to is all documents up to Hellpach and the last two?
MR. DODD: Yes, that is exactly right.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand. Then, with reference to Books 2 and 3 you do not object, but the Soviet Union wishes to offer an objection to this affidavit by Professor Dencker.
MR. DODD: That is exactly right, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better hear what the Soviets say about that.
STATE COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE M. Y. RAGINSKY (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): I invite the Tribunal’s attention to Document Rosenberg-38. This is in the third document book, Page 29. This document is a letter, dated 24 August 1931.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, is it not an affidavit?
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: No. I am referring to two documents, Mr. President, Document Rosenberg-38 and the second one dealing with Dencker’s affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. Yes, I got Page 21. We will deal with Document 38 first, that is Page 29.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: This document is the letter of an unknown wine merchant, addressed to Rosenberg, concerning some sort of newspaper paragraph. We do not know this newspaper paragraph since defense counsel, Dr. Thoma, has not submitted it; and, therefore, we believe it is not relevant to the matter and all the more so since in none of his claims and in none of his explanations did Dr. Thoma explain what this document was supposed to prove nor what this letter was about.
I would then like to mention a few considerations regarding the second document, concerning Dencker’s affidavit presented by defense counsel Dr. Thoma. This affidavit is also in the third document book, Pages 8-11, and is registered as Rosenberg Number 35. Judging by the contents, Dencker, a former member of Economic Staff East, participated in the perpetration of war crimes in the territories occupied by the German troops. This Dencker took part in the looting of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union.
I wish to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that defense counsel, Dr. Thoma, on 6 April of this year, requested the Tribunal to allow the admission of this document, and the General Secretary of the Tribunal got the opinion of the Prosecution. However, before the Tribunal had made up its mind, before the Prosecution had come to a conclusion, Dencker’s affidavit was included in the document book, mimeographed and distributed to everybody. What, may I ask, is this affidavit? We consider, and it is very easy to prove, that the information contained in this affidavit throws a false light on the factual state of affairs. It contains a number of slanderous and incorrect statements which have already been refuted by various documents submitted to the Tribunal and read into the record. Therefore, inasmuch as Dencker has not been summoned before the Tribunal as a witness and we are deprived of the possibility of exposing the mendacity of his evidence under cross-examination, we consider that these documents should not be admitted by the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Thoma.
DR. THOMA: Gentlemen, I agree that Professor Dr. Dencker, who states that 180 million Reichsmark worth of tractors and other agricultural machinery was taken to the Ukraine, should be called as a witness. But this document is striking evidence of the fact that reconstruction was in process in the Ukraine, that an efficient administration was intended, that the land was not to be stupidly exploited, but that long-term plans were made in the interest of the country and the population. I, therefore, ask the Tribunal to admit this affidavit in evidence. If necessary, I shall make an application that Professor Dencker—in Bonn—be called as a witness, in case the Tribunal should be impressed with the statement of the Soviet Prosecutor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. THOMA: And also, Mr. President, I beg your pardon, but I did not understand the previous objection regarding Document Book Number 3. I do not have my Document Book Number 3 with me, and I do not know what the objection was.
THE PRESIDENT: On Page 29 is a letter addressed to Rosenberg by somebody without signature. It is Rosenberg-38.
DR. THOMA: Oh, yes; but that document has been admitted by the Tribunal, and the signature is “Adolf Hitler.” Apparently, the typist was not able to read that.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a letter, is it?
DR. THOMA: Yes, Sir; it has already been approved. It has been approved, Gentlemen. But, I beg to apologize; I still do not quite understand. Is Hellpach the only one of my entire document book who has been approved? Is it Sir David’s or Mr. Dodd’s wish that only Hellpach should be quoted and nobody else? In that case I should like to have an opportunity to go a little into detail on what the other authors were intended to prove. For instance, I...
THE PRESIDENT: We have not made any decision yet.
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We thought that you had given us the reasons in support of the documents in Book 1, Volumes I and II.
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: If you have given us the reasons, it is not necessary for you to say anything further.
DR. THOMA: Yes, Mr. President; but I thought that, with reference to the different books, I might state very briefly what I wished to prove.
With Messer, Tillich, Leeuw, and Bergson, I am trying to prove that neoromanticism—that is, the philosophy of the irrational, whose forerunner was Rousseau—invaded Germany with elementary force and was at the same time influenced by French, English, and American philosophers.
Secondly, through Martin Buber I wish to prove that this philosophy is not anti-Semitic, but that, on the contrary, Martin Buber not only preached this philosophy but also recommended its application in practice; it is precisely Martin Buber’s work wherein we find those vital terms and expressions, which have acquired such importance in this Trial, such as the significance of blood, the myth of blood, the relation between national character and living space, of intuition, of the concepts of movement, of the character of inheritage, and so forth.
And further, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, in connection with these quotations from Eickstedt, Mühlmann, Scheidt, Keiter, I wish to state that these authors are not National Socialists, but that, in fact, they were partly opposed to Rosenberg’s ideology; but they are proof of the fact that the concepts of race, people, nation, blood, and soil, et cetera, are recognized by natural science experts. And Hellpach, in his Introduction to the Psychology of Nations, made the extremely important statement—and Hellpach is a very famous name in German philosophic literature—that every thesis leads to a synthesis and eventually breaks down.
Gentlemen, I have only one brief concluding remark to make. In the last number of Die Neue Zeitung there was an article to the effect that in the French Constituent Assembly a few days ago a discussion on one of the most important and basic issues of our times had begun, a discussion on the rights of man—during which the inner attitude of the members of the resistance was examined and definite theses were set up regarding liberty and the crises liable to affect the rights of man, and various contradictions were pointed out.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. THOMA: And, Gentlemen, the following was established: There is a contradiction between the preaching of liberty and the ever greater enslavement by the machine. That is exactly what we assert. Secondly, there is a contradiction between the increase of material wealth and the decrease of spiritual values. Thirdly, contradiction is involved in every type of progress, in that every improvement is counterbalanced by corresponding decadence. Fourthly, there is an opposition between the ideals of humanism of the 18th century and the discoveries of the science of the human being—biology and psychoanalysis—which demonstrate that man is subject to the laws of nature.
Fifthly, contradiction between the broad masses of people who are “enlightened” by such superficial means as newspapers, radio, motion pictures, and all types of propaganda, and the disappearance of a thinking and cultured elite.
That was the subject of debate in the Constituent Assembly of the present French Parliament, and that is why I suggest, Gentlemen, that such questions also have a place in this Trial, since they are indicative of the political and mental attitude of the people, because highly ethical consideration may be derived from the concept of nationality. The fact that they have deteriorated is due to philosophical and biological process and partly to training, but only in part.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished, Dr. Thoma? Have you finished what you wanted to say?
DR. THOMA: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, of course, has not made its decision yet, and it will consider your arguments. But I am bound to point out to you that there is no charge in the Indictment or in this case against the Defendant Rosenberg either that he invented his philosophy, or that he held certain philosophical ideas. The charge against him is that he made a certain use of his philosophical ideas. That is all I have to say.
The only other matter which I want to mention to you is an application you made for calling Rosenberg, not first, but at some other point in the course of his case; and as to that, if the Tribunal should come to the conclusion that these other philosophical works are not matters which ought to be considered, is it not really unnecessary to put off the calling of the Defendant Rosenberg to some later stage? Would it not be in the interests of expedition that he should be called first?
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, there are two things I might say to that. I was under the erroneous impression that any evidence that is taken must begin with the hearing of the accused. I assumed that documents could not be read prior to that, and that is why I asked that I be allowed to produce some introductory documents first, so that the examination of the Defendant Rosenberg could proceed more smoothly, because in my opinion the Tribunal would become acquainted with the facts much more quickly through the documents. Furthermore, I asked for the Witness Riecke, who could also quickly acquaint you with the Eastern problems and particularly with the food problem and who would expedite matters if he were heard before Rosenberg. That is how I planned it. I would like to read in the first sequence the most important documents first—not only the ideological ones, but all those concerning the Einsatzstab and the administration of the East; then I would like to call the witness Riecke, and after that the Defendant Rosenberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal has already indicated that in its opinion, in every ordinary case, it tends to expedition if the defendant is called first; and, of course, any document which is material can be put to the defendant in the course of his evidence for any explanation which he may have to give upon it.
DR. THOMA: I believe, Your Honor, that if I were to make very brief remarks concerning the documents, it would take less time than if Rosenberg dealt with the individual documents. That is why I thought I might read some of the documents at the start, only to save time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, in order that you should be prepared and able to go on on Monday morning, the Tribunal, having considered this matter, rules that Rosenberg should be called first. That is the ruling of the Tribunal.
As to the documents, we will consider what our judgment shall be with reference to the documents which are objected to.
I said Monday morning. I beg your pardon. I meant at the end of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner’s case.
DR. THOMA: Your Honors, I merely wish to say a few words with reference to Rosenberg’s ideology. I am asking the Tribunal to read the speech by M. De Menthon, who states that this ideology was in itself criminal since it was related to his activity as editor and publisher of the Völkischer Beobachter and as author of the Myth and other writings. He says that in this way he psychologically prepared the German nation for an offensive war.
THE PRESIDENT: I said that it was not a question of what was the origin of his philosophy or the mere holding of the philosophical ideas, but the use to which he puts these philosophical ideas. Well, the Tribunal will consider it.
MR. DODD: If Your Honor please, I want to make it clear that we do object to the works of Hellpach. I rather gather that Dr. Dix had asked me to request that his documents be heard today.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it is too late now, but we will consider them shortly if Dr. Dix wishes it. We will consider them very soon.
DR. DIX: I would appreciate that. We discussed it first with Sir David, and then I discussed it with Dr. Dodd and Mr. Albrecht, and these gentlemen have raised objections which should be brought before the Court. But translations have not yet been made, and a decision ought to be made soon, or else the document book will not be ready. I would appreciate it if we could briefly discuss that on Monday.
THE PRESIDENT: We will try to do it on Monday.
DR. DIX: On Monday?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 15 April 1946 at 1000 hours.]
ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTH DAY Monday, 15 April 1946
Morning Session
MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal: The report is made that the Defendant Ribbentrop is absent from this session of the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: I will deal first of all with the documents of the Defendant Rosenberg.
The Tribunal rules that all the documents in Book 1, Volume I and Volume II, should be denied, up to and including the book by Hellpach, that is to say, Exhibits 1 to 6 and also Exhibit 7(e) and Exhibit 8.
Secondly, the Tribunal rules that it will take judicial notice of Exhibits 7(a) to 7(d); but it rules that those exhibits, 7 to 7(d), are not to be read at the present stage but may be quoted by counsel in his final speech.
Thirdly, the Tribunal allows Books 2 and 3.
And fourthly, the Tribunal rules that the Defendant Rosenberg shall be called first and any documents which have been allowed may be put to him in the course of his examination.
That is all.
Now, Dr. Kauffmann.
DR. KAUFFMANN: With the agreement of the Tribunal, I now call the witness Hoess.
[The witness Hoess took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Stand up. Will you state your name?
RUDOLF FRANZ FERDINAND HOESS (Witness): Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, your statements will have far-reaching significance. You are perhaps the only one who can throw some light upon certain hidden aspects, and who can tell which people gave the orders for the destruction of European Jewry, and can further state how this order was carried out and to what degree the execution was kept a secret.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, will you kindly put questions to the witness.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.
[Turning to the witness.] From 1940 to 1943, you were the Commander of the camp at Auschwitz. Is that true?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And during that time, hundreds of thousands of human beings were sent to their death there. Is that correct?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that you, yourself, have made no exact notes regarding the figures of the number of those victims because you were forbidden to make them?
HOESS: Yes, that is correct.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it furthermore correct that exclusively one man by the name of Eichmann had notes about this, the man who had the task of organizing and assembling these people?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it furthermore true that Eichmann stated to you that in Auschwitz a total sum of more than 2 million Jews had been destroyed?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Men, women, and children?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You were a participant in the World War?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then in 1922, you entered the Party?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Were you a member of the SS?
HOESS: Since 1934.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that you, in the year 1924, were sentenced to a lengthy term of hard labor because you participated in a so-called political murder?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then at the end of 1934, you went to the concentration camp of Dachau?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What task did you receive?
HOESS: At first, I was the leader of a block of prisoners and then I became clerk and finally, the administrator of the property of prisoners.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And how long did you stay there?
HOESS: Until 1938.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What job did you have from 1938 on and where were you then?
HOESS: In 1938 I went to the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen where, to begin with, I was adjutant to the commander and later on I became the head of the protective custody camp.
DR. KAUFFMANN: When were you commander at Auschwitz?
HOESS: I was commander at Auschwitz from May 1940 until December 1943.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the highest number of human beings, prisoners, ever held at one time at Auschwitz?
HOESS: The highest number of internees held at one time at Auschwitz, was about 140,000 men and women.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that in 1941 you were ordered to Berlin to see Himmler? Please state briefly what was discussed.
HOESS: Yes. In the summer of 1941 I was summoned to Berlin to Reichsführer SS Himmler to receive personal orders. He told me something to the effect—I do not remember the exact words—that the Führer had given the order for a final solution of the Jewish question. We, the SS, must carry out that order. If it is not carried out now then the Jews will later on destroy the German people. He had chosen Auschwitz on account of its easy access by rail and also because the extensive site offered space for measures ensuring isolation.
DR. KAUFFMANN: During that conference did Himmler tell you that this planned action had to be treated as a secret Reich matter?
HOESS: Yes. He stressed that point. He told me that I was not even allowed to say anything about it to my immediate superior Gruppenführer Glücks. This conference concerned the two of us only and I was to observe the strictest secrecy.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the position held by Glücks whom you have just mentioned?
HOESS: Gruppenführer Glücks was, so to speak, the inspector of concentration camps at that time and he was immediately subordinate to the Reichsführer.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Does the expression “secret Reich matter” mean that no one was permitted to make even the slightest allusion to outsiders without endangering his own life?
HOESS: Yes, “secret Reich matter” means that no one was allowed to speak about these matters with any person and that everyone promised upon his life to keep the utmost secrecy.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you happen to break that promise?
HOESS: No, not until the end of 1942.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Why do you mention that date? Did you talk to outsiders after that date?
HOESS: At the end of 1942 my wife’s curiosity was aroused by remarks made by the then Gauleiter of Upper Silesia, regarding happenings in my camp. She asked me whether this was the truth and I admitted that it was. That was my only breach of the promise I had given to the Reichsführer. Otherwise I have never talked about it to anyone else.
DR. KAUFFMANN: When did you meet Eichmann?
HOESS: I met Eichmann about 4 weeks after having received that order from the Reichsführer. He came to Auschwitz to discuss the details with me on the carrying out of the given order. As the Reichsführer had told me during our discussion, he had instructed Eichmann to discuss the carrying out of the order with me and I was to receive all further instructions from him.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you briefly tell whether it is correct that the camp of Auschwitz was completely isolated, describing the measures taken to insure as far as possible the secrecy of carrying out of the task given to you.
HOESS: The Auschwitz camp as such was about 3 kilometers away from the town. About 20,000 acres of the surrounding country had been cleared of all former inhabitants, and the entire area could be entered only by SS men or civilian employees who had special passes. The actual compound called “Birkenau,” where later on the extermination camp was constructed, was situated 2 kilometers from the Auschwitz camp. The camp installations themselves, that is to say, the provisional installations used at first were deep in the woods and could from nowhere be detected by the eye. In addition to that, this area had been declared a prohibited area and even members of the SS who did not have a special pass could not enter it. Thus, as far as one could judge, it was impossible for anyone except authorized persons to enter that area.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then the railway transports arrived. During what period did these transports arrive and about how many people, roughly, were in such a transport?
HOESS: During the whole period up until 1944 certain operations were carried out at irregular intervals in the different countries, so that one cannot speak of a continuous flow of incoming transports. It was always a matter of 4 to 6 weeks. During those 4 to 6 weeks two to three trains, containing about 2,000 persons each, arrived daily. These trains were first of all shunted to a siding in the Birkenau region and the locomotives then went back. The guards who had accompanied the transport had to leave the area at once and the persons who had been brought in were taken over by guards belonging to the camp.
They were there examined by two SS medical officers as to their fitness for work. The internees capable of work at once marched to Auschwitz or to the camp at Birkenau and those incapable of work were at first taken to the provisional installations, then later to the newly constructed crematoria.
DR. KAUFFMANN: During an interrogation I had with you the other day you told me that about 60 men were designated to receive these transports, and that these 60 persons, too, had been bound to the same secrecy described before. Do you still maintain that today?
HOESS: Yes, these 60 men were always on hand to take the internees not capable of work to these provisional installations and later on to the other ones. This group, consisting of about ten leaders and subleaders, as well as doctors and medical personnel, had repeatedly been told, both in writing and verbally, that they were bound to the strictest secrecy as to all that went on in the camps.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Were there any signs that might show an outsider who saw these transports arrive, that they would be destroyed or was that possibility so small because there was in Auschwitz an unusually large number of incoming transports, shipments of goods and so forth?
HOESS: Yes, an observer who did not make special notes for that purpose could obtain no idea about that because to begin with not only transports arrived which were destined to be destroyed but also other transports arrived continuously, containing new internees who were needed in the camp. Furthermore, transports likewise left the camp in sufficiently large numbers with internees fit for work or exchanged prisoners.
The trains themselves were closed, that is to say, the doors of the freight cars were closed so that it was not possible, from the outside, to get a glimpse of the people inside. In addition to that, up to 100 cars of materials, rations, et cetera, were daily rolled into the camp or continuously left the workshops of the camp in which war material was being made.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And after the arrival of the transports were the victims stripped of everything they had? Did they have to undress completely; did they have to surrender their valuables? Is that true?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then they immediately went to their death?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I ask you, according to your knowledge, did these people know what was in store for them?
HOESS: The majority of them did not, for steps were taken to keep them in doubt about it and suspicion would not arise that they were to go to their death. For instance, all doors and all walls bore inscriptions to the effect that they were going to undergo a delousing operation or take a shower. This was made known in several languages to the internees by other internees who had come in with earlier transports and who were being used as auxiliary crews during the whole action.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then, you told me the other day, that death by gassing set in within a period of 3 to 15 minutes. Is that correct?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You also told me that even before death finally set in, the victims fell into a state of unconsciousness?
HOESS: Yes. From what I was able to find out myself or from what was told me by medical officers, the time necessary for reaching unconsciousness or death varied according to the temperature and the number of people present in the chambers. Loss of consciousness took place within a few seconds or a few minutes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you yourself ever feel pity with the victims, thinking of your own family and children?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How was it possible for you to carry out these actions in spite of this?
HOESS: In view of all these doubts which I had, the only one and decisive argument was the strict order and the reason given for it by the Reichsführer Himmler.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I ask you whether Himmler inspected the camp and convinced himself, too, of the process of annihilation?
HOESS: Yes. Himmler visited the camp in 1942 and he watched in detail one processing from beginning to end.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Does the same apply to Eichmann?
HOESS: Eichmann came repeatedly to Auschwitz and was intimately acquainted with the proceedings.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did the Defendant Kaltenbrunner ever inspect the camp?
HOESS: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you ever talk with Kaltenbrunner with reference to your task?
HOESS: No, never. I was with Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner on only one single occasion.
DR. KAUFFMANN: When was that?
HOESS: That was one day after his birthday in the year 1944.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What position did you hold in the year 1944?
HOESS: In the year 1944 I was the head of Department E-1 in the Main Economic and Administrative Office in Berlin. My office was the former Inspectorate of Concentration Camps at Oranienburg.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And what was the subject of that conference which you have just mentioned?
HOESS: It concerned a report from the camp at Mauthausen on the so-called nameless internees and their engagement in armament industry. Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner was to make a decision on the matter. For that reason I came to him with the report from the commander at Mauthausen but he did not make a decision telling me he would do so later.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Regarding the location of Mauthausen, will you please state in which district Mauthausen is situated. Is that Upper Silesia or is it the Government General?
HOESS: Mauthausen...
DR. KAUFFMANN: Auschwitz, I beg your pardon, I made a mistake. I mean Auschwitz.
HOESS: Auschwitz is situated in the former state of Poland. Later, after 1939, it was incorporated in the province of Upper Silesia.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it right for me to assume that administration and feeding of concentration camps were exclusively under the control of the Main Economic and Administrative Office?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: A department which is completely separated from the RSHA?
HOESS: Quite correct.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then from 1943 until the end of the war, you were one of the chiefs in the Inspectorate of the Main Economic and Administrative Office?
HOESS: Yes, that is correctly stated.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you mean by that, that you are particularly well informed on everything occurring in concentration camps regarding the treatment and the methods applied?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I ask you, therefore, first of all, whether you have any knowledge regarding the treatment of internees, whether certain methods became known to you according to which they were tortured and cruelly treated? Please formulate your statement according to periods, up to 1939 and after 1939.
HOESS: Until the outbreak of war in 1939, the situation in the camps regarding feeding, accommodations, and treatment of internees, was the same as in any other prison or penitentiary in the Reich. The internees were treated severely, but methodical beatings or ill-treatments were out of the question. The Reichsführer gave frequent orders that every SS man who laid violent hands on an internee would be punished; and several times SS men who did ill-treat internees were punished.
Feeding and billeting at that time were on the same basis as those of other prisoners under legal administration.
The accommodations in the camps during those years were still normal because the mass influxes at the outbreak of the war and during the war had not yet taken place. When the war started and when mass deliveries of political internees arrived, and, later on, when prisoners who were members of the resistance movements arrived from the occupied territories, the construction of buildings and the extensions of the camps could no longer keep pace with the number of incoming internees. During the first years of the war this problem could still be overcome by improvising measures; but later, due to the exigencies of the war, this was no longer possible since there were practically no building materials any more at our disposal. And, furthermore, rations for the internees were again and again severely curtailed by the provincial economic administration offices.
This then led to a situation where internees in the camps no longer had the staying power to resist the now gradually growing epidemics.
The main reason why the prisoners were in such bad condition towards the end of the war, why so many thousands of them were found sick and emaciated in the camps, was that every internee had to be employed in the armament industry to the extreme limit of his forces. The Reichsführer constantly and on every occasion kept this goal before our eyes, and also proclaimed it through the Chief of the Main Economic and Administrative Office, Obergruppenführer Pohl, to the concentration camp commanders and administrative leaders during the so-called commanders’ meetings.
Every commander was told to make every effort to achieve this. The aim was not to have as many dead as possible or to destroy as many internees as possible; the Reichsführer was constantly concerned with being able to engage all forces available in the armament industry.
DR. KAUFFMANN: There is no doubt that the longer the war lasted, the larger became the number of the ill-treated and tortured inmates. Whenever you inspected the concentration camps did you not learn something of this state of affairs through complaints, et cetera, or do you consider that the conditions which have been described are more or less due to excesses?
HOESS: These so-called ill-treatments and this torturing in concentration camps, stories of which were spread everywhere among the people, and later by the prisoners that were liberated by the occupying armies, were not, as assumed, inflicted methodically, but were excesses committed by individual leaders, subleaders, and men who laid violent hands on internees.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you mean you never took cognizance of these matters?
HOESS: If in any way such a case came to be known, then the perpetrator was, of course, immediately relieved of his post or transferred somewhere else. So that, even if he were not punished for lack of evidence to prove his guilt, even then, he was taken away from the internees and given another position.
DR. KAUFFMANN: To what do you attribute the particularly bad and shameful conditions, which were ascertained by the entering Allied troops, and which to a certain extent were photographed and filmed?
HOESS: The catastrophic situation at the end of the war was due to the fact that, as a result of the destruction of the railway network and of the continuous bombing of the industrial plants, care for these masses—I am thinking of Auschwitz with its 140,000 internees—could no longer be assured. Improvised measures, truck columns, and everything else tried by the commanders to improve the situation were of little or no avail; it was no longer possible. The number of the sick became immense. There were next to no medical supplies; epidemics raged everywhere. Internees who were capable of work were used over and over again. By order of the Reichsführer, even half-sick people had to be used wherever possible in industry. As a result every bit of space in the concentration camps which could possibly be used for lodging was overcrowded with sick and dying prisoners.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now asking you to look at the map which is mounted behind you. The red dots represent concentration camps. I will first ask you how many concentration camps as such existed at the end of the war?
HOESS: At the end of the war there were still 13 concentration camps. All the other points which are marked here on the map mean so-called labor camps attached to the armament industry situated there. The concentration camps, of which there are 13 as I have already said, were the center and the central point of some district, such as the camp at Dachau in Bavaria, or the camp of Mauthausen in Austria; and all the labor camps in that district were under the control of the concentration camp. That camp had then to supply these outside camps, that is to say, they had to supply them with workers, exchange the sick inmates and furnish clothing; the guards, too, were supplied by the concentration camp.
From 1944 on, the supplying of food was almost exclusively a matter of the individual armament industries in order to give the prisoners the benefit of the wartime supplementary rations.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What became known to you about so-called medical experiments on living internees?
HOESS: Medical experiments were carried out in several camps. For instance, in Auschwitz there were experiments on sterilization carried out by Professor Klaubert and Dr. Schumann; also experiments on twins by SS medical officer Dr. Mengele.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know the medical officer Dr. Rascher?
HOESS: In Dachau he was a medical officer of the Luftwaffe who carried out experiments, on internees who had been sentenced to death, about the resistance of the human body to cold and in high pressure chambers.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Can you tell whether such experiments carried out within the camp were known to a large circle?
HOESS: Such experiments, just like all other matters, were, of course, called “secret Reich matters.” However, it could not be avoided that the experiments became known since they were carried out in a large camp and must have been seen in some way by the inmates. I cannot say, however, to what extent the outside world learned about these experiments.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You explained to me that orders for executions were received in the camp at Auschwitz, and you told me that until the outbreak of war such orders were few, but that later on they became more numerous. Is that correct?
HOESS: Yes. There were hardly any executions until the beginning of the war—only in particularly serious cases. I remember one case in Buchenwald where an SS man had been attacked and beaten to death by internees, and the internees were later hanged.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But during the war—and that you will admit—the number of executions increased, and not inconsiderably.
HOESS: That had already started with the beginning of the war.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was the basis for these execution orders in many cases a legal sentence of German courts?
HOESS: No. Orders for the executions carried out in the camps came from the RSHA.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Who signed the orders for executions which you received? Is it correct that occasionally you received orders for executions which bore the signature “Kaltenbrunner,” and that these were not the originals but were teleprints which therefore had the signature in typewritten letters?
HOESS: It is correct. The originals of execution orders never came to the camps. The original of these orders either arrived at the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps, from where they were transmitted by teletype to the camps concerned, or, in urgent cases, the RSHA sent the orders directly to the camps concerned, and the Inspectorate was then only informed, so that the signatures in the camps were always only in teletype.
DR. KAUFFMANN: So as to again determine the signatures, will you tell the Tribunal whether the overwhelming majority of all execution orders either bore the signature of Himmler or that of Müller in the years before the war and until the end of the war.
HOESS: Only very few teletypes which I have ever seen came from the Reichsführer and still fewer from the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. Most of them, I could say practically all, were signed “Signed Müller.”
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is that the Müller with whom you repeatedly talked about such matters as you stated earlier?
HOESS: Gruppenführer Müller was the Chief of Department IV in the RSHA. He had to negotiate with the Inspectorate about all matters connected with concentration camps.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Would you say that you went to see the Gestapo Chief Müller because you, on the strength of your experience, were of the opinion that this man because of his years of activities was acting almost independently?
HOESS: That is quite right. I had to negotiate all matters regarding concentration camps with Gruppenführer Müller. He was informed on all these matters, and in most cases he would make an immediate decision.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Well, so as to have a clear picture, did you ever negotiate these matters with the defendant?
HOESS: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you learn that towards the end of the war concentration camps were evacuated? And, if so, who gave the orders?
HOESS: Let me explain. Originally there was an order from the Reichsführer, according to which camps, in the event of the approach of the enemy or in case of air attacks, were to be surrendered to the enemy. Later on, due to the case of Buchenwald, which had been reported to the Führer, there was—no, at the beginning of 1945, when various camps came within the operational sphere of the enemy, this order was withdrawn. The Reichsführer ordered the Higher SS and Police Leaders, who in an emergency case were responsible for the security and safety of the camps, to decide themselves whether an evacuation or a surrender was appropriate.
Auschwitz and Gross-Rosen were evacuated. Buchenwald was also to be evacuated, but then the order from the Reichsführer came through to the effect that on principle no more camps were to be evacuated. Only prominent inmates and inmates who were not to fall into Allied hands under any circumstances were to be taken away to other camps. This also happened in the case of Buchenwald. After Buchenwald had been occupied, it was reported to the Führer that internees had armed themselves and were carrying out plunderings in the town of Weimar. This caused the Führer to give the strictest order to Himmler to the effect that in the future no more camps were to fall into the hands of the enemy, and that no internees capable of marching would be left behind in any camp.
This was shortly before the end of the war, and shortly before northern and southern Germany were cut. I shall speak about the Sachsenhausen camp. The Gestapo chief, Gruppenführer Müller, called me in the evening and told me that the Reichsführer had ordered that the camp at Sachsenhausen was to be evacuated at once. I pointed out to Gruppenführer Müller what that would mean. Sachsenhausen could no longer fall back on any other camp except perhaps on a few labor camps attached to the armament works that were almost filled up anyway. Most of the internees would have to be sheltered in the woods somewhere. This would mean countless thousands of deaths and, above all, it would be impossible to feed these masses of people. He promised me that he would again discuss these measures with the Reichsführer. He called me back and told me that the Reichsführer had refused and was demanding that the commanders carry out his orders immediately.
At the same time Ravensbrück was also to be evacuated in the same manner but it could no longer be done. I do not know to what extent camps in southern Germany were cleared, since we, the Inspectorate, no longer had any connections with southern Germany.
DR. KAUFFMANN: It has been maintained here—and this is my last question—that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner gave the order that Dachau and two auxiliary camps were to be destroyed by bombing or with poison. I ask you, did you hear anything about this; if not, would you consider such an order possible?
HOESS: I have never heard anything about this, and I do not know anything either about an order to evacuate any camps in southern Germany, as I have already mentioned. Apart from that, I consider it quite impossible that a camp could be destroyed by this method.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions?
DR. MERKEL: Witness, did the State Police, as an authority of the Reich, have anything to do with the destruction of Jews in Auschwitz?
HOESS: Yes, insofar as I received all my orders as to the carrying out of that action from the Obersturmführer Eichmann.
DR. MERKEL: Was the administration of concentration camps under the control of the Main Economic and Administrative Office?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. MERKEL: You said already that you had nothing to do with the RSHA.
HOESS: No.
DR. MERKEL: Please, will you emphasize, therefore, that the Gestapo as such had nothing to do with the administration of the camps or the accommodation, feeding, and treatment of the internees, but that this was exclusively a matter for the Main Economic and Administrative Office?
HOESS: Yes, that is quite correct.
DR. MERKEL: How do you explain it then that you, nevertheless, discussed different questions concerning concentration camps with Müller?
HOESS: The RSHA, or rather Amt IV, had the executive power for the directing of all internees into camps, classification into the camp grades 1, 2, 3, and furthermore, the punishments which were to be carried out on the part of the RSHA. Executions, the accommodation of special internees, and all questions which might ensue therefrom were also taken care of by the RSHA or Amt IV.
DR. MERKEL: When was this Main Economic and Administrative Office created?
HOESS: The Main Economic and Administrative Office existed since 1933 under various names. The Inspectorate of Concentration Camps was, however, subordinated only to this Main Economic and Administrative Office since the year 1941.
DR. MERKEL: Then these concentration camps were from the very beginning under the control of this Main Economic and Administrative Office, that is to say the SS and not the State Police.
HOESS: Yes.
DR. MERKEL: You mentioned the name of Dr. Rascher a while ago. Do you know this doctor personally?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know that Dr. Rascher before beginning his work at Dachau had become a member of the SS?
HOESS: No, I know nothing about that. I only know that later he—I still saw him in the uniform of an Air Force medical officer. Later he was supposed to have been taken over into the SS, but I did not see him again.
DR. MERKEL: I have no further questions. Thank you very much.
HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for SS): Witness, at the beginning of your examination you stated that when you were ordered to the Reichsführer SS Himmler, he told you that the carrying out of this order of the Führer was to be left to the SS and that the SS had been ordered to do it. What is to be understood under this general title SS?
HOESS: According to the explanations of the Reichsführer, this could only mean the men guarding the concentration camps. According to the nature of the order only concentration camp crews and not the Waffen-SS could be concerned with the carrying out of this task.
HERR BABEL: How many members of the SS were assigned to concentration camps, and which units did they belong to?
HOESS: Toward the end of the war there were approximately 35,000 SS men and in my estimation approximately 10,000 men from the Army, Air Force, and the Navy detailed to the labor camps for guard duties.
HERR BABEL: What were the tasks of these guards? As far as I know, the duties varied. First, there was the actual guarding and then there was a certain amount of administrative work within the camp.
HOESS: Yes, that is correct.
HERR BABEL: How many guards were there within the camps for, let us say, 1,000 internees?
HOESS: You cannot estimate it in that way. According to my observations about 10 percent of the total number of guarding personnel were used for internal duties, that is to say, administration and supervision of internees within the camp, including the medical personnel of the camp.
HERR BABEL: So that 90 percent were therefore used for the exterior guarding, that is to say, for watching the camp from watch towers and for escorting the internees on work assignments.
HOESS: Yes.
HERR BABEL: Did you make any observations as to whether there was any ill-treatment of prisoners to a greater or lesser degree on the part of those guards, or whether the ill-treatment was mainly to be traced back to the so-called Kapos?
HOESS: If any ill-treatment of prisoners by guards occurred—I myself have never observed any—then this was possible only to a very small degree since all offices in charge of the camps took care that as few SS men as possible had direct contact with the inmates, because in the course of the years the guard personnel had deteriorated to such an extent that the standards formerly demanded could no longer be maintained.
We had thousands of guards who could hardly speak German, who came from all lands as volunteers and joined these units, or we had older men, between 50 and 60, who lacked all interest in their work, so that a camp commander had to watch constantly that these men fulfilled even the lowest requirements of their duties. It is obvious that there were elements among them who would ill-treat internees, but this ill-treatment was never tolerated.
Besides, it was impossible to have these masses of people directed at work or when in the camp by SS men only; therefore, inmates had to be assigned everywhere to direct the other prisoners and set them to work. The internal administration of the camp was almost completely in their hands. Of course a great deal of ill-treatment occurred which could not be avoided because at night there were hardly any members of the SS in the camps. Only in specific cases were SS men allowed to enter the camp, so that the internees were more or less exposed to these Kapos.
HERR BABEL: You have already mentioned regulations which existed for the guards, but there was also a standing order in each camp. In this camp order certainly punishment was provided for internees who violated the camp rules. What punishment was provided?
HOESS: First of all, transfer to a penal company (Strafkompanie), that is to say, harder work and restricted accommodations; next, detention in the cell block, detention in a dark cell; and in very serious cases, chaining or strapping. Punishment by strapping was prohibited in the year 1942 or 1943—I cannot say exactly when—by the Reichsführer. Then there was the punishment of standing at the camp gate over a rather long period, and finally corporal punishment.
However, no commander could decree this corporal punishment on his own authority. He could only apply for it. In the case of men, the decision came from the Inspector of Concentration Camps, Gruppenführer Schmidt, and where women were concerned, the Reichsführer reserved the decision exclusively for himself.
HERR BABEL: It may also be known to you that for members of the SS, too, there were two penal camps which sometimes were called concentration camps, namely, Dachau and Danzig-Matzkau.
HOESS: That is right.
HERR BABEL: Were the existing camp regulations and the treatment of members of the SS who were put in such camps different from the regulations applying to the other concentration camps?
HOESS: Yes; these two detention camps were not under the Inspectorate for Concentration Camps, but they were under an SS and Police court. I myself have neither inspected nor seen these two camps.
HERR BABEL: So that you know nothing about the standing orders relating to those camps?
HOESS: I know nothing about them.
HERR BABEL: I have no further questions to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. HAENSEL: I have a question that I would like to ask the High Tribunal. A second defense counsel has been requested for the SS. Is it permitted that several questions be put for the second defense counsel?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal ruled a long time ago that only one counsel could be heard.
DR. HAENSEL: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): Witness, you just mentioned that members of the Navy were detailed to guard concentration camps.
HOESS: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these concentration, camps, or were they labor camps?
HOESS: They were labor camps.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Are labor camps barracks camps of the armament industries?
HOESS: Yes, if they were not accommodated in the actual factories themselves.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have been informed that soldiers who were to be assigned for guard duty at labor camps were given over to the SS.
HOESS: That is only partially correct. A part of these men—I do not recall the figures—was taken over into the SS. A part was returned to the original unit, or exchanged. Exchanges were continually taking place.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.
COL. AMEN: If the Tribunal pleases, first I would like to submit, on behalf of our British Allies, a series of exhibits pertaining to the Waffen-SS, without reading them. It is merely statistical information with respect to the number of Waffen-SS guards used at the concentration camps.
I ask that the witness be shown Documents D-745(a-b), D-746(a-b), D-747, D-748, D-749(b), and D-750, one of them being a statement of this witness.
[The documents were submitted to the witness.]
Witness, you made the statement, D-749(b), which has been handed to you?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And you are familiar with the content of the others?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And you testify that those figures are true and correct?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Very good. Those will become Exhibit Number USA-810.
Witness, from time to time did any high Nazi officials or functionaries visit the camp at Mauthausen or Dachau while you were there?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Will you state the names of such persons to the Tribunal please?
HOESS: I remember that in 1935 all the Gauleiter inspected Dachau guided by Reichsführer Himmler. I do not remember them individually.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall any of the ministers having visited either of those camps while you were there?
HOESS: Do you mean by this the inspection tour of 1935?
COL. AMEN: At any time while you were at either of those concentration camps.
HOESS: In 1938 Minister Frick was at Sachsenhausen with the Regierungspräsident.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall any other ministers who were there at any time?
HOESS: Not at Sachsenhausen, but at Auschwitz, the Minister of Justice.
COL. AMEN: Who was he?
HOESS: Thierack.
COL. AMEN: And who else? Do you recall any others?
HOESS: Yes, but I do not remember the name for the moment.
COL. AMEN: Well, who?
HOESS: I have already stated that in the record, but at the moment I cannot recall the name.
COL. AMEN: All right. You have testified that many of the execution orders were signed by Müller. Is that correct?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact that all of those execution orders to which you testified were signed by...
DR. STEINBAUER: Pardon me, Mr. President, documents have been submitted and the witness is being questioned about the contents. The Defense is not in a position to follow the Prosecution because we do not know the contents of these documents. I request that we receive copies of them.
THE PRESIDENT: Haven’t copies of these documents been handed to the defendants?
COL. AMEN: Yes, so I understood. We have copies here. However, five German copies have been distributed.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the matter can be looked into.
COL. AMEN: Witness, I was asking you about these execution orders which you testify were signed by Müller. Do you understand?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact that all of these execution orders which you testify were signed by Müller were also signed by order of, or as representative of, the Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner?
HOESS: Yes. That was on the copies that I had in the originals. Afterwards, when I was employed at Oranienburg, it said underneath, “I. V. Müller”—“in Vertretung Müller” (as representative, Müller).
COL. AMEN: In other words Müller was merely signing as the representative of the Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner? Is that not correct?
HOESS: I must assume so.
COL. AMEN: And, of course, you know that Müller was a subordinate of the Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner.
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Witness, you made an affidavit, did you not, at the request of the Prosecution?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: I ask that the witness be shown Document 3868-PS, which will become Exhibit USA-819.
[The document was submitted to the witness.]
COL. AMEN: You signed that affidavit voluntarily, Witness?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And the affidavit is true in all respects?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: This, if the Tribunal pleases, we have in four languages.
[Turning to the witness.] Some of the matters covered in this affidavit you have already told us about in part, so I will omit some parts of the affidavit. If you will follow along with me as I read, please. Do you have a copy of the affidavit before you?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: I will omit the first paragraph and start with Paragraph 2:
“I have been constantly associated with the administration of concentration camps since 1934, serving at Dachau until 1938; then as Adjutant in Sachsenhausen from 1938 to 1 May 1940, when I was appointed Commandant of Auschwitz. I commanded Auschwitz until 1 December 1943, and estimate that at least 2,500,000 victims were executed and exterminated there by gassing and burning, and at least another half million succumbed to starvation and disease making a total dead of about 3,000,000. This figure represents about 70 or 80 percent of all persons sent to Auschwitz as prisoners, the remainder having been selected and used for slave labor in the concentration camp industries; included among the executed and burned were approximately 20,000 Russian prisoners of war (previously screened out of prisoner-of-war cages by the Gestapo) who were delivered at Auschwitz in Wehrmacht transports operated by regular Wehrmacht officers and men. The remainder of the total number of victims included about 100,000 German Jews, and great numbers of citizens, mostly Jewish, from Holland, France, Belgium, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Greece, or other countries. We executed about 400,000 Hungarian Jews alone at Auschwitz in the summer of 1944.”
That is all true, Witness?
HOESS: Yes, it is.
COL. AMEN: Now I omit the first few lines of Paragraph 3 and start in the middle of Paragraph 3:
“...prior to establishment of the RSHA, the Secret State Police Office (Gestapo) and the Reich Office of Criminal Police were responsible for arrests, commitments to concentration camps, punishments and executions therein. After organization of the RSHA all of these functions were carried on as before, but pursuant to orders signed by Heydrich as Chief of the RSHA. While Kaltenbrunner was Chief of RSHA orders for protective custody, commitments, punishment, and individual executions were signed by Kaltenbrunner or by Müller, Chief of the Gestapo, as Kaltenbrunner’s deputy.”
THE PRESIDENT: Just for the sake of accuracy, the last date in Paragraph 2, is that 1943 or 1944?
COL. AMEN: 1944, I believe. Is that date correct, Witness, at the close of Paragraph 2, namely, that the 400,000 Hungarian Jews alone at Auschwitz in the summer of 1944 were executed? Is that 1944 or 1943?
HOESS: 1944. Part of that figure also goes back to 1943; only a part. I cannot give the exact figure; the end was 1944, autumn of 1944.
COL. AMEN: Right.
“4. Mass executions by gassing commenced during the summer of 1941 and continued until fall 1944. I personally supervised executions at Auschwitz until first of December 1943 and know by reason of my continued duties in the Inspectorate of Concentration Camps, WVHA, that these mass executions continued as stated above. All mass executions by gassing took place under the direct order, supervision, and responsibility of RSHA. I received all orders for carrying out these mass executions directly from RSHA.”
Are those statements true and correct, Witness?
HOESS: Yes, they are.
COL. AMEN: “5. On 1 December 1943 I became Chief of Amt I in Amt Group D of the WVHA, and in that office was responsible for co-ordinating all matters arising between RSHA and concentration camps under the administration of WVHA. I held this position until the end of the war. Pohl, as Chief of WVHA, and Kaltenbrunner, as Chief of RSHA, often conferred personally and frequently communicated orally and in writing concerning concentration camps....”
You have already told us about the lengthy report which you took to Kaltenbrunner in Berlin, so I will omit the remainder of Paragraph 5.
“6. The ‘final solution’ of the Jewish question meant the complete extermination of all Jews in Europe. I was ordered to establish extermination facilities at Auschwitz in June 1941. At that time, there were already in the General Government three other extermination camps: Belzek, Treblinka, and Wolzek. These camps were under the Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and SD. I visited Treblinka to find out how they carried out their exterminations. The camp commandant at Treblinka told me that he had liquidated 80,000 in the course of one-half year. He was principally concerned with liquidating all the Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto. He used monoxide gas, and I did not think that his methods were very efficient. So when I set up the extermination building at Auschwitz, I used Cyklon B, which was a crystallized prussic acid which we dropped into the death chamber from a small opening. It took from 3 to 15 minutes to kill the people in the death chamber, depending upon climatic conditions. We knew when the people were dead because their screaming stopped. We usually waited about one-half hour before we opened the doors and removed the bodies. After the bodies were removed our special Kommandos took off the rings and extracted the gold from the teeth of the corpses.”
Is that all true and correct, Witness?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Incidentally, what was done with the gold which was taken from the teeth of the corpses, do you know?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal?
HOESS: This gold was melted down and brought to the Chief Medical Office of the SS at Berlin.
COL. AMEN:
“7. Another improvement we made over Treblinka was that we built our gas chamber to accommodate 2,000 people at one time whereas at Treblinka their 10 gas chambers only accommodated 200 people each. The way we selected our victims was as follows: We had two SS doctors on duty at Auschwitz to examine the incoming transports of prisoners. The prisoners would be marched by one of the doctors who would make spot decisions as they walked by. Those who were fit for work were sent into the camp. Others were sent immediately to the extermination plants. Children of tender years were invariably exterminated since by reason of their youth they were unable to work. Still another improvement we made over Treblinka was that at Treblinka the victims almost always knew that they were to be exterminated and at Auschwitz we endeavored to fool the victims into thinking that they were to go through a delousing process. Of course, frequently they realized our true intentions and we sometimes had riots and difficulties due to that fact. Very frequently women would hide their children under the clothes, but of course when we found them we would send the children in to be exterminated. We were required to carry out these exterminations in secrecy but of course the foul and nauseating stench from the continuous burning of bodies permeated the entire area and all of the people living in the surrounding communities knew that exterminations were going on at Auschwitz.”
Is that all true and correct, Witness?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Now, I will omit Paragraphs 8 and 9, which have to do with the medical experiments as to which you have already testified.
“10. Rudolf Mildner was the chief of the Gestapo at Katowice ...from approximately March 1941 until September 1943. As such, he frequently sent prisoners to Auschwitz for incarceration or execution. He visited Auschwitz on several occasions. The Gestapo court, the SS Standgericht, which tried persons accused of various crimes, such as escaping prisoners of war, et cetera, frequently met within Auschwitz, and Mildner often attended the trial of such persons, who usually were executed in Auschwitz following their sentence. I showed Mildner through the extermination plant at Auschwitz and he was directly interested in it since he had to send the Jews from his territory for execution at Auschwitz.
“I understand English as it is written above. The above statements are true; this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over the statement I have signed and executed the same at Nuremberg, Germany, on the fifth day of April 1946.”
Now I ask you, Witness, is everything which I have read to you true to your own knowledge?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: That concludes my cross-examination, except for one exhibit that our British allies would like to have in, which is a summary sheet of the exhibits which I introduced at the commencement of the cross-examination. That will be Exhibit Number USA-810. It is a summary of the earlier exhibits that I put in with respect to the Waffen-SS at the commencement of my cross-examination.
Now, I understand, Your Lordship, that both the Soviet and the French delegations have one or two questions which they consider peculiar to their country which they would like to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, you will remember that the Tribunal was assured by Counsel for the Prosecution that, so far as witnesses were concerned, with the exception of one or two particular defendants, the Prosecution would have only one cross-examination and now, since that assurance was given, this is the second instance when the Prosecution have desired to have more than one cross-examination.
GEN. RUDENKO: This is correct, Mr. President, that the Prosecution did make that statement; however, the Prosecution reserved the right to do otherwise on certain occasions when deemed necessary. Since, in this case, the Prosecution represent four different states, occasions do arise when each of the prosecutors feels that he has the right to ask the defendant or witnesses individual questions particularly interesting to his own country.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you indicate the nature of the questions which the Soviet Prosecution desire to put? I mean the subjects upon which they are. I don’t mean the exact questions but the subject.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I understand. Colonel Pokrovsky, who intends to ask the questions, will report on the subject to the Tribunal.
COL. POKROVSKY: May I report to you, Mr. President, that the questions of interest to the Soviet Prosecution are those dealing specifically with the annihilation of millions of Soviet citizens and some details connected with that annihilation. At the request of the French Prosecution, and in order to clarify the contents I would also like to ask two or three questions connected with the documents which in due course were submitted as Document F-709(a) to the Tribunal by the French Prosecution. This is really all there is; however, these questions do have great importance for us.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal, as has just been stated, made the rule, with the assent of the Prosecutors, that in the case of the witnesses there should be one cross-examination. There is nothing in the Charter which expressly gives to the Prosecution the right for each prosecutor to cross-examine and there is, on the other hand, Article 18 which directs the Tribunal to take strict measures to prevent any action which will cause unreasonable delay, and, in the opinion of the Tribunal in the present case, the subject has been fully covered and the Tribunal therefore think it right to adhere to the rules which they have laid down in this case. They will therefore not hear any further cross-examination.
Do you wish to re-examine, Dr. Kauffmann?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I will be very brief.
Witness, in the affidavit which was just read, you said under Point 2 that “at least an additional half million died through starvation and disease.” I ask you, when did this take place? Was it towards the end of the war or was this fact observed by you already at an earlier period?
HOESS: No, it all goes back to the last years of the war, that is beginning with the end of 1942.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Under Point 3—do you still have the affidavit before you?
HOESS: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I ask that it be given to the witness again?
[The document was returned to the witness.]
Under Point 3, at the end you state that orders for protective custody, commitments, punishments, and special executions were signed by Kaltenbrunner or Müller, Chief of the Gestapo, as Kaltenbrunner’s deputy. Thus, do you wish to contradict what you stated previously?
HOESS: No, this only completes what I said over and again. I read only a few decrees signed by Kaltenbrunner; most of them were signed by Müller.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Under Point 4, at the end, you state:
“All mass executions through gassing took place under the direct order, supervision, and responsibility of RSHA. I received all orders for carrying out these mass executions directly from RSHA.”
According to the statements which you previously made to the Tribunal, this entire action came to you directly from Himmler through Eichmann, who had been personally delegated. Do you maintain that now as before?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: With this last sentence under Point 4, do you wish to contradict what you testified before?
HOESS: No. I always mean regarding mass executions, Obersturmbannführer Eichmann in connection with the RSHA.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Under Point 7, at the end, you state—I am not going to read it—you were saying that even though exterminations took place secretly, the population in the surrounding area noticed something of the extermination of people. Did not, at an earlier period of time—that is, before the beginning of this special extermination action—something of this nature take place to remove people who had died in a normal manner in Auschwitz?
HOESS: Yes, when the crematoria had not yet been built we burned in large pits a large part of those who had died and who could not be cremated in the provisional crematoria of the camp; a large number—I do not recall the figure anymore—were placed in mass graves and later also cremated in these graves. That was before the mass executions of Jews began.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Would you agree with me if I were to say that from the described facts alone, one could not conclusively prove that this was concerned with the extermination of Jews?
HOESS: No, this could in no way be concluded from that. The population...
THE PRESIDENT: What was your question about?
DR. KAUFFMANN: My question was whether one could assume from the established facts—at the end of Paragraph 7—that this concerned the so-called extermination of Jews. I tied this question to the previous answer of the witness. It is my last question.
THE PRESIDENT: The last sentence of Paragraph 7 is with reference to the foul and nauseating stench. What is your question about that?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Whether the population could gather from these things that an extermination of Jews was taking place.
THE PRESIDENT: That really is too obvious a question, isn’t it? They could not possibly know who it was being exterminated.
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is enough for me. I have no further questions.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I ask the Tribunal’s permission to ask a few supplementary questions, for during cross-examination the witness stated that the Defendant Frick had visited the concentration camps Sachsenhausen and Oranienburg in 1938.
Witness, when an inspection of the concentration camp of Oranienburg took place at that time, 1937-38, was there any evidence at all of atrocities?
HOESS: No.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Why not?
HOESS: Because there was no question of atrocities at that time.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Is it correct that at that period of time the concentration camp at Oranienburg was still a model of order and that agricultural labor was the main occupation?
HOESS: Yes, that is right. However, work was mainly done in workshops, in wood-finishing workshops.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you give me any details as to what was shown at that time at such an official visit?
HOESS: Yes. The visiting party was shown through the prisoners’ camp proper, inspected the quarters, the kitchen, the hospital, and then all the administrative buildings; above all the workshops, where the inmates were employed.
DR. PANNENBECKER: At that time were the quarters and the hospitals already overcrowded?
HOESS: No, at that time they were normally filled.
DR. PANNENBECKER: How did these quarters look?
HOESS: At that period of time, living quarters looked the same as the barracks of a training ground. The internees still had bed-clothing and all necessary hygienic facilities. Everything was yet in the best of order.
DR. PANNENBECKER: That is all. I have no further questions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): Witness, what was the greatest number of labor camps existing at any one time?
HOESS: I cannot give the exact figure but in my estimation there were approximately 900.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What was the population of these 900?
HOESS: I am not able to say that either; the population varied. There were camps with 100 internees and camps with 10,000 internees. Therefore, I cannot give any figure of the total number of people who were in these labor camps.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Under whose administration were the labor camps—under what offices?
HOESS: These labor camps, as far as the guarding, direction, and clothing were concerned, were under the control of the Economic and Administration Main Office. All matters dealing with labor output and the supplying of food were attended to by the armament industries which employed these internees.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And at the end of the war were the conditions in those labor camps similar to those existing in the concentration camps as you described them before?
HOESS: Yes. Since there no longer was any possibility of bringing ill internees to the main camps, there was much overcrowding in these labor camps and the death rate very high.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
Dr. Kauffmann, does that close your case?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I wish to call another witness with the permission of the Court, the witness Neubacher.
[The witness Neubacher took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
HERMANN NEUBACHER (Witness): Hermann Neubacher.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, what was your position before the war and during the war?
NEUBACHER: For 5 years during the war I was abroad on diplomatic missions. Before the war I was Mayor of the City of Vienna.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know the Defendant Kaltenbrunner?
NEUBACHER: I do.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How long have you known him?
NEUBACHER: I met Kaltenbrunner for the first time in Austria in 1934 in connection with the so-called appeasement action of the engineer Reinthaller in Austria. Later I saw him again, after the Anschluss.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In the year 1943 Kaltenbrunner was appointed Chief of the RSHA. Are you acquainted with that fact?
NEUBACHER: Yes, I am.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know whether Kaltenbrunner was glad to take this position?
NEUBACHER: Kaltenbrunner told me, I believe at the end of 1943, that he did not wish to take that position, that he had declined three times but then had received a military order to accept. He added that he had requested and had been given a promise to be relieved of this office after the war.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you made any observations from which may be deduced how the defendant looked upon his task as Chief of the RSHA?
NEUBACHER: I had a number of conversations with Kaltenbrunner during my official visits to the Main Office from time to time, but they all dealt with foreign intelligence and foreign policy.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The RSHA was in control of the Gestapo; are you familiar with that fact?
NEUBACHER: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: According to your knowledge of the defendant’s character can you tell whether he had the prerequisites and the qualifications necessary for the taking over of the police executive?
NEUBACHER: Kaltenbrunner, as far as I was acquainted with him, had no knowledge of police work when he assumed his office. Besides, in the year 1941 he wanted to abandon his police career.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What proofs do you have for this?
NEUBACHER: At that time I was a special representative for economic questions in Romania. Kaltenbrunner told me that he did not like a police career, that he did not understand anything about police work and furthermore, had no interest for it. He was interested, however, in foreign political affairs.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that is really evidence which ought to be given. It cannot affect his official position, the fact he did not like it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Kaltenbrunner was called the successor of Heydrich. Does this apply to him in the full sense of the word?
NEUBACHER: It cannot, and that I know because...
THE PRESIDENT: That’s a matter of argument. This witness’ opinion cannot affect the position of Kaltenbrunner. This witness cannot testify whether he was called a successor to Heydrich or another Heydrich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The Prosecution speak in a disdainful way that Kaltenbrunner was the successor of the ill-famed Heydrich. This witness knows them both, therefore I believe...
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has already admitted that he was the successor of Heydrich. You may ask him if he was another Heydrich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Please, will you tell whether he was called a second Heydrich?
NEUBACHER: Himmler himself used this expression...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal feels that that is incompetent.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I understand. I now come to the next question:
Is there anything to show just why Himmler selected the Defendant Kaltenbrunner?
NEUBACHER: From remarks which Himmler made to me...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that the witness can give any evidence as to what Himmler thought. Himmler appointed him.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The witness, so far as I am told, will report something from a conversation with Himmler, which clearly shows that Himmler selected Kaltenbrunner, and no one else, because he did not fear Kaltenbrunner in any way. The Prosecution contend exactly the opposite. He therefore knows that the Prosecution’s contention is entirely incorrect.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks you can ask what Himmler said about the appointment, if he said anything to this witness. You can ask him what did Himmler say about the appointment to Kaltenbrunner.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Please begin, Witness.
NEUBACHER: During the course of a conversation with Himmler when I was at his office at headquarters to look at the death mask of Heydrich, Himmler said to me that he had suffered an irreparable loss by the death of this man. After Heydrich, there was not a single person who could any longer direct this gigantic office. That could only be done by the man who had built it up. Upon my question, “What about Kaltenbrunner?” Himmler said as follows:
“Of course as an Austrian you are interested in that matter. Kaltenbrunner will have to become familiar with the work. He is now fully occupied with matters of interest to you, with foreign intelligence.”
These were the remarks of Himmler.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you have any knowledge of the fact that soon after he assumed office in the year of 1943, Kaltenbrunner assiduously tried to establish contact abroad, because he considered the military situation at that time as hopeless?
NEUBACHER: Kaltenbrunner was, as I know from many conversations, always striving for a so-called “talk with the enemy.” He was convinced that we could not come out of this war favorably without the use of some large-scale diplomacy. I did not discuss further details with him concerning the war. In Germany everyone was sentenced to death who, even to one other person, expressed a doubt about the victory of Germany.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did Kaltenbrunner support you in your efforts to mitigate as much as possible the terror policy in Serbia?
NEUBACHER: Yes, I owe much to Kaltenbrunner’s support in this respect. The German police offices in Serbia knew, through me and through Kaltenbrunner, that the latter, as Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Service, wholeheartedly supported my policy in the southeast area. I succeeded therefore in making my influence felt in the police offices, and the support from Kaltenbrunner was valuable to me in my endeavors to overthrow, with the help of sensible officers, the former system of collective responsibility and reprisals.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know the basic attitude of Kaltenbrunner towards the Jewish question?
NEUBACHER: Once, I spoke very briefly with Kaltenbrunner about this subject. When rumors of a systematic action swelled up I asked Kaltenbrunner, “Is there any truth in this?” Kaltenbrunner briefly told me that that was a special action which was not under his command. He kept aloof from the action, as far as I could observe, and later—I believe it was at the beginning or the end of 1944—he told me briefly, that a new course had been adopted in the treatment of the Jews. His voice sounded the pride of his success.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Kaltenbrunner is characterized as “hungry for power.” Do you know what kind of a life he led?
NEUBACHER: Kaltenbrunner led a simple life. He never acquired a fortune...
THE PRESIDENT. The Prosecution has not called him “hungry for power.” There is no charge against him as being “hungry for power.”
DR. KAUFFMANN: Hungry for power and cruel. Both of these words were expressly used.
THE PRESIDENT: But being “hungry for power” or “cruel” is quite different.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, I am just asking about the first term.
THE PRESIDENT: I was just wondering where these terms were used.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The Indictment contains both these terms: “hungry for power” and “cruel”.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): It certainly is not in the Indictment. We find no allegation in the Indictment which reads “hungry for power and cruel,” and we do not recollect any mention being made in the statement in the Prosecution’s case.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But I would not have had notes taken on it otherwise. In the Indictment there is a page with the heading “Summary and Conclusion.” I am referring to the last paragraph, where it says:
“As all other Nazis, Kaltenbrunner was hungry for power. In order to assure himself of power he signed his name in blood—a name which will remain in memory as a symbol for cruelty, for...”
THE PRESIDENT: Where are you reading from? What are you reading from?
DR. KAUFFMANN: From the Indictment, on the last page, under the heading “Summary and Conclusion.”
MR. DODD: I think I can clarify the matter. It is rather clear that the counsel is reading from my trial brief. The trial brief was never offered in evidence in court, but it was handed to the counsel.
DR. KAUFFMANN: If that will not be maintained I do not need to ask any questions on that point.
I now come to the next question. Do you know, Witness, whether Kaltenbrunner gave an order for the evacuation of concentration camps?
NEUBACHER: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did Kaltenbrunner, from your experience and observations, do everything as chief of this office to mitigate inhuman measures or prevent their application?
NEUBACHER: I must call your attention to the fact that I was abroad for 5 years and could little observe what was happening within Germany. As I have come to know Kaltenbrunner, I do not doubt that he gave way to the illusion that he was able to influence the course of events. He was in no way capable of doing so.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thus, I come to the last question:
Do you know of a case where he used his power against a measure of the Police to liberate two church dignitaries of the Orthodox Church in Serbia?
NEUBACHER: Yes, I am familiar with that. These two church dignitaries...
THE PRESIDENT: How is this relevant to Kaltenbrunner?
DR. KAUFFMANN: He is accused of having persecuted the churches throughout his whole policy. The Prosecution expressly accuse Kaltenbrunner of persecuting churches, with the annihilation of Christianity as his objective; this I can say with assurance is contained in the records; and it is to this that my question refers.
THE PRESIDENT: The answer to it cannot answer any charge against Kaltenbrunner, can it?
DR. KAUFFMANN: If a defendant tried to exterminate churches, then he would not take a measure exactly opposite to that policy. The witness will be able to attest to this fact.
THE PRESIDENT: With reference to churches or with reference to individual people?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Individual people as representatives of the church of course. I do not believe you can separate the two.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the question is incompetent.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you. Then I have concluded my examining of the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
[The witness Neubacher resumed the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished, Dr. Kauffmann?
DR. KAUFFMANN: My examination of this witness is finished.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the Defense want to ask questions?
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have some questions to put which are, of course, not in any way connected with Kaltenbrunner, but which refer to subjects which will have to be dealt with later during the case of the Defendant Funk. Since the witness can be called only once, however, I have no other choice than to put to the witness now these questions, which really ought to be put later.
Witness, you said today that the German Foreign Service had sent you to Romania—I believe—on questions of economy. Is it correct that during the time you were working in Romania, you were also representing and handling economic interests in Greece?
NEUBACHER: In the autumn of 1942, notwithstanding my assignment in Romania, I received a special assignment, together with an Italian financial expert, Minister D’Agostino, to prevent by proper methods the total devaluation of currency and the total disruption of the economic structure in Greece.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, were you suited for such a difficult task by training and previous experience? Please tell us briefly, which posts you held before, so that we can judge whether you were capable of carrying out this task in Greece; but please, Witness, be very brief.
NEUBACHER: I was one of the foremost economic leaders in Austria. At the age of 28 I was a director; at 30 I was the general manager of the Viennese Settlement Corporation; and at the age of 33 I was directing a large combine in the building trade and building material industry. I was an executive of the Austrian National Bank and a member of the Austrian Customs Auxiliary Council. I was a member of the Russian Credit Committee of the City of Vienna and a member of the Commission of Experts for the investigation of the collapse of the Austrian Credit Bank Corporation. Therefore, I was qualified for this task by extensive economic experience.
Moreover, I was quite familiar with the economic problems of the Balkans, since I had last worked on economic questions relating to the Balkans in the central finance administration of I. G. Farben in Berlin.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, several days ago when I visited you in prison, I gave you a report of a commission of the Royal Greek Government, addressed to the International Military Tribunal, and I asked you to read it and state your opinion. Is this report correct?
Mr. President, it is Exhibit USSR-379, and it has the additional Document Number UK-82.
Witness, in this report of the commission the matter is presented as if the economy of Greece had been entirely destroyed by German authorities and that Greece had been plundered, et cetera. In the end this reflects on the Defendant Funk. Please do not go into detail, but tell us briefly what is your impression in this connection.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, General Rudenko.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I would like to make the following statement before the Tribunal: In regard to the report of the Greek Government, which was presented before the Tribunal by the Soviet Prosecution as provided by Article 21 of the Charter, it seems to me that the question of the Defense Counsel, asking the witness to give his opinion on this particular matter, should be rejected because the witness is not competent to give an opinion on the report of the Greek Government. The Defense Counsel can ask him a concrete question in regard to any particular fact, but that is all.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, if it is desired, I can, of course, put the questions individually. It will probably take a little longer, but if the Soviet Russian Prosecution so desires I agree. May I now question the witness? Witness, is it correct...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Dr. Sauter, what exactly is it that you want to ask the witness about this report?
DR. SAUTER: The report of the Greek Government, which has been submitted by the Russian Prosecution, states, for instance, that Germany in its occupation of Greece plundered the country and brought about a famine by exporting an excessive amount of goods. It states that the country was charged excessive occupation costs, and that the country was heavily prejudiced by the clearing system, et cetera. Through this witness, who as the economic expert of the German Foreign Office handled these problems in Greece at that time, I propose to prove: First, that these statements are untrue; second, that this state of affairs prevailed already when the German troops marched in and was not created by the German authorities; and, last, that it was the Defendant Funk who tried repeatedly to improve matters for Greece through the clearing system and had considerable amounts of gold brought to Greece.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, can’t you put a few short questions to show that the scheme which this witness introduced into Greece was in accordance with international law and was not unfair to Greece? If you could do that, that would meet the case, wouldn’t it?
DR. SAUTER: Yes, that is what I wanted to do, and I am sure that the witness would have done so on his own initiative.
Now, then, Witness, are you acquainted with the viewpoint of the German economic authorities, and particularly of the Defendant Funk, in regard to the question of the clearing of debts incurred by Greece and the question of how Greece was to be treated with regard to this clearing system?
NEUBACHER: Concerning the mutual financial charges and obligations, I spoke at one time to the Reich Finance Minister, Schwerin Von Krosigk, and it was proposed that at some later date after the war the claims and counter-claims were to be settled on the basis of a common denominator.
DR. SAUTER: And at that time, during the war, how was the question of this clearing dealt with?
NEUBACHER: Regarding the economic events in Greece, I can give you information based on my own observations only, starting with October 1942. At that time, when I first came to Athens, the Greek currency had already been considerably devaluated, and the circulation of banknotes had increased by something like 3,000 percent.
Greece also suffered an economic set-back due to the fact that, in addition to a progressing inflation, an attempt had been made to introduce in Greece a planned economy with ceiling prices along German lines. The result was, of course, that the merchants selling Greek goods suffered losses when they were paid later. On the other hand, when I arrived there the importers of German goods made tremendous profits, because they paid Reichsmark at the rate of 60 on the clearing and resold the goods at a rate of about 30,000. This chaos, due to the inflation in connection with the attempt of introducing a planned economy on the German pattern, could be remedied only by transforming the black market in Greece into a completely free market. The two experts of the Axis Powers introduced this measure with considerable success at the end of October 1942. Within a few weeks all shops and markets were full of goods and foodstuffs; the prices of food dropped to one-fifth and prices of manufactured products to one-tenth. This success could be maintained for 4 months in spite of increasing inflation.
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Neubacher, is it true that the Defendant Funk, who was Reich Minister of Economy at that time, proposed during a conversation or in correspondence he had had with you that, in spite of the shortage of goods prevailing in Germany, a considerable amount of goods should be sent from Germany and other European countries, particularly to Greece?
NEUBACHER: Reich Minister Funk, with whom I discussed the difficulties of my task, and I both fully agreed that a maximum of goods should be transported to Greece, and certainly not only food. I secured not only 60,000 tons of food at that time but also German export goods, since it was hopeless to try to stop an inflation or the effects of an inflation on the prices, if there were no supplies. Reich Minister Funk supported exports to Greece with the view to a restoration of normal market conditions with every means at his disposal.
DR. SAUTER: You know, Witness, that since transport from Germany to Greece had become impossible, the Defendant Funk made every effort to have goods transported on neutral ships, furnished with British navicerts, from Germany to Greece in order to combat as far as possible the already impending famine.
NEUBACHER: I think that was between 1941 and 1942 when I had not yet arrived in Greece. In 1943, when shipping in Greek waters had completely stopped for us, because all ships had been torpedoed and the railroads had become the object of incessant acts of sabotage and dynamiting, I, with the help of the Swedish Minister, Alar, who directed the International Relief for Greece, applied for British navicerts for food transports to Greece. The British granted this application, and when our own means of transport had ceased to exist, the Swedish boat Halaren went from Trieste or Venice to the Piraeus once a month, loaded with German food supplies for Greece.
DR. SAUTER: And Funk, the Reich Minister of Economy at that time, played an important part in these actions, did he not?
NEUBACHER: Reich Minister of Economy Funk took a very positive interest in the Greek question, a question which is unique in the history of economy, and he supported me in my efforts with every means at his disposal.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know anything about the fact that the Defendant Funk advocated in particular that the occupation costs should be kept as low as possible, and that he took the view that it would be preferable that a considerable part of the occupation costs should rather be charged to the German account so that Greece should not be overburdened? What do you know about that?
NEUBACHER: I know too little of the details of what happened in Berlin; but at long intervals I reported to Reich Minister Funk about the situation in Greece, and I know that he made my reports the basis for his own interventions. He was perfectly aware of the fact that the Greek economic problem during the war and within the blockade was so infinitely complicated that all efforts had to be made to prevent a complete dissolution of the monetary value and the economic structure; and he intervened at all times in that respect.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, did Defendant Funk act in such a way that the Greek currency, drachma currency, was devaluated, or that it deteriorated? Or did he, on the contrary, endeavor to back the drachma value, particularly for the purpose of preventing a catastrophic famine? Please state briefly what you know about that.
NEUBACHER: Reich Minister Funk always made every effort in the latter direction. He proved that by enforcing exports to Greece and finally by the grant of a considerable amount of gold for the purpose of slowing down the Greek inflation—which grant, in accordance with the Four Year Plan, involved the gravest sacrifice for Germany.
DR. SALTER: You say “a considerable amount of gold.” There was very little gold in Germany during the war. Can you tell us how large the amount of gold was which the Defendant Funk sent to Greece at that time for the purpose of backing the drachma to some extent and preventing the impending catastrophe? How large was the amount?
NEUBACHER: All told, one and one third million pounds sterling were invested in Greece and Albania, to my recollection.
DR. SAUTER: One and one third million pounds sterling?
NEUBACHER: Greece and Albania got that amount.
DR. SAUTER: And now, Witness, I have a last question. Is it correct that all these efforts on the part of the German economic management and the German Minister of Economy were often frustrated and foiled, particularly by Greek merchants? To quote just one example, there were cases where German factories sold German engines for 60 drachmas to Greek merchants—that is to say, 60 drachmas which had actually no value—and the Greek merchant sold these same engines which they had bought for 60 drachmas from Germans to the German Armed Forces at 60,000 drachmas apiece. These are supposed to be cases which you discovered and on which you reported to the Defendant Funk, and that is why I am asking you whether that is true.
NEUBACHER: I have the following comment to make about that. It did, in fact, happen, but I want to state that the Greek businessmen had to do that in consequence of inflation and the black market. The Greek people are much too intelligent to be caught up in an inflation. Every child there is a businessman. Therefore, the only possible method for counteracting this obvious speculation, which in itself is not dishonest, was that of converting the black market into a totally free market on sound business lines; and that was the end of these experiments.
DR. SAUTER: This transformation of the black market into a free market, a problem which also played an important part in France, was brought about by your activity in agreement with the Defendant Funk?
NEUBACHER: Yes, I introduced this measure together with my Italian colleague D’Agostino at the end of October 1942.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you very much, Witness.
Mr. President, I have no further questions.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, Members of the Military Tribunal, for your information I am going to examine the witness on the question of the Anschluss.
Witness, you have described to the Tribunal your economic activities. Were you not active politically as well?
NEUBACHER: I was politically active as the chairman of the Austro-German People’s Union.
DR. STEINBAUER: What were the aims of that Austro-German People’s Union?
NEUBACHER: The Austro-German People’s Union was an organization which stood above parties and religious denominations, and which, in a one-sided manner, aimed at revising the Anschluss prohibition in the peace treaties by solving the question of the Austro-German Anschluss peacefully through plebiscite. In the executive committee of this Austro-German People’s Union, all parties were officially represented with the exception of the National Socialist and Communist Parties. The German organization of the same name was under the leadership of the Social Democratic President of the German Reichstag, Paul Loebe.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have here a list of the executive committee which is dated 1926. You appear as chairman and Staatsrat Paul Speiser as deputy. Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart is named as treasurer, and then there is Dr. Benedikt Kautsky, one Georg Stern, Hofrat and President of the Banks’ Association, and a certain Dr. Stolper. Is that correct?
NEUBACHER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Why did all these members who represented different party lines and religious denominations strive toward the Anschluss at that time?
NEUBACHER: After the conclusion of the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, a movement on the broadest basis started in Austria for the union of this country, which was suffering from severe economic depression, with Germany. Men from all parties and all religions joined this movement, as you can see from the names which you, Herr Doctor, have just mentioned.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know by which way and under what conditions this was intended in 1918, especially with regard to the position of Vienna as capital of the Reich and seat of the Court?
NEUBACHER: There were no clear ideas about the technical form of such a distant goal; but every Austrian, on the basis of a historically well-founded pride, was agreed that the city of Vienna should rank as the second capital of Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry. The Tribunal isn’t really concerned with whether or not any Anschluss was desirable, or whether it was just or not. The Tribunal is concerned with whether it was obtained by violence and force. Most of this evidence does not seem to be relevant at all.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, unfortunately I must say that my opinion differs from that of the Tribunal, because I believe—and that applies not only to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, but also to the other defendants who participated in the Anschluss, namely, Göring, Ribbentrop, Papen, Neurath—that it is important to know the economic, political, and cultural auspices and the political situation of Austria at the time when these men were striving toward an Anschluss. Therefore, I am of the opinion that it is important to ascertain just what the general attitude was. I have taken the liberty of including in my document book a short historical report to clarify the various views.
Witness, then, in 1938 you became Mayor of the City of Vienna?
NEUBACHER: That was after the Anschluss.
DR. STEINBAUER: At the same time, Seyss-Inquart was Reichsstatthalter for the Gau of Vienna, or rather the State of Austria; is that correct?
NEUBACHER: I became Mayor of Vienna under Seyss-Inquart on the morning of 13 March 1938, when he was still Austrian Federal Chancellor. At that time Seyss-Inquart was Federal Chancellor of Austria.
DR. STEINBAUER: Very well. How long did you remain in office as Mayor of the City of Vienna?
NEUBACHER: According to the Austrian Law, until February 1939. Then Bürckel became Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Vienna, and thereby automatically supreme head of the communal administration. Thus...
DR. STEINBAUER: That is enough. Thank you. And what was the relationship between Seyss-Inquart on the one hand and the Commissioner for the Reichsvereinigung, Bürckel, on the other hand?
NEUBACHER: The relations were notoriously bad. Bürckel disregarded the authority of the Reichsstatthalter, Seyss-Inquart. He ruled over his head, and he tried by every method of slander, intrigue, and provocation to overthrow Seyss-Inquart and remove him from office. And he succeeded.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to question?
COL. AMEN: No.
THE PRESIDENT: No questions?
COL. AMEN: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
Dr. Kauffmann.
DR. KAUFFMANN: There are still six interrogatories outstanding. I hope that I will be permitted to submit them as soon as they are received; and may I also reserve for myself the right, in connection with the application I made 2 days ago, to apply for some one of the witnesses in writing, that is, witnesses from among those who appear in the affidavits submitted by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean you want to cross-examine somebody from whom the Prosecution has submitted an affidavit?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of affidavits which have already been put in?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am speaking of the affidavits which were submitted for the first time 2 days ago.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal thinks you should make up your mind very soon as to whether you want to cross-examine those persons.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Certainly. I intended to put that application to you, but the Tribunal told me to make that application in writing.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see. Very well.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Apart from that, I have finished my case for today.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, we understood that Dr. Dix wanted to have the question of his documents settled on behalf of the Defendant Schacht. Did you anticipate that that would take long?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If I might just consult Mr. Dodd—I don’t think it will, but I would just like to verify that, if Your Lordship will allow.
THE PRESIDENT: What does Dr. Dix say?
DR. DIX: I do not think it will take long, perhaps a quarter of an hour. However, I shall have to reply to the Prosecution, and therefore the length of my reply depends upon the length of the statement made by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, there would seem to be some advantages in taking it now, because otherwise we have got to stop at some particular time, and we shan’t know how long it is going to take. If we take it now, it does not so much matter, and then we could go on with Dr. Thoma afterwards.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, my friend Mr. Dodd thinks it will take about a half hour.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Dr. Thoma, you have no objection to that, have you?
DR. THOMA: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I have before me an index which is submitted by Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht.
First, I assume that I should proceed by taking up the exhibits to which we have objected.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am not sure that I have that index before me. Have you got a copy of it we could have?
MR. DODD: I have just the one copy, which was supplied to us by Dr. Dix.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it been supplied to the Tribunal?
MR. DODD: I don’t think so; I don’t know.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you could indicate what the documents are without our having them before us. Would you give the numbers when you indicate the documents?
MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor.
As to the first four documents, Number 1 is a book by Sir Nevile Henderson, Failure of a Mission. Number 2 is also an excerpt from that book; so is Number 3. We object to all of those on the ground that they only represent the opinion of Sir Nevile Henderson; they do not recount historical fact. Number 4 is an excerpt from a book written about Dr. Schacht by a man by the name of Karl Bopp. We object to that on the same ground; that it is the opinion of the author and not pertinent here.
Exhibit Number 5 is an excerpt from the book written by Mr. Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision. Our objection to this excerpt is based on the same grounds; it contains only an opinion of Mr. Welles and, however valuable in some places, it is incompetent here.
Exhibit Number 6 is the book by Viscount Rothermere which was already passed upon by the Tribunal with respect to the application of the Defendant Göring. We renew the objection that was made at that time, citing again that it is only the opinion of this gentleman and is of no value before this Tribunal.
Exhibit Number 7 is the Messersmith affidavit, which was offered in evidence by the Prosecution. We have no objection to that, of course.
Exhibit Number 8 is also a Prosecution exhibit. No objection.
Number 9, likewise.
Number 10 is an affidavit or declaration by the late Field Marshal Von Blomberg, and we have no objection to that.
Passing on, we have no objection until we reach Exhibit Number 14, Ambassador Dodd’s diary—and it is not really an objection there. We ask that we be given the dates of the entries—they have not been given to us thus far—or the pages from the diary from which it is intended to quote.
We go on to Exhibit Number 18. The intervening exhibits, of course, we have no objection to...
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I understand this is really a question of what shall be translated, is it not?
MR. DODD: Yes. We are objecting now, because we want to save the labor of the translation.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Then you go on to 18.
MR. DODD: Yes. Number 18 consists of three parts: (a), (b), and (c). They are statements of Paul Boncour, of Briand, and of Lord Cecil. They are statements about Germany’s right to rearm. We object to them because they are not statements made by officials of any of these governments—of these two governments. No source is given in the excerpt which is to be quoted, and it appears that they are nothing more than opinions, given after these men had retired from office.
Passing on, then, we come to Exhibit Number 33. That is a speech by Dr. Schacht in 1937. Our only question about it—we are not questioning at all its relevancy, of course, but we would like to know whether or not the original is available. We have not been able to find out yet.
Number 34 is a speech by Adolf Hitler. It is very brief, and I am rather loath to make too much objection to it, except that I cannot see its relevancy here. It does not seem to pertain to any of the issues that have been raised in this place, and unless Dr. Dix has something in mind that we have not been apprised of, we would object to it.
THE PRESIDENT: What does it deal with, Mr. Dodd?
MR. DODD: It deals with rearmament, generally; but it does not say anything about Dr. Schacht or any of the allegations here. It seems to be just a general statement about rearmament.
We have an objection to Exhibit Number 37. It is a letter from Dr. Schacht to Mr. Leon Fraser. Our objection is that we would like to know whether or not the original is available; and if it is—why, we would have no objection.
Number 38 is a newspaper article from a newspaper in Zürich, Switzerland about what Dr. Schacht’s thoughts were; and we object to that. The author is unknown, to begin with. It is only a newspaper account and seems to be immaterial and unimportant here.
Exhibit Number 39 is a letter written by one Richard Morton, addressed to the Solicitor of the Treasury in Great Britain. It was forwarded here to the General Secretary, I believe. In any event, we object to it on the ground that it is not competent. It purports to tell what Morton thought about Schacht and about some assistance that Morton received from Schacht. We would suggest that if Dr. Schacht’s counsellor, Dr. Dix, feels that Morton has really some pertinent and relevant testimony to give here, it could be done by way of an interrogatory. He is in London, and it would be, we submit, a more proper way to proceed, rather than offering this letter, which was written without any direction or basis.
Then we move down to Exhibit Number 49, being correspondence between the publisher of Ambassador Dodd’s diary and Sir Nevile Henderson. It is reprinted in the volume containing Dodd’s diary. It is rather vague to me just what the relevance of the entry is here, or how it could be shown in that fashion.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it long?
MR. DODD: Not very long, no.
Now, I am a little bit confused about the last few exhibits, running from 54 to 61. We are only informed that 54 is the record of Göring’s testimony before this Tribunal, and so on—the record of so and so before the Tribunal: three excerpts from Göring’s testimony and four from the statements of Lt. Brady Bryson, made in connection with the Prosecution’s presentation of the case against the Defendant Schacht. I, of course, simply say that it is unnecessary to have these translated or do anything more than refer to them. They are already in the record, and I do not know just what Dr. Dix has in mind. I have no objection, of course, to his reference to them or any other such use as he may properly make.
THE PRESIDENT: Are those excerpts long?
MR. DODD: Well, I don’t know. It is just a matter of copying them over again from the record. They are already in the record of this Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. DODD: You see, if Your Honor pleases, I do not have them before me.
That amounts to our view on the applications of Dr. Schacht’s counsel at this time. If there are any questions, I should be glad to answer them. I have not gone into much detail here.
THE PRESIDENT: No, that is all right. Dr. Dix can answer now. Yes, Dr. Dix.
DR. DIX: Concerning the objections raised to Numbers 1 to 6, I readily admit to Mr. Dodd that these documents are matters of argument rather than evidence. Schacht will argue the fact that prominent persons abroad represented the same views which were the basis for his entire attitude, including the question of rearmament. He will quote these opinions; and I, too, in my final speech, shall refer to these passages for the purpose of argument. If Mr. Dodd says, therefore, that this is not so much evidence as it is argument, he is right. But, in my opinion we are not now arguing the question of what is to be officially submitted as evidence to the Tribunal according to procedure. We are merely arguing—or rather we are discussing—whether these documents should be translated, so that if Schacht quotes them during his examination, or if I quote them during my speech, the Tribunal would be able to follow the quotation easily. We have observed that the Tribunal—and this seems fairly obvious—prefer the documents which are being quoted here to be submitted in translation so that they can follow exactly. Therefore, regarding Numbers 1 to 6—and, incidentally, the same applies to all the documents contained in Exhibit Number 18—I am not attempting to have them admitted in evidence: I am merely recommending that they be translated in the interest of everyone concerned, so that in case they are quoted the translation can be given to the Tribunal. It is merely a question of being practical. This applies to 1 to 6 and all under 18.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, hasn’t the Tribunal already ruled that both the document books of Viscount Rothermere and the speech or book by M. Paul Boncour are not to be put in evidence and are not to be referred to?
DR. DIX: I only know of one ruling of the Tribunal to the effect that no arguments regarding the justice or injustice of the Versailles Peace Treaty will be admitted. We shall, of course, obey that ruling of the Tribunal. But we will not quote these passages in order to discuss the justice or injustice of the Versailles Treaty. That is not Schacht’s intention or mine. To cite an example:
The Prosecution considers that a certain attitude of Schacht’s proves that by backing armament he supported and wanted aggression. He wants to disprove this by referring to the fact that certain prominent foreigners took the same view, and that these men could not possibly mean to further German aggression by adopting that view. That is only one example. But at any rate the purpose is not to give academic lectures on the justice or injustice of the Versailles Treaty—which I had not intended in any event, since I feel that such arguments would find but deaf ears. It is not my habit to use arguments which I believe will receive no response. May I continue?
Concerning Number 18 may I—I beg to apologize. I have just heard Mr. Dodd’s statements, and I must reply at once. I must first assemble the material. I have noted down that under Number 18, which I have just mentioned—and this also applies to Numbers 1 to 6—Mr. Dodd is missing the sources. That may be due to the fact that he has had only the index to the document. The sources and documents are quoted in the actual quotations.
I now turn to Number 37. It is Schacht’s letter to a certain Fraser. I understood Mr. Dodd to say that he was raising no objection but that he merely wanted to know where the original document is located. It is a letter from Schacht to Fraser, the late president of the First National Bank. The original of that letter—if it still exists—would be among the papers left by the deceased Mr. Fraser, to which I have no access, nor has any one else.
One moment, Mr. President. Schacht tells me that he has only a copy which bears his signature and, therefore, is a so-called auto-copy. This auto-copy was deposited in Switzerland during the war because of its contents. This auto-copy, signed personally by Schacht, is here, and the copy in the document book has been taken from it. The fact that it is a true copy has been certified by Professor Kraus, and I think that as far as possible it has been adequately identified. So much for Number 37. Then I have made a note regarding Number 34. Just one moment, please. Number 34 is another case where the source was missing. The same applies as above. The source is stated in the document book—namely, Dokumente der Deutschen Politik. This compilation has been used a great deal as a source of evidence. Then objections have been raised...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the objection to 34 was not that the original was not available, but it was a speech by Hitler which was about rearmament and did not seem to be relevant.
DR. DIX: Yes, that is correct. Thank you very much, Mr. President.
Mr. Dodd, of course, could not recognize the relevancy of the document. Schacht could recognize it, since he alone knows his inner development. This is a speech of Hitler’s in which there is a passage which confirmed the slowly developing suspicion on Schacht’s part that this policy not only would lead to a war of aggression, but that possibly Hitler actually desired the war. This suspicion was particularly roused by this passage in the speech made by Hitler in the Reichstag on 28 February 1938. This speech is an important milestone in presenting Schacht’s inner attitude toward Hitler and his policy, beginning with Schacht’s adherence in the year 1933 through the turning-point when distrust started and developed into opposition, which was increased to continuous preparations for revolt. For that reason, I believe it is relevant evidence. That is Number 34.
Then there is Number 38. That is the article from the Basler Nachrichten. In my opinion it is evidence of the greatest importance. At any rate, I shall fight to my very last breath to have that document admitted. Subject: Before the war—the fight against the war; during the war—the fight and the attempts to bring about an early peace, the fight against the spreading of the war.
In 1941—that is to say, before Russia’s entry into the war and before the entry of the United States into this war—Schacht had a conversation with a political economist from the United States, which he did not recollect until an acquaintance sent him the article which had appeared in the Basler Nachrichten of 14 January 1946. He said, “Of course, now I remember. Four years ago, in the spring of 1941, I had this conversation with an American political economist.” The name, he has still forgotten. This conversation shows once more the efforts he made as late as 1941 to tie threads and get contacts to prevent any spreading of the war, particularly by opening pourparlers with the United States and the men around President Roosevelt.
We have no other evidence to prove the fact that this conversation took place, since we cannot call upon this professor, because Schacht has forgotten his name. But it is the professor himself who is anonymously speaking in this newspaper edition of 14 January 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, what is the nature of the conversation which you say is reported in this newspaper?
DR. DIX: It is a fairly long article. Perhaps I may pick out a few points so that the Tribunal can understand the nature of the conversation. The professor relates in this interview that at that time Schacht took an extremely critical attitude toward the National Socialist system of government; that he had pointed out the dangers of maintaining such a system because this would lead to a complete mortification of intellectual activities. Thereupon, he goes on further to tell the professor that this war was entirely senseless, and that, when considered from a higher level, it would be senseless and futile even for a victorious Germany. He explained to the professor that every means should be employed to stop the war, because in an orderly world—in a world put in order by a just peace—the governments would automatically become liberal. In the end he suggests, therefore, that an attempt should be made at all costs to establish contact between the nations, particularly with representative men from the United States, before Russia and America entered the war.
He goes on to regret that Roosevelt—I beg your pardon—he goes on to name Roosevelt—and his friends—as the very man who could carry out the great task of helping to contrive such a meeting artfully and carefully. It is an attempt, Your Lordship, similar to the one which appears in the letter to Fraser, which I quoted before. Fraser, too, belonged to the closer—at any rate, let us say to these people who had access to President Roosevelt. It is the last desperate effort, relying on the confidence Roosevelt had in him personally, to contribute his part to bring about peace before it was too late.
Such an attitude is, of course, of extraordinary relevancy in rebutting the charge of aggression, and that is why I think that the Tribunal should under any circumstances admit this article as evidence. We cannot, after all, assume that this professor is not telling the truth. Technically, it might be possible to try to discover his name from the Basler Nachrichten; but I am afraid that the Basler Nachrichten will not disclose the name without having made further enquiries from the professor in America. It is questionable whether he will permit his name to be disclosed, and we may have serious difficulties. Since personal experience shows that the professor’s report in the Basler Nachrichten is true, then why would he not speak the truth here? Moreover, he is a respected man. That is why I think that this piece of evidence is equivalent to a personal examination of the professor. Therefore, I urge you to admit this document not only for translation but also in evidence. That was Number 38.
As to Morton, I am perfectly agreeable to sending an interrogatory to Morton; but I believe that this would be a superfluous effort. Actually, I need this letter of Morton’s only to prove the fact that Lord Montagu Norman, on his return from a BIZ meeting to England in 1939, told this man Morton—who was a respected citizen of Frankfurt am Main, associated with the Metallgesellschaft and later emigrated—that Schacht was in considerable personal danger on account of his political attitude. That is the main fact which I am to prove with this letter, and it is contained in the letter. This letter was not written by Morton to me or to Schacht. It is a letter which was addressed to the Solicitor of the Treasury, and from there it was given to the Prosecution here, and the Prosecution has been kind enough to inform us of the letter. We thought it would be too much trouble to have Morton called as a witness. I am perfectly willing to draft a questionnaire, but I think it would be a more simple and just as reliable a method if the Tribunal permitted me to quote two short passages from that letter. I am, however, equally prepared to send an interrogatory to London. That is Number 39.
Regarding Number 49, this is correspondence between Sir Nevile Henderson and the editor of the diary of the late Ambassador Dodd. It is of the greatest importance in establishing the reliability of the statements in the Dodd diary, which not I but the Prosecution has quoted repeatedly to the detriment of Schacht, as far as I can remember. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, I should like to emphasize that we are far from questioning the reliability of the late Ambassador Dodd. Both Dr. Schacht and myself knew him personally, and we consider him to be an absolutely honorable man. But the Tribunal know that this diary, which was based on hasty notes made by the ambassador, was edited by his children after his death. Therefore, it is possible that mistakes may occur, bad mistakes. This becomes evident in the correspondence between Sir Nevile Henderson and the editor of the diary, where Sir Nevile Henderson points out that a conversation, or several conversations—which according to the diary Dodd is supposed to have had with him—were quoted quite wrongly. I believe there can be no better proof of the unbiased unreliability of this diary—I repeat, only the unbiased unreliability—than this correspondence between Sir Nevile Henderson and the editor. Therefore, in order to test the credibility of this evidence which was produced by the Prosecution, and to reduce its value to the proper proportion, I ask to have this document admitted in evidence.
Regarding Numbers 54 to 61, I do not intend in any way to introduce evidence by means of these documents. It is perfectly agreeable to me if they are not translated, but the thought I had in mind was merely that of making the work of the Tribunal easier. I will examine Schacht with reference to these passages of Göring’s testimony. If the Tribunal believe that it is not necessary to have these excerpts available when they are quoted or if it prefers to use the record only or have the record which is here brought up for use, then of course it will not be necessary to translate these passages. It is, therefore, merely a question of what the Tribunal consider to be the most practical way. We have made the excerpts, and if the Tribunal wish, they will be translated.
Now there is left only the affidavits. Mr. Dodd did not mention them; but I think at the time when Sir David and I discussed the witnesses and affidavits here in court in open session the affidavits had already been admitted by the Tribunal. Of course, reserving the right of the Prosecution to ask counter questions or call the witnesses for cross-examination after having read the documents, that is their privilege. We have been satisfied with affidavits instead of the personal appearance merely in order to save time; but if the Prosecution wishes these witnesses, from whom we have affidavits, to appear, then, of course, the Defense is perfectly agreeable to this.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: I will deal first of all with the documents on behalf of the Defendant Schacht.
The following documents will be translated:
Number 7, Number 8, Number 9, Number 14, Number 18, Number 33, Number 34, Number 37, Number 38, Number 39, and Number 49.
With reference to documents 54 to 61, which are already in the record, they will not be translated, but Dr. Dix is requested to give references to those documents in his document book.
Documents 1 to 6 will not be translated at all.
I meant that the documents which I have not alluded to will be translated—the documents which I have not referred to specifically will be translated.
Now, Dr. Thoma.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, first of all I am submitting copies of the documents which were granted me this morning and which are from Rosenberg’s publications—Tradition and Our Present Age, Writings and Speeches, Blood and Honor, Formation of the Idea, and The Myth of the 20th Century—as evidence of the fact that the defendant did not participate in a conspiracy against the peace and in the psychological preparation for war. These excerpts contain speeches which the defendant made before diplomats, before students, before jurists, and are meant to prove that on these occasions he fought for social peace, and that, in particular, he did not want the battle of ideologies to result in foreign political enmity. In these speeches he advocated respect for all races, spoke against the propaganda for leaving the church, advocated freedom of conscience and a sensible solution of the Jewish problem, even giving certain advantages to Jews. In particular, he called for equality and justice in this matter. I ask the Tribunal to take official notice of these speeches, and with the permission of the Tribunal I call the Defendant Rosenberg to the witness stand.
[The Defendant Rosenberg took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
ALFRED ROSENBERG (Defendant): Alfred Rosenberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—to speak the pure truth—and withhold and add nothing.
[The defendant repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. THOMA: Mr. Rosenberg, will you please give the Tribunal your personal history.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, you have not given your exhibits any exhibit numbers, have you?
DR. THOMA: Yes, I have. That is Rosenberg-7(a).
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, they have all been numbered?
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. When you refer to any of the documents, you will give them their exhibit number.
DR. THOMA: Yes, indeed.
[Turning to the defendant.] Will you give the Tribunal your personal history...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait one minute, Dr. Thoma. For the purposes of the record, you see, which is contained in the transcript, I think you ought to read out a list of the documents which you are putting in, stating what the exhibit numbers are. Have you got a list there of the documents you are going to offer in evidence?
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you just read it into the record?
DR. THOMA: Exhibit Rosenberg-7, The Myth of the 20th Century.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. THOMA: Rosenberg-7(a), Gestaltung der Idee (Formation of the Idea); Rosenberg-7(b), Rosenberg, Blut und Ehre (Blood and Honor); Rosenberg-7(c), Rosenberg, Tradition und Gegenwart (Tradition and Our Present Age); Rosenberg-7(d), Rosenberg, Schriften und Reden (Writings and Speeches); and Rosenberg-8, Völkischer Beobachter, March and September 1933.
THE PRESIDENT: That one was excluded by the Tribunal. Numbers 7(e) and 8 were excluded.
DR. THOMA: I did not cite 7(e) but Rosenberg-8.
THE PRESIDENT: You cited 8, though.
DR. THOMA: Yes, I mentioned Rosenberg-8, and I beg to apologize.
THE PRESIDENT: Number 8 is excluded, too.
DR. THOMA: Yes.
[Turning to the defendant.] Mr. Rosenberg, please give the Tribunal your personal history.
ROSENBERG: I was born on 12 January 1893 in Reval in Estonia. After having graduated there from high school I began to study architecture in the autumn of 1910 at the Institute of Technology at Riga. When the German-Russian front lines approached in 1915, the Institute of Technology, including the professors and students, was evacuated to Moscow, and there I continued my studies in this capital of Russia. The end of January or the beginning of February 1918 I finished my studies, received a diploma as an engineer and architect, and returned to my native city.
When the German troops entered Reval, I tried to enlist as a volunteer in the German Army, but since I was a citizen of an occupied country, I was not accepted without special recommendation. Since in the future I did not want to live between the frontiers of several countries, I tried to get to Germany.
To the Baltic Germans, notwithstanding their loyalty toward the Russian State, German culture was their intellectual home, and the experience I had had in Russia strengthened my resolution to do everything within my power to help prevent the political movement in Germany from backsliding into Bolshevism. I believed that this movement in Germany, because of the precarious structure of the system of the German Reich, would have meant a tremendous catastrophe. At the end of November 1918 I travelled to Berlin and from there to Munich. Actually, I wanted to take up my profession as an architect, but in Munich I met people who felt the way I did, and I became a staff member of a weekly, which was founded at that time in Munich. I went to work on this weekly paper in January 1918 and have continued in literary work since that time. I lived through the development of the political movement here in Munich until the Räte Republic in 1919 and its overthrow.
DR. THOMA: You just mentioned Germany as your intellectual home. Will you tell the Tribunal by which studies and by which scientists you were influenced in favor of the German mentality?
ROSENBERG: In addition to my immediate artistic interests in architecture and painting, I had since childhood pursued historical and philosophical studies and thus, of course, instinctively I tended to read Goethe, Herder, and Fichte in order to develop intellectually along these lines. At the same time, I was influenced by the social ideas of Charles Dickens, Carlyle, and, with regard to America, by Emerson. I continued these studies at Riga and, naturally, took up Kant and Schopenhauer and, above all, devoted myself to the study of the philosophy of India and related schools of thought. Later, of course, I studied the prominent European historians of the history of civilization; Burckhardt and Rohde, Ranke and Treitschke, Mommsen and Schlieffen. Finally, in Munich I started to study modern biology more closely.
DR. THOMA: You frequently mentioned in the course of your speeches “the embodiment of the idea.” Was this due to Goethe’s influence?
ROSENBERG: Yes, it is a matter of course that the idea, to see the world as an embodiment, goes back to Goethe.
THE PRESIDENT: [To Dr. Thoma.] The Tribunal, you see, want you to confine yourself to his own philosophy and not to the origins of these philosophies, insofar as you are referring to philosophical subjects at all.
DR. THOMA: How did you come to the NSDAP and to Hitler in Munich?
ROSENBERG: In May 1919 the publisher of the journal which I mentioned was visited by a man by the name of Anton Drexler, who introduced himself as the chairman of a newly founded German Labor Party. He stated that he advocated ideas similar to those expressed by this journal, and from that time I began to have connections with a very small group of German laborers which had been formed in Munich. There in the autumn of 1919 I also met Hitler.
DR. THOMA: When did you join Hitler?
ROSENBERG: Well, at that time I had an earnest conversation with Hitler, and on that occasion I noticed his broad view of the entire European situation.
He said that in his opinion Europe was at that time in a social and political crisis, such as had not existed since the fall of the ancient Roman Empire. He said that seats of unrest were to be found everywhere in this sphere, and that he was personally striving to get a clear picture from the viewpoint of Germany’s restoration to sound conditions. Thereupon, I listened to some of the first speeches by Hitler which were made at small meetings of 40 and 50 people. I believed, above all, a soldier who had been at the front, and who had done his duty silently for 4½ years, had the right to speak now.
At the end of 1919, I entered the Party—not before Hitler, as it is contended here, but later. In this original Party I was assigned Number 625 as a member.
I did not participate in setting up the program. I was present, however, when this program was read and commented upon by Hitler on 24 February 1920.
DR. THOMA: Then you gave a justification for the Party program and probably wanted to solve the problems which referred to the social and political crisis. How did you picture the solution?
ROSENBERG: In response to different inquiries regarding the 25 points of the program, I wrote a commentary at the end of 1922, which has been read to the Tribunal in fragments. Our general attitude at the time may perhaps be stated briefly as follows:
The technical revolution of the 19th Century had certain social and mental consequences. Industrialization and the clamor for profit dominated life and created the industrial state and the metropolis with all its backyards and estrangement from nature and history.
At the turn of the century, many people who wanted to regain their homeland and its history turned against this one-sided movement. The revival of tradition, folk song and folklore of the past, originated with the youth movement of that time. The works of art, for instance, by Professor Schultze-Naumburg and by some poets were a characteristic protest against this one-sided movement of the time, and it is here that National Socialism attempted to gain a foothold—in full consciousness though, that it was a modern movement and not a movement of retrospective sentimentality. It linked itself with the social movement of Stöcker and the national movement of Schönerer in Austria without using them in their entirety as a model.
I should like to add that the name “National Socialism,” I believe, originated in the Sudetenland, and the small German Labor Party was founded under the name of “National Socialist German Labor Party.”
If I may say so, what finally animated us in essence and the reason for our calling ourselves National Socialists—for, you see, many terrible things have been delivered during these 3 months by the Prosecution, but nothing has been said about National Socialism—we were, at the time, aware of the fact that there were two hostile camps in Germany, that in both camps millions of decent Germans were fighting; and we found ourselves facing the problem of what could be acceptable to both these camps from the viewpoint of national unity and what was preventing an understanding between these two camps. In short, at that time as well as later we explained to the proletarian side, that even if the class-conflict had been and still was a factor in social and political life, nevertheless, as an ideological basis and permanent maxim it would mean eternal disunity of the nation. The direction of a movement for social appeasement or any kind of social conflict by an international center was the second decisive obstacle to social reconciliation. The call for social justice, raised generally by labor, was, however, justified, worthy, and necessary. Concerning the bourgeoisie, we believed we would be able to establish that in some cases the reactionary caste prejudice of privileged circles had worked to the detriment of the people and secondly that the representation of national interests should not be based on privileges of certain classes; on the contrary, the demand for national unity and dignified representation was the right attitude on their part. From this resulted the ideas which Hitler...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, would you try to confine the witness to the charges which are against him? The charges against the defendants are not that they attempted to reconstruct Germany, but that they used this form of reconstruction with a view to attacking outside—races and nations outside.
DR. THOMA: But, in my opinion, we have to devote some time to Rosenberg’s train of thought to determine the motives for his actions; but I will now ask him this:
Did you realize that these questions of socialism and the questions of labor and capital were in truth international questions? And why did you fight against democracy as a matter of international struggle?
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I think this is a continuation of this same line of examination, and I should like to say that no one in the Prosecution has made any charge against this defendant for what he has thought. I think we are all, as a matter of principle, opposed to prosecuting any man for what he thinks. And I say with great respect that I feel very confident that is the attitude of this Tribunal. Therefore, we think it is entirely unnecessary to spell out whatever thoughts this defendant had on these subjects, or on any other, for that matter.
DR. THOMA: To my knowledge, the defendant is also accused of fighting democracy; and that is why I believe I should put this question to him.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the question?
DR. THOMA: Why he was fighting democracy—why National Socialism and he himself fought against democracy.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that has got anything to do with this case. The only question is whether he used National Socialism for the purpose of conducting international offensives.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, National Socialism as a concept must be dissected into its constituent parts. Since the Prosecution maintains that National Socialism was a fight against democracy, a one-sided stress on nationalism and militarism, he ought now to have the opportunity to say why National Socialism supported militarism, and whether that was actually the case. National Socialism must be analyzed as a concept in order to determine its constituent parts.
THE PRESIDENT: What National Socialism was has already been shown to the Tribunal, and he is not disputing the fact that there was a Führer principle introduced into Germany. There is no question about that, why it was introduced. If it was introduced for solely internal purposes there would be no charge in respect of that. The only charges are that National Socialism was used for the purpose of making aggressive war and perpetrating the other crimes which we have heard of.
DR. THOMA: To my knowledge, the charge of waging a war of aggression was preferred because it was a war against democracy based on nationalism and militarism.
THE PRESIDENT: Democracy outside Germany, not in Germany.
DR. THOMA: Then I should like to ask the defendant how he will answer the charge that National Socialism preached a master race.
ROSENBERG: I know that this problem is the main point of the Indictment, and I realize that at present, in view of the number of terrible incidents, conclusions are automatically drawn about the past and the reason for the origin of the so-called racial science. I believe, however, that it is of decisive importance in judging this problem to know exactly what we were concerned with.
I have never heard the word “master race” (“Herrenrasse”) as often as in this court room. To my knowledge, I did not mention or use it at all in my writings. I leafed through my Writings and Speeches again and did not find this word. I spoke only once of super humans as mentioned by Homer, and I found a quotation from a British author, who in writing about the life of Lord Kitchener said the Englishman who had conquered the world had proved himself as a creative superman (Herrenmensch). Then I found the word “master race” (“Herrenrasse”) in a writing of the American ethnologist, Madison Grant, and of the French ethnologist, Lapouge.