Chapter CXCII…

Chapter CXCII

MR. CLAY'S PLAN OF SLAVERY COMPROMISE: MR. BENTON'S SPEECH AGAINST IT: EXTRACTS.

MR. BENTON. It is a bill of thirty-nine sections--forty, save one--an ominous number; and which, with the two little bills which attend it, is called a compromise, and is pressed upon us as a remedy for the national calamities. Now, all this labor of the committee, and all this remedy, proceed upon the assumption that the people of the United States are in a miserable, distracted condition; that it is their mission to relieve this national distress, and that these bills are the sovereign remedy for that purpose. Now, in my opinion, all this is a mistake, both as to the condition of the country, the mission of the committee, and the efficacy of their remedy. I do not believe in this misery and distraction, and distress, and strife, of the people. On the contrary, I believe them to be very quiet at home, attending to their crops, such of them as do not mean to feed out of the public crib; and that they would be perfectly happy if the politicians would only permit them to think so. I know of no distress in the country, no misery, no strife, no distraction, none of those five gaping wounds of which the senator from Kentucky made enumeration on the five fingers of his left hand, and for the healing of which, all together, and all at once, and not one at a time, like the little Doctor Taylor, he has provided this capacious plaster in the shape of five old bills tacked together. I believe the senator and myself are alike, in this, that each of us has but five fingers on the left hand; and that may account for the limitation of the wounds. When the fingers gave out, they gave out; and if there had been five more fingers, there might have been more wounds--as many as fingers--and, toes also. I know nothing of all these "gaping wounds," nor of any distress in the country since we got rid of the Bank of the United States, and since we got possession of the gold currency. Since that time I have heard of no pecuniary or business distress, no rotten currency, no expansions and contractions, no deranged exchanges, no decline of public stocks, no laborers begging employment, no produce rotting upon the hands of the farmer, no property sacrificed at forced sales, no loss of confidence, no three per centum a month interest, no call for a bankrupt act. Never were the people--the business-doing and the working people--as well off as they are to-day. As for political distress, "it is all in my eye." It is all among the politicians. Never were the political blessings of the country greater than at present: civil and religious liberty eminently enjoyed; life, liberty, and property protected; the North and the South returning to the old belief that they were made for each other; and peace and plenty reigning throughout the land. This is the condition of the country--happy in the extreme; and I listen with amazement to the recitals which I have heard on this floor of strife and contention, gaping wounds and streaming blood, distress and misery. I feel mystified. The senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay), chairman of the committee, and reporter of the bill, and its pathetic advocate, formerly delivered us many such recitals, about the times that the tariff was to be increased, the national bank charter to be renewed, the deposits to be restored, or a bankrupt act to be passed. He has been absent for some years; and, on returning among us, seems to begin where he left off. He treats us to the old dish of distress! Sir, it is a mistake. There is none of it; and if there was, the remedy would be in the hands of the people--in the hearts of the people--who love their country, and mean to take care of it--and not in the contrivances of politicians, who mistake their own for their country's distresses. It is all a mistake. It looks to me like a joke. But when I recollect the imposing number of the committee, and how "distinguished" they all were, and how they voted themselves free from instructions, and allowed the Senate to talk, but not to vote, while they were out, and how long they were deliberating: when I recollect all these things, I am constrained to believe the committee are in earnest. And as for the senator himself, the chairman of the committee, the perfect gravity with which he brought forward his remedy--these bills and the report--the pathos with which he enforced them, and the hearty congratulations which he addressed to the Senate, to the United States, and all mankind on the appointment of his committee, preclude the idea of an intentional joke on his part. In view of all this, I find myself compelled to consider this proceeding as serious, and bound to treat it parliamentarily; which I now proceed to do. And, in the first place, let us see what it is the committee has done, and what it is that it has presented to us as the sovereign remedy for the national distempers, and which we are to swallow whole--in the lump--all or none--under the penalty of being treated by the organs as enemies to the country.

Here are a parcel of old bills, which have been lying upon our tables for some months, and which might have been passed, each by itself, in some good form, long ago; and which have been carried out by the committee, and brought back again, bundled into one, and altered just enough to make each one worse; and then called a compromise--where there is nothing to compromise--and supported by a report which cannot support itself. Here are the California State admission bill, reported by the committee on territories three months ago--the two territorial government bills reported by the same committee at the same time--the Texas compact bill, originated by me six years ago, and reproduced at the present session--the fugitive slave recovery bill, reported from the judiciary committee at the commencement of the session--and the slave trade suppression bill for this District of Columbia, which is nothing but a revival of an old Maryland law, in force before the District was created, and repealed by an old act of Congress. These are the batch--five bills taken from our files, altered just enough to spoil each, then tacked together, and christened a compromise, and pressed upon the Senate as a sovereign remedy for calamities which have no existence. This is the presentation of the case: and now for the case itself.

The committee has brought in five old bills, bundled into one, and requires us to pass them. Now, how did this committee get possession of these bills? I do not ask for the manual operation. I know that each senator had a copy on his table, and might carry his copy where he pleased; but these bills were in the possession of the Senate, on its calendar--for discussion, but not for decision, while the committee was out. Two sets of resolutions were referred to the committee--but not these bills. And I now ask for the law--the parliamentary law--which enables a committee to consider bills not referred to it? to alter bills not in their legal power or possession? to tack bills together which the Senate held separate on its calendar? to reverse the order of bills on the calendar? to put the hindmost before, and the foremost behind? to conjoin incongruities, and to conglomerate individualities? This is what I ask--for this is what the committee has done; and which, if a point of order was raised, might subject their bundle of bills to be ruled off the docket. Sir, there is a custom--a good-natured one--in some of our State legislatures, to convert the last day of the session into a sort of legislative saturnalia--a frolic--something like barring out the master--in which all officers are displaced, all authorities disregarded, all rules overturned, all license tolerated, and all business turned topsy-turvy. But then this is only done on the last day of the session, as a prelude to a general break-up. And the sport is harmless, for nothing is done; and it is relieved by adjournment, which immediately follows. Such license as this may be tolerated; for it is, at least, innocent sport--the mere play of those "children of a larger growth" which some poet, or philosopher, has supposed men to be. And it seems to me that our committee has imitated this play without its reason--taken the license of the saturnalia without its innocence--made grave work of their gay sport--produced a monster instead of a merry-andrew--and required us to worship what it is our duty to kill.

I proceed to the destruction of this monster. The California bill is made the scape-goat of all the sins of slavery in the United States--that California which is innocent of all these sins. It is made the scape-goat; and as this is the first instance of an American attempt to imitate that ancient Jewish mode of expiating national sins, I will read how it was done in Jerusalem, to show how exactly our committee have imitated that ancient expiatory custom. I read from an approved volume of Jewish antiquities:

"The goat being tied in the north-east corner of the court of the temple, and his head bound with scarlet cloth to signify sin; the high-priest went to him, and laid his hands on his head, and confessed over it all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins, putting them all on the head of the goat. After which, he was given to the person appointed to lead him away, who, in the early ages of the custom, led him into the desert, and turned him loose to die; but as the goat sometimes escaped from the desert, the expiation, in such cases, was not considered complete; and, to make sure of his death, the after-custom was to lead him to a high rock, about twelve miles from Jerusalem, and push him off of it backwards, to prevent his jumping, the scarlet cloth being first torn from his head, in token that the sins of the people were taken away."

This was the expiation of the scape-goat in ancient Jerusalem: an innocent and helpless animal, loaded with sins which were not his own, and made to die for offences which he had never committed. So of California. She is innocent of all the evils of slavery in the United States, yet they are all to be packed upon her back, and herself sacrificed under the heavy load. First, Utah and New Mexico are piled upon her, each pregnant with all the transgressions of the Wilmot Proviso--a double load in itself--and enough, without further weight, to bear down California. Utah and New Mexico are first piled on; and the reason given for it by the committee is thus stated in their authentic report:

"The committee recommend to the Senate the establishment of those territorial governments; and, in order more effectually to secure that desirable object, they also recommend that the bill for their establishment be incorporated in the bill for the admission of California, and that, united together, they both be passed."

This is the reason given in the report: and the first thing that strikes me, on reading it, is its entire incompatibility with the reasons previously given for the same act. In his speech in favor of raising the committee, the senator from Kentucky [Mr. Clay] was in favor of putting the territories upon California for her own good, for the good of California herself--as the speedy way to get her into the Union, and the safe way to do it, by preventing an opposition to her admission which might otherwise defeat it altogether. This was his reason then, and he thus delivered it to the Senate:

"He would say now to those who desired the speedy admission of California, the shortest and most expeditious way of attaining the desired object was to include her admission in a bill giving governments to the territories. He made this statement because he was impelled to do so from what had come to his knowledge. If her admission as a separate measure be urged, an opposition is created which may result in the defeat of any bill for her admission."

These are the reasons which the senator then gave for urging the conjunction of the State and the territories--quickest and safest for California: her admission the supreme object, and the conjunction of the territories only a means of helping her along and saving her. And, unfounded as I deemed these reasons at the time, and now know them to be, they still had the merit of giving preference where it was due--to the superior object--to California herself, a State, without being a State of the Union, and suffering all the ills of that anomalous condition. California was then the superior object: the territories were incidental figures and subordinate considerations, to be made subservient to her salvation. Now all this is reversed. The territories take the superior place. They become the object: the State the incident. They take the first--she the second place! And to make sure of their welfare--make more certain of giving governments to them--innuendo, such governments as the committee prescribe--the conjunction is now proposed and enforced. This is a change of position, with a corresponding change of reasons. Doubtless the senator from Kentucky has a right to change his own position, and to change his reasons at the same time; but he has no right to ask other senators to change with him, or to require them to believe in two sets of reasons, each contradictory to the other. It is my fortune to believe in neither. I did not believe in the first set when they were delivered; and time has shown that I was right. Time has disposed of the argument of speed. That reason has expired under the lapse of time. Instead of more speedy, we all now know that California has been delayed three months, waiting for this conjunction: instead of defeat if she remained single, we all know now that she might have been passed singly before the committee was raised, if the senator from Kentucky had remained on his original ground, on my side; and every one knows that the only danger to California now comes from the companionship into which she has been forced. I do not believe in either set of reasons. I do not admit the territorial governments to be objects of superior interest to the admission of California. I admit them to be objects of interest, demanding our attention, and that at this session; but not at the expense of California, nor in precedence of her, nor in conjunction with her, nor as a condition for her admission. She has been delayed long, and is now endangered by this attempt to couple with her the territories, with which she has no connection, and to involve her in the Wilmot Proviso question, from which she is free. The senator from Kentucky has done me the favor to blame me for this delay. He may blame me again when he beholds the catastrophe of his attempted conjunctions; but all mankind will see that the delay is the result of his own abandonment of the position which he originally took with me. The other reason which the senator gave in his speech for the conjunction is not repeated in the report--the one which addressed itself to our nervous system, and menaced total defeat to California if urged in a bill by herself. He has not renewed that argument to our fears, so portentously exhibited three months ago; and it may be supposed that that danger has passed by, and that Congress is now free. But California is not bettered by it, but worsted. Then it was only necessary to her salvation that she should be joined to the territories; so said the speech. Now she is joined to Texas also; and must be damned if not strong enough to save Texas, and Utah, and New Mexico, and herself into the bargain!

United together, the report says, the bills will be passed together. That is very well for the report. It was natural for it to say so. But, suppose they are rejected together, and in consequence of being together: what is, then, the condition of California? First, she has been delayed three months, at great damage to herself, waiting the intrusive companionship of this incongruous company. Then she is sunk under its weight. Who, then, is to blame--the senator from Kentucky or the senator from Missouri? And if opposition to this indefinite postponement shall make still further delay to California, and involve her defeat in the end, who then is to be blamed again? I do not ask these questions of the senator from Kentucky. It might be unlawful to do so: for, by the law of the land, no man is bound to criminate himself.

Mr. CLAY (from his seat). I do not claim the benefit of the law.

Mr. BENTON. No; a high-spirited man will not claim it. But the law gives him the privilege; and, as a law-abiding and generous man, I give him the benefit of the law whether he claims it or not. But I think it is time for him to begin to consider the responsibility he has incurred in quitting his position at my side for California single, and first, to jumble her up in this crowd, where she is sure to meet death, come the vote when it will. I think it is time for him to begin to think about submitting to a mis-trial! withdraw a juror, and let a venire facias de novo be issued.

But I have another objection to this new argument. The territorial government bills are now the object; and to make more certain of these bills they are put into the California bill, to be carried safe through by it. This is the argument of the report; and it is a plain declaration that one measure is to be forced to carry the other. This is a breach of parliamentary law--that law upon the existence of which the senator from Kentucky took an issue with me, and failed to maintain his side of it. True, he made a show of maintaining it--ostentatiously borrowing a couple of my books from me, in open Senate, to prove his side of the case; and taking good care not to open them, because he knew they would prove my side of it. Then he quoted that bill for the "relief of John Thompson, and for other purposes," the reading of which had such an effect upon the risible susceptibilities of that part of our spectators which Shakspeare measures by the quantity, and qualifies as barren! Sir, if the senator from Kentucky had only read us Dr. Franklin's story of John Thompson and his hat-sign, it would have been something--a thing equally pertinent as argument, and still more amusing as anecdote. The senator, by doing that much, admitted his obligation to maintain his side of the issue: by doing no more, he confessed he could not. And now the illegality of this conjunction stands confessed, with the superaddition of an avowed condemnable motive for it. The motive is--so declared in the report--to force one measure to carry the other--the identical thing mentioned in all the books as the very reason why subjects of different natures should not be tacked together. I do not repeat what I have heretofore said on this point: it will be remembered by the Senate: and its validity is now admitted by the attempt, and the failure, to contest it. It is compulsory legislation, and a flagrant breach of parliamentary law, and of safe legislation. It is also a compliment of no equivocal character to a portion of the members of this Chamber. To put two measures together for the avowed purpose of forcing one to carry the other, is to propose to force the friends of the stronger measure to take the weak one, under the penalty of losing the stronger. It implies both that these members cannot be trusted to vote fairly upon one of the measures, or that an unfair vote is wanted from them; and that they are coercible, and ought to be coerced. This is the compliment which the compulsory process implies, and which is as good as declared in this case. It is a rough compliment, but such a one as "distinguished senators"--such as composed this committee--may have the prerogative to offer to the undistinguished ones: but then these undistinguished may have the privilege to refuse to receive it--may refuse to sanction the implication, by refusing to vote as required--may take the high ground that they are not coercible, that they owe allegiance, not to the committee, but to honor and duty; and that they can trust themselves for an honest vote, in a bill by itself, although the committee cannot trust them! But, stop! Is it a government or the government which the committee propose to secure by coercion? Is it a government, such as a majority of the Senate may agree upon? or is it the government, such as a majority of the committee have prescribed? If the former, why not leave the Senate to free voting in a separate bill? if the latter, will the Senate be coerced? will it allow a majority of the committee to govern the Senate?--seven to govern sixty? Sir! it is the latter--so avowed; and being the first instance of such an avowal, it should meet a reception which would make it the last.

Mr. President: all the evils of incongruous conjunctions are exemplified in this conjunction of the territorial government bills with the California State admission bill. They are subjects not only foreign to each other, but involving different questions, and resting upon principles of different natures. One involves the slavery and anti-slavery questions: the other is free from them. One involves constitutional questions: the other does not. One is a question of right, resting upon the constitution of the United States and the treaty with Mexico: the other is a question of expediency, resting in the discretion of Congress. One is the case of a State, asking for an equality of rights with the other States: the other is a question of territories, asking protection from States. One is a sovereignty--the other a property. So that, at all points, and under every aspect, the subjects differ; and it is well known that there are senators here who can unite in a vote for the admission of California, who cannot unite in any vote for the territorial governments; and that, because these governments involve the slavery questions, from all which the California bill is free. That is the rock on which men and parties split here. Some deny the power of Congress in toto over the subject of slavery in territories: such as these can support no bill which touches that question one way or the other. Others admit the power, but deny the expediency of its exercise. Others again claim both the power and the exercise. Others again are under legislative instructions--some to vote one way, some the other. Finally, there are some opposed to giving any governments at all to these territories, and in favor of leaving them to grow up of themselves into future States. Now, what are the senators, so circumstanced, to do with these bills conjoined? Vote for all--and call it a compromise! as if oaths, duty, constitutional obligation, and legislative instructions, were subjects of compromise. No! rejection of the whole is the only course; and to begin anew, each bill by itself, the only remedy.

The conjunction of these bills illustrates all the evils of joining incoherent subjects together. It presents a revolting enormity, of which all the evils go to an innocent party, which has done all in its power to avoid them. But, not to do the Committee of Thirteen injustice, I must tell that they have looked somewhat to the interest of California in this conjunction, and proposed a compensating advantage to her; of which kind consideration they are entitled to the credit in their own words. This, then, is what they propose for her:

"As for California--far from feeling her sensibility affected by her being associated with other kindred measures--she ought to rejoice and be highly gratified that, in entering into the Union, she may have contributed to the tranquillity and happiness of the great family of States, of which it is to be hoped she may one day be a distinguished member."

This is the compensation proposed to California. She is to rejoice, and be highly gratified. She is to contribute to the tranquillity and happiness of the great family of States, and thereby become tranquil and happy herself. And she is one day, it is hoped, to become a distinguished member of this confederacy. This is to be her compensation--felicity and glory! Prospective felicity, and contingent glory. The felicity rural--rural felicity--from the geographical position of California--the most innocent and invigorating kind of felicity. The glory and distinction yet to be achieved. Whether California will consider these anticipations ample compensation for all the injuries of this conjunction--the long delay, and eventual danger, and all her sufferings at home in the mean time--will remain for herself to say. For my part, I would not give one hour's duration of actual existence in this Union for a whole eternity of such compensation; and such, I think, will be the opinion of California herself. Life, and present relief from actual ills, is what she wants. Existence and relief, is her cry! And for these she can find no compensation in the illusions of contributing to the tranquillity of States which are already tranquil, the happiness of people who are already happy, the settlement of questions in which she has no concern, and the formation of compromises which breed new quarrels in assuming to settle old ones.

With these fine reasons for tacking Utah and New Mexico to California, the committee proceed to pile a new load upon her back. Texas next appears in the committee's plan, crammed into the California bill, with all her questions of debt and boundary, dispute with New Mexico, division into future States, cession of territory to the United States, amount of compensation to be given her, thrust in along with her! A compact with one State put into a law for the life of another! And a veto upon the admission of California given to Texas! This is a monstrosity of which there is no example in the history of our legislation, and for the production of which it is fair to permit the committee to speak for themselves.

These are the reasons of the committee, and they present grave errors in law, both constitutional and municipal, and of geography and history. They assume a controversy between New Mexico and Texas. No such thing. New Mexico belongs to the United States, and the controversy is with the United States. They assume there is no way to settle this controversy but by a compact with Texas. This is another great mistake. There are three ways to settle it: first, and best, by a compact; secondly, by a suit in the Supreme Court of the United States; thirdly, by giving a government to New Mexico according to her actual extent when the United States acquired her, and holding on to that until the question of title is decided, either amicably by compact, or legally by the Supreme Court. The fundamental error of the committee is in supposing that New Mexico is party to this controversy with Texas. No such thing. New Mexico is only the John Doe of the concern. That error corrected, and all the reasoning of the committee falls to the ground. For the judicial power of the United States extends to all controversies to which the United States are party; and the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extends to all cases to which a State is a party. This brings the case bang up at once within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, without waiting for the consent of Texas, or waiting for New Mexico to grow up into a State, so as to have a suit between two States; and so there is no danger of collision, as the committee suppose, and make an argument for their bill, in the danger there is to New Mexico from this apprehended collision. If any takes place it will be a collision with the United States, to whom the territory of New Mexico belongs; and she will know how to prevent this collision, first, by offering what is not only just, but generous to Texas; and next, in defending her territory from invasion, and her people from violence.

These are the reasons for thrusting Texas, with all her multifarious questions, into the California bill; and, reduced to their essence, they argue thus: Utah must go in, because she binds upon California; New Mexico must go in, because she binds upon Utah; and Texas must go in, because she binds upon New Mexico. And thus poor California is crammed and gorged until she is about in the condition that Jonah would have been in, if he had swallowed the whale, instead of the whale swallowing him. This opens a new chapter in legislative ratiocination. It substitutes contiguity of territory for congruity of matter, and makes geographical affinities the rule of legislative conjunctions. Upon that principle the committee might have gone on, cramming other bills into the California bill, all over the United States; for all our territory is binding in some one part upon another. Upon that principle, the District of Columbia slave trade suppression bill might have been interjected; for, though not actually binding upon Texas, yet it binds upon land that binds upon land that does bind upon her. So of the fugitive slave bill. For, let the fugacious slave run as far as he may, he must still be on land; and that being the case, the territorial contiguity may be established which justifies the legislative conjunction.

Mr. President, the moralist informs us that there are some subjects too light for reason--too grave for ridicule; and in such cases the mere moralist may laugh or cry, as he deems best. But not so with the legislator--his business is not laughing or crying. Whimpering, or simpering, is not his mission. Work is his vocation, and gravity his vein; and in that vein I proceed to consider this interjection of Texas, with all her multifarious questions, into the bowels of the California bill.

In the first place, this Texas bill is a compact, depending for its validity on the consent of Texas, and is put into the California bill as part of a compromise and general settlement of all the slavery questions; and, of course, the whole must stand together, or fall together. This gives Texas a veto upon the admission of California. This is unconstitutional, as well as unjust; for by the constitution, new States are to be admitted by Congress, and not by another State; and, therefore, Texas should not have a veto upon the admission of California. In the next place, Texas presents a great many serious questions of her own--some of them depending upon a compact already existing with the United States, many of them concerning the United States, one concerning New Mexico, but no one reaching to California. She has a question of boundary nominally with New Mexico, in reality with the United States, as the owner of New Mexico; and that might be a reason for joining her in a bill, so far as that boundary is concerned, with New Mexico; but it can be no reason for joining her to California. The western boundary of Texas is the point of collision with New Mexico; and this plan of the committee, instead of proposing a suitable boundary between them adapted to localities, or leaving to each its actual possessions, disturbing no interest, until the decision of title upon the universal principle of uti possidetis; instead of these obvious and natural remedies, the plan of the committee cuts deep into the actual possessions of the United States in New Mexico--rousing the question which the committee professes to avoid, the question of extending slavery, and so disturbing the whole United States.

And here I must insist on the error of the committee in constitutional and municipal law, before I point out their mistakes in geography and history. They treat New Mexico as having a controversy with Texas--as being in danger of a collision with her--and that a compact with Texas to settle the boundary between them is the only way to settle that controversy and prevent that collision. Now, all this is a mistake. The controversy is not with New Mexico, but with the United States, and the judicial power of the United States has jurisdiction of it. Again, possession is title until the right is tried; and the United States having the possession, may give a government at once according to the possession; and then wait the decision of title.

I avoid all argument about right--the eventual right of Texas to any part of what was New Mexico before the existence of Texas. I avoid that question. Amicable settlement of contested claim, and not adjudication of title, is now my object. I need no argument from any quarter to satisfy me that the Texas questions ought to be settled. I happened to know that before Texas was annexed, and brought in bills and made speeches for that purpose at that time. I brought in such bills six years ago, and again at the present session; and whenever presented single, either by myself or any other person, I shall be ready to give it a generous consideration; but, as part of the California bill, I wash my hands of it.

I am against disturbing actual possession, either that of New Mexico or of Texas; and, therefore, am in favor of leaving to each all its population, and an ample amount of compact and homogeneous territory. With this view, all my bills and plans for a divisional line between New Mexico and Texas--whether of 1844 or 1850--left to each all its settlements, all its actual possessions, all its uncontested claim; and divided the remainder by a line adapted to the geography and natural divisions of the country, as well as suitable to the political and social condition of the people themselves. This gave a longitudinal line between them; and the longitude of 100 degrees in my bill of 1844, and 102 degrees in my bill of 1850--and both upon the same principle of leaving possessions intact, Texas having extended her settlements in the mean time. The proposed line of the committee violates all these conditions. It cuts deep and arbitrarily into the actual possessions of New Mexico, such as she held them before Texas had existence; and so conforms to no principle of public policy, private right, territorial affinity, or local propriety. It begins on the Rio del Norte, twenty miles in a straight line above El Paso, and thence, diagonally and northeastwardly, to the point where the Red River crosses the longitude of 100°. Now this beginning, twenty miles above El Paso, is about three hundred miles in a straight line (near six hundred by the windings of the river) above the ancient line of New Mexico; and this diagonal line to the Red River cuts about four hundred miles in a straight line through the ancient New Mexican possessions, cutting off about seventy thousand square miles of territory from New Mexico, where there is no slavery, and giving it to Texas where there is. This constitutes a more serious case of tacking than even that of sticking incongruous bills together, and calls for a most considerate examination of all the circumstances it involves. I will examine these circumstances, first making a statement, and then sustaining it by proof.

El Paso, above which the Texas boundary is now proposed to be placed by the committee, is one of the most ancient of the New Mexican towns, and to which the Spaniards of New Mexico retreated in the great Indian revolt in 1680, and made their stand, and thence recovered the whole province. It was the residence of the lieutenant-governor of New Mexico, and the most southern town of the province, as Taos was the most northern. Being on the right bank of the river, the dividing line between the United States and the Republic of Mexico leaves it out of our limits, and consequently out of the present limits of New Mexico; but New Mexico still extends to the Rio del Norte at the Paso; and therefore this beginning line proposed by the committee cuts into the ancient possession of New Mexico--a possession dating from the year 1595. That line in its course to the Red River, cuts the river and valley of the Puerco (called Pecos in the upper part) into two parts, leaving the lower and larger part to Texas; the said Rio Puerco and its valley, from head to mouth, having always been a part of New Mexico, and now in its actual possession. Putting together what is cut from the Puerco, and from the Del Norte above and below El Paso, and it would amount to about seventy thousand square miles, to be taken by the committee's line from its present and ancient possessor, and transferred to a new claimant. This is what the new line would do, and in doing it would raise the question of the extension of slavery, and of its existence at this time, by law, in New Mexico as a part of Texas.

To avoid all misconception, I repeat what I have already declared, that I am not occupying myself with the question of title as it may exist and be eventually determined between New Mexico and Texas; nor am I questioning the power of Congress to establish any line it pleases in that quarter for the State of Texas, with the consent of the State, and any one it pleases for the territory of New Mexico without her consent. I am not occupying myself with the questions of title or power, but with the question of possession only--and how far the possession of New Mexico is to be disturbed, if disturbed at all, by the committee's line; and the effect of that disturbance in rousing the slavery question in that quarter. In that point of view the fact of possession is every thing: for the possessor has a right to what he holds until the question of title is decided--by law, in a question between individuals or communities in a land of law and order--or by negotiation or arms between independent Powers. I use the phrase, possession by New Mexico; but it is only for brevity, and to give locality to the term possession. New Mexico possesses no territory; she is a territory, and belongs to the United States; and the United States own her as she stood on the day of the treaty of peace and cession between the United States and the Republic of Mexico; and it is into that possession that I inquire, and all which I assert that the United States have a right to hold until the question of title is decided. And to save inquiry or doubt, and to show that the committee are totally mistaken in law in assuming the consent of Texas to be indispensable to the settlement of the title, I say there are three ways to settle it; the first and best by compact, as I proposed before Texas was annexed, and again by a bill of this year: next, by a suit in the Supreme Court, under that clause in the constitution which extends the judicial power of the United States to all controversies to which the United States is a party, and that other clause which gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction of all cases to which a State is a party: the third way is for the United States to give a government to New Mexico according to the territory she possessed when she was ceded to the United States. These are the three ways to settle the question--one of them totally dependent on the will of Texas--one totally independent of her will--and one independent of her will until she chooses to go into court. As to any thing that Texas or New Mexico may do in taking or relinquishing possession, it is all moonshine. New Mexico is a territory of the United States. She is the property of the United States; and she cannot dispose of herself, or any part of herself; nor can Texas take her or any part of her. She is to stand as she did the day the United States acquired her; and to that point all my examinations are directed.

And in that point of view it is immaterial what are the boundaries of New Mexico. The whole of the territory obtained from Mexico, and not rightfully belonging to a State, belongs to the United States; and, as such, is the property of the United States, and to be attended to accordingly. But I proceed with the possession of New Mexico, and show that it has been actual and continuous from the conquest of the country by Don Juan de Onate, in 1595 to the present time. That ancient actual possession has already been shown at the starting point of the line--at El Paso del Norte. I will now show it to be the same throughout the continuation of the line across the Puerco and its valley, and at some points on the left bank of the Del Norte below El Paso. And first, of the Puerco River. It rises in the latitude of Santa Fé, and in its immediate neighborhood, only ten miles from it, and running south, falls into the Rio del Norte, about three hundred miles on a straight line below El Paso, and has a valley of its own between the mountain range on the west, which divides it from the valley of the Del Norte, to which it is parallel, and the high arid table land on the east called El Llano Estacado--the Staked Plain--which divides it from the head waters of the Red River, the Colorado, the Brasos, and other Texian streams. It is a long river, its head being in the latitude of Nashville--its mouth a degree and a half south of New Orleans. It washes the base of the high table land, and receives no affluents, and has no valley on that side; on the west it has a valley, and many bold affluents, coming down from the mountain range (the Sierra Obscura, the Sierra Blanca, and the Sierra de los Organos), which divides it from the valley of the upper Del Norte. It is valuable for its length, being a thousand miles, following its windings--from its course, which is north and south--from the quality of its water, derived from high mountains--from its valley, timbered and grassy, part prairie, good for cultivation, for pasturage, and salt. It has two climates, cold in the north from its altitude (seven thousand feet)--mild in the south from its great descent, not less than five thousand feet, and with a general amelioration of climate over the valley of the Del Norte from its openness on the east, and mountain shelter on the west. It is a river of New Mexico, and is so classified in geography. It is an old possession of New Mexico and the most valuable part of it, and has many of her towns and villages upon it. Las Vegas, Gallinas, Tecolote Abajo, Cuesta, Pecos, San Miguel, Anton Chico, Salinas, Gran Quivira, are all upon it. Some of these towns date their origin as far back as the first conquest of the Taos Indians, about the year 1600, and some have an historical interest, and a special relation to the question of title between New Mexico and Texas. Pecos is the old village of the Indians of that name, famous for the sacred fire so long kept burning there for the return of Montezuma. Gran Quivira was a considerable mining town under the Spaniards before the year 1680, when it was broken up in the great Indian revolt of that year.

San Miguel, twenty miles from Santa Fé, is the place where the Texian expedition, under Colonel Cooke, were taken prisoners in 1841.

To all these evidences of New Mexican possession of the Rio Puerco and its valley, is to be added the further evidence resulting from acts of ownership in grants of land made upon its upper part, as in New Mexico, by the superior Spanish authorities before the revolution, and by the Mexican local authorities since. The lower half was ungranted, and leaves much vacant land, and the best in the country, to the United States.

The great pastoral lands of New Mexico are in the valley of the Puerco, where millions of sheep were formerly pastured, now reduced to about two hundred thousand by the depredation of the Indians. The New Mexican inhabitants of the Del Norte send their flocks there to be herded by shepherds, on shares; and in this way, and by taking their salt there, and in addition to their towns and settlements, and grants of lands, the New Mexicans have had possession of the Puerco and its valley since the year 1600--that is to say, for about one hundred years before the shipwreck of La Salle, in the bay of San Bernardo, revealed the name of Texas to Europe and America.

These are the actual possessions of New Mexico on the Rio Puerco. On the Rio del Norte, as cut off by the committee's bill, there are, the little town of Frontera, ten miles above El Paso, a town begun opposite El Paso, San Eleazario, twenty miles below, and some houses lower down opposite El Presidio del Norte. Of all these, San Eleazario is the most considerable, having a population of some four thousand souls, once a town of New Biscay, now of New Mexico, and now the property of the United States by avulsion. It is an island; and the main river, formerly on the north and now on the south of the island, leaves it in New Mexico. When Pike went through it, it was the most northern town, and the frontier garrison of New Biscay; and there the then lieutenant-governor of New Mexico, who had escorted him from El Paso, turned him over to the authorities of a new province. It is now the most southern town of New Mexico, without having changed its place, but the river which disappeared from its channel in that place, in 1752, has now changed it to the south of the island.

I reiterate: I am not arguing title; I am only showing possession, which is a right to remain in possession until title is decided. The argument of title has often been introduced into this question; and a letter from President Polk, through Secretary Buchanan, has often been read on the Texian side. Now, what I have to say of that letter, so frequently referred to, and considered so conclusive, is this: that, however potent it may have been in inducing annexation, or how much soever it may be entitled to consideration in fixing the amount to be paid to Texas for her Mexican claim, yet as an evidence of title, I should pay no more regard to it than to a chapter from the life and adventures of Robinson Crusoe. Congress and the judiciary are the authorities to decide such claims to titles, and not Presidents and secretaries.

I rest upon the position, then, that the Rio Puerco, and its valley, is and was a New Mexican possession, as well as the left bank of the Del Norte, from above El Paso to below the mouth of the Puerco; and that this possession cannot be disturbed without raising the double question, first, of actual extension of slavery; and, secondly, of the present legal existence of slavery in all New Mexico east of the Rio Grande, as a part of Texas. These are the questions which the proposed line of the committee raise, and force us to face. They are not questions of my seeking, but I shall not avoid them. It is not a new question with me, this extension of slavery in that quarter. I met it in 1844, before the annexation of Texas. On the 10th day of June, of that year, and as part of a bill for a compact with Texas, and to settle all questions with her--the very ones which now perplex us--before she was annexed, I proposed, as article V. in the projected compact:

ART. V. "The existence of slavery to be for ever prohibited in that part of the annexed territory which lies west of the hundredth degree of longitude west from the meridian of Greenwich."

This is what I proposed six years ago, and as one in a series of propositions to be offered to Texas and Mexico for settling all questions growing out of the projected annexation beforehand. They were not adopted. Immediate annexation, without regard to consequences, was the cry; and all temperate counsels were set down to British traitors, abolitionists, and whigs. Well! we have to regard consequences now--several consequences: one of which is this large extension of slavery, which the report and conglomerate bills of the Committee of Thirteen force us to face. I did so six years ago, and heard no outbreak against my opinions then. But my opposition to the extension of slavery dates further back than 1844--forty years further back; and as this is a suitable time for a general declaration, and a sort of general conscience delivery, I will say that my opposition to it dates from 1804, when I was a student at law in the State of Tennessee, and studied the subject of African slavery in an American book--a Virginia book--Tucker's edition of Blackstone's Commentaries. And here it is (holding up a volume and reading from the title-page): "Blackstone's Commentaries, with notes of reference to the Constitution and laws of the Federal Government of the United States, and of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in five volumes, with an appendix to each volume containing short tracts, as appeared necessary to form a connected view of the laws of Virginia as a member of the Federal Union. By St. George Tucker, Professor of Law in the University of William and Mary, and one of the Judges of the General Court in Virginia." In this American book--this Virginia edition of an English work--I found my principles on the subject of slavery. Among the short tracts in the appendices, is one of fifty pages in the appendix to the first volume, second part, which treats of the subject of African slavery in the United States, with a total condemnation of the institution, and a plan for its extinction in Virginia. In that work--in that school--that old Virginia school which I was taught to reverence--I found my principles on slavery: and adhere to them. I concur in the whole essay, except the remedy--gradual emancipation--and find in that remedy the danger which the wise men of Virginia then saw and dreaded, but resolved to encounter, because it was to become worse with time: the danger to both races from so large an emancipation. The men of that day were not enthusiasts or fanatics: they were statesmen and philosophers. They knew that the emancipation of the black slave was not a mere question between master and slave--not a question of property merely--but a question of white and black--between races; and what was to be the consequence to each race from a large emancipation.[10] And there the wisdom, not the philanthropy, of Virginia balked fifty years ago; there the wisdom of America balks now. And here I find the largest objection to the extension of slavery--to planting it in new regions where it does not now exist--bestowing it on those who have it not. The incurability of the evil is the greatest objection to the extension of slavery. It is wrong for the legislator to inflict an evil which can be cured: how much more to inflict one that is incurable, and against the will of the people who are to endure it for ever! I quarrel with no one for supposing slavery a blessing: I deem it an evil: and would neither adopt it nor impose it on others. Yet I am a slaveholder, and among the few members of Congress who hold slaves in this District. The French proverb tells us that nothing is new but what has been forgotten. So of this objection to a large emancipation. Every one sees now that it is a question of races, involving consequences which go to the destruction of one or the other: it was seen fifty years ago, and the wisdom of Virginia balked at it then. It seems to be above human wisdom. But there is a wisdom above human! and to that we must look. In the mean time, not extend the evil.

[10] "It may be asked why not retain the blacks among us, and incorporate them into the State. Deep-rooted prejudices entertained by the whites; ten thousand recollections of the blacks of the injuries they have sustained; new provocations; the real distinctions which nature has made; and many other circumstances, will divide us into parties, and produce convulsions, which will probably never end but in the extermination of one or the other race."--Jefferson.

In refusing to extend slavery into these seventy thousand square miles, I act in conformity not only to my own long-established principles, but also in conformity to the long-established practice of Congress. Five times in four years did Congress refuse the prayer of Indiana for a temporary suspension of the anti-slavery clause of the ordinance of '87. On the 2d of March, 1803, Mr. Randolph, of Roanoke, as chairman of the committee to which the memorial praying the suspension was referred, made a report against it, which was concurred in by the House. This is the report:

"That the rapid population of the State of Ohio, sufficiently evinces, in the opinion of your committee, that the labor of slaves is not necessary to promote the growth and settlement of colonies in that region. That this labor, demonstrably the dearest of any, can only be employed to advantage in the cultivation of products more valuable than any known to that quarter of the United States: that the committee deem it highly dangerous and inexpedient to impair a provision wisely calculated to promote the happiness and prosperity of the north-western country, and to give strength and security to that extensive frontier. In the salutary operation of this sagacious and benevolent restraint, it is believed that the inhabitants of Indiana will, at no very distant day, find ample remuneration for a temporary privation of labor and of emigration."

This report of Mr. Randolph was in 1803: the next year, March, 1804, a different report, on the same prayer, was made by a committee of which Mr. Rodney, of Delaware, was chairman. It recommended a suspension of the anti-slavery clause for ten years: it was not concurred in by the House. Two years afterwards, February, 1806, a similar report, recommending suspension for ten years, was made by a committee of which Mr. Garnett, of Virginia, was chairman: it met the same fate--non-concurrence. The next year, 1807, both Houses were tried. In February of that year, a committee of the House, of which Mr. Parke was chairman, reported in favor of the indefinite suspension of the clause: the report was not concurred in. And in November of that year, Mr. Franklin, of North Carolina, as chairman of a committee of the Senate, made a report against the suspension, which was concurred in by the Senate, and unanimously, as it would seem from the journal, there being no division called for. Thus, five times in four years, the respective Houses of Congress refused to admit even a temporary extension, or rather re-extension of slavery into Indiana territory, which had been before the ordinance of '87 a slave territory, holding many slaves at Vincennes. These five refusals to suspend the ordinance of '87, were so many confirmations of it. All the rest of the action of Congress on the subject, was to the same effect or stronger. The Missouri compromise line was a curtailment of slave territory; the Texas annexation resolutions were the same; the ordinance of '87 itself, so often confirmed by Congress, was a curtailment of slave territory--in fact, its actual abolition; for it is certain that slavery existed in fact in the French settlements of the Illinois at that time; and that the ordinance terminated it. I acted then in conformity to the long, uniformly established policy of Congress, as well as in conformity to my own principles, in refusing to vote the extension of slavery, which the committee's line would involve.

And here, it does seem to me that we, of the present day, mistake the point of the true objection to the extension of slavery. We look at it as it concerns the rights, or interests, of the inhabitants of the States! and not as it may concern the people to whom it is to be given! and to whom it is to be an irrevocable gift--to them, and posterity! Mr. Randolph's report, in the case of Indiana, took the true ground. It looked to the interests of the people to whom the slavery was to go, and refused them an evil, although they begged for it.

This is a consequence which the committee's bill involves, and from which there is no escape but in the total rejection of their plan, and the adoption of the line which I propose--the longitudinal line of 102--which, corresponding with ancient title and actual possession, avoids the question of slavery in either country: which, leaving the population of each untouched, disturbs no interest, and which, in splitting the high sterile table land of the Staked Plain, conforms to the natural division of the country, and leaves to each a natural frontier, and an ample extent of compact and homogeneous territory. To Texas is left all the territory drained by all the rivers which have their mouths within her limits, whether those mouths are in the Gulf of Mexico, the Mississippi, or the Rio Grande: to New Mexico is left the whole course of the Rio Puerco and all its valley: and which, added to the valley of the Del Norte, will make a State of the first class in point of territory, susceptible of large population and wealth, and in a compact form, capable of defence against Indians. The Staked Plain is the natural frontier of both countries. It is a dividing wall between systems of waters and systems of countries. It is a high, sterile plain, some sixty miles wide upon some five hundred long, running north and south, its western declivity abrupt, and washed by the Puerco at its base: its eastern broken into chasms--cañones--from which issue the myriad of little streams which, flowing towards the rising sun, form the great rivers--Red River, Brasos, Colorado, Nueces, which find their outlet in the Mississippi or in the Gulf of Mexico. It is a salient feature in North American geography--a table of land sixty miles wide, five hundred long, and some thousands of feet above the level of the sea--and sterile, level, without a shrub, a plant, or grass, and presenting to the traveller a horizon of its own like the ocean. Without a landmark to guide the steps of the traveller across it, the early hunters and herdsmen of New Mexico staked their course across it, and hence its name, El Llano Estacado--the Staked Plain. It is a natural frontier between New Mexico and Texas; and for such a line, quieting all questions between them, all with the United States, yielding near two hundred thousand square miles of territory to the United States and putting into her hands the means of populating and defending New Mexico by giving lands to settlers and defenders--I am ready to vote the fifteen millions which my bill fairly and openly proposes. For the line in this bill I would not give a copper. But it would be a great error to suppose I would give fifteen millions for the territory in dispute between New Mexico and Texas. That disputed territory is only a small part of what the Texian cession would be. It would embrace four degrees of latitude on the north of Texas, and a front of a thousand miles on the Arkansas, and would give to the United States territory indispensable to her--to the population and defence both of New Mexico and Utah, in front of both which this part of Texas lies.

The committee, in their report, and the senator from Kentucky [Mr. Clay], in his speech, are impressive in their representations in favor of giving governments to New Mexico and the remaining part of California. I join them in all they say in favor of the necessity of these governments, and the duty of Congress to give them. But this bill is not the way to give it. These governments are balked by being put into this bill. They not only impede California, but themselves. The conjunction is an injury to both. They mutually delay and endanger each other. And it is no argument in favor of the conjunction to say that the establishment of a government for New Mexico requires the previous settlement of her eastern boundary with Texas. That is no argument for tacking Texas, with all her multifarious questions, even to New Mexico, much less to California. It is indeed very desirable to settle that boundary, and to settle it at once, and for ever; but it is not an indispensability to the creation of a government for New Mexico. We have a right to a government according to her possession; and that we can give her, to continue till the question of title is decided. The uti possidetis--as you possess--is the principle to govern our legislation--the principle which gives the possessor a right to the possession until the question of title is decided. This principle is the same both in national and municipal law--both in the case of citizens or communities of the same government and between independent nations. The mode of decision only is different. Between independent nations it is done by negotiation or by arms: between citizens or communities of the same government, it is done by law. Independent nations may invade and fight each other for a boundary: citizens or communities of the same government cannot. And the party that shall attempt it commits a violation of law and order; and the government which permits such violation is derelict of its duty.

I have now examined, so far as I propose to do it on a motion for indefinite postponement, the three bills which the committee have tacked together--the California, Utah, New Mexico and Texas bills. There are two other bills which I have not mentioned, because they are not tacked, but only hung on; but which belong to the system, as it is called, and without some mention of which, injustice would be done to the committee in the presentation of their scheme. The fugitive slave recovery bill, and the District of Columbia slave trade suppression bill, are parts of the system of measures which the committee propose, and which, taken together, are to constitute a compromise, and to terminate for ever and most fraternally all the dissensions of the slavery agitation in the United States. They apply to two out of the five gaping wounds which the senator from Kentucky enumerated on the five fingers of his left hand, and for healing up all which at once he had provided one large plaster, big enough to cover all, and efficacious enough to cure all; while the President only proposed to cure one, and that with a little plaster, and it of no efficacy. I do not propose to examine these two attendant or sequacious bills, which dangle at the tail of the other three.

This is the end of the committee's labor--five old bills gathered up from our table, tacked together, and christened a compromise! Now compromise is a pretty phrase at all times, and is a good thing in itself, when there happens to be any parties to make it, any authority to enforce it, any penalties for breaking it, or any thing to be compromised. The compromises of the constitution are of that kind; and they stand. Compromises made in court, and entered of record, are of that kind; and they stand. Compromises made by individuals on claims to property are likewise of that character; and they stand. I respect all such compromises. But where there happens to be nothing to be compromised, no parties to make a compromise, no power to enforce it, no penalty for its breach, no obligation on any one--not even its makers--to observe it, and when no two human beings can agree about its meaning, then a compromise becomes ridiculous and pestiferous. I have no respect for it, and eschew it. It cannot stand, and will fall; and in its fall will raise up more ills than it was intended to cure. And of this character I deem this farrago of incongruous matter to be, which has been gathered up and stuck together, and offered to us "all or none," like "fifty-four forty." It has none of the requisites of a compromise, and the name cannot make it so.

In the first place, there are no parties to make a compromise. We are not in convention, but in Congress; and I do not admit a geographical division of parties in this chamber, although the Committee of Thirteen was formed upon that principle--six from the South, half a dozen from the North, and one from the borders of both--sitting on a ridge-pole, to keep the balance even. The senator from Kentucky chairman of this committee of a baker's dozen and the illustrious progenitor of that committee, sits on that ridge-pole. It is a most critical position, and requires a most nice adjustment of balance to preserve the equilibrium--to keep the weight from falling on one side or the other--something like that of the Roman emperor, in his apotheosis, who was required to fix himself exactly in the middle of the heavens when he went up among the gods, lest, by leaning on one side or the other, he might overset the universe:

"Press not too much on any part the sphere, Hard were the task thy weight divine to bear! O'er the mid orb more equal shalt thou rise, And with a juster balance fix the skies."--LUCAN.

I recognize no such parties--no two halves in this Union, separated by a ridge-pole, with a man, or a god, sitting upon it, to keep the balance even. I know no North, and I know no South; and I repulse and repudiate, as a thing to be for ever condemned, this first attempt to establish geographical parties in this chamber, by creating a committee formed upon that principle. In the next place, there is no sanction for any such compromise--no authority to enforce it--none to punish its violation. In the third place, there is nothing to be compromised. A compromise is a concession, a mutual concession of contested claims between two parties. I know of nothing to be conceded on the part of the slaveholding States in regard to their slave property. Their rights are independent of the federal government, and admitted in the constitution--a right to hold their slaves as property, a right to pursue and recover them as property, a right to it as a political element in the weight of these States, by making five count three in the national representation. These are our rights by an instrument which we are bound to respect, and I will concede none of them, nor purchase any of them. I never purchase as a concession what I hold as a right, nor accept an inferior title when I already hold the highest. Even if this congeries of bills was a compromise, in fact, I should be opposed to it for the reasons stated. But the fact itself is to me apocryphal. What is it but the case of five old bills introduced by different members as common legislative measures--caught up by the senator from Kentucky, and his committee, bundled together, and then called a compromise! Now, this mystifies me. The same bills were ordinary legislation in the hands of their authors; they become a sacred compromise in the hands of their new possessors. They seemed to be of no account as laws: they become a national panacea as a compromise. The difference seems to be in the change of name. The poet tells us that a rose will smell as sweet by any other name. That may be true of roses, but not of compromises. In the case of the compromise, the whole smell is in the name; and here is the proof. The senator from Illinois (Mr. Douglass) brought in three of these bills: they emitted no smell. The senator from Virginia (Mr. Mason) brought in another of them--no smell in that. The senator from Missouri, who now speaks to the Senate, brought in the fifth--ditto, no smell about it. The olfactory nerve of the nation never scented their existence. But no sooner are they jumbled together, and called a compromise, than the nation is filled with their perfume. People smell it all over the land, and, like the inhalers of certain drugs, become frantic for the thing. This mystifies me; and the nearest that I can come to a solution of the mystery is in the case of the two Dr. Townsends and their sarsaparilla root. They both extract from the same root, but the extract is a totally different article in the hands of the two doctors. Produced by one it is the universal panacea: by the other, it is of no account, and little less than poison. Here is what the old doctor says of this strange difference:

"We wish it understood, because it is the absolute truth, that S. P. Townsend's article and Old Dr. Jacob Townsend's sarsaparilla are heaven-wide apart, and infinitely dissimilar; that they are unlike in every particular, having not one single thing in common."

And accounts for the difference thus:

"The sarsaparilla root, it is well known to medical men, contains many medicinal properties, and some properties which are inert or useless, and others which, if retained in preparing it for use, produce fermentation and acid, which is injurious to the system. Some of the properties of sarsaparilla are so volatile that they entirely evaporate, and are lost in the preparation, if they are not preserved by a scientific process, known only to the experienced in its manufacture. Moreover, those volatile principles, which fly off in vapor, or as an exhalation, under heat, are the very essential medical properties of the root, which give to it all its value."

