Opening…

Chapter XXXV

History of Scottish Philosophy――Carmichael――Hutcheson.

⭘ Scope of this account of Scottish Philosophy――Carmichael, his Teaching and Writings

⭘ Francis Hutcheson, his success as a Professor――His Writings and Moral Doctrines――Moral Sense, Happiness, the Object of Approbation――His Political Views――Influence of his Teaching and Writings

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Chapter XXXVI

David Hume and Adam Smith.

SECTION I.

Hume.

⭘ Characteristics of Hume and Smith――Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, its Method――His own Account of the Origin of his Philosophy

⭘ His Explication of the Understanding, treatment of Impressions and Ideas――Discussion of the Ideas of Space and Time, Idealism ――Treatment of Causation――Scepticism touching Reason and the Senses, Personal Identity――Summary of his Conclusions concerning the Understanding

⭘ His Handling of the Passions and the Will――His Theory of Morals, Utility――Summary of his Views

⭘ Essay on Miracles, its Characteristics――Natural History of Religion, and Dialogues on Religion――Estimate of his Philosophy ――Its Influence on Subsequent Speculation――Hume’s Personal Character

SECTION II.

Adam Smith.

⭘ His early Life――Method of Teaching――His Travels――His Method of Working

⭘ His Theory of Moral Sentiments, its Method and Style――Sympathy the Origin of Approbation, early manifestation of Sympathy ――Exposition of the operation of Sympathy――Happiness――Summary of his Moral Views

⭘ The Wealth of Nations, his chief work, its Arrangement――His Explanation of Labour, Land, and Rent

⭘ His Explication of the accumulation and employment of Stock ――Progress of Opulence, state of Agriculture in Europe, and the Rise and Progress of Cities

⭘ Discussion of the Mercantile System, erroneous notions about Money――Exposure of the Doctrine of the Balance of Trade――His attack upon the Great Eastern Company

⭘ Revenue of the State――Educational and Religious Institutions ――Influence of the Work

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Chapter XXXVII

Reid, Ferguson, Stewart, and Other Writers.

SECTION I.

Reid.

⭘ His Life and Teaching――His Writings――Treatment of the External Senses――His doctrine of Signs

⭘ His doctrine of Perception, imperfect Discrimination of the Views of other Philosophers――Explanation of Theories of Mediate Perception

⭘ His Division of Mental Phenomena, and Treatment of Mental Powers ――Common-sense, its Relation to First Principles――Classification of First Principles

⭘ Active Powers of the Mind――Moral Obligation――Reid’s Merits

SECTION II.

Adam Ferguson.

⭘ His early Life――Principles of Moral and Political Science, his Method, Conceptions, and grasp of Thought

⭘ The Standard of Morality, the Supreme End, and the Principle of Approbation

SECTION III.

Dugald Stewart.

⭘ Stewart was a successful Professor――The Scope of his Philosophy of the Human Mind――His Political Views

⭘ Discrimination of Ultimate Principles――Classification of the Intellectual Faculties――Laws of Association of Ideas――Memory, Imagination――Reasoning and Deductive Evidence――Varieties of Intellectual ♦Caricature

♦ “Characture” replaced with “Caricature”

⭘ Summary of his Ethical System――His Method and Style

SECTION IV.

Gerard, Beattie, Campbell, and Alison.

⭘ Gerard’s Essay on Taste, its Method and Characteristics

⭘ Beattie’s Essay on the Immutability of Truth――His Elements of Moral Science――Characteristics of his Style

⭘ Campbell’s Essay on Miracles, its Method――His Rhetoric and Style ――Alison, the Scope of his Essay on Taste

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Chapter XXXVIII

Dr. Brown――Mackintosh.

SECTION I.

Dr. Brown.

⭘ His early Life――Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect――A successful Professor, his Lectures

⭘ Exposition of his Psychology――Analysis of Sensation, his Doctrine of Perception, and Criticism of Dr. Reid――His Classification of Mental Phenomena, Laws of Suggestion or Association――Reduction of the Faculties of Judgment and Reason

⭘ Treatment of the Emotions, his Ethical Views, the Moral Faculty ――Practical Ethics――The existence of God and Immortality of the Soul――Estimate of his Psychology

SECTION II.

Mackintosh.

⭘ Vicissitudes of his Life――He entered keenly into the stormy Movements of his Time――His Literary Projects

⭘ His Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy――Its Method and Scope――His Sketches of Ethical Systems and Writers ――Summary of his own Ethical Views

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Chapter XXXIX

Hamilton――Ferrier――and Robertson.

⭘ Hamilton’s Education and early Life――Appointed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics――Preparation of his Lectures, his Edition of Reid’s Works――He sustained a severe Paralytic Stroke, which disabled his right side――His Death――His Writings

⭘ Exposition of his Philosophy――The Fundamental Principles ――Doctrines enunciated in his Introductory Lectures――Man an End unto Himself――His peculiar View of the End of Speculation――The Communication of Knowledge――The Nature, Causes, and Method of Philosophy

⭘ Division and Classification of Mental Phenomena――His Distribution of Mental Philosophy

⭘ Explication of Consciousness, and its Relation to the Cognitive Faculties――His Theory of Attention――Law of Limitation――Are we always consciously active?――Latent Mental Modifications ――Somnambulism

⭘ Exposition of Cognition, Classification of the Special Faculties of Knowledge――Discussion of Doctrines of Perception――Statement of his own Doctrine of Natural Realism

⭘ Explanation of Memory, Reproduction, and Imagination

⭘ The Elaborative Faculty, Comparison――Evolution of the Processes of Apprehension, Judgment, Classification, Abstraction, and Generalisation, from the original act of Consciousness

⭘ Primary Notions, Common Sense, or Fundamental Principles of Intelligence, recognised by Hamilton

⭘ Classification and Treatment of the Feelings――His Theory of Pleasure and Pain

⭘ His Philosophy of the Conditioned, its Aim――Explication of its Principles and Applications

⭘ His Treatment of Logic――Efforts to simplify the Syllogistic System――Doctrine of the Quantification of the Predicate

⭘ Summary――His Method and Style――Influence of Teaching and Writings――Reference to Mill’s Examination

⭘ Ferrier’s Theory of Knowing and Being――Primary Law of Knowledge ――His Method and Style――Hegel

⭘ Robertson――His Education――Appointed Professor of Mental Philosophy and Logic in University College, London――Editor of Mind――His Writings

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Chapter XL

_Literature of Scotland in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries._

SECTION I.

Historical Literature of the Eighteenth Century.

⭘ Abercromby――Anderson――Campbell, his Historical Writings――Goodal, “Casket Letters”――Innes on the Ancient Inhabitants of Scotland

⭘ Literary Revival――Style became an Object of Study――Clubs and Societies

⭘ Hume’s History of Great Britain, its defects and merits――His Style

⭘ Robertson’s Historical Works――Characteristics and Style of his Writings

⭘ Historical Writings of Guthrie, Smollett, Tytler, and Stuart

⭘ Henry’s History of Great Britain――Lord Hailes’ Annals of Scotland――Ferguson’s Historical Works――Russell’s History of Modern Europe――Watson’s Historical Writings――Gillies’s History of Ancient Greece

⭘ Chalmers’s Caledonia――Laing’s History of Scotland

SECTION II.

Historical Literature of the Nineteenth Century.

⭘ Historic Characteristics of the Period――M‘Crie’s Writings――His Style――Mill’s History of British India――Dunlop’s History of Fiction――Tytler’s History of Scotland; its historic value ――Alison’s History of Europe, his Method and Style

⭘ Thomas Carlyle――His early Life and Work――His Essays and Pamphlets――The French Revolution――Oliver Cromwell’s Letters and Speeches――History of Frederick the Great of Prussia――Peculiar Characteristics of his Works――His Death

⭘ Burton, his early Writings――His History of Scotland――History of Britain in the Reign of Queen Anne――Blakey’s Historical Writings

⭘ Skene’s contributions to History――His History of Celtic Scotland

⭘ Record Scholars and Editors of Historical materials, Thomson, Innes, Stuart, Robertson, Laing, and Pitcairn

⭘ Chambers’ History of the Rising of 1745――Robertson’s Scotland under her early Kings――Mure’s History of the Literature of Ancient Greece――Grub’s Ecclesiastical History of Scotland ――Conclusion

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Chapter XLI

_Literature of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (continued)._

SECTION I.

Poetry of the Eighteenth Century.

⭘ Aim of the Chapter――Allan Ramsay, Characteristics of his Songs and Poems――His Gentle Shepherd――William Hamilton――Robert Crawford

⭘ Thomson, his Education and early Life――The Four Seasons ――Character of his Genius――The Castle of Indolence――Influence of his Poetry

⭘ Mallet’s poetical efforts――Armstrong’s Art of Preserving Health――Blair’s Poem entitled The Grave――Hamilton of Bangour, Characteristics of his Poetry

⭘ Alexander Ross, his Poems and Songs――Skinner’s Poems and Songs ――Dr. Blacklock’s Poems――Smollett’s Tears of Scotland

⭘ Home’s Tragedy of Douglas, caused a sensation――Falconer’s Poem, The Shipwreck――Macpherson’s Translation of Ossian’s Poems ――Macpherson’s abilities

⭘ Beattie’s Minstrel――Logan’s Poems and Writings――Fergusson’s Poems, Characteristics of his Genius

⭘ Burns was an assiduous reader and student――His Ideal of the Poet’s Functions――His Influence on the Imaginative Literature of ScotLand――His Influence on the Mind of the Nation

⭘ Minor Poets

SECTION II.

Poetry of the Nineteenth Century.

⭘ Tannahill, Characteristics of his Poems and Songs

⭘ Mayne, his Poem, the Siller Gun, and a Ballad, Logan Braes ――Leyden, his early Life――Style of his Poetry

⭘ Campbell’s Pleasures of Hope, its Characteristics――His short Poems and Songs――Specimens of the Poets

⭘ Scott, his Collection of Ballads――His own Poems

⭘ Hogg, his early efforts――The Queen’s Wake――The cast of his Genius――Flowing style of his Poetry

⭘ Boswell’s Songs――Cunningham’s Songs――His Prose Writings――Tennant ――Motherwell――Aytoun

⭘ Minor Poets

⭘ Smith――Mackay――Murdoch――Lewis Morrison-Grant――A great number of Scottish Poets

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Chapter XLII

Fiction of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.

