Chapter XXXVIII
Dr. Brown――Mackintosh.
SECTION I.
Dr. Brown.
DR. THOMAS BROWN¹ was a native of the parish of Kirkmabreck, in the south of Scotland, where his father was minister; but he died shortly after the birth of the future philosopher, and the family then removed to Edinburgh. There he received the rudiments of his education from his mother, and at the age of seven he was sent by his relatives to school in England. At the age of fourteen he returned, entered the University of Edinburgh, attended the logic class and Stewart’s courses of lectures. But in 1798 he was studying law, which, however, he soon relinquished for medicine. He attended the medical classes from 1798 to 1803, when he graduated M.A., having been over ten years a student in the University. Thus Brown had the advantage of the instruction of several eminent professors who then illumined this school.
¹ Born in 1778; died in 1820.
In 1805, he ventured into what has been called the Leslie controversy, touching the heterodoxy of John Leslie, whom the clergy wished to exclude from the chair of mathematics, on the ground that he had enounced views on causation similar to David Hume’s; and in reference to this, Brown published his Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect, defending Hume’s theory that this relation is merely one of constant antecedence and sequence. He was for some time assistant to Dr. James Gregory; but a wider field for the exercise of his genius awaited him.
It was in the summer of 1810, with the full approval of Stewart himself, that Brown was appointed his colleague and successor in the chair of moral philosophy. He was an interesting, cultured man, with a glowing poetical fancy, combined with other qualities of mind of a rarer form, and he soon became popular. Those who had the good fortune to listen to his lectures were delighted with them; and his career as a professor, though comparatively short, was a brilliant success. His lectures were published shortly after his death in 1820, and attained a remarkable popularity; for before 1852 eighteen editions had been issued in great Britain, and more in America.¹
¹ His lectures extend to one hundred, and, with his unfinished text-book, contain all that he wrote on the philosophy of the mind.
They contain a systematic exposition of the philosophy of the human mind. In his introductory lectures he explains the scope and limits of the subject, the relation of the philosophy of the mind to the sciences in general, and to the mental sciences, arts, and moral culture in particular; and he did this in an interesting and attractive manner, well suited to arrest the attention of a youthful audience. He told his class:――“Though I shall endeavour to give as full a view as my limits will permit of all the objects of inquiry which are to come before us, it will be my chief wish to awake in you, or to cherish, a love of those sublime inquiries themselves. There is a philosophic spirit which is far more valuable than any limited acquirements of philosophy; and the cultivation of which, therefore, is the most precious advantage that can be derived from the lessons and studies of many academic years――a spirit which is quick to pursue whatever is within the reach of human intellect, but which is not less quick to discern the bounds that limit every human inquiry, and which, therefore, in seeking much, seeks only what man may learn――which knows how to distinguish what is just in itself from what is merely accredited by illustrious names; adopting a truth which no one has sanctioned, and rejecting an error of which all approve, with the same calmness as if no judgment were opposed to its own.”¹
¹ Volume I., pages 14‒15, 18‒20.
He devotes several lectures to an explanation of the methods of inquiry in physical science in general, of power, cause and effect, hypothesis and theory; and in these he manifested considerable powers of exposition. He insisted strongly that the method of inquiry in physical science, should also be followed in mental science.
The chief features of Brown’s psychology may be briefly indicated thus:――Fundamentally, it is a simple form of idealism, which recognises primary beliefs, while its conception of method is two-fold――(1) The mental phenomena may be viewed as successive, and so susceptible of arrangement in the order of their succession, as causes and effects; (2) viewed as complex, and consequently susceptible of analysis; and it was chiefly in the latter relation that he conceived the philosophy of the mind to be a science of progressive discovery. In this relation it still presented an inexhaustible field of inquiry, since the mind is continually forming new combinations, which modify its subsequent thoughts and emotions, the results of which it is the end of mental analysis to reduce to their original elements. In accordance with this conception, he divided the whole phenomena of the mind into two classes――the internal and external affections; the second class is simple and requires few sub-divisions, but the first, as it comprehends the far greater part of the mental phenomena, admits of many sub-divisions, as aids to arrangement and exposition. The first great sub-division of the intellectual class, is into the intellectual states of mind and emotions. But our external affections have their causes in external objects, while the internal affections arise from the previous feelings or emotions of the mind itself; both classes co-exist, and cannot always be considered as arising separately. Hence the different views which have been taken of perception and the existence of the external world.
Brown treated sensation at length, minutely analysing the different tribes of our sensations, as he called them, through all the external senses. After some explanation of the physical side of the process, he follows the same order as Reid in discussing the first four external senses, and he avers that none of our sensations arising through smelling, taste, or hearing afford us any original knowledge of the existence of external things, though we seem to act on such an assumption. He dwells long and interestingly on the early sensations of touch, and rightly assigns to them a priority over all our other sensations. Those qualities of bodies supposed to be made known to us by touch he reduced to two――resistance and extension; and he endeavoured to show that our muscular frame is the organ through which these external qualities are originally felt. He illustrated this view in various ways.¹
¹ Volume I., pages 481, 483, 484.
He minutely explained the points touching perception wherein he differed from Reid. In the preceding account of Reid’s doctrines, it was shown that he held to an intuitive knowledge of the primary qualities of bodies; Brown maintained that we have no such intuitive knowledge of bodies. Speaking of perception in reference to the primary and secondary qualities of bodies, he says:――“In both, it is the effect of the pressure of an external cause, and in both it must be relative only, to that particular cause which produced it; the knowledge of which cause, in the case of extension, as much as in the case of fragrance, is nothing more than the knowledge that there is within us something which is not our mind itself, but which exists, as we cannot but believe, permanently and independent of our mind.... What it is, as it exists in absolute independence of our perceptions, we who become acquainted with it, only by those very perceptions, know not in either case.... We must still believe our perceptions themselves to be altogether different and distinct from the external causes, whatever they may be, which have produced them; to be, in short, phenomena purely mental, and to be this equally, whether they relate to the primary or the secondary qualities of matter; our notion of extension, in whatever way the Deity may have connected it with the presence of external things, being as much a state of the mind as our notion of sweetness or sound.”¹
¹ Volume I., page 582, et seq.
He occupies two lectures with a criticism of Dr. Reid’s claims in regard to the ideal system of perception. He argues that Reid misunderstood the real opinions of philosophers; that many of them held a view of perception similar to his own; that the supposed difference arose from Reid’s having imagined as real “what was merely intended as metaphorical, and overthrown opinions which the authors, to whom he ascribes them, would themselves have been equally eager to overthrow.” His attack upon Reid’s claims is remarkably virulent.¹ But it should be observed that neither Reid nor Brown himself was strong in the history of philosophical opinions; in the case of both their knowledge of systems and theories of recorded thought was limited and inaccurate. The natural result was that both of them have sometimes fallen into mistakes concerning the views of preceding philosophers and schools. In short, Brown had a stronger passion for quoting poetry than for making wise and accurate references to the doctrines of prior philosophers.
¹ Volume II., page 51; Lectures, 26, 27, 28.
In so far as Brown’s psychology is not the issue of his own analytic powers, it is indebted to Reid, to those British thinkers who had given prominence to the principles of associations in explaining mental phenomena, to Condillac, and a few other French philosophers of the latter part of last century. He was naturally attracted towards those thinkers who had carried analysis to the farthest limits.
He classified the intellectual states of the mind (or cognition) into what he called two generic capacities――(1) simple suggestion and (2) relative suggestion. Simple suggestion meant what is usually termed the laws of association. But he intended to give these a wider application, and therefore adopted a classification which he conceived to be most in accordance with the associative principle. As the influence of this principle itself extends not merely to ideas but to every affection of the mind, all our emotions may be revived in a certain degree by its influence, or may become blended with the ideas or other feelings which awaken them, in the same way as our conceptions of external objects.¹
¹ Volume II., pages 189, 197‒199, et seq.
His primary laws of simple suggestion are――(1) Resemblance, (2) Contrast, (3) Contiguity; and he reduced what he called the supposed mental faculties of memory, conception, and imagination to simple suggestion. In his exposition of these principles of association, he exhibited great analytic powers and an amazing fertility of illustration. He was also masterly in summarising; and the following quotation, touching his reduction of conception and memory to the principle of suggestion, though abridged, will afford an indication of his powers in this particular:――
“Gentlemen, the inquiries which have occupied us with respect to the phenomena of the principle of suggestion have, I hope, shown you what that principle is, as distinguished from other principles of our mental constitution. It becomes necessary, however, in justification of that simple arrangement which I ventured to propose to you, to consider this principle, not merely in relation to the phenomena which I have included under it, but also in relation to other arrangements, and to show that this one general tendency of the mind is sufficient to account for a variety of phenomena which have been referred to peculiar powers of the understanding. This I endeavoured to prove in my last lecture, with respect to two of these supposed intellectual powers――conception and memory.
“In the first place, I showed that conception, far from being distinguished from suggestion, is only a particular operation of that very principle; what are called the laws of association in relation to our mere ideas, being nothing more than the general circumstances according to which conceptions follow conceptions in our trains of thought.... The power of suggestion is the capacity of the mind by which we are sensible of the varieties of light; and we might as well speak of a power of seeing a particular colour, distinct from vision, as of a power of conceiving the same particular colour, distinct from the general power of the mind that is termed by us suggestion. When I hear the sound of my friend’s name, and the conception of my friend immediately arises, there is not in the production of this one mental state the operation both of a power of association and a power of conception, but there is a development of the single capacity of the mind, in consequence of which certain other conceptions arise after certain other conceptions or perceptions....
“After showing our conceptions to be only particular modifications of the general power of suggestion, I proceeded to consider our remembrances, analysing these into two distinct parts――a particular conception of some object or feeling remembered, and the accompanying feeling of a certain relation of priority to our consciousness. The simple conception which forms one of the elements of the remembrance, and differs in no respect from the conceptions that are unaccompanied with the notion of a relation, is of course reducible to the power of simple suggestion, to which all our conceptions are to be referred; the feeling of the relation of priority, which forms its other element, is, like our feeling of every other relation, an effort of that general susceptibility of relation suggested, which we are to consider afterwards. The remembrance, therefore, being a complex feeling, is a proof of these two susceptibilities of the mind, to which we owe the constituent elementary feelings; but it is not a proof of any third power.... What we term memory, then, in distinction from mere conception, is not a new power, but merely a complex result of different mental capacities.”¹
¹ Volume II., pages 384‒388.
He also classified and explained the secondary laws of suggestion. He enumerated nine of these which he regarded as indispensable to account for the variety in the effects of the primary laws. Thus, suggestions are as various as the original feelings have been――(1) of longer or shorter continuance; (2) more or less lively; (3) more or less frequently present; (4) more or less recent; (5) more or less free from mixture; (6) that they vary according to the difference of original constitution; (7) according to differences of temporary emotion; (8) according to changes produced in the state of the body; (9) according to general tendencies produced by prior habits. The first four touch rather the momentary feelings themselves than any particular state of the mind of an individual, and have, as it were, a double operation. But each one of these secondary laws alone may be sufficient to change the suggestion, which would otherwise have arisen from the operation of the primary laws; and it is not wonderful, therefore, that when many of them, as they usually do, concur in one joint effect, the result in different individuals should be so various.¹
¹ Volume II., pages 282‒285, et seq.
Under his second sub-division of mental phenomena he included all feelings of relation. He employed the term relative suggestion as nearly equivalent to comparison; and whether the relation was of two or many external objects, or of two or many affections of the mind, the feeling of this, arising in consequence of certain preceding states of mind, is what he called relative suggestion. He classified relations under two heads――(1) those of co-existence, and (2) those of succession. To the first belong the relations of position, resemblance, proportion, degree, and comprehension; to the second, as the word imports, all those which stand to each other as prior in the order of time. History is merely a succession of facts and events, together with their causes and effects, in the order of time. Thus relations ♦of succession are either of a casual or of invariable antecedence and consequence.¹
♦ duplicate word “of” removed
¹ Volume II., pages 458, 459, 470‒472.
Concerning the general terms and the early stage of generalisation, Brown sees no reason to doubt that man can reason without language; though it is equally true that, without general terms, reasoning must be very limited and imperfect. He explains the early process of generalisation thus:――“The perception of objects,――the feeling of their resemblance in certain respects,――the invention of a name for these circumstances of felt resemblance,――what can be more truly and readily conceivable than this process?” He repeats this many times in varied words.¹
¹ Volume II., pages 478, 495, 504.
He also endeavoured to reduce the supposed faculties of judgment, reason, and abstraction to relative suggestion, and his reasoning assumed this form:――Relative suggestions are the relations of co-existence and those of succession; and we can easily separate the feeling of relation from the perceptions or conceptions themselves. We perceive or conceive objects, and feel them to be variously related; now, with this capacity of relative suggestion, the faculty of judgment may be considered as almost synonymous. Accordingly, he treated it in that light. But reasoning itself is nothing more than a series of judgments――that is, feelings of relations, which are all referable to the capacity of relative suggestion. Abstraction, in like manner, is only a feeling of resemblance, of partial similarity among objects. His classification of the mind may be tabulated thus:――
{ I. External { 1. Sensation. { Affections. { 2. Organic States. { { II. Internal { 1. Simple Suggestion = Laws of Association. Mind. { Affections. { 2. Relative Suggestion. { { { Emotions. { = Taste. { { { = Moral Philosophy. { { III. Results. { Existence of God. { { Immortality of the Soul.
Brown treats the emotions in detail, under three divisions――1. Immediate, excited by present objects; 2. Retrospective; 3. Prospective. In the first division he includes cheerfulness and melancholy, wonder, languor, beauty, sublimity, the ludicrous, moral feeling, love and hate, sympathy, pride, and humility; in the second, anger, gratitude, simple regret and gladness, remorse and its opposite; in the third, desires of continued existence, pleasure, action, society, knowledge, power, affection, glory, the happiness of others, evil to others, fear, hope, expectation, and anticipation.
His treatment and analysis of the emotions is pretty satisfactory. In this division of mental phenomena, as in his treatment of the cognitive side of the mind, the influence of Hume may occasionally be traced; but his own emotional powers were of a warmer and keener cast than Hume’s.
In the ethical department of his system Brown partly follows Stewart and Hutcheson, but applies the principle of association more than his predecessors. He contended for a moral faculty――an innate sentiment, and the following will afford an idea of his views:――
“When we think within ourselves,――Is this what we ought to do? we do not make two inquiries,――first, Whether the action be right? and then, Whether we should have merit in doing wrong; or demerit in doing what is right for us to do? We only consider whether doing it shall excite in others approbation or disapprobation, and in ourselves a corresponding emotion of complacency or remorse. According to the answer which we give in our hearts, in this respect――an answer which relates to a single feeling of moral approbation,――we shall conceive that we are doing what we ought to do, or what we ought not to do,――and knowing this, we can have no farther moral inquiry to make as to the merit or demerit of doing what is previously felt by us to be right or wrong.
“To have merit, to be virtuous, to have done our duty, to have acted in conformity with obligation,――all have reference to one feeling of the merit,――that feeling of approbation, which attends the contemplation of virtuous actions.... To this simple proposition, therefore, we must always come in our moral estimate, whatever division, or varied reference, we may afterwards make. Persons acting in a certain manner, excite in us a feeling of approval; persons acting in a manner opposite to this, cannot be considered by us, without an emotion equally vivid of a different kind.... Why does it seem to us virtue to act in this way? Why have we a feeling of obligation or duty, when we think of acting in this way? The only answer which we can give to these questions is the same in all,――that it is impossible for us to consider the action, without feeling that by acting in this way, we should look upon ourselves, and others would look upon us, with approving regard; and that if we were to act in a different way, we should look upon ourselves, and others would look upon us, with abhorrence, or at least with disapprobation.... Why do we consider certain actions as morally right,――certain actions as morally wrong? Why do we consider ourselves as morally bound to perform certain actions,――to abstain from certain other actions? Why do we feel moral approbation of those who perform certain actions,――moral disapprobation of those who perform certain other actions? For an answer to all these, I would refer to the simple emotion, as that on which alone the moral distinction is formed.”¹
¹ Volume III., pages 568‒573, 581, et seq.
This is the most definite statement on the moral faculty in his lectures. He seldom uses the term conscience, but leaves his meaning to be gathered from such sentences as these:――“There is then, in the mind of each individual, a principle which leads him to divide actions into two classes, virtuous and vicious.” “There is in our breast a susceptibility of moral emotion; and the principle which thus approves or condemns in us, is the noblest of the ties that connect us with the universal community of mankind.” “All our moral sentiments then, of obligation, virtue, merit, are, in themselves, as we have seen, nothing more than one single feeling, variously referred to actions, as future, present, and past. With the loss of the susceptibility of this one peculiar species of emotion, all practical morality would instantly cease.”¹
¹ Volume IV., pages 152, 158.
He gives an exposition of practical morals under the most common heads――(1) Duties to our fellow men; (2) Duties to ourselves; (3) Duties which we owe to the Supreme Being. He treats the family and parental duties with much insight and judgment, and with elevated feeling.
His lectures on the existence of God exhibit fine moral feeling and good intention; but they lack metaphysical grasp and range of intellect. He dwells chiefly upon the design argument, on which he worked wonderfully well. But it is, at best, only a creeping mode of proving the existence of a Supreme Being; and if a belief in God is to continue among men, it must be placed upon higher grounds and arguments than the evidence of mere mechanical design.
Brown also treated at length on the immortality of the human soul; and on this subject his arguments are well worked out, and worthy of attention. On this his psychological theory of the mind was available, and he made a good use of it. His closing lectures are devoted to an exposition of duty of cultivating our moral sentiments, our religious and intellectual nature, in order to render ourselves happy and glorious; and he expatiated eloquently on these themes.
In forming an estimate of Brown’s philosophy, we should recall attention to his position, and the aims which he immediately had in view. He was only thirty-two years of age when appointed to teach the moral philosophy class, and ten years after he died in the midst of his work. His lectures were hastily prepared for oral delivery, and many things might be quite appropriately introduced, as merely spoken to the students, with the object of interesting them in the subjects of the course, but which would be out of character in a work deliberately composed and revised for publication. His lectures, as we have them, appear with all the imperfections of being prepared for oral delivery to a class of students; and it may fairly be assumed that if he had himself prepared them for publication, he would have weeded out most of the poetical quotations, the repetitions, and other blemishes.
His reduction of all the special faculties of cognition to simple and relative suggestion are unfortunate attempts. Conception, memory, and imagination are reduced to simple suggestion; and judgment, reason, and abstraction, to relative suggestion.