Now, all this is perfectly intelligible to me. I understand it exactly. It shows me precisely how the same root is either to be a poison or a medicine, as it happens to be in the hands of the old or the young doctor. This may be the case with these bills. To me it looks like a clue to the mystery; but I decide nothing, and wait patiently for the solution which the senator from Kentucky may give when he comes to answer this part of my speech. The old doctor winds up in requiring particular attention to his name labelled on the bottle, to wit, "Old Doctor Jacob Townsend," and not Young Doctor Samuel Townsend. This shows that there is virtue in a name when applied to the extract of sarsaparilla root; and there may be equal virtue in it when applied to a compromise bill. If so, it may show how these self-same bills are of no force or virtue in the hands of the young senator from Illinois (Mr. Douglass), and become omnipotently efficacious in the hands of the old senator from Kentucky.

This is the end of the grand committee's work--five old bills tacked together, and presented as a remedy for evils which have no existence, and required to be accepted under a penalty--the penalty of being gazetted as enemies of compromise, and played at by the organs! The old one, to be sure, is dreadfully out of tune--the strings all broken, and the screws all loose, and discoursing most woful music, and still requiring us to dance to it! And such dancing it would be!--nothing but turn round, cross over, set-to, and back out! Sir, there was once a musician--we have all read of him--who had power with his lyre (but his instrument was spelt l y r e)--not only over men, but over wild beasts also, and even over stones, which he could make dance into their places when the walls of Ilion were built. But our old organist was none of that sort, even in his best day; and since the injury to his instrument in playing the grand national symphony of the four F's--the fifty-four forty or fight--it is so out of tune that its music will be much more apt to scare off tame men than to charm wild beasts or stones.

No, sir! no more slavery compromises. Stick to those we have in the constitution, and they will be stuck to! Look at the four votes--those four on the propositions which I submitted. No abolition of slavery in the States: none in the forts, arsenals, navy-yards, and dock-yards: none in the District of Columbia: no interference with the slave trade between the States. These are the votes given on this floor, and which are above all Congress compromises, because they abide the compromises of the constitution.

The committee, besides the ordinary purpose of legislation, that of making laws for the government of the people, propose another object of a different kind, that of acting the part of national benefactors, and giving peace and happiness to a miserable and distracted people--innuendo, the people of the United States. They propose this object as the grand result and crowning mercy of their multifarious labors. The gravity with which the chairman of the committee has brought forward this object in his report, and the pathetic manner in which he has enforced it in his speech, and the exact enumeration he has made of the public calamities upon his fingers' ends, preclude the idea, as I have heretofore intimated, of any intentional joke to be practised upon us by that distinguished senator; otherwise I might have been tempted to believe that the eminent senator, unbending from his serious occupations, had condescended to amuse himself at our expense. Certain it is that the conception of this restoration of peace and happiness is most jocose. In the first place, there is no contention to be reconciled, no distraction to be composed, no misery to be assuaged, no lost harmony to be restored, no lost happiness to be recovered! And, if there was, the committee is not the party to give us these blessings. Their example and precept do not agree. They preach concord, and practise discord. They recommend harmony to others, and disagree among themselves. They propose the fraternal kiss to us, and give themselves rude rebuffs. They set us a sad example. Scarcely is the healing report read, and the anodyne bills, or pills, laid on our tables, than fierce contention breaks out in the ranks of the committee itself. They attack each other. They give and take fierce licks. The great peacemaker himself fares badly--stuck all over with arrows, like the man on the first leaf of the almanac. Here, in our presence, in the very act of consummating the marriage of California with Utah, New Mexico, Texas, the fugacious slaves of the States, and the marketable slaves of this District--in this very act of consummation, as in a certain wedding feast of old, the feast becomes a fight--the festival a combat--and the amiable guests pummel each other.

When his committee was formed, and himself safely installed at the head of it, conqueror and pacificator, the senator from Kentucky appeared to be the happiest of mankind. We all remember that night. He seemed to ache with pleasure. It was too great for continence. It burst forth. In the fulness of his joy, and the overflowing of his heart, he entered upon that series of congratulations which we all remember so well, and which seemed to me to be rather premature, and in disregard of the sage maxim which admonishes the traveller never to halloo till he is out of the woods. I thought so then. I was forcibly reminded of it on Saturday last, when I saw that senator, after vain efforts to compose his friends, and even reminding them of what they were "threatened" with this day--innuendo, this poor speech of mine--gather up his beaver and quit the chamber, in a way that seemed to say, the Lord have mercy upon you all, for I am done with you! But the senator was happy that night--supremely so. All his plans had succeeded--Committee of Thirteen appointed--he himself its chairman--all power put into their hands--their own hands untied, and the hands of the Senate tied--and the parties just ready to be bound together for ever. It was an ecstatic moment for the senator, something like that of the heroic Pirithous when he surveyed the preparations for the nuptial feast--saw the company all present, the lapithæ on couches, the centaurs on their haunches--heard the Io hymen beginning to resound, and saw the beauteous Hippodamia, about as beauteous I suppose as California, come "glittering like a star," and take her stand on his left hand. It was a happy moment for Pirithous! and in the fulness of his feelings he might have given vent to his joy in congratulations to all the company present, to all the lapithæ and to all the centaurs, to all mankind, and to all horsekind, on the auspicious event. But, oh! the deceitfulness of human felicity. In an instant the scene was changed! the feast a fight--the wedding festival a mortal combat--the table itself supplying the implements of war!

"At first a medley flight, Of bowls and jars supply the fight; Once implements of feasts, but now of fate."

You know how it ended. The fight broke up the feast. The wedding was postponed. And so may it be with this attempted conjunction of California with the many ill-suited spouses which the Committee of Thirteen have provided for her.

Mr. President, it is time to be done with this comedy of errors. California is suffering for want of admission. New Mexico is suffering for want of protection. The public business is suffering for want of attention. The character of Congress is suffering for want of progress in business. It is time to put an end to so many evils; and I have made the motion intended to terminate them, by moving the indefinite postponement of this unmanageable mass of incongruous bills, each an impediment to the other, that they may be taken up one by one, in their proper order, to receive the decision which their respective merits require.

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CXCIII. DEATH OF PRESIDENT TAYLOR

He died in the second year of his presidency, suddenly, and unexpectedly, of violent fever, brought on by long exposure to the burning heat of a fourth of July sun--noted as the warmest of the season. He attended the ceremonies of the day, sitting out the speeches, and omitting no attention which he believed the decorum of his station required. It cost him his life. The ceremony took place on Friday: on the Tuesday following, he was dead--the violent attack commencing soon after his return to the presidential mansion. He was the first President elected upon a reputation purely military. He had been in the regular army from early youth. Far from having ever exercised civil office, he had never even voted at an election, and was a major-general in the service, at the time of his election. Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, Monterey, and Buena Vista, were his titles to popular favor--backed by irreproachable private character, undoubted patriotism, and established reputation for judgment and firmness. His brief career showed no deficiency of political wisdom for want of previous political training. He came into the administration at a time of great difficulty, and acted up to the emergency of his position. The slavery agitation was raging; the Southern manifesto had been issued: California, New Mexico, Utah, were without governments: a Southern Congress was in process of being called, the very name of which implied disunion: a Southern convention was actually called, and met, to consult upon disunion. He met the whole crisis firmly, determined to do what was right among all the States, and to maintain the Federal Union at all hazards. His first, and only annual message, marked out his course. The admission of California as a State was recommended by him, and would avoid all questions about slavery. Leaving Utah and New Mexico to ripen into State governments, and then decide the question for themselves, also avoided the question in those territories where slavery was then extinct under the laws of the country from which they came to the United States. Texas had an unsettled boundary on the side of New Mexico. President Taylor considered that question to be one between the United States and New Mexico, and not between New Mexico and Texas; and to be settled by the United States in some legal and amicable way--as, by compact, by mutual legislation, or judicial decision. Some ardent spirits in Texas proposed to take possession of one half of New Mexico, in virtue of a naked pretension to it, founded in their own laws and constitution. President Taylor would have resisted that pretension, and protected New Mexico in its ancient actual possession until the question of boundary should have been settled in a legal way. His death was a public calamity. No man could have been more devoted to the Union, or more opposed to the slavery agitation; and his position as a Southern man, and a slave-holder--his military reputation, and his election by a majority of the people and of the States--would have given him a power in the settlement of these questions which no President without these qualifications could have possessed. In the political division he classed with the whig party, but his administration, as far as it went, was applauded by the democracy, and promised to be so to the end of his official term. Dying at the head of the government, a national lamentation bewailed his departure from life and power, and embalmed his memory in the affections of his country.

ADMINISTRATION OF MILLARD FILLMORE.

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CXCIV. INAUGURATION AND CABINET OF MR. FILLMORE

Wednesday, July the tenth, witnessed the inauguration of Mr. Fillmore, Vice-President of the United States, become President by the death of President Taylor. It took place in the Hall of the House of Representatives, in the presence of both Houses of Congress, in conformity to the wish of the new President, communicated in a message. The constitution requires nothing of the President elect, before entering on the duties of his station, except to take the oath of office, faithfully to execute his duties, and do his best to preserve, protect, and defend the constitution; and that oath might be taken any where, and before any magistrate having power to administer oaths, and then filed in the department of State; but propriety and custom have made it a ceremony to be publicly performed, and impressively conducted. A place on the great eastern portico of the Capitol, where tens of thousands could witness it, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States to administer the oath, have always been the place and the magistrate for this ceremony, in the case of Presidents elected to the office--giving the utmost display to it--and very suitably as in such cases there is always a feeling of general gratification and exultation. Mr. Fillmore, with great propriety, reduced the ceremony of his inauguration to an official act, impressively done in Congress, and to be marked by solemnity without joy. A committee of the two Houses attended him--Messrs. Soulé, of Louisiana, Davis, of Massachusetts, and Underwood, of Kentucky, on the part of the Senate; Messrs. Winthrop, of Massachusetts, Morse, of Louisiana, and Morehead, of Kentucky, on the part of the House; and he was accompanied by all the members of the late President's cabinet. The Chief Justice of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, the venerable William Cranch, appointed fifty years before, by President John Adams, administered the oath; which being done, the President, without any inaugural address, bowed, and retired; and the ceremony was at an end.

The first official act of the new President was an immediate message to the two Houses, recommending suitable measures to be taken by them for the funeral of the deceased President--saying:

"A great man has fallen among us, and a whole country is called to an occasion of unexpected, deep, and general mourning.

"I recommend to the two Houses of Congress to adopt such measures as in their discretion they may deem proper, to perform with due solemnities the funeral obsequies of ZACHARY TAYLOR, late President of the United States; and thereby to signify the great and affectionate regard of the American people for the memory of one whose life has been devoted to the public service; whose career in arms has not been surpassed in usefulness or brilliancy; who has been so recently raised by the unsolicited voice of the people to the highest civil authority in the government--which he administered with so much honor and advantage to his country; and by whose sudden death, so many hopes of future usefulness have been blighted for ever.

"To you, senators and representatives of a nation in tears, I can say nothing which can alleviate the sorrow with which you are oppressed. I appeal to you to aid me, under the trying circumstances which surround me, in the discharge of the duties, from which, however much I may be oppressed by them, I dare not shrink; and I rely upon Him, who holds in his hands the destinies of nations, to endow me with the requisite strength for the task, and to avert from our country the evils apprehended from the heavy calamity which has befallen us.

"I shall most readily concur in whatever measures the wisdom of the two Houses may suggest, as befitting this deeply melancholy occasion."

The two Houses readily complied with this recommendation, and a solemn public funeral was unanimously voted, and in due time, impressively performed. All the members of the late President's cabinet gave in their resignations immediately, but were requested by President Fillmore to retain their places until successors could be appointed; which they did. In due time, the new cabinet was constituted: Daniel Webster, of Massachusetts, Secretary of State; Thomas Corwin, of Ohio, Secretary of the Treasury; Alexander H. H. Stuart, of Virginia, Secretary of the Interior; Charles M. Conrad, of Louisiana, Secretary at War; William A. Graham, of North Carolina, Secretary of the Navy (succeeded by John P. Kennedy, of Maryland); John J. Crittenden, of Kentucky, Attorney-General; Nathan K. Hall, of New York (succeeded by Samuel D. Hubbard, of Connecticut).

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CXCV. REJECTION OF MR. CLAY'S PLAN OF COMPROMISE

The Committee of Thirteen had reported in favor of Mr. Clay's plan. It was a committee so numerous, almost a quarter of the Senate, that its recommendation would seem to insure the senatorial concurrence. Not so the fact. The incongruities were too obvious and glaring to admit of conjunction. The subjects were too different to admit of one vote--yea or nay--upon all of them together. The injustice of mixing up the admission of California, a State which had rejected slavery for itself, with all the vexations of the slave question in the territories, was too apparent to subject her to the degradation of such an association. It was evident that no compromise, of any kind whatever, on the subject of slavery, under any one of its aspects separately, much less under all put together, could possibly be made. There was no spirit of concession--no spirit in which there could be giving and taking--in which a compromise could be made. Whatever was to be done, it was evident would be done in the ordinary spirit of legislation, in which the majority gives law to the minority. The only case in which there was even forbearance, was in that of rejecting the Wilmot proviso. That measure was rejected again as heretofore, and by the votes of those who were opposed to extending slavery into the territories, because it was unnecessary and inoperative--irritating to the slave States without benefit to the free States--a mere work of supererogation, of which the only fruit was to be discontent. It was rejected, not on the principle of non-intervention--not on the principle of leaving to the territories to do as they pleased on the question; but because there had been intervention! because Mexican law and constitution had intervened! had abolished slavery by law in those dominions! which law would remain in force, until repealed by Congress. All that the opponents to the extension of slavery had to do then, was to do nothing. And they did nothing.

The numerous measures put together in Mr. Clay's bill were disconnected and separated. Each measure received a separate and independent consideration, and with a result which showed the injustice of the attempted conjunction. United, they had received the support of the majority of the committee: separated, and no two were passed by the same vote: and only four members of the whole grand committee that voted alike on each of the measures.

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Chapter CXCVI

THE ADMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA: PROTEST OF SOUTHERN SENATORS: REMARKS UPON IT BY MR. BENTON.

This became the "test" question in the great slavery agitation which disturbed Congress and the Union, and as such was impressively presented by Mr. Calhoun in the last and most intensely considered speech of his life--read for him in the Senate by Mr. Mason of Virginia. In that speech, and at the conclusion of it, and as the resulting consequence of the whole of it, he said:

"It is time, senators, that there should be an open and manly avowal on all sides, as to what is intended to be done. If the question is not now settled, it is uncertain whether it ever can hereafter be; and we, as the representatives of the States of this Union, regarded as governments, should come to a distinct understanding as to our respective views, in order to ascertain whether the great questions at issue can be settled or not. If you, who represent the stronger portion, cannot agree to settle them on the broad principle of justice and duty, say so; and let the States we both represent agree to separate and part in peace. If you are unwilling that we should part in peace, tell us so, and we shall know what to do, when you reduce the question to submission or resistance. If you remain silent, you will compel us to infer by your acts what you intend. In that case, California will become the test question. If you admit her, under all the difficulties that oppose her admission, you compel us to infer that you intend to exclude us from the whole of the acquired territories, with the intention of destroying irretrievably the equilibrium between the two sections. We would be blind not to perceive, in that case, that your real objects are power and aggrandizement, and infatuated not to act accordingly."

Mr. Calhoun died before the bill for the admission of California was taken up: but his principles did not die with him: and the test question which he had proclaimed remained a legacy to his friends. As such they took it up, and cherished it. The bill was taken up in the Senate, and many motions made to amend, of which the most material was by Mr. Turney of Tennessee, to limit the southern boundary of the State to the latitude of 36° 30', and to extend the Missouri line through to the Pacific, so as to authorize the existence of slavery in all the territory south of that latitude. On this motion the yeas and nays were:

"YEAS--Messrs. Atchison, Badger, Barnwell, Bell, Berrien, Butler, Clemens, Davis of Mississippi, Dawson, Downs, Foote, Houston, Hunter, King, Mangum, Mason, Morton, Pearce, Pratt, Rusk, Sebastian, Soulé, Turney, and Yulee--24.

"NAYS--Messrs. Baldwin, Benton, Bradbury, Bright, Cass, Clarke, Cooper, Davis of Massachusetts, Dayton, Dickinson, Dodge of Wisconsin, Dodge of Iowa, Douglass, Ewing, Felch, Greene, Hale, Hamlin, Jones, Norris, Phelps, Seward, Shields, Smith, Spruance, Sturgeon, Underwood, Upham, Wales, Walker, Whitcomb, and Winthrop--32."

The amendments having all been disposed of, the question was taken upon the passage of the bill, and resulted in its favor, 34 yeas to 18 nays. The vote was:

"YEAS--Messrs. Baldwin, Bell, Benton, Bradbury, Bright, Cass, Chase, Cooper, Davis of Massachusetts, Dickinson, Dodge of Wisconsin, Dodge of Iowa, Douglass, Ewing, Felch, Greene, Hale, Hamlin, Houston, Jones, Miller, Norris, Phelps, Seward, Shields, Smith, Spruance, Sturgeon, Underwood, Upham, Wales, Walker, Whitcomb, and Winthrop--34.