⭘ Smollett’s Novels――Mackenzie’s stories, The Man of Feeling, and the Man of the World――Moore’s Novels

⭘ Elizabeth Hamilton, her childhood――Her Writings――Mrs. Brunton’s Novels

⭘ Scott, an industrious Writer――Characteristics of his Novels and Tales――Their Influence on the People

⭘ Galt, his chequered Life――He wrote many Novels, Tales and Dramatic pieces――Mrs. Johnstone――Susan E. Ferrier, her Three Novels――John Wilson’s Tales and Stories

⭘ Sir Thomas D. Lauder’s Novels――Andrew Picken’s Tales and Sketches――James B. Fraser’s Eastern Tales――Lockhart’s Novels ――David M. Moir――James Grant

⭘ David Pae, his early Life――He wrote many Stories――William Minto

⭘ William Alexander, his Stories, Sketches, and other Writings ――Robert L. Stevenson, his Novels and Romances――His Poems

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Chapter XLIII

Literature of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (continued)――Religious and Miscellaneous Literature.

SECTION I.

_Religious Literature of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries._

⭘ Character of the Religious Literature of Scotland――Ebenezer Erskine――Ralph Erskine――Dr. John Erskine――Dr. Webster――Dr. John Witherspoon, his Writings――His work in the United States of America

⭘ Dr. Blair’s Sermons――Dr. MacKnight’s Writings――John Brown of Haddington――His Works――Dr. John Brown, his Writings

⭘ Dr. Hunter’s Works――Dr. William L. Brown――Dr. Hill――Dr. Andrew Thomson

⭘ Dr. Chalmers, his Energy and Work in Glasgow――Appointed Professor of Divinity――Characteristics of his Writings――His influence among the People

⭘ Dr. Wardlaw――Dr. Candlish――Dr. Cumming――Dr. Guthrie

⭘ Norman Macleod――Dr. Eadie――Dr. Buchanan――Dr. Tulloch――Dr. Milligan

⭘ William R. Smith――His efforts for freedom of Criticism ――Importance of his Research and Works――Conclusion

SECTION II.

_Miscellaneous Literature of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries._

⭘ Arbuthnot’s Writings――History of John Bull

⭘ Lord Kames, his Public Spirit――His Writings――Elements of Criticism and Sketches of the History of Man

⭘ Lord Monboddo, his Eccentricity――His Writings

⭘ Lord Erskine――Appointed Lord Chancellor――His forensic Oratory

⭘ James Boswell――Dr. Currie――Lord Jeffrey, Editor of the Edinburgh Review――His Writings

⭘ Lord Brougham, his early Career――His Writing――Robert Mudie ――George Combe, Characteristics of his Works

⭘ Hugh Miller――His Literary Talents――Character and Style of his Works

⭘ Patrick E. Dove’s Theory of Human Progression

⭘ George Gilfillan――His Mental Powers and Sympathies――A Preacher and Lecturer――His Writings

⭘ Dr. John Brown――William Minto――His Education and early Life ――Appointed Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen ――His Writings

⭘ John Veitch, variety and character of his Philosophical and Literary Efforts

⭘ John S. Blackie, his Education and early Life――A Professor of Humanity in Marischal College, Aberdeen, subsequently Professor of Greek in the University of Edinburgh――His Writings

⭘ Travellers――James Bruce――Mungo Park――Dr. Livingstone

⭘ Rise and Development of the Newspaper Press and Periodical Literature――Works of Reference

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Chapter XLIV

_Progress of Science in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries._

SECTION I.

Physical Science.

⭘ Aim of the Chapter――Conceptions of the Universe; Newton’s Theory Controversy touching the Invention of the Calculus――Importance of Mathematical Science

⭘ Maclaurin, a Professor of Mathematics――Method and Scope of his Course of Instruction――His Works――Theories of the Tides

⭘ James Stirling’s Mathematical Works――Stewart――Simson――Playfair ――Leslie

⭘ Dr. Black’s Experiments――His discovery of Latent Heat――His Lectures on Chemistry――His connection with James Watt――Black was a successful Instructor

⭘ Sir John Leslie and other scientific men investigated the subject of Radiant Heat――Leslie’s Experiments――His Works

⭘ Progress of Discovery――Spectrum Analysis

⭘ Optics: Dr. Young――Sir David Brewster――His Intellectual Energy and Industry――His Discoveries――His Works――His Invention of Instruments and Apparatus

⭘ Geology: Hutton――Lyell’s Works――Murchison’s Explorations and Writings――Siluria Strata――Maclaren――Hugh Miller

SECTION II.

Progress of Mechanical Science.

⭘ Relation between Physical Science and Mechanical Arts

⭘ Dr. Robison; his education――He becomes acquainted with James Watt――His work in foreign countries――Appointed Professor of Natural Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh――His Works

⭘ James Watt; his early training――Went to London to improve his mechanical skill――On returning he found employment in the University of Glasgow

⭘ Watt’s Experiments touching Steam――The Steam Engine; his first improvement of it; subsequent improvements

⭘ His other Inventions――His discovery of the composition of Water ――Honours conferred on him――Serenity of the evening of his life ――His death――The worth of his character and genius

⭘ Early attempts to apply Steam power to Navigation

⭘ Rise and Progress of the Science of Electricity――Practical applications of the Electric Forces――Conclusion of the Chapter

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Chapter XLV

Progress of Medical Science in Scotland in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.

⭘ The prime phenomenon of Medical Science――Sketch of the state of Medical Science in Europe at the beginning of the Eighteenth Century

⭘ Founding of the Edinburgh Medical School――The College of Physicians and College of Surgeons――The first Professor of Anatomy Recognition of other Chairs by the University――John Monro; Alexander Monro

⭘ Alexander Monro, Professor of Anatomy――His method and course of Instruction――His Work on the Human Bones――Erection of the Royal Infirmary――By his Teaching and energy Monro contributed to raise the standing of the Edinburgh School――A Chair of Midwifery instituted

⭘ Dr. Cullen; his education and early career――His first Course of Lectures in the University of Glasgow――His method of Instruction and energy

⭘ Cullen appointed Professor of Chemistry in the University of Edinburgh――Subsequently he was appointed to the Chair of Institutes of Medicine――His Expository Powers――His Works and Influence

⭘ Dr. John Gregory; his Works――Dr. James Gregory――Dr. Andrew Duncan, Professor of the Institutes of Medicine――His Works――His son, Dr. Andrew, was Professor of Medical Jurisprudence――His Writings

⭘ Alexander Monro succeeded his father as Professor of Anatomy ――His Teaching and Works――And his son, Alexander, also ♦succeeded to the Chair of Anatomy――His Works are numerous――John Goodsir

♦ “succeded” replaced with “succeeded”

⭘ Extra-mural Teaching――John Bell, Lecturer on Surgery and Midwifery――His Works――Sir Charles Bell, Lecturer on Anatomy and Surgery――He was appointed Professor of Surgery in the University of Edinburgh――His Works――Dr. Barclay, Dr. Gordon and Dr. Knox, were extra-mural Lecturers

⭘ Dr. John Thomson, his work as a Professor of Military Surgery, a Lecturer, and Professor of Pathology

⭘ Dr. Henderson, Professor of Pathology――His Writings――Dr. Sanders ――Dr. ♦Ballingall, his Writings――Dr. Alison――James Syme――An extra-mural Lecturer and Professor of Clinical Surgery――His Works

♦ “Balingall” replaced with “Ballingall”

⭘ Dr. Alexander Hamilton――Sir James Y. Simpson――Robert Christison

⭘ Institution of the Glasgow Medical School――New Chairs instituted Extra-mural Lecturers――The University Buildings――The Infirmaries of Glasgow

⭘ Aberdeen Medical School――Institution of New Chairs――Erection of New Buildings――Present state of the Medical School――Dr. Pirrie ――Dr. Keith――Dr. Lizars――Dr. Ogston

⭘ Dr. James Douglas, his Works――Dr. William Hunter――William Cruickshanks――John Hunter

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Chapter XLVI

_Progress of Education in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries._

⭘ The old Parish School System ineffective in the Highlands――The People took an interest in Education――Annual Grants from Government――Government Inspectors of Schools

⭘ Effect of the Disruption upon Education――Free Church and Established Church Schools――Sabbath Schools――Reformatory Schools

⭘ Grammar Schools in the last Century, a marked improvement in these Schools――Technical and Art Schools

⭘ The Universities in the early part of this Century――Universities Act and Executive Commission of 1858――Act and Executive Commission of 1889――New Ordinances

⭘ Libraries in Scotland

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Chapter XLVII

_Progress of Agriculture in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries._

⭘ State of Agriculture in the last Century――The Implements primitive and rude――Introduction of Fanners and Thrashing-Machines ――Andrew Meikle――Washing away the Moss of Kincardine

⭘ A revolution has been effected in Agricultural Implements and Machines――Enclosing of Pasture Lands――Reports on the state of Agriculture――Institution of the Highland and Agricultural Society of Scotland

⭘ Change in the method of Rotation of Crops――♦Improvements in the system of Breeding, Rearing, and Feeding of Cattle――Rents ――Horticulture

♦ “Inprovements” replaced with “Improvements”

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Chapter XLVIII

_Progress of Mining, Manufactures, and Commerce in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries._

SECTION I.

Coal, Iron, and Lead Mining.

⭘ Coal Mining in the early part of last Century――Improved methods of working the Mines, application of Steam-power――Gradual increase in the consumption of Coal――State of the Coal Miners in the last Century

⭘ The Collieries are now worked by Steam-power――Quantities of Coal raised in Scotland――Number of persons employed――Wages of Coal Miners at different periods

⭘ Iron, Lead, and Copper Miners

SECTION II.

Iron Works, and Iron Manufactures.

⭘ Scottish Iron Ores――Furnaces erected in Scotland――Carron Iron Works――Erection of other Iron Works in the last Century――Quantity of Iron annually produced

⭘ More Blast-furnaces erected――Discovery of the Blackband Ironstone――Increasing demand for Iron――Invention of the Hot-blast――Annual production of Iron at different periods

⭘ Account of Iron Works――Malleable Iron Works――Steel Manufacture

⭘ Iron-founding and other branches of the Iron Trade――Sequence of Industrial Development

SECTION III.

Improvement of the Means of Communication.

⭘ State of the Roads in the last Century――New Roads and Bridges in the Highlands――Making of Canals

⭘ Introduction and Development of Railways――Improved Postal and Telegraphic Arrangements

SECTION IV.

Shipbuilding.

⭘ Progress of Shipping from the end of the Seventeenth Century Onwards

⭘ Shipbuilding in Leith――In Dundee――In Aberdeen, and other Ports ――Effect of Changes in the Construction of Vessels

⭘ Shipbuilding on the Clyde, Steam vessels――Iron Ships――War Ships ――Steel Vessels――Number and Tonnage of Vessels built and launched

SECTION V.

Glass and Earthenware Manufactures.

⭘ Various kinds of Glass――Process of making it――Glass Engraving ――Glass Painting

⭘ Earthenware Works――Brick and Tile Works

SECTION VI.

Textile Manufactures.

⭘ Mechanical Inventions, Appliances, and Machines for Spinning and Weaving

⭘ I.――Development of the Woollen and Hosiery Manufactures ――Introduction of Machinery, Steam-power, and Power-looms――Keen Competition in the Markets of the World――Carpet Manufacture ――Bonnet Manufacture――Number of Woollen Factories in Scotland, and number of Persons employed

⭘ II.――Progress of the Linen Manufactures――Number of Lint Mills in the Eighteenth Century――Quantity of Linen produced, and its value――Table Linen Manufacture in Dunfermline――Introduction of Jute Manufactures――Its rapid Development――Number of Linen and Jute Factories, and total number of Persons employed

⭘ III.――Introduction and Development of Cotton Manufactures ――Number of Cotton Mills in the Eighteenth Century――Steam-power, and Power-looms――Number of hands employed at different periods ――Thread Manufacture

⭘ IV.――Silk Manufacture――Mixed Fabrics――Floorcloth――Total number of Persons employed in Textile Manufactures

⭘ Some of the Effects of the Industrial Revolution――Wages of Operatives in Cotton Factories

SECTION VII.

Paper Manufacture.

⭘ Invention of the Pulping engine, and Paper-making Machine ――Development of Paper Manufactures――Raw materials used, and quantity of Paper produced――Number of Persons employed

⭘ Manufacture of Paper-hangings

SECTION VIII.

Printing and Book-binding.

⭘ Printing in the last Century――Invention and Development of Stereotyping――Introduction of Printing Machines, and Steam-power ――Number of Persons employed

⭘ Book-binding, Machines used――Minute division of Labour

SECTION IX.

Leather, India-rubber, and Shoe Manufactures.

⭘ Manufacture of Leather――Number of hands employed――Revolution in the Shoe-making Trade――Gutta-percha――India-rubber Manufactures

SECTION X.

Sugar-refining, Brewing, and Distilling.

⭘ I.――Sugar-refining Trade――Heavy Machinery and Apparatus used

⭘ II.――Quantities of Malt consumed and Beer produced at different periods――Export Trade――Aerated Water

⭘ III.――Legislation touching Whisky――Variation of the Duty on Whisky――Quantities produced and consumed in Scotland

SECTION XI.

Miscellaneous Manufactures.

⭘ Importance of Chemical Science in the useful Arts and Manufactures――I. Alkali Works; II. Alum Works; III. Mineral Oil Works; IV. Artificial Manures; V. Comb Works――Conclusion

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Chapter XLIX

Architecture, and Monumental Art.

SECTION I.

Architecture.

⭘ Variety of Stones――Scottish Architects――William Adam――Robert Adam――James Craig――James Gibbs――Robert Mylne――Functions of the Architect

⭘ Crowded State of Edinburgh in the last Century――The North Loch Bridged――New Town――Opening up and rebuilding of the Old Town ――Characteristics of the Architecture

⭘ Glasgow――Extension and construction of new Streets――In the middle of this Century the old localities of the City crowded ――New Water Works――An extensive scheme of Improvement carried out――Architectural characteristics of Glasgow――Sanitary Arrangements

SECTION II.

Monumental Art, Granite Cutting and Polishing.

⭘ Reference to early stone Monuments――Quarrying in Aberdeenshire ――Quantity of Stone annually Quarried

⭘ Granite-cutting and polishing Trade――The branch of Monumental Art――Lettering――Export Trade

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Chapter L

Fine Art, Music, and Painting.

SECTION I.

Music.

⭘ I.――Earliest Collection of Scottish Melodies――Dance Music ――Sword-Dance

⭘ II.――Scottish Musicians, Composers, Violinists, Vocalists, and Pipers

⭘ III.――Psalmody――Hymn Books――Organs――A Chair of Music instituted in the University of Edinburgh――A Lectureship on Music founded in Anderson’s College

SECTION II.

Painting.

⭘ Conditions favourable to the Culture of Art――Aikman――Ramsay――His success in London――Runciman, his early efforts――Paintings from scenes in Ossian’s Poems

⭘ David Allan――His work in Rome――His paintings of Scottish Subjects――Other Painters of the Period

⭘ Raeburn, his Education――His first Efforts at Painting――His success and marriage――His sojourn in Rome, and return to Edinburgh――His method of working――Honours conferred on him――His Merits

⭘ Andrew Robertson――Wilkie, his early Efforts――Variety and Characteristics of his Paintings

⭘ John Burnet――James Burnet――Andrew Wilson, a Landscape Painter ――Andrew Donaldson

⭘ Sir William Allan, his early Efforts――His historic Pictures of Scottish Subjects――His Dramatic Power――David Roberts――William Bonnar

⭘ Thomas Duncan――William Simson――Sir John W. Gordon――William Dyce ――His Paintings

⭘ Sir George Harvey――His historic Pictures――Robert S. Lauder ――David Scott――Horatio M‘Culloch――Alexander Johnston――Alexander Backley

⭘ Sir Daniel Macnee――His Portraits――John Phillip――His early Efforts and ultimate Success――Characteristics of his Pictures

⭘ Robert T. Ross――Robert Thorburn――Joseph N. Paton――Erskine Nicol ――Robert Herdman, an eminent Painter――George Chalmers――William B. Scott

⭘ Sculptors:――Thomas Campbell――Laurence Macdonald――Sir John Steel ――William Brodie――Alexander Brodie――Henry B. Smith

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Chapter LI

Political and Social Movements.

⭘ State of Political Representation in Scotland prior to 1832 ――Effect of the French Revolution on the Executive――Trial of Thomas Muir――The Lord Justice Clerk’s Address to the Jury――Other persons tried for political offences――Three Men Executed

⭘ Slow progress of Liberal Principles――Chartist Movement――New Reform Bill before Parliament, opposed and defeated――Great Agitation――The Second Reform Bill passed

⭘ Political Rights of the People recognised

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Chapter LII

Ecclesiastical Movements.

⭘ Theocratic Conception of the Church and State――Historic Polity of Presbyterianism――Election of ministers

⭘ Patronage restored――Struggles within the Church――Secession――Dr. Robertson’s Leadership of the Assembly, effect of his policy ――Continuation of the internal Struggle

⭘ A Revolution preparing――Narrative of the Movement

⭘ The Popular Party assumed a firm attitude――Interference of the Court of Session, historical view of its Proceedings

⭘ Excitement in the Country――The General Assembly adopted “the Claim of Right,” but Parliament rejected it――Assembly of 1843 ――The final Scene――Significance of the Disruption

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Chapter LIII

Summary.

⭘ Summary of the Work――Conclusion

♦INDEX

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♦ added to Contents listing

THE HISTORY OF CIVILISATION IN SCOTLAND.

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Chapter XXXV

History of Scottish Philosophy――Carmichael――Hutcheson.

IN the closing chapter of the third volume an outline of the history of European philosophy in the seventeenth century and the early part of the eighteenth was given, as a preliminary to the history of Scottish philosophy. It was shown that although this speculative movement had arisen and assumed importance in the seventeenth century, it was not felt in Scotland in its philosophical form till during the century following. This movement, with its scrutinising spirit, was partly a result of the great religious revolution of the sixteenth century, with which, in its religious and political consequences, Scotland was deeply affected. On the continent the earlier efforts of the movement were somewhat halting, wavering, and doubtful; but at last the human mind launched into the regions of speculation and scientific investigation with vigour and freedom, and on the scientific side attained a marked degree of success. The sources whence Scottish philosophy drew the materials which were not original to itself, may be indicated thus:――1. The mental philosophy of Greece, especially the ethics and metaphysics of Aristotle, chiefly by Hutcheson, and the later development of Hamilton. 2. The mental philosophy of France, slightly marked in Stewart, to a greater degree in Brown, and also partly in Hamilton. 3. English philosophy, mostly from Locke’s Essay on the Understanding and Berkeley’s writings, notably in Hume, Reid, and Stewart; in a less degree in Brown and Hamilton. 4. German philosophy, almost restricted to Hamilton, at least till quite recent times. Such is a very general indication of the various sources to which Scottish philosophy was partly indebted for its materials; but, except in the cases of Hume and Hamilton, they are not particularly marked.

This history of Scottish philosophy will present a brief account of the origin of the school. The subsequent chapters will treat the views and speculations of Hume, Adam Smith, Reid, Ferguson, Stewart, Brown, Mackintosh, Hamilton, Ferrier, and others. It has not been deemed advisable to discuss the writings of living philosophers. As the main aim is historic exposition in relation to the progress of civilisation, the relative importance of the many subjects which come within the scope of the work, has determined the method and the limits of their treatment.

In the early part of the eighteenth century mental philosophy was at a low ebb in Scotland. As stated in the last volume, the old method of teaching in the Universities was continued in some of them till past the middle of the century; although the College of Edinburgh, in 1708, adopted in the Arts Faculty the specialised method of instruction――a distinct branch of study was assigned to each professor. It appears that before 1741, Stevenson, the professor of logic and metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, used an abridgment of Locke’s Essay on the Human Understanding as one of his text-books.

In the University of Glasgow, the regents were restricted to the teaching of special subjects in 1727; and in that year Gershom Carmichael was appointed to the chair of moral philosophy. It is reported that he was a successful teacher; but he died in 1729. He was the author of a short treatise on Logic, which reached a second edition in 1722; and in 1720 published an edition of Puffendorff’s treatise, De Officio Hominis et Civis, for the use of students, to which he wrote notes and supplements. Hutcheson said that Carmichael’s notes were of more value than the text. Carmichael’s latest work, Synopsis Theologiæ Naturalis, appeared in 1729, shortly before his death. In his effort to prove the existence and perfections of God, he showed considerable discrimination and reasoning power; he considered the arguments of Descartes and Clarke as unsatisfactory, and insisted that the existence of God should be proved on a posteriori arguments.¹

¹ Sir William Hamilton in a note to Reid’s Works, says ――“Carmichael was Hutcheson’s immediate predecessor in the chair of moral philosophy, and may be regarded, on good grounds, as the real founder of Scottish philosophy.” ――Volume I., page 30.

Francis Hutcheson, who has usually been considered the founder of the Scottish School of mental philosophy, was a native of the north of Ireland, but originally of Scotch descent.¹ He was educated at the University of Glasgow, where he studied for six years, and enjoyed the instruction of Carmichael, who was then acting as a regent. On his return to Ireland, he was ♦licensed to preach among a dissenting body. But he soon left this profession, and opened a school in Dublin, where he taught the higher branches of education with much success for about eight years. Having become known by his writings, he was elected professor of moral philosophy in the University of Glasgow in 1729――an office which he held until his death, in the fifty-third year of his age.

¹ Born in 1694, died in 1747. He was descended from an Ayrshire family.

♦ “licenced” replaced with “licensed” for consistency

As a professor of moral philosophy, he was very successful. He entered on his task with the ardour of a man of keen sensibilities and all the glow of genius, and worked hard. Hence his class soon became large, and he was enabled to exercise a wide influence; in short, he was himself animated with a genuine love of knowledge, of liberty, and of virtue; and thus he contributed much to diffuse a taste for the higher literature in Scotland. He lectured on five days in the week――on natural religion, morals, jurisprudence, and government; and, besides, he lectured other three days of the week on some of the best Greek and Latin writers, explaining their moral views, and also their style. Further, on the Sunday evenings, he delivered a course of lectures on the truth and evidence of Christianity; which is said to have been attended by larger auditories than any of his other courses of lectures; indeed, his Sunday lectures were attended by all the different classes of students.¹

¹ Leechman’s “Account of Hutcheson’s Life and Writings,” prefixed to Hutcheson’s Moral Philosophy, pages 26‒37; see also Rev. Alexander Carlyle’s Autobiography. Carlyle says――“I attended Hutcheson’s class this year (1743) with great satisfaction and improvement. He was a good-looking man, of an engaging countenance. He delivered his lectures without notes, walking backwards and forwards in the area of his room. As his elocution was good and his voice and manner pleasing, he raised the attention of his hearers at all times; and when the subject led him to explain and enforce the moral virtues and duties, he displayed a fervent and persuasive eloquence which was irresistible.” ――Autobiography, page 70.

Hutcheson’s writings are these:――1. An Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 1725; 2. An Essay on the Passions and Affections, 1728; 3. Metaphysical Synopsis, 1742; 4. Logical Compendium, a short but useful treatise; 5. his System of Moral Philosophy, which was published by his son in 1755, from the original manuscript. This last work presented a complete view of his system, and consists of three Books――the first of which treats on the constitution of human nature; the second presents a deduction of the more special laws and duties of life, previous to civil government; and the third treats on civil polity or government.

Although it is chiefly as a moralist that he attained distinction in the history of philosophy, his psychology was in advance of his time, and on some points it is still worth attention. He distinguished sensation from perception; and stated that the common division of the external senses into five classes is imperfect; he made many ingenious and just remarks on the origin and character of our ideas of beauty; and his view of the formation of acquired desires is natural and reasonable.

As a moralist, Hutcheson insists much on disinterested affections and a distinct moral faculty as essential constituents of human nature. He explains the objects which the moral sense approves, as those having “a tendency to the happiness of others, and the general perfection of the mind possessing them.” His definition of the moral sense or faculty itself is to this effect:――It is a power of which anyone by close attention and reflection may convince himself, being “a natural and immediate determination to approve certain affections and actions consequent upon them, not referred to any other quality perceivable by our senses or by reasoning.... It may be a constant, settled determination in the soul itself, as much as our power of judging and reasoning.” He maintained that reason is only a subordinate factor in our ultimate determination both of will and perception. “The ultimate end is settled by some sense and some determination of will; by some sense we enjoy happiness, and self-love determines to it without reasoning. Reason can only direct to the means, or compare two ends previously constituted by some other immediate powers.... This moral sense from its very nature appears to be designed for regulating and controlling all our powers. This dignity and commanding nature we are immediately conscious of, as we are conscious of the power itself. Nor can such matters of immediate feeling be otherwise proved but by appeals to our own hearts.... We immediately discern moral good to be superior in kind and dignity to all others which are perceived by the other perceptive powers.... By this sense the heart can not only approve itself in sacrificing every other gratification to moral goodness, but have the highest self-enjoyment and approbation of its own disposition in doing so, which plainly shows this moral sense to be naturally destined to command all the other powers.”¹

¹ System of Moral Philosophy, Book I., chapter 1, sections 1, 5, 6, and chapter 4 throughout.

Still, he explicitly argues that this moral sense, like all our other faculties, needs to be cultivated and improved, and adduces very obvious illustrations――that special culture improves our taste, as more accurate knowledge and reflection aid us in forming sound judgments.

Hutcheson treated happiness at great length, and with much elegance and fine feeling. He placed our supreme happiness in the exercise of the highest virtue and the gratification of our widest affections. He sums up the subject thus:――“It is plain our supreme and complete happiness, according to the universal doctrine of the wisest men in all ages, must consist in the complete exercise of those nobler virtues, especially that entire resignation to God, and of all the inferior virtues which do not conflict with the superior, and in the enjoyment of such external prosperity as we can, consistently with virtue, obtain.

“A just estimation of the value of life, and of the several sorts of evil we are exposed to, must be equally necessary. If moral evils and some sympathetic sufferings are worse than any external ones, and can make life shameful and miserable amidst all the affluence of other things, as we have shown above; if at best life is but an uncertain possession we must soon lose, we shall see something that is more to be dreaded than death, and many just reasons why it may on certain occasions be our interest to incur the danger of it.... Many are discouraged from a virtuous culture of their minds for the reception of all virtues by a rash prejudice. We are dazzled with the conspicuous glories of some great successful actors in higher stations; we can allow such virtues to be the noblest enjoyments, but they are placed so high that few have access to them, Nay, persons in the highest positions often despair when their power is not absolute.

“To arm the soul against prejudice, we should remember that the reality and the perfection of virtue, and the inward satisfaction of it too, to a calm mind, depends not on external success, but upon the inward temper of the soul. Persisting under these doubts about the success of glory in the public offices of virtue, or, if we are excluded from them, in all the lower private offices――in a constant sweetness of deportment in obscurity, and a constant resignation to the Supreme Mind――embracing cheerfully the lot appointed for us, repressing every envious notion and every repining thought against providence, resolving to go steadfastly on in the path pointed out to us by God and nature, till our mortal part fall down to that earth whence it sprung――must appear rather more noble and heroic to an All-seeing Eye, and to the judgment of every wise man, than the more glittering virtues of a prosperous fortune.

“When we despair of glory, and even of executing all the good we intend, it is a sublime exercise to the soul to persist in acting the rational and social part as it can; discharging its duty well, and committing the rest to God. Who can tell what greater good might be attainable if all good men exerted their powers even under great uncertainties, and great dangers of misrepresentation and obloquy? Or how much worse should all matters proceed, if all good men desponded and grew remiss under such apprehensions? If virtue appears more glorious by surmounting external dangers and obstacles, is not its glory equally increased by surmounting these inward discouragements, and persisting without the aids of glory or applause, conquering even the ingratitude of those it serves, satisfied with the silent testimony of our hearts and the hope of divine approbation? Thus, the most heroic excellence, and its consequent happiness and enjoyment, may be attained under the worst circumstances of fortune; nor is any station of life excluded from the enjoyment of the supreme.”¹

¹ System of Moral Philosophy, Book I., chapter 2.

In the above passages there is evidence, not only of Christian sentiment and resignation to the Supreme Mind, but also of classic culture; the very spirit of the noble and heroic sages of ancient Greece and Rome breathes in them.

Hutcheson placed the object of moral approbation in general benevolence. The calm kind of affections are more approved than the passions; and the calm desire of private good, though not approved as virtue, is far from being condemned as vice; and none of the truly natural appetites and passions when restrained within proper limits are of themselves condemned as evil, although they are not referred by the agent to any public interest. But the disposition which is most excellent, and naturally attains the highest moral approbation, “is the calm, stable, universal goodwill to all, or the most extensive benevolence. This seems the most distinct notion we can form of the moral excellence of the Deity.” The love of moral excellence itself is a very high object of approbation, when by reflection we find it in ourselves or observe it in others.¹

¹ Book I., chapter 4, sections 7, 10.

Although Hutcheson coincided with Shaftesbury touching disinterested affections, he is more distinct than his predecessor; and his theory of the moral faculty is better developed. In short, his ethical ideas were higher than Shaftesbury’s, while his grasp of mind and analytic powers were also much greater.

Touching the relation of morality to religion, he stated that the highest exercise of the moral faculty and the highest happiness are found in the recognition and worship of God.

In the second book of his System of Moral Philosophy, Hutcheson treats at length on the subjects of natural rights, society, the foundation of private property, laws, and contracts; and the third book treats of government, embracing domestic and civil rights. But in these parts of his system, his conclusions are often founded on speculative and imaginary grounds. As an example of his method, his view of the establishment of government may be cited:――Civil power is most naturally founded by these three different acts of the whole people ――(1) an agreement or contract of each one with all the rest, that they will unite into one society or body, to be governed in all their common interests by one council; (2) a decree or designation made by the whole of the people, of the form or plan of power, and of the persons to be entrusted with it; (3) a mutual agreement or contract between the governors thus constituted and the people, the former obliging themselves to a faithful administration of the powers vested in them for the common interest, and the latter obliging themselves to obedience.¹

¹ Book III., chapter 5, section 2.

This is merely a statement of the famous Contract Theory of the Origin of Government, and substantially the same as enunciated by Hobbes, Locke, and others. Although Hutcheson’s general views of government are more sober and liberal than Hobbes’, yet both start from the same unhistorical and imaginary basis. He maintained the doctrine that all states have in themselves the causes of dissolution and death.¹

¹ “States themselves have within them the seeds of death and destruction; what in the temerity, imprudence, or superstition of the first contrivers; what in the selfish ambition or other meaner passions of the governors and their subjects, jarring with each other and among themselves; what in the opposition of those seeming interests which such persons pursue; what in the weakness and inconstancy of human virtue; and in the proneness of men to luxury and present pleasure, without attention to the consequences. These seeds, along with external force and jarring national interests, have always occasioned the dissolution and death of every political body, and will occasion it as certainly as the internal weakness of the animal body and external causes will at last bring it to its final period. Good men indeed study, by all the art they are masters of, to ward off and delay these ♦catastrophes as long as they can, from their friends or their country; such kind of offices are the most honourable and delightful employment they can have while they live. But he must little think of the order of nature who sees not that all our efforts will be defeated at last, whether for the preservation of individuals or of the political body.”――Book III., chapter 11.

♦ “catastrophies” replaced with “catastrophes”

In conclusion, according to Hutcheson, the ethical standard is identical with the moral faculty. His general views obtained in the first instance a pretty wide circulation from his own teaching in the University of Glasgow, and his ethical writings have exercised a considerable influence since his death. His first course of lectures in Glasgow was delivered in 1730, and we shall find that both Hume and Adam Smith were somewhat indebted to Hutcheson. He agreed with his contemporary Butler in holding that the moral faculty is an essential part of human nature.

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Chapter XXXVI

David Hume and Adam Smith.

SECTION I.

Hume.

THE two names at the head of this chapter have attained high distinction not only in Scottish philosophy, but also in the history of European thought, and especially in the literature of political economy. This is so fully recognised, that it would be superfluous to enlarge on it; but it may be said that Hume, by his bold and sceptical reasoning, aroused philosophers from their slumber, and greatly stimulated thought to further inquiries in various directions; while Smith advanced an attractive moral theory, and founded the science of political economy, which has proved beneficial in suggesting legislative reform and commercial enterprise.

Hume and Smith were mutual friends, and took a keen interest in each other’s speculation and researches. In several branches their inquiries were identical, but in others they were as wide as the poles asunder.

Hume¹ published in 1739 two volumes of a work entitled A Treatise of Human Nature: “Being an Attempt to introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects.” In explaining his system, it is requisite to direct special attention to this work, as it is the most systematic, elaborate, and complete of all his productions.

¹ Born in 1711, and died in Edinburgh in 1776. Shortly before his death he wrote a short but characteristic account of himself, entitled My Own Life. Besides this there are various biographical accounts of Hume, but I need only mention that the late Dr. H. Burton produced one, entitled The Life and Correspondence of David Hume, published in 1848; and more recently Professor Huxley published an account of Hume and his philosophy.

It consists of three books, which treat consecutively “Of the Understanding; Of the Passions; and Of Morals.” The first book is divided into four parts. The first part of it, which consists of seven sections, treats of ideas and impressions――their origin, composition, connection, abstraction, and other relations. The second part, extending to six sections, discusses at length the ideas of space and time. The third, contains sixteen sections, which deal with the subjects of knowledge and probability. The fourth, extending to seven sections, discusses the sceptical and other systems of philosophy, and completes his exposition of the Understanding. The second book is divided into three parts:――The first part consists of twelve sections, and under the general heading “Of pride and humility,” a pretty large division of the passions is treated; the second part, also consisting of twelve sections, treats of love and hatred; and the third part, containing ten sections, discusses the problem of the will, and the direct passions. The third book is, in like manner, divided into three parts:――The first part contains two sections, which treat of virtue and vice in general; the second part, extending to twelve sections, treats of justice and injustice, and various points connected with society and government; and the third part contains six sections, which treat of various virtues and vices.

Such is the plan of Hume’s great philosophical work. Although it is characterised by a marked simplicity of arrangement, it presents some of the most subtle thought and searching reasoning to be found in any literature. Still it did not at once produce a great impression; for, in his own words, “never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my Treatise of Human Nature. It fell dead-born from the press without reaching such distinction, as even to excite a murmur among the Zealots.” This caused him to recast portions of it in a more popular form, under the titles of “Essays: Moral and Political;” “Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary;” “An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding;” “An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals;” and “Political Discourses.”¹ But the principles which he enunciated in the Treatise of Human Nature were not essentially changed in any of his subsequent writings. In an advertisement to the authoritative edition of his Essays and Treatises, published in 1777, the year after his death, he says that henceforth he desired that his later writings alone should be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles; and it is only fair to concede that the original Treatise of Human Nature, which he composed at an early period of his life, did not in all points truly represent his later sentiments; yet it is mainly in the improvement, the ease and polish of his style, and in the omission of two parts of the original treatise, containing some of his most acute speculations, that his later writings differ from his earliest――a difference of form and finish rather than of thought and matter. Moreover, it is in the original treatise that Hume can be historically studied to the best advantage.

¹ Hume’s numerous short essays treat on a variety of subjects. Some of the more notable are those on eloquence, the standard of taste, and the highly polished ones on the Epicurean, the Stoic, the Platonist, and the Sceptic. In these and in others of his essays, he shows a fine critical faculty.

Regarding some of his other writings, it may be mentioned here that his Natural History of Religion was first published in 1757; his two essays, the one on Suicide, and the other Of the Immortality of the Soul; his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, and some other short pieces, were published after his death.

Several editions of his essays were published in his lifetime; and new ones were frequently added, as well as many alterations and corrections made on them. Since his death various editions of his works have appeared. An edition of his philosophical works, edited by Mr. T. H. Green and Mr. T. H. Grose, with valuable introductions and notes, was published in 1874‒5, in four large volumes.

Although Hume’s mind was original and vigorous, and his thinking and critical powers unusually great, yet he found the principles upon which he most effectively operated mainly in Locke and in Berkeley. There is little trace of the influence of Descartes in the Treatise of Human Nature; but his style bears internal evidence of the influence of French literature. No English philosophical writer of a prior date approached Hume in the qualities and the grace of his style.

On various points treated in the moral part of the treatise, the influence of Hobbes and of Hutcheson are easily traced; and Hume held the latter philosopher in very great esteem. Let us proceed to the exposition of his system, beginning with his own account of the state of his mind when he approached the subject:――

“At the time therefore that I am tired with amusement and company, and have indulged a reverie in my chamber, or in a solitary walk by a river side, I feel my mind all collected within itself, and am naturally inclined to carry my view into all those subjects, about which I have met with so many disputes in the course of my reading and conversation. I cannot forbear having a curiosity to be acquainted with the principles of moral good and evil, the nature and foundation of government, and the cause of those several passions and inclinations which actuate and govern me. I am uneasy to think I approve of one object and disapprove of another; call one thing beautiful and another deformed; decide concerning truth and falsehood, reason and folly, without knowing upon what principles I proceed. I am concerned for the condition of the learned world, which lies under such a deplorable ignorance in all these particulars. I feel an ambition to arise in me of contributing to the instruction of mankind, and of acquiring a name by my inventions and discoveries. These sentiments spring up naturally in my present disposition, and should I endeavour to banish them, by attaching myself to any other business or diversion, I feel I should be a loser in point of pleasure; and this is the origin of my philosophy.”¹

¹ Book I., Part IV., section 7.

He begins his exposition of the Understanding with a description of impressions and ideas, and resolves the perceptions of the mind into these two terms. The perceptions which enter the mind with most force he calls impressions, and this term includes all our sensations, passions, and emotions; by ideas he means the faint images of impressions excited in thinking and in reasoning. Having distinguished impressions and ideas into simple and complex classes, he then proceeds to discuss their qualities and relations. Impressions and ideas differ from each other only in the degrees of their vivacity――the one seems to be the reflection of the others; in the case, however, of complex ideas, he notices some exceptions to this doctrine; but seeing that all simple perceptions and ideas are copies of impressions, and that the complex ones are formed from them, therefore these two kinds of perceptions exactly correspond. He next starts the main subject――the existence of impressions and ideas――and proposes to inquire which of them are causes and which effects.

He concludes that simple impressions are prior to their corresponding ideas, and that impressions are of two kinds――those of sensation and those of reflection. The first kind arise originally in the mind from unknown causes; the second are derived mostly from our ideas. Thus:――“An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain, of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases, and this we call an idea.¹ This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflection, because derived from it. These are again copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas, which, perhaps, in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas.” At this stage he expresses his opinion that the examination of the sensations belongs more to the anatomists and natural philosophers than to mental science, and therefore he does not enter upon them.²

¹ This is nearly the same as Hobbes’ doctrine.

² Book I., sections 1, 2.

Memory and imagination he treats together, but neither of them at much length. The first, he says, retains a strong and vivid impression, the second only a much fainter one. The chief distinction between memory and imagination consists in the fact that the memory retains the impressions in the order and form in which it receives them, while the imagination is not at all restricted in this way, as its function is to transpose and change its ideas.¹ This power of the imagination he connects with his exposition of the association of ideas.

¹ Further on he says――“Nothing is more dangerous to reason than the flights of imagination.... Men of bright fancies may in this respect be compared to those angels whom the Scriptures represent as covering their eyes with their wings.”――Book IV., section 7. Again, in his later work, An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, he remarks ――“Nothing is more free than the imagination of man; and though it cannot exceed the original stock of ideas furnished by the external and internal senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, separating, and dividing these ideas, in all the varieties of fiction and vision.”――Section 5, Part II.

Ideas are associated in three ways――namely, by semblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. These relations are briefly explained as principles of association, with the remark that, of the three, the associative relations of causation are the most widely ramified. Among the effects of the association of ideas, the most remarkable are those complex ideas which are the common subjects of our thoughts and reasonings, and generally arise from some principle of union among our simple ideas. These complex ideas he divides into relations, modes, and substances; and proceeds to examine these.¹

¹ Book I., Part I., sections 3, 4. What he states above, however, should be compared with his treatment of the principles of association in his later work, _An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding_, section 3.

He classifies relations under seven general heads――(1) resemblance, the most essential requisite of philosophical relation; (2) identity; (3) space and time; (4) quantity or number; (5) objects having the same quantity, but in different degrees; (6) contrariety; and (7) cause and effect. He affirms that we have no idea of substance, except as a mere collection of particular qualities, and closes the first part of his treatise with a discussion of abstract ideas. He alludes to Berkeley’s view, and argues that abstract or general ideas are formed from individual and particular ones, and brings in the convenient term Custom, of which he makes so much use in his speculations――“If ideas be particular in their nature, and at the same time finite in their number, it is only by custom they can become general in their representation, and contain an infinite number of other ideas under them.”¹

¹ Book I., Part I., sections 5, 6, 7.

The second part of the Understanding contains a long and exceedingly penetrating discussion of the ideas of space and time. He opens with a few sentences of polished banter about the dispositions of philosophers and their disciples. The first serious point taken up is the doctrine of infinite divisibility, which is handled with consummate skill. Founding upon the limited power of the human mind, he proceeds vigorously to demolish it; and in the fourth section he puts it in this form:――“Our system concerning space and time consists of two parts, which are intimately connected together. The capacity of the mind is not infinite, consequently no idea of extension or duration consists of an infinite number of parts or inferior ideas, but of a finite number, and these simple and indivisible: it is, therefore, possible for space and time to exist conformable to this idea; and if it be possible, it is certain they actually do exist conformable to it, since their infinite divisibility is utterly impossible and contradictory.

“The other part of our system is a consequence of this. The parts, into which the ideas of space and time resolve themselves, become at last indivisible; and these indivisible parts, being nothing in themselves, are inconceivable when not filled with something real and existent. The ideas of space and time are, therefore, no separate or distinct ideas, but merely those of the manner or order in which objects exist; or, in other words, it is impossible to conceive a vacuum and extension without matter, or a time when there was no succession or change in any real existence.”¹

¹ Book I., Part II., sections 1, 2, 3, 4.

The discussion is carried on through other three sections with great animation and ingenuity, and culminates in the annunciation of absolute Idealism, thus:――“Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind, it follows that it is impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible; let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe――we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can we conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions which have appeared in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there produced.”¹

¹ Book I., Part II., sections 4, 5, 6.

The third part of the Understanding, which treats of knowledge and probability, is the longest in the book; many topics of great interest are handled in it; but I shall chiefly direct attention to his views on causation.

Knowledge and science mainly turn and rest on the various kinds of philosophical relation. He re-states the relations which have been already noticed in a preceding page, and expiscates them at length in his own manner. In treating causation, he begins by proposing to search for the origin of the idea; and finds it to be some relation among objects. He then seeks to discover what the relation itself is; but all that he discovers is that the two relations of contiguity and priority in time are essential to causation. But seeing that any object may be contiguous and prior to another without being considered as its cause, there is a necessary connection to be taken into account, and it is upon this, the most essential relation of causation, that he made his grand attack. It would be tedious to follow him through his long discussion, and in fact it is unnecessary; therefore, I will only indicate the lines of his method of investigating the subject, and its results.

He inquires why a cause is always necessary, and affirms that the real state of the question is “whether every object which begins to exist, must owe its existence to a cause; and this he continues, I assert neither to be intuitively nor demonstratively certain.” After a very long exposition of the manner in which we reason beyond our immediate impressions, and conclude that particular causes must have particular effects, he takes up the discussion of the idea of necessary connection, and asks――“What is our idea of necessity, when we say that two objects are necessarily connected together? Upon this head I repeat what I have often had occasion to observe, that as we have no idea that is not derived from an impression, we must find some impression that gives rise to this idea of necessity, if we assert we have really such an idea.... Finding that it is always ascribed to causes and effects, I turn my eye to two objects supposed to be placed in that relation, and examine them in all the situations of which they are susceptible. I immediately perceive that they are contiguous in time and place, and that the object we call cause precedes the other we call effect. In no one instance can I go any further, nor is it possible for me to discover any third relation between these objects. I therefore enlarge my view to comprehend several instances.... Upon further inquiry I find that the repetition is not in every particular the same, but produces a new impression, and by that means the idea, which I at present examine. For, after a frequent repetition, I find that upon the appearance of one of the objects, the mind is determined by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon its relation to the first object. It is this impression, then, or determination which affords me the idea of necessity.”

After more discussion of a negative cast, he reaches the following result:――“The necessary connection between causes and effects is the foundation of our inference from one to the other. The foundation of our inference is the transition arising from the accustomed union. These are therefore the same.

“The idea of necessity arises from some impression. There is no impression conveyed by our senses which can give rise to that idea. It must, therefore, be derived from some internal impression or impression of reflection. There is no internal impression, which has any relation to the present business, but that propensity which custom produces, to pass from an object to its usual attendant. This, therefore, is the essence of necessity. Upon the whole, necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in objects; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, considered as a quality of bodies. Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but that determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects, and from effects to causes, according to their experienced union.”

He further draws the following conclusions:――1. All causes are of the same kind, and there is no ground for the distinction, sometimes made, between efficient, formal, material, and final causes; for every cause is efficient, or, if it is not, there is no cause at all. 2. There is but one kind of necessity, as there is but one kind of cause; and the distinction between moral and physical necessity has no foundation in nature. 3. The necessity of a cause to every beginning of existence is not founded on intuitive or demonstrative evidence. 4. We can never have reason to believe that any object exists, if we cannot form an idea of it.¹

¹ Book I., Part III., sections 1‒6, et seq. On this subject of Causation, Hume never changed his views, for in his later work, the Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, we find the following:――“When it is asked what is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact, the proper answer seems to be that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked what is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation, it may be replied in one word――Experience. But if we still carry on our sifting humour, and ask what is the foundation of all conclusions from experience, this implies a new question, which may be of more difficult solution and explication.... I shall content myself in this section with an easy task, and shall pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed. I say then that, even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning, or any process of the Understanding.” ――Section 4.

He repeats the statement that there is no connecting principle between cause and effect, which we can discover, and argues the point thus:――“These two propositions are far from being the same. I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, and I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects. I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may be justly inferred from the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. The connection between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent on those to produce it, who assert, that it really exists, and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact.”――Section 4.

Again, “it appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connection among events arises from a number of similar instances, which occur, of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe, that it will exist. This connection, therefore, which we feel in the mind――this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant――is the sentiment or impression, from which we form the idea of power or necessary connection. Nothing further is in the case. Contemplate the subject on all sides; you will never find any other origin of that idea.... And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising ignorance and weakness of the Understanding, than the present? For surely, if there be any relation among objects, which it imports us to know perfectly, it is that of cause and effect.”――Section 7. Hume’s doctrine of causation, it will thus be seen, is the same in his latest works as in his earliest. I shall only adduce one other example of its application:――

“We are ignorant, it is true, of the manner in which bodies operate on each other: their force or energy is entirely incomprehensible; but are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by which a Mind, even the Supreme Mind, operates either on itself or on body? Whence, I beseech you, do we acquire any idea of it? We have no sentiment or consciousness of this power in ourselves. We have no idea of the Supreme Being but what we learn from reflection or our own faculties. Were our ignorance, therefore, a good reason for rejecting anything, we should be led into that principle of denying all energy in the Supreme Being as much as the grossest matter. We surely comprehend as little the operations of one as of the other. It is more difficult to conceive, that motion may arise from impulse, than that it may arise from volition? All we know is our profound ignorance in both cases.”――Section 7.

In the fourth part of the book on the Understanding, Hume discusses Scepticism with regard to reason and the senses, touches briefly on ancient and modern philosophy, and treats at length of the immateriality of the soul and of personal identity. His treatment of the first of these subjects is of little real value, but his discussion on the senses is of more importance; while his handling of the immateriality of the soul and personal identity chiefly consists of a repetition and application of the negative principles, which he had before reached in the earlier parts of the book, and are therefore of less consequence. From the way in which he refers to the views of Spinoza, it is evident that he had never thoroughly studied the works of that great thinker. In the history of thought, indeed, Hume was not strong.

Touching reason, he says:――“When I reflect on the natural fallibility of my judgment, I have less confidence in my opinions than when I only consider the objects concerning which I reason; and when I proceed still further, to turn the scrutiny against every successive estimation I make of my faculties, all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.

“Should it here be asked me, whether I sincerely assent to this argument, which I seem to take such pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of those sceptics who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in anything possessed of any measure of truth and falsehood; I should reply, that this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely or constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity, has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connection with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, of seeing the surrounding bodies when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine.”¹

¹ Book I., Part IV., section 1.

Now, touching the senses from a sceptical standpoint, Hume had already said, “that belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression;” and, taking it for granted that body exists, he proposes to inquire into the causes which induce us to believe in its existence. He argues at length that by the senses we cannot know anything of continued or distinct existence. He then inquires how we attain the belief in the continued existence of the objects of the senses, and attributes it to the constancy and coherence of our impressions of them. He points out that when the mind starts in a particular train, it has a tendency to continue, even when objects fail it; and through this tendency we transform interrupted existence into continued existence. And, on his own theory of the mind, he accounts for our believing in this imagined continuity.

In the section on personal identity, he denies in the abstract the existence of self, and could find nothing to give us the impression of an unchangeable self. He observes “that the true idea of the human mind is, to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other. Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas, and these in their turn produce other impressions. One thought chases another and draws after it a third, by which it is expelled in its turn.... As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, it is to be considered, upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no memory, we should never have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects which constitutes our self or person.”¹

¹ Book I., Part IV., sections 2, 6.

Before passing from Hume’s exposition of the Understanding, which is the most important part of his philosophy, let us recapitulate the leading points. It has to be observed that he develops a system of the human mind. 1. There are impressions, perceptions, and ideas, of which we are conscious; and, although we may imagine that we know external things as objects of perception, still, in reality we know nothing but our own impressions and perceptions. 2. Therefore, we know nothing of an actual external world save as a phenomenon, which may be, for ought we can ever know, a creation of our own minds――the world of imagination. 3. Since our notion of Causation is nothing but a generated habit of looking at our impressions, perceptions, and ideas as constantly conjoined in the relations of contiguity and succession――a mere result which custom has engrafted on human belief――beyond this we can have no idea of any power, force, energy, or necessary connection in causation. 4. Thus, as already indicated, Hume’s system of the mind is a form of absolute Idealism; in short, he embraced the idealistic principles of Berkeley, excepting that portion of them relating to a separate soul or spirit, which in the bishop’s own system played so important a part. Even granting the truth of Hume’s starting-point, and his fundamental principles, still a large part of his treatment of the Understanding may be fairly described as reasoning in a circle; for he proposes to examine, to clear up, and to solve difficulties, but he often returns to his original point of departure without disclosing anything at all, save the inevitable impressions and ideas in the universe of the imagination.

Passing to the Second Book of the Treatise, which is devoted to the treatment of the passions, under this general term he includes impressions of reflection, emotions, desires, and appetites; and divides them into two main classes,――the direct and indirect passions, which are all founded on pleasure and pain. He enumerates the direct as desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security, together with the will; the indirect class embraces pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, and others associated with these. He also distinguishes the reflective emotions, as the calm and the violent:――“Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, etc. This division is far from exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly called passions, may decay into so soft an emotion as to become, in a manner, imperceptible.”¹ He gives a description and a kind of natural history of the several groups of passions, in which much insight and acute thinking are displayed.

¹ Book II., Part I., section 1.

His usual method of explanation is to fix upon one or two generic passions, and then, by a vigorous process of argument and reasoning, mainly of a deductive form, to show their nature, their relation to other passions, and their modes of manifestation and influence. I can only afford space for a short specimen of his manner of exposition in this department, taken from the section on property and riches:――“For the same reason that riches cause pleasure and pride, and poverty excites uneasiness and humility, power must produce the former emotions, and slavery the latter. Power, or an authority over others, makes us capable of satisfying all our desires; as slavery, by subjecting us to the will of others, exposes us to a thousand wants and mortifications.

“It is here worth observing that the vanity of power, or shame of slavery, are much augmented by the consideration of the persons over whom we exercise our authority, or who exercise it over us. For supposing it possible to frame statutes of such an admirable mechanism that they could move and act in obedience to the will, it is evident the possession of them would give pleasure and pride, but not to such a degree as the same authority, when exercised over sensible and rational creatures, whose condition, being compared to our own, makes it seem more agreeable and honourable. Comparison is in every case a sure method of augmenting our esteem of anything. A rich man feels the felicity of his condition better by opposing it to that of the beggar. But there is a peculiar advantage in power, by the contrast which is, in a manner, presented to us between ourselves and the person we command. The comparison is obvious and natural. The imagination finds in it the very subject. The passage of the thought to its conception is smooth and easy. And that this circumstance has a considerable effect in augmenting its influence, will appear afterwards in examining the nature of malice and envy.”¹

¹ Book II., Part I., section 10.

He treats on the will at length, and maintains that it is controlled by the strongest motive; and he emphatically asserts that reason alone can never afford a motive to any action of the will, nor oppose passion in the direction of the will. “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” Reason operates without producing any sensible emotion, and, except in the more sublime disquisitions of philosophy, scarcely ever gives any pleasure or uneasiness.

But it is evident that there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, though they are real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling. These desires are either (1) certain instincts originally implanted in our nature, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or (2) the general appetite to good and aversion to evil.¹ Besides these calm passions there are other violent emotions which have a great influence on the will, such as impending evils which raise our fears and aversions, and produce a sensible emotion. The common error of philosophers has been to ascribe the direction of the will to one of these principles, and in supposing the other to have no influence. Men often act knowingly contrary to their interest; for this reason the view of the greatest possible good does not always influence them. Men often counteract a strong passion in the pursuit of their interests and designs. “It is not therefore the present uneasiness alone which determines them. In general we may observe, that both these principles operate on the will; and, where they are contrary, that either of them prevails, according to the general character or present disposition of the person. What we call strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent; though we may easily observe there is no man so constantly possessed of this virtue as never on any occasion to yield to the solicitations of passion and desire.”²

¹ Touching this distinction of the calm passions and desires, and the function assigned to them, Hume so far seems to follow Hutcheson.

² Book II., Part III., section 3. Locke had stated that the strongest immediate desire, or, as he sometimes phrased it, “the present uneasiness,” determines the will to action; in effect his theory was that the will is always determined by the strongest motive, but the theory is better stated by Hume.

Hume, however, did not thoroughly develop the relation between belief and will. He merely says, what I have already indicated in a preceding page, “that belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression. This vivacity is a requisite circumstance to the exciting of all our passions, the calm as well as the violent.” But he gives no satisfactory exposition of belief in its relation to the will, although he touches on it in his later work――An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, section 5.

In the Third Book, Hume explains his moral views as originally advanced in the Treatise of Human Nature; and in an advertisement to it he expresses a hope that it may be understood by ordinary readers, with as little attention as is usually accorded to books of reasoning. As we have already seen, he maintains that reason alone can never be a motive of action, or impulse of the will; accordingly, he insists that moral distinctions are not derived from reason, but from a moral sense. What constitutes this moral sense, however, he failed to render explicit: and there is a lack of precision on the moral faculty, in the original development of his system. He recognises sympathy as the chief source of moral distinctions, which, along with utility, seems to form the foundation of his ethical views. The following is the clearest expression of his moral doctrines which I have found in the Treatise of Human Nature:――

“Most people will readily allow that the useful qualities of the mind are virtuous, because of their utility. This way of thinking is so natural, and occurs on so many occasions, that few will make any scruple of admitting it. Now, this being once admitted, the force of sympathy must necessarily be acknowledged. Virtue is considered as means to an end. Means to an end are only valued so far as the end is valued. But the happiness of strangers affects us by sympathy alone. To that principle, therefore, we must ascribe the sentiment of approbation, which arises from the survey of all those virtues that are useful to society or to the person possessed of them. These form the most considerable part of morality.”¹

¹ Book III., Part III., section 6. It may be observed that the influence of the current moral theories are visible in the views of Hume.

In his attempts to account for the origin of society, and of property, he adopts the deductive method. He usually states certain propositions, and then proceeds to adduce arguments in support of the conclusions which he intends to establish; still his treatment of these subjects is always interesting and often ingenious, although quite unhistorical and imaginary. His conception of the problem of the origin of government resembles that advanced by Hobbes, only it is not so violent; as Hume had more polish than the sage of Malmesbury.

Having now completed my account of Hume’s system as it was originally conceived and advanced; but seeing that he himself averred that his matured ethical views were embodied in his later work, An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, I shall briefly summarise his moral principles from this famed production.

It consists of nine sections, which treat the following topics:――“The general principles of Morals; Benevolence; Justice; Political Society; Why Utility pleases; Qualities useful to ourselves; Qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves; Qualities immediately agreeable to others; Conclusion.” In an appendix, the points of “moral sentiment, self-love, justice, and verbal disputes” are treated. If we were only to look at the conception, the execution, and the limits of this treatise, it might be pronounced an admirable production. The main difference between it and the corresponding part in the Treatise of Human Nature, lies in the greater importance ascribed to utility in the later work.

1. As in it utility or a reference to the happiness of mankind is the standard of right and wrong, and also the ground and motive of moral approbation. 2. While the moral faculty itself assumes the form of a compound of reason and generous sentiment. 3. He insists warmly on the existence and importance of the sentiment of benevolence, but hardly recognises it as leading to any uncompensated self-sacrifice. 4. Touching the varied and great constituents of human happiness, he is meagre and defective. 5. He accepts the prevailing moral code of the society of his day. 6. According to his view, the inducements to virtue are, on the one side, our humane sentiments, and on the other, our self-love; the two classes of motives concurring to promote both our own good and the good of mankind. 7. The connection of ethics with politics is not developed; he does not distinguish the legal sanction of morality from the popular sanction; he draws no line between duty and merit. 8. He recognises no connection between ethics and religion. Such then are the leading principles of this remarkable treatise, which for long served as a text-book to utilitarian moralists.

Touching Hume’s other writings, I must be brief. His essay on Miracles is exceedingly well worked out. His argumentation is entirely founded on the principle that experience is our only guide in estimating and appreciating the force and the value of evidence; but he also strengthens this position by a free use of every available weapon, that is, every passion, sentiment, feeling, and weakness of the human mind, were called into requisition as elements of the problem, and all employed with great sagacity and ingenuity. A short quotation will confirm this, and indicate his method.

“With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received――their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations of wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners? But if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense, and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretension to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality. He may know his narrative to be false, and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions in the world, for the sake of promoting so holy a cause. Or even where this delusion has not place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation, operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any circumstances, and self-interest with equal force. His auditors may not have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgment to canvass his evidence. What judgment they have, they renounce by principle, in these sublime and mysterious subjects. Or if they were ever so willing to employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations. Their credulity increases his impudence, and his impudence overpowers their credulity.”

He observes that records of miracles are found to abound most among ignorant and barbarous communities, and that when they are found among civilised nations, they are merely transmitted from the former. He also notices that the earliest annals of all nations are full of prodigies, omens, oracles, and judgments, which almost hide the few natural facts that are mixed with them; but, as we advance nearer to the enlightened ages, these mysterious and irregular phenomena become less and less prominent, though never entirely extirpated from human nature.

His ultimate conclusion was this:――“That no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle and make it a just foundation for any system of religion. I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own that otherwise there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the ordinary course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history.”¹

¹ Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, section 10. Hume’s own opinion of his main argument was this:――“I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently will be useful as long as the world endures. For so long, I suppose, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane.”

The chief value of this essay was that it presented a very able examination of the various circumstances, influences, and conditions which are apt to colour, exaggerate, and otherwise affect the evidence of certain classes of facts and events. It is a kind of inquiry for which Hume possessed unmatched qualifications.

As already mentioned, his Natural History of Religion appeared in 1757: it consists of a short introduction, and fifteen sections. Following his usual method, he began with a general statement to the effect that polytheism was the primary religion of mankind, and then proceeds by arguments and reasoning to prove this general proposition. Thus the work is argumentative rather than historical, although he uses historical examples to confirm his propositions and arguments. It may be observed that the origins and the causes of early religions have now been far more satisfactorily explained than was possible in Hume’s day.

His Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, published after his death, are highly polished in style, and handle in a speculative form various interesting topics. But they are somewhat monotonous, and in fact contain little which had not before appeared in his other publications.

Concerning the value of Hume’s philosophy as a whole, it must be characterised as incomplete, which is partly a consequence of its sceptical foundation. He raises many questions and difficulties which he does not solve; while he often comes to unsatisfactory conclusions, by taking up the principles of Locke and Berkeley, and driving them to their logical issues.¹

¹ Hamilton’s Reid, Volume I., footnotes, pages 129, 444, 457, 489; Discussions, page 85, et seq.; Lectures, Volume I., pages 294, 373. Hamilton says:――“The sceptic ... cannot himself lay down his premises, he can only accept them from the dogmatist; if false the sooner they are exposed in their real character the better. Accepting his principles from the dominant philosophies of Locke and Leibnitz, and deducing with irresistible evidence these principles to their legitimate results, Hume showed by the extreme absurdity of these results themselves, either that philosophy was a delusion, or that the individual systems which afforded the premises were erroneous or incomplete. He thus constrained philosophers to the alternative, either of surrendering philosophy as null, or of ascending to higher principles, in order to re-establish it against the sceptical reduction. The dilemma of Hume constitutes perhaps the most wonderful crisis in the history of philosophy; for out of it the whole subsequent philosophy of Europe has taken its rise.” ――Lectures, Volume I., pages 394‒395.

Mr. J. S. Mill thought that Hamilton was wrong in his opinion of the scope and end of Hume’s philosophy, and expresses his own conviction “that Hume sincerely accepted both the premises and the conclusions of his own system.” ――Mill’s Examination of Hamilton, page 554.

Owing to a concurrence of various circumstances, Hume’s speculations have had a direct and wide influence on subsequent philosophy, psychology, ethics, theology, and criticism. In psychology he has had eminent followers in Britain and in other countries; while the sceptical side of his system has had much influence in many directions. But his doctrine of causation appeared to some thinkers as the most pressing problem which he had raised; and it was chiefly this doctrine which suggested to Kant the necessity of a new and thorough examination and criticism of the faculties of the human mind. While Kant’s own chief works, thus suggested, have in turn been the main source whence modern speculation has since radiated. Under varied modifications, Hume’s influence on Scottish philosophy was direct and important in its results.

Another notable consequence of the critically sceptical side of Hume’s writings, sprang from his suggestions concerning the methods of testing evidence, which touched both scientific and historical researches. He showed that the current modes of estimating historical evidence were extremely defective, and also boldly exposed the weakness of some of the grounds of belief. To this we owe Campbell’s Essay on Miracles, not to mention, at the same time other works of less note. In short, Hume’s influence was widely felt in culture, science, and historic criticism.

According to the best contemporary testimony, personally, Hume was a most exemplary man. Adam Smith’s character of him is well known; but I will quote the verdict of another of his contemporaries, a man who was a good judge of character, and knew Hume well. “At this time (1753), David Hume was living in Edinburgh and composing his History of Great Britain. He was a man of great knowledge, and of a social and benevolent temper, and truly the best-natured man in the world. He was branded with the title of Atheist, on account of the many attacks on revealed religion that are to be found in his philosophical works, and in many places of his history――the last which are still more objectionable than the first, which a friendly critic might call only sceptical. Apropos of this, when Mr. Robert Adam, the celebrated architect, and his brother lived in Edinburgh with their mother, an aunt of Dr. Robertson’s, and a very respectable woman, she said to her son, ‘I shall be glad to see any of your companions to dinner, but I hope you will never bring the Atheist here to disturb my peace.’ But Robert soon fell on a method to reconcile her to him, for he introduced him under another name, or concealed it carefully from her. When the company parted she said to her son, ‘I must confess that you bring very agreeable companions about you, but the large jolly man who sat next me is the most agreeable of them all.’ ‘This was the very Atheist,’ said he, ‘mother, that you were so much afraid of.’ ‘Well,’ says she, ‘you may bring him here as much as you please, for he’s the most innocent, agreeable, facetious man I ever met with.’ This was truly the case with him; for though he had much learning and a fine taste, and was professedly a sceptic, though by no means an Atheist, he had the greatest simplicity of mind and manners, with the utmost facility and benevolence of temper, of any man I ever knew. His conversation was truly irresistible, for while it was enlightened it was very naïve.”¹

¹ Autobiography of the Rev. Dr. Alexander Carlyle, pages 272‒273, 1860. This production contains a good deal of small gossiping, and some important and useful information.

SECTION II.

Adam Smith.

Adam Smith was one of Hume’s most beloved and intimate friends. Smith ultimately limited his researches to special departments of moral and economical science. In these he was the more exhaustive thinker of the two, even if his efforts were less striking than those of his illustrious contemporary.

He was born at Kirkcaldy in 1723, and he lived till 1790. He was educated at the University of Glasgow, and attended the lectures of Hutcheson, then professor of moral philosophy. From Glasgow he went to Oxford, where he seems to have greatly widened the range of his culture, and thus laid the foundation of the vast stores of information, which he ultimately turned to so good account. He returned to Scotland in 1746, with the hope of obtaining a professorship in one of the Universities. In 1748, under the patronage of Lord Kames, Smith delivered a course of lectures on rhetoric in Edinburgh. He was appointed professor of logic in the University of Glasgow, in 1751; but in the following year he was transferred to the chair of moral philosophy, a position more in accord with his taste and aspiration.

In this chair his teaching covered a wide field. He divided his course of lectures into four parts:――(1) natural theology; (2) ethics; (3) justice, or that part of morality which can be stated under precise rules; (4) political science, in which he delivered some of the thoughts, afterwards embodied in his Wealth of Nations. In 1763, he was persuaded to resign his chair, and undertake the education of the young Duke of Buccleuch.

He travelled with his pupil abroad for about three years, chiefly in France, where he became personally acquainted with some of the leading men of letters and philosophers of that nation. On his return to Scotland, he retired to Kirkcaldy; and there, in the society of his mother, intently applied himself for ten years to inquiry and study, the results of which appeared in 1776, in his famous work, The Wealth of Nations. During the last twenty years of his life he held the post of Commissioner of Customs in Scotland. A few days before his death, he caused all his unpublished manuscripts to be burned, except a few comparatively short essays.¹

¹ These were published in a volume after his death, and consist of six, on the following subjects:――“A History of Astronomy;” “A History of Ancient Physics;” “A History of Ancient Logic and Metaphysics;” “An Essay on the Imitative Arts;” “On certain English and Italian Verses;” “On the External Senses.” His earliest efforts were a review of Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary and _Observations on the State of Learning in Europe_, which appeared in 1755, in a periodical called the Edinburgh Review.

Personally, Adam Smith was a grave-looking man, of a stout middle height, with prominent features and grey eyes. He was simple, warm-hearted, and kindly in disposition. His intellectual operations were calm, regular, and patient. He mastered a subject slowly but thoroughly, and carried his principles with a steady tenacity and invincible persistence through immense masses of facts and details on to wonderfully successful results. He was gifted with a remarkably strong memory, and had acquired a wide knowledge of English, French, and Italian literature; indeed the learning which he brought to bear on the subject of his chief work was amazingly various and great. But I will first direct attention to his charming work on Morals.

His Theory of Moral Sentiments was first published in 1757; and soon became popular, as one of the most interesting and attractive books in the circle of ethical literature. Its distinctive feature is that the operation of human sympathy is the prime factor of moral sentiments: that mankind are so constituted as to sympathise with each other’s feelings, and to feel pleasure in the consonance of these feelings, are the simple facts on which Smith’s moral theory is founded.

His treatise is divided into seven parts, in the following order:――(1) of the propriety of action; (2) of merit and demerit, or the objects of reward and punishment; (3) of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct; (4) of the effect of utility upon the sentiment of approbation; (5) of the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation; (6) of the character of virtue; (7) of systems of moral philosophy. Such is the arrangement of the main heads of his theory, as given in the sixth edition; I will show its general scope, without entering into details.

The influence of Hutcheson and of Hume can be traced in several parts of Smith’s work, although his conception and application of the fundamental idea of his system differs from theirs. He is really original in his applications and illustrations. Analytically, his treatise is not remarkable; its merits rather lie in the practical and hortatory discourse, in the eloquent criticisms of character, and the fine illustrations of virtuous conduct with which it abounds, and are presented in a naturally copious, easy, flowing, and fascinating style. The chief blemish of his style is an excess of language――a running into redundance.

In Smith’s time the chief questions agitated, touched the foundation of morality――the standard of right and wrong, and the nature of the moral faculty.

He begins by stating that sympathy is the origin and source of moral approbation. “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he desires nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.” Thus, sympathy being one of the original passions of human nature, we may see it in the immediate passing of an emotion from one person to another, even when one does not know the cause of another’s grief or joy. Sympathy originates in the imagination, which alone enables us to enter into the sentiments and feelings of others; as we can easily imagine ourselves in the position of another, by simply changing places with him in fancy, by reflecting on what our own sentiments would be in a similar difficulty. Thus we can feel in some degree what the suffering or joy of another really is; so the feeling of a spectator corresponds to what, by bringing the case of another home to himself, he imagines should be that other’s sentiments; since sympathy is based on an original tendency to reflect the emotional states of those around us. We therefore form our moral ideas from observation and reflection on the sentiments and emotions of our neighbours.¹

¹ The following remarks on the operations of sympathy are from Mr. Sully’s able, careful, and valuable work, _Outlines of Psychology_, published in 1884:――“Sympathy in its simplest form shows itself in an unconscious reproduction or imitation of another’s feeling. The mind of the person affected does not consciously represent or dwell on the feeling which affects him, but simply vibrates in unison with it.

“This tendency manifests itself very early. There is possibly some instinctive knowledge of the signs of feeling, and connected with this, a native disposition to answer smile with smile.... But some amount of individual experience is needed for fixing the connection between the several feelings and their external expression. When this is acquired the child tends automatically to take on the moods of hilarity, anxiety, depression, of those about him. This appears to be due to the working of an imitative impulse which leads to the more or less complete adoption of the external attitude, gesture, tone,” etc. In a note he says――“That the child has a vague intuitive knowledge of other’s feelings seems to be shown by the fact that he responds to the smile of his mother long before his own experience could have taught him to associate pleasurable feeling with this particular facial movement.”――Pages 508‒511.

I have for a long period specially observed the early development of conscious feeling, and intelligence in infants; and my observation as to the primitive nature of sympathy agrees with Mr. Sully’s view.

But concerning the record of the signs of intelligence which Mr. Darwin has given of several of his own infants, my observation of infants does not tally with his. Taking the ages by months, I have found more signs of intelligence in infants than he did. For instance, I have found unmistakable signs of memory in relation to external and inanimate objects, in infants of three and four months old. Again, with regard to vision, I have observed an infant of four months old, fixing its eyes, and looking steadily at the flag on the top of the mast of a ship, at a considerable distance off.

Accord of feeling produces pleasure, and consciousness of its absence pain. As the sympathy of others is more necessary for us in grief than in joy, we are more desirous to communicate to others our disagreeable feelings than our agreeable ones. “The agreeable passions of love and joy can satisfy and support the heart without any auxiliary pleasure. The bitter and painful emotions of grief and resentment more strongly require the healing consolation of sympathy.” But we are pleased ourselves if we can sympathise with another’s success or misfortune, and pained if we cannot.

The amount of pleasure or pain felt by one person in the conduct or feelings of another is the measure of his approbation or the contrary. Thus the sentiments of anyone are just and proper, or the reverse, according as they coincide or not with the sentiments of someone else, who observe them; while his approbation varies according to the degree in which he can sympathise with them. A full accord of sentiments means perfect approbation. Just as a man’s sympathetic indignation fails to correspond to mine, according as his compassion falls short of my grief, does he feel a stronger or weaker disapproval of my feelings. Moral and intellectual approbation admits of a similar explanation: for to approve or disapprove of the opinions of others is only to observe their agreement or disagreement with our own; so to approve or disapprove of their feelings and emotions is merely to mark a similar agreement or disagreement between our own and theirs. Thus it appears that the sentiments of each individual are the standard of the correctness of another’s, for we can hardly judge of matters of sentiment by any other canon than the correspondent affections in ourselves; and the only measure by which any man can judge of the faculty of another is by his own faculty of a similar kind. On our efforts to sympathise with the feeling and passion of others are founded the gentle virtues of condescension, toleration, and humanity; while the sterner virtