LXV. REPEAL OF THE INDEPENDENT TREASURY ACT: MR. BENTON'S SPEECH…

LXV. REPEAL OF THE INDEPENDENT TREASURY ACT: MR. BENTON'S SPEECH

The lateness of the hour, the heat of the day, the impatience of the majority, and the determination evinced to suffer no delay in gratifying the feeling which demanded the sacrifice of the Independent Treasury system, shall not prevent me from discharging the duty which I owe to the friends and authors of that system, and to the country itself, by defending it from the unjust and odious character which clamor and faction have fastened upon it. A great and systematic effort has been made to cry down the sub-treasury by dint of clamor, and to render it odious by unfounded representations and distorted descriptions. It seems to have been selected as a subject for an experiment at political bamboozling; and nothing is too absurd, too preposterous, too foreign to the truth, to be urged against it, and to find a lodgment, as it is believed, in the minds of the uninformed and credulous part of the community. It is painted with every odious color, endowed with every mischievous attribute, and made the source and origin of every conceivable calamity. Not a vestige of the original appears; and, instead of the old and true system which it revives and enforces, nothing is seen but a new and hideous monster, come to devour the people, and to destroy at once their liberty, happiness and property. In all this the opponents of the system copy the conduct of the French jacobins of the year '89, in attacking the veto power reserved to the king. The enlightened historian, Thiers, has given us an account of these jacobinical experiments upon French credulity; and we are almost tempted to believe he was describing, with the spirit of prophecy, what we have seen taking place among ourselves. He says that, in some parts of the country, the people were taught to believe that the veto was a tax, which ought to be abolished; in others, that it was a criminal, which ought to be hung; in others again, that it was a monster, which ought to be killed; and in others, that it was a power in the king to prevent the people from eating or drinking. As a specimen of this latter species of imposition which was attempted upon the ignorant, the historian gives a dialogue which actually took place between a jacobin politician and a country peasant in one of the remote departments of France, and which ran in about these terms: "My friend, do you know what the veto is?" "I do not." "Then I will tell you what it is. It is this: You have some soup in your porringer; you are going to eat it; the king commands you to empty it on the ground, and you must instantly empty it on the ground: that is the veto!" This, said Mr. B. is the account which an eminent historian gives us of the means used to bamboozle ignorant peasants and to excite them against a constitutional provision in France, made for their benefit, and which only arrested legislation till the people could speak; and I may say that means little short of such absurdity and nonsense have been used in our country to mislead and deceive the people, and to excite them against the sub-treasury here.

It is my intention, said Mr. B., to expose and to explode these artifices; to show the folly and absurdity of the inventions which were used to delude the people in the country, and which no senator of the opposite party will so far forget himself as to repeat here; and to exhibit the independent treasury as it is--not as a new and hurtful measure just conceived; but as an old and salutary law, fallen into disuse in evil times, and now revived and improved for the safety and advantage of the country.

What is it, Mr. President, which constitutes the system called and known by the name of the sub-treasury, or the independent treasury? It is two features, and two features alone, which constitute the system--all the rest is detail--and these two features are borrowed and taken from the two acts of Congress of September first, and September the second, 1789; the one establishing a revenue system, and the other establishing a treasury department for the United States. By the first of these acts, and by its 30th section, gold and silver coin alone was made receivable in payments to the United States; and by the second of them, section four, the treasurer of the United States is made the receiver, the keeper, and the payer, of the moneys of the United States, to the exclusion of banks, of which only three then existed. By these two laws, the first and the original financial system of the United States was established; and they both now stand upon the statute book, unrepealed, and in full legal force, except in some details. By these laws, made in the first days of the first session of the first Congress, which sat under the constitution, gold and silver coin only was made the currency of the federal treasury, and the treasurer of the United States was made the fiscal agent to receive, to keep, and to pay out that gold and silver coin. This was the system of Washington's administration; and as such it went into effect. All payments to the federal government were made in gold and silver; all such money paid remained in the hands of the treasurer himself, until he paid it out; or in the hands of the collectors of the customs, or the receivers of the land offices, until he drew warrants upon them in favor of those to whom money was due from the government. Thus it was in the beginning--in the first and happy years of Washington's administration. The money of the government was hard money; and nobody touched that money but the treasurer of the United States, and the officers who collected it; and the whole of these were under bonds and penalties for their good behavior, subject to the lawful orders and general superintendence of the Secretary of the Treasury and the President of the United States, who was bound to see the laws faithfully executed. The government was then what it was made to be--a hard-money government. It was made by hard-money men, who had seen enough of the evils of paper money and wished to save their posterity from such evils in future. The money was hard, and it was in the hands of the officers of the government--those who were subject to the orders of the government--and not in the hands of those who were only subject to requisitions--who could refuse to pay, protest a warrant, tell the government to sue, and thus go to law with the government for its own money. The framers of the constitution, and the authors of the two acts of 1789, had seen enough of the evils of the system of requisitions under the confederation to warn them against it under the constitution. They determined that the new government should keep its own hard money, as well as collect it; and thus the constitution, the law, the practice under the law, and the intentions of the hard-money and independent treasury men, were all in harmony, and in full, perfect, and beautiful operation, under the first years of General Washington's administration. All was right, and all was happy and prosperous, at the commencement.

But the spoiler came! General Hamilton was Secretary of the Treasury. He was the advocate of the paper system, the banking system, and the funding system, which were fastened upon England by Sir Robert Walpole, in his long and baneful administration under the first and second George. General Hamilton was the advocate of these systems, and wished to transplant them to our America. He exerted his great abilities, rendered still more potent by his high personal character, and his glorious revolutionary services, to substitute paper money for the federal currency, and banks for the keepers of the public money; and he succeeded to the extent of his wishes. The hard-money currency prescribed by the act of September 1st, 1789, was abolished by construction, and by a Treasury order to receive bank notes; the fiscal agent for the reception, the keeping, and the disbursement of the public moneys, consisting of the treasurer, and his collectors and receivers, was superseded by the creation of a national bank, invested with the privilege of keeping the public moneys, paying them out, and furnishing supplies of paper money for the payment of dues to the government. Thus, the two acts of 1789 were avoided, or superseded; not repealed, but only avoided and superseded by a Treasury order to receive paper, and a bank to keep it and pay it out. From this time paper money became the federal currency, and a bank the keeper of the federal money. It is needless to pursue this departure farther. The bank had its privileges for twenty years--was succeeded in them by local banks--they superseded by a second national bank--it again by local banks--and these finally by the independent treasury system--which was nothing but a return to the fundamental acts of 1789.

This is the brief history--the genealogy rather--of our fiscal agents; and from this it results, that after more than forty years of departure from the system of our forefathers--after more than forty years of wandering in the wilderness of banks, local and national--after more than forty years of wallowing in the slough of paper money, sometimes sound, sometimes rotten--we have returned to the point from which we sat out--hard money for our Federal Treasury; and our own officers to keep it. We returned to the acts of '89, not suddenly and crudely, but by degrees, and with details, to make the return safe and easy. The specie clause was restored, not by a sudden and single step, but gradually and progressively, to be accomplished in four years. The custody of the public moneys was restored to the treasurer and his officers; and as it was impossible for him to take manual possession of the moneys every where, a few receivers-general were given to him to act as his deputies, and the two mints in Philadelphia and New Orleans (proper places to keep money, and their keys in the hands of our officers), were added to his means of receiving and keeping them. This return to the old acts of '89 was accomplished in the summer of 1840. The old system, with a new name, and a little additional organization, has been in force near one year. It has worked well. It has worked both well and easy, and now the question is to repeal it, and to begin again where General Hamilton started us above forty years ago, and which involved us so long in the fate of banks and in the miseries and calamities of paper money. The gentlemen on the other side of the House go for the repeal; we against it; and this defines the position of the two great parties of the day--one standing on ground occupied by General Hamilton and the federalists in the year '91; the other standing on the ground occupied at the same time by Mr. Jefferson and the democracy.

The democracy oppose the repeal, because this system is proved by experience to be the safest, the cheapest, and the best mode of collecting the revenues, and keeping and disbursing the public moneys, which the wisdom of man has yet invented. It is the safest mode of collecting, because it receives nothing but gold and silver, and thereby saves the government from loss by paper money, preserves the standard of value, and causes a supply of specie to be kept in the country for the use of the people and for the support of the sound part of the banks. It is the cheapest mode of keeping the moneys; for the salaries of a few receivers are nothing compared to the cost of employing banks; for banks must be paid either by a per centum, or by a gross sum, or by allowing them the gratuitous use of the public money. This latter method has been tried, and has been found to be the dearest of all possible modes. The sub-treasury is the safest mode of keeping, for the receivers-general are our officers--subject to our orders--removable at our will--punishable criminally--suable civilly--and bound in heavy securities. It is the best mode; for it has no interest in increasing taxes in order to increase the deposits. Banks have this interest. A national bank has an interest in augmenting the revenue, because thereby it augmented the public deposits. The late bank had an average deposit for near twenty years of eleven millions and a half of public money in the name of the treasurer of the United States, and two millions and a half in the names of public officers. It had an annual average deposit of fourteen millions, and was notoriously in favor of all taxes, and of the highest tariffs, and was leagued with the party which promoted these taxes and tariffs. A sub-treasury has no interest of this kind, and in that particular alone presents an immense advantage over any bank depositories, whether a national institution or a selection of local banks. Every public interest requires the independent treasury to be continued. It is the old system of '89. The law for it has been on our statute-book for fifty-two years. Every citizen who is under fifty-two years old has lived all his life under the sub-treasury law, although the law itself has been superseded or avoided during the greater part of the time. Like the country gentleman in Molière's comedy, who had talked prose all his life without knowing it, every citizen who is under fifty-two has lived his life under the sub-treasury law--under the two acts of '89 which constitute it, and which have not been repealed.

We are against the repeal; and although unable to resist it here, we hope to show to the American people that it ought not to be repealed, and that the time will come when its re-establishment will be demanded by the public voice.

Independent of our objections to the merits of this repeal, stands one of a preliminary character, which has been too often mentioned to need elucidation or enforcement, but which cannot be properly omitted in any general examination of the subject. We are about to repeal one system without having provided another, and without even knowing what may be substituted, or whether any substitute whatever shall be agreed upon. Shall we have any, and if any, what? Shall it be a national bank, after the experience we have just had of such institutions? Is it to be a nondescript invention--a fiscality--or fiscal agent--to be planted in this District because we have exclusive jurisdiction here, and which, upon the same argument, may be placed in all the forts and arsenals, in all the dock-yards and navy-yards, in all the lighthouses and powder magazines, and in all the territories which the United States now possess, or may hereafter acquire? We have exclusive jurisdiction over all these; and if, with this argument, we can avoid the constitution in these ten miles square, we can also avoid it in every State, and in every territory of the Union. Is it to be the pet bank system of 1836, which, besides being rejected by all parties, is an impossibility in itself? Is it to be the lawless condition of the public moneys, as gentlemen denounced it, which prevailed from October, 1833, when the deposits were removed from the Bank of the United States, till June, 1836, when the State bank deposit system was adopted; and during all which time we could hear of nothing but the union of the purse and the sword, and the danger to our liberties from the concentration of all power in the hands of one man? Is it to be any one of these, and which? And if neither, then are the two acts of '89, which have never been repealed--which have only been superseded by temporary enactments, which have ceased, or by treasury constructions which no one can now defend--are these two acts to recover their vitality and vigor, and again become the law of the land, as they were in the first years of General Washington's administration, and before General Hamilton overpowered them? If so, we are still to have the identical system which we now repeal, with no earthly difference but the absence of its name, and the want of a few of its details. Be all this as it may--let the substitute be any thing or nothing--we have still accomplished a great point by the objection we have taken to the repeal before the substitute was produced, and by the vote which we took upon that point yesterday. We have gained the advantage of cutting gentlemen off from all plea for adopting their baneful schemes, founded upon the necessity of adopting something, because we have nothing. By their own vote they refuse to produce the new system before they abolish the old one. By their own vote they create the necessity which they deprecate; and having been warned in time, and acting with their eyes open, they cannot make their own conduct a plea for adopting a bad measure rather than none. If Congress adjourns without any system, and the public moneys remain as they did from 1833 to 1836, the country will know whose fault it is; and gentlemen will know what epithets to apply to themselves, by recollecting what they applied to General Jackson from the day the deposits were removed until the deposit act of '36 was passed.

Who demands the repeal of this system? Not the people of the United States; for there is not a solitary petition from the farmers, the mechanics, the productive classes, and the business men, against it. Politicians who want a national bank, to rule the country, and millionary speculators who want a bank to plunder it--these, to be sure, are clamorous for the repeal; and for the obvious reasons that the present system stands in the way of their great plans. But who else demands it? Who else objects to either feature of the sub-treasury--the hard-money feature, or the deposit of our own moneys with our own officers? Make the inquiry--pursue it through its details--examine the community by classes, and see who objects. The hard-money feature is in full force. It took full effect at once in the South and West, because there were no bank-notes in those quarters of the Union of the receivable description: it took full effect in New York and New England, because, having preserved specie payments, specie was just as plenty in that quarter as paper money; and all payments were either actually or virtually in hard money. It was specie, or its equivalent. The hard-money clause then went into operation at once, and who complained of it? The payers of the revenue? No, not one of them. The merchants who pay the duties have not complained; the farmers who buy the public lands have not complained. On the contrary, they rejoice; for hard-money payments keep off the speculator, with his bales of notes borrowed from banks, and enable the farmer to get his land at a fair price. The payers of the revenue then do not complain. How stands it with the next most interested class--the receivers of money from the United States? Are they dissatisfied at being paid in gold and silver? And do they wish to go back to the depreciated paper--the shinplasters--the compound of lampblack and rags--which they received a few years ago? Put this inquiry to the meritorious laborer who is working in stone, in wood, earth, and in iron for you at this moment. Ask him if he is tired of hard-money payments, and wishes the independent treasury system repealed, that he may get a chance to receive his hard-earned wages in broken bank-notes again. Ask the soldier and the mariner the same question. Ask the salaried officer and the contractor the same question. Ask ourselves here if we wish it--we who have seen ourselves paid in gold for years past, after having been for thirty years without a sight of that metal. No, sir, no. Neither the payers of money to the government, nor the receivers of money from the government, object to the hard-money clause in the sub-treasury act. How is it then with the body of the people--the great mass of the productive and business classes? Do they object to the clause? Not at all. They rejoice at it: for they receive, at second-hand, all that comes from the government. No officer, contractor, or laborer, eats the hard money which he receives from the government, but pays it out for the supplies which support his family: it all goes to the business and productive classes: and thus the payments from the government circulate from hand to hand, and go through the whole body of the people. Thus the whole body of the productive classes receive the benefit of the whole amount of the government hard-money payments. Who is it then that objects to it? Broken banks, and their political confederates, are the clamorers against it. Banks which wish to make their paper a public currency: politicians who wish a national bank as a machine to rule the country. These banks, and these politicians, are the sole clamorers against the hard-money clause in the sub-treasury system: they alone clamor for paper money. And how is it with the other clause--the one which gives the custody of the public money to the hands of our own officers, bound to fidelity by character, by official position, by responsibility, by ample securityship--and makes it felony in them to touch it for their own use? Here is a clear case of contention between the banks and the government, or between the clamorers for a national bank and the government. These banks want the custody of the public money. They struggle and strive for it as if it was their own. They fight for it: and if they get it, they will use it as their own--as we all well know; and refuse to render back when they choose to suspend. Thus, the whole struggle for the repeal resolves itself into a contest between the government, and all the productive and business classes on one side, and the federal politicians, the rotten part of the local banks, and the advocates of a national bank on the other.

Sir, the independent treasury has been organized: I say, organized! for the law creating it is fifty-two years old--has been organized in obedience to the will of the people, regularly expressed through their representatives after the question had been carried to them, and a general election had intervened. The sub-treasury system was proposed by President Van Buren in 1837, at the called session: it was adopted in 1840, after the question had been carried to the people, and the elections made to turn upon it. It was established, and clearly established, by the will of the people. Have the people condemned it? Have they expressed dissatisfaction? By no means. The presidential election was no test of this question; nor of any question. The election of General Harrison was effected by the combination of all parties to pull down one party, without any unity among the assailants on the question of measures. A candidate was agreed upon by the opposition for whom all could vote. Suppose a different selection had been made, and an eminent whig candidate taken, and he had been beaten two to one (as would probably have been the case): what then would have been the argument? Why, that the sub-treasury, and every other measure of the democracy, had been approved, two to one. The result of the election admits of no inference against this system; and could not, without imputing a heedless versatility to the people, which they do not possess. Their representatives, in obedience to their will, and on full three years' deliberation, established the system--established it in July, 1840: is it possible that, within four months afterwards--in the month of November following--the same people should condemn their own work?

But the system is to be abolished; and we are to take our chance for something, or nothing, in place of it. The abolition is to take place incontinently--incessantly--upon the instant of the passage of the bill! such is the spirit which pursues it! such the revengeful feeling which burns against it! And the system is still to be going on for a while after its death--for some days in the nearest parts, and some weeks in the remotest parts of the Union. The receiver-general in St. Louis will not know of his official death until ten days after he shall have been killed here. In the mean time, supposing himself to be alive, he is acting under the law; and all he does is without law, and void. So of the rest. Not only must the system be abolished before a substitute is presented, but before the knowledge of the abolition can reach the officers who carry it on; and who must continue to receive, and pay out public moneys for days and weeks after their functions have ceased, and when all their acts have become illegal and void.

Such is the spirit which pursues the measure--such the vengeance against a measure which has taken the money of the people from the moneyed corporations. It is the vengeance of the banking spirit against its enemy--against a system which deprives soulless corporations of their rich prey. Something must rise up in the place of the abolished system until Congress provides a substitute; and that something will be the nest of local banks which the Secretary of the Treasury may choose to select. Among these local banks stands that of the Bank of the United States. The repeal of the sub-treasury has restored that institution to its capacity to become a depository of the public moneys: and well, and largely has she prepared herself to receive them. The Merchants' Bank in New Orleans, her agent there; her branch in New York under the State law; and her branches and agencies in the South and in the West: all these subordinates, already prepared, enable her to take possession of the public moneys in all parts of the Union. That she expected to do so we learn from Mr. Biddle, who considered the attempted resumption in January last as unwise, because, in showing the broken condition of his bank, her claim to the deposits would become endangered. Mr. Biddle shows that the deposits were to have been restored; that, while in a state of suspension, his bank was as good as any. De noche todas los gatos son pardos. So says the Spanish proverb. In the dark, all the cats are grey--all of one color: the same of banks in a state of suspension. And in this darkness and assimilation of colors, the Bank of the United States has found her safety and security--her equality with the rest, and her fair claim to recover the keeping of the long-lost deposits. The attempt at resumption exposed her emptiness, and her rottenness--showed her to be the whited sepulchre, filled with dead men's bones. Liquidation was her course--the only honest--the only justifiable course. Instead of that she accepts new terms (just completed) from the Pennsylvania legislatures--affects to continue to exist as a bank: and by treating Mr. Biddle as the Jonas of the ship, when the whole crew were Jonases, expects to save herself by throwing him overboard. That bank is now, on the repeal of the sub-treasury, on a level with the rest for the reception of the public moneys. She is legally in the category of a public depository, under the act of 1836, the moment she resumes: and when her notes are shaved in--a process now in rapid movement--she may assert and enforce her right. She may resume for a week, or a month, to get hold of the public moneys. By the repeal, the public deposits, so far as law is concerned, are restored to the Bank of the United States. When the Senate have this night voted the repeal, they have also voted the restoration of the deposits; and they will have done it wittingly and knowingly, with their eyes open, and with a full perception of what they were doing. When they voted down my proposition of yesterday--a vote in which the whole opposition concurred, except the senator from Virginia who sits nearest me (Mr. Archer)--when they voted down that proposition to exclude the Bank of the United States from the list of future deposit banks, they of course declared that she ought to remain upon the list, with the full right to avail herself of her privilege under the revived act of 1836. In voting down that proposition, they voted up the prostrate bank of Mr. Biddle, and accomplished the great object of the panic of 1833-'34--that of censuring General Jackson, and of restoring the deposits. The act of that great man--one of the most patriotic and noble of his life--the act by which he saved forty millions of dollars to the American people--is reversed. The stockholders and creditors of the institution lose above forty millions, which the people otherwise would have lost. They lose the whole stock, thirty-five millions--for it will not be worth a straw to those who keep it: and the vote of the bank refusing to show their list of debtors--suppressing, hiding and concealing--the rotten list of debts--(in which it is mortifying to see a Southern gentleman concurring)--is to enable the initiated jobbers and gamblers to shove off their stock at some price on ignorant and innocent purchasers. The stockholders lose the thirty-five millions capital: they lose the twenty per centum advance upon that capital, at which many of the later holders purchased it; and which is near seven millions more: they lose the six millions surplus profits which were reported on hand: but which, perhaps, was only a bank report: and the holders of the notes lose the twenty to thirty per centum, which is now the depreciation of the notes of the bank--soon to be much more. These losses make some fifty millions of dollars. They now fall on the stockholders, and note-holders: where would they have fallen if the deposits had not been removed? They would have fallen upon the public treasury--upon the people of the United States: for the public is always the goose that is to be first plucked. The public money would have been taken to sustain the bank: taxes would have been laid to uphold her: the high tariff would have been revived for her benefit. Whatever her condition required would have been done by Congress. The bank, with all its crimes and debts--with all its corruptions and plunderings--would have been saddled upon the country--its charter renewed--and the people pillaged of the more than forty millions of dollars which have been lost. Congress would have been enslaved: and a new career of crime, corruption, and plunder commenced. The heroic patriotism of President Jackson saved us from this shame and loss: but we have no Jackson to save us now; and millionary plunderers--devouring harpies--foul birds, and voracious as foul--are again to seize the prey which his brave and undaunted arm snatched from their insatiate throats.