"NAYS--Messrs. Atchison, Barnwell, Berrien, Butler, Clemens, Davis of Mississippi, Dawson, Foote, Hunter, King, Mason, Morton, Pratt, Rusk, Sebastian, Soulé, Turney, and Yulee--18."

Immediately upon the passage of the bill through the Senate, ten of the senators opposed to it offered a protest against it, which was read at the secretary's table, of which the leading points were these:

"We, the undersigned senators, deeply impressed with the importance of the occasion, and with a solemn sense of the responsibility under which we are acting, respectfully submit the following protest against the bill admitting California as a State into this Union, and request that it may be entered upon the Journal of the Senate. We feel that it is not enough to have resisted in debate alone a bill so fraught with mischief to the Union and the States which we represent, with all the resources of argument which we possessed; but that it is also due to ourselves, the people whose interest have been intrusted to our care, and to posterity, which even in its most distant generations may feel its consequences, to leave in whatever form may be most solemn and enduring, a memorial of the opposition which we have made to this measure, and of the reasons by which we have been governed, upon the pages of a journal which the constitution requires to be kept so long as the Senate may have an existence. We desire to place the reasons upon which we are willing to be judged by generations living and yet to come, for our opposition to a bill whose consequences may be so durable and portentous as to make it an object of deep interest to all who may come after us.

"We have dissented from this bill because it gives the sanction of law, and thus imparts validity to the unauthorized action of a portion of the inhabitants of California, by which an odious discrimination is made against the property of the fifteen slaveholding States of the Union, who are thus deprived of that position of equality which the constitution so manifestly designs, and which constitutes the only sure and stable foundation on which this Union can repose.

"Because the right of the slaveholding States to a common and equal enjoyment of the territory of the Union has been defeated by a system of measures which, without the authority of precedent, of law, or of the constitution, were manifestly contrived for that purpose, and which Congress must sanction and adopt, should this bill become a law.

"Because to vote for a bill passed under such circumstances would be to agree to a principle, which may exclude for ever hereafter, as it does now, the States which we represent from all enjoyment of the common territory of the Union; a principle which destroys the equal rights of their constituents, the equality of their States in the Confederacy, the equal dignity of those whom they represent as men and as citizens in the eye of the law, and their equal title to the protection of the government and the constitution.

"Because all the propositions have been rejected which have been made to obtain either a recognition of the rights of the slaveholding States to a common enjoyment of all the territory of the United States, or to a fair division of that territory between the slaveholding and non-slaveholding States of the Union--every effort having failed which has been made to obtain a fair division of the territory proposed to be brought in as the State of California.

"But, lastly, we dissent from this bill, and solemnly protest against its passage, because, in sanctioning measures so contrary to former precedent, to obvious policy, to the spirit and intent of the constitution of the United States, for the purpose of excluding the slaveholding States from the territory thus to be erected into a State, this government in effect declares, that the exclusion of slavery from the territory of the United States is an object so high and important as to justify a disregard not only of all the principles of sound policy, but also of the constitution itself. Against this conclusion we must now and for ever protest, as it is destructive of the safety and liberties of those whose rights have been committed to our care, fatal to the peace and equality of the States which we represent, and must lead, if persisted in, to the dissolution of that confederacy, in which the slaveholding States have never sought more than equality, and in which they will not be content to remain with less."

This protest was signed by Messrs. Mason and Hunter, senators from Virginia; Messrs. Butler and Barnwell, senators from South Carolina; Mr. Turney, senator from Tennessee; Mr. Pierre Soulé, senator from Louisiana; Mr. Jefferson Davis, senator from Mississippi; Mr. Atchison, senator from Missouri; and Messrs. Morton and Yulee, senators from Florida. It is remarkable that this protest is not on account of any power exercised by Congress over the subject of slavery in a territory, but for the non-exercise of such power, and especially for not extending the Missouri compromise line to the Pacific Ocean; and which non-extension of that line was then cause for the dissolution of the Union.

Mr. Winthrop, newly appointed senator from Massachusetts, in place of Mr. Webster, appointed Secretary of State, immediately raised the question of reception upon this protest, for the purpose of preventing it from going upon the Journal, where, he alleged, the only protest that could be entered by a senator (and that was a sufficient one) was his peremptory "no:" and then said:

"Sir, does my honorable friend from Virginia (Mr. Hunter), know that there is but one parliamentary body in the world--so far as my own knowledge, certainly, goes--which acknowledges an inherent right in its members to enter their protests upon the Journals? That body is the British House of Lords. It is the privilege of every peer, as I understand it, to enter upon the Journals his protest against any measure which may have been passed contrary to his own individual views or wishes. But what has been the practice in our own country? You, yourself, Mr. President, have read to us an authority upon this subject. It seems that in the earliest days of our history, when there may have been something more of a disposition than I hope prevails among us now, to copy the precedents of the British government, a rule was introduced into this body for the purpose of securing to the senators of the several States this privilege which belongs to the peers of the British Parliament. That proposition was negatived. I know not by what majority, for you did not read the record; I know not by whose votes; but that rule was rejected. It was thus declared in the early days of our history that this body should not be assimilated to the British House of Lords in this respect, however it may be in any other; and that individual senators should not be allowed this privilege which belongs to British peers, of spreading upon the Journals the reasons which may have influenced their votes."

Mr. Benton spoke against the reception of the protest, denying the right of senators to file any reasons upon the Journal for their vote; and said:

"In the British House of Lords, Mr. President, this right prevails, but not in the House of Commons; and I will show you before I have done that the attempt to introduce it into the House of Commons gave rise to altercation, well-nigh led to bloodshed on the floor of the House, and caused the member who attempted to introduce it, though he asked leave to do so, to be committed to the Tower for his presumption. And I will show that we begin the practice here at a point at which the British Parliament had arrived, long after they commenced the business of entering the dissents. It will be my business to show that, notwithstanding the British House of Lords in the beginning entered the protestor's name under the word 'dissent,' precisely as our names are entered here under the word 'nay,' it went on until something very different took place, and which ended in authorizing any member who pleased to arraign the sense of the House, and to reproach the House whenever he pleased. Now, how came the lords to possess this right? It is because every lord is a power within himself. He is his own constituent body. He represents himself; and in virtue of that representation of himself, he can constitute a representative, and can give a proxy to any lord to vote for him on any measure not judicial. Members of the House of Commons cannot do it, because they are themselves nothing but proxies and representatives of the people. The House of Lords, then, who have this privilege and right of entering their dissent, have it by virtue of being themselves, each one, a power within himself, a constituent body to himself, having inherent rights which he derives from nobody, but which belong to him by virtue of being a peer of the realm; and by virtue of that he enters his protest on the Journal, if he pleases. It is a privilege belonging to every lord, each for himself, and is an absolute privilege; and although the form is to ask leave of the House, yet the House is bound to grant the leave."

Mr. Benton showed that there was no right of protest in the members of the British House of Commons--that the only time it was attempted there was during the strifes of Charles the First with the Parliament, and by Mr. Hyde (afterwards Lord Clarendon), who was committed prisoner to the Tower for presuming to insult the House, by proposing to set up his judgment against the act of the House after the House had acted. Having spoken against the right of the senators to enter a protest on the Journal against an act of the Senate, Mr. Benton proceeded to speak against the protest itself, and especially the concluding part of it, in which a dissolution of the Union was hypothetically predicated upon the admission of California.

"I now pass over what relates to the body or matter of the protest, and come to the concluding sentence, where, sir, I see a word which I am sorry to see, or hear used even in the heat of debate in this chamber. It is one which I believe I have not pronounced this session, not even hypothetically or historically, in speaking of every thing which has taken place. But I find it here, and I am sorry to see it. It is qualified, it is true; yet I am sorry to see it any where, and especially in a paper of such solemn import. It is in the concluding sentence:

'Against this conclusion we must now and for ever protest, as it is destructive of the safety and liberties of those whose rights have been committed to our care, fatal to the peace and equality of the States which we represent, and must lead, if persisted in, to the dissolution of that confederacy in which the slaveholding States have never sought more than an equality, and in which they will not be content to remain with less.'

"I grieve to see these words used with this deliberation; still more do I grieve to see an application made to enter them on the Journal of the Senate. Hypothetically they use the words; but we all know what this word "if" is--a great peacemaker, the poet tells us, between individuals, but, as we all know, a most convenient introduction to a positive conclusion. The language here is used solemnly, and the word protest is one of serious import. Protest is a word known to the law, and always implies authority, and one which is rarely used by individuals at all. It is a word of grave and authoritative import in the English language, which implies the testification of the truth! and a right to testify to it! and which is far above any other mode of asseveration. It comes from the Latin--testari, to be a witness--protestari, to be a public witness, to publish, avouch, and testify the truth; and can be only used on legal or on the most solemn occasions. It has given a name to a great division of the Christian family, who took the title from the fact of their 'protesting' against the imperial edicts of Charles V., which put on a level with the Holy Scriptures the traditions of the church and the opinions of the commentators. It was a great act of protesting, and an act of conscience and duty. It was a proper occasion to use the word protest; and it was used in the face of power, and maintained through oceans and seas of blood, until it has found an immortality in the name of one division of the Christian family.

"I have read to you from British history--history of 1640--the most eventful in the British annals--to show the first attempt to introduce a protest in the House of Commons--to show you how the men of that day--men in whose bosoms the love of liberty rose higher than love of self--the Puritans whose sacrifices for liberty were only equalled by their sacrifices to their religion--these men, from whom we learned so much, refused to suffer themselves to be arraigned by a minority--refused to suffer an indictment to be placed on their own Journals against themselves. I have shown you that a body in which were such men as Hampden, and Cromwell, and Pym, and Sir Harry Vane, would not allow themselves to be arraigned by a minority, or to be impeached before the people, and that they sent the man to the Tower who even asked leave to do it. This period of British history is that of the civil wars which deluged Great Britain with blood; and, sir, may there be no analogy to it in our history!--may there be no omen in this proceeding--nothing ominous in this attempted imitation of one of the scenes which preceded the outbreak of civil war in Great Britain. Sir, this protest is treated by some senators as a harmless and innocent matter; but I cannot so consider it. It is a novelty, but a portentous one, and connects itself with other novelties, equally portentous. The Senate must bear with me for a moment. I have refrained hitherto from alluding to the painful subject, and would not now do it if it was not brought forward in such a manner as to compel me. This is a novelty, and it connects itself with other novelties of a most important character. We have seen lately what we have never before seen in the history of the country--sectional meetings of members of Congress, sectional declarations by legislative bodies, sectional meetings of conventions, sectional establishment of a press here! and now the introduction of this protest, also sectional, and not only connecting itself in time and circumstances, but connecting itself by its arguments, by its facts, and by its conclusions, with all these sectional movements to which I have referred. It is a sectional protest.

"All of these sectional movements are based upon the hypothesis, that, if a certain state of things is continued, there is to be a dissolution of the Union. The Wilmot proviso, to be sure, is now dropped, or is not referred to in the protest. That cause of dissolution is dead; but the California bill comes in its place, and the system of measures of which it is said to be a part. Of these, the admission of California is now made the prominent, the salient point in that whole system, which hypothetically it is assumed may lead to a dissolution of the Union. Sir, I cannot help looking upon this protest as belonging to the series of novelties to which I have referred. I cannot help considering it as part of a system--as a link in a chain of measures all looking to one result, hypothetically, to be sure, but all still looking to the same result--that of a dissolution of the Union. It is afflicting enough to witness such things out of doors; but to enter a solemn protest on our Journals, looking to the contingent dissolution of the Union, and that for our own acts--for the acts of a majority--to call upon us of the majority to receive our own indictment, and enter it, without answer, upon our own Journals--is certainly going beyond all the other signs of the times, and taking a most alarming step in the progress which seems to be making in leading to a dreadful catastrophe. 'Dissolution' to be entered on our Journal! What would our ancestors have thought of it? The paper contains an enumeration of what it characterizes as unconstitutional, unjust, and oppressive conduct on the part of Congress against the South, which, if persisted in, must lead to a dissolution of the Union, and names the admission of California as one of the worst of these measures. I cannot consent to place that paper on our Journals. I protest against it--protest in the name of my constituents. I have made a stand against it. It took me by surprise; but my spirit rose and fought. I deem it my sacred duty to resist it--to resist the entrance upon our Journal of a paper hypothetically justifying disunion. If defeated, and the paper goes on the Journal, I still wish the present age and posterity to see that it was not without a struggle--not without a stand against the portentous measure--a stand which should mark one of those eras in the history of nations from which calamitous events flow."

The reception of the protest was refused, and the bill sent to the House of Representatives, and readily passed; and immediately receiving the approval of the President, the senators elect from California, who had been long waiting (Messrs. William M. Gwinn and John Charles Frémont), were admitted to their seats; but not without further and strenuous resistance. Their credentials being presented, Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, moved to refer them to the Committee on the Judiciary, to report on the law and the facts of the case; which motion led to a discussion, terminated by a call for the yeas and nays. The yeas were 12 in number; to wit: Messrs. Atchison, Barnwell, Berrien, Butler, Davis of Mississippi, Hunter, Mason, Morton, Pratt, Sebastian, Soulé, Turney. Only 12 voting for the reference, and 36 against it; the two senators elect were then sworn in, and took their seats.

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Chapter CXCVII

FUGITIVE SLAVES--ORDINANCE OF 1787: THE CONSTITUTION: ACT OF 1793: ACT OF 1850.

It is of record proof that the anti-slavery clause in the ordinance of 1787, could not be passed until the fugitive slave recovery clause was added to it. That anti-slavery clause, first prepared in the Congress of the confederation by Mr. Jefferson in 1784, and rejected, remained rejected for three years--until 1787; when receiving the additional clause for the recovery of fugitives, it was unanimously passed. This is clear proof that the first clause, prohibiting slavery in the Northwest territory, could not be obtained without the second, authorizing the recovery of slaves which should take refuge in that territory. It was a compromise between the slave States and the free States, unanimously agreed to by both parties, and founded on a valuable consideration--one preventing the spread of slavery over a vast extent of territory, the other retaining the right of property in the slaves which might flee to it. Simultaneously with the adoption of this article in the ordinance of 1787 was the formation of the constitution of the United States--both formed at the same time, in neighboring cities, and (it may be said) by the same men. The Congress sat in New York--the Federal Convention in Philadelphia--and, while the most active members of both were members of each, as Madison and Hamilton, yet, from constant interchange of opinion, the members of both bodies may be assumed to have worked together for a common object. The right to recover fugitive slaves went into the constitution, as it went into the ordinance, simultaneously and unanimously; and it may be assumed upon the facts of the case, and all the evidence of the day, that the constitution, no more than the ordinance, could have been formed without the fugitive slave recovery clause contained in it. A right to recover slaves is not only authorized by the constitution, but it is a right without which there would have been no constitution, and also no anti-slavery ordinance.

One of the early acts of Congress, as early as February, '93, was a statute to carry into effect the clause in the constitution for the reclamation of fugitives from justice, and fugitives from labor; and that statute, made by the men who made the constitution, may be assumed to be the meaning of the constitution, as interpreted by men who had a right to know its meaning. That act consisted of four sections, all brief and clear, and the first two of which exclusively applied to fugitives from justice. The third and fourth applied to fugitives from labor, embracing apprentices as well as slaves, and applying the same rights and remedies in each case: and of these two, the third alone contains the whole provision for reclaiming the fugitive--the fourth merely containing penalties for the obstruction of that right. The third section, then, is the only one essential to the object of this chapter, and is in these words:

"That when a person held to labor in any of the United States, or in either of the territories on the north-west, or south of Ohio, under the laws thereof, shall escape into any other of said States or territories, the person to whom such labor is due, his agent or attorney, is hereby empowered to seize or arrest such fugitive from labor, and to take him or her before any judge of the circuit or district courts of the United States, residing or being within the State, or before any magistrate of a county, city, or town corporate, wherein such seizure or arrest shall be made, and upon proof to the satisfaction of such judge or magistrate, either by oral testimony, or affidavit taken before and certified by a magistrate of any such State or territory, that the person so seized and arrested, doth under the laws of the State or territory from which he or she fled, owe service to the person claiming him or her, it shall be the duty of such judge or magistrate to give a certificate thereof to such claimant, his agent or attorney, which shall be sufficient warrant for removing the said fugitive from labor, to the State or territory from which he or she fled."

This act was passed on the recommendation of President Washington, in consequence of a case having arisen between Pennsylvania and Virginia, which showed the want of an act of Congress to carry the clause in the constitution into effect. It may be held to be a fair interpretation of the constitution, and by it the party claiming the service of the fugitive in any State or territory, had the right to seize his slave wherever he saw him, and to carry him before a judicial authority in the State; and upon affidavit, or oral testimony, showing his right, he was to receive a certificate to that effect, by virtue of which he might carry him back to the State from which he had fled. This act, thus fully recognizing the right of the claimant to seize his slave by mere virtue of ownership, and then to carry him out of the State upon a certificate, and without a trial, was passed as good as unanimously by the second Congress which sat under the constitution--the proceedings of the Senate showing no division, and in the House only seven voting against the bill, there being no separate vote on the two parts of it, and two of these seven from slave States (Virginia and Maryland). It does not appear to what part these seven objected--whether to the fugitive slave sections, or those which applied to fugitives from justice. Such unanimity in its passage, by those who helped to make the constitution, was high evidence in its favor: the conduct of the States, and both judiciaries, State and federal, were to the same effect. The act was continually enforced, and the courts decided that this right of the owner to seize his slave, was just as large in the free State to which he had fled as in the slave State from which he had run away--that he might seize, by night as well as by day, of Sundays as well as other days; and, also, in a house, provided no breach of the peace was committed. The penal section in the bill was clear and heavy, and went upon the ground of the absolute right of the master to seize his slave by his own authority wherever he saw him, and the criminality of any obstruction or resistance in the exercise of that right. It was in these words:

"That any person who shall knowingly and wilfully obstruct or hinder such claimant, his agent or attorney, in so seizing or arresting such fugitive from labor, or shall rescue such fugitive from such claimant, his agent or attorney, when so arrested pursuant to the authority herein given or declared; or shall harbor or conceal such person after notice that he or she was a fugitive from labor as aforesaid, shall, for either of the said offences, forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars. Which penalty may be recovered by and for the benefit of such claimant, by action of debt in any court proper to try the same, saving moreover to the person claiming such labor or service his right of action for or on account of the said injuries, or either of them."

State officers, the magistrates and judges, though not bound to act under the law of Congress, yet did so; and State jails, though not obligatory under a federal law, were freely used for the custody of the re-captured fugitive. This continued till a late day in most of the free States--in all of them until after the Congress of the United States engaged in the slavery agitation--and in the great State of Pennsylvania until the 20th of March, 1847: that is to say, until a month after the time that Mr. Calhoun brought into the Senate the slavery resolutions, stigmatized by Mr. Benton as "fire-brand," at the moment of their introduction, and which are since involving the Union in conflagration. Then Pennsylvania passed the act forbidding her judicial authorities to take cognizance of any fugitive slave case--granted a habeas corpus remedy to any fugitive arrested--denying the use of her jails to confine any one--and repealing the six months' slave sojourning law of 1780.

Some years before the passage of this harsh act, and before the slavery agitation had commenced in Congress, to wit, 1826 (which was nine years before the commencement of the agitation), Pennsylvania had passed a most liberal law of her own, done upon the request of Maryland, to aid the recovery of fugitive slaves. It was entitled, "An act to give effect to the Constitution of the United States in reclaiming fugitives from justice." Such had been the just and generous conduct of Pennsylvania towards the slave States until up to the time of passing the harsh act of 1847. Her legal right to pass that act is admitted; her magistrates were not bound to act under the federal law--her jails were not liable to be used for federal purposes. The sojourning law of 1780 was her own, and she had a right to repeal it. But the whole act of '47 was the exercise of a mere right, against the comity which is due to States united under a common head, against moral and social duty, against high national policy, against the spirit in which the constitution was made, against her own previous conduct for sixty years; and injurious and irritating to the people of the slave States, and parts of it unconstitutional. The denial of the intervention of her judicial officers, and the use of her prisons, though an inconvenience, was not insurmountable, and might be remedied by Congress; the repeal of the act of 1780 was the radical injury and for which there was no remedy in federal legislation.

That act was passed before the adoption of the constitution, and while the feelings of conciliation, good will, and entire justice, prevailed among the States; it was allowed to continue in force near sixty years after the constitution was made; and was a proof of good feeling towards all during that time. By the terms of this act, a discrimination was established between sojourners and permanent residents, and the element of time--the most obvious and easy of all arbiters--was taken for the rule of discrimination. Six months was the time allowed to discriminate a sojourner from a resident; and during that time the rights of the owner remained complete in his slave; after the lapse of that time, his ownership ceased. This six months was equally in favor of all persons; but there was a further and indefinite provision in favor of members of Congress, and of the federal government, all of whom, coming from slave States, were allowed to retain their ownership as long as their federal duties required them to remain in the State. Such an act was just and wise, and in accordance with the spirit of comity which should prevail among States formed into a Union, having a common general government, and reciprocating the rights of citizenship. It is to be deplored that any event ever arose to occasion the repeal of that act. It is to be wished that a spirit would arise to re-enact it; and that others of the free States should follow the example. For there were others, and several which had similar acts, and which have repealed them in like manner, as Pennsylvania--under the same unhappy influences, and with the same baleful consequences. New York, for example--her law of discrimination between the sojourner and the resident, being the same in principle, and still more liberal in detail, than that of Pennsylvania--allowing nine months instead of six, to determine that character.

This act of New York, like that of Pennsylvania, continued undisturbed in the State, until the slavery agitation took root in Congress; and was even so well established in the good opinion of the people of that State, as late as thirteen years after the commencement of that agitation, as to be boldly sustained by the candidates for the highest offices. Of this an eminent instance will be given in the canvass for the governorship of the State, in the year 1838. In that year Mr. Marcy and Mr. Seward were the opposing candidates, and an anti-slavery meeting, held at Utica, passed a resolve to have them interrogated (among other things) on the point of repealing the slave sojournment act. Messrs. Gerritt Smith, and William Jay, were nominated a committee for that purpose, and fulfilled their mission so zealously as rather to overstate the terms of the act, using the word "importation" as applied to the coming of these slaves with their owners, thus: "Are you in favor of the repeal of the law which now authorizes the importation of slaves into this State, and their detention here as such for the time of nine months?" Objecting to the substitution of the term importation, and stating the act correctly, both the candidates answered fully in the negative, and with reasons for their opinion. The act was first quoted in its own terms, as follows:

"Any person, not being an inhabitant of this State, who shall be travelling to or from, or passing through this State, may bring with him any person lawfully held by him in slavery, and may take such person with him from this State; but the person so held in slavery shall not reside or continue in this State more than nine months; and if such residence be continued beyond that time, such person shall be free."

Replying to the interrogatory, Mr. Marcy then proceeds to give his opinion and reasons in favor of sustaining the act, which he does unreservedly:

"By comparing this law with your interrogatory, you will perceive at once that the latter implies much more than the former expresses. The discrepancy between them is so great, that I suspected, at first, that you had reference to some other enactment which had escaped general notice. As none, however, can be found but the foregoing, to which the question is in any respect applicable, there will be no mistake, I presume, in assuming it to be the one you had in view. The deviation, in putting the question, from what would seem to be the plain and obvious course of directing the attention to the particular law under consideration, by referring to it in the very terms in which it is expressed, or at least in language showing its objects and limitations, I do not impute to an intention to create an erroneous impression as to the law, or to ascribe to it a character of odiousness which it does not deserve; yet I think that it must be conceded that your question will induce those who are not particularly acquainted with the section of the statute to which it refers, to believe that there is a law of this State which allows a free importation of slaves into it, without restrictions as to object, and without limitation as to the persons who may do so; yet this is very far from being true. This law does not permit any inhabitant of this State to bring into it any person held in slavery, under any pretence or for any object whatsoever; nor does it allow any person of any other State or country to do so, except such person is actually travelling to or from, or passing through this State. This law, in its operation and effect, only allows persons belonging to States or nations where domestic slavery exists, who happen to be travelling in this State, to be attended by their servants whom they lawfully hold in slavery when at home, provided they do not remain within our territories longer than nine months. The difference between it and the one implied by your interrogatory is so manifest, that it is perhaps fair to presume, that if those by whose appointment you act in this matter had not misapprehended its character, they would not have instructed you to make it the subject of one of your questions. It is so restricted in its object, and that is so unexceptionable, that it can scarcely be regarded as obnoxious to well-founded objections when viewed in its true light. Its repeal would, I apprehend, have an injurious effect upon our intercourse with some of the other States, and particularly upon their business connection with our commercial emporium. In addition to this, the repeal would have a tendency to disturb the political harmony among the members of our confederacy, without producing any beneficial results to compensate for these evils. I am not therefore in favor of it."

This is an explicit answer, meeting the interrogatory with a full negative, and impliedly rebuking the phrase "importation," by supposing it would not have been used if the Utica convention had understood the act. Mr. Seward answered in the same spirit, and to the same effect, only giving a little more amplitude to his excellent reasons. He says:

"Does not your inquiry give too broad a meaning to the section? It certainly does not confer upon any citizen of a State, or of any other country, or any citizen of any other State, except the owner of slaves in another State by virtue of the laws thereof, the right to bring slaves into this State or detain them here under any circumstances as such. I understand your inquiry, therefore to mean, whether I am in favor of a repeal of the law which declares, in substance, that any person from the southern or south-western States, who may be travelling to or from or passing thrugh the State, may bring with him and take with him any person lawfully held by him in slavery in the State from whence he came, provided such slaves do not remain here more than nine months. The article of the constitution of the United States which bears upon the present question, declares that no person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping to another State, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but such persons shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due. I understand that, in the State of Massachusetts, this provision of the constitution has been decided by the courts not to include the case of a slave brought by his master into the State, and escaping thence. But the courts of law in this State have uniformly given a different construction to the same article of the constitution, and have always decided that it does embrace the case of a slave brought by his master into this State, and escaping from him here. Consequently, under this judicial construction of the constitution, and without, and in defiance of any law or regulation of this State, if the slave escape from his master in this State, he must be restored to him, when claimed at any time during his master's temporary sojournment within the State, whether that sojournment be six months, nine months, or longer. It is not for me to say that this decision is erroneous, nor is it for our legislature. Acting under its authority, they passed the law to which you object, for the purpose, not of conferring new powers or privileges on the slave-owner, but to prevent his abuse of that which the constitution of the United States, thus expounded, secures to him. The law, as I understand it, was intended to fix a period of time as a test of transient passage through, or temporary residence in the State, within the provisions of the constitution. The duration of nine months is not material in the question, and if it be unnecessarily long, may and ought to be abridged. But, if no such law existed, the right of the master (under the construction of the constitution before mentioned) would be indefinite, and the slave must be surrendered to him in all cases of travelling through, or passage to or from the State. If I have correctly apprehended the subject, this law is not one conferring a right upon any person to import slaves into the State, and hold them here as such; but is an attempt at restriction upon the constitutional right of the master; a qualification, or at least a definition of it, and is in favor of the slave. Its repeal, therefore, would have the effect to put in greater jeopardy the class of persons you propose to benefit by it. While the construction of the constitution adopted here is maintained, the law, it would seem, ought to remain upon our statute book, not as an encroachment upon the rights of man, but a protection for them.

"But, gentlemen, being desirous to be entirely candid in this communication, it is proper I should add, that I am not convinced it would be either wise, expedient or humane, to declare to our fellow-citizens of the southern and south-western States, that if they travel to or from, or pass through the State of New York, they shall not bring with them the attendants whom custom, or education, or habit, may have rendered necessary to them. I have not been able to discover any good object to be attained by such an act of inhospitality. It certainly can work no injury to us, nor can it be injurious to the unfortunate beings held in bondage, to permit them, once perhaps in their lives, and at most, on occasions few and far between, to visit a country where slavery is unknown. I can even conceive of benefits to the great cause of human liberty, from the cultivation of this intercourse with the South. I can imagine but one ground of objection, which is, that it may be regarded as an implication that this State sanctions slavery. If this objection were well grounded, I should at once condemn the law. But, in truth, the law does not imply any such sanction. The same statute which, in necessary obedience to the constitution of the United States as expounded, declares the exception, condemns, in the most clear and definite terms, all human bondage. I will not press the considerations flowing from the nature of our Union, and the mutual concessions on which it was founded, against the propriety of such an exclusion as your question contemplates, apparently for the purpose only of avoiding an implication not founded in fact, and which the history of our State so nobly contradicts. It is sufficient to say that such an exclusion could have no good effect practically, and would accomplish nothing in the great cause of human liberty."

These answers do not seem to have affected the election in any way. Mr. Seward was elected, each candidate receiving the full vote of his party. Since that time the act has been repealed, and no voice has yet been raised to restore it. Just and meritorious as were the answers of Messrs. Marcy and Seward in favor of sustaining the sojourning act, their voice in favor of its restoration would be still more so now. It was a measure in the very spirit of the constitution, and in the very nature of a union, and in full harmony with the spirit of concession, deference and good-will in which the constitution was founded. Several other States had acts to the same effect, and the temper of the people in all the free States was accordant. It was not until after the slavery question became a subject of political agitation, in the national legislature, that these acts were repealed, and this spirit destroyed. Political agitation has done all the mischief.

The act of Pennsylvania, of March 3d, 1847, besides repealing the slave sojournment act of 1780--(an act made in the time of Dr. Franklin, and which had been on her statute-book near seventy years), besides repealing her recent act of 1826, and besides forbidding the use of her prisons, and the intervention of her officers in the recovery of fugitive slaves--besides all this, went on to make positive enactments to prevent the exercise of the rights of forcible recaption of fugitive slaves, as regulated by the act of Congress, under the clause in the constitution; and for that purpose contained this section:

"That if any person or persons claiming any negro or mulatto, as fugitive from servitude or labor, shall, under any pretence of authority whatever, violently and tumultuously seize upon and carry away in a riotous, violent, and tumultuous manner, and so as to disturb and endanger the public peace, any negro or mulatto within this commonwealth, either with or without the intention of taking such negro or mulatto before any district or circuit judge, the person or persons so offending against the peace of this commonwealth, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor; and on conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than two thousand dollars; and, further, be confined in the county jail for any period not exceeding three months, at the discretion of the court."

The granting of the habeas corpus writ to any fugitive slave completed the enactments of this statute, which thus carried out, to the full, the ample intimations contained in its title, to wit: "An act to prevent kidnapping, preserve the public peace, prohibit the exercise of certain powers heretofore exercised by judges, justices of the peace, aldermen, and jailers in this commonwealth; and, to repeal certain slave laws." This act made a new starting-point in the anti-slavery movements North, as the resolutions of Mr. Calhoun, of the previous month, made a new starting-point in the pro-slavery movements in the South. The first led to the new fugitive slave recovery act of 1850--the other has led to the abrogation of the Missouri Compromise line; and, between the two, the state of things has been produced which now afflicts and distracts the country, and is working a sectional divorce of the States.

A citizen of Maryland, acting under the federal law of '93, in recapturing his slave in Pennsylvania, was prosecuted under the State act of 1826--convicted--and sentenced to its penalties. The constitutionality of this enactment was in vain plead in the Pennsylvania court; but her authorities acted in the spirit of deference and respect to the authorities of the Union, and concurred in an "agreed case," to be carried before the Supreme Court of the United States, to test the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania law. That court decided fully and promptly all the points in the case, and to the full vindication of all the rights of a slaveholder, under the recaption clause in the constitution. The points decided cover the whole ground, and, besides, show precisely in what particular the act of 1793 required to be amended, to make it work out its complete effect under the constitution, independent of all extrinsic aid. The points were these:

"The provisions of the act of 12th of February, 1793, relative to fugitive slaves, is clearly constitutional in all its leading provisions, and, indeed, with the exception of that part which confers authority on State magistrates, is free from reasonable doubt or difficulty. As to the authority so conferred on State magistrates, while a difference of opinion exists, and may exist on this point, in different States, whether State magistrates are bound to act under it, none is entertained by the court, that State magistrates may, if they choose, exercise that authority, unless forbid by State legislation." "The power of legislation in relation to fugitives from labor is exclusive in the national legislature." "The right to seize and retake fugitive slaves, and the duty to deliver them up, in whatever State of the Union they may be found, is under the constitution recognized as an absolute, positive right and duty, pervading the whole Union with an equal and supreme force, uncontrolled and uncontrollable by State sovereignty or State legislation. The right and duty are co-extensive and uniform in remedy and operation throughout the whole Union. The owner has the same exemption from State regulations and control, through however many States he may pass with the fugitive slaves in his possession in transitu to his domicil." "The act of the legislature of Pennsylvania, on which the indictment against Edward Prigg was founded, for carrying away a fugitive slave, is unconstitutional and void. It purports to punish, as a public offence against the State, the very act of seizing and removing a slave by his master, which the constitution of the United States was designed to justify and uphold." "The constitutionality of the act of Congress (1793), relating to fugitives from labor, has been affirmed by the adjudications of the State tribunals, and by those of the courts of the United States."

This decision of the Supreme Court--so clear and full--was further valuable in making visible to the legislative authority what was wanting to give efficacy to the act of 1793; it was nothing but to substitute federal commissioners for the State officers forbidden to act under it; and that substitution might have been accomplished in an amendatory bill of three or four lines--leaving all the rest of the act as it was. Unfortunately Congress did not limit itself to an amendment of the act of 1793; it made a new law--long and complex--and striking the public mind as a novelty. It was early in the session of 1849-'50 that the Judiciary Committee of the Senate reported a bill on the subject; it was a bill long and complex, and distasteful to all sides of the chamber, and lay upon the table six months untouched. It was taken up in the last weeks of a nine months' session, and substituted by another bill, still longer and more complex. This bill also was very distasteful to the Senate (the majority), and had the singular fate of being supported in its details, and passed into law, with less than a quorum of the body in its favor, and without ever receiving the full senatorial vote of the slave States. The material votes upon it, before it was passed, were on propositions to give the fugitive a jury trial, if he desired it, upon the question of his condition--free or slave; and upon the question of giving him the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus. The first of these propositions originated with Mr. Webster, but was offered in his absence by Mr. Dayton, of New Jersey. He (Mr. Webster) drew up a brief bill early in the session, to supply the defect found in the working of the act of '93; it was short and simple; but it contained a proviso in favor of a jury trial when the fugitive denied his servitude. That would have been about always; and this jury trial, besides being incompatible with the constitution, and contradictory to all cases of proceeding against fugitives, would have been pretty sure to have been fatal to the pursuer's claim; and certainly both expensive and troublesome to him. It was contrary to the act of 1793, and contrary to the whole established course of reclaiming fugitives, which is always to carry them back to the place from which they fled to be tried. Thus, if a man commits an offence in one country, and flies to another, he is carried back; so, if he flies from one State to another; and so in all the extradition treaties between foreign nations. All are carried back to the place from which they fled, the only condition being to establish the flight and the probable cause; and that in the case of fugitives from labor, as well as from justice, both of which classes are put together in the constitution of the United States, and in the fugitive act of 1793. The proposition was rejected by a vote of eleven to twenty-seven. The yeas were: Messrs. Davis of Massachusetts, Dayton, Dodge of Wisconsin, Greene, Hamlin, Phelps, Smith, Upham, Walker of Wisconsin, and Winthrop. The nays were: Messrs. Atchison, Badger, Barnwell, Bell, Benton, Berrien, Butler, Cass, Davis of Mississippi, Dawson, Dodge of Iowa, Downs, Houston, Jones of Iowa, King, Mangum, Mason, Morton, Pratt of Maryland, Rusk, Sebastian, Soulé, Sturgeon, Turney, Underwood, Wales, Yulee. The motion in favor of granting the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus to the fugitive was made by Mr. Winthrop, and rejected by the same vote of eleven yeas and twenty-seven nays. Other amendments were offered and disposed of, and the question coming on the passing of the bill, Mr. Cass, in speaking his own sentiments in favor of merely amending the act of 1793, also spoke the sentiments of many others, saying:

"When this subject was before the compromise committee, there was a general wish, and in that I fully concurred, that the main features of the act of 1793 upon this subject, so far as they were applicable, should be preserved, and that such changes as experience has shown to be necessary to a fair and just enforcement of the provisions of the constitution for the surrender of fugitive slaves, should be introduced by way of amendment. That law was approved by Washington, and has now been in force for sixty years, and lays down, among others, four general principles, to which I am prepared to adhere: 1. The right of the master to arrest his fugitive slave wherever he may find him. 2. His duty to carry him before a magistrate in the State where he is arrested, and that claim may be adjudged by him. 3. The duty of the magistrate to examine the claim, and to decide it, like other examining magistrates, without a jury, and then to commit him to the custody of the master. 4. The right of the master then to remove the slave to his residence. At the time this law was passed, every justice of the peace throughout the Union was required to execute the duties under it. Since then, as we all know, the Supreme Court has decided that justices of the peace cannot be called upon to execute this law, and the consequence is, that they have almost every where refused to do so. The master seeking his slave found his remedy a good one at the time, but now very ineffectual; and this defect is one that imperiously requires a remedy. And this remedy I am willing to provide, fairly and honestly, and to make such other provisions as may be proper and necessary. But I desire for myself that the original act should remain upon the statute book, and that the changes shown to be necessary should be made by way of amendment."

The vote on the passing of the bill was 27 to 12, the yeas being: Messrs. Atchison, Badger, Barnwell, Bell, Berrien, Butler, Davis of Miss., Dawson, Dodge of Iowa, Downs, Foote, Houston, Hunter, Jones of Iowa, King, Mangum, Mason, Pearce, Rusk, Sebastian, Soulé, Spruance, Sturgeon, Turney, Underwood, Wales, and Yulee. The nays were: Messrs. Baldwin, Bradbury, Cooper, Davis of Mass., Dayton, Dodge of Wisconsin, Greene of Rhode Island, Smith, Upham, Walker, and Winthrop. Above twenty senators did not vote at all upon the bill, of whom Mr. Benton was one. Nearly the whole of these twenty would have voted for an amendment to the act of 1793, supplying federal officers in place of the State officers who were to assist in its execution. Some three or four lines would have done that; but instead of this brief enactment to give effect to an ancient and well-known law, there was a long bill of ten sections, giving the aspect of a new law; and with such multiplied and complex provisions as to render the act inexecutable, except at a cost and trouble which would render the recovery of little or no value; and to be attended with an array and machinery which would excite disturbance, and scenes of force and violence, and render the law odious. It passed the House, and became a law, and has verified all the objections taken to it.

Mr. Benton did not speak upon this bill at the time of its passage; he had done that before, in a previous stage of the question, and when Mr. Clay proposed to make it a part of his compromise measures. He (Mr. Benton) was opposed to confounding an old subject of constitutional obligation with new and questionable subjects, and was ready to give the subject an independent consideration, and to vote for any bill that should be efficient and satisfactory. He said:

"We have a bill now--an independent one--for the recovery of these slaves. It is one of the oldest on the calendar, and warmly pressed at the commencement of the session. It must be about ripe for decision by this time. I am ready to vote upon it, and to vote any thing under the constitution which will be efficient and satisfactory. It is the only point, in my opinion, at which any of the non-slaveholding States, as States, have given just cause of complaint to the slaveholding States. I leave out individuals and societies, and speak of States in their corporate capacity; and say, this affair of the runaway slaves is the only case in which any of the non-slaveholding States, in my opinion, have given just cause of complaint to the slaveholding States. But, how is it here? Any refusal on the part of the northern members to legislate the remedy? We have heard many of them declare their opinions; and I see no line of east and west dividing the north from the south in these opinions. I see no geographical boundary dividing northern and southern opinions. I see no diversity of opinion but such as occurs in ordinary measures before Congress. For one, I am ready to vote at once for the passage of a fugitive slavery recovery bill; but it must be as a separate and independent measure."

Mr. Benton voted upon the amendments, and to make the bill efficient and satisfactory; but failed to make it either, and would neither vote for it nor against it. It has been worth but little to the slave States in recovering their property, and has been annoying to the free States from the manner of its execution, and is considered a new act, though founded upon that of '93, which is lost and hid under it. The wonder is how such an act came to pass, even by so lean a vote as it received--for it was voted for by less than the number of senators from the slave States alone. It is a wonder how it passed at all, and the wonder increases on knowing that, of the small number that voted for it, many were against it, and merely went along with those who had constituted themselves the particular guardians of the rights of the slave States, and claimed a lead in all that concerned them.

Those self-constituted guardians were permitted to have their own way; some voting with them unwillingly, others not voting at all. It was a part of the plan of "compromise and pacification," which was then deemed essential to save the Union: and under the fear of danger to the Union on one hand, and the charms of pacification and compromise on the other, a few heated spirits got the control, and had things their own way. Under other circumstances--in any season of quiet and tranquillity--the vote of Congress would have been almost general against the complex, cumbersome, expensive, annoying, and ineffective bill that was passed, and in favor of the act (with the necessary amendment) which Washington recommended and signed--which State and Federal judiciaries had sanctioned--which the people had lived under for nearly sixty years, and against which there was no complaint until slavery agitation had become a political game to be played at by parties from both sides of the Union. All public men disavow that game. All profess patriotism. All applaud the patriotic spirit of our ancestors. Then imitate that spirit. Do as these patriotic fathers did--the free States by reviving the sojournment laws which gave safety to the slave property of their fellow-citizens of other States passing through them--the slave States by acting in the spirit of those who enacted the anti-slavery ordinance of 1787, and the Missouri Compromise line of 1820. New York and Pennsylvania are the States to begin, and to revive the sojournment laws which were in force within them for half a century. The man who would stand up in each of these States and propose the revival of these acts, for the same reasons that Messrs. Marcy and Seward opposed their repeal, would give a proof of patriotism which would entitle him to be classed with our patriotic ancestors.

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Chapter CXCVIII

DISUNION MOVEMENTS: SOUTHERN PRESS AT WASHINGTON: SOUTHERN CONVENTION AT NASHVILLE: SOUTHERN CONGRESS CALLED FOR BY SOUTH CAROLINA AND MISSISSIPPI.

"When the future historian shall address himself to the task of portraying the rise, progress, and decline of the American Union, the year 1850 will arrest his attention, as denoting and presenting the first marshalling and arraying of those hostile forces and opposing elements which resulted in dissolution; and the world will have another illustration of the great truth, that forms and modes of government, however correct in theory, are only valuable as they conduce to the great ends of all government--the peace, quiet, and conscious security of the governed."

So wrote a leading South Carolina paper on the first day of January, 1850--and not without a knowledge of what it was saying. All that was said was attempted, and the catastrophe alone was wanting to complete the task assigned to the future historian.

The manifesto of the forty-two members from the slave States, issued in 1849, was not a brutum fulmen, nor intended to be so. It was intended for action, and was the commencement of action; and regular steps for the separation of the slave from the free States immediately began under it. An organ of disunion, entitled "The Southern Press," was set up at Washington, established upon a contribution of $30,000 from the signers to the Southern manifesto, and their ardent adherents--its daily occupation to inculcate the advantages of disunion, to promote it by inflaming the South against the North, and to prepare it by organizing a Southern concert of action. Southern cities were to recover their colonial superiority in a state of sectional independence; the ships of all nations were to crowd their ports to carry off their rich staples, and bring back ample returns; Great Britain was to be the ally of the new "United States South;" all the slave States were expected to join, but the new confederacy to begin with the South Atlantic States, or even a part of them; and military preparation was to be made to maintain by force what a Southern convention should decree. That convention was called--the same which had been designated in the first manifesto, entitled THE CRISIS, published in the Charleston Mercury in 1835; and the same which had been repulsed from Nashville in 1844. Fifteen years of assiduous labor produced what could not be started in 1835, and what had been repulsed in 1844. A disunion convention met at Nashville! met at the home of Jackson, but after the grave had become his home.

This convention (assuming to represent seven States) took the decisive step, so far as it depended upon itself, towards a separation of the States. It invited the assembling of a "Southern Congress." Two States alone responded to that appeal--South Carolina and Mississippi; and the legislatures of these two passed solemn acts to carry it into effect--South Carolina absolutely, by electing her quota of representatives to the proposed congress; Mississippi provisionally, by subjecting her law to the approval of the people. Of course, each State gave a reason, or motive for its action. South Carolina simply asserted the "aggressions" of the slaveholding States to be the cause, without stating what these aggressions were; and, in fact, there were none to be stated. For even the repeal of the slave sojournment law in some of them, and the refusal to permit the State prisons to be used for the detention of fugitives from service, or State officers to assist in their arrest, though acts of unfriendly import, and a breach of the comity due to sister States, and inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution, were still acts which the States, as sovereign within their limits upon the subjects to which they refer, had a right to pass. Besides, Congress had readily passed the fugitive slave recovery bill, just as these Southern members wished it; and left them without complaint against the national legislature on that score. All other matters of complaint which had successively appeared against the free States were gone--Wilmot Proviso, and all. The act of Mississippi gave two reasons for its action:

"First. That the legislation of Congress, at the last session, was controlled by a dominant majority regardless of the constitutional rights of the slaveholding States: and,

"Secondly. That the legislation of Congress, such as it was, affords alarming evidence of a settled purpose on the part of said majority to destroy the institution of slavery, not only in the State of Mississippi, but in her sister States, and to subvert the sovereign power of that and other slaveholding States."

Waiving the question whether these reasons, if true, would be sufficient to justify this abrupt attempt to break up the Union, an issue of fact can well be taken on their truth: and first, of the dominant majority of the last session, ending September 1850: that majority, in every instance, was helped out by votes from the slave States, and generally by a majority of them. The admission of California, which was the act of the session most complained of, most resisted, and declared to be a "test" question, was supported by a majority of the members from the slave States: so that reason falls upon the trial of an issue of fact. The second set of reasons have for their point, an assertion that the majority in Congress have a settled purpose to destroy the institution of slavery in the State of Mississippi, and in the other slave States, and to subvert the sovereignty of all the slave States. It is the duty of history to deal with this assertion, thus solemnly put in a legislative act as a cause for the secession of a State from the Union--and to say, that it was an assertion without evidence, and contrary to the evidence, and contrary to the fact. There was no such settled purpose in the majority of Congress, nor in a minority of Congress, nor in any half-dozen members of Congress--if in any one at all. It was a most deplorable assertion of a most alarming design, calculated to mislead and inflame the ignorant, and make them fly to disunion as the refuge against such an appalling catastrophe. But it was not a new declaration. It was part and parcel of the original agitation of slavery commenced in 1835, and continued ever since. To destroy slavery in the States has been the design attributed to the Northern States from that day to this, and is necessary to be kept up in order to keep alive the slavery agitation in the slave States. It has received its constant and authoritative contradiction in the conduct of those States at home, and in the acts of their representatives in Congress, year in and year out; and continues to receive that contradiction, continually; but without having the least effect upon its repetition and incessant reiteration. In the mean time there is a fact visible in all the slave States, which shows that, notwithstanding these twenty years' repetition of the same assertion, there is no danger to slavery in any slave State. Property is timid! and slave property above all: and the market is the test of safety and danger to all property. Nobody gives full price for anything that is insecure, either in title or possession. All property, in danger from either cause, sinks in price when brought to that infallible test. Now, how is it with slave property, tried by this unerring standard? Has it been sinking in price since the year 1835? since the year of the first alarm manifesto in South Carolina, and the first of Mr. Calhoun's twenty years' alarm speeches in the Senate? On the contrary, the price has been constantly rising the whole time--and is still rising, although it has attained a height incredible to have been predicted twenty years ago.

But, although the slavery alarm does not act on property, yet it acts on the feelings and passions of the people, and excites sectional animosity, hatred for the Union, and desire for separation. The Nashville convention, and the call for the Southern Congress, were natural occasions to call out these feelings; and most copiously did they flow. Some specimens, taken from the considered language of men in high authority, and speaking advisedly, and for action, will show the temper of the whole--the names withheld, because the design is to show a danger, and not to expose individuals.

In the South Carolina Legislature, a speaker declared:

"We must secede from a Union perverted from its original purpose, and which has now become an engine of oppression to the South. He thought our proper course was for this legislature to proceed directly to the election of delegates to a Southern Congress. He thought we should not await the action of all the Southern States; but it is prudent for us to await the action of such States as Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and Florida; because these States have requested us to wait. If we can get but one State to unite with us, then we must act. Once being independent, we would have a strong ally in England. But we must prepare for secession."

Another:

"The friends of the Southern movement in the other States look to the action of South Carolina; and he would make the issue in a reasonable time, and the only way to do so is by secession. There would be no concert among the Southern States until a blow is struck. And if we are sincere in our determination to resist, we must give the South some guarantee that we are in earnest. He could not concur with the gentleman from Greenville in his expressions of attachment to the Union. He hated and detested the Union, and was in favor of cutting the connection. He avowed himself a disunionist--a disunionist per se. If he had the power, he would crush this Union to-morrow."

Another:

"Denied the right or the power of the general government to coerce the State in case of secession. This State is sovereign and independent, so soon as she sees proper to assert that sovereignty. And when can we be stronger than we are now? If we intend to wait until we become superior to the federal government in numerical strength, we will wait for ever. In the event of an attempt to coerce her, sacrifices might be made, but we are willing and ready to make those sacrifices. But he did not believe one gun would be fired in this contest. South Carolina would achieve a bloodless victory. But, should there be a war, all the nations of Europe would be desirous of preserving their commercial intercourse with the Southern States, and would make the effort to do so. He thought there never would be a union of the South until this State strikes the blow, and makes the issue."

Another:

"Would not recapitulate the evils which had been perpetrated upon the South. Great as they have been, they are comparatively unimportant, when compared with the evils to which they would inevitably lead. We must not consider what we have borne, but what we must bear hereafter. There is no remedy for these evils in the government; we have no alternative left us, then, but to come out of the government."

Another:

"He was opposed to calling a convention, because he thought it would impede the action of this State on the questions now before the country. He thought it would impede our progress towards disunion. All his objections to a convention of the people applied only to the proposition to call it now. He thought conventions dangerous things, except when the necessities of the country absolutely demand them. He said that he had adopted the course he had taken on these weighty matters simply and entirely with the view of hastening the dissolution of this Union."

Another:

"Would sustain the bill for electing delegates to a Southern Congress, because he thought it would bring about a more speedy dissolution of the Union."

In the Nashville convention a delegate said:

"I shall enumerate no more of the wrongs that we have suffered, or the dangers with which we are threatened. If these, so enormous and so atrocious, are not sufficient to arouse the Southern mind, our case is desperate. But, supposing that we shall be roused, and that we shall act like freemen, and, knowing our rights and our wrongs, shall be prepared to sustain the one and redress the other, what is the remedy? I answer secession--united secession of the slaveholding States, or a large number of them. Nothing else will be wise--nothing else will be practicable. The Rubicon is passed. The Union is already dissolved. Instead of wishing the perpetuity of any government over such vast boundaries, the rational lover of liberty should wish for its speedy dissolution, as dangerous to all just and free rule. Is not all this exemplified in our own case? In nine months, in one session of Congress, by a great coup d'etat, our constitution has been completely and for ever subverted. Instead of a well balanced government, all power is vested in one section of the country, which is in bitter hostility with the other. And this is the glorious Union which we are to support, for whose eternal duration we are to pray, and before which the once proud Southron is to bow down. He ought to perish rather."

"They have not, however, been satisfied with taking all (the territory). They have made that all a wicked instrument for the abolition of the constitution, and of every safeguard of our property and our lives. I have said they have made the appropriation of this territory an instrument to abolish the constitution. There is no doubt that they have abolished the constitution. The carcass may remain, but the spirit has left it. It is now a fetid mass, generating disease and death. It stinks in our nostrils."

"A constitution means ex vi termini, a guarantee of the rights, liberty, and security of a free people, and can never survive in the shape of dead formalities. It is a thing of life, and just and fair proportions; not the caput mortuum which the so-called Constitution of the United States has now become. Is there a Southern man who bears a soul within his ribs, who will consent to be governed by this vulgar tyranny," &c.

From public addresses:

"Under the operation of causes beyond the scan of man, we are rapidly approaching a great and important crisis in our history. The shadow of the sun has gone back upon the dial of American liberty, and we are rapidly hastening towards the troubled sea of revolution. A dissolution of the Union is our inevitable destiny, and it is idle for man to raise his puny arm to stem the tide of events," &c.

Another:

"We must form a separate government. The slaveholding States must all yet see that their only salvation consists in uniting, and that promptly too, in organizing a Southern confederacy. Should we be wise enough thus to unite, all California, with her exhaustless treasures, would be ours; all New Mexico also, and the sun would never shine upon a country so rich, so great and so powerful, as would be our Southern republic."

Another:

"By our physical power," said one of the foremost of those leaders, in a late speech to his constituents, "we can protect ourselves against foreign nations, whilst by our productions we can command their peace or support. The keys of their wealth and commerce are in our hands, which we will freely offer to them by a system of free trade, making our prosperity their interest--our security their care. The lingering or decaying cities of the South, which before our Revolution carried on all their foreign commerce, buoyant with prosperity and wealth, but which now are only provincial towns, sluggish suburbs of Boston and New York, will rise up to their natural destiny, and again enfold in their embraces the richest commerce of the world. Wealth, honor, and power, and one of the most glorious destinies which ever crowned a great and happy people, awaits the South, if she but control her own fate; but, controlled by another people, what pen shall paint the infamous and bloody catastrophe which must mark her fall?"

From fourth of July toasts:

"The Union: A splendid failure of the first modern attempt, by people of different institutions, to live under the same government.

"The Union: For it we have endured much; for it we have sacrificed much. Let us beware lest we endure too much; lest we sacrifice too much.

"Disunion rather than degradation.

"South Carolina: She struck for the Union when it was a blessing; when it becomes a curse, she will strike for herself.

"The Compromise: 'The best the South can get.' A cowardly banner held out by the spoilsman that would sell his country for a mess of pottage.

"The American Eagle: In the event of a dissolution of the Union, the South claims as her portion, the heart of the noble bird; to the Yankees we leave the feathers and carcass.

"The South: Fortified by right, she considers neither threats nor consequences.

"The Union: Once a holy alliance, now an accursed bond."

Among the multitude of publications most numerous in South Carolina and Mississippi, but also appearing in other slave States, all advocating disunion, there were some (like Mr. Calhoun's letter to the Alabama member which feared the chance might be lost which the Wilmot Proviso furnished) also that feared agitation would stop in Congress, and deprive the Southern politicians of the means of uniting the slave States in a separate confederacy. Of this class of publications here is one from a leading paper:

"The object of South Carolina is undoubtedly to dissolve this Union, and form a confederacy of slaveholding States. Should it be impossible to form this confederacy, then her purpose is, we believe conscientiously, to disconnect herself from the Union, and set up for an independent Power. Will delay bring to our assistance the slaveholding States? If the slavery agitation, its tendencies and objects, were of recent origin, and not fully disclosed to the people of the South, delay might unite us in concerted action. We have no indication that Congress will soon pass obnoxious measures, restricting or crippling directly the institution of slavery. Every indication makes us fear that a pause in fanaticism is about to follow, to allow the government time to consolidate her late acquisitions and usurpations of power. Then the storm will be again let loose to gather its fury, and burst upon our heads. We have no hopes that the agitation in Congress, this or next year, will bring about the union of the South."

Enough to show the spirit that prevailed, and the extraordinary and unjustifiable means used by the leaders to mislead and exasperate the people. The great effort was to get a "Southern Congress" to assemble, according to the call of the Nashville convention. The assembling of that "Congress" was a turning point in the progress of disunion. It failed. At the head of the States which had the merit of stopping it, was Georgia--the greatest of the South-eastern Atlantic States. At the head of the presses which did most for the Union, was the National Intelligencer at Washington City, long edited by Messrs. Gales & Seaton, and now as earnest against Southern disunion in 1850 as they were against the Hartford convention disunion of 1814. The Nashville convention, the Southern Congress, and the Southern Press established at Washington, were the sequence and interpretation (so far as its disunion-design needed interpretation), of the Southern address drawn by Mr. Calhoun. His last speech, so far as it might need interpretation, received it soon after his death in a posthumous publication of his political writings, abounding with passages to show that the Union was a mistake--the Southern States ought not to have entered into it, and should not now re-enter it, if out of it, and that its continuance was impossible as things stood: Thus:

"All this has brought about a state of things hostile to the continuance of this Union, and the duration of the government. Alienation is succeeding to attachment, and hostile feelings to alienation; and these, in turn, will be followed by revolution, or a disruption of the Union, unless timely prevented. But this cannot be done by restoring the government to its federal character--however necessary that may be as a first step. What has been done cannot be undone. The equilibrium between the two sections has been permanently destroyed by the measures above stated. The Northern section, in consequence, will ever concentrate within itself the two majorities of which the government is composed; and should the Southern be excluded from all the territories, now acquired, or to be hereafter acquired, it will soon have so decided a preponderance in the government and the Union, as to be able to mould the constitution to its pleasure. Against this the restoration of the federal character of the government can furnish no remedy. So long as it continues there can be no safety for the weaker section. It places in the hands of the stronger and the hostile section, the power to crush her and her institutions; and leaves no alternative but to resist, or sink down into a colonial condition. This must be the consequence, if some effectual and appropriate remedy is not applied.

"The nature of the disease is such, that nothing can reach it, short of some organic change--a change which will so modify the constitution as to give to the weaker section, in some one form or another, a negative on the action of the government. Nothing short of this can protect the weaker, and restore harmony and tranquillity to the Union by arresting effectually the tendency of the dominant section to oppress the weaker. When the constitution was formed, the impression was strong that the tendency to conflict would be between the larger and smaller States; and effectual provisions were accordingly made to guard against it. But experience has proved this to be a mistake; and that instead of being as was then supposed, the conflict is between the two great sections which are so strongly distinguished by their institutions, geographical character, productions and pursuits. Had this been then as clearly perceived as it now is, the same jealousy which so vigilantly watched and guarded against the danger of the larger States oppressing the smaller, would have taken equal precaution to guard against the same danger between the two sections. It is for us, who see and feel it, to do, what the framers of the constitution would have done, had they possessed the knowledge, in this respect, which experience has given to us; that is, to provide against the dangers which the system has practically developed; and which, had they been foreseen at the time, and left without guard, would undoubtedly have prevented the States forming the Southern section of the confederacy, from ever agreeing to the constitution; and which, under like circumstances, were they now out of, would for ever prevent them entering into the Union. How the constitution could best be modified, so as to effect the object, can only be authoritatively determined by the amending power. It may be done in various ways. Among others, it might be effected through a re-organization of the Executive Department; so that its powers, instead of being vested, as they now are, in a single officer, should be vested in two, to be so elected, as that the two should be constituted the special organs and representatives of the respective sections in the Executive Department of the government; and requiring each to approve of all the acts of Congress before they become laws. One might be charged with the administration of matters connected with the foreign relations of the country; and the other, of such as were connected with its domestic institutions: the selection to be decided by lot. Indeed it may be doubted, whether the framers of the constitution did not commit a great mistake, in constituting a single, instead of a plural executive. Nay, it may even be doubted whether a single magistrate, invested with all the powers properly appertaining to the Executive Department of the government, as is the President, is compatible with the permanence of a popular government; especially in a wealthy and populous community, with a large revenue, and a numerous body of officers and employées. Certain it is, that there is no instance of a popular government so constituted which has long endured. Even ours, thus far, furnishes no evidence in its favor, and not a little against it: for, to it the present disturbed and dangerous state of things, which threaten the country with monarchy or disunion, may be justly attributed."

The observing reader, who may have looked over the two volumes of this View, in noting the progress of the slavery agitation, and its successive alleged causes for disunion, must have been struck with the celerity with which these causes, each in its turn, as soon as removed, has been succeeded by another, of a different kind; until, at last, they terminate in a cause which ignores them all, and find a new reason for disunion in the constitution itself! in that constitution, the protection of which had been invoked as sufficient, during the whole period of the alleged "aggressions and encroachments." In 1835, when the first agitation manifesto and call for a Southern convention, and invocation to unity and concert of action, came forth in the Charleston Mercury, entitled "The Crisis," the cause of disunion was then in the abolition societies established in some of the free States, and which these States were required to suppress. Then came the abolition petitions presented in Congress; then the mail transmission of incendiary publications; then the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia; then the abolition of the slave trade between the States; then the exclusion of slavery from Oregon; then the Wilmot Proviso; then the admission of California with a free constitution. Each of these, in its day, was a cause of disunion, to be effected through the instrumentality of a Southern convention, forming a sub-confederacy, in flagrant violation of the constitution, and effecting the disunion by establishing a commercial non-intercourse with the free States. After twenty years' agitation upon these points, they are all given up. The constitution, and the Union, were found to be a "mistake" from the beginning--an error in their origin, and an impossibility in their future existence, and to be amended into another impossibility, or broken up at once.

The regular inauguration of this slavery agitation dates from the year 1835; but it had commenced two years before, and in this way: nullification and disunion had commenced in 1830 upon complaint against protective tariff. That being put down in 1833 under President Jackson's proclamation and energetic measures, was immediately substituted by the slavery agitation. Mr. Calhoun, when he went home from Congress in the spring of that year, told his friends, That the South could never be united against the North on the tariff question--that the sugar interest of Louisiana would keep her out--and that the basis of Southern union must be shifted to the slave question. Then all the papers in his interest, and especially the one at Washington, published by Mr. Duff Green, dropped tariff agitation, and commenced upon slavery; and, in two years, had the agitation ripe for inauguration on the slavery question. And, in tracing this agitation to its present stage, and to comprehend its rationale, it is not to be forgotten that it is a mere continuation of old tariff disunion; and preferred because more available.

In June, 1833, at the first transfer of Southern agitation from tariff to slavery, Mr. Madison wrote to Mr. Clay:

"It is painful to see the unceasing efforts to alarm the South, by imputations against the North of unconstitutional designs on the subject of slavery. You are right, I have no doubt, in believing that no such intermeddling disposition exists in the body of our Northern brethren. Their good faith is sufficiently guaranteed by the interest they have as merchants, as ship-owners, and as manufacturers in preserving a union with the slaveholding States. On the other hand, what madness in the South to look for greater safety in disunion. It would be worse than jumping into the fire for fear of the frying-pan. The danger from the alarms is, that pride and resentment excited by them may be an overmatch for the dictates of prudence; and favor the project of a Southern convention, insidiously revived, as promising by its counsels the best security against grievances of every kind from the North."

Nullification, secession, and disunion were considered by Mr. Madison as Synonymous terms, dangerous to the Union as fire to powder, and the danger increasing in all the Southern States, even Virginia. "Look at Virginia herself, and read in the Gazettes, and in the proceedings of popular meetings, the figure which the anarchical principle now makes, in contrast with the scouting reception given to it but a short time ago." Mr. Madison solaced himself with the belief that this heresy would not reach a majority of the States; but he had his misgivings, and wrote them down in the same paper, entitled, "Memorandum on nullification," written in his last days and published after his death. "But a susceptibility of the contagion in the Southern States is visible, and the danger not to be concealed, that the sympathy arising from known causes, and the inculcated impression of a permanent incompatibility of interests between the North and the South, may put it in the power of popular leaders, aspiring to the highest stations, to unite the South on some critical occasion, in a course that will end in creating a theatre of great though inferior extent. In pursuing this course, the first and most obvious step is nullification--the next, secession--and the last, a farewell separation. How near has this course been lately exemplified! and the danger of its recurrence, in the same or some other quarter, may be increased by an increase of restless aspirants, and by the increasing impracticability of retaining in the Union a large and cemented section against its will."--So wrote Mr. Madison in the year 1836, in the 86th year of his age, and the last of his life. He wrote with the pen of inspiration, and the heart of a patriot, and with a soul which filled the Union, and could not be imprisoned in one half of it. He was a Southern man! but his Southern home could not blind his mental vision to the origin, design, and consequences of the slavery agitation. He gives to that agitation, a Southern origin--to that design, a disunion end--to that end, disastrous consequences both to the South and the North.

Mr. Calhoun is dead. Peace to his manes. But he has left his disciples who do not admit of peace! who "rush in" where their master "feared to tread." He recoiled from the disturbance of the Missouri compromise: they expunge it. He shuddered at the thought of bloodshed in civil strife: they demand three millions of dollars to prepare arms for civil war.

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Chapter CXCIX

THE SUPREME COURT: ITS JUDGES, CLERK, ATTORNEY-GENERALS, REPORTERS AND MARSHALS DURING THE PERIOD TREATED OF IN THIS VOLUME.

CHIEF JUSTICE:--Roger Brooke Taney, of Maryland, appointed in 1836: continues, 1850.

JUSTICES:--Joseph Story, of Massachusetts, appointed, 1811: died 1845.--John McLean, of Ohio, appointed, 1829: continues, 1850.--James M. Wayne, of Georgia, appointed, 1835: continues, 1850.--John Catron, of Tennessee, appointed, 1837: continues, 1850.--Levi Woodbury, of New Hampshire, appointed, 1845: continues, 1850.--Robert C. Grier, of Pennsylvania, appointed, 1846: continues, 1850.

ATTORNEY-GENERALS:--Henry D. Gilpin, of Pennsylvania, appointed, 1840.--John J. Crittenden, of Kentucky, appointed, 1841.--Hugh S. Legare, of South Carolina, appointed, 1841.--John Nelson, of Maryland, appointed, 1843.--John Y. Mason, of Virginia, appointed, 1846.--Nathan Clifford, of Maine, appointed, 1846.--Isaac Toucey, of Connecticut, appointed, 1848.--Reverdy Johnson, of Maryland, appointed, 1849.--John J. Crittenden, of Kentucky, appointed, 1850.

CLERK:--William Thomas Carroll, of the District of Columbia, appointed, 1827: continues, 1850.

REPORTERS OF DECISIONS:--Richard Peters, jr., of Pennsylvania, appointed, 1828.--Benjamin C. Howard, appointed, 1843: continues, 1850.

MARSHALS:--Alexander Hunter, appointed, 1834.--Robert Wallace, appointed, 1848.--Richard Wallach, appointed, 1849.

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