He possessed several of the qualities of a good expositor. His conception of method was clear, his analytic power conspicuous; and he had the command of a great store of illustrations. His style is florid, and brilliant to excess; though some fine touches of pathos and eloquent passages occur in his lectures. His choice of words and phrases is sometimes ridiculously inappropriate; such as these――“tribes of our sensations,” “nameless tribes of sensations.” In truth, he had not a great command of subjective language; in this respect he fell far behind Adam Smith. His lectures, however, have furnished many hints to the association school of psychologists; and in this direction his influence has been considerable.
SECTION II.
Mackintosh.
Sir James Mackintosh was a native of Inverness-shire,¹ and was educated at King’s College, Aberdeen; thence, in 1784, he proceeded to Edinburgh, and entered on the study of medicine. After taking his medical degree in 1788, he went to London to push his fortune; but not having obtained a satisfactory practice in the medical profession, he abandoned it. He seems to have entered warmly into the politics and stormy movements of the time, listened with intense interest to the speeches of the leading orators, and soon became a political writer himself. In the spring of 1791, his Vindiciæ Gallicæ appeared, which is a glowing defence of the French Revolution against the vehement Reflections of Burke. The style of this pamphlet is animated, but rather diffuse; yet it soon attained a wide circulation.
¹ He was born at Aldourie, on the banks of the Ness, seven miles from Inverness, in 1765, and died in 1832.
Shortly after, he betook himself to the study of the law, and was called to the bar in 1795. In 1799, he delivered a course of thirty-nine Lectures on the Law of Nature and Nations, which were subsequently published. He greatly distinguished himself in 1803 by his defence of M. Peltier against a prosecution for libel on Bonaparte. His speech on this occasion was a great effort of forensic eloquence, and seems to have brought him into public notice. Like many other talented and warm-hearted young men, he cherished ambitious literary projects which were never realised.
In 1804, he was appointed Recorder of Bombay. He resided eight years in India; and returned to England in 1812, with an impaired constitution. He was elected a member of Parliament for the county of Nairn, and in the House of Commons he advocated liberal measures. He was appointed professor of law in the East Indian College at Haileybury in 1818.
But his literary projects, though not entirely abandoned, made little progress, owing to a variety of circumstances: his good nature, pleasant humour, wide knowledge, and great conversational power made him a favourite in every society; and thus he was diverted from his real work. He wrote articles for the Edinburgh Review; an abridgment of English History down to the Reformation; a Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, for the Encyclopædia Britannica; and a fragment which he left on the Causes of the Revolution of 1688; which was intended to be his masterpiece, and he had collected a large quantity of materials for it. It is, however, only his Ethical Dissertation which comes properly within the range of this section.
Mackintosh’s “Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy” is chiefly limited to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, although it presented a brief review of earlier systems, and included Stewart and Brown. After a luminous introduction, he devotes a section to preliminary observations on the nature of ethical science, and the methods of examining it. He put the main ethical questions into a definite form; and after remarking on the universality of the distinction between right and wrong, he observes that in the inquiry as to the foundation of morals, the two distinct questions――touching (1) the Moral Faculty, and (2) the Standard of Morality, have seldom been fully discriminated.¹ The first of these problems embraces ethical theory, and also involves certain questions of pure psychology; the second problem relates to the standard or test of morality――of right and wrong in action――the ultimate end. Other important questions arise in the province of morality; but he insists strongly on the necessity of keeping these two chief distinctions steadily in view. His own criticisms of moral systems proceed throughout upon these lines, which gives to them a clearness and simplicity rarely found in ethical disquisition.
¹ Dissertation, page 62. 1837.
He gives a brief sketch of ancient ethics, and of scholastic ethics; and began his account of modern ethics with Grotius and Hobbes. Grotius’ work, which was published in 1625, presented the most authentic statement of the general principles of morals which prevailed in Europe, before the writings of Hobbes had occasioned those ethical controversies which more especially belong to modern times. He appreciates Hobbes very fairly; though, of course, he exposes the fundamental errors of his ethical system. Hobbes was the real instigator of most of the ethical inquiries instituted in Britain, till through the early part of the eighteenth century; and the answers to the Leviathan alone would form a library.¹
¹ Dissertation, pages 112‒133.
He then gives an exposition of the views concerning the moral faculties and the social affections, and examines the systems of Cumberland, Cudworth, Clarke, Shaftesbury, Leibnitz, Malebranche, Edwards, and others. The main cause of the imperfect views of morality exhibited in the writings of most of those philosophers was the want of a clear and discriminative insight into the position and significance of the sentiments and feelings in relation to ethical philosophy. Some of them insisted that reason alone was the supreme principle of morality, an assumption long since shown to be utterly untenable.
Those philosophers who are regarded as laying the foundations of a more just theory of ethics, embracing Butler, Hutcheson, Berkeley, Hume, Price, Hartley, Tucker, Paley, Bentham, Stewart, and Brown, were next treated. He gives comparatively short but candid and valuable sketches of the systems of these philosophers; while he introduced his own criticisms under separate headings. Mackintosh was an able, amiable, and mild-tempered man; and I have seen it stated that his critical authority was weakened, “by an amiable propensity to eulogistic declamation.” But this, like many other sayings, is only half true; as bearing on the point, as well as for its historic interest, I will quote his opening remarks on Bentham and his school:――
“The disciples of Mr. Bentham are more like the hearers of an Athenian philosopher than the pupils of a modern professor, or the cool proselytes of a modern writer. They are in general men of competent age, of superior understanding, who voluntarily embrace the laborious study of useful and noble sciences; who derive their opinions not so much from the cold perusal of his writings, as from familiar converse with a master from whose lips these opinions are recommended by simplicity, disinterestedness, originality, and vivacity; aided rather than impeded by foibles not unamiable, enforced of late by the growing authority of years and fame, and at all times strengthened by that unbounded reliance on his own judgment which mightily increases the ascendant of such men over those who approach him. As he and they deserve the credit of having abandoned vulgar prejudices, so they must be content to incur the imputation of falling into the neighbouring vices of seeking distinction by singularity; of clinging to opinions because they are obnoxious; of wantonly wounding the most respectable feelings of mankind; of regarding an immense display of method and nomenclature as a sure token of a corresponding increase of knowledge, and of considering themselves as a chosen few, whom an initiation into the most secret mysteries of philosophy entitles to look down with pity, if not with contempt, on the profane multitude.... Mr. Bentham has at length been betrayed into the unphilosophical hypothesis, that all the ruling bodies who guide the community have conspired to stifle and defeat his discoveries. He is too little acquainted with doubts to believe the honest doubts of others, and he is too angry to make allowance for their prejudices and habits. He has embraced the most extreme party in practical politics; manifesting more dislike and contempt towards those who are more moderate supporters of popular principles than towards their most inflexible opponents.”¹
¹ Dissertation, pages 285, 286.
This is among the warmest statements in his Dissertation. Indeed, the spirit in which he criticises the systems of philosophers is unusually calm, just, and candid. I will briefly indicate his own views on some of the chief points of morality.
1. He considered conscience to be a derived faculty――gradually formed, the result of a series of associations. He notes the primary feelings that enters into it, the principal of which are gratitude, sympathy, resentment, remorse, and shame; the secondary causes of its development are education, imitation, general opinion, laws and government. He traces and explains its developments, and finally, conscience attains its distinctive character, and appears in close relation with the will.
2. Touching the standard, he is in favour of utility, with some limitations. Utility is the final justification of right actions, but not the immediate motive in the mind of the agent. He says: “The laws prescribed by a benevolent Being to His creatures must necessarily be founded on the principle of promoting their happiness. It would be singular, indeed, if the proofs of the goodness of God, legible in every part of nature, should not, above all others, be most discoverable and conspicuous in the beneficial tendency of His moral laws.”
He remarks that to calculate the general tendency of every kind of human action is a possible and common operation. The general good effects of temperance, justice, fortitude, prudence, benevolence, gratitude, and many others, are the subjects of calculations which, when taken as generalities, are unerring.¹
¹ Dissertation, pages 229‒230, 350‒365.
3. The supreme good, or theory of happiness, is embodied in his doctrine of the delightfulness of virtuous conduct, by which he proposes to effect the reconciliation of our own good with that of others. “Virtue is an inward fountain of pure delight, and the pleasure of benevolence, if it could become lasting and intense, would convert the heart into a heaven. They alone are truly happy or truly virtuous, that have no need of a motive in regard to outward consequences.”
Chapter XXXIX
Hamilton――Ferrier――and Robertson.
SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON,¹ the most learned of all the Scottish philosophers, was the son of Dr. William Hamilton, professor of anatomy in the University of Glasgow, a position formerly held by his grandfather, Dr. Thomas Hamilton. Sir William was the lineal representative to the title of Sir Robert Hamilton, the leader of the Covenanting army at Drumclog, and he manifested at least one feature of the spirit of his ancestors――the energy and will to combat when occasion occurred. His father died when he was an infant, but he received an excellent education. He passed through the arts classes at the University of Glasgow, and studied medicine one session at Edinburgh, having intended at first to follow the hereditary profession of the family. But in 1807, having obtained a Snell exhibition, he went to Oxford. There he entered deeply into the study of ancient philosophy, and finally graduated in the highest class. He returned to Scotland in 1811, studied law, and was called to the bar in 1816.
¹ Born in 1788; died in 1856.
In 1820, Hamilton became a candidate for the chair of moral philosophy, vacant by the death of Dr. Brown. The contest for the chair was very keen, and finally lay between Hamilton and John Wilson. But Hamilton was a Whig, Wilson a Tory; and as the appointment turned upon political grounds, the majority of the town council of Edinburgh,――the patrons of the chair, voted for Wilson, who accordingly obtained it. It should be observed, however, that neither of the two gentlemen had up to that time published anything which could be referred to as evidence of their special qualifications for the chair of moral philosophy in the University of Edinburgh.¹
¹ In reality, Wilson was quite out of his element in the chair of moral philosophy. But “the chair of moral philosophy in a Scottish university seems to be elastic in its adaptability. Brown made it a chair of psychology; Ferrier, at St. Andrews, a chair of metaphysics; Wilson made it a chair of rhetoric and Belles Letters. It is true that he treated of the passions, virtues, duties, and so on, but he dealt with them in the concrete, with illustrations from literature.”――Sir A. Grant’s Story of the University of Edinburgh, Volume II., pages 345‒346.
The following year Sir William obtained the chair of civil history in the University of Edinburgh, and he entered on his duties with ardour and energy; yet his success was comparatively limited. The salary attached to the chair was only one hundred pounds a year. His wide range of historical knowledge enabled him to handle the subject in a comprehensive and attractive manner, and for some years he had a class of about thirty students. He petitioned the Senatus in 1824 to include his subject in the arts curriculum, but the arts faculty gave him no encouragement. Hamilton then, in 1828, enunciated his views to the Royal Commission, but the commissioners, instead of protecting the chair of history, recommended its abolition. In 1833, when the city became bankrupt, the small salary of the chair ceased to be paid, and Hamilton ceased lecturing.¹
¹ This chair of civil history continued in an anomalous position, though sometimes held by able men, such as Professor Ferrier and Cosmo Innes, until 1862, when the Executive Commission changed the title of the chair to that of history, and then made the lectures of the professor on constitutional law and history necessary for a degree in law.
In 1836, Dr. Ritchie resigned the chair of logic and metaphysics, which he had held for a period of twenty-eight years, and four candidates entered the field for the vacant office――namely, Sir William Hamilton, Isaac Taylor, Patrick C. Macdougall, and George Combe, the popular phrenologist. It was seen that the real contest would be between the first two candidates; and after a hard struggle, of which the issue seemed doubtful, when the final decision was taken, out of thirty-two votes Hamilton had eighteen――a majority of four. Although then in his forty-eighth year, he entered on his new task with all the emotion and ardour of youth, and threw his heart and intellect into the work.
With his exact method and lofty ideal of philosophical style, he felt much difficulty in deciding on the character of the course of lectures on philosophy which would meet the wants of the young students, and at the same time do justice to the subject; and, after three months of intense thought and reflection, at the opening of the session he had only a few of his lectures written. Thus it happened that his lectures on metaphysics were composed during the first session which he taught. He often sat up nearly all the preceding night preparing his lecture for the next day, with his loving wife by his side acting as his amanuensis. These lectures being composed in such circumstances, and solely designed for the instruction of his own class, it is not surprising that they may not at all points present a consistent and complete exposition of his philosophical views; still, so far as they go, they may be fairly assumed to contain a reliable statement of his chief doctrines. His lectures on logic were composed during the next session, and under the same pressure as the former course.
Hamilton greatly felt the want of text-books suitable for his purposes, so he resolved to edit an edition of Reid’s works, and projected a new work on logic. It has been affirmed by some that the dedication of his powers to the service of Reid was a great mistake, that he should have built entirely upon his own foundation. Be this as it may, the form of exposition which he selected was in some respects unfortunate. His numerous footnotes to Reid’s works were written as the text was passing through the press in 1837 and 1838, and the supplementary dissertations to the end of D were written and stereotyped in 1841 and 1842.
But, in 1838, a quarrel arose between Hamilton and the town council of Edinburgh about his lectures, which had the effect of preventing him from delivering a separate and more advanced course of lectures on metaphysics.¹ Then his brother died, to whom he was warmly attached. Next came the threatened disruption of the Church of Scotland, which he struggled hard to avert; and in 1844, in the midst of his arduous labour and duties, a severe paralytic stroke almost deprived him of the use of his right side for the rest of his life. Though he partly recovered, and his mental faculties seemed unimpaired, he never regained his former energy and health.²
¹ “It was a loss to the University that Sir W. Hamilton’s separate class in metaphysics was put a stop to; but this was due to his own uncompromising temper, as well as to the somewhat ignorant interference of the town council.”――Sir A. Grant’s Story of the University of Edinburgh, Volume II., pages 62‒65. I may add that it was a loss to the nation and to philosophy.
² Veitch’s Memoir of Sir W. Hamilton, pages 266, 270, 278, et seq.
So when his edition of Reid’s works was issued in 1846, it still remained incomplete; one of his supplementary dissertations breaking off in the middle of a sentence; and although afterwards added to, it was never completed. The fragmentary materials which his editors collected and published, after his death, form but a small portion of what Hamilton originally intended to present; while only an outline of his projected work on logic ever appeared. All hope of revising his lectures seems to have been relinquished, save by occasional oral interpolations. But he continued to lecture and instruct his classes, though sometimes an assistant read his lectures, when the effort of delivery had become too painful for himself. He expired shortly after the close of the session of 1856, tended in his last moments by his faithful wife, and surrounded by his children.
Hamilton was much beloved by his pupils; and all who called on him for information were kindly treated. Although his temper was warm and sometimes easily roused; on the whole, however, his life was a noble struggle; and, if he occasionally manifested an impatience of ignorant opposition, it was only natural and human. Yet, in one or two of his controversies with opponents of his special doctrines, his vehemence passed the limits of fair discussion.
His writings consist of:――1. Sixteen articles contributed to the Edinburgh Review, chiefly on philosophy, education, University reform and methods of teaching, and on literature; the first of these appeared in 1829, and he republished the whole of them in 1852, with large additions. 2. His notes and supplementary dissertations to Reid’s works. 3. His lectures on metaphysics. 4. His lectures on logic. All his writings bristle with quotations and references to the views of previous thinkers; his erudition was vast and varied.
In order to give his views the justice to which they are well entitled, and to mark the gratitude for his memory which I warmly feel,¹ I will indicate the lines on which his philosophy may be justly appreciated and fairly expounded. The first requisite is to understand the purpose of a writer’s works, and in the case of Hamilton, to take special account of the immediate aims which he had in view; guided by these considerations, I will begin the exposition of his system with his lectures on metaphysics――his psychology, then the philosophy of the conditioned, and close with his logic. The fundamental principles are these:――(1) His peculiar view of the end of speculation; (2) his theory of external perception――natural realism; (3) his doctrine of a priori laws or native notions of the mind; (4) his philosophy of the conditioned; (5) his conception of logic, and the peculiarities of his logical system.
¹ I never had the gratification of even seeing Sir W. Hamilton; yet I may be permitted to state, that the first philosophical writings which I ever read with interest was his volume of discussions, which I perused shortly after the date of his death. His edition of Reid soon after came into my hands; and his four volumes of lectures, almost immediately after their publication. And I now gratefully record, that his writings first roused me to think for myself.
In his introductory lectures he explained to the students the utility of philosophy on its subjective and objective sides; its absolute utility viewed simply in itself, and its value viewed in relation to other sciences. He endeavoured to impress their minds with just ideas of the importance of philosophy, and to clear away all superficial misconceptions of the end and objects of education. He discussed philosophy as means and ends in relation to the culture and happiness of man. While man himself, being in so far a mean for the glory of God, “must be an end unto himself, for it is only in the accomplishment of his own perfection that, as a creature, he can manifest the glory of his Creator.... I say it is manifest that man is by nature necessarily an end to himself――that his perfection and happiness constitute the goal of his activity, to which he tends, and ought to tend, when not diverted from this, his general and native destination, by peculiar and accidental circumstances.” In the realities of social life, however, “each man, instead of being solely an end to himself――instead of being able to subordinate everything to that full and harmonious development of his own faculties, in which his real perfection and his true happiness consists――is, in general, compelled to turn himself into the mean towards the accomplishment of some end, external to himself, and for the benefit of others. So the perfection of man as an end, and the perfection of man as a mean or instrument are not only not the same, but in reality they are generally opposed ... even admitting, therefore, that the study of the mind is of no immediate advantage in preparing the student for many of the subordinate parts in the mechanism of society, its utility cannot on that account be called in question, unless it be asserted that man ‘liveth by bread alone,’ and has no higher destination than that of the calling by which he earns his subsistence.”¹
¹ Volume I., pages 2, 7.
He drew a distinction between the mere possession of truth and intellectual development; by the latter he meant the power acquired through the exercise of the higher faculties of a more varied and vigorous mental activity. This led him to his peculiar view of the end of speculation, and he asks:――“Is truth or is the mental exercise in the pursuit of truth, the superior end? this is perhaps the most curious theoretical, and certainly the most important practical, problem in the whole compass of philosophy. For, according to the solution at which we arrive, must we accord the higher or lower rank to certain great departments of study: and, what is of more importance, the character of its solution, as it determines the aim, regulates from first to last the method which an enlightened science of education must adopt.”
In practical knowledge it is clear that truth is not the ultimate end; as the knowledge of a moral truth, a political, or a religious one, is of value only as it affords the condition of its exercise. But Sir William further held, “that speculative truth is only pursued, and is only held of value, for the sake of intellectual activity.... A truth, once known, falls into comparative insignificance. It is now prized, less on its own account than as opening up new ways to new activity, new suspense, new hopes, new discoveries, new self-gratulation.... Accordingly, the sciences always studied with the keenest interest are those in a state of progress and uncertainty; absolute certainty and absolute completion would be the paralysis of any study....
“But if speculative truth itself be only valuable as a mean of intellectual activity, these studies which determine the faculties to a more vigorous exertion will, in every liberal sense, be better entitled, absolutely, to the name of useful, than those which, with a greater complement of more certain facts, awaken them to a less intense, and consequently a less improving, exercise. It is on this ground that I would rest one of the permanent utilities of mental philosophy.” This doctrine is stated in other parts of his writings;¹ and he had sounded the range of its consequences pretty definitely.
¹ Volume I., pages 8‒13. In the Discussions he says:――“We exist only as we energise; pleasure is the reflex of unimpeded energy; energy is the mean by which our faculties are developed; and a higher energy the end of which their development proposes.... Speculative truth is subordinate to speculation itself; and its value is directly measured by the quantity of energy it occasions immediately in its discovery, mediately through its consequences” (page 39).
In his opening lecture he told his class that the communication of knowledge was a high, but not the highest, aim of instruction; and that he would not merely deliver lectures――“By all the means in my power I shall endeavour to rouse you, gentlemen, to the free and vigorous exercise of your faculties; and shall deem my task accomplished, not by teaching logic and philosophy, but by teaching to reason and philosophise.”¹
¹ Volume I., page 18.
In these introductory lectures he also explained the nature and comprehension of philosophy, its causes, and the disposition with which it ought to be studied. Touching the method of philosophy, Hamilton affirms that there is only one possible method――a combination of analysis and synthesis, and the purity and equilibrium of these two elements constitute its perfection.
Concerning the divisions of the philosophy of the mind, he adopted, from Kant, the threefold division of mental phenomena; and the whole subject is enounced in these three questions:――1. What are the facts or phenomena to be observed? 2. What are the laws which regulate these facts, or under which these phenomena appear? 3. What are the real results, not immediately manifested, which these phenomena warrant us in drawing?
First, we should investigate the facts; second, discover their laws; and third, ascertain by legitimate inference their ultimate results. Thus we obtain three branches of mental science, which he designates as phenomenal psychology, nomological psychology, and ontology. Each of these chief classes of the phenomena of mind has a science, which is conversant about its laws. But there is no general science of the cognitive faculties; and the only one of these faculties, whose laws form the object matter of a separate science, is the understanding, the faculty of relations, of thought proper――logic, the science of the laws of thought, in relation to the end which our cognitive faculties propose, that is the true. To this head might be referred universal grammar――philosophical grammar, or the science conversant with the laws of language as the instrument of thought.
The science of the laws of our capacities of enjoyment, in relation to the end which they propose, that is, the pleasurable, has no precise name in English. It has sometimes been called the philosophy of taste, the theory of the fine arts, the science of the beautiful and sublime; and on the Continent it has been termed Æsthetic; but none of these are quite appropriate.
The nomology of our exertive powers and tendencies constitute practical philosophy; for it is simply the science of the laws which regulate our will and desire, in relation to the end which our conative powers propose, that is, the good. This, as it treats these laws in relation to man as an individual, or in relation to man as a member of society, will fall to be divided into two branches――Ethics and Politics; and these again admit of various sub-divisions――such as jurisprudence and legislation.
Empirical psychology is limited to the facts afforded in consciousness, considered exclusively in themselves. But these may be such as not only to be objects of knowledge in themselves, but may also afford us the grounds of inference to something out of themselves. As effects of a peculiar character, they may enable us to infer the analogous character of their unknown causes; as phenomena of particular qualities, they may warrant us in drawing many conclusions regarding the character of that unknown principle, of that unknown substance, of which they are the manifestations. It is true, that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are not presented to us as phenomena, or as objects of immediate knowledge; still, if the phenomena actually given do inevitably render it requisite, for their rational explanation, then the hypotheses of immortality and of God, we are certainly entitled, from the existence of the former, to infer the reality of the latter. Now, the science which treats of all such inferences of unknown being from its known manifestations, is called ontology, or metaphysics proper.
The following is his tabular view of the distribution of mental philosophy:――
{ Facts,―― { Cognitions. { Phenomenology. { Feelings. { Empirical { Conative Powers { Psychology. { (Will and Desire). { { Mind or { Laws,――Nomology. { Cognitions,――Logic. Consciousness { Rational { Feelings,――Æsthetic. affords. { Psychology. { Conative { Moral Philosophy. { { powers. { Political Philosophy. { { Results,―― { { Ontology. { Being of God. { Inferential { Immortality of the Soul, etc. { Psychology. {
Hamilton considered this distribution of philosophy as the simplest and most exhaustive; and he specially marked out the branches which belonged to his course of instruction.¹ In his lectures he treats only one of the three main groups――empiric al psychology――and even this he has not treated exhaustively; only cognitions――the cognitive faculties are fully discussed; but one division of the second group is treated in his lectures on logic. Will and desire receive only incidental notice.
¹ Volume I., pages 120‒128. As already mentioned, he originally intended to deliver a more advanced course, and the following sentences, bearing on the point, appear in the manuscript of his seventh lecture:――“The plan which I propose to adopt in the distribution of the course, or rather courses, is the following: I shall commence with mental philosophy, strictly so-called, with the science which is conversant with the manifestations of mind――phenomenology or psychology. I shall then proceed to logic, the science which considers the laws of thought; and finally to ontology, or metaphysics proper, the philosophy of results. Æsthetic, or the theory of the pleasurable, I should consider subsequent to logic, and previously to ontology” (page 128).
A large part of the first volume is occupied with the discussion of Consciousness, which in his system is the primary and fundamental characteristic of mind, and the universal condition of intelligence. He discusses the special conditions of consciousness; its relation to the cognitive faculties; consciousness and attention; the evidence and authority of consciousness; and violations of its authority. Many other interesting questions are discussed, such as the general phenomena of consciousness; whether the mind is always consciously active, or if it is ever unconsciously modified; and an exceedingly interesting lecture on the difficulties and facilities of studying mental science.
While consciousness cannot be logically defined, it may be philosophically analysed. This is effected by observing and holding fast the facts of consciousness, comparing these, and then evolving the universal conditions under which alone an act of consciousness is possible. It is by following this method that we can attain to accurate knowledge of the contents of consciousness.
The nature of the act of consciousness may be shown thus: “When I know, I must know that I know; when I feel, I must know that I feel; when I desire, I must know that I desire. The knowledge, the feeling, the desire, are possible only under the condition of being known by me. For if I did not know that I knew, I would not know; if I did not know that I felt, I would not feel; if I did not know that I desired, I would not desire.... The expressions I know that I know, I know that I feel, I know that I desire, are thus translated by: I am conscious that I know, I am conscious that I feel, I am conscious that I desire. Consciousness is thus, on the one hand, the recognition by the mind of its own acts and affections; in other words, the self-affirmation that certain modifications are known by me, and that these modifications are mine. But, on the other hand, consciousness is not to be viewed as anything different from these modifications themselves, but is, in fact, the general condition of their existence within the sphere of intelligence. Though the simplest act of the mind, consciousness thus expresses a relation subsisting between two terms. These terms are, on the one hand, an I or self, as the subject of a certain modification; and, on the other hand, some modification, state, quality, effection or operation belonging to the subject. Consciousness thus in its simplicity necessarily involves three things: (1) a recognising or knowing subject; (2) a recognised or known modification; and (3) a recognition or knowledge by the subject of the modification.”¹
¹ Volume I., pages 189, 190‒193.
He explains and illustrates this fundamental characteristic of mind at great length, and with an analytic power and clearness of statement as yet unmatched in the annals of philosophy: “Every mental phenomena may be called a fact of consciousness. But as we distinguish consciousness from the special faculties, though these are all only modifications of consciousness, only branches of which consciousness is the trunk, so we distinguish the special and derivative phenomena of mind from those that are primary and universal, and to give the latter the name of facts of consciousness, as more eminently worthy of that appellation.... A fact of consciousness in this sense is a simple, and, as we regard it, either an ultimate or a primary datum of intelligence. It obtains also various denominations; sometimes it is called a principle, sometimes a fundamental law of mind, sometimes a transcendental condition of thought, etc.” He insists on its characteristics of ultimate priority and necessity; that, as an ultimate fact, it is also given to us with a belief of its reality. It reveals what it is, but not why or how it is. “To ask how any fact of consciousness is possible, is to ask how consciousness itself is possible; and to ask how consciousness is possible, is to ask how an intelligent being like man is possible.... But as we did not create ourselves, and are not even in the secret of our creation, we must take our existence and our knowledge upon trust.”
The result of this inquiry concerning consciousness is――(1) The facts which are given in the act of consciousness itself; and (2) the facts which consciousness does not at once give, but to the reality of which it only bears evidence. As to the first class of facts, no doubt can be or ever has been entertained; it is only the authority of these facts as evidence of something beyond themselves, only thus the second class of facts, which become matter of discussion; it is not the reality of consciousness, but its veracity, that may be questioned.¹
¹ Volume I., pages 269‒276, et seq., and Discussions, page 62.
As psychology is only a developed consciousness, a scientific evolution of the facts of which consciousness is the guarantee and revelation; thus the Positive philosopher has a primary presumption in favour of the elements out of which his system is constructed, whilst the sceptical philosopher must be content to argue back to the falsehood of these elements, from the impossibility which the dogmatist may experience in combining them into the harmony of truth. For truth is one, and the end of philosophy is the intuition of unity. He repeated that:――“Philosophy is a systematic evolution of the contents of consciousness by the instrumentality of consciousness; it therefore necessarily supposes in both respects the veracity of consciousness.”¹
¹ Discussions, page 85; Lectures, Volume I., page 267.
His theory of attention is stated thus:――“The greater the number of objects to which our consciousness is simultaneously extended, the smaller is the interest with which it is able to consider each, and consequently the less vivid and distinct will be the information it obtains of the several objects. Such being the law, it follows, when our interest in any particular object is excited, and when we wish to obtain all the information concerning it in our power, it behoves us to limit our consideration to that object, to the exclusion of others. This is done by an act of volition or desire, which is called attention. But to view attention as a special act of intelligence, and to distinguish it from consciousness is utterly inapt. Consciousness may be compared to a telescope, attention to the pulling out or in of the tubes in accommodating the focus to the object; and we might with equal justice distinguish in the eye the adjustment of the pupil from the general organ of vision, as in the mind distinguish attention from consciousness as a separate faculty. Not, however, that they are to be accounted the same. Attention is consciousness, and something more. It is consciousness voluntarily applied, under its law of limitations, to some determinate object; it is consciousness concentrated.”
Thus, though attention is not a special and separate faculty of mind, it is an interesting and important subject, and he proceeds to consider it in its various relations, as a general phenomena of consciousness. As to the number of objects which the mind can attend to at once, Stewart supposed that we could only attend to one thing at one and the same instant; but Hamilton supposes that consciousness can simultaneously apprehend six objects. Taking this number of objects as the highest which it can embrace at once, the limitation of consciousness to five, four, three, two, or one, will all be acts of attention, differing only in degree.¹
¹ Volume I., pages 231‒239, et seq.
Hamilton rightly holds, that even an act of comparison or discrimination supposes that we are able to comprehend, in the unity of consciousness, the different objects to be discriminated. Instead, therefore, of consciousness not being competent to cognise two things at once, it is only possible under this condition.
He distinguishes three kinds of attention: (1) a mere vital and irresistible act, such as when we open our eyes, we cannot by an act of will avert our mind from all perception of sight; (2) an act determined by desire, which, though involuntary, may be resisted by the will; (3) and an act determined by a deliberate volition. It is the third kind of attention which is really of importance in thinking.
He again refers to the law of limitation in relation to attention, and then says:――“But whatever be its relation to the special faculties, attention doubles all their efficiency, and affords them a power of which they would otherwise be destitute. It is, in fact, as we are at present constituted, the primary condition of their activity.”¹
¹ Volume I., pages 246‒248, et seq. Hamilton gives a clear and interesting explanation of the difficulties of commencing real intellectual efforts, the obstacles that must be overcome before the power of concentrated attention, of continuous thinking, is acquired.
It may not be quite out of character to state briefly my own experience on the subject of attention, or the acquired power of concentration. I admit that Hamilton’s statement of the difficulties of commencing real intellectual efforts is quite true, so far as it goes; yet it appears that in many circumstances, the numerous difficulties which have to be overcome at the initial stages are greater than what he represents them to be. In my own case the initial stage was extremely difficult; the circumstances were unpropitious to the acquisition of the power of concentrating attention, as I was almost constantly in the midst of bustle, and seldom alone. By a prolonged course of persistent efforts, I gradually acquired a complete power of concentrating my mind, by an act of will, upon whatever subject I wished to investigate. This will be understood, when I state that the whole of this history was written, and the proof sheets revised, upon the counter of my own small shop, in the midst of the clattering of a stirring street, and at the same time attending to customers coming in and out. Thus, though often interrupted, I mentally work on, unconscious of noise. The power of attention, of concentration, and of continuous thinking, essentially depends on the strength of the acquired command of the will.
Hamilton’s whole account of attention is exceedingly interesting and valuable, and especially what he says of it in its higher degree, as a direct act of the will, consummated in the habit of deliberate concentration of thought. His view of this, the highest exercise of mind, is as true as it is lucidly expressed.
Among the general phenomena of consciousness, he discusses the question whether we are always consciously active? and begins by averring that there is no pure activity or passivity in creation: that all things in the universe of nature are in a state of continual action and counteraction, being always active and passive at once. “God alone must be thought of as a Being active without any mixture of passivity, as His activity is subject to no limitation. But precisely because it is unlimited, it is for us wholly incomprehensible.”
We are never directly conscious of passivity; so far as we are conscious, we are active; but whether there may be a mental activity of which we are unconscious, is another question. He touches upon the phenomena of dreaming, talking during sleep, and somnambulism, with the view of ascertaining whether the mind be at any moment wholly unconscious. He refers, as usual, to the opinions of other philosophers, but also gives his own personal experience, that the mind remains conscious during sleep.¹
¹ Volume I., pages 310‒312, 323‒337.
He also discussed the subject of latent mental modifications. He observes, that the possessions of our mind are not to be measured by its present monetary activities, but by the amount of its acquired habits. Thus one knows a science or a language, not merely when he is making a temporary use of it, but inasmuch as he can apply it when and how he pleases, at the command of his will: and so the greater part of our mental treasures lies always behind the sphere of consciousness, hid in the recesses of the mind; this is the first degree of latency. The second degree of latency exists when the mind contains certain systems of knowledge, or habits of action, which it is wholly unconscious of possessing in its ordinary state, but which are revealed to consciousness in certain extraordinary exaltations of its powers. Such as the abnormal states of madness, febrile delirium, somnambulism, catalepsy, etc., when they may flash out into consciousness, and throw into the shade of unconsciousness those other systems by which they had for long been eclipsed and even extinguished. He insists that the theory of latent modifications enables us to account for some of the most perplexing phenomena of mind.¹
¹ Volume I., pages 339‒352, 366, et seq.
Sir William’s second volume of lectures commenced with his exposition of the phenomena of cognition; and he classified the special faculties of knowledge thus:――
{ I. Presentative, { External = Perception. { { Internal = Self-consciousness. { { II. Conservative, = Memory. { { III. Reproductive, { Without Will = Suggestion. Cognitive { { With Will = Reminiscence. Faculties. { { IV. Representative, = Imagination. { { V. Elaborative, = Comparison = Faculty of { Relations. { { VI. Regulative, = Reason = Common Sense.
Such is Hamilton’s distribution of the intellectual powers, which he terms the cognitive faculties. He explains distinctly what he meant by a mental faculty,――it is merely a mode of designating a certain class or group of mental energies. In short, all mental powers are only names determined by various orders of mental phenomena; but as these differ from and resemble each other in various ways, various modes of classification may be adopted, and consequently various faculties, in different views, may be the result. “System is only valuable when it is not arbitrarily devised, but arises naturally out of an observation of the facts, and of the whole facts, themselves. On the other hand, to despise system is to despise philosophy; for the end of philosophy is the detection of unity.”¹
¹ Volume II., pages 3‒5; also footnotes to Reid, pages 221, 242, 511.
1. The presentative faculty on its two sides――perception of external objects, and self-consciousness or reflection, forms the faculty of experience; and it affords us all our contingent knowledge. It enables us to cognise an object, when presented within the sphere of external or internal consciousness; but if our knowledge terminated with this, it would be small indeed. 2. So we have not only a faculty of acquiring knowledge, but also a faculty of retaining it――which is properly called Memory. 3. The reproductive faculty enables us to recall our knowledge out of memory into consciousness; it is the power which regulates the succession of our thoughts, or the laws of mental association. 4. But the general capacity of knowledge renders it requisite that, besides the power of evoking out of unconsciousness one portion of our retained information in preference to another, we have the faculty of representing in consciousness what is thus evoked; and this is effected by the representative faculty, Imagination. 5. The four preceding faculties, or varied acts of acquisition, conservation, reproduction, and representation, form, as it were, a subsidiary class of faculties, furnishing the materials to a higher faculty, which elaborates these; this is the Elaborative faculty, Comparison, or the faculty of relations; and its chief functions are conception, judgment, reasoning, abstraction, and generalisation. 6. The last of the faculties of cognition he called the Regulative faculty――reason or common sense, under which is included all notions, principles, and laws, not derived from experience, but native to the mind, being at once the laws which govern the mind and afford the conditions of its capacity of knowledge.¹
¹ Volume II., pages 10‒26.
His treatment of perception is somewhat marred by his rather vehement polemic with Dr. Brown; yet his own doctrine may be disentangled from the discussions with which it is mixed up. He is distinguished both as a historian and critic of the theories of perception; but, leaving the historical points as much as possible out of account, his own theory of perception, and his doctrine of Natural Realism, is as follows:――
“The question to be determined is this, Is our perception, or our consciousness of external objects, mediate or immediate?” He gives a general historical account of the views of philosophers touching this subject, discusses and criticises them, with much acuteness and great ability; the objections to natural realism are canvassed; and finally, he takes up the consideration of the general questions of the relation of the senses to the external world, with special reference to the views of Dr. Reid, Stewart, and Dr. Brown. The discussion occupies nearly nine lectures, and the same subject is treated in his Discussions, and in the Supplementary Dissertations to Reid’s works.¹
¹ I originally intended to present a more detailed account of Hamilton’s views concerning the theories of perception, and other points, but want of space has forced me to relinquish this.
He explains his own doctrine thus: “The only object ever perceived is the object in immediate contact――in immediate relation with the organ. What Reid and philosophers in general call the distant object, is wholly unknown to perception; by reasoning we may connect the object of perception with certain antecedents――certain causes, but these, as the result of inference, cannot be the object of perception. The only objects of perception are in all senses equally immediate. Thus the object of my vision at present is not the paper or letters at a foot from my eye, but the rays of light reflected from these upon the retina. The object of your hearing is not the vibrations of my language, nor the vibrations of the intervening air; but the vibrations determined thereby in the cavity of the internal ear, and in immediate contact with the auditory nerves. In both senses, then, the external object perceived is the last effect of a series of unperceived causes. But to call these unperceived causes the object of perception, and to call the perceived effect, the real object, only the medium of perception, is either a gross error or an unwarranted abuse of language. My conclusion is, therefore, that in all the senses, the external object is in contact with the organ, and thus, in a certain signification, all the senses are only modifications of touch. This is the simple fact, and any other statement of it is either the effect or the cause of misconception.
“In the second place――in relation to the number and consecution of the elementary phenomena――it is, and must be, admitted, on all hands, that perception must be preceded by an impression of the external object on the sense.... On this point there can be no dispute. But the case is different in regard to the two following. It is asserted by philosophers in general: (1) That the impression made on the organ must be propagated to the brain, before a cognition of the object takes place in the mind,――in other words, that an organic action must precede and determine the intellectual action; and (2) That sensation proper precedes perception proper. In regard to the former assertion, if by this were only meant, that the mind does not perceive external objects out of relation to its bodily organs, and that the relation of the object to the organism, as the condition of perception, must, therefore, in the order of nature, be viewed as prior to the cognition of that relation, no objection could be made to the statement. But if it be intended, as it seems to be, that the organic affection precedes in the order of time the intellectual cognition, of this we have no proof whatever. The fact as stated would be inconsistent with the doctrine of an intuitive perception: for, if the organic affection were chronologically prior to the act of knowledge, the immediate perception of an object different from our bodily senses would be impossible, and the external would thus be represented only in the subjective affections of our own organism. It is, therefore, more correct to hold, that the corporeal movement and the mental perception are simultaneous after the bodily has terminated,――in place of holding that the mind is connected with the body only at the central extremity of the nervous system, it is more simple and philosophical to suppose that it is united with the nervous system in its whole extent.”
Touching the latter assertion, that a perception proper is always preceded by a sensation, though maintained by Reid and Stewart, is more erroneous than the former assertion concerning the precedence of an organic to a mental action. In fact, sensation and perception both exist only as they co-exist. “They do not, indeed, co-exist in the same degree of intensity, but they are really equally original; and it is only by an act, not of the easiest abstraction, that we are able to discriminate them scientifically from each other.”¹
¹ Volume II., pages 185‒189.
The following is a concise statement of his doctrine of Natural Realism:――1. In an act of external perception, “I am conscious of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an external reality as the object perceived, and I am conscious of both existences in the same indivisible moment of intuition. 2. The knowledge of the subject does not precede nor follow the knowledge of the object; neither determines, neither is determined by, the other. 3. The two terms of correlation stand in mutual counterpoise and equal independence; they are given as connected in the synthesis of knowledge, but as contrasted in the antithesis of existence. 4. Consciousness declares our ♦knowledge of material qualities to be intuitive. Nor is the fact, as given, denied even by those who disallow its truth. So clear is the deliverance, that even the philosophers who reject an intuitive perception find it impossible not to admit that their doctrine stands decidedly opposed to the voice of consciousness, and the natural conviction of mankind.” 5. This doctrine of Natural Realism is partly supported upon the distinction of the qualities of matter.¹
♦ “knowlege” replaced with “knowledge”
¹ Discussions, pages 53‒54; also his _Dissertations to Reid’s Works_. In short, his Dissertations to Reid contain a body of valuable philosophical and critical matter relating to the science of the mind. He has endeavoured to present an exhaustive classification of all the possible theories of perception, and his distinctions, explanations, and critical remarks are admirable specimens of logical power and historic genius. This is especially applicable to his important dissertations on the “Qualities of Matter,” of which I had prepared an abstract, and regret that I cannot afford space for it.
Sir William himself says, “that Natural Realism and Absolute Idealism are the only systems worthy of a philosopher; for, as they alone have any foundation in consciousness, so they alone have any consistency in themselves.... The scheme of Natural Realism may be ultimately difficult, for, like all other truths, it ends in the inconceivable; but Hypothetical Realism, in its origin, in its development, in its result, although the favourite scheme of philosophers, is philosophically absurd.”――Dissertations to Reid, Note C, page 817.
Having explicated two of the fundamental peculiarities of Hamilton’s system――his view of the end of speculation, and natural realism――I resume the exposition of his views of the cognitive faculties.
Through the powers of internal and external perception, we are enabled to acquire information, experience; but this acquisition is not of itself independent and complete. It supposes that we are also able to retain the knowledge acquired, as we cannot be said to obtain what we are unable to keep. Thus the faculty of acquisition is only realised through the faculty of memory. We have here two distinct elementary phenomena, each depending on the other for its realisation; for without a power of acquisition a power of retention could not be exerted, and without the latter the former would be fruitless, for we should lose as fast as we acquired. Further, the faculty of acquisition would be ineffective without the faculties of reproduction and imagination, for though the mind retained beyond the sphere of consciousness a treasury of knowledge, this would be of no avail, if it did not possess the power of reproducing and representing such knowledge in consciousness. Although the faculty of memory would be fruitless without the faculties of reproduction and imagination, we are not to confound these faculties, or to view the act of mind which is their joint result, as a simple and elementary power; while they mutually depend on each other, the faculties of memory, reproduction, and imagination are governed by different laws, and in different individuals are found to vary greatly in their comparative vigour.¹
¹ Volume II., pages 205‒207. Further on he says: “By memory, you will see, is only meant the condition of reproduction; and it is, therefore, evident that it is only by an extension of the term, that it can be called a faculty, that is, an active power ... it ought perhaps to receive rather the appellation of a capacity” (page 209).
Touching memory, Hamilton held that all mental energies must persist and endure; we never wholly lose them, but they become obscure. It is only the more vivid changes which sufficiently affect our consciousness to become objects of its apprehension. Thus we are only conscious of the more prominent series of changes in our mental states; the others remain mostly latent. The law of retention extends over all the phenomena of mind. Hence a good memory is one main condition of reproduction.
There is probably no mental power in which such extreme differences appear in individuals as in memory. In a good memory two chief qualities are requisite――the capacity of retention and the power of reproduction.¹ To the latter I now proceed.
¹ Volume II., pages 211‒218. I may state that at one period I could repeat a sermon or a lecture the morning after hearing it. Although I state the fact of my own experience, I do not at all approve of such stretches of verbal memory, and many years ago I ceased from making any such efforts, and instead cultivated the reproductive and representative faculties.
By the faculty of reproduction, Hamilton meant the process of awakening that which is lying dormant in the memory, as contra-distinguished from the representation of it in consciousness as awakened. He was not satisfied with the term reproductive, because it did not precisely of itself mark what he wished to express. And he was right; for no single term could be chosen which would exactly mark the process and at the same time distinguish it from another closely related process as he wished. “I am not satisfied, I say, with the term reproduction for the process by which the dormant thought or affection is aroused, for it does not clearly denote what it is intended to express....
“The phenomena of reproduction is one of the most wonderful in the whole compass of psychology, and it is one in the explanation of which philosophers have been more successful than in almost any other.... The faculty of reproduction is governed by the laws which regulate the association of the mental train, or, to speak more correctly, reproduction is nothing but the result of these laws. Everyone is conscious of the ceaseless succession of thoughts, one thought suggesting another, which again is the cause of exciting a third, and so on. In what manner, it may be asked, does the presence of any thought determine the introduction of another? Is the train subject to laws, and, if so, by what laws is it regulated?”
He gives, as usual, an indication of the views of other philosophers touching the laws of mental association, and he himself endeavoured to carry up all the laws of association into the “law of redintegration,” which he announced thus:――“Those thoughts suggest each other which had previously constituted parts of the same entire act of cognition. Now, to the same entire or total act belong, as integral or constituent parts, in the first place, those thoughts which arose at the same time, or in immediate consecution; and in the second, those thoughts which are bound up into one by their mutual affinity. Thus, therefore, the two laws of simultaneity and affinity are carried up into unity in the higher law of redintegration of totality; and by this one law the whole phenomena of association may be easily explained.”¹
¹ Volume II., pages 227‒229, 231‒238. In one of his Dissertations to Reid, Hamilton gives a “Contribution towards a history of mental suggestion or association;” this, however, deals chiefly with the views of Aristotle and Themistitus. But he also presents an outline of a “theory of mental reproduction, suggestion, or association,” setting forth his own views. The outline is more developed in thought than what is given in his lectures, but it was left incomplete.
I. In it he distinguishes the general laws of mental succession from those of reproduction proper; and of this class he specifies five laws――1. The law of succession. 2. The law of variation. 3. The law of dependence or determined consecution. 4. The law of relativity or integration. 5. The law of intrinsic or objective relativity; under this head he would also include the law of the conditioned.
II. General laws of mental succession, as of reproduction proper――1. The law of repetition. 2. The law of redintegration. 3. The law of preference.
III. Special laws of mental suggestion――1. The law of similars. 2. The law of contrast. 3. The law of coadjacency.
Herbert Spencer, following some of the lines indicated by Hamilton, insists that the cohering of impressions with previously experienced impressions of the same class is the sole law of association. This is not the only principle which the evolution philosophy has adopted from Sir William’s writings; the cast of Hamilton’s intellect itself was essentially evolutionary.
Hamilton shows that the processes of representation and reproduction are closely related; though they are discriminated by differences quite decisive. Reproduction operates, in part, at least, out of consciousness; while representation is only realised as far as it is realised in consciousness, the vivacity of the representation being always in proportion to the vivacity of our consciousness of its reality. The energies of representation and reproduction are not always exerted by the same individual in equal intensity, any more than the energies of reproduction and retention.¹
¹ “Some minds are distinguished by a higher power of manifesting one of these phenomena; others for manifesting another; and as it is not always the person who forgets nothing who can most promptly recall what he retains, so neither is it always the person who recalls most easily and correctly who can exhibit what he remembers in the most vivid colours. It is to be recollected, however, that retention, reproduction, and representation, though not in different persons of the same relative vigour, are, however, in the same individuals, all strong or weak in reference to the same class of subjects. For example, if a man’s memory be more peculiarly retentive of words, his verbal reminiscence and imagination will, in like manner, be more particularly energetic.” (Volume II., page 260.)
According to Hamilton’s view of the fundamental processes of the mind, the function of representation is simply the energy of the mind in holding up to its contemplation what it is determined to represent. But he distinguishes as essentially different, the representation, and the determination to represent; for the reproductive faculty is the immediate source whence the representative receives both the material and the determination to represent; and the laws which control the reproductive faculty also control the representative. So if there were no other laws in the combination and construction of thought than those of association, the representative faculty would be solely determined in its manifestation by the reproductive faculty; but comparison――the faculty of relations also comes into operation. Comparison plays an important part in determining in what combinations objects are represented. By its aid, the complex groups of phenomena called up by the representative faculty undergo various operations; they are separated into parts, analysed into elements; and these parts and elements are again compounded and combined in innumerable ways. While in all this, the representative faculty――imagination co-operates; as it first exhibits the facts as called up by the laws of association; it then exhibits them as variously arranged by the analysis and synthesis of the comparative faculty, thus acting as a subsidiary both to the reproductive and elaborative faculties. Still, in these operations the imaginative power is often the most active element in the process; it is a condition of the analytic operations, as it holds up the objects in a vivid light to the analytic grasp, that it may observe the various circumstances of relation, and the new reconstruction――the result of its own elaboration.
A vigorous power of imagination――of representing objects, is indispensable in every department of thought; but there are many kinds and degrees of imagination. There is the imagination of abstraction, representing to us certain phases of an object to the exclusion of others; the imagination of reason, which represents a principle in connection with its consequences, the effect in dependence on its cause; the imagination of feeling, which represents the accessory images allied to some particular sentiment, which thus confer on it greater compass and intensity; the imagination of the passions, and so on.¹
¹ Volume II., pages 263‒266. Hamilton holds, that the organs which imagination employs in the representation of sensible objects, are the organs of sense themselves, on which the original impressions were made, and through which they were originally perceived. This is the same as Hobbes’ view.
He discusses the elaborative faculty――comparison, or faculty of relations, at length, and in an exceedingly interesting style, under the heads of classification, abstraction, generalisation, judgment, and reasoning. A class of subjects which form the transition from psychology to logic, from the analysis and laws of the mental phenomena, “to the science of thought as thought.” In connection with these, he discusses, in his usual historic form, the interesting subjects of nominalism and conceptionalism, and also the curious question as to “the primum cognitum,” the first cognition, as it was called in the schools. The latter question assumes this character, Does language originate with general names or proper names? Did mankind in the evolution of language, and do children in their first applications of it, begin with general terms or with particular words; or, in other words, does knowledge begin with general notions, or particular notions? There are many illustrious philosophers on each side of the question. Hamilton himself held that our knowledge neither begins with the general nor the particular, but with the vague and confused, and thence proceeds by degrees to evolve both the general and the particular.¹
¹ Volume II., page 279.
The reduction of complicated processes to greater simplicity, or to a single principle, was a marked feature of Hamilton’s intellect; and the following statement touching comparison is an instance in point. “In opposition to the views hitherto promulgated in regard to comparison, I will show that this faculty is at work in every, the simplest, act of mind; and that from the primary affirmation of existence in an original act of consciousness to the judgment contained in the conclusion of an act of reasoning, every operation is only an evolution of the same elementary process,――that there is a difference in the complexity, none in the nature of the act; in short, that the various products of analysis and synthesis, of abstraction and generalisation, are all merely the results of comparison, and that the operations of conception or simple apprehension, of judgment, and reasoning, are all only acts of comparison, in various applications and degrees.”¹
¹ Volume II., pages 319, 335.
He proceeds to develop and to prove this view of comparison. The process of classification is simply an act of comparison, determined by the necessities of the mind――the nature and limits of its powers. In classifying, the mind greatly depends on language for its success, on general names, general and abstract terms, which are used to denote complex and abstract notions. Abstraction, or rather exclusive attention to a particular object or quality of an object, is evidently the work of comparison; it is a process quite familiar to the most uncultured minds. Generalisation is dependent on abstraction, and supposes it; but abstraction does not involve generalisation. It is the process through which we obtain general notions and ideas; thus the points in which a number of objects or things agree, having been discovered, we arrange them by these common points of agreement or similarity, into classes; and from the lowest class ascending step by step till we reach at the highest class.¹
¹ Volume II., pages 279‒283, 293‒295.
Under the last of the special faculties of cognition――the regulative faculty, which is not, properly speaking, an active faculty――he included those primary notions of intelligence or common sense, variously designated as the fundamental principles of intelligence, laws of thought, necessary cognitions, primary data of consciousness. “There are cognitions in the mind which are not contingent,――which are necessary, which we cannot but think, which thought supposes as its fundamental condition. These cognitions, therefore, are not mere generalisations from experience. But if not derived from experience, they must be native to the mind.... These native――these necessary cognitions, are the laws by which the mind is governed in its operations, and which afford the conditions of its capacity of knowledge. These necessary laws, or primary conditions of intelligence, are phenomena of a similar character; and we must, therefore, generalise them or collect them into a class; and on the power possessed by the mind of manifesting these phenomena, we may bestow the name of the Regulative Faculty.”
It should be observed that the primary and necessary notions of the mind here announced as the laws which afford the conditions of knowledge, are embodied by Hamilton in his philosophy of the conditioned. He recognised a considerable number of primary or ultimate notions and principles; but did not pretend to give an exhaustive and complete enumeration of such notions. What he really did, was to argue that there was such a class of notions and principles, and actually employed a certain number of them in the construction of his psychology, his philosophy of the conditioned, and his logic.
With regard to the essential characteristics for discriminating the principles of common sense――the original data of consciousness, he says: “These characters, I think, may be reduced to four: (1) Their incomprehensibility, (2) their simplicity, (3) their necessity and absolute universality, (4) their comparative evidence and certainty.”¹
¹ Hamilton’s Reid, page 754.
What has just been stated, taken in connection with what was said before, of the immediate facts of consciousness, and the intuitive character of perception, will be sufficient to indicate Hamilton’s view of the primary and ultimate notions of the mind. Thus far I have signalised three of the fundamental and distinctive principles of his philosophy. But to complete the exposition of his psychology, it is requisite to notice briefly his treatment of the feelings.
These, the second great class of mental phenomena, in his classification, is not exhaustively treated; but so far it is satisfactory, and exceedingly interesting. He devoted six lectures to the feelings, one of which is occupied with an historical account of the theories of pleasure and pain. His classification and division of the feelings may be indicated thus:
I. First, sensations――the five senses and organic sensations. II. The sentiments and internal feelings: first, the contemplative, subdivided into (1) those of the subsidiary faculties, including those of self-consciousness, and (2) those of imagination, order, symmetry, unity in variety; (3) those of the elaborative faculty, wit, the pleasures of truth and science, and the gratification of adapting means to ends; (4) beauty and sublimity springing from the conjoint energy of the imagination and the understanding. III. The practical feelings relate to (1) self-preservation――hunger and thirst, loathing, sorrow, bodily pain, anxiety, etc.; (2) the enjoyment of our existence; (3) the preservation of the species; (4) the tendency towards development and perfection; and (5) moral law.
He delivered a theory of pleasure and pain, and applied it to explain this general mental phenomena; in other words, he considered the feelings as causes――causes of pleasure and pain; and he then considered them as effects, or products of the action of our different powers. The scope of his standpoint is thus stated by himself:――
“What are the general conditions which determine the existence of pain; for pleasure and pain are the phenomena which constitute the essential attribute of true feeling, under all its manifestations?... I shall, first of all, state the abstract theory of pleasure and pain, in other words, enounce the fundamental law by which these phenomena are governed, in all their manifestations.” Under the ninth and last head of his theory, the following is enounced:――“Pleasure is thus the result of certain harmonious relations――of certain agreements; pain, on the contrary, the effect of certain unharmonious relations――of certain disagreements. The pleasurable is, therefore, not inappropriately called the agreeable; the painful, the disagreeable; and in conformity to this doctrine, pleasure and pain, may be thus defined:――Pleasure is a reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power, of whose energy we are conscious. Pain a reflex of the overstrained or repressed exertion of such a power.” As already stated, he illustrates the application of his theory in the explanation of pleasure and pain at some length,¹ with keen insight and rare breadth of view. In the two last lectures, he treats the feelings as effects――as products of the action of our different powers; and thus considered, his exposition is often very happy.
¹ Volume II., pages 434‒440, et seq.
Hamilton’s Philosophy of the Conditioned is simply an attempt to systematise the conditions of the thinkable, in the form of an Alphabet of human thought. In its fundamental conception it is restrictive and conservative. Probably he was as well informed and aware of the many aberrations of human thought and speculation as any man that ever lived; and he was fully cognisant of the systems and speculations of those philosophers who had pretended to walk through the dark mountains of eternity and infinity without stumbling, and to return with positive knowledge. Knowing this, he was, therefore, well entitled to make an effort to lay down the conditions and limits of human thought; and thus he has done great service to real philosophy, to science, and mankind.
He grounded his own theory of the Conditioned upon the recognised laws of identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, and the law of relativity. Thus when he speaks of the Conditioned it is in special reference to relativity; and by existence conditioned is meant existence thought under relation. Relation may be understood to contain all the categories and forms of positive thought. We should not, however, think it as a law of things, but simply as a law of thought; for we find that there are contradictory opposites, one of which, by the rule of Excluded Middle, must be true, but neither of which can be positively thought, as possible. Thinking, under this condition, is synthetic. The condition of Relativity is brought to bear under three principal relations: the first springs from the subject of knowledge――the mind thinking, the relation of knowledge; the second and third from the object of knowledge――the thing thought about, the relations of Existence.
1. The relations of knowledge are those arising from the reciprocal dependence of the subject and of the object of thought, self and not-self――subjective and objective. Everything that comes into consciousness is thought by us, either as belonging to the mental self exclusively, or as belonging to the not-self exclusively, or as belonging partly to both.
2. The relations of Existence arising from the object of knowledge are twofold; as the relation is either Intrinsic or Extrinsic. As the relation of Existence is Intrinsic, it is that of Substance and Quality. It may be called qualitative. But, as the relation of Existence is Extrinsic, it is threefold; and as formed by three kinds of quantity, it may be called quantitative. It is realised in or by: (1) Protensive quantity, or time; (2) Extensive quantity, Extension or Space; (3) Intensive quantity, or degree.
3. Time, or protensive quantity, called also Duration, is a necessary condition of thought; and it may be considered both in itself and in the things which it contains.
Considered in itself, Time is positively inconceivable, if we attempt to construe it in thought; on the one side, as absolutely commencing or absolutely terminating, or on the other, as infinite or eternal. It is positively conceivable, if conceived as an indefinite past, present, or future; and as an indeterminate mean between the two unthinkable extremes of an absolute least and an infinite divisibility: for thus it is relative.
Things in Time are either coinclusive or coexclusive. Things coinclusive, if of the same time, are identical, apparently and in thought; if of different times, as causes and effect, they appear as different, but are thought as identical. Things coexclusive are mutually either prior and posterior, or contemporaneous.
The impossibility we experience of thinking as non-existent, non-existent, consequently, in time, aught which we have conceived as existent,――this impossibility affords the principle of Causality, which will be subsequently explained.
Time applies to both Substance and Quantity; and includes the other quantities, Space and Degree.
4. Space, extension or extensive quantity, is likewise a necessary condition of thought; and may also be considered, both in itself and in the things which it contains.
Considered in itself, Space is positively inconceivable: as a whole, either infinitely unbounded, or absolutely bounded; as a part, either infinitely divisible, or absolutely indivisible. Space is positively conceivable, as a mean between these extremes; that is, we can think it either as an indefinite whole, or as an indefinite part. For thus it is relative.¹ So much touching the foundation of the philosophy of the Conditioned.
¹ Discussions, pages 577‒582.
He enounced the Law of the Conditioned thus:――“All positive thought lies between two extremes, neither of which we can conceive as possible, and yet, as mutually contradictory, the one or the other must necessarily be true.”¹ We have already seen that we cannot think past time as beginning to be; on the other hand, we cannot conceive it going backwards without limit――eternity baffles our imagination. But time either had a beginning or it had not. So of space, we are unable to conceive space as finite or bounded; we are equally powerless to realise in thought an idea of infinite space. “You may launch out in thought beyond the solar walk, you may traverse in fancy over the universe of matter, and rise from sphere to sphere in the regions of empty space, until imagination sinks exhausted;――with all this what have you done? You have never got beyond the finite, you have attained at best only to the indefinite, and the indefinite, however expanded, is still always the finite.... The infinite is infinitely incomprehensible.” Thus the conceivable or the thinkable “lies always between two inconceivable extremes, as illustrated by every other relation of thought.”²
¹ Discussions, page 591; also Reid’s Works, page 911. Hamilton states the Law of the Conditioned repeatedly in his different writings; and some of its positions are stated at greatest length in the second volume of his Lectures.
² Discussions, page 591; Lectures, Volume II., pages 366‒372.
The chief applications of the Law of the Conditioned are to the principles of substance and causality: and taking substance first, which he has not treated with much detail. We cannot think a quality existing entirely in or of itself. We are constrained to think it as inhering in some substance; but this substance is only conceived by us the unapparent――the inconceivable correlative of certain appearing qualities. If we attempt to think it positively, we only think it by transforming it into a quality or bundle of qualities, which again we refer to an unknown substance, now supposed for their incognisable basis. Thus, everything may be conceived as the quality, or as the substance of something else; but absolute substance and absolute quality are both inconceivable.¹
¹ Discussions, page 580.
The phenomenon of causality is the Law of the Conditioned applied to a thing thought as existing in time. We cannot know, nor think a thing, except under the attribute of existence, and existing in time; and we cannot know or think a thing to exist in time, and think it absolutely to commence. This imposes on us the judgment of causality. An object is given to us by our perceptive faculties, as given, we cannot but think it existent, and existent in time; but to say this, is to say, that we are unable to think it non-existent,――to annihilate it in thought, and this we cannot do; for once thinking it to exist, we cannot think it not to exist. This will be admitted of the present, but probably denied of the past and future, under the belief that we can think creation or annihilation. Matter or objects may change their forms in innumerable ways; but we cannot conceive that there can be an atom absolutely added to, or taken away from, existence as a whole. Let us try it:――
“We are able to conceive the creation of a world; this indeed as easily as the creation of an atom. But what is our thought of creation? It is not a thought of the mere springing of nothing into something. On the contrary creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the evolution of existence from possibility into actuality, by the fiat of the Deity. Let us place ourselves in imagination at its very crisis. Now, can we construe it to thought, that the moment after the universe flashed into material reality, into manifest being, that there was a larger complement of existence in the universe and its author together, than the moment before there subsisted in the Deity alone? This we are unable to imagine. And what is true of our concept of creation, holds of our concept of annihilation. We can think no real annihilation, no absolute sinking of something into nothing. But, as creation is cogitable by us, only as a putting forth of divine power, so is annihilation by us only conceivable as a withdrawal of that same power.... In short, it is impossible for the human mind to think what it thinks existent, lapsing into non-existence, either in time past or in time future.”¹
¹ Discussions, pages 591‒593; Lectures, Volume II. pages 400‒406.
He thinks that his theory of causality is preferable to others, because to explain the phenomenon of the causal judgment, it postulates no new or express principle, not even a positive power; while it shows that the phenomenon is only one of a class, it assigns as their common cause, only a negative impotence. He also thinks that it affords a philosophical defence of the freedom of the will. He points out the inconsistencies and contradictions of his predecessors; but he admits that speculatively we are unable to understand how moral liberty is possible in man. But practically, our consciousness of the moral law gives a decisive preponderance to the doctrine of freedom over the doctrine of fate. We are free in act, if we are accountable for our actions. That the philosophy of the Conditioned has a real foundation in the human mind, appears to be evident, when considered in its relation to the universe. The necessities of its capacities and faculties of knowledge, their limits and imperfection, as well as the actual position in which man finds himself in the universe of nature, all plainly indicate that his powers of knowledge are anything rather than absolute and infinite. This much may be averred; still, it is open to anyone to question, if Hamilton’s applications of his own theory were in all points the most legitimate. I will now proceed to his logic.
He viewed Logic as a formal science, and divided it into pure and modified. In his lectures on this subject, he proceeds on a definite and interesting style of exposition; he first states the leading doctrines in separate paragraphs, and then in a running commentary explains and illustrates them. The first paragraph is this:――“A system of logical instruction consists of two parts――(1) Of an introduction to the science; (2) of a body of doctrine constituting the science itself.” These he discussed in their order: the introduction to logic should afford answers to the five following questions: What is logic? what is its value? what are its divisions? what is its history? what are the best books on the subject? These questions are treated in a concise and animated style; and the answer to the first one is given in his definition of logic, which is this:――“Logic is the Science of Thought as thought.” But he says that this definition cannot be understood without a clear exposition of its several parts, which he proceeds to present.
What he meant by “the laws of thought as thought,” is thus explained: the term thought is used in two significations, in a wider, and in a narrower and stricter sense, and it is with thought in the latter sense――thought proper, that logic is concerned. “All thought is a comparison, a recognition of similarity or difference; a conjunction or disjunction, in other words, a synthesis or analysis of its objects.... But thought simply is still too undetermined; the proper object of logic is something still more definite; it is not thought in general, but thought considered merely as thought, of which this science takes cognisance.... What is meant by thought as thought? It is the recognition of a thing as coming under a concept; in other words, the marking an object by an attribute or attributes previously known as common to sundry objects, and to which we have accordingly given a general name. Logic is properly conversant with the form of thought to the exclusion of the matter.
“But the limitation of the object――matter of logic to the form of thought, is not yet enough to determine its province from that of other mental sciences; for psychology is, in like manner, among other mental phenomena, conversant about the phenomena of formal thought. A still further limitation is, therefore, requisite; and this is given in saying, that logic is the science not merely of thought as thought, but the laws of thought as thought, ... or the science of the formal laws of thought, or the science of the laws of the form of thought; these being three various expressions of the same thing.”¹
¹ Lectures, Volume III., pages 3‒26.
He gives further explanations, of which this is one:――“Abstract logic considers the laws of thought as potentially applicable to the objects of all arts and sciences, but as not actually applicable to those of any; concrete logic considers these laws in their actual and immediate application to the object-matter of this or that particular art or science. The former of these is one, and alone belongs to philosophy, whereas the latter is as multiform as the arts and sciences to which it is relative.”¹
¹ Volume III., page 53.
Abstract logic is divided into pure and modified; and the former he divides into two parts: (1) The Doctrine of Elements, which are either laws or products; and (2) Methodology, or the doctrine of Method――the means of thinking well. Modified logic falls into three parts: (1) The first treats of the nature of Truth and Error, and of the higher laws for their discrimination; (2) the second of the Impediments to thinking, with the means of their removal; (3) the third of the Aids of thinking.
In passing, I may remark that Hamilton’s treatment of modified logic, although not exhaustive, is exceedingly clear and valuable so far as it goes. This part of his lectures should be attentively read by those who wish to cultivate their minds, or to study the laws of criticism and historical evidence.
The following is his tabular view of the divisions of logic:
{ { i. Doctrine { 1. Noetic: Nomology. { { of Elements. { { { { 2. Dianoetic: { a. Conception. { { { Dynamic. { b. Judgment. { I. Pure. { { { c. Reasoning. { { { { ii. { Clear thinking: 1. Definition. General { { Method- { Distinct thinking: 2. Division. or { { ology. { Connected thinking: 3. Probation. Abstract { Logic. { { i. Truth and Error: Certainty and Illusion. { { { { ii. Impediments { 1. The Mind. { { to thinking, { 2. The Body. { II. Mod- { with { 3. External circumstances. { ified. { { { iii. Aids or { 1. The Acquisition { { Subsidiaries { of Knowledge. { { to thinking, { 2. The Communication { { through { of Knowledge.
After stating the fundamental laws of thought, he proceeds to the doctrine of Elements――to the exposition of concepts, judgment, and reasoning. Five lectures are given to an explication of concepts or notions: (1) Their general character is described; (2) then their special objective relation, in regard to quantity; (3) their subjective relation, in regard to quality; (4) their imperfection; (5) their reciprocal relation, in regard to the quality of extension ――subordination and co-ordination; (6) their reciprocal relations in regard to the quantity of comprehension, which are all explained with remarkable clearness.¹
¹ Volume III., page 137, et seq.
He expounds his doctrine of judgments in two lectures, and it is in connection with the quantification of the predicate of propositions or judgments that Sir William claims to have made improvements on formal logic.¹ I am aware that his claim, even on this point, has been disputed since his death, but my limits will not permit me to enter into a discussion of the subject; yet I think that the varied materials printed in the second volume of his Lectures on Logic afford the means of placing it in its true light. Hamilton there notices many partial anticipations of this doctrine.
¹ In a footnote to his article on Logic, he says:――“It will be seen from the tenor of the text, that, by the year 1833, I had become aware of the error in the doctrine of Aristotle and the logicians, which maintains that the predicate in affirmative propositions could only be formally quantified as particular, nay, that Aristotle, in his practice in the inductive syllogism, virtually contradicts the speculative precept which he, over and over, expressly enounces for syllogism in general.... The doctrine of a thorough-going quantification of the predicate, with its results, I have, however, publicly taught since the year 1840, at the latest.” ――Discussions, page 162.
As already stated, his projected work on logic was never finished. He introduced, however, several modifications in syllogistic theory, and signalised various distinctions, tending toward more simplicity, and constructed an ingenious scheme of logical notation.¹ There can be no doubt that he spent a considerable part of his life in prosecuting inquiries connected with logic.
¹ See Discussions, pages 614‒620, and the appendices to the second volume of his Lectures on Logic. His final scheme of logical notation is inserted at the end of this volume. I can only notice a few points:――
1. “That we can only rationally deal with what we already understand, determines the simple logical postulate――to state explicitly what is thought implicitly.
2. “All mediate inference is one――that incorrectly called Categorical; for the Conjunctive and Disjunctive forms of hypothetical reasoning are reducible to immediate inferences.
“Mentally one, the Categorical Syllogism, according to its order of enouncement, is either Analytic (A) or Synthetic (B). Analytic, if what is inappropriately styled the conclusion be expressed first, and what are inappropriately styled the premisses be then stated as its reasons. Synthetic, if the premisses precede, and, as it were, effectuate the conclusion. These general forms of syllogism can with ease be distinguished by a competent notation; and every special variety in the one has its corresponding variety in the other.
“Taking the syllogism under the latter form (B), which, though perhaps less natural, has been alone cultivated by logicians, and to which therefore, exclusively all logical nomenclature is relative,――the syllogism is again divided into the non-figured (a) and figured (b).”――Discussions, pages 614‒616.
3. “Quantity and quality combined constitute the only real discrimination of syllogistic mood. Syllogistic figure vanishes, with its perplexing apparatus of special rules; and even the general laws of syllogism proper are reduced to a single compendious canon....
“We have shown that a judgment or proposition is only a comparison resulting in a congruence, an equation, or non-equation of two notions in the quantity of extension; and that these compared notions stand to each other, as the one subject and the other predicate, as both the subject, or as both the predicate of the judgment. If this be true, the transposition of the terms of a proposition sinks into a very easy and a very simple process; whilst the whole doctrine of logical conversion is superseded as operose and imperfect, as useless and erroneous.”――Lectures, Volume IV., Appendix, pages 275‒276.
He also wrote very effectively on Education, chiefly on the higher branches, and in reference to University reform. His views were comprehensive, enlightened, and liberal, far in advance of his time. But occasionally he was extremely outspoken and severe on the prevailing abuses and shortcomings of the Universities. He did not limit himself to Scotland, but wrote powerfully on the state of the English Universities, with especial reference to Oxford. He argued that dissenters ought to be admitted into the public Universities. Altogether, his articles on education contain a body of varied, curious, interesting, and valuable information.
To sum up, I have presented a brief account of Hamilton’s psychology and philosophy; its fundamental principles have been explained. He taught the doctrine that man, in so far as he is a mean for the glory of God, must be an end to himself, inasmuch as his perfection and happiness constitute the goal of his activity. He seemed to value the pursuit of truth more than its possession, or rather that its pursuit afforded man more pleasure than its possession, which is quite true. He embraced the doctrine of intuitive perception――natural realism; and drew up a scheme of all the possible theories of perception. He maintained that the human mind possesses native notions, necessary cognitions, which afford the requisite conditions of knowledge. His own vast and varied knowledge of recorded thought and philosophical systems afforded him innumerable instances of the aberrations of thought, contradictions, and vain presumptions; and so he constructed his Philosophy of the Conditioned, which indicates the limits of human thought. He took a strictly formal and limited view of the province of logic; and upon this conception his exposition of the science is clear and masterly. He also endeavoured to simplify the common syllogistic system, and introduced several useful improvements.
His conception of method, his skill and care in arrangement, and in brief and clear summaries, are admirable; while his powers of exposition were of the highest order. The style of his lectures is lighted with a fire and glow of thought and a genuine human feeling rarely found in philosophical literature.
Hamilton attained a European reputation in his own lifetime, chiefly through his articles in the Edinburgh Review, and his teaching in the University of Edinburgh. Since his death his writings have had a considerable influence. He had of course a certain number of direct followers, very few of whom are now alive. But several other schools of thought are indebted to Hamilton; and perhaps Herbert Spencer is more indebted to him for the fundamental conceptions and principles of his system of philosophy than to any other philosopher. This of course, mainly refers to Spencer’s First Principles, but partly also to his Psychology. On the other hand, Hamilton’s philosophy has been subjected to severe criticism from various quarters.¹ I can, however, only mention the fact, and must refrain from entering into any discussion.
¹ J. S. Mill’s Examination of Hamilton’s Philosophy is well known, and it is an able and acute work; but I affirm that Mill did not, in all respects, present a fair and just estimate of Hamilton. He did not take any account of the circumstances in which Hamilton was placed; and so when reckoning up the little that Hamilton had produced in philosophy in comparison to what he might have done, and began to seek for reasons to explain this, it never occurred to him to assign any weight to these circumstances. Unfortunately Hamilton’s father died when he was an infant; Mill’s father not only lived to bring him up, but also to educate him personally, and to cram him with all kinds of knowledge and science, so that long ere he reached the years of manhood, he was a prodigy; then, when he came of age, his father got him into a position in the Indian Office, where he had only to work a few hours a day. Thus his father did everything for him that could be done. Mill never knew the difficulties of finding a post for himself, or the humiliation of going about seeking employment. Hamilton had to face a very different career, as he had to struggle hard for existence, and fight many a battle ere he attained a position.
But Mill himself avows that he wrote his Examination of Hamilton’s Philosophy for the express purpose of reducing his too great reputation, and explicitly declares in his own Autobiography that it had fully effected its original aim!
Dr. J. F. Ferrier was an intimate friend of Sir William Hamilton, and at one time he was professor of civil history in the University of Edinburgh; but in 1846 he was appointed to the chair of moral philosophy in the University of St. Andrews, which he held until his death in 1864. When the chair of logic and metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh became vacant on the death of Hamilton, Ferrier entered the field as a candidate for it, but he was not successful. However, in connection with this he published a pamphlet in 1856, entitled Scottish Philosophy, the Old and the New, the new being his own. In this pamphlet he complained against the town council of Edinburgh for allowing themselves to be influenced by certain outside parties in favour of candidates who professed to teach the old Scottish philosophy in preference to the new. It seems that he was greatly disappointed when he failed to obtain the Edinburgh chair.¹
¹ In this pamphlet he replied to criticisms on his own metaphysics, and says:――“It has been asserted that my philosophy is of German origin and complexion. A broader fabrication than that never dropped from human lips or dribbled from the point of pen. My philosophy is Scottish to the very core; it is national in every fibre and articulation of its frame. It is a natural growth of old Scotland’s soil, and has drunk in no nourishment from any other land.” (page 12).
Ferrier’s Institutes of Metaphysics, the Theory of Knowing and Being, appeared in 1854. It consists of an introduction, partly historical and partly critical, and three sections, the first of which treats of the theory of knowledge, the second of the theory of ignorance, and the third of the theory of being. He adopted the demonstrative method of exposition, states his propositions and counter propositions in a series, and reasons them out in a precise and rigorous form. His thinking is acute, definite, vigorous, and easily followed. In short, his style is unusually clear, simple, and concise.
Ferrier’s first proposition is headed, “The primary law or condition of knowledge,” and it is worded thus:――“Along with whatever any intelligence knows it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of itself.” This is a very primitive truth, and he tells us over and over that it is the keystone of his system. “Looked at in itself, or as an isolated truth, our first proposition is of no importance; but viewed as the foundation of the whole system, and as the single staple on which all the truths subsequently to be advanced depend, it cannot be too strongly insisted on or too fully elucidated. Everything hinges on the stability which can be given to this proposition, on the acceptance it may meet with. If it falls, the system entirely fails; if it stands, the system entirely succeeds. It is to be hoped that the reader will not be stopped or discouraged by the apparent truism which it involves. He may think that if the main truth which this philosophy has to tell him is that all his cognitions and perceptions are known by him to be his own, he will have very little to thank it for. Let him go on and see what follows.”
He remarks that if this first proposition is not very clearly confirmed by experience, it is not refuted by experience; for by no effort can anyone ever apprehend a thing to the entire exclusion of himself. A man cannot leave himself altogether out of his account and proceed to the consideration of the surrounding objects. But experience can only establish it as a limited matter of fact, and this is insufficient for the purposes of his subsequent demonstrations. “It is reason alone that can give to this proposition the certainty and extension which are required to render it a sure foundation for all that is to follow.... It must be established as a necessary truth of reason――as a law binding on intelligence universally――as a conception the opposite of which is a contradiction and an absurdity.
“Strictly speaking, the proposition cannot be demonstrated, because, being itself the absolute starting point, it cannot be deduced from any antecedent data; but it may be explained in such a way as to leave no doubt as to its axiomatic character. It claims all the stringency of a geometrical axiom, and its claims, it is conceived, are irresistible.... A man has knowledge, and is cognisant of perceptions only when he brings them home to himself. If he were not aware that they were his, he could not be aware of them at all. Can I know without knowing that it is I who know? No, truly. But if a man in knowing anything, must always know that he knows it, he must always be self-conscious.”
But this had been fully recognised before by the Scottish School. For there is nothing more explicit in Hamilton, than that consciousness is the primary, the necessary, and the universal condition of knowing, and of knowledge. It would be unfair, however, to adduce this as detracting in any way from the candour and the merit of Ferrier’s work; and I shall quote a part of what he says regarding anticipations of his own first proposition:――
“But passing over all intermediate approximations, we find anticipations of this first principle in the writings of the philosophers of Germany. It has no claim to novelty, however novel may be the uses to which these institutes apply it. Kant had glimpses of the truth; but his remarks are confused in the extreme, in regard to what he calls the analytic and synthetic of consciousness. This is one of the few places in his works from which no meaning can be extracted. In his hands the principle answered no purpose at all. It died in the act of being born, and was buried under a mass of subordinate considerations before it can be said to have even breathed. Fichte got hold of it, and lost it; got hold of it, and lost it again, through a series of eight or ten different publications, in which the truth slips through his fingers when it seems just on the point of being turned to some account. Schelling promised magnificent operations in the heyday of his youth, on a basis very similar to that laid down in this first proposition. But the world has been waiting for the fulfilment of these promises――for the fruits of that exuberant blossom――during a period of more than fifty years.... Hegel――but who has ever yet uttered one intelligible word about Hegel? Not any of his countrymen, not any foreigner――seldom even himself. With peaks, here and there, more lucent than the sun, his intervals are filled with a sea of darkness, unnavigable by the aid of any compass, and an atmosphere or rather vacuum, in which no human intellect can breathe. Hegel had better not be meddled with just at present. It is impossible to say to what extent this proposition coincides, or does not coincide, with his opinions; for whatever truth there may be in Hegel, it is certain that his meaning cannot be wrung from him by any amount of mere reading, any more than the whisky which is in bread――so at least we have been informed――can be extracted by squeezing the loaf into a tumbler. He requires to be distilled, as all philosophers do, more or less, but Hegel to an extent which is unparalleled.”¹
¹ Pages 82‒84, 90‒92. Since the above passage was written, a considerable change has occurred in Scotland with regard to Hegel. Dr. Stirling’s efforts to explain Hegel are well known; and Dr. Seth, now Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, after criticising the principle of the Relativity of Knowledge, and generally commenting unfavourably on Hamilton’s principles, speaks of Hegel thus:――
“So far as I can see, Hegel alone of all metaphysicians lifts us completely clear of Relativism. He alone has gone systematically to work to lay bare the abstractions on which it depends; and in so doing he has to a great extent transformed the character of metaphysics, and so rendered unjust many of the epithets which popular phraseology still associates with the science.
“We have Hegel’s own word for it that the method is nothing, unless we bring the whole nature of thought with us.... The Method sums up a thought which may almost be said to constitute Hegel’s philosophy, and one which, in my opinion, gives him a signal advantage over all his modern predecessors.
“The thought in question is primarily a logical principle; a fact which may partly explain why Hegel made his logic the centre of his system. It is the principle to which we have already referred so often, the systematic recognition of the fact that thought is founded upon difference; whereas identity had hitherto been the god of the logician’s idolatry.... I do believe that here we have a principle, not of arbitrary invention, but drawn from the heart of things, from the nature of the self-conscious spirit itself.... The essential point in a systematic philosophy is simply the possession of some outline or scheme, by reference to which each conception may be judged and receive its place and meaning. In self-consciousness, Hegel seems to hold a position, from which, in the nature of the case, it is impossible to dislodge him.”――Seth’s Lectures on Scottish Philosophy, pages 167, 171, 174, ♦183, 195‒197.
♦ “83” replaced with “183”
His theory of Ignorance seems the most effective section of his Institutes. Its principle is that ignorance is a defect, privation, or shortcoming; and that there can be an ignorance only of that which can be known. But Ferrier’s Institutes, and also several dissertations published after his death, are almost entirely occupied in clearing the ground of prevailing contradictions and inconsistencies of thought. His own positive views consist of a few remarks and brief indications.
George Croom Robertson was born in Aberdeen on the 10th of March, 1842. He was educated at the Grammar School there, and at the University of Aberdeen, where, after a very distinguished career, he graduated in 1861 with highest honours in classics and mental philosophy. The same year he gained the Ferguson Scholarship, in these two subjects, one of the great prizes open to all Scottish graduates. Subsequent to this Mr. Robertson pursued his philosophic studies for upwards of two years at Heidelberg, Berlin, Göttingen, and Paris, where he made the acquaintance of Trendeleburg, Du Bois, Reymond, Bona Meyer, Lotze, and other distinguished teachers and thinkers, and profited greatly by their instruction and intercourse. He returned to Aberdeen in 1863, and continued to devote his attention to philosophical study.
Having elaborated a number of valuable and interesting notes from his German studies, he assisted Dr. Bain in the revision and amplification of his work, entitled, The Senses and the Intellect, the Emotions and the Will, for a second edition. He also aided Dr. Bain in the ethical part of the excellent manual――Mental and Moral Science, and contributed to it the articles on the Neo-Platonists, the Scholastic Ethics, Hobbes, Cumberland, Cudworth, Kant, Cousin, and Jouffroy. In these there is ample evidence of Robertson’s philosophic, critical, and literary powers, scholarship, and research.
In 1864 he was appointed assistant to Professor Geddes in the University of Aberdeen, and held the post for two sessions; he also assisted in teaching the Greek classes. In December, 1866, he was appointed to the Chair of Mental Philosophy and Logic in University College, London, and opened his class in January, 1867. He carefully prepared courses of lectures for his classes on Systematic Psychology, Ethical Theory, and Logic――inductive and deductive. He mainly directed his teaching to the elaboration and explication of psychological doctrines, and the history of philosophy. His knowledge of recorded thought, and of the great philosophical systems, ancient and modern, was wide and accurate, while his clear style of stating psychological doctrines and expository powers were remarkable.
For ten years he was Examiner in Philosophy in the University of London. He also acted as Examiner in the University of Aberdeen for two terms. Occasionally he delivered popular lectures at Manchester, Newcastle, and the Royal Institution, London. For several years he gave the philosophical course of lectures to the College of Preceptors. He took an active interest in the business and management of University College, as a member of the Senate, and subsequently as one of the Senate’s Representatives on the Council.
In 1874 Dr. Bain originated a proposal for establishing a Quarterly Journal of Philosophy, and consulted Robertson on the subject. Dr. Bain desired that Professor Robertson should be editor, and after consideration he accepted the editorship. Time, however, was required to obtain the approbation and promise of support from, at least, some of the eminent living writers on philosophy. Accordingly both made efforts by personal interviews and correspondence, and they received sufficient encouragement to make arrangements for the publication. Under the title of Mind: a Quarterly Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, the first number appeared in January, 1876. Robertson was editor of Mind for sixteen years, and expended a great amount of thought and labour upon it. Besides his own original articles, and many reviews of works on psychology, ethics, and philosophy, he carefully revised most of the articles contributed by others before they appeared in the pages of Mind. This quarterly publication――the first entirely devoted in the English language to the discussions of mental philosophy, has, during the last twenty years, had a considerable influence upon philosophic thought.
Professor Robertson’s health began to fail twelve years before his death. During the sessions from 1883 to 1888 he had several times to employ substitutes for his teaching work in the College. In the later years of his life he suffered much severe pain, which he bore with great patience. He resigned his Chair in the College on the 7th of May, 1892. His wife died on the 29th of May, the same year; and he himself died on the 20th of September following.¹
¹ _Philosophical Remains of George Croom Robertson, with a Memoir_, 1894. This volume was edited by Dr. Bain and Mr. T. Whittaker, who had long acted as Robertson’s assistant in preparing notices for Mind.
Owing to weak health in the later part of his life, and his death at the comparatively early age of fifty, his writings are not voluminous. Yet they touch on a considerable variety of subjects of much interest, embracing biography, psychology, and philosophy treated historically and associated with the characteristics of an elevated and candid criticism.
He contributed to the Dictionary of National Biography biographies of George Grote, the historian, and his wife, and two of the historian’s brothers――John and Arthur. His contributions to the ninth edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica extended to eight articles, two of which were historical. One of these dealt with Abelard, the famous lecturer and teacher of the twelfth century, a very able and interesting article. Another article was on the remarkable philosopher, Hobbes, a subject to which he had given much attention, and subsequently treated in a book. The remaining articles were philosophical, and treated on Analogy, Analysis, Analytic Judgments, Autonomy, Association, and Axion. All these are admirable specimens of method, clear thought, polished style, and lucid exposition of difficult mental processes.
At an early stage of his life he intended to write a large work on Hobbes, and to treat the subject on comprehensive historic lines. He rightly formed the conception that Hobbes was an important historic character, as he lived and wrote in one of the stirring and revolutionary periods of the history of the Island. He had made some progress in research and had prepared much material for such a work, but untoward circumstances of health prevented him from realising his original conception. He, however, as mentioned before, contributed an article on Hobbes to the Encyclopædia; and in 1886 a volume on Hobbes appeared as one of the series, entitled Philosophical Classics for English Readers. It is not written on a large scale, yet it is a compact and excellent treatise. He shows a fine historic insight into the social and political conflicts of the period, with reference to their influence upon Hobbes’s views and opinions. Robertson’s remarkable historic faculty is clearly manifested in this volume. His appreciation and criticism of Hobbes’ works, and his influence on subsequent writers, is marked by thoroughness, candour, and accuracy. The treatise is a model of its kind, and is recognised as the best existing monograph on the subject.
To conclude, the preceding account of Scottish Philosophy covers nearly two centuries. The Scottish Philosophers mainly concentrated their efforts on mental philosophy――the explication of the human mind, psychology, moral and political science. Their works present a body of doctrines and reflective thought which are well worth careful study. For the mind alone constitutes the distinctive glory and dignity of man. Insomuch, that it is only by the culture of the mind and the moral sentiments that mankind can hope to attain a more elevated and higher stage of civilisation.
Chapter XL
_Literature of Scotland in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries._
SECTION I.
Historical Literature of the Eighteenth Century.
AFTER the union various external influences began to touch Scottish literature. Ere indicating these, and dealing with the eminent historians of the period, a few of the historical writers who preceded them may be briefly noticed.
Dr. Patrick Abercromby was descended from the Abercrombies of Tullibody in Fife, and was born at Forfar in 1656. He was educated at the University of St. Andrews, and obtained the degree of doctor of medicine in 1685. His family were supporters of the Stuart line, and he was appointed one of the physicians of James VII. After the Revolution of 1688 he lived abroad, but returned to Scotland in the reign of Queen Anne, and directed his attention to the study of national antiquities. The first volume of his work, entitled The Martial Achievements of the Scots Nation, was published in 1711, and the second in 1715. This work is interesting, but it has little historical value.
James Anderson, a son of the Rev. Patrick Anderson, was born in 1662. He was educated at the University of Edinburgh, and graduated in 1680; and having subsequently studied Law, in 1691 he became a member of the Society of Writers to the Signet.
When the question of the Union was stirring the feeling of the Scottish people, Mr. Attwood, a lawyer, in 1704 issued a pamphlet, in which all the old claims of Edward I. over Scotland were reasserted. In 1705 Mr. Anderson published an answer to Attwood’s pamphlet, entitled An Essay, showing that the Crown of Scotland is Imperial and Independent. This effort was well received in Scotland, while Parliament passed a vote of thanks and a reward to Mr. Anderson, which was presented to him by the Chancellor in presence of the Royal Commissioner. Then Attwood’s pamphlet and others of a similar character were ordered to be burned at the Cross of Edinburgh by the common hangman. The value of Anderson’s essay mainly consisted in the important charters attached to it.
In research connected with his essay, he had collected a number of valuable national documents. He obtained the patronage of the Scottish Parliament to a plan for engraving and publishing a series of facsimiles of royal charters prior to the reign of James I., and of coins and seals from the earliest times to the end of the seventeenth century. In November, 1706, the Scottish Parliament granted him three hundred pounds to promote the work, and he proceeded with it. By the beginning of March, 1707, he had expended this sum and about six hundred pounds of his own on the work. This was reported to Parliament, and a majority of the House recommended that the Queen should grant to him an additional sum of one thousand and fifty pounds. It said, however, that the money voted to Anderson by the expiring Parliament was never paid to him, yet he proceeded with the work. In 1728 he died, leaving his great undertaking unfinished. The year after his death the plates of the work were sold for £530. At last his work, under the title of Selectus Diplomatum et Numismatum Scotiæ Thesaurus, appeared, carefully edited by the well-known scholar, Thomas Ruddiman, who contributed an elaborate preface. At that time the work had much historical value as a book of reference. Anderson was also the author of Collections relating to the History of Mary, Queen of Scotland, published at Edinburgh in 1727‒8 in four volumes, which contains a great number of original documents touching the Marian controversy.
Dr. John Campbell,¹ a son of Campbell of Glenlyon, attained some distinction as an historical writer. His Military History of the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene was published in 1736 in two volumes, and was well received. In 1742‒44 his Lives of the Admirals appeared in four volumes, which, owing to the interest of the subject, was long popular. His work, The Present State of Europe, was issued in 1750, and passed through many editions. He wrote a portion of the Biographia Britannica, and contributed a number of articles to the Modern Universal History. His last work was a Political Survey of Britain, published in 1774 in two volumes, which was much admired. He was a candid and well informed man, and an industrious writer.
¹ Born at Edinburgh in 1707; died in 1775.
Walter Goodal¹ was a native of Banffshire, and was educated at King’s College, Aberdeen. In 1730 he obtained employment in the Advocates’ Library at Edinburgh, and assisted Ruddiman in the compilation of the first Catalogue of the Library, which was printed in 1742. When Hume succeeded Ruddiman, Goodal continued to act as sub-librarian. He was an ardent Jacobite, and an enthusiastic defender of Mary, Queen of Scots. He contemplated writing a life of Mary, but ultimately limited his effort to An Examination of the Letters said to be written by Queen Mary to James, Earl of Bothwell, which appeared in 1754. It is an important work. His conclusion is that the famous “Casket Letters” were not written by Queen Mary. The subsequent defenders of the unfortunate Queen, including Skelton, usually refer with confidence to Goodal’s conclusion on the Letters as decisive.
¹ Born in 1706; died on the 28th July, 1766.
He published an edition of Scott of Scotestarvet’s Staggering State of Scots Statesmen, with Notes; an edition of Fordun’s Scotichronicon, with a Latin Introduction; and also contributed to Keith’s Catalogue of Scottish Bishops.
Thomas Innes was a native of the Valley of the Dee, Aberdeenshire. He left Scotland when young, completed his education abroad, and became a Roman Catholic priest. He is the author of A Critical Essay on the Ancient Inhabitants of Scotland, published in 1729. The preface extends to fifty pages, and the Essay itself is elaborate, and shows evidence of much research. His effort has the merit of being the first that questioned the legendary history of Ireland and Scotland. The value of his work, however, was not recognised till after his death.
Early in the eighteenth century indications of a literary revival appeared in Scotland. The awakening influences were mainly native, though external circumstances partly aided it. The energy and genius of the Scots under favourable conditions, soon manifested itself in literature as in other fields of enterprise. The external influence which aided the literary revival came from English literature, at a somewhat later stage and in a slighter degree from French literature. The culture of style became a special object of study, and attempts were made to acquire the idiomatic expression of classic English writers.¹
¹ One stimulus of the literary revival was the Clubs and Societies which were specially formed for literary conversation and improvement in composition. To promote these objects, in 1716 the Rakenian Club was instituted in Edinburgh, and it continued to meet till 1760. In the roll of its members the names of a number of Scottish literary men appeared, including ♦Maclaurin, the mathematician; Rev. Dr. Robert Wallace; Dr. Young, a distinguished physician; Rev. George Turnbull, author of a work on moral philosophy, and a treatise on Ancient Painting; Alexander Boswell, a Lord of Session, and father of Johnson’s biographer. This Club was pretty successful in disseminating freedom of thought, taste, and attention to composition. At a somewhat later time societies with similar or wider aims were formed in other cities in Scotland. In 1750 the Select Society projected by Allan Ramsay, the painter, was instituted in Edinburgh, for the purposes of literary discussion, philosophical inquiry, and improvement in public speaking. It continued active for seven years, and amongst its members were――Hume, Dr. Robertson, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Lord Kames, Lord Hales, Lord Monboddo, John Home, and other celebrated men. Dugald Stewart says the Society produced――“Debates such as have not often been heard in modern assemblies――debates where the dignity of the speakers was not lowered by the intrigues of policy, or the intemperance of faction, and where the most splendid talents that have ever adorned this country were roused to their best exertions by the liberal and ennobling discussions of literature and philosophy.”――_Life and Writings of Dr. Robertson_, page 15.
♦ “Maclurin” replaced with “Maclaurin”
In the department of history an important change appeared in the eighteenth century. The critical examination of historical evidence began to be recognised and applied, and a clearer conception of the requisites of historical inquiry was shown. Yet it cannot be affirmed that adequate historic conceptions of the human race were attained by the historians of the period.
David Hume avowed that he was actuated by a passionate love of literary fame, which led him to turn aside from philosophical studies and try his skill in historical composition. In 1747 he formed a resolution to write some historical work. As he had also a desire to counteract the prejudice against the Stuart Kings, he resolved to commence his History of Great Britain with the reign of James VI. With the view of facilitating his historic studies, in 1752 he assumed gratuitously the office of Librarian to the Faculty of Advocates in Edinburgh; and in the Advocates’ Library, amid a rich store of books and historical materials, he began to write his history. The first volume, embracing the reigns of James VI. and Charles I., appeared in 1754, the second in 1757, the third and fourth in 1759, and the fifth and sixth in 1762. The first volume was bitterly assailed by the Whigs, and Hume was greatly disappointed by the attacks upon his work, and also on account of its slow sale. In a short time, however, his history became popular, new editions were issued in rapid succession; and at last Hume was placed in the front rank of English historians.
Recognising his great abilities, easy circumstances, and the varied store of historical matter at his command, yet it has to be regretted that his work is not of high historical authority. He did not reach a high standard either in research or the accurate statement of facts; though he was well qualified to estimate every description of evidence, still he fell into many mistakes. On some important religious and political subjects, such as the Covenanting struggle, and the period of persecution in Scotland, Hume was constitutionally disqualified for forming just views of his suffering countrymen. Having made these adverse comments on his history, I will indicate some of its special merits. Looking at the general character of his work, in many points it is much superior to the annals and compilations of previous British historians. His sagacity enabled him to sink much of the offal and draff which encumber the pages of less gifted writers. While he exhibited a lamentable deficiency in appreciating some of the movements of the seventeenth century, yet on other occasions the views of conflicting parties are grasped and estimated with rare fairness, and presented with much effect. He recognises the importance of literature and culture, which is specially treated in certain portions of his history. His narrative is admirable. His style is clear, easy, and polished.
The following on the character of Queen Elizabeth is a fair specimen of his style:――“There are few personages in history who have been more exposed to the calumny of enemies and the adulation of friends than Queen Elizabeth; and yet there is scarcely any whose reputation has been more certainly determined by the unanimous consent of posterity. The unusual length of her administration, and the strong features of her character, were able to overcome all prejudices; and obliging her detractors to abate much of their invectives, and her admirers somewhat of their panegyrics, have at last, in spite of political factions, and what is more, of religious animosities, produced a uniform judgment with regard to her conduct. Her vigour, her constancy, her magnanimity, her penetration, vigilance, and address, are allowed to merit the highest praise, and appear not to have been surpassed by any person that ever filled a throne: a conduct less vigorous, less imperious, more sincere, more indulgent to her people, would have been requisite to form a perfect character. By the force of her mind she controlled all her more active and stronger qualities, and prevented her from running into excess: her heroism was exempt from temerity, her frugality from avarice, her friendship from partiality, her active temper from turbulency and vain ambition: she guarded not herself with equal care or success from lesser infirmities; the rivalship of beauty, the desire of admiration, the jealousy of love, and the sallies of anger.”
Dr. William Robertson¹ was a native of the parish of Borthwick, in the county of Edinburgh, where his father was minister. He was educated for the Church, and in 1743, was appointed minister of Gladsmuir in Haddingtonshire; but in 1758, he removed to one of the churches of Edinburgh. He delivered his first speech in the General Assembly in 1751, which at once produced a marked impression, and was subsequently the leader of the moderate party in the Church of Scotland.
¹ Born in 1721; died 1793. An interesting account of his life and writings was written by Dugald Stewart.
His works consist of: (1) The History of Scotland during the Reigns of Queen Mary and James the VI., which appeared in 1759; (2) History of the Reign of Charles V., in three volumes, published in 1769; (3) History of America, (1777); and (4) A Historical Disquisition on Ancient India, a slight sketch, (1791). For the copyright of his History of Scotland, he received £600, and £4500 for his History of Charles V.
Shortly after the publication of his History of Scotland, he was appointed principal of the University of Edinburgh, and historiographer royal for Scotland.
Dr. Robertson was a man of great intellectual power and grasp of mind, combined with a singularly clear and sober judgment. Guided and enlightened as his faculties were by a pretty broad and varied culture, the works which he produced were all stamped with enduring qualities, and still remain monuments of his industry and genius. Although his works are not remarkable for exhaustiveness of research, he possessed in a high degree the rarer qualification of seizing the essential features of a subject, and presenting them in a lucid and attractive way. His introductory chapter on Scottish history prior to the birth of Queen Mary, though only a slight retrospective sketch, is remarkable for its grasp and luminous view of the subject. It is true that this period of history is now better understood than it was in his day; yet with the materials within his reach, he drew a wonderfully accurate picture of the subject.
His History of Scotland is intensely interesting; the period itself was a stirring one, full of important, varied, and tragic events; his narrative is masterly, and his style flowing and clear. The first volume of his History of Charles V., which describes the state of society in Europe prior to the sixteenth century, is one of the most valuable parts of his works, and exhibits his highest qualifications as a historian to the best advantage. Soon after its appearance the work was translated into French. His History of America is full of deep interest, presenting a clear narrative teeming with picturesque features and touching incidents, accompanied with striking and philosophical reflections, which charmed the literary world. A short extract from his account of the discovery of America may be given. The land had been descried about midnight, and great joy was manifested by the crews of the ships:――
“As soon as the sun arose, all their boats were manned and armed. They rowed towards the island with their colours displayed, with warlike music, and other martial pomp. As they approached the coast, they saw it covered with a multitude of people, whom the novelty of the spectacle had drawn together, whose attitudes and gestures expressed wonder and astonishment at the strange objects which presented themselves to their view. Columbus was the first European who set foot on the new world which he had discovered. He landed in a rich dress, and with a naked sword in his hand. His men followed, and kneeling down, they all kissed the ground which they had so long desired to see. They next erected a crucifix, and prostrating themselves before it, returned thanks to God for conducting their voyage to such a happy issue. They then took solemn possession of the country for the crown of Castile and Leon, with all the formalities which the Portuguese were accustomed to observe in acts of this kind in their new discoveries.
“The Spaniards, while thus employed, were surrounded by many of the natives, who gazed in silent admiration upon actions which they could not comprehend, and of which they did not foresee the consequences. The dress of the Spaniards, the whiteness of their skins, their beards, their arms, appeared strange and surprising. The vast machines in which they had traversed the ocean, that seemed to move upon the waters with wings, and uttered a dreadful sound resembling thunder, accompanied with lightning and smoke, struck them with such terror that they began to respect their new guests as a superior order of beings, and concluded that they were children of the sun, who had descended to visit the earth.
“The Europeans were hardly less amazed at the scene now before them. Every herb and shrub and tree was different from those which flourished in Europe. The soil seemed to be rich, but bore few marks of cultivation. The climate, even to the Spaniards, felt warm, though extremely delightful. The inhabitants appeared in the simple innocence of nature, entirely naked. Their black hair, long and uncurled, floated upon their shoulders, or was bound in tresses on their heads. They had no beards, and every part of their bodies was perfectly smooth. Their complexion was of a dusky copper colour, their features singular rather than disagreeable, their aspect gentle and timid. Though not tall, they were well-shaped and active. Their faces and several parts of their bodies were fantastically painted with glaring colours.... Towards evening Columbus returned to his ships, accompanied by many of the islanders in their boats, which they called canoes; and though rudely formed out of the trunk of a single tree, they rowed them with surprising dexterity. Thus, in the first interview between the inhabitants of the old and new worlds, everything was conducted amicably and to their mutual satisfaction. The former, enlightened and ambitious, formed already vast ideas with respect to the advantages which they might derive from the regions that began to open to their view. The latter, simple and undiscerning, had no foresight of the calamities and desolation which were approaching their country.”
William Guthrie, a son of an episcopal minister, was born at Brechin in 1708. He was educated at King’s College, Aberdeen, and afterwards proceeded to London to push his fortune. He was for some time engaged writing as a supporter of the Government, and received from the Pelham Ministry a pension of £200 per annum. He became a voluminous writer, and was connected with many literary undertakings. He wrote a History of England in three volumes, which begins with the Conquest and closes with the Commonwealth. In 1767 he published a History of Scotland in ten volumes. His Historical and Geographical Grammar was his most successful work. It had reached its twenty-first edition in 1810, and was translated into French. He died on the 9th of March, 1770.
Dr. ♦Smollett, the novelist, wrote a History of England, published in 1758, in four large volumes; but it is not of much historical value. It was hastily composed without sufficient preparation and study, and it is full of mistakes and inconsistencies. The portion of this history from 1688 to the death of George II. has often been printed as a continuation to Hume’s history.
♦ “Smollet” replaced with “Smollett”
Mr. William Tytler of Woodhouselee, published in 1759 An Inquiry into the Evidence against Mary Queen of Scots, in which he combated the views advanced by Robertson and Hume, touching Queen Mary. Tytler’s work is acute and candid, but not at all conclusive. He also rendered good service to the national literature by his publication of the Poetical Remains of James I., with a dissertation on the life and writings of the royal poet.
Dr. Gilbert Stuart was born at Edinburgh in 1742. He is the author of a History of Scotland, a History of the Reformation, and a Dissertation on the British Constitution. He also wrote many articles for periodicals in which he bitterly attacked the works of some of his contemporaries. His style is florid and flowing, but much affected. He died in 1786.
In 1771, the first volume of Dr. Robert Henry’s¹ History of Great Britain appeared, and four others followed at intervals from this date to 1785. In this work special attention was directed to the state of the people and domestic manners; but it only came down to the reign of Henry VIII. The author received for his work £3300; and was rewarded with a pension from the Crown of £100 a year.
¹ Born in 1718; died in 1790.
Lord Hailes, a son of Sir James Dalrymple, was born in Edinburgh in 1726. He distinguished himself at the Scottish bar, and was raised to the bench in 1766. He was a man of considerable erudition, an able lawyer and conscientious judge. He was, moreover, a man of wit, and had a strong feeling of the comic and ridiculous in human conduct and character, “which gave a keen edge of irony both to his conversation and writings.... How much he excelled in painting the lighter weaknesses and absurdities of mankind, may be seen from the papers of his composition in the World and the Mirror.... In a word, he was an honour to the station which he filled, and to the age in which he lived. He died in his 67th year, on the 29th of November 1792.”¹
¹ Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Lord Kames, by A. F. Tytler, Volume I., pages 182‒183; 1807.
The first part of Lord Hailes’ Annals of Scotland was published in 1776, and the second part, which brought the work down to the death of David II., appeared in 1779. It is a work of very high merit and historical value, and it has been long well known and esteemed by historical students. He was gifted with the critical faculty in a high degree, and the power of discriminating and estimating historical evidence. Lord Hailes was also the author of a number of legal and antiquarian treatises; of the Remains of Christian Antiquity, containing translations from the Fathers, etc., and of An Inquiry into the secondary causes assigned by Gibbon for the rapid spread of Christianity.
Dr. Adam Ferguson’s Essay on the History of Civil Society appeared in 1766, and his History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic in 1783. In the first named work, he introduced the method of studying mankind in groups, and of tracing the gradual progress of entire societies, or what is now called the science of sociology. As already stated, Ferguson’s views of the progress of mankind and the gradual growth of social institutions, approached nearer to the modern conception of the historical development of the human race than those of any of his predecessors. In his History of the Roman Republic he showed much careful research, skilful arrangement, and just philosophical reflections. But his style, though exceedingly clear and vigorous, is rather compressed and sententious.
Dr. William Russell¹ was a native of Selkirkshire, and raised himself to literary distinction in the midst of many difficulties. He was the author of a useful History of Modern Europe, of which the first two volumes appeared in 1779, and three others in 1784, bringing it down to 1763. This history was long popular, and continuations have been made to it by Dr. Coote and others.
¹ Born in 1741; died 1793.
Dr. Robert Watson,¹ professor of rhetoric in the University of St. Andrews, is the author of a History of Philip II. of Spain, which was published in 1776, and was intended as a continuation of Robertson’s History of Charles V. He also left unfinished a History of Philip III., which was completed by Dr. Thomson, and published in 1783.
¹ Born in 1730; died 1780.
Dr. John Gillies,¹ historiographer for Scotland to His Majesty George III., wrote The History of Ancient Greece, its Colonies and Conquests, which appeared in 1784. It is a work which exhibits historic ability and research. The sixth edition of it was issued in four volumes in 1820. He was the author also of a View of the Reign of Frederic II. of Prussia; a History of the World from the Reign of Alexander to Augustus, which was published in 1807‒10; and produced English Translations of Aristotle’s Ethics, Politics, and Rhetoric.
¹ Born in 1747; died 1836.
To his translation of the Rhetoric he prefixed a long introduction in which, after showing its importance as a work of taste and criticism, and its connection with Aristotle’s other writings, he opened an attack on modern philosophy in general, and on the Scottish School in particular. He animadverts adversely on the views of Adam Smith, Reid, Lord Kames, and especially on the writings of Dugald Stewart. Their views he maintained were all wrong, while those of the mighty Stagirite were alone right.
George Chalmers,¹ a native of Fochabers, in Morayshire, is the author of a number of works on various subjects. His History of the United Colonies, from the Settlement to the Peace of 1763, appeared in 1780; among his other writings may be mentioned, a Life of Sir David Lindsay, with an edition of his works, and a Life of Mary Queen of Scots drawn from the State Papers. But his greatest work is Caledonia, the first volume of which was published in 1807; other two large volumes were issued in his lifetime, but it was left unfinished. This work contains a mass of minute antiquarian details of the early periods of Scottish history, together with topographical and historical accounts of the different counties; it embodies a vast collection of facts and incidents of much value, but there is little method in it, and his style is not attractive. A new edition of it has recently been published by Mr. Gardner, which includes a large quantity of manuscript prepared by Chalmers, but left unprinted when he died, thus completing the work as far as possible.
¹ Born 1742; died 1825.
Malcolm Laing¹ is the author of a History of Scotland. He was educated for the Scottish bar, and passed advocate in 1785. In 1800 his History of Scotland, from the Union of the Crowns in 1603 to the Union of the Kingdoms in 1707, was published. It is an able work, and of very high historical value. He possessed analytic and critical powers which enabled him to estimate evidence at its value; and notwithstanding his strong Whig opinions, and his love of liberty, his historical integrity is unimpeachable. But he attacked Macpherson, the translator of Ossian, with unmerciful severity. Though a clear and vigorous thinker, he was not a great master of historic style.
¹ Born in 1762; died 1818. There are other historical writers of more or less note, a few of whom I can only briefly mention. Ruddiman, the eminent Latin grammarian, edited an edition of Buchanan’s History of Scotland, and published several historical memoirs. Dr. Alexander Adam, rector of the High School of Edinburgh, is the author of _Roman Antiquities_ and A Summary of Geography and History, etc. John Pinkerton was a native of Edinburgh, born in 1758, and died at Paris in 1825. He distinguished himself by the vehement controversial tone of his historical writings, and by the obstinacy of his unreasoned notions; still, he was an industrious collector of forgotten fragments of ancient history.
His first historical effort was a Dissertation on the Origin of the Goths, in which he enounced the strange theory which he maintained to the end of his days, namely, that the Celts of Ireland, Wales, and Scotland are savages, and have been savages since the world began. He next produced an Inquiry into the History of Scotland preceding the Reign of Malcolm III., in which he argued at great length on the history of the Goths, and the conquests which he asserts they achieved over the Celts in their progress through Europe. In 1796, he issued a History of Scotland during the Reign of the Stuarts, the most valuable of all his works. He also edited, but very indifferently, a series of Ancient Lives of Scottish Saints under the title Vitæ Antiquæ Sanctorum Scotiæ, a revised and enlarged edition of which has recently been issued.
SECTION II.
Historical Literature of the Nineteenth Century.
The nineteenth century has been remarkable for an increasing interest in all departments of historical literature; for more thorough research, critical examination of evidence, more exhaustive treatment, and withal a perceptible broadening and deepening of historic conceptions. The methods of investigating historical subjects, and social phenomena, have undergone a marked change within the present century; and, as a consequence, the opinions and the convictions of the people have also been greatly modified.
Dr. Thomas M‘Crie¹ is best known as the author of the Life of John Knox, and the Life of Andrew Melville. The first appeared in 1813, and has passed through many editions; the second has not been so popular, though it is an able work. He also wrote Memoirs of Veitch and Brysson, two Scottish ministers and supporters of the Covenant. He composed able and valuable Histories of the Reformation in Italy and in Spain, and various other sketches and papers. Dr. M‘Crie was gifted with a vigorous intellect, and all his writings display much varied and careful research, and a masterly literary ability. His style is clear, animated, and easy; and his works are highly esteemed by all students of history.
¹ Born 1772; died 1835.
Mr. James Mill attained distinction as a historian as well as a philosopher and a political writer; he was a man of great intellectual power.¹ His History of British India, which was begun in 1806, was published in 1817‒18, in five volumes, and is probably the ablest work on our Indian Empire which has yet appeared. His analytic powers and grasp of principles enabled him to master social phenomena, which less gifted minds fail to see or to seize.
¹ An excellent account of his life and writings, by Dr. Bain, has been published.
John Dunlop, Esquire, a Scottish advocate and sheriff of Renfrewshire, wrote a History of Fiction, which appeared in 1814, in three volumes. It is a work of much merit and value. He also wrote a History of Roman Literature, from the earliest period to the close of the Augustan age, in three volumes. His latest work was Memoirs of Spain during the Reigns of Philip IV. and Charles II., which was published in 1834, in two volumes. He died in 1842.
Patrick F. Tytler¹ was the author of a History of Scotland, and other works――chiefly of a biographical character. His History of Scotland embraces the period from the accession of Alexander III. to the union of the Crowns of England and Scotland in 1603. The first volume was published in 1828, and the others followed at intervals till the work was completed in nine volumes. It is a work of high historical value. His pages evince the results of much original research and great industry. Many documents and State papers were printed for the first time in the appendices to the volumes. His style is plain and animated, but somewhat diffuse and redundant.
¹ Tytler belonged to the family of Woodhouselee, whom I have already mentioned in a preceding section. In the latter years of his life be enjoyed a pension of £200 per annum. He died in December, 1849; and an interesting account of his life has been published by the Rev. John Burgon, M.A., in 1859.
Sir Archibald Alison was a son of the Rev. Archibald Alison, as already incidentally mentioned, and was born in 1792. He was educated in Edinburgh, studied law, and was called to the Scottish bar in 1814. He was appointed sheriff of Lanarkshire in 1832, and was created a baronet in 1852. The idea of his History of Europe was conceived when on a visit to Paris in the eventful year of 1814; and henceforth he devoted much research and study to its preparation.
The work covers the period from the commencement of the French Revolution in 1789 to the restoration of the Bourbons in 1815. Its first instalment appeared in 1833, and the concluding volumes in 1844. It has since gone through nine or ten editions. It contains a vast store of facts and details relating to a very important and memorable period of modern history. In the later years of his active life, he produced a continuation of his History to the accession of Louis Napoleon in 1852, in eight volumes, which appeared at intervals from 1852 to 1859. But the continuation is not equal in accuracy and merit to the earlier history, and some of his peculiar opinions are pushed to greater extremes. In politics he was a firm Conservative, and a strong opponent of Free Trade. Sir Archibald died in May, 1867.
Alison’s History of Europe, as might be expected in so wide and great a subject, has merits and defects. His exertions in personal observation of many of the localities of the events and scenes which he described, his industry in collecting available materials, and his patient and careful researches, are great merits, which imparted a freshness to his narrative and an animation to his descriptions rarely met with in any history. His mastery of method and arrangement was also creditable; but on the other hand, his style has often been severely animadverted on――he has been charged with verbosity and excessive pomp, with being careless, turgid, and obscure. On the whole, the work has been exceedingly popular, it has been translated into all European languages; this, however, may be partly accounted for by the intensely absorbing interest of the period and the events of which it treats. Although Alison cannot be called a great historian, still he has produced an interesting work.
Thomas Carlyle was a noted man of genius and a voluminous writer. He was a son of a farmer, and born on the 4th of December, 1795, at the village of Ecclefechan, in Annandale, a beautiful pastoral district, rich in Border traditions, old castles, and historic associations. He was educated at the Grammar School of Annan, and the University of Edinburgh. At the University he was distinguished in mathematics, and subsequently he acted as teacher of mathematics in Annan, and afterwards in Kirkcaldy. In 1818 he went to Edinburgh, where he had the use of the University Library, and he then wrote a number of short biographies and other articles for the Edinburgh Encyclopædia. He wrote a Life of Schiller, and also commenced to translate German works. In 1824 he translated Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, which was favourably received. He married Miss Jane Welsh in 1825. She was a descendent of John Knox, a daughter of Dr. Welsh, Haddington; and through her Carlyle acquired the small property of Craigenputtoch, in Dumfriesshire, at which he resided for eight years. In this retired residence he wrote articles for the Foreign Review, and his Sartor Resartus, which first appeared in Fraser’s Magazine in 1833‒34. Carlyle left Craigenputtoch in 1834 and went to London, and finally settled in the famous House, Number 5 Cheyne Row, Chelsea. In 1837 he delivered a series of lectures on German Literature in London, and in the following year another course on the Successive Periods of European Culture. Again in 1839 he delivered a course of lectures on the Revolutions of Modern Europe, and another on Heroes and Hero Worship in 1840. These lectures greatly extended his popularity. The lectures on Heroes and Hero Worship were published in book form, and widely read.
Carlyle wrote on many branches of literature, embracing critical essays, political and satirical pamphlets in various forms, and biography and history. His critical and miscellaneous essays extend to seven volumes, and treat on many subjects. Some of them are exceedingly good, such as those on Burns, Edward Irving, Voltaire, Goethe, and others; and the whole of his essays are characteristic and interesting. His political views were presented in a pamphlet entitled “Chartism,” published in 1839, and in another, “Past and Present,” which appeared in 1843. In these he enunciated some important truths, and made scathing observations against all shams, cant, formulas, and so on; yet he has very little to offer in the form of constructive remedies for the existing evils of society, either political or social. He issued another series of political tracts in 1850, entitled “Latter-day Pamphlets,” and in these he appeared as the vehement and irate Censor, with all the exaggerating peculiarities of his style in greater profusion. He assumed the characteristics of a mere worshipper of force, and an ardent advocate of all coercive measures. Improved prisons and schools for the reform of criminals, poor laws, the churches, the aristocracy, Parliament, and other institutions, as then constituted, were all attacked and ridiculed in a scathing style. On some political points and administrative abuses, however, his bold and stinging satire was quite justifiable.
It was chiefly in biography and history that Carlyle attained distinction and fame as a writer. In 1837 his famous work, The French Revolution, a History, was published. It is the best of all Carlyle’s works, and is a very remarkable book. It presents a masterly and vivid panoramic view of the Revolution. He exerted his great powers of description in this work with striking effect.¹ As a specimen of his style, I will quote the passage on the death of Marie Antoinette:――
¹ A very fair analysis and criticism of Carlyle’s style is given in the late Professor Minto’s _Manual of English Prose Literature_.
“Is there a man’s heart that thinks without pity of those long months and years of slow-wasting ignominy; of thy birth, self-cradled in imperial Schonbrunn, the winds of heaven not to visit thy face too roughly, thy feet to light on softness, thy eye on splendour; and then of thy death, or hundred deaths, to which the guillotine and ♦Fouquier-Tinville’s Judgment-bar was but the merciful end? Look there, O man born of woman! The bloom of that fair face is wasted, the hair is gray with care; the brightness of those eyes are quenched, their lids hang drooping, the face is stony pale, as of one living in death. Mean weeds, which her own hand has mended, attire the Queen of the World. The death-hurdle where thou sittest pale, motionless, which only curses environ, has to stop; a people, drunk with vengeance, will drink it again in full draught, looking at thee there. Far as the eye reaches a multitudinous sea of maniac heads, the air deaf with their triumph yell! The living-dead must shudder with yet one other pang; her startled blood yet again suffuses with the hue of agony that pale face which she hides with her hands! There is there no heart to say, God pity thee! O think not of these; think of Him whom thou worshippest, the crucified――who also treaded the wine-press alone, fronted sorrow still deeper; and triumphed over it and made it holy, and built of it a sanctuary of sorrow for thee and all the wretched! Thy path of thorns is nigh ended, one long last look at the Tuilleries, where thy step was once so light, where thy children shall not dwell. The head is on the block, the axe rushes――dumb lies the world; the wild yelling world and all its madness is behind thee.”
♦ “Forquier” replaced with “Fouquier”
Carlyle’s collection of Oliver Cromwell’s Letters and Speeches, with Elucidations, appeared in 1845, in two volumes. It is an excellent work, and a valuable contribution to the historical materials of the seventeenth century. His own additional Elucidations, historic and descriptive, are important, and often very characteristic and interesting.
His Life of John Stirling was published in 1851. It is a warm tribute by Carlyle to the memory of a personal friend. Stirling was an amiable and accomplished man, and his friends were much attached to him. He had written some attractive volumes in prose and verse; and he died in 1844, in his thirty-eighth year.
Carlyle had been long working on his History of Friedrich the Great of Prussia, and in 1858 the first and second volumes of it appeared, the third and fourth in 1862, and the fifth and sixth completing the work in 1865. It is a work evincing great research, admirable descriptions of battle-fields and historic scenes, vivid and sage remarks on men and things, and touches of pathos and humour. Yet, viewed according to a recognised standard, it fails to reach the higher and genuine characteristics of history; and in truth, it is rather a personal biography and a glorification of the hero, Friedrich II., enlivened and widely varied by the writer’s rare genius. If Carlyle was not a pure worshipper of mere force and might, he had, at least, an excessive veneration of individual great men――heroism; so he made them the central conception and wove events and movements around them for their special glorification, treating other men with scorn, and ignoring many important historic influences. He scouted the idea of tracing the relation of causes and effects in history, or the gradual development of political institutions. For the sake of the central hero, he sums up an estimate of the eighteenth century thus:――“What little it did, we must call Friedrich; what little it thought, Voltaire.”
In spite of his veneration of might, and some unreasoned impulses, he was a great historical biographer. His fine power of description, insight of character, and the power of seizing reality, the faculty of discerning and selecting appropriate facts and incidents, and weaving these into a stirring narrative, enabled him to attain a marked distinction in this branch of literature. He had many readers and admirers, and his influence has been widely felt.
He was elected Lord Rector of the University of Edinburgh, and on the 2nd of April 1866, delivered his installation address. Before he returned home, his wife died at London, on the 21st of April. His subsequent writings mostly consisted of short addresses and articles on the topics of the day; and a History of the Early Kings of Norway, published in 1875. He died on the 4th of February, 1881.¹
¹ His Reminiscences, edited by Mr. Froude, were published in 1881, in two volumes.
Dr. John Hill Burton, a native of Aberdeen, was born in 1809; and having studied law, was called to the bar in 1833. He was a hard working student, and at an early period of his life, produced a work on the Scottish Bankruptcy Law, and a Manual of the Law of Scotland. He was also the author of a small volume, now much sought after, On Political and Social Economy, published in 1849. He was an exceedingly industrious writer, chiefly in the field of Scottish history and biography.
In 1846, his Life and Correspondence of David Hume was published in two volumes; and the following year, his Lives of Lord Lovat and Duncan Forbes of Culloden appeared. Both works are valuable contributions to the historic literature of Scotland. In 1864, his work entitled The Scot Abroad appeared in two volumes; it consists of an account of the relations of Scotland and Scotsmen to foreign countries, and contains many interesting sketches and anecdotes.
His longest work is The History of Scotland, from Agricola’s Invasion to the Revolution of 1688, which appeared in 1867‒70; he had before written a History of Scotland from the Revolution to the extinction of the last Jacobite Insurrection, which was published in 1853. Thus, presumably following the example of Hume, he wrote and published the latest part of his history first.¹ This History is much marred by the author’s prejudice against the Celtic people of Scotland. A revised edition of the whole work has been published.
¹ One of Hume’s opponents, who had a waggish turn, once said that he had written his history backwards.
Besides the important works mentioned above, Dr. Burton occasionally contributed papers to the Westminster Review, Blackwood’s Magazine, and other literary journals, and sometimes articles to the Scotsman. Moreover, he edited several of the volumes of the Records of the Scottish Privy Council of the Sixteenth Century, and wrote a preface to the first volume. He also contributed many articles to biographical dictionaries. His last work was a History of Britain in the Reign of Queen Anne, in three volumes, published in 1880. He died in 1881.
The late Robert Blakey was the author of a number of works:――History of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, in four volumes, in which a pretty complete account of works on philosophy, especially British works in this department, is given down to about the middle of the present century. His History of Political Literature, published in 1855, in two volumes, is a very useful and interesting work, written in a clear, animated, and vigorous style.
Dr. William F. Skene was born on the 7th of June 1809. Having studied for the profession of law, he became a member of the Society of Writers to the Signet in 1831. After the death of Dr. John H. Burton, Dr. Skene was appointed Historiographer Royal for Scotland.
He edited a publication entitled The Four Ancient Books of Wales, which appeared in 1868. The work contains an English translation, rendered by two eminent Welsh scholars, of the Cymric poems, tales, and romances connected with the early history of Wales. The translation is from the oldest known Welsh manuscripts, and the work has considerable historical value. Dr. Skene edited another volume under the title of The Chronicles of the Picts and Scots, which consists of a number of short pieces, fragments, and some extracts from early Irish chronicles, to which he wrote a long and interesting preface. He also edited and wrote introductions to several of the series of volumes known by the title of The Historians of Scotland.
His chief work is the History of Celtic Scotland, published in 1876‒81, in three volumes, of which a second edition has been issued. He announced that this work was designed to ascertain all that could be extracted from the early authorities; and it may be granted that when he had written matter to work upon, his conclusions were fairly satisfactory. He was very industrious and painstaking; but his mind was narrow and glimmering. He had no philosophic grasp, and very little of the critical faculty. He shows lamentable defects in the discrimination and estimation of historical evidence, and seemed to be unconscious of the value of circumstantial evidence, and its use for limiting, correcting, or confirming, incomplete and erroneous statements of facts and events. Thus he often placed too much reliance on fragments of writings, old chronicles, and traditions. He introduced into his History a fanciful body, viz., “The Seven Earls of Scotland,” who enjoyed the privilege of controlling the Kings in early times. In truth, his Celtic Scotland has been rather much praised. He died in August, 1892.
In a chapter on Scottish historical literature, it seems requisite to give some account of the Record scholars, and those who have worked in order to place important historical materials within the reach of historical students. The first who claims to be remembered is Mr. Thomas Thomson, the able and careful editor of the Scots Acts of Parliament, and other national records. For many years he worked hard in the General Register-house in Edinburgh, and under him others were trained and encouraged by his example in this branch of research. Space would fail to signalise all those who have followed in the footsteps of Mr. Thomson, and have rendered valuable service to their country in the wide field of national records and historical materials.
Mr. Cosmo Innes, a native of the parish of Durris, Kincardineshire, was an eminent Record scholar and an industrious historical student. He edited the first volume of the Scots Acts of Parliament, containing all the earliest laws and fragments of legislation of Scotland, several of the Old Spalding Club publications, and a number of the volumes printed by the Clubs in the south, all containing valuable historical materials. He also edited the earlier volumes of the Facsimiles of the National Manuscripts of Scotland, a magnificent work, issued under the direction of the Record Commission, as well as the first volume issued by the Burgh Record Society; and spent years of labour in preparing an exhaustive index to the Scots Acts. Mr. Innes was also the author of three notable works: Scotland in the Middle Ages, 1860; Sketches of Early Scottish History, 1861; and Legal Antiquities; all these formed valuable contributions to the history of Scotland.
Another notable man of this class was Dr. John Stuart, a native of the parish of Forgue, in Aberdeenshire. He was an advocate in Aberdeen, and for many years acted as the secretary of the Old Spalding Club, of which he was one of the originators; but for a number of years before his death, which happened in the summer of 1877, he was employed in the General Register-house at Edinburgh.
He edited and wrote the prefaces to the well-known work, The Sculptured Stones of Scotland. His prefaces and notes to this work are admirable specimens of antiquarian research, clear and well reasoned exposition. To the Book of Deer, which he edited, he wrote a long and very valuable preface. He also edited and wrote prefaces to other volumes of the Old Spalding Club, including the Burgh Records of Aberdeen.
Joseph Robertson, a native of Aberdeen, born in 1810, also one of the original members of the Old Spalding Club, was a distinguished Record scholar; and edited a number of volumes for the Club. But it is in the work entitled Statuta Ecclesiæ Scoticanæ, a collection of the Canons of the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland prior to the Reformation, that his Record scholarship is fully manifested. The painstaking labour which he devoted to this work is almost incredible, his research is both accurate and exhaustive to the minutest detail. His preface to the work is a monument of scholarship, sound judgment, and historic elucidation, while the body of notes and illustrations are of deep interest and great historic value. He is also the author of a history of the city of Aberdeen, entitled the Book of Bon-accord, which unfortunately he left unfinished. He died in 1866.
The late Dr. David Laing, a gifted and esteemed gentleman, who for long held the office of librarian to the Writers to the Signet, was a large contributor to the historic materials of Scottish history. Laing’s¹ efforts were specially directed to the culture and the elucidation of the literary history of Scotland in the early periods, and to the history of art. He published some collections of early poetry, and edited the poems of Hendryson, Dunbar, and Sir David Lindsay; and in many other ways endeavoured to advance the culture of history and art.²
¹ I have already noticed his service to the nation by his edition of Knox’s works.――_History of Civilisation in Scotland_, Volume II., page 346.
² It may be mentioned that Laing, after the death of Dr. David Irving, edited his History of Scottish Poetry, which in its first form was published in 1804; but Irving seems to have worked and revised at it almost to the end of his life. Laing published the work in its final form in 1861, with a memoir of the author. Irving was also the author of a series of biographical sketches of eminent Scotsmen.
The Criminal Trials in Scotland from the end of the Fifteenth Century to 1624, carefully edited and ably illustrated by Robert Pitcairn, W.S., form a valuable contribution to the history of domestic life and manners. He died in 1855. In this connection, The Domestic Annals of Scotland, by Dr. Robert Chambers, are well worthy of notice. Dr. R. Chambers was also the author of an excellent History of the Rising of 1745, which has passed through eight editions. It is an interesting and very valuable contribution to our historical literature.
Mr. E. W. Robertson was the author of a work entitled Scotland under her early Kings, published in 1862, in two volumes, which presents a history of the kingdom down to the close of the thirteenth century. It shows much research and industry, and commendable exactness of statement in matters of fact. Mr. Robertson also published a volume of historical essays in 1872.
Mr. William Mure, of Caldwell,¹ was the author of A Critical History of the Language and Literature of Ancient Greece, published in 1850‒53, in four volumes. A fifth volume appeared in 1857, but the work was left incomplete when he died. He devoted a considerable portion of his history to an examination of the Iliad and Odyssey, and the conclusion which he arrived at is, that each of these poems was originally composed substantially as we now possess them. This is a subject which has engaged the attention of many able classical scholars. Mure presented an interesting account of the origin and the early history of Greek prose literature, and a long critical examination of Herodotus.
¹ Born in 1799; died 1860.
George Grub, LL.D., was born in Old Aberdeen in 1812. He was educated at King’s College, Aberdeen, and graduated in 1829. Having studied law, he was admitted a member of the Society of Advocates in 1836, and in 1843 he was appointed Lecturer on Scots Law and Conveyancing in Marischal College. At the union of the Colleges in 1860, Dr. Patrick Davidson became Professor of Law, and Dr. Grub was appointed his substitute. On the death of Dr. Davidson in 1881, Dr. Grub succeeded him in the Chair. He retired from the professorship in 1891; and died on the 23rd of September in 1892. He was a very considerate and kindly gentleman.¹
¹ Robbie’s History of Aberdeen, page 490. 1893.
He was one of the original members of the Old Spalding Club, and edited several of the works issued by it. He is the author of The Ecclesiastical History of Scotland, published in 1861, in four volumes. It is a work of much merit and research, and remarkable for its candour and impartiality. His style is plain and clear.
In conclusion, though perhaps all the historical writers have not been enumerated that might be named, still enough has been given to show that a considerable amount of effort and talent has been devoted to history during the last and present century, and that the taste for this branch of literature has been steadily spreading amongst the people.