The deposits are restored, so far as the vote of the Senate goes; and if not restored in fact, it will be because policy, and new schemes forbid it. And what new scheme can we have? A nondescript, hermaphrodite, Janus-faced fiscality? or a third edition of General Hamilton's bank of 1791? or a bastard compound, the unclean progeny of both? Which will it be? Hardly the first named. It comes forth with the feeble and rickety symptoms which announce an unripe conception, and an untimely death. Will it be the second? It will be that, or worse. And where will the late flatterers--the present revilers of Mr. Biddle--the authors equally of the bank that is ruined, and of the one that is to be created: where will they find better men to manage the next than they had to manage the last? I remember the time when the vocabulary of praise was exhausted on Mr. Biddle--when in this chamber, and out of it, the censer, heaped with incense, was constantly kept burning under his nose: when to hint reproach of him was to make, if not a thousand chivalrous swords leap from their scabbards, at least to make a thousand tongues, and ten thousand pens, start up to defend him. I remember the time when a senator on this floor, and now on it (Mr. Preston of South Carolina), declared in his place that the bare annunciation of Mr. Biddle's name as Secretary of the Treasury, would raise the value of the people's property one hundred millions of dollars. My friend here on my right (pointing to Senator Woodbury) was the Secretary of the Treasury; and the mere transposition of names and places--the mere substitution of Biddle for Woodbury--was to be worth one hundred millions of dollars to the property of the country! What flattery could rise higher than that? Yet this man, once so lauded--once so followed, flattered, and courted--now lies condemned by all his former friends. They cannot now denounce sufficiently the man who, for ten years past, they could not praise enough: and, after this, what confidence are we to have in their judgments? What confidence are we to place in their new bank, and their new managers, after seeing such mistakes about the former?

Let it not be said that this bank went to ruin since it became a State institution. The State charter made no difference in its character, or in its management: and Mr. Biddle declared it to be stronger and safer without the United States for a partner than with it. The mortal wounds were all given while it was a national institution; and the late report of the stockholders shows not one species of offence, the cotton speculations alone excepted, which was not shown by Mr. Clayton's report of 1832; and being shown, was then defended by the whole power of those who are now cutting loose from the old bank, and clamoring for a new one. Not an act now brought to light, save and except the cotton operation, not even that for which Reuben M. Whitney was crushed to death, and his name constituted the synonyme of perjury and infamy for having told it; not an act now brought to light which was not shown to exist ten years ago, and which was not then defended by the whole federal party; so that the pretension that this institution did well as a national bank, and ill as a State one, is as unfounded in fact, as it is preposterous and absurd in idea. The bank was in the high road to ruin--in the gulf of insolvency--in the slough of crime and corruption--when the patriot Jackson signed the veto, and ordered the removal of the deposits; and nothing but these two great acts saved the people from the loss of the forty millions of dollars which have now fallen upon the stockholders and the note holders, and from the shame of seeing their government the slave and instrument of the bank. Jackson saved the people from this loss, and their government from this degradation; and for this he is now pursued with the undying vengeance of those whose schemes of plunder and ambition were balked by him.

Wise and prudent was the conduct of those who refused to recharter the second Bank of the United States. They profited by the error of their friends who refused to recharter the first one. These latter made no preparations for the event--did nothing to increase the constitutional currency--and did not even act until the last moment. The renewed charter was only refused a few days before the expiration of the existing charter, and the federal government fell back upon the State banks, which immediately sunk under its weight. The men of 1832 acted very differently. They decided the question of the renewal long before the expiration of the existing charter. They revived the gold currency, which had been extinct for thirty years. They increased the silver currency by repealing the act of 1819 against the circulation of foreign silver. They branched the mints. In a word, they raised the specie currency from twenty millions to near one hundred millions of dollars; and thus supplied the country with a constitutional currency to take the place of the United States Bank notes. The supply was adequate, being nearly ten times the average circulation of the national bank. That average circulation was but eleven millions of dollars; the gold and silver was near one hundred millions. The success of our measures was complete. The country was happy and prosperous under it; but the architects of mischief--the political, gambling, and rotten part of the banks, headed by the Bank of the United States, and aided by a political party--set to work to make panic and distress, to make suspensions and revulsions, to destroy trade and business, to degrade and poison the currency; to harass the country until it would give them another national bank: and to charge all the mischief they created upon the democratic administration. This has been their conduct; and having succeeded in the last presidential election, they now come forward to seize the spoils of victory in creating another national bank, to devour the substance of the people, and to rule the government of their country. Sir, the suspension of 1837, on the part of the Bank of the United States and its confederate banks and politicians, was a conspiracy and a revolt against the government. The present suspension is a continuation of the same revolt by the same parties. Many good banks are overpowered by them, and forced into suspension; but with the Bank of the United States, its affiliated banks, and its confederate politicians, it is a revolt and a conspiracy against the government.

Sir, it is now nightfall. We are at the end of a long day when the sun is more than fourteen hours above the horizon, and when a suffocating heat oppresses and overpowers the Senate. My friends have moved adjournments: they have been refused. I have been compelled to speak now, or never, and from this commencement we may see the conclusion. Discussion is to be stifled; measures are to be driven through; and a mutilated Congress, hastily assembled, imperfectly formed, and representing the census of 1830, not of 1840, is to manacle posterity with institutions which are as abhorent to the constitution as they are dangerous to the liberties, the morals, and the property of the people. A national bank is to be established, not even a simple and strong bank like that of General Hamilton, but some monstrous compound, born of hell and chaos, more odious, dangerous, and terrible than any simple bank could be. Posterity is to be manacled, and delivered up in chains to this deformed monster; and by whom? By a rump Congress, representing an expired census of the people, in the absence of members from States which, if they had their members here, would still have but the one-third part of their proper weight in the councils of the Union. The census of 1840 gives many States, and Missouri among the rest, three times their present relative weight; and no permanent measure ought to be discussed until this new relative weight should appear in Congress. Why take the census every ten years, if an expiring representation at the end of the term may reach over, and bind the increased numbers by laws which claim immunity from repeal, and which are rushed through without debate? Am I to submit to such work? No, never! I will war against the bank you may establish, whether a simple or a compound monster; I will war against it by every means known to the constitution and the laws. I will vote for the repeal of its charter as General Harrison and others voted for the repeal of the late bank charter in 1819. I will promote quo warranto's and sci. fa.'s against it. I will oppose its friends and support its enemies, and work at its destruction in every legal and constitutional way. I will war upon it while I have breath; and if I incur political extinction in the contest, I shall consider my political life well sold--sold for a high price--when lost in such a cause.

But enough for the present. The question now before us is the death of the sub-treasury. The discussion of the substitute is a fair inquiry in this question. We have a right to see what is to follow, and to compare it with what we have. But gentlemen withhold their schemes, and we strike in the dark. My present purpose is to vindicate the independent treasury system--to free it from a false character--to show it to be what it is, nothing but the revival of the two great acts of September the 1st and September the 2d, 1789, for the collection, safe keeping, and disbursement of the public moneys, under which this government went into operation; and under which it operated safely and successfully until General Hamilton overthrew it to substitute the bank and state system of Sir Robert Walpole, which has been the curse of England, and towards which we are now hurrying again with headlong steps and blindfold eyes.

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Chapter LXVI

THE BANKRUPT ACT: WHAT IT WAS: AND HOW IT WAS PASSED.

It has been seen in Mr. Tyler's message that, as a measure of his own administration, he would not have convened Congress in extraordinary session; but this having been done by his predecessor, he would not revoke his act. It was known that the call had been made at the urgent instance of Mr. Clay. That ardent statesman had so long seen his favorite measures baffled by a majority opposition to them in one House or the other, and by the twelve years presidency of General Jackson and Mr. Van Buren, that he was naturally now impatient to avail himself of the advantage of having all the branches of the government in their favor. He did so without delay. Mr. Tyler had delivered his message recommending the measures which he deemed proper for the consideration of Congress: Mr. Clay did the same--that is to say, recommend his list of measures to Congress also, not in the shape of a message, but in the form of a resolve, submitted to the Senate; and which has been given. A bankrupt act was not in his programme, nor in the President's message; and it was well known, and that by evidence less equivocal than its designed exclusion from his list of measures, that Mr. Clay was opposed to such a bill. But parties were so nearly balanced in the Senate, a deduction of two or three from the one side and added to the other would operate the life or death of most important measures, in the event that a few members should make the passage of a favorite measure the indispensable condition of their vote for some others which could not be carried without it. This was the case with the bank bill, and the distribution bill. A bank was the leading measure of Mr. Clay's policy--the corner stone of his legislative edifice. It was number two in his list: it was number one in his affections and in his parliamentary movement. He obtained a select committee on the second day of the session, to take into consideration the part of the President's message which related to the currency and the fiscal agent for the management of the finances; but before that select committee could report a bill, Mr. Henderson, of Mississippi, taking the shortest road to get at his object, asked and obtained leave to bring in a bill to establish a system of bankruptcy. This measure, then, which had no place in the President's message, or in Mr. Clay's schedule, and to which he was averse, took precedence on the calendar of the vital measure for which the extra session was chiefly called; and Mr. Henderson being determinedly supported by his colleague, Mr. Walker, and a few other resolute senators with whom the bankrupt act was an overruling consideration, he was enabled to keep it ahead, and coerce support from as many averse to it as would turn the scale in its favor. It passed the Senate, July 24th, by a close vote, 26 to 23. The yeas were:

"Messrs. Barrow, Bates, Berrien, Choate, Clay of Kentucky, Clayton, Dixon, Evans, Henderson, Huntington, Kerr, Merrick, Miller, Morehead, Mouton, Phelps, Porter, Simmons, Smith of Indiana, Southard, Tallmadge, Walker, White, Williams, Woodbridge, Young.

"NAYS--Messrs. Allen, Archer, Bayard, Benton, Buchanan, Calhoun, Clay of Alabama, Cuthbert, Fulton, Graham, King, Linn, McRoberts, Nicholson, Pierce, Prentiss, Rives, Sevier, Smith of Connecticut, Sturgeon, Tappan, Woodbury, Wright."

The distribution bill was a leading measure in Mr. Clay's policy: it ranked next after the national bank. He had also taken it into his own care, and had introduced a bill on leave for the purpose at an early day. A similar bill was also introduced in the House of Representatives. There was no willing majority for the bankrupt bill in either House; but the bank bill and the land bill were made to pass it. The ardent friends of the bankrupt bill embargoed both the others until their favorite measure was secure. They were able to defeat the other two, and determined to do so if they did not get their own measure; and they did get it--presenting the spectacle of a bill, which had no majority in either House, forcing its own passage, and controlling the fate of two others--all of them measures of great national concern.

The bankrupt bill had passed the Senate ahead of the bank bill, and also of the distribution bill, and went to the House of Representatives, where the majority was against it. It seemed doomed in that House. The same bill had originated in that body; but lay upon the table without consideration. The President, beset by a mass of debtors who had repaired to Washington to promote the passage of the bill, sent in a special message in its favor; but without effect. The House bill slept on the table: the Senate bill arrived there, and was soon put to rest upon the same table. Mr. Underwood, of Kentucky, a friend of Mr. Clay, had moved to lay it on the table; and the motion prevailed by a good majority--110 to 97. Information of this vote instantly flew to the Senate. One of the senators, intent upon the passage of the bill, left his seat and went down to the House; and when he returned he informed the writer of this View that the bill would pass--that it would be taken off the table, and put through immediately: and such was the fact. The next day the bill was taken up and passed--the meagre majority of only six for it. The way in which this was done was made known to the writer of this View by the senator who went down to attend to the case when the bill was laid on the table: it was simply to let the friends of the bank and distribution bills know that these measures would be defeated if the bankrupt bill was not passed--that there were enough determined on that point to make sure: and, for the security of the bankrupt bill, it was required to be passed first.

The bill had passed the House with an amendment, postponing the commencement of its operation from November to February; and this amendment required to be communicated to the Senate for its concurrence--which was immediately done. This amendment was a salvo to the consciences of members for their forced votes: it was intended to give Congress an opportunity of repealing the act before it took effect; but the friends of the bill were willing to take it that way--confident that they could baffle the repeal for some months, and until those most interested, had obtained the relief they wanted.

At the time that this amendment was coming up to the Senate that body was engaged on the distribution bill, the debate on the bank veto message having been postponed by the friends of the bank to make way for it. August the 18th had been fixed for that day--12 o'clock the hour. The day and the hour, had come; and with them an immense crowd, and an excited expectation. For it was known that Mr. Clay was to speak--and to speak according to his feelings--which were known to be highly excited against Mr. Tyler. In the midst of this expectation and crowd, and to the disappointment of every body, Mr. Berrien rose and said that--"Under a sense of duty, he was induced to move that the consideration of the executive veto message on the fiscal bank bill be postponed until to-morrow, 12 o'clock."--Mr. Calhoun objected to this postponement. "The day, he said, had been fixed by the friends of the bank bill. The President's message containing his objections to it had now been in possession of the Senate, and on the tables of members for two days. Surely there had been sufficient time to reflect upon it: yet now it was proposed still longer to defer action upon it. He asked the senator from Georgia, who had made the motion, to assign some reason for the proposed delay." The request of Mr. Calhoun for a reason, was entirely parliamentary and proper; and in fact should have been anticipated by giving the reason with the motion--as it was not deferential to the Senate to ask it to do a thing without a reason, especially when the thing to be done was contrary to an expressed resolve of the Senate, and took members by surprise who came prepared to attend to the appointed business, and not prepared to attend to another subject. Mr. Berrien declined to give a reason, and said that--"When the senator from South Carolina expressed his personal conviction that time enough had been allowed for reflection on the message, he expressed what would no doubt regulate his personal conduct; but when he himself stated that, under a sense of duty, he had asked for further time, he had stated his own conviction in regard to the course which ought to be pursued. Senators would decide for themselves which opinion was to prevail."--Mr. Calhoun rejoined in a way to show his belief that there was a secret and sinister cause for this reserve, so novel and extraordinary in legislative proceedings. He said--"Were the motives such as could not be publicly looked at? were they founded on movements external to that chamber? It was certainly due to the Senate that a reason should be given. It was quite novel to refuse it. Some reason was always given for a postponement. He had never known it to be otherwise."--Mr. Berrien remained unmoved by this cogent appeal, and rejoined--"The senator from South Carolina was at liberty to suggest whatever he might think proper; but that he should not conclude him (Mr. Berrien), as having made a motion here for reasons which he could not disclose."--Mr. Calhoun then said that, "this was a very extraordinary motion, the votes of senators upon it ought to be recorded: he would therefore move for the yeas and nays,"--which were ordered, and stood thus: Yeas: Messrs. Archer, Barrow, Bates, Bayard, Berrien, Choate, Clay of Kentucky, Clayton (Thomas of Delaware), Dixon, Evans, Graham, Henderson, Huntingdon, Kerr, Mangum, Merrick, Miller, Morehead, Phelps, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Rives, Simmons, Smith of Indiana, Southard, Tallmadge, White, and Woodbridge, 29--the supporters of the bank all voting for the postponement, their numbers swelled a little beyond their actual strength by the votes of Mr. Rives, and a few other whigs. The nays were: Messrs. Allen, Benton, Buchanan, Calhoun, Clay of Alabama, Cuthbert, Fulton, King, Linn, McRoberts, Mouton, A. O. P. Nicholson, Pierce, Sevier, Sturgeon, Tappan, Walker, Williams, Woodbury, Wright, and Young--21. It was now apparent that the postponement of the bank question was a concerted measure of the whig party--that Mr. Berrien was its organ in making the motion--and that the reason for it was a party secret which he was not at liberty to disclose. Events, however, were in progress to make the disclosure.

The distribution bill was next in order, and during its consideration Mr. White, of Indiana, made a remark which attracted the attention of Mr. Benton. Deprecating further debate, as a useless waste of time, Mr. White wished discussion to cease, and the vote be taken--"as he hoped, as well as believed, that the bill would pass, and not alone, but be accompanied by other measures." This remark from Mr. White gave Mr. Benton something to go upon; and he immediately let out what was on his mind.

He thanked the senator from Indiana for his avowal; it was a confirmation of what he well knew before--that measures, at this extraordinary session, were not passed or rejected upon their merits, but made to depend one upon another, and the whole upon a third! It was all bargain and sale. All was conglomerated into one mass, and must go together or fall together. This was the decree out of doors. When the sun dips below the horizon, a private Congress is held, the fate of the measure is decided; a bundle are tied together; and while one goes ahead as a bait, another is held back as a rod.

Mr. Linn, of Missouri, still more frank than his colleague, stigmatized the motive for postponement, and the means that were put in practice to pass momentous bills which could not pass on their own merits; and spoke out without disguise:

"These artifices grow out of the system adopted for carrying through measures that never could be carried through other than by trick and art. The majority which by force, not by argument, have to carry their measures, must meet in secret--concoct their measures in conclave--and then hold every member of the party bound to support what is thus agreed upon--a master spirit leading all the while. There had been enough of falsehood, misrepresentation and delusion. The presidential election had contained enough of it, without adding to the mass at this session. The country was awake to these impositions, and required only to be informed of the movements of the wire-workers to know how to appreciate their measures. And the people should be informed. As far as it was possible for him and his friends to lay that information before the country, it should be done. Every man in the community must be told how this bank bill, which was intended to rule the country with a moneyed despotism for years to come, had been passed--how a national debt was entailed upon the country--how this bankrupt bill was forced through, as he (Mr. LINN) now understood it was, by a majority of five votes, in the other end of the Capitol, many of its whig opponents dodging behind the columns; and how this land distribution bill was now in the course of being passed, and the tricks resorted to to effect its passage. It was all part and parcel of the same system which was concocted in Harrisburg, wrought with such blind zeal at the presidential election, and perfected by being compressed into a congressional caucus, at an extraordinary called, but uncalled-for, session."

The distribution bill had been under debate for an hour, and Mr. King, of Alabama, was on the floor speaking to it, when the clerk of the House of Representatives appeared at the door of the Senate Chamber with the bankrupt bill, and the amendments made by the House--and asking the concurrence of the Senate. Still standing on his feet, but dropping the line of his argument, Mr. King exclaimed:

"That, sir, is the bill. There it is sir. That is the bill which is to hurry this land distribution bill to its final passage, without either amendments or debate. Did not the senator know that yesterday, when the bankrupt bill was laid on the table by a decided vote in the other House, the distribution bill could not, by any possibility then existing, be passed in this House? But now the case was altered. A reconsideration of the vote of yesterday had taken place in the other House, and the bankrupt bill was now returned to the Senate for concurrence; after which it would want but the signature of the Executive to become a law. But how had this change been so suddenly brought about? How, but by putting on the screws? Gentlemen whose States cried aloud for the relief of a bankrupt law, were told they could not have it unless they would pay the price--they must pass the distribution bill, or they should have no bankrupt bill. One part of the bargain was already fulfilled: the bankrupt bill was passed. The other part of the bargain is now to be consummated: the distribution bill can pass now without further delay. He (Mr. KING) had had the honor of a seat in this chamber for many years, but never during that time had he seen legislation so openly and shamefully disgraced by a system of bargain and sale. This extra session of Congress would be long remembered for the open and undisguised extent to which this system had been carried."

Incontinently the distribution bill was laid upon the table, and the bankrupt bill was taken up. This was done upon the motion of Mr. Walker, who gave his reasons, thus:

"He rose not to prolong the debate on the distribution bill, but to ask that it might be laid on the table, that the bill to establish a general bankrupt law, which had just been received from the House, might be taken up, and the amendment, which was unimportant, might be concurred in by the Senate. He expressed his ardent joy at the passage of this bill by this House, which was so imperiously demanded as a measure of great relief to a suffering community, which he desired should not be held in suspense another night; but that they should immediately take up the amendments, and act on them. For this purpose he moved to lay the distribution bill on the table."

Mr. Linn asked for the yeas and nays, that it might be seen how senators voted in this rigadoon legislation, in which movements were so rapid, so complicated, and so perfectly performed. They were ordered, and stood: Yeas--Messrs. Archer, Barrow, Bates, Bayard, Berrien, Choate, Clay of Kentucky, Dixon, Evans, Henderson, Huntington, Kerr, Mangum, Merrick, Miller, Morehead, Phelps, Porter, Preston, Simmons, Smith of Indiana, Southard, Tallmadge, Walker, White, and Woodbridge--26. Nays--Messrs. Allen, Benton, Buchanan, Calhoun, Clay of Alabama, Clayton, Cuthbert, Fulton, Graham, King, Linn, McRoberts, Mouton, Pierce, Sevier, Sturgeon, Tappan, Williams, Woodbury, Wright, and Young--21. So that the whole body of the friends to the distribution bill, voted to lay it down to take up the bankrupt bill, as they had just voted to lay down the bank bill to take up the distribution. The three measures thus travelled in company, but bankrupt in the lead--for the reason, as one of its supporters told Mr. Benton, that they were afraid it would not get through at all if the other measures got through before it. The bankrupt bill having thus superseded the distribution bill, as itself had superseded the bank bill, Mr. Walker moved a concurrence in the amendment. Mr. Buchanan intimated to Mr. Walker that he was taken in--that the postponement was to enable Congress to repeal the bill before it took effect; and, speaking in this sense, said:

"From the tone of the letters he had received from politicians differing with him, he should advise his friend from Mississippi [Mr. WALKER], not to be quite so soft as, in his eagerness to pass this bill, to agree to this amendment, postponing the time for it to take effect to February, as it would be repealed before its operation commenced; although it was now made a price of the passage of the distribution bill. He felt not a particle of doubt but there would be a violent attempt to repeal it next session."

Mr. Walker did not defend the amendment, but took it rather than, by a non-concurrence, to send the bill back to the House, where its friends could not trust it again. He said--"When his friend from Pennsylvania spoke of his being 'soft,' he did not know whether he referred to his head or his heart; but he could assure him he was not soft enough to run the chance of defeating the bill by sending it back to the House."--Mr. Calhoun did not concur with his friend from Pennsylvania, that there would be any effort to repeal this bill. It would be exceedingly popular at its first "go off," and if this bill passed, he hoped that none of his friends would attempt to repeal it. It would, if permitted to work, produce its legitimate effects; and was enough to destroy any administration. He saw that this was a doomed administration. It would not only destroy them, but blow them "sky high."

This was the only instance in which Mr. Calhoun was known to express a willingness that a bad measure should stand because it would be the destruction of its authors; and on this occasion it was merely the ebullition of an excited feeling, as proved when the question of repeal came on at the next session--in which he cordially gave his assistance. The amendment was concurred in without a division, the adversaries of the bill being for the postponement in good faith, and its friends agreeing to it for fear of something worse. There had been an agreement that the three measures were to pass, and upon that agreement the bank bill was allowed to go down to the House before the bankrupt bill was out of it; but the laying that bill on the table raised an alarm, and the friends of the bankrupt required the others to be stopped until their cherished measure was finished: and that was one of the reasons for postponing the debate on the bank veto message which could not be disclosed to the Senate. The amendment of the House being agreed to, there was no further vote to be taken on the bill; but a motion was made to suppress it by laying it on the table. That motion brought out a clean vote for and against the bill--23 to 26. The next day it received the approval of the President, and became a law.

The act was not a bankrupt law, but practically an insolvent law for the abolition of debts at the will of the debtor. It applied to all persons in debt--allowed them to commence their proceedings in the district of their own residence, no matter how lately removed to it--allowed constructive notice to creditors in newspapers--declared the abolition of the debt where effects were surrendered and fraud not proved. It broke down the line between the jurisdiction of the federal courts and the State courts in the whole department of debtors and creditors; and bringing all local debts and dealings into the federal courts, at the will of the debtor, to be settled by a federal jurisdiction, with every advantage on the side of the debtor. It took away from the State courts the trials between debtor and creditor in the same State--a thing which under the constitution can only be done between citizens of different States. Jurisdiction over bankruptcies did not include the mass of debtors, but only that class known to legislative and judicial proceedings as bankrupts. To go beyond, and take in all debtors who could not pay their debts, and bring them into the federal courts, was to break down the line between federal and State jurisdictions, and subject all persons--all neighbors--to have their dealings settled in the federal courts. It violated the principle of all bankrupt systems--that of a proceeding on the part of the creditors for their own benefit--and made it entirely a proceeding for the benefit of the debtor, at his own will. It was framed upon the model of the English insolvent debtor's act of George the Fourth; and after closely paraphrasing eighteen provisions out of that act, most flagrantly departed from its remedy in the conclusion, in substituting a release from the debt instead of a release from imprisonment. In that feature, and in applying to all debts, and in giving the initiative to the debtor, and subjecting the whole proceeding to be carried on at his will, it ceased to be a bankrupt act, and became an insolvent act; but with a remedy which no insolvent act, or bankrupt system, had ever contained before--that of a total abolition of the debt by the act of the debtor alone, unless the creditor could prove fraud; which the sort of trial allowed would render impossible, even where it actually existed. It was the same bill which had been introduced at the previous session, and supported by Mr. Webster in an argument which confounded insolvency with bankruptcy, and assumed every failure to pay a debt to be a bankruptcy. The pressure for the passing of the act was immense. The long disorders of the currency, with the expansions, contractions, suspensions, and breaking of banks had filled the country with men of ruined fortunes, who looked to the extinction of their debts by law as the only means of getting rid of their incumbrances, and commencing business anew. This unfortunate class was estimated by the most moderate observers at an hundred thousand men. They had become a power in the State. Their numbers and zeal gave them weight: their common interest gave them unity: the stake at issue gave them energy. They worked in a body in the presidential election, and on the side of the whigs: and now attended Congress, and looked to that party for the legislative relief for which they had assisted in the election. Nor did they look in vain. They got all they asked--but most unwillingly, and under a moral duresse--and as the price of passing two other momentous bills. Such is legislation in high party times! selfish and sinistrous, when the people believe it to be honest and patriotic! people at home, whose eyes should be opened to the truth, if they wish to preserve the purity of their government. Here was a measure which, of itself, could not have got through either House of Congress: combined with others, it carried itself, and licensed the passing of two more! And all this was done--so nicely were parties balanced--by the zeal and activity (more than the numbers) of a single State, and that a small one, and among the most indebted. In brief, the bankrupt act was passed, and the passage of the bank and distribution bills were licensed by the State of Mississippi, dominated by the condition of its population.

Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Wright, Mr. Woodbury, were the principal speakers against the bill in the Senate. Mr. Benton addressed himself mainly to Mr. Webster's position, confounding insolvency and bankruptcy, as taken at the previous session; and delivered a speech of some research in opposition to that assumption--of which some extracts are given in the next chapter.

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LXVII. BANKRUPT BILL: MR. BENTON'S SPEECH: EXTRACTS

The great ground which we occupy in relation to the character of this bill (said Mr. B.) is this: that it is not a bankrupt system, but an insolvent law, perverted to a discharge from debts, instead of a discharge from imprisonment. As such, it was denounced from the moment it made its appearance in this chamber, at the last session, and I am now ready to prove it to be such. I have discovered its origin, and hold the evidence in my hand. It is framed upon the English insolvent debtor's act of the 1st of George IV., improved and extended by the act of the 7th of George IV., and by the 1st of Victoria. From these three insolvent acts our famous bankrupt system of 1841 is compiled; and it follows its originals with great fidelity, except in a few particulars, until it arrives at the conclusion, where a vast and terrible alteration is introduced! Instead of discharging the debtor from imprisonment, as the English acts do, our American copy discharges him from his debts! But this is a thing rather to be proved than told; and here is the proof. I have a copy of the British statutes on my table, containing the three acts which I have mentioned, and shall quote from the first one, in the first year of the reign of George IV., and is entitled "An act for the relief of insolvent debtors in England." The preamble recites that it is expedient to make permanent provision for the relief of insolvent debtors in England confined in jail, and who shall be willing to surrender their property to their creditors, and thereby obtain a discharge from imprisonment. For this purpose the act creates a new court, to be called the insolvent debtor's court, which was to sit in London, and send commissioners into the counties. The first sections are taken up with the organization of the court. Then come its powers and duties, its modes of proceeding, and the rights of insolvents in it: and in these enactments, as in a mirror, and with a few exceptions (the effect of design, of accident, or of necessity, from the difference of the two forms of government), we perceive the original of our bankrupt act. I quote partly from the body of the statute, but chiefly from the marginal notes, as being a sufficient index to the contents of the sections. (Here the speaker quoted eighteen separate clauses in which the bill followed the English act, constituting the whole essence of the bill, and its mode of proceeding.)

This is the bill which we call bankrupt--a mere parody and perversion of the English insolvent debtor's act. And now, how came such a bill to be introduced? Sir, it grew out of the contentions of party; was brought forward, as a party measure; and was one of the bitter fruits of the election of 1840. The bill was brought forward in the spring of that year, passed in the Senate, and lost in the House. It was contested in both Houses as a party measure, and was taken up as a party topic in the presidential canvass. The debtor class--those irretrievably in debt, and estimated by the most moderate at a hundred thousand men--entered most zealously into the canvass, and on the side of the party which favored the act. The elections were carried by that party--the Congress as well as the presidential. All power is in the hands of that party; and an extra session of the legislature was impatiently called to realize the benefits of the victory. But the opening of the session did not appear to be auspicious to the wishes of the bankrupts. The President's message recommended no bankrupt bill; and the list of subjects enumerated for the action of Congress, and designated in a paper drawn by Mr. Clay, and placed on our journal for our guidance, was equally silent upon that subject. To all appearance, the bankrupt bill was not to come before us at the extra session. It was evidently a deferred subject. The friends and expectants of the measure took the alarm--flocked to Congress--beset the President and the members--obtained from him a special message recommending a bankrupt law; and prevailed on members to bring in the bill. It was brought into the Senate--the same which had been defeated in 1840--and it was soon seen that its passage was not to depend upon its own merits; that its fate was indissolubly connected with another bill; and that one must carry the other.

This is an insolvent bill: it is so proved, and so admitted: and to defend it the argument is, that insolvency and bankruptcy are the same--a mere inability or failure to pay debts. This is the corner stone of the argument for the bill, and has been firmly planted as such, by its ablest supporter (Mr. Webster). He says:

"Bankruptcies, in the general use and acceptation of the term, mean no more than failures. A bankruptcy is a fact. It is an occurrence in the life and fortunes of an individual. When a man cannot pay his debts, we say that he has become bankrupt, or has failed. Bankruptcy is not merely the condition of a man who is insolvent, and on whom a bankrupt law is already acting. This would be quite too technical an interpretation. According to this, there never could be bankrupt laws; because every law, if this were the meaning, would suppose the existence of a previous law. Whenever a man's means are insufficient to meet his engagements and pay his debts, the fact of bankruptcy has taken place--a case of bankruptcy has arisen, whether there be a law providing for it or not. A learned judge has said, that a law on the subject of bankruptcies is a law making provision for cases of persons failing to pay their debts. Over the whole subject of these failures, or these bankruptcies, the power of Congress, as it stands on the face of the constitution, is full and complete."

This is an entire mistake. There is no foundation for confounding bankruptcy and insolvency. A debtor may be rich, and yet be a bankrupt. Inability to pay does not even enter as an ingredient into bankruptcy. The whole system is founded on ability and fraud. The bankrupt is defined in Blackstone's commentaries--a work just issued and known to all our statesmen at the time of our Revolution--"to be a trader, who secretes himself, or does certain other acts to defraud his creditors." So far from making insolvency a test of bankruptcy the whole system supposes ability and fraud--ability to pay part or all, and a fraudulent intent to evade payment. And every British act upon the subject directs the surplus to be restored to the debtor if his effects sell for more than pays the debts--a proof that insolvency was no ingredient in the acts.

The eminent advocate of the bill, in confounding insolvency and bankruptcy, has gone to the continent of Europe, and to Scotland, to quote the cessio bonorum of the civil law, and to confound it with bankruptcy. He says: "That bankrupt laws, properly so called, or laws providing for the cessio bonorum, on the continent of Europe and Scotland, were never confined to traders." That is true. This cessio was never confined to traders: it applied to debtors who could not pay. It was the cession, or surrender of his property by the debtor for the purpose of obtaining freedom for his person--leaving the debt in full force--and all future acquisitions bound for it. I deal in authority, and read from Professor Bell's Commentaries upon the Laws of Scotland--an elegant an instructive work, which has made the reading of Scottish law almost as agreeable to the law reader as the writings of Scott have made Scottish history and manners to the general reader. Mr. Bell treats of the cessio and of bankruptcy, and treats of them under distinct heads; and here is what he says of them:

"The law of cessio bonorum had its origin in Rome. It was introduced by Julius Cæsar, as a remedy against the severity of the old Roman laws of imprisonment; and his law--which included only Rome and Italy--was, before the time of Diocletian, extended to the provinces. The first law of the code respecting the cessio bonorum expresses, in a single sentence, the whole doctrine upon the subject: 'Qui bonis cesserint,' says the Emperor Alexander Severus, 'nisi solidum creditor receperit, non sunt liberati. In eo enim tantummodo hoc beneficium eis prodest, ne judicati detrahantur in carcerem.' This institution, having been greatly improved in the civil law, was adopted by those of the European nations who followed that system of jurisprudence. In France, the institution was adopted very nearly as it was received with us. Perhaps, indeed, it was from France that our system received its distinguishing features. The law in that country was, during the seventeenth century, extremely severe--not only against bankrupts (which name they applied to fraudulent debtors alone), but against debtors innocently insolvent. * * * The short digest of the law of cessio in Scotland, then, is:

"1. That a debtor who has been a month in prison, for a civil debt, may apply to the court of session--calling all his creditors before that court, by a summons in the king's name; and concluding that he should be freed from prison on surrendering to his creditors all his funds and effects.

"2. That he is entitled to this benefit without any mark of disgrace, if (proving his insolvency) he can satisfy the court, in the face of his creditors, that his insolvency has arisen from innocent misfortune, and is willing to surrender all his property and effects to his creditors.

"3. That, though he may clear himself from any imputation of fraud, still, if he has been extravagant, and guilty of sporting with the money of his creditors, he is, in strict law, not entitled to the cessio, but on the condition of wearing the habit (mark of disgrace); but which is now exchanged for a prolongation of his imprisonment.

"4. That, if his creditors can establish a charge of fraud against him, he is not entitled to the cessio at all; but must lie in prison, at the mercy of his creditors, till the length of his imprisonment may seem to have sufficiently punished his crime; when, on a petition, the court may admit him to the benefit.

"5. That, if he has not given a fair account of his funds, and shall still be liable to the suspicion of concealment, the court will, in the meanwhile, refuse the benefit of the cessio--leaving it to him to apply again, when he is able to present a clearer justification, or willing to make a full discovery."

This is the cessio, and its nature and origin are both given. Its nature is that of an insolvent law, precisely as it exists at this day in the United States and in England. Its origin is Roman, dating from the dictatorship of Julius Cæsar. That great man had seen the evils of the severity of the Roman law against debtors. He had seen the iniquity of the law itself, in the cruel condemnation of the helpless debtor to slavery and death at the will of the creditor; and he had seen its impolicy, in the disturbances to which it subjected the republic--the seditions, commotions, and conspiracies, which, from the time of the secession of the people to the Mons Sacer to the terrible conspiracy of Catiline, were all built upon the calamities of the debtor class, and had for their object an abolition of debts. Cæsar saw this, and determined to free the commonwealth from a deep-seated cause of commotion, while doing a work of individual justice. He freed the person of the debtor upon the surrender of his property; and this equitable principle, becoming ingrafted in the civil law, spread over all the provinces of the Roman world--has descended to our times, and penetrated the new world--and now forms the principle of the insolvent laws of Europe and America. The English made it permanent by their insolvent law of the first of George the Fourth--that act from which our bankrupt system is compiled; and in two thousand years, and among all nations, there has been no departure from the wise and just principles of Cæsar's edict, until our base act of Congress has undertaken to pervert it into an abolition debt law, by substituting a release from the debt for a release from jail!

This is the cessio omnium bonorum of Scotland, to which we are referred as being the same thing with bankruptcy (properly so called), and which is quoted as an example for our act of 1841. And, now, what says Professor Bell of bankruptcy? Does he mention that subject? Does he treat of it under a separate head--as a different thing from the cessio--and as requiring a separate consideration? In fact, he does. He happens to do so; and gives it about 300 pages of his second volume, under the title of "System of the Bankrupt Laws;" which system runs on all-fours with that of the English system, and in the main point--that of discharge from his debts--it is identical with the English; requiring the concurrence of four-fifths of the creditors to the discharge; and that bottomed on the judicial attestation of the bankrupt's integrity. Here it is, at page 441 of the second volume:

"The concurrence of the creditors, without which the bankrupt cannot apply to the court for a discharge, must be not that of a mere majority, but a majority of four-fifths in number and value. * * * * The creditors are subject to no control in respect to their concurrence. Against their decision there is no appeal, nor are they bound to account for or explain the grounds of it. They are left to proceed upon the whole train of the bankrupt's conduct, as they may have seen occasion to judge of him; and the refusal of their concurrence is an absolute bar until the opposition be overcome. * * * * The statute requires the concurrence of the trustee, as well as of the creditors. There appears, however, to be this difference between them: that the creditors are entirely uncontrolled in giving or withholding their concurrence; while, on the part of the trustee, it is debitum justiliæ either to the bankrupt or to the creditors to give or withhold his concurrence. He acts not as a creditor, but as a judge. To his jurisdiction the bankrupt is subjected by the choice of his creditors; and, on deciding on the bankrupt's conduct, he is not entitled to proceed on the same undisclosed motives or evidence on which a creditor may act, but on the ground of legal objection alone--as fraud, concealment, nonconformity with the statute. In England, the commissioners are public officers--not the mere creatures of the creditors. They are by statute invested with a judicial discretion, which they exercise under the sanction of an oath. Their refusal is taken as if they swore they could not grant the certificate; and no mandamus lies to force them to sign."

So much for bankruptcy and cessio--two things very different in their nature, though attempted to be confounded; and each of them still more different from our act, for which they are quoted as precedents. But the author of our act says that bankrupt laws in Scotland are not confined to traders, but take in all persons whatsoever; and he might have added--though, perhaps, it did not suit his purpose at the moment--that those laws, in Scotland, were not confined to natural persons, but also included corporations and corporate bodies. Bell expressly says:

"Corporate bodies are, in law, considered as persons, when associated by royal authority or act of Parliament. When a community is thus established by public authority, it has a legal existence as a person, with power to hold funds, to sue and to defend. It is, of consequence, subject to diligence; and although personal execution cannot proceed against this ideal-legal person, and so the requisites of imprisonment, &c., cannot be complied with, there seems to be no reason to doubt that a corporation may now be made bankrupt by the means recently provided for those cases in which imprisonment is incompetent."--vol. 2, p. 167.

The gentleman might have quoted this passage from the Scottish law; and then what would have become of his argument against including corporations in the bankrupt act? But he acts the advocate, and quotes what suits him; and which, even if it were applicable, would answer but a small part of his purpose. The Scottish system differs from the English in its application to persons not traders; but agrees with it in the great essentials of perfect security for creditors, by giving them the initiative in the proceedings, discriminating between innocent and culpable bankruptcy, and making the discharge from debt depend upon their consent, bottomed upon an attestation of integrity from the officer that tries the case. It answers no purpose to the gentleman, then, to carry us to Scotland for the meaning of a term in our constitution. It is to no purpose that he suggests that the framers of the constitution might have been looking to Scotland for an example of a bankrupt system. They were no more looking to it in that case, than they were in speaking of juries, and in guarantying the right of jury trials--a jury of twelve, with unanimity, as in England; and not of fifteen, with a majority of eight to give the verdict, as in Scotland. In all its employment of technical, legal, and political phrases, the constitution used them as used in England--the country from which we received our birth, our language, our manners, and customs, and all our systems of law and politics. We got all from England; and, this being the case, there is no use in following the gentleman to the continent of Europe, after dislodging him from Scotland; but as he has quoted the continent for the effect of the cessio in abolishing debts, and for its identity with bankruptcy, I must be indulged with giving him a few citations from the Code Napoleon, which embodies the principles of the civil law, and exemplifies the systems of Europe on the subject of bankruptcies and insolvencies. Here they are:

Mr. B. here read copiously from the Code Napoleon, on the subjects of bankruptcies and cession of property; the former contained in the commercial division of the code, the latter in the civil. Bankruptcy was divided into two classes--innocent and fraudulent; both confined to traders (commercants); the former were treated with lenity, the latter with criminal severity. The innocent bankrupt was the trader who became unable to pay his debts by the casualties of trade, and who had not lived beyond his means, nor gambled, nor engaged in speculations of pure hazard; who kept fair books, and satisfied his creditors and the judge of his integrity. The fraudulent bankrupt was the trader who had lived prodigally, or gambled, or engaged in speculations of pure hazard, or who had not kept books, or not kept them fairly, or misapplied deposits, or violated trusts, or been guilty of any fraudulent practice. He was punished by imprisonment and hard labor for a term of years, and could not be discharged from his debts by any majority of his creditors whatever. Cession of property--in French, la cession de biens--was precisely the cessio omnium bonorum of the Romans, as established by Julius Cæsar. It applied to all persons, and obtained for them freedom from imprisonment, and from suits, on the surrender of all their present property to their creditors; leaving their future acquisitions liable for the remainder of the debt. It was the insolvent law of the civil law; and thus bankruptcy and insolvency were as distinct on the continent of Europe as in England and Scotland, and governed by the same principles.

Having read these extracts from the civil law, Mr. B. resumed his speech, and went on to say that the gentleman was as unfortunate in his visit to the continent as in his visit to Scotland. In the first place he had no right to go there for exemplification of the terms used in our constitution. The framers of the constitution did not look to other countries for examples. They looked to England alone. In the second place, if we sought them elsewhere, we found precisely the same thing that we found in England: we found bankruptcy and insolvency everywhere distinct and inconvertible. They were, and are, distinct everywhere; here and elsewhere--at home and abroad--in England, Scotland, France, and all over Europe. They have never been confounded anywhere, and cannot be confounded here, without committing a double offence: first, violating our own constitution; secondly, invading the States. And with this, I dismiss the gentleman's first fundamental position, affirming that he has utterly failed in his attempt to confound bankruptcy with insolvency; and, therefore, has utterly failed to gain jurisdiction for Congress over the general debts of the community, by the pretext of the bankrupt power.

I have said that this so-called bankrupt bill of ours is copied from the insolvent law of the first year of George IV., and its amendments, and so it is, all except section 13 of that act, which is omitted, and for the purpose of keeping out the distinction between bankrupts and insolvents. That section makes the distinction. The act permits all debtors to petition for the benefit of the insolvent law, that is to say, discharge from imprisonment on surrendering their property; yet, in every case in which traders, merchants, &c. petition, the proceedings stop until taken up, and proceeded upon by the creditors. The filing the petition by a person subject to the bankrupt law, is simply held to be an act of bankruptcy, on which the creditors may proceed, or not, as on any other act of bankruptcy, precisely as they please. And thus insolvency and bankruptcy are kept distinct; double provisions on the same subject are prevented; and consistency is preserved in the administration of the laws. Not so under our bill. The omission to copy this 13th section has nullified all that relates to involuntary bankruptcy; puts it into the power of those who are subject to that proceeding to avoid it, at their pleasure, by the simple and obvious process of availing themselves of their absolute right to proceed voluntarily. And now a word upon volunteer bankruptcy. It is an invention and a crudity in our bill, growing out of the confounding of bankruptcy and insolvency. There is no such thing in England, or in any bankrupt system in the world; and cannot be, without reversing all the rules of right, and subjecting the creditor to the mercy of his debtor. The English bankrupt act of the 6th George IV., and the insolvent debtors' act of the 1st of the same reign, admit the bankrupt, as an insolvent, to file his declaration of insolvency, and petition for relief; but there it stops. His voluntary action goes no further than the declaration and petition. Upon that, his creditors, if they please, may proceed against him as a bankrupt, taking the declaration as an act of bankruptcy. If they do not choose to proceed, the case stops. The bankrupt cannot bring his creditors into court, and prosecute his claim to bankruptcy, whether they will or not. This is clear from the 6th section of the bankrupt act of George IV., and the 13th section of the insolvent debtors' act of the 1st year of the same reign; and thus our act of 1841 has the honor of inventing volunteer bankruptcy, and thus putting the abolition of debts in the hands of every person! for these volunteers have a right to be discharged from their debts, without the consent of their creditors!

Mr. Benton then read the two sections of the two acts of George IV. to which he had referred, and commented upon them to sustain his positions. And first the 6th section of the act of George IV. (1826) for the amendment of the bankrupt laws:

"SEC. 6. That if any such trader shall file in the office of the Lord Chancellor's secretary of bankrupts, a declaration in writing, signed by such trader, and attested by an attorney or solicitor, that he is insolvent or unable to meet his engagements, the said secretary of bankrupts, or his deputy, shall sign a memorandum that such declaration hath been filed; which memorandum shall be authority for the London Gazette to insert an advertisement of such declaration therein; and every such declaration shall, after such advertisement inserted as aforesaid, be an act of bankruptcy committed by such TRADER at the time when such declaration was filed: but no commission shall issue thereupon, unless it be sued out within two calendar months next after the insertion of such advertisement, and unless such advertisement shall have been inserted in the London Gazette within eight days after such declaration filed. And no docket shall be struck upon such act of bankruptcy before the expiration of four days next after such insertion of such advertisement, in case such commission is to be executed in London; or before the expiration of eight days next after such insertion, in case such commission is to be executed in the country; and the Gazette containing such advertisement shall be evidence to be received of such declaration having been filed."

Having read this section, Mr. B. said it was explicit, and precluded argument. The voluntary action of the debtor, which it authorized, was limited to the mere filing of the declaration of insolvency. It went no further; and it was confined to traders--to the trading classes--who, alone, were subject to the laws of bankruptcy.

Mr. B. said that the English had, as we all know, an insolvent system, as well as a bankrupt system. They had an insolvent debtors' court, as well as a bankrupt court; and both these were kept separate, although there were no States in England to be trodden under foot by treading down the insolvent laws. Not so with us. Our insolvent laws, though belonging to States called sovereign, are all trampled under foot! There would be a time to go into this. At present, Mr. B. would only say that, in England, bankruptcy and insolvency were still kept distinct; and no insolvent trader was allowed to proceed as a bankrupt. On the contrary, an insolvent, applying in the insolvent debtors' court for the release of his person, could not proceed one step beyond filing his declaration. At that point the creditors took up the declaration, if they pleased, transferred the case to the bankrupt court, and prosecuted the case in that court. This is done by virtue of the 13th section of the insolvent debtors' act of 7th George IV. (1827). Mr. B. read the section, as follows:

"Insolvent debtors' act of 7th year of George IV. (1827).

"SEC. 13. And be it further enacted, That the filing of the petition of every person in actual custody, who shall be subject to the laws concerning bankrupts, and who shall apply by petition to the said court for his or her discharge from custody, according to this act, shall be accounted and adjudged an act of bankruptcy from the time of filing such petition; and that any commission issuing against such person, and under which he or she shall be declared bankrupt before the time appointed by the said court, and advertised in the London Gazette, for hearing the matters of such petition, or at any time within two calendar months from the time of filing such petition, shall have effect to avoid any conveyance and assignment of the estate and effects of such person, which shall have been made in pursuance of the provisions of this act: Provided, always, That the filing of such petition shall not be deemed an act of bankruptcy, unless such person be so declared bankrupt before the time so advertised as aforesaid, or within such two calendar months as aforesaid; but that every such conveyance and assignment shall be good and valid, notwithstanding any commission of bankruptcy under which such person shall be declared bankrupt after the time so advertised as aforesaid, and after the expiration of such two calendar months as aforesaid."

This (said Mr. B.) accords with the section of the year before in the bankrupt act. The two sections are accordant, and identical in their provisions. They keep up the great distinction between insolvency and bankruptcy, which some of our judges have undertaken to abrogate; they keep up, also, the great distinction between the proper subjects of bankruptcy--to wit: traders, and those who are not traders; and they keep up the distinction between the release of the person (which is the object of insolvent laws) and the extinction of the debt with the consent of creditors, which is the object of bankrupt systems. By this section, if the "person" in custody who files a declaration of insolvency shall be a trader, subject to the laws of bankruptcy, it only operates as an act of bankruptcy--upon which the creditors may proceed, or not, as they please. If they proceed, it is done by suing out a commission of bankruptcy; which carries the case to the bankrupt court. If the creditors do not proceed, the petition of the insolvent trader only releases his person. Being subject to bankruptcy, his creditors may call him into the bankrupt court, if they please; if they do not, he cannot take it there, nor claim the benefit of bankruptcy in the insolvent court: he can only get his person released. This is clear from the section; and our bill of 1841 committed something worse than a folly in not copying this section. That bill creates two sorts of bankruptcy--voluntary and involuntary--and, by a singular folly, makes them convertible! so that all may be volunteers, if they please. It makes merchants, traders, bankers, and some others of the trading classes, subject to involuntary bankruptcy: then it gives all persons whatever the right to proceed voluntarily. Thus the involuntary subjects of bankruptcy may become volunteers; and the distinction becomes ridiculous and null. Our bill, which is compiled from the English Insolvent Debtors' Act, and is itself nothing but an insolvent law perverted to the abolition of debts at the will of the debtor, should have copied the 13th section of the English insolvent law: for want of copying this, it annihilated involuntary bankruptcy--made all persons, traders or not, volunteers who chose to be so--released all debts, at the will of the debtor, without the consent of a single creditor; and committed the most daring legislative outrage upon the rights of property, which the world ever beheld!

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Chapter LXVIII

DISTRIBUTION OF THE PUBLIC LAND REVENUE AND ASSUMPTION OF THE STATE DEBTS.

About two hundred millions of dollars were due from States and corporations to creditors in Europe. These debts were in stocks, much depreciated by the failure in many instances to pay the accruing interest--in some instances, failure to provide for the principal. These creditors became uneasy, and wished the federal government to assume their debts. As early as the year 1838 this wish began to be manifested: in the year 1839 it was openly expressed: in the year 1840, it became a regular question, mixing itself up in our presidential election; and openly engaging the active exertions of foreigners. Direct assumption was not urged: indirect, by giving the public land revenue to the States, was the mode pursued, and the one recommended by Mr. Tyler. In his first regular message, he recommended this disposition of the public lands, and with the expressed view of enabling the States to pay their debts, and also to raise the value of the stock. It was a vicious recommendation, and a flagrant and pernicious violation of the constitution. It was the duty of Congress to provide for the payment of the federal debts: that was declared in the constitution. There was no prohibition upon the payment of the State debts: that was a departure from the objects of the Union too gross to require prohibition: and the absence of any authority to do so was a prohibition as absolute as if expressed in the eyes of all those who held to the limitations of the constitution, and considered a power, not granted, as a power denied. Mr. Calhoun spoke with force and clearness, and with more than usual animation, against this proposed breach in the constitution. He said:

"If the bill should become a law, it would make a wider breach in the constitution, and be followed by changes more disastrous, than any other measure which has ever been adopted. It would, in its violation of the constitution, go far beyond the general welfare doctrine of former days, which stretched the power of the government as far as it was then supposed was possible by construction, however bold. But as wide as were the limits which it assigned to the powers of the government, it admitted by implication that there were limits; while this bill, as I shall show, rests on principles which, if admitted, would supersede all limits. According to the general welfare doctrine, Congress had power to raise money and appropriate it to all objects which might seem calculated to promote the general welfare--that is, the prosperity of the States, regarded in their aggregate character as members of the Union: or, to express it more briefly, and in language once so common, to national objects: thus excluding, by necessary implication, all that were not national, as falling within the sphere of the separate States. It takes in what is excluded under the general welfare doctrine, and assumes for Congress the right to raise money, to give by distribution to the States: that is, to be applied by them to those very local State objects to which that doctrine, by necessary implication, denied that Congress had a right to appropriate money; and thus superseding all the limits of the constitution--as far, at least, as the money power is concerned. Such, and so overwhelming, are the constitutional difficulties which beset this measure. No one who can overcome them--who can bring himself to vote for this bill--need trouble himself about constitutional scruples hereafter. He may swallow without hesitation bank, tariff, and every other unconstitutional measure which has ever been adopted or proposed. Yes; it would be easier to make a plausible argument for the constitutionality of the measures proposed by the abolitionists--for abolition itself--than for this detestable bill. And yet we find senators from slaveholding States, the very safety of whose constituents depends upon a strict construction of the constitution, recording their names in favor of a measure from which they have nothing to hope, and every thing to fear. To what is a course so blind to be attributed, but to that fanaticism of party zeal, openly avowed on this floor, which regards the preservation of the power of the whig party as the paramount consideration? It has staked its existence on the passage of this, and the other measures for which this extraordinary session was called; and when it is brought to the alternative of their defeat or success, in their anxiety to avoid the one and secure the other, constituents, constitution, duty, country,--all are forgotten."

Clearly unconstitutional, the measure itself was brought forward at the most inauspicious time--when the Treasury was empty, a loan bill, and a tax bill actually depending; and measures going on to raise money from the customs, not only to support the government, but to supply the place of this very land money proposed to be given to the States. Mr. Benton exposed this aggravation in some pointed remarks:

What a time to choose for squandering this patrimony! We are just in the midst of loans, and taxes, and new and extravagant expenditures, and scraping high and low to find money to support the government. Congress was called together to provide revenue; and we begin with throwing away what we have. We have just passed a bill to borrow twelve millions, which will cost the people sixteen millions to pay. We have a bill on the calendar--the next one in order--to tax every thing now free, and to raise every tax now low, to raise eight or ten millions for the government, at the cost of eighteen or twenty to the people. Sixteen millions of deficit salute the commencement of the ensuing year. A new loan of twelve millions is announced for the next session. All the articles of consumption which escape taxation now, are to be caught and taxed then. Such are the revelations of the chairman of the Finance Committee; and they correspond with our own calculations of their conduct. In addition to all this, we have just commenced the national defences--neglected when we had forty millions of surplus, now obliged to be attended to when we have nothing: these defences are to cost above a hundred millions to create them, and above ten millions annually to sustain them. A new and frightful extravagance has broken out in the Indian Department. Treaties which cannot be named, are to cost millions upon millions. Wild savages, who cannot count a hundred except by counting their fingers ten times over, are to have millions; and the customs to pay all; for the lands are no longer to pay for themselves, or to discharge the heavy annuities which have grown out of their acquisition. The chances of a war ahead: the ordinary expenses of the government, under the new administration, not thirteen millions as was promised, but above thirty, as this session proves. To crown all, the federal party in power! that party whose instinct is debt and tax--whose passion is waste and squander--whose cry is that of the horse-leech, give! give! give!--whose call is that of the grave, more! more! more! In such circumstances, and with such prospects ahead, we are called upon to throw away the land revenue, and turn our whole attention to taxing and borrowing. The custom-house duties--that is to say, foreign commerce, founded upon the labor of the South and West, is to pay all. The farmers and planters of the South and West are to take the chief load, and to carry it. Well may the senator from Kentucky [Mr. CLAY] announce the forthcoming of new loans and taxes--the recapture of the tea and coffee tax, if they escape us now--and the increase and perpetuity of the salt tax. All this must come, and more too, if federalism rules a few years longer. A few years more under federal sway, at the rate things have gone on at this session--this sweet little session called to relieve the people--and our poor America would be ripe for the picture for which England now sits, and which has been so powerfully drawn in the Edinburgh Review. Listen to it, and hear what federalism would soon bring us to, if not stopped in its mad career:

"Taxes upon every article which enters into the mouth, or covers the back, or is placed under the foot. Taxes upon every thing which it is pleasant to see, hear, feel, smell, or taste. Taxes upon warmth, light, and locomotion. Taxes on every thing on earth, and the waters under the earth; on every thing that comes from abroad, or is grown at home. Taxes on the raw material; taxes on every fresh value that is added to it by the industry of man. Taxes on the sauce which pampers a man's appetite, and the drug that restores him to health; on the ermine which decorates the judge, and the rope which hangs the criminal; on the brass nails of the coffin, and the ribbons of the bride. At bed or board, couchant or levant, we must pay. The schoolboy whips his taxed top; the beardless youth manages his taxed horse with a taxed bridle, on a taxed road. The dying Englishman pours his medicine, which has paid seven per cent., into a spoon that has paid fifteen per cent.; flings himself back upon his chintz bed, which has paid twenty-two per cent.; makes his will on an eight-pound stamp, and expires in the arms of an apothecary, who has paid a license of a hundred pounds for the privilege of putting him to death. His whole property is then immediately taxed from two to ten per cent. Besides the probate, large fees are demanded for burying him in the chancel; his virtues handed down to posterity on taxed marble, and he is then gathered to his fathers, to be taxed no more."

This is the way the English are now taxed, and so it would be with us if the federalists should remain a few years in power.

Execrable as this bill is in itself, and for its objects, and for the consequences which it draws after it, it is still more abominable for the time and manner in which it is driven through Congress, and the contingencies on which its passage is to depend. What is the time?--when the new States are just ready to double their representation, and to present a front which would command respect for their rights, and secure the grant of all their just demands. They are pounced upon in this nick of time, before the arrival of their full representation under the new census, to be manacled and fettered by a law which assumes to be a perpetual settlement of the land question, and to bind their interests for ever. This is the time! what is the manner?--gagged through the House of Representatives by the previous question, and by new rules fabricated from day to day, to stifle discussion, prevent amendments, suppress yeas and nays, and hide the deeds which shunned the light. This was the manner! What was the contingency on which its passage was to depend?--the passage of the bankrupt bill! So that this execrable bill, baited as it was with douceurs to old States, and bribes to the new ones, and pressed under the gag, and in the absence of the new representation, was still unable to get through without a bargain for passing the bankrupt bill at the same time. Can such legislation stand? Can God, or man, respect such work?

But a circumstance which distinguished the passage of this bill from all others--which up to that day was without a precedent--was the open exertion of a foreign interest to influence our legislation. This interest had already exerted itself in our presidential election: it now appeared in our legislation. Victorious in the election, they attended Congress to see that their expectations were not disappointed. The lobbies of the House contained them: the boarding-houses of the whig members were their resort: the democracy kept aloof, though under other circumstances they would have been glad to have paid honor to respectable strangers, only avoided now on account of interest and exertions in our elections and legislation. Mr. Fernando Wood of New York brought this scandal to the full notice of the House. "In connection with this point I will add that, at the time this cheat was in preparation--the merchants' petition being drawn up by the brokers and speculators for the congressional market--there were conspicuous bankers in Wall street, anxious observers, if not co-laborers in the movement. Among them might be named Mr. Bates, partner of the celebrated house of Baring, Brothers & Company; Mr. Cryder, of the equally celebrated house of Morrison, Cryder & Company; Mr. Palmer, junior, son of Mr. Horsley Palmer, now, or lately, the governor of the Bank of England. Nor were these 'allies' seen only in Wall street. Their visits were extended to the capitol; and since the commencement of the debate upon this bill in the other House, they have been in the lobbies, attentive, and apparently interested listeners. I make no comment. Comment is unnecessary. I state facts--undeniable facts: and it is with feelings akin to humiliation and shame that I stand up here and state them." These respectable visitors had a twofold object in their attention to our legislation--the getting a national bank established, as well as the State debts provided for. Mr. Benton also pointed out this outrage upon our legislation:

He then took a rapid view of the bill--its origin, character, and effects; and showed it to be federal in its origin, associated with all the federal measures of the present and past sessions; with bank, tariff, assumption of State debts, dependent upon the bankrupt bill for its passage; violative of the constitution and the compacts with the new States; and crowning all its titles to infamy by drawing capitalists from London to attend this extra session of Congress, to promote the passage of this bill for their own benefit. He read a paragraph from the money article in a New York paper, reciting the names and attendance, on account of this bill, of the foreign capitalists at Washington. The passage was in these words:

"At the commencement of the session, almost every foreign house had a representative here. Wilson, Palmer, Cryder, Bates, Willinck, Hope, Jaudon, and a host of others, came over on various pretences; all were in attendance at Washington, and all seeking to forward the proposed measures. The land bill was to give them three millions per annum from the public Treasury, or thirty millions in ten years, and to raise the value of the stock at least thirty millions more. The revenue bill was to have supplied the deficiency in the Treasury. The loan bill was to have been the basis of an increase of importations and of exchange operations; and the new bank was the instrument of putting the whole in operation."

This Mr. Benton accompanied by an article from a London paper, showing that the capitalists in that city were counting upon the success of their emissaries at Washington, and that the passage of this land bill was the first and most anxious wish of their hearts--that they considered it equivalent to the assumption of the State debts--and that the benefit of the bill would go to themselves. This established the character of the bill, and showed that it had been the means of bringing upon the national legislation the degrading and corrupting influences of a foreign interference. For the first time in the history of our government, foreigners have attended our Congress, to promote the passage of laws for their own benefit. For the first time we have had London capitalists for lobby members; and, mortifying to be told, instead of being repulsed by defeat, they have been encouraged by success; and their future attendance may now be looked for as a matter of course, at our future sessions of Congress, when they have debts to secure, stocks to enhance, or a national bank to establish.

Mr. Benton also denounced the bill for its unconstitutionality, its demagogue character, its demoralizing tendencies, its bid for popularity, and its undaunted attempt to debauch the people with their own money.

The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. ARCHER], to whose speech I am now replying, in allusion to the frequent cry of breach of the constitution, when there is no breach, says he is sick and weary of the cry, wolf! wolf! when there is no wolf. I say so too. The constitution should not be trifled with--should not be invoked on every petty occasion--should not be proclaimed in danger when there is no danger. Granting that this has been done sometimes--that too often, and with too little consideration, the grave question of constitutionality has been pressed into trivial discussions, and violation proclaimed where there was none: granting this, I must yet be permitted to say that such is not the case now. It is not now a cry of wolf! when there is no wolf. It is no false or sham cry now. The boy cries in earnest this time. The wolf has come! Long, lank, gaunt, hungry, voracious, and ferocious, the beast is here! howling, for its prey, and determined to have it at the expense of the life of the shepherd. The political stockjobbers and gamblers raven for the public lands, and tear the constitution to pieces to get at them. They seize, pillage, and plunder the lands. It is not a case of misconstruction, but of violation. It is not a case of misunderstanding the constitution, but of assault and battery--of maim and murder--of homicide and assassination--committed upon it. Never has such a daring outrage been perpetrated--never such a contravention of the object of a confederation--never such a total perversion, and barefaced departure, from all the purposes for which a community of States bound themselves together for the defence, and not for the plunder of each other. No, sir! no! The constitution was not made to divide money. This confederacy was not framed for a distribution among its members of lands, money, property, or effects of any kind. It contains rules and directions for raising money--for levying duties equally, which the new tariff will violate; and for raising direct taxes in proportion to federal population; but it contains no rule for dividing money; and the distributors have to make one as they go, and the rule they make is precisely the one that is necessary to carry the bill; and that varies with the varying strength of the distributing party. In 1836, in the deposit act, it was the federal representation in the two Houses of Congress: in this bill, as it came from the House of Representatives, it was the federal numbers. We have put in representation: it will come back to us with numbers; and numbers will prevail; for it is a mere case of plunder--the plunder of the young States by the old ones--of the weak by the strong. Sir, it is sixteen years since these schemes of distribution were brought into this chamber, and I have viewed them all in the same light, and given them all the same indignant opposition. I have opposed all these schemes as unconstitutional, immoral, fatal to the Union, degrading to the people, debauching to the States; and inevitably tending to centralism on one hand or to disruption on the other. I have opposed the whole, beginning with the first proposition of a senator from New Jersey [Mr. DICKERSON], to divide five millions of the sinking fund, and following the baneful scheme through all its modifications for the distribution of surplus revenue, and finally of land revenue. I have opposed the whole, adhering to the constitution, and to the objects of the confederacy, and scorning the ephemeral popularity which a venal system of plunder could purchase from the victims, or the dupes of a false and sordid policy.

I scorn the bill: I scout its vaunted popularity: I detest it. Nor can I conceive of an object more pitiable and contemptible than that of the demagogue haranguing for votes, and exhibiting his tables of dollars and acres, in order to show each voter, or each State, how much money they will be able to obtain from the Treasury if the land bill passes. Such haranguing, and such exhibition, is the address of impudence and knavery to supposed ignorance, meanness, and folly. It is treating the people as if they were penny wise and pound foolish; and still more mean than foolish. Why, the land revenue, after deducting the expenses, if fairly divided among the people, would not exceed ninepence a head per annum; if fairly divided among the States, and applied to their debts, it would not supersede above ninepence per annum of taxation upon the units of the population. The day for land sales have gone by. The sales of this year do not exceed a million and a half of dollars, which would not leave more than a million for distribution; which, among sixteen millions of people would be exactly fourpence half penny, Virginia money, per head! a fip in New York, and a picaillon in Louisiana. At two millions, it would be ninepence a head in Virginia, equivalent to a levy in New York, and a bit in Louisiana! precisely the amount which, in specie times, a gentleman gives to a negro boy for holding his horse a minute at the door. And for this miserable doit--this insignificant subdivision of a shilling--a York shilling--can the demagogue suppose that the people are base enough to violate their constitution, mean enough to surrender the defence of their country, and stupid enough to be taxed in their coffee, tea, salt, sugar, coats, hats, blankets, shoes, shirts; and every article of comfort, decency, or necessity, which they eat, drink, or wear; or on which they stand, sit, sleep, or lie?

* * * * *

The bill was bound to pass. Besides being in the same boat with the other cardinal whig measures--bank, bankrupt, repeal of independent treasury--and all arranged to pass together; and besides being pushed along and supported by the London bankers--it contained within itself the means of success. It was richly freighted with inducements to conciliate every interest. To every new State it made a preliminary distribution of ten per centum (in addition to the five per centum allowed by compact), on the amount of the sales within the State: then it came in for a full share of all the rest in proportion to its population. To the same new States it gave also five hundred thousand acres of land; or a quantity sufficient to make up that amount where less had been granted. To the settlers in the new States, including foreigners who had made the declaration of their intentions to become naturalized citizens, it gave a pre-emption right in the public lands, to the amount of one quarter section: 160 acres. Then it distributed the whole amount of the land revenue, after deduction of the ten and the five per centum to the new States, to all the old States and new States together, in proportion to their population: and included all the States yet to be created in this scheme of distribution. And that no part of the people should go without their share in these largesses, the Territories, though not States, and the District of Columbia, though not a Territory, were also embraced in the plan--each to receive in proportion to its numbers. So many inducements to all sections of the country to desire the bill, and such a chance for popularity to its authors, made sure, not only of its passage, but of its claim to the national gratitude. To the eye of patriotism, it was all a venal proceeding--an attempt to buy up the people with their own money--having the money to borrow first. For it so happened that while the distribution bill was passing in one House, to divide out money among the States and the people, there was a loan bill depending in the other House, to borrow twelve millions of dollars for three years; and also, a tax bill to produce eighteen millions a year to reimburse that loan, and to defray the current expenses of the government. To make a gratuitous distribution of the land revenue (equal to several millions per annum), looked like fatuity; and was so in a financial or governmental point of view. But it was supposed that the distribution scheme would be irresistibly popular--that it would chain the people and the States to the party which passed it--and insure them success in the ensuing presidential elections. Baseless calculation, as it applied to the people! Vain hope, as it applied to themselves! The very men that passed the bill had to repeal it, under the sneaking term of suspension, before their terms of service were out--within less than one year from the time it was passed! to be precise, within eleven calendar months and twelve days, from the day of its passage--counting from the days, inclusive of both, on which John Tyler, President, approved and disapproved it--whereof, hereafter. But it passed! and was obliged to pass. It was a case of mutual assurance with the other whig measures, and passed the Senate by a party vote--Mr. Preston excepted--who "broke ranks," and voted with the democracy, making the negative vote 23. The yeas and nays were:

YEAS--Messrs. Archer, Barrow, Bates, Bayard, Berrien, Choate, Clay of Kentucky, Clayton, Dixon, Evans, Graham, Henderson, Huntington, Kerr, Mangum, Merrick, Miller, Morehead, Phelps, Porter, Prentiss, Rives, Simmons, Smith of Indiana, Southard, Tallmadge, White, Woodbridge.

NAYS--Messrs. Allen, Benton, Buchanan, Calhoun, Clay of Alabama, Cuthbert, Fulton, King, Linn, McRoberts, Mouton, Nicholson, Pierce, Preston, Sevier, Smith of Connecticut, Sturgeon, Tappan, Walker, Williams, Woodbury, Wright, Young.

In the House the vote was close--almost even--116 to 108. The yeas and nays were:

YEAS--Messrs. John Quincy Adams, Elisha H. Allen, Landaff W. Andrews, Sherlock J. Andrews, Thomas D. Arnold, John B. Aycrigg, Alfred Babcock, Osmyn Baker, Daniel D. Barnard, Victory Birdseye, Henry Black, Bernard Blair, William W. Boardman, Nathaniel B. Borden, John M. Botts, George N. Briggs, John H. Brockway, David Bronson, Jeremiah Brown, Barker Burnell, William B. Calhoun, Thomas J. Campbell, Robert L. Caruthers, Thomas C. Chittenden, John C. Clark, Staley N. Clarke, James Cooper, Benjamin S. Cowen, Robert B. Cranston, James H. Cravens, Caleb Cushing, Edmund Deberry, John Edwards, Horace Everett, William P. Fessenden, Millard Fillmore, A. Lawrence Foster, Seth M. Gates, Meredith P. Gentry, Joshua R. Giddings, William L. Goggin, Patrick G. Goode, Willis Green, John Greig, Hiland Hall, William Halstead, William S. Hastings, Thomas Henry, Charles Hudson, Hiram P. Hunt, James Irvin, William W. Irvin, Francis James, William Cost Johnson, Isaac D. Jones, John P. Kennedy, Henry S. Lane, Joseph Lawrence, Archibald L. Linn, Thomas F. Marshall, Samson Mason, Joshua Mathiot, John Mattocks, John P. B. Maxwell, John Maynard, John Moore, Christopher Morgan, Calvary Morris, Jeremiah Morrow, Thomas B. Osborne, Bryan Y. Owsley, James A. Pearce, Nathaniel G. Pendleton, John Pope, Cuthbert Powell, George H. Proffit, Robert Ramsey, Benjamin Randall, Alexander Randall, Joseph F. Randolph, Kenneth Rayner, Joseph Ridgway, George B. Rodney, William Russel, Leverett Saltonstall, John Sergeant, William Simonton, William Slade, Truman Smith, Augustus R. Sollers, James C. Sprigg, Edward Stanly, Samuel Stokely, Charles C. Stratton, Alexander H. H. Stuart, George W. Summers, John Taliaferro, John B. Thompson, Richard W. Thompson, Joseph L. Tillinghast, George W. Toland, Thomas A. Tomlinson, Philip Triplett, Joseph Trumbull, Joseph R. Underwood, Henry Van Rensselaer, David Wallace, William H. Washington, Edward D. White, Joseph L. White, Thomas W. Williams, Lewis Williams, Joseph L. Williams, Robert C. Winthrop, Thomas Jones Yorke, Augustus Young, John Young.

Those who voted in the negative, are:

NAYS--Messrs. Julius C. Alford, Archibald H. Arrington, Charles G. Atherton, Linn Banks, Henry W. Beeson, Benjamin A. Bidlack, Samuel S. Bowne, Linn Boyd, David P. Brewster, Aaron V. Brown, Milton Brown, Joseph Egbert, Charles G. Ferris, John G. Floyd, Joseph Fornance, Thomas F. Foster, Roger L. Gamble, Thomas W. Gilmer, William O. Goode, Samuel Gordon, James Graham, Amos Gustine, Richard W. Habersham, William A. Harris, John Hastings, Samuel L. Hays, Isaac E. Holmes, George W. Hopkins, Jacob Houck, jr., George S. Houston, Edmund W. Hubard, Robert M. T. Hunter, William Jack, Cave Johnson, John W. Jones, George M. Keim, Edmund Burke, Sampson H. Butler, William Butler, William O. Butler, Green W. Caldwell, Patrick C. Caldwell, John Campbell, William B. Campbell, George B. Cary, Reuben Chapman, Nathan Clifford, Andrew Kennedy, Thomas Butler King, Dixon H. Lewis, Nathaniel S. Littlefield, Joshua A. Lowell, Abraham McClellan, Robert McClellan, James J. McKay, John McKeon, Francis Mallory, Albert G. Marchand, Alfred Marshall, John Thompson Mason, James Mathews, William Medill, James A. Meriwether, John Miller, Peter Newhard, Eugenius A. Nisbet, William M. Oliver, William Parmenter, Samuel Patridge, William W. Payne, Francis W. Pickens, Arnold Plumer, James G. Clinton, Walter Coles, John R. J. Daniel, Richard D. Davis, John B. Dawson, Ezra Dean, Davis Dimock, jr., William Doan, Andrew W. Doig, Ira A. Eastman, John C. Edwards, John R. Reding, Abraham Rencher, R. Barnwell Rhett, Lewis Riggs, James Rogers, James I. Roosevelt, John Sanford, Romulus M. Saunders, Tristram Shaw, Augustine H. Shepperd, Benjamin G. Shields, John Snyder, Lewis Steenrod, Thomas D. Sumter, George Sweney, Hopkins L. Turney, John Van Buren, Aaron Ward, Lott Warren, Harvey M. Watterson, John B. Weller, John Westbrook, James W. Williams, Henry A. Wise, Fernando Wood.

The progress of the abuse inherent in a measure so vicious, was fully illustrated in the course of these distribution-bills. First, they were merely to relieve the distresses of the people: now they were to make payment of State debts, and to enhance the price of State stocks in the hands of London capitalists. In the beginning they were to divide a surplus on hand, for which the government had no use, and which ought to be returned to the people who had paid it, and who now needed it: afterwards it was to divide the land-money years ahead without knowing whether there would be any surplus or not: now they are for dividing money when there is none to divide--when there is a treasury deficit--and loans and taxes required to supply it. Originally, they were for short and limited terms--first, for one year--afterwards for five years: now for perpetuity. This bill provides for eternity. It is a curiosity in human legislation, and contained a clause which would be ridiculous if it had not been impious--an attempt to manacle future Congresses, and to bind posterity through unborn generations. The clause ran in these words: That if, at any time during the existence of this act, duties on imported goods should be raised above the rate of the twenty per centum on the value as provided in the compromise act of 1833, then the distribution of the land revenue should be suspended, and continue so until reduced to that rate; and then be resumed. Fallacious attempt to bind posterity! It did not even bind those who made it: for the same Congress disregarded it. But it shows to what length the distribution spirit had gone; and that even protective tariff--that former sovereign remedy for all the wants of the people--was sacrificed to it. Mr. Clay undertaking to bind all the Congresses for ever to uniform twenty per centum ad valorem duties. And while the distribution-bill thus undertook to protect and save the compromise of 1833, the new tariff-bill of this session, undertook to return the favor by assuming to protect and save the distribution-bill. Its second section contained this proviso: That if any duty exceeding twenty per centum on the value shall be levied before the 30th day of June, 1842, it should not stop the distribution of the land revenue, as provided for in the distribution act of the present session. Thus, the two acts were made mutual assurers, each stipulating for the life of the other, and connecting things which had no mutual relation except in the coalitions of politicians; but, like other assurers, not able to save the lives they assured. Both acts were gone in a year! And the marvel is how such flimsy absurdities could be put into a statute? And the answer, from the necessity of conciliating some one's vote, without which the bills could not pass. Thus, some Southern anti-tariff men would not vote for the distribution bill unless the compromise of 1833 was protected; and some distribution men of the West would not vote for the anti-tariff act unless the distribution bill was protected. And hence the ridiculous, presumptuous, and idle expedient of mutually insuring each other.

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Chapter LXIX

INSTITUTION OF THE HOUR RULE IN DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: ITS ATTEMPT, AND REPULSE IN THE SENATE.

This session is remarkable for the institution of the hour rule in the House of Representatives--the largest limitation upon the freedom of debate which any deliberative assembly ever imposed upon itself, and presents an eminent instance of permanent injury done to free institutions in order to get rid of a temporary annoyance. It was done at a time when the party, called whig, was in full predominance in both Houses of Congress, and in the impatience of delay in the enactment of their measures. It was essentially a whig measure--though with exceptions each way--the body of the whigs going for it; the body of the democracy against it--several eminent whigs voting with them: Mr. John Quincy Adams, William C. Dawson, James A. Pearce, Kenneth Rayner, Edward Stanly, Alexander H. H. Stuart, Edward D. White and others. Mr. Lott Warren moved the rule as an amendment to the body of the rules; and, in the same moment, moved the previous question: which was carried. The vote was immediately taken, and the rule established by a good majority--only seventy-five members voting against it. They were:

Messrs. John Quincy Adams, Archibald H. Arrington, Charles G. Atherton, Linn Banks, Daniel D. Barnard, John M. Botts, Samuel S. Bowne, Linn Boyd, David P. Brewster, Aaron V. Brown, Edmund Burke, Barker Burnell, Green W. Caldwell, John Campbell, Robert L. Caruthers, George B. Cary, Reuben Chapman, James G. Clinton, Walter Coles, John R. J. Daniel, Wm. C. Dawson, Ezra Dean, Andrew W. Doig, Ira A. Eastman, Horace Everett, Charles G. Ferris, John G. Floyd, Charles A. Floyd, William O. Goode, Samuel Gordon, Samuel L. Hays, George W. Hopkins, Jacob Houck, jr., Edmund W. Hubard, Charles Hudson, Hiram P. Hunt, William W. Irwin, William Jack, Cave Johnson, John W. Jones, George M. Keim, Andrew Kennedy, Thomas Butler King, Dixon H. Lewis, Nathaniel S. Littlefield, Joshua A. Lowell, Abraham McClellan, Robert McClellan, James J. McKay, Francis Mallory, Alfred Marshall, Samson Mason, John Thompson Mason, John Miller, Peter Newhard, William Parmenter, William W. Payne, James A. Pearce, Francis W. Pickens, Kenneth Rayner, John R. Reding, Lewis Riggs, Romulus M. Saunders, William Slade, John Snyder, Augustus R. Sollers, James C. Sprigg, Edward Stanly, Lewis Steenrod, Alexander H. H. Stuart, Hopkins L. Turney, Aaron Ward, John Westbrook, Edward D. White, Joseph L. Williams.

The Roman republic had existed four hundred and fifty years, and was verging towards its fall under the first triumvirate--(Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus)--before pleadings were limited to two hours before the JUDICES SELECTI. In the Senate the speeches of senators were never limited at all; but even the partial limitation then placed upon judicial pleadings, but which were, in fact, popular orations, drew from Cicero an affecting deprecation of its effect upon the cause of freedom, as well as upon the field of eloquence. The reader of the admired treatise on oratory, and notices of celebrated orators, will remember his lamentation--as wise in its foresight of evil consequences to free institutions, as mournful and affecting in its lamentation over the decline of oratory. Little could he have supposed that a popular assembly should ever exist, and in a country where his writings were read, which would voluntarily impose upon itself a far more rigorous limitation than the one over which he grieved. Certain it is, that with our incessant use of the previous question, which cuts off all debate, and the hour rule which limits a speech to sixty minutes (constantly reduced by interruptions); and the habit of fixing an hour at which the question shall be taken, usually brief, and the intermediate little time not secure for that question: with all these limitations upon the freedom of debate in the House, certain it is that such an anomaly was never seen in a deliberative assembly, and the business of a people never transacted in the midst of such ignorance of what they are about by those who are doing it.

No doubt the license of debate has been greatly abused in our halls of Congress--as in those of the British parliament: but this suppression of debate is not the correction of the abuse, but the destruction of the liberty of speech: and that, not as a personal privilege, but as a representative right, essential to the welfare of the people. For fifty years of our government there was no such suppression: in no other country is there the parallel to it. Yet in all popular assemblies there is an abuse in the liberty of speech, inherent in the right of speech, which gives to faction and folly the same latitude as to wisdom and patriotism. The English have found the best corrective: it is in the House itself--its irregular power: its refusal to hear a member further when they are tired of him. A significant scraping and coughing warns the annoying speaker when he should cease: if the warning is not taken, a tempest drowns his voice: when he appeals to the chair, the chair recommends him to yield to the temper of the House. A few examples reduce the practice to a rule--insures its observance; and works the correction of the abuse without the destruction of debate. No man speaking to the subject, and giving information to the House, was ever scraped and coughed down, in the British House of Commons. No matter how plain his language, how awkward his manner, how confused his delivery, so long as he gives information he is heard attentively; while the practice falls with just, and relentless effect upon the loquacious members, who mistake volubility for eloquence, who delight themselves while annoying the House--who are insensible to the proprieties of time and place, take the subject for a point to stand on: and then speak off from it in all directions, and equally without continuity of ideas or disconnection of words. The practice of the British House of Commons puts an end to all such annoyance, while saving every thing profitable that any member can utter.

The first instance of enforcing this new rule stands thus recorded in the Register of Debates:

"Mr. PICKENS proceeded, in the next place to point out the items of expenditure which might, without the least injury to the interests of the government or to the public service, suffer retrenchment. He quoted the report of the Secretary of the Treasury of December 9, 1840; from it he took the several items, and then stated how much, in his opinion, each might be reduced. The result of the first branch of this reduction of particulars was a sum to be retrenched amounting to $852,000. He next went into the items of pensions, the Florida war, and the expenditures of Congress; on these, with a few minor ones in addition, he estimated that there might, without injury, be a saving of four millions. Mr. P. had gotten thus far in his subject, and was just about to enter into a comparison of the relative advantages of a loan and of Treasury notes, when

"The Chair here reminded Mr. Pickens that his hour had expired.

"Mr. PICKENS. The hour out?

"The CHAIR. Yes, sir.

"Mr. PICKENS. [Looking at his watch.] Bless my soul! Have I run my race?

"Mr. HOLMES asked whether his colleague had not taken ten minutes for explanations?

"Mr. Warren desired that the rule be enforced.

"Mr. PICKENS denied that the House had any constitutional right to pass such a rule.

"The CHAIR again reminded Mr. Pickens that he had spoken an hour.

"Mr. PICKENS would, then, conclude by saying it was the most infamous rule ever passed by any legislative body.

"Mr. J. G. FLOYD of New York, said the gentleman had been frequently interrupted, and had, therefore, a right to continue his remarks.

"The CHAIR delivered a contrary opinion.

"Mr. FLOYD appealed from his decision.

"The CHAIR then rose to put the question, whether the decision of the Chair should stand as the judgment of the House? when

"Mr. FLOYD withdrew his appeal.

"Mr. DAWSON suggested whether the Chair had not possibly made a mistake with respect to the time.

"The CHAIR said there was no mistake.

"Mr. PICKENS then gave notice that he would offer an amendment.

"The CHAIR remarked that the gentleman was not in order.

"Mr. PICKENS said that if the motion to strike out the enacting clause should prevail, he would move to amend the bill by introducing a substitute, giving ample means to the Treasury, but avoiding the evils of which he complained in the bill now under consideration."

The measure having succeeded in the House which made the majority master of the body, and enabled them to pass their bills without resistance or exposure, Mr. Clay undertook to do the same thing in the Senate. He was impatient to pass his bills, annoyed at the resistance they met, and dreadfully harassed by the species of warfare to which they were subjected; and for which he had no turn. The democratic senators acted upon a system, and with a thorough organization, and a perfect understanding. Being a minority, and able to do nothing, they became assailants, and attacked incessantly; not by formal orations against the whole body of a measure, but by sudden, short, and pungent speeches, directed against the vulnerable parts; and pointed by proffered amendments. Amendments were continually offered--a great number being prepared every night, and placed in suitable hands for use the next day--always commendably calculated to expose an evil, and to present a remedy. Near forty propositions of amendment were offered to the first fiscal agent bill alone--the yeas and nays taken upon them seven and thirty times. All the other prominent bills--distribution, bankrupt, fiscal corporation--new tariff act, called revenue--were served the same way. Every proposed amendment made an issue, which fixed public attention, and would work out in our favor--end as it might. If we carried it, which was seldom, there was a good point gained: if we lost it, there was a bad point exposed. In either event we had the advantage of discussion, which placed our adversaries in the wrong; and the speaking fact of the yeas and nays--which told how every man was upon every point. We had in our ranks every variety of speaking talent, from plain and calm up to fiery and brilliant--and all matter-of-fact men--their heads well stored with knowledge. There were but twenty-two of us; but every one a speaker, and effective. We kept their measures upon the anvil, and hammered them continually: we impaled them against the wall, and stabbed them incessantly. The Globe newspaper was a powerful ally (Messrs. Blair and Rives); setting off all we did to the best advantage in strong editorials--and carrying out our speeches, fresh and hot, to the people: and we felt victorious in the midst of unbroken defeats. Mr. Clay's temperament could not stand it, and he was determined to silence the troublesome minority, and got the acquiescence of his party, and the promise of their support: and boldly commenced his operations--avowing his design, at the same time, in open Senate.

It was on the 12th day of July--just four days after the new rule had been enforced in the House, and thereby established (for up to that day, it was doubtful whether it could be enforced)--that Mr. Clay made his first movement towards its introduction in the Senate; and in reply to Mr. Wright of New York--one of the last men in the world to waste time in the Senate, or to speak without edification to those who would listen. It was on the famous fiscal bank bill, and on a motion of Mr. Wright to strike out the large subscription reserved for the government, so as to keep the government unconnected with the business of the bank. The mover made some remarks in favor of his motion--to which Mr. Clay replied: and then went on to say:

"He could not help regarding the opposition to this measure as one eminently calculated to delay the public business, with no other object that he could see than that of protracting to the last moment the measures for which this session had been expressly called to give to the people. This too was at a time when the whole country was crying out in an agony of distress for relief."

These remarks, conveying a general imputation upon the minority senators of factious conduct in delaying the public business, and thwarting the will of the people, justified an answer from any one of them to whom it was applicable: and first received it from Mr. Calhoun.

Mr. Calhoun was not surprised at the impatience of the senator from Kentucky, though he was at his attributing to this side of the chamber the delays and obstacles thrown in the way of his favorite measure. How many days did the senator himself spend in amending his own bill? The bill had been twelve days before the Senate, and eight of those had been occupied by the friends of the bill. That delay did not originate on this side of the House; but now that the time which was cheerfully accorded to him and his friends is to be reciprocated, before half of it is over, the charge of factious delay is raised. Surely the urgency and impatience of the senator and his friends cannot be so very great that the minority must not be allowed to employ as many days in amending their bill as they took themselves to alter it. The senator from Kentucky says he is afraid, if we go on in this way, we will not get through the measures of this session till the last of autumn. Is not the fault in himself, and in the nature of the measures he urges so impatiently? These measures are such as the senators in the minority are wholly opposed to on principle--such as they conscientiously believe are unconstitutional--and is it not then right to resist them, and prevent, if they can, all invasions of the constitution? Why does he build upon such unreasonable expectations as to calculate on carrying measures of this magnitude and importance with a few days of hasty legislation on each? What are the measures proposed by the senator? They comprise the whole federal system, which it took forty years, from 1789 to 1829, to establish--but which are now, happily for the country, prostrate in the dust. And it is these measures, fraught with such important results that are now sought to be hurried through in one extra session; measures which, without consuming one particle of useless time to discuss fully, would require, instead of an extra session of Congress, four or five regular sessions. The senator said the country was in agony, crying for "action," "action." He understood whence that cry came--it came from the holders of State stocks, the men who expected another expansion, to relieve themselves at the expense of government. "Action"--"action," meant nothing but "plunder," "plunder," "plunder;" and he assured the gentleman, that he could not be more anxious in urging on a system of plunder than he (Mr. Calhoun) would be in opposing it. He so understood the senator, and he inquired of him, whether he called this an insidious amendment?

This was a sharp reply, just in its retort, spirited in its tone, judicious in expanding the basis of the new debate that was to come on; and greatly irritated Mr. Clay. He immediately felt that he had no right to impeach the motives of senators, and catching up Mr. Calhoun on that point, and strongly contesting it, brought on a rapid succession of contradictory asseverations: Thus:

"Mr. CLAY. I said no such thing, sir; I did not say any thing about the motives of senators.

"Mr. CALHOUN said he understood the senator's meaning to be that the motives of the opposition were factious and frivolous.

"Mr. CLAY. I said no such thing, sir.

"Mr. CALHOUN. It was so understood.

"Mr. CLAY. No, sir; no, sir.

"Mr. CALHOUN. Yes, sir, yes; it could be understood in no other way.

"Mr. CLAY. What I did say, was, that the effect of such amendments, and of consuming time in debating them, would be a waste of that time from the business of the session; and, consequently, would produce unnecessary delay and embarrassment. I said nothing of motives--I only spoke of the practical effect and result.

"Mr. CALHOUN said he understood it had been repeated for the second time that there could be no other motive or object entertained by the senators in the opposition, in making amendments and speeches on this bill, than to embarrass the majority by frivolous and vexatious delay.

"Mr. CLAY insisted that he made use of no assertions as to motives.

"Mr. CALHOUN. If the senator means to say that he does not accuse this side of the House of bringing forward propositions for the sake of delay, he wished to understand him.

"Mr. CLAY. I intended that.

"Mr. CALHOUN repeated that he understood the senator to mean that the senators in the opposition were spinning out the time for no other purpose but that of delaying and embarrassing the majority.

"Mr. CLAY admitted that was his meaning, though not thus expressed."

So ended this keen colloquy in which the pertinacity, and clear perceptions of Mr. Calhoun brought out the admission that the impeachment of motives was intended, but not expressed. Having got this admission Mr. Calhoun went on to defy the accusation of faction and frivolity, and to declare a determination in the minority to continue in their course; and put a peremptory question to Mr. Clay.

"Mr. Calhoun observed that to attempt, by such charges of factious and frivolous motives, to silence the opposition, was wholly useless. He and his friends had principles to contend for that were neither new nor frivolous, and they would here now, and at all times, and in all places, maintain them against those measures, in whatever way they thought most efficient. Did the senator from Kentucky mean to apply to the Senate the gag law passed in the other branch of Congress? If he did, it was time he should know that he (Mr. Calhoun), and his friends were ready to meet him on that point."

This question, and the avowed readiness to meet the gagging attempt, were not spoken without warrant. The democratic senators having got wind of what was to come, had consulted together and taken their resolve to defy and to dare it--to resist its introduction, and trample upon the rule, if voted: and in the mean time to gain an advantage with the public by rendering odious their attempt. Mr. Clay answered argumentatively for the rule, and that the people were for it:

"Let those senators go into the country, and they will find the whole body of the people complaining of the delay and interruption of the national business, by their long speeches in Congress; and if they will be but admonished by the people, they will come back with a lesson to cut short their debating, and give their attention more to action than to words. Who ever heard that the people would be dissatisfied with the abridgment of speeches in Congress? He had never heard the shortness of speeches complained of. Indeed, he should not be surprised if the people would got up remonstrances against lengthy speeches in Congress."

With respect to the defiance, Mr. Clay returned it, and declared his determination to bring forward the measure.

"With regard to the intimation of the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. CALHOUN], he understood him and his course perfectly well, and told him and his friends that, for himself, he knew not how his friends would act; he was ready at any moment to bring forward and support a measure which should give to the majority the control of the business of the Senate of the United States. Let them denounce it as much as they pleased in advance: unmoved by any of their denunciations and threats, standing firm in the support of the interests which he believed the country demands, for one, he was ready for the adoption of a rule which would place the business of the Senate under the control of a majority of the Senate."

Mr. Clay was now committed to bring forward the measure; and was instantly and defyingly invited to do so.

"Mr. CALHOUN said there was no doubt of the senator's predilection for a gag law. Let him bring on that measure as soon as ever he pleases.

"Mr. BENTON. Come on with it."

Without waiting for any thing further from Mr. Clay, Mr. Calhoun proceeded to show him, still further, how little his threat was heeded and taunted him with wishing to revive the spirit of the alien and sedition laws:

"Mr. CALHOUN said it must be admitted that if the senator was not acting on the federal side, he would find it hard to persuade the American people of the fact, by showing them his love of gag laws, and strong disposition to silence both the national councils and the press. Did he not remember something about an alien and sedition law, and can he fail to perceive the relationship with the measure he contemplates to put down debate here? What is the difference, in principle, between his gag law and the alien and sedition law? We are gravely told that the speaking of the representatives of the people, which is to convey to them full information on the subjects of legislation in their councils, is worse than useless, and must be abated. Who consumed the time of last Congress in long speeches, vexatious and frivolous attempts to embarrass and thwart the business of the country, and useless opposition, tending to no end but that out of doors, the presidential election? Who but the senator and his party, then in the minority? But now, when they are in the majority, and the most important measures ever pressed forward together in one session, he is the first to threaten a gag law, to choke off debate, and deprive the minority even of the poor privilege of entering their protest."

Of all the members of the Senate, one of the mildest and most amicable--one of the gentlest language, and firmest purpose--was Dr. Linn, of Missouri. The temper of the minority senators may be judged by the tone and tenor of his remarks.

"He (Mr. LINN) would for his part, make a few remarks here, and in doing so he intended to be as pointed as possible, for he had now, he found, to contend for liberty of speech; and while any of that liberty was left, he would give his remarks the utmost bounds consistent with his own sense of what was due to himself, his constituents, and the country. The whigs, during the late administration, had brought to bear a system of assault against the majority in power, which might justly be characterized as frivolous and vexatious, and nothing else; yet they had always been treated by the majority with courtesy and forbearance; and the utmost latitude of debate had been allowed them without interruption. In a session of six months, they consumed the greater part of the time in speeches for electioneering effect, so that only twenty-eight bills were passed. These electioneering speeches, on all occasions that could be started, whether the presentation of a petition, motion, or a resolution, or discussion of a bill, were uniformly and studiously of the most insulting character to the majority, whose mildest form of designation was "collar men;" and other epithets equally degrading. How often had it been said of the other branch of Congress, "What could be expected from a House so constituted?" Trace back the course of that party, step by step, to 1834, and it may be tracked in blood. The outrages in New York in that year are not forgotten. The fierce and fiendish spirit of strife and usurpation which prompted the seizure of public arms, to turn them against those who were their fellow-citizens, is yet fresh as ever, and ready to win its way to what it aims at. What was done then, under the influence and shadow of the great money power, may be done again. He (Mr. LINN) had marked them, and nothing should restrain him from doing his duty and standing up in the front rank of opposition to keep them from the innovations they meditated. Neither the frown nor menace of any leader of that party--no lofty bearing, or shaking of the mane--would deter him from the fearless and honest discharge of those obligations which were due to his constituents and to the country. He next adverted to the conduct of the whig party when the sub-treasury was under discussion, and reminded the present party in power of the forbearance with which they had been treated, contrasting that treatment with the manifestations now made to the minority. We are now, said Mr. Linn in conclusion, to be checked; but I tell the senator from Kentucky, and any other senator who chooses to tread in his steps, that he is about to deal a double handed game at which two can play. He is welcome to try his skill. But I would expect that some on that side are not prepared to go quite so far; and that there is yet among them sufficient liberality to counterbalance political feeling, and induce them not to object to our right of spending as much time in trying to improve their bill as they have taken themselves to clip and pare and shape it to their own fancies."

Here this irritating point rested for the day--and for three days, when it was revived by the reproaches and threats of Mr. Clay against the minority.

"The House (he said) had been treading on the heels of the Senate, and at last had got the start of it a long way in advance of the business of this session. The reason was obvious. The majority there is for action, and has secured it. Some change was called for in this chamber. The truth is that the minority here control the action of the Senate, and cause all the delay of the public business. They obstruct the majority in the dispatch of all business of importance to the country, and particularly those measures which the majority is bound to give to the country without further delay. Did not this reduce the majority to the necessity of adopting some measure which would place the control of the business of the session in their hands? It was impossible to do without it: it must be resorted to."

To this Mr. Calhoun replied:

"The senator from Kentucky tells the Senate the other House has got before it. How has the other House got before the Senate? By a despotic exercise of the power of a majority. By destroying the liberties of the people in gagging their representatives. By preventing the minority from its free exercise of its right of remonstrance. This is the way the House has got before the Senate. And now there was too much evidence to doubt that the Senate was to be made to keep up with the House by the same means."

Mr. Clay, finding such undaunted opposition to the hour rule, replied in a way to let it be seen that the threat of that rule was given up, and that a measure of a different kind, but equally effective, was to be proposed; and would be certainly adopted. He said:

"If he did not adopt the same means which had proved so beneficial in the other House, he would have something equally efficient to offer. He had no doubt of the cheerful adoption of such a measure when it should come before the Senate. So far from the rule being condemned, he would venture to say that it would be generally approved. It was the means of controlling the business, abridging long and unnecessary speeches, and would be every way hailed as one of the greatest improvements of the age."

This glimpse of another measure, confirmed the minority in the belief of what they had heard--that several whig senators had refused to go with Mr. Clay for the hour rule, and forced him to give it up; but they had agreed to go for the previous question, which he held to be equally effective; and was, in fact, more so--as it cut off debate at any moment. It was just as offensive as the other. Mr. King, of Alabama, was the first to meet the threat, under this new form, and the Register of Debates shows this scene:

"Mr. King said the senator from Kentucky complained of three weeks and a half having been lost in amendments to his bill. Was not the senator aware that it was himself and his friends had consumed most of that time? But now that the minority had to take it up, the Senate is told there must be a gag law. Did he understand that it was the intention of the senator to introduce that measure?

"Mr. CLAY. I will, sir; I will!

"Mr. KING. I tell the senator, then, that he may make his arrangements at his boarding-house for the winter.

"Mr. CLAY. Very well, sir.

"Mr. KING was truly sorry to see the honorable senator so far forgetting what is due to the Senate, as to talk of coercing it by any possible abridgment of its free action. The freedom of debate had never yet been abridged in that body, since the foundation of this government. Was it fit or becoming, after fifty years of unrestrained liberty, to threaten it with a gag law? He could tell the senator that, peaceable a man as he (Mr. KING) was, whenever it was attempted to violate that sanctuary, he, for one, would resist that attempt even unto the death."

The issue was now made up, and the determination on both sides declared--on the part of Mr. Clay, speaking in the name of his party, to introduce the previous question in the Senate, for the purpose of cutting off debate and amendments; on the part of the minority, to resist the rule--not only its establishment, but its execution. This was a delicate step, and required justification before the public, before a scene of resistance to the execution--involving disorder, and possibly violence--should come on. The scheme had been denounced, and defied; but the ample reasons against it had not been fully stated; and it was deemed best that a solid foundation of justification for whatever might happen, should be laid beforehand in a reasoned and considered speech. The author of this View, was required to make that speech; and for that purpose followed Mr. King.

"Mr. Benton would take this opportunity to say a word on this menace, so often thrown out, of a design to stifle debate, and stop amendments to bills in this chamber. He should consider such an attempt as much a violation of the constitution, and of the privileges of the chamber, as it would be for a military usurper to enter upon us, at the head of his soldiery, and expel us from our seats.

"It is not in order, continued Mr. B.--it is not in order, and would be a breach of the privilege of the House of Representatives, to refer to any thing which may have taken place in that House. My business is with our own chamber, and with the threat which has so often been uttered on this floor, during this extra session, of stifling debate, and cutting off amendments, by the introduction of the previous question.

"With respect to debates, senators have a constitutional right to speak; and while they speak to the subject before the House, there is no power any where to stop them. It is a constitutional right. When a member departs from the question, he is to be stopped: it is the duty of the Chair--your duty, Mr. President, to stop him--and it is the duty of the Senate to sustain you in the discharge of this duty. We have rules for conducting the debates, and these rules only require to be enforced in order to make debates decent and instructive in their import, and brief and reasonable in their duration. The government has been in operation above fifty years, and the freedom of debate has been sometimes abused, especially during the last twelve years, when those out of power made the two houses of Congress the arena of political and electioneering combat against the democratic administration in power. The liberty of debate was abused during this time; but the democratic majority would not impose gags and muzzles on the mouths of the minority; they would not stop their speeches; considering, and justly considering, that the privilege of speech was inestimable and inattackable--that some abuse of it was inseparable from its enjoyment--and that it was better to endure a temporary abuse than to incur a total extinction of this great privilege.

"But, sir, debate is one thing, and amendments another. A long speech, wandering off from the bill, is a very different thing from a short amendment, directed to the texture of the bill itself, and intended to increase its beneficial, or to diminish its prejudicial action. These amendments are the point to which I now speak, and to the nature of which I particularly invoke the attention of the Senate.

"By the constitution of the United States, each bill is to receive three readings, and each reading represents a different stage of proceeding, and a different mode of action under it. The first reading is for information only; it is to let the House know what the bill is for, what its contents are; and then neither debate nor amendment is expected, and never occurs, except in extraordinary cases. The second reading is for amendments and debate, and this reading usually takes place in Committee of the Whole in the House of Representatives, and in quasi committee in the Senate. The third reading, after the bill is engrossed, is for passage; and then it cannot be amended, and is usually voted upon with little or no debate. Now, it is apparent that the second reading of the bill is the important one--that it is the legislative--the law-making--reading; the one at which the collective wisdom of the House is concentrated upon it, to free it from defects, and to improve it to the utmost--to illustrate its nature, and trace its consequences. The bill is drawn up in a committee; or it is received from a department in the form of a projet de loi, and reported by a committee; or it is the work of a single member, and introduced on leave. The bill, before perfected by amendments, is the work of a committee, or of a head of a department, or of a single member; and if amendments are prevented, then the legislative power of the House is annihilated; the edict of a secretary, of a committee, or of a member, becomes the law; and the collected and concentrated wisdom and experience of the House has never been brought to bear upon it.

"The previous question cuts off amendments; and, therefore, neither in England nor in the United States, until now, in the House of Representatives, has that question ever been applied to bills in Committee of the Whole, on the second reading. This question annihilates legislation, sets at nought the wisdom of the House, and expunges the minority. It is always an invidious question, but seldom enforced in England, and but little used in the earlier periods of our own government. It has never been used in the Senate at all, never at any stage of the bill; in the House of Representatives it has never been used on the second reading of a bill, in Committee of the Whole, until the present session--this session, so ominous in its call and commencement, and which gives daily proof of its alarming tendencies, and of its unconstitutional, dangerous, and corrupting measures. The previous question has never yet been applied in this chamber; and to apply it now, at this ominous session, when all the old federal measures of fifty years ago are to be conglomerated into one huge and frightful mass, and rushed through by one convulsive effort; to apply it now, under such circumstances, is to muzzle the mouths, to gag the jaws, and tie up the tongues of those whose speeches would expose the enormities which cannot endure the light, and present to the people these ruinous measures in the colors in which they ought to be seen.

"The opinion of the people is invoked--they are said to be opposed to long speeches, and in favor of action. But, do they want action without deliberation, without consideration, without knowing what we are doing? Do they want bills without amendments--without examination of details--without a knowledge of their effect and operation when they are passed? Certainly the people wish no such thing. They want nothing which will not bear discussion. The people are in favor of discussion, and never read our debates with more avidity than at this ominous and critical extraordinary session. But I can well conceive of those who are against those debates, and want them stifled. Old sedition law federalism is against them: the cormorants who are whetting their bills for the prey which the acts of this session are to give them, are against them: and the advocates of these acts, who cannot answer these arguments, and who shelter weakness under dignified silence, they are all weary, sick and tired of a contest which rages on one side only, and which exposes at once the badness of their cause and the defeat of its defenders. Sir, this call for action! action! action! (as it was well said yesterday), comes from those whose cry is, plunder! plunder! plunder!

"The previous question, and the old sedition law, are measures of the same character, and children of the same parents, and intended for the same purposes. They are to hide light--to enable those in power to work in darkness--to enable them to proceed unmolested--and to permit them to establish ruinous measures without stint, and without detection. The introduction of this previous question into this body, I shall resist as I would resist its conversion into a bed of justice--Lit de Justice--of the old French monarchy, for the registration of royal edicts. In these beds of justice--the Parliament formed into a bed of justice--the kings before the revolution, caused their edicts to be registered without debate, and without amendment. The king ordered it, and it was done--his word became law. On one occasion, when the Parliament was refractory, Louis XIV. entered the chamber, booted and spurred--a whip in his hand--a horsewhip in his hand--and stood on his feet until the edict was registered. This is what has been done in the way of passing bills without debate or amendment, in France. But, in extenuation of this conduct of Louis the XIV., it must be remembered that he was a very young man when he committed this indiscretion, more derogatory to himself than to the Parliament which was the subject of the indignity. He never repeated it in his riper age, for he was a gentleman as well as a king, and in a fifty years' reign never repeated that indiscretion of his youth. True, no whips may be brought into our legislative halls to enforce the gag and the muzzle, but I go against the things themselves--against the infringement of the right of speech--and against the annihilation of our legislative faculties by annihilating the right of making amendments. I go against these; and say that we shall be nothing but a bed of justice for the registration of presidential, or partisan, or civil chieftain edicts, when debates and amendments are suppressed in this body.

"Sir, when the previous question shall be brought into this chamber--when it shall be applied to our bills in our quasi committee--I am ready to see my legislative life terminated. I want no seat here when that shall be the case. As the Romans held their natural lives, so do I hold my political existence. The Roman carried his life on the point of his sword; and when that life ceased to be honorable to himself, or useful to his country, he fell upon his sword, and died. This made of that people the most warlike and heroic nation of the earth. What they did with their natural lives, I am willing to do with my legislative and political existence: I am willing to terminate it, either when it shall cease to be honorable to myself, or useful to my country; and that I feel would be the case when this chamber, stripped of its constitutional freedom, shall receive the gag and muzzle of the previous question."

Mr. Clay again took the floor. He spoke mildly, and coaxingly--reminded the minority of their own course when in power--gave a hint about going into executive business--but still felt it his duty to give the majority the control of the public business, notwithstanding the threatened resistance of the minority.

"He (Mr. CLAY) would, however, say that after all, he thought the gentlemen on the other side would find it was better to go on with the public business harmoniously and good humoredly together, and all would get along better. He would remind the gentlemen of their own course when in power, and the frequent occasions on which the minority then acted with courtesy in allowing their treasury note bills to pass, and on various other occasions. He thought it was understood that they were to go into executive session, and afterwards take up the loan bill. He should feel it his duty to take measures to give the majority the control of the business, maugre all the menaces that had been made."

Here was a great change of tone, and the hint about going into executive business was a sign of hesitation, faintly counterbalanced by the reiteration of his purpose under a sense of duty. It was still the morning hour--the hour for motions, before the calendar was called: the hour for the motion he had been expected to make. That motion was evidently deferred. The intimation of going into executive business, was a surprise. Such business was regularly gone into towards the close of the day's session--after the day's legislative work was done; and this course was never departed from except in emergent cases--cases which would consume a whole day, or could not wait till evening: and no such cases were known to exist at present. This was a pause, and losing a day in the carrying along of those very measures, for hastening which the new rule was wanted. Mr. Calhoun, to take advantage of the hesitation which he perceived, and to increase it, by daring the threatened measure, instantly rose. He was saluted with cries that "the morning hour was out:" "not yet!" said he: "it lacks one minute of it; and I avail myself of that minute:" and then went on for several minutes.

"He thought this business closely analogous to the alien and sedition laws. Here was a palpable attempt to infringe the right of speech. He would tell the senator that the minority had rights under the constitution which they meant to exercise, and let the senator try when he pleased to abridge those rights, he would find it no easy job. When had that (our) side of the Senate ever sought to protract discussion unnecessarily? [Cries of 'never! never!'] Where was there a body that had less abused its privileges? If the gag-law was attempted to be put in force, he would resist it to the last. As judgment had been pronounced, he supposed submission was expected. The unrestrained liberty of speech, and freedom of debate, had been preserved in the Senate for fifty years. But now the warning was given that the yoke was to be put on it which had already been placed on the other branch of Congress. There never had been a body in this or any other country, in which, for such a length of time, so much dignity and decorum of debate had been maintained. It was remarkable for the fact, the range of discussion was less discursive than in any other similar body known. Speeches were uniformly confined to the subject under debate. There could be no pretext for interference. There was none but that of all despotisms. He would give the senator from Kentucky notice to bring on his gag measure as soon as he pleased. He would find it no such easy matter as he seemed to think."

Mr. Linn, of Missouri, rose the instant Mr. Calhoun stopped, and inquired of the Chair if the morning hour was out. The president pro tempore answered that it was. Mr. Linn said, he desired to say a few words. The chair referred him to the Senate, in whose discretion it was, to depart from the rule. Mr. Linn appealed to the Senate: it gave him leave: and he stood up and said:

"It was an old Scottish proverb, that threatened people live longest. He hoped the liberties of the Senate would yet outlive the threats of the senator from Kentucky. But, if the lash was to be applied, he would rather it was applied at once, than to be always threatened with it. There is great complaint of delay; but who was causing the delay now growing out of this threat? Had it not been made, there would be no necessity for repelling it. He knew of no disposition on the part of his friends to consume the time that ought to be given to the public business. He had never known his friends, while in the majority, to complain of discussion. He knew very well, and could make allowances, that the senator from Kentucky was placed in a very trying situation. He knew, also, that his political friends felt themselves to be in a very critical condition. If he brought forward measures that were questionable, he had to encounter resistance. But he was in the predicament that he had pledged himself to carry those measures, and, if he did not, it would be his political ruin. He had every thing on the issue, hence his impatience to pronounce judgment against the right of the minority to discuss his measures."

Mr. Clay interrupted Mr. Linn, to say that he had not offered to pronounce judgment. Mr. Linn gave his words "that if the Senate was disposed to do as he thought it ought to do, they would adopt the same rule as the other House." Mr. Clay admitted the words; and Mr. Linn claimed their meaning as pronouncing judgment on the duty of the Senate, and said:

"Very well; if the senator was in such a critical condition as to be obliged to say he cannot get his measures through without cutting off debates, why does he not accept the proposition of taking the vote on his bank bill on Monday? If he brings forward measures that have been battled against successfully for a quarter of a century, is it any wonder that they should be opposed, and time should be demanded to discuss them? The senator is aware that whiggery is dying off in the country, and that there is no time to be lost: unless he and his friends pass these measures they are ruined. All he should say to him was, pass them if he could. If, in order to do it, he is obliged to come on with his gag law, he (Mr. LINN) would say to his friends, let them meet him like men. He was not for threatening, but if he was obliged to meet the crisis, he would do it as became him."

Mr. Berrien, apparently acting on the hint of Mr. Clay, moved to go into the consideration of executive business. A question of order was raised upon that motion by Mr. Calhoun. The Chair decided in its favor. Mr. Calhoun demanded what was the necessity for going into executive business? Mr. Berrien did not think it proper to discuss that point: so the executive session was gone into: and when it was over, the Senate adjourned for the day.

Here, then, was a day lost for such pressing business--the bill, which was so urgent, and the motion, which was intended to expedite it. Neither of them touched: and the omission entirely the fault of the majority. There was evidently a balk. This was the 15th of July. The 16th came, and was occupied with the quiet transaction of business: not a word said about the new rules. The 17th came, and as soon as the Senate met, Mr. Calhoun took the floor; and after presenting some resolutions from a public meeting in Virginia, condemning the call of the extra session, and all its measures, he passed on to correct an erroneous idea that had got into the newspapers, that he himself, in 1812, at the declaration of war against Great Britain, being acting chairman of the committee of foreign relations, who had reported the war bill, had stifled discussion--had hurried the bill through, and virtually gagged the House. He gave a detail of circumstances, which showed the error of this report--that all the causes of war had been discussed before--that there was nothing new to be said, nor desire to speak: and that, for one hour before the vote was taken, there was a pause in the House, waiting for a paper from the department; and no one choosing to occupy any part of it with a speech, for or against the war, or on any subject. He then gave a history of the introduction of the previous question into the House of Representatives.

"It had been never used before the 11th Congress (1810-12). It was then adopted, as he always understood, in consequence of the abuse of the right of debate by Mr. Gardinier of New York, remarkable for his capacity for making long speeches. He could keep the floor for days. The abuse was considered so great, that the previous question was introduced to prevent it; but so little was it in favor with those who felt themselves forced to adopt it, that he would venture to say without having looked at the journals, that it was not used half a dozen times during the whole war, with a powerful and unscrupulous opposition, and that in a body nearly two-thirds the size of the present House. He believed he might go farther, and assert that it was never used but twice during that eventful period. And now, a measure introduced under such pressing circumstances, and so sparingly used, is to be made the pretext for introducing the gag-law into the Senate, a body so much smaller, and so distinguished for the closeness of its debate and the brevity of its discussion. He would add that from the first introduction of the previous question into the House of Representatives, his impression was that it was not used but four times in seventeen years, that is from 1811 to 1828, the last occasion on the passage of the tariff bill. He now trusted that he had repelled effectually the attempt to prepare the country for the effort to gag the Senate, by a reference to the early history of the previous question in the other House."

Mr. Calhoun then referred to a decision made by Mr. Clay when Speaker of the House, and the benefit of which he claimed argumentatively. Mr. Clay disputed his recollection: Mr. Calhoun reiterated. The senators became heated, Mr. Clay calling out from his seat--"No, sir, No!"--and Mr. Calhoun answering back as he stood--"Yes, sir, yes:" and each giving his own version of the circumstance without convincing the other. He then returned to the point of irritation--the threatened gag;--and said:

"The senator from Kentucky had endeavored to draw a distinction between the gag law and the old sedition law. He (Mr. Calhoun) admitted there was a distinction--the modern gag law was by far the most odious. The sedition law was an attempt to gag the people in their individual character, but the senator's gag was an attempt to gag the representatives of the people, selected as their agents to deliberate, discuss, and decide on the important subjects intrusted by them to this government."

This was a taunt, and senators looked to see what would follow. Mr. Clay rose, leisurely, and surveying the chamber with a pleasant expression of countenance, said:

"The morning had been spent so very agreeably, that he hoped the gentlemen were in a good humor to go on with the loan bill, and afford the necessary relief to the Treasury."

The loan bill was then taken up, and proceeded with in a most business style, and quite amicably. And this was the last that was heard of the hour rule, and the previous question in the Senate: and the secret history of their silent abandonment was afterwards fully learnt. Several whig senators had yielded assent to Mr. Clay's desire for the hour rule under the belief that it would only be resisted parliamentarily by the minority; but when they saw its introduction was to produce ill blood, and disagreeable scenes in the chamber, they withdrew their assent; and left him without the votes to carry it: and that put an end to the project of the hour rule. The previous question was then agreed to in its place, supposing the minority would take it as a "compromise;" but when they found this measure was to be resisted like the former, and was deemed still more odious, hurtful and degrading, they withdrew their assent again: and then Mr. Clay, brought to a stand again for want of voters, was compelled to forego his design; and to retreat from it in the manner which has been shown. He affected a pleasantry, but was deeply chagrined, and the more so for having failed in the House where he acted in person, after succeeding in the other where he acted vicariously. Many of his friends were much dissatisfied. One of them said to me: "He gives your party a great deal of trouble, and his own a great deal more." Thus, the firmness of the minority in the Senate--it may be said, their courage, for their intended resistance contemplated any possible extremity--saved the body from degradation--constitutional legislation from suppression--the liberty of speech from extinction, and the honor of republican government from a disgrace to which the people's representatives are not subjected in any monarchy in Europe. The previous question has not been called in the British House of Commons in one hundred years--and never in the House of Peers.

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Chapter LXX

BILL FOR THE RELIEF OF MRS. HARRISON, WIDOW OF THE LATE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Such was the title of the bill which was brought into the House of Representatives for an indemnity, as it was explained to be, to the family of the late President for his expenses in the presidential election, and in removing to the seat of government. The bill itself was in these words: "That the Secretary of the Treasury pay, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to Mrs. Harrison, widow of William Henry Harrison, late President of the United States, or in the event of her death before payment, to the legal representatives of the said William Henry Harrison, the sum of $25,000." Mr. John Quincy Adams, as reporter of the bill from the select committee to which had been referred that portion of the President's message relating to the family of his predecessor, explained the motives on which the bill had been founded; and said:

"That this sum ($25,000), as far as he understood, was in correspondence with the prevailing sentiment of the joint committee raised on this subject, and of which the gentleman now in the chair had been a member. There had been some difference of opinion among the members of the committee as to the sum which it would be proper to appropriate, and, also, on the part of one or two gentlemen as to the constitutionality of the act itself in any shape. There had been more objection to the constitutionality than there had been as to the sum proposed. So far as there had been any discussion in the committee, it seemed to be the general sense of those composing it, that some provision ought to be made for the family of the late President, not in the nature of a grant, but as an indemnity for actual expenses incurred by himself first, when a candidate for the presidency. It had been observed in the committee, and it must be known to all members of the House, that, in the situation in which General Harrison had been placed--far from the seat of government, and for eighteen months or two years, while a candidate for the presidency, exposed to a heavy burden of expense which he could not possibly avoid--it was no more than equitable that he should, to a reasonable degree, be indemnified. He had been thus burdened while in circumstances not opulent; but, on the contrary, it had been one ground on which he had received so decided proof of the people's favor, that through a long course of public service he remained poor, which was in itself a demonstrative proof that he had remained pure also. Such had been his condition before leaving home to travel to the seat of government. After his arrival here, he had been exposed to another considerable burden of expense, far beyond any amount he had received from the public purse during the short month he had continued to be President. His decease had left his family in circumstances which would be much improved by this act of justice done to him by the people, through their representatives. The feeling was believed to be very general throughout the country, and without distinction of party, in favor of such a measure."

This bill, on account of its principle, gave rise to a vehement opposition on the part of some members who believed they saw in it a departure from the constitution, and the establishment of a dangerous precedent. Mr. Payne, of Alabama, said:

"As he intended to vote against this proposition it was due to himself to state the reasons which would actuate him. In doing so he was not called to examine either the merits or demerits of General Harrison. They had nothing to do with the question. The question before the House was, not whether General Harrison was or was not a meritorious individual, but whether that House would make an appropriation to his widow and descendants. That being the question, the first inquiry was, had the House a right to vote this money, and, if they had, was it proper to do so? Mr. P. was one of those who believed that Congress had no constitutional right to appropriate the public money for such an object. He quoted the language of the constitution, and then inquired whether this was an appropriation to pay the debts of the Union, to secure the common defence, or to promote the general welfare? He denied that precedents ever ought to be considered as settling a constitutional question. If they could, then the people had no remedy. It was not pretended that this money was to be given as a reward for General Harrison's public services, but to reimburse him for the expense of an electioneering campaign. This was infinitely worse."

Mr. Gilmer, of Virginia, said:

"When he had yesterday moved for the rising of the committee, he had not proposed to himself to occupy much of the time of the House in debate, nor was such his purpose at present. With every disposition to vote for this bill, he had then felt, and he still felt, himself unable to give it his sanction, and that for reasons which had been advanced by many of the advocates in its favor. This was not a place to indulge feeling and sympathy: if it were, he presumed there would be but one sentiment throughout that House and throughout the country, and that would be in favor of the bill. If this were an act of generosity, if the object were to vote a bounty, a gratuity, to the widow or relatives of the late President, it seemed to Mr. G. that they ought not to vote it in the representative capacity, out of the public funds, but privately from their own personal resources. They had no right to be generous with the money of the people. Gentlemen might bestow as much out of their own purses as they pleased; but they were here as trustees for the property of others, and no public agent was at liberty to disregard the trust confided to him under the theory of our government. It was quite needless here to attempt an eulogy on the character of the illustrious dead: history has done and would hereafter do ample justice to the civil and military character of William Henry Harrison. The result of the recent election, a result unparalleled in the annals of this country, spoke the sentiment of the nation in regard to his merits, while the drapery of death which shrouded the legislative halls, the general gloom which overspread the nation, spoke that sentiment in accents mournfully impressive. But those rhapsodies in which gentlemen had indulged, might, he thought, better be deferred for some Fourth of July oration, or at least reserved for other theatres than this. They had come up here not to be generous, but to be just. His object now was to inquire whether they could not place this bill on the basis of indisputable justice, so that it might not be carried by a mere partial vote, but might conciliate the support of gentlemen of all parties, and from every quarter of the Union. He wished, if possible, to see the whole House united, so as to give to their act the undivided weight of public sentiment. Mr. G. said he could not bow to the authority of precedent; he should ever act under the light of the circumstances which surrounded him. His wish was, not to furnish an evil precedent to others by his example. He thought the House in some danger of setting one of that character; a precedent which might hereafter be strained and tortured to apply to cases of a very different kind, and objects of a widely different character. He called upon the advocates of the bill to enable all the members of the House, or as nearly all as was practicable (for, after what had transpired yesterday, he confessed his despair of seeing the House entirely united), to agree in voting for the bill."

There was an impatient majority in the House in favor of the passage of the bill, and to that impatience Mr. Gilmer referred as making despair of any unanimity in the House, or of any considerate deliberation. The circumstances were entirely averse to any such deliberation--a victorious party, come into power after a most heated election, seeing their elected candidate dying on the threshold of his administration, poor, and beloved: it was a case for feeling more than of judgment, especially with the political friends of the deceased--but few of whom could follow the counsels of the head against the impulsions of the heart. Amongst these few Mr. Gilmer was one, and Mr. Underwood of Kentucky, another; who said:

"His heart was on one side and his judgment upon the other. If this was a new case, he might be led away by his heart; but as he had heretofore, in his judgment, opposed all such claims he should do so now. He gave his reasons thus at large, because a gentleman from Indiana, on the other side of the House, denounced those who should vote against the bill. He objected, because it was retroactive in its provisions, and because it called into existence legislative discretion, and applied it to past cases--because it provided for the widow of a President for services rendered by her husband while in office, thus increasing the President's compensation after his death. If it applied to the widow of the President, it applied to the widows of military officers. He considered if this bill passed, that Mr. Jefferson's heirs might with equal propriety claim the same compensation."

If the House had been in any condition for considerate legislation there was an amendment proposed by Mr. Gordon of New York, which might have brought it forth. He proposed an indemnity equal to the amount of one quarter's salary, $6,250. He proposed it, but got but little support for his proposition, the majority calling for the question, and some declaring themselves for $50,000, and some for $100,000. The vote was taken, and showed 66 negatives, comprehending the members who were best known to the country as favorable to a strict construction of the constitution, and an economical administration of the government. The negatives were:

Archibald H. Arrington, Charles G. Atherton, Linn Banks, Henry W. Beeson, Linn Boyd, David P. Brewster, Aaron V. Brown, Charles Brown, Edmund Burke, William O. Butler, Green W. Caldwell, Patrick C. Caldwell, John Campbell, George B. Cary, Reuben Chapman, Nathan Clifford, James G. Clinton, Walter Coles, John R. J. Daniel, Richard D. Davis, William Doan, Andrew W. Doig, Ira A. Eastman, John C. Edwards, Joseph Egbert, John G. Floyd, Charles A. Floyd, James Gerry, William O. Goode, Samuel Gordon, Amos Gustine, William A. Harris, Samuel L. Hays, George W. Hopkins, Jacob Houck, jr., Edmund W. Hubard, Robert M. T. Hunter, Cave Johnson, John W. Jones, George M. Keim, Andrew Kennedy, Joshua A. Lowell, Abraham McClellan, Robert McClellan, James J. McKay, Albert G. Marchand, Alfred Marshall, John Thompson Mason, James Mathews, William Medill, John Miller, Peter Newhard, William W. Payne, Francis W. Pickens, Arnold Plumer, John R. Reding, James Rogers, Romulus M. Saunders, Tristram Shaw, John Snyder, Lewis Steenrod, Hopkins L. Turney, Joseph R. Underwood, Harvey M. Watterson, John B. Weller, James W. Williams.

Carried to the Senate for its concurrence, the bill continued to receive there a determined opposition from a considerable minority. Mr. Calhoun said:

"He believed no government on earth leaned more than ours towards all the corruptions of an enormous pension list. Not even the aristocratic government of Great Britain has a stronger tendency to it than this government. This is no new thing. It was foreseen from the beginning, and the great struggle then was, to keep out the entering wedge. He recollected very well, when he was at the head of the War Department, and the military pension bill passed, that while it was under debate, it was urged as a very small matter--only an appropriation of something like $150,000 to poor and meritorious soldiers of the Revolution, who would not long remain a burden on the Treasury. Small as the sum was, and indisputable as were the merits of the claimants, it was with great difficulty the bill passed. Why was this difficulty--this hesitation on such an apparently irresistible claim? Because it was wisely argued, and with a spirit of prophecy since fulfilled, that it would prove an entering wedge, which, once admitted, would soon rend the pillar of democracy. And what has been the result of that trifling grant? It is to be found in the enormous pension list of this government at the present day.

"He asked to have any part of the Constitution pointed out in which there was authority for making such an appropriation as this. If the authority exists in the Constitution at all, it exists to a much greater extent than has yet been acted upon, and it is time to have the fact known. If the Constitution authorizes Congress to make such an appropriation as this for a President of the United States, it surely authorizes it to make an appropriation of like nature for a doorkeeper of the Senate of the United States, or for any other officer of the government. There can be no distinction drawn. Pass this act, and the precedent is established for the family of every civil officer in the government to be placed on the pension list. Is not this the consummation of the tendency so long combated? But the struggle is in vain--there is not, he would repeat, a government on the face of the earth, in which there is such a tendency to all the corruptions of an aristocratic pension list as there is in this."

Mr. Woodbury said:

"This was the first instance within his (Mr. W.'s) knowledge, of an application to pension a civil officer being likely to succeed; and a dangerous innovation, he felt convinced, it would prove. Any civil officer, by the mere act of taking possession of his office for a month, ought to get his salary for a year, on the reasoning adopted by the senator from Delaware, though only performing a month's service. If that can be shown to be right, he (Mr. W.) would go for this, and all bills of the kind. But it must first be shown satisfactorily. If this lady was really poor, there would be some plea for sympathy, at least. But he could point to hundreds who have that claim, and not on account of civil, but military service, who yet have obtained no such grant, and never will. He could point to others in the civil service, who had gone to great expense in taking possession of office and then died, but no claim of this kind was encouraged, though their widows were left in most abject poverty. All analogy in civil cases was against going beyond the death of the incumbent in allowing either salary or gratuity."

Mr. Pierce said:

"Without any feelings adverse to this claim, political or otherwise, he protested against any legislation based upon our sympathies--he protested against the power and dominion of that 'inward arbiter,' which in private life was almost sure to lead us right; but, as public men, and as the dispensers of other men's means--other men's contributions--was quite as sure to lead us wrong. It made a vast difference whether we paid the money from our own pockets, or drew it from the pockets of our constituents. He knew his weakness on this point, personally, but it would be his steady purpose, in spite of taunts and unworthy imputations, to escape from it, as the representative of others. But he was departing from the object which induced him, for a moment, to trespass upon the patience of the Senate. This claim did not come from the family. No gentleman understood on what ground it was placed. The indigence of the family had not even been urged: he believed they were not only in easy circumstances, but affluent. It was not for loss of limb, property, or life, in the military service. If for any thing legitimate, in any sense, or by any construction, it was for the civil services of the husband; and, in this respect, was a broad and dangerous precedent."

In saying that the claim did not come from the family of General Harrison, Mr. Pierce spoke the words which all knew to be true. Where then did it come from? It came, as was well known at the time, from persons who had advanced moneys to the amount of about $22,000, for the purposes mentioned in the bill; and who had a claim upon the estate to that amount.

Mr. Benton moved to recommit the bill with instructions to prefix a preamble, or insert an amendment showing upon what ground the grant was motived. The bill itself showed no grounds for the grant. It was, on its face, a simple legislative donation of money to a lady, describing her as the widow of the late President; but in no way connecting either herself, or her deceased husband, with any act or fact as the alleged ground of the grant. The grant is without consideration: the donee is merely described, to prevent the donation from going to a wrong person. It was to go to Mrs. Harrison. What Mrs. Harrison? Why, the widow of the late President Harrison. This was descriptive, and sufficiently descriptive; for it would carry the money to the right person. But why carry it? That was the question which the bill had not answered; for there is nothing in the mere fact of being the widow of a President which could entitle the widow to a sum of public money. This was felt by the reporter of the bill, and endeavored to be supplied by an explanation, that it was not a "grant" but an "indemnity;" and an indemnity for "actual expenses incurred when he was a candidate for the presidency;" and for expenses incurred after his "arrival at the seat of government;" and as "some provision for his family;" and because he was "poor." Now why not put these reasons into the bill? Was the omission oversight, or design? If oversight, it should be corrected; if design, it should be thwarted. The law should be complete in itself. It cannot be helped out by a member's speech. It was not oversight which caused the omission. The member who reported the bill is not a man to commit oversights. It was design! and because such reasons could not be put on the face of the bill! could not be voted upon by yeas and nays! and therefore must be left blank, that every member may vote upon what reasons he pleases, without being committed to any. This is not the way to legislate; and, therefore, the author of this View moved the re-commitment, with instructions to put a reason on the face of the bill itself, either in the shape of a preamble, or of an amendment--leaving the selection of the reasons to the friends of the bill, who constituted the committee to which it would be sent. Mr. Calhoun supported the motion for re-commitment, and said:

"Is it an unreasonable request to ask the committee for a specific report of the grounds on which they have recommended this appropriation? No; and the gentlemen know it is not unreasonable; but they will oppose it not on that account; they will oppose it because they know such a report would defeat their bill. It could not be sustained in the face of their own report. Not that there would be no ground assumed, but because those who now support the bill do so on grounds as different as any possibly can be; and, if the committee was fastened down to one ground, those who support the others would desert the standard."

The vote was taken on the question, and negatived. The yeas were: Messrs. Allen, Benton, Calhoun, Clay of Alabama, Fulton, King of Alabama, Linn, McRoberts, Pierce, Sevier Smith of Connecticut, Tappan, Williams of Maine, Woodbury, Wright, Young of Illinois. To the argument founded on the alleged poverty of General Harrison, Mr. Benton replied:

"Look at the case of Mr. Jefferson, a man than whom no one that ever existed on God's earth were the human family more indebted to. His furniture and his estate were sold to satisfy his creditors. His posterity was driven from house and home, and his bones now lay in soil owned by a stranger. His family are scattered; some of his descendants are married in foreign lands. Look at Monroe--the amiable, the patriotic Monroe, whose services were revolutionary, whose blood was spilt in the war of Independence, whose life was worn out in civil service, and whose estate has been sold for debt, his family scattered, and his daughter buried in a foreign land. Look at Madison, the model of every virtue, public or private, and he would only mention in connection with this subject, his love of order, his economy, and his systematic regularity in all his habits of business. He, when his term of eight years had expired, sent a letter to a gentleman (a son of whom is now upon this floor) [Mr. PRESTON], enclosing a note for five thousand dollars, which he requested him to endorse, and raise the money in Virginia, so as to enable him to leave this city, and return to his modest retreat--his patrimonial inheritance--in that State. General Jackson drew upon the consignee of his cotton crop in New Orleans for six thousand dollars to enable him to leave the seat of government without leaving creditors behind him. These were honored leaders of the republican party. They had all been Presidents. They had made great sacrifices, and left the presidency deeply embarrassed; and yet the republican party who had the power and the strongest disposition to relieve their necessities, felt they had no right to do so by appropriating money from the public Treasury. Democracy would not do this. It was left for the era of federal rule and federal supremacy--who are now rushing the country with steam power into all the abuses and corruptions of a monarchy, with its pensioned aristocracy--and to entail upon the country a civil pension list.

"To the argument founded on the expense of removing to the seat of government, Mr. Benton replied that there was something in it, and if the bill was limited to indemnity for that expense, and a rule given to go by in all cases, it might find claims to a serious consideration. Such a bill would have principle and reason in it--the same principle and the same reason which allows mileage to a member going to and returning from Congress. The member was supposed during that time to be in the public service (he was certainly out of his own service): he was at expense: and for these reasons he was allowed a compensation for his journeys. But, it was by a uniform rule, applicable to all members, and the same at each session. The same reason and principle with foreign ministers. They received an out-fit before they left home, and an in-fit to return upon. A quarter's salary, was the in-fit: the out-fit was a year's salary, because it included the expense of setting up a house after the minister arrived at his post. The President finds a furnished house on his arrival at the seat of government, so that the principle and reason of the case would not give to him, as to a minister to a foreign court, a full year's salary. The in-fit would be the proper measure; and that rule applied to the coming of the President elect, and to his going when he retires, would give him $6,250 on each occasion. For such an allowance he felt perfectly clear that he could vote as an act of justice; and nearly as clear that he could do it constitutionally. But it would have to be for a general and permanent act."

The bill was passed by a bare quorum, 28 affirmatives out of 52. The negatives were 16: so that 18 senators--being a greater number than voted against the bill--were either absent, or avoided the vote. The absentees were considered mostly of that class who were willing to see the bill pass, but not able to vote for it themselves. The yeas and nays were:

YEAS--Messrs. Barrow, Bates, Bayard, Berrien, Buchanan, Choate, Clay of Kentucky, Clayton, Dixon, Evans, Graham, Huntington, Mangum, Merrick, Miller, Morehead, Phelps, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Rives, Simmons, Smith of Indiana, Southard, Tallmadge, Walker, White, Woodbridge.

NAYS--Messrs. Allen, Benton, Calhoun, Clay of Alabama, Fulton, King, Linn, McRoberts, Nicholson, Sevier, Smith of Connecticut, Surgeon, Tappan, Williams, Woodbury, Wright, Young.

It was strenuously opposed by the stanch members of the democratic party, and elaborately resisted in a speech from the writer of this View--of which an extract is given in the next chapter.

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LXXI. MRS. HARRISON'S BILL: SPEECH OF MR. BENTON EXTRACTS

Mr. Benton said he was opposed to this bill--opposed to it on high constitutional grounds, and upon grounds of high national policy--and could not suffer it to be carried through the Senate without making the resistance to it which ought to be made against a new, dangerous, and unconstitutional measure.

It was a bill to make a grant of money--twenty-five thousand dollars--out of the common Treasury to the widow of a gentleman who had died in a civil office, that of President of the United States; and was the commencement of that system of civil pensions, and support for families, which, in the language of Mr. Jefferson, has divided England, and other European countries into two classes--the tax payers and the tax consumers--and which sends the laboring man supperless to bed.

It is a new case--the first of the kind upon our statute book--and should have been accompanied by a report from a committee, or preceded by a preamble to the bill, or interjected with a declaration, showing the reason for which this grant is made. It is a new case, and should have carried its justification along with it. But nothing of this is done. There is no report from a committee--from the two committees in fact--which sat upon the case. There is no preamble to it, setting forth the reason for the grant. There is no declaration in the body of the bill, showing the reason why this money is voted to this lady. It is simply a bill granting to Mrs. Harrison, widow of William H. Harrison, late President of the United States, the sum of $25,000. Now, all this is wrong, and contrary to parliamentary practice. Reason tells us there should be a report from a committee in such a case. In fact, we have reports every day in every case, no matter how inconsiderable, which even pays a small sum of money to an individual. It is our daily practice, and yet two committees have shrunk from that practice in this new and important case. They would not make a report, though urged to do it. I speak advisedly, for I was of the committee, and know what was done. No report could be obtained; and why? because it was difficult, if not impossible, for any committee to agree upon a reason which would satisfy the constitution, and satisfy public policy, for making this grant. Gentlemen could agree to give the money--they could agree to vote--but they could not agree upon the reason which was to be left upon the record as a justification for the gift and the vote. Being no report, the necessity became apparent for a preamble; but we have none of that. And, worse than all, in the absence of report and preamble, the bill itself is silent on the motive of the grant. It does not contain the usual clause in money bills to individuals, stating, in a few words, for what reason the grant or payment is made. All this is wrong; and I point it out now, both as an argument against the bill, and as a reason for having it recommitted, and returned with a report, or a preamble, or a declaratory clause.

We were told at the last session that a new set of books were to be opened--that the new administration would close up the old books, and open new ones; and truly we find it to be the case. New books of all kinds are opened, as foreign to the constitution and policy of the country, as they are to the former practice of the government, and to the late professions of these new patriots. Many new books are opened, some by executive and some by legislative authority; and among them is this portentous volume of civil pensions, and national recompenses, for the support of families. Military pensions we have always had, and they are founded upon a principle which the mind can understand, the tongue can tell, the constitution can recognize, and public policy can approve. They are founded upon the principle of personal danger and suffering in the cause of the country--upon the loss of life or limb in war. This is reasonable. The man who goes forth, in his country's cause, to be shot at for seven dollars a month, or for forty dollars a month, or even for one or two hundred, and gets his head or his limbs knocked off, is in a very different case from him who serves the same country at a desk or a table, with a quill or a book in his hand, who may quit his place when he sees the enemy coming; and has no occasion to die except in his tranquil and peaceful bed. The case of the two classes is wholly different, and thus far the laws of our country have recognized and maintained the difference. Military pensions have been granted from the foundation of the government--civil pensions, never; and now, for the first time, the attempt is to be made to grant them. A grant of money is to be made to the widow of a gentleman who has not been in the army for near thirty years--who has since that time, been much employed in civil service, and has lately died in a civil office. A pension, or a grant of a gross sum of money, under such circumstances, is a new proceeding under our government, and which finds no warrant in the constitution, and is utterly condemned by high considerations of public policy.

The federal constitution differs in its nature--and differs fundamentally from those of the States. The States, being original sovereignties, may do what they are not prohibited from doing; the federal government, being derivative, and carved out of the States, is like a corporation, the creature of the act which creates it, and can only do what it can show a grant for doing. Now the moneyed power of the federal government is contained in a grant from the States, and that grant authorizes money to be raised either by loans, duties or taxes, for the purpose of paying the debts, supporting the government, and providing for the common defence of the Union. These are the objects to which money may be applied, and this grant to Mrs. Harrison can come within neither of them.

But, gentlemen say this is no pension--it is not an annual payment, but a payment in hand. I say so, too, and that it is so much the more objectionable on that account. A pension must have some rule to go by--so much a month--and generally a small sum, the highest on our pension roll being thirty dollars--and it terminates in a reasonable time, usually five years, and at most for life. A pension granted to Mrs. Harrison on this principle, could amount to no great sum--to a mere fraction, at most, of these twenty-five thousand dollars. It is not a pension, then, but a gift--a gratuity--a large present--a national recompense; and the more objectionable for being so. Neither our constitution, nor the genius of our government, admits of such benefactions. National recompenses are high rewards, and require express powers to grant them in every limited government. The French Consular Constitution of the year 1799, authorized such recompenses; ours does not, and it has not yet been attempted, even in military cases. We have not yet voted a fortune to an officer's or a soldier's family, to lift them from poverty to wealth. These recompenses are worse than pensions: they are equally unfounded in the constitution, more incapable of being governed by any rule, and more susceptible of great and dangerous abuse. We have no rule to go by in fixing the amount. Every one goes by feeling--by his personal or political feeling--or by a cry got up at home, and sent here to act upon him. Hence the diversity of the opinions as to the proper sum to be given. Some gentlemen are for the amount in the bill; some are for double that amount; and some are for nothing. This diversity itself is an argument against the measure. It shows that it has no natural foundation--nothing to rest upon--nothing to go by; no rule, no measure, no standard, by which to compute or compare it. It is all guess-work--the work of the passions or policy--of faction or of party.

By our constitution, the persons who fill offices are to receive a compensation for their services; and, in many cases, this compensation is neither to be increased nor diminished during the period for which the person shall have been elected; and in some there is a prohibition against receiving presents either from foreign States, or from the United States, or from the States of the Union. The office of President comes under all these restrictions, and shows how jealous the framers of the constitution were, of any moneyed influence being brought to bear upon the Chief Magistrate of the Union. All these limitations are for obvious and wise reasons. The President's salary is not to be diminished during the time for which he was elected, lest his enemies, if they get the upper hand of him in Congress, should deprive him of his support, and starve him out of office. It is not to be increased, lest his friends, if they get the upper hand, should enrich him at the public expense; and he is not to receive "any other emolument," lest the provision against an increase of salary should be evaded by the grant of gross sums. These are the constitutional provisions; but to what effect are they, if the sums can be granted to the officer's family, which cannot be granted to himself?--if his widow--his wife--his children can receive what he cannot? In this case, the term for which General Harrison was elected, is not out. It has not expired; and Congress cannot touch his salary or bestow upon him or his, any emolument without a breach of the constitution.

It is in vain to look to general clauses of the constitution. Besides the general spirit of the instrument, there is a specific clause upon the subject of the President's salary and emoluments. It forbids him any compensation, except at stated times, for services rendered; it forbids increase or diminution; and it forbids all emolument. To give salary or emolument to his family, is a mere evasion of this clause. His family is himself--so far as property is concerned, a man's family is himself. And many persons would prefer to have money or property conveyed to his family, or some member of it, because it would then receive the destination which his will would give it, and would be free from the claims or contingencies to which his own property--that in his own name--would be subject. There is nothing in the constitution to warrant this proceeding, and there is much in it to condemn it. It is condemned by all the clauses which relate to the levy, and the application of money; and it is specially condemned by the precise clause which regulates the compensation of the President, and which clause would control any other part of the constitution which might come in conflict with it. Condemned upon the constitutional test, how stands this bill on the question of policy and expediency? It is condemned--utterly condemned, and reprobated, upon that test! The view which I have already presented of the difference between military and naval services (and I always include the naval when I speak of the military) shows that the former are proper subjects for pensions--the latter not. The very nature of the service makes the difference. Differing in principle, as the military and civil pensions do, they differ quite as much when you come to details, and undertake to administer the two classes of rewards. The military has something to go by--some limit to it--and provides for classes of individuals--not for families or for individuals--one by one. Though subject to great abuse, yet the military pensions have some limit--some boundary--to their amount placed upon them. They are limited at least to the amount of armies, and the number of wars. Our armies are small, and our wars few and far between. We have had but two with a civilized power in sixty years. Our navy, also, is limited; and compared to the mass of the population, the army and navy must be always small. Confined to their proper subjects, and military and naval pensions have limits and boundaries which confine them within some bounds; and then the law is the same for all persons of the same rank. The military and naval pensioners are not provided for individually, and therefore do not become a subject of favoritism, of party, or of faction. Not so with civil pensions. There is no limit upon them. They may apply to the family of every person civilly employed--that is, to almost every body--and this without intermission of time; for civil services go on in peace and war, and the claims for them will be eternal when once begun. Then again civil pensions and grants of money are given individually, and not by classes, and every case is governed by the feeling of the moment, and the predominance of the party to which the individual belonged. Every case is the sport of party, of faction, of favoritism; and of feelings excited and got up for the occasion. Thus it is in England, and thus it will be here. The English civil pension list is dreadful, both for the amount paid, and the nature of the services rewarded; but it required centuries for England to ripen her system. Are we to begin it in the first half century of our existence? and begin it without rule or principle to go by? Every thing to be left to impulse and favor--by the politics of the individual, his party affinities, and the political complexion of the party in power.

Gentlemen refuse to commit themselves on the record; but they have reasons; and we have heard enough, here and elsewhere, to have a glimpse of what they are. First, poverty: as if that was any reason for voting a fortune to a family, even if it was true! If it was a reason, one half of the community might be packed upon the backs of the other. Most of our public men die poor; many of them use up their patrimonial inheritances in the public service; yet, until now, the reparation of ruined fortune has not been attempted out of the public Treasury. Poverty would not do, if it was true, but here it is not true: the lady in question has a fine estate, and certainly has not applied for this money. No petition of hers is here! No letter, even, that we have heard of! So far as we know, she is ignorant of the proceeding! Certain it is, she has not applied for this grant, either on the score of poverty, or any thing else. Next, election expenses are mentioned; but that would seem to be a burlesque upon the character of our republican institutions. Certainly no candidate for the presidency ought to electioneer for it--spend money for it--and if he did, the public Treasury ought not to indemnify him. Travelling expenses coming on to the seat of government, are next mentioned; but these could be but a trifle, even if the President elect came at his own expense. But we know to the contrary. We know that the contest is for the honor of bringing him; that conveyances and entertainments are prepared; and that friends dispute for precedence in the race of lifting and helping along, and ministering to every want of the man who is so soon to be the dispenser of honor and fortune in the shape of office and contracts. Such a man cannot travel at his own expense. Finally, the fire in the roof of the west wing of the North Bend mansion has been mentioned; but Jackson had the whole Hermitage burnt to the ground when he was President, and would have scorned a gift from the public Treasury to rebuild it. Such are the reasons mentioned in debate, or elsewhere, for this grant. Their futility is apparent on their face, and is proved by the unwillingness of gentlemen to state them in a report, or a preamble, or in the body of the bill itself.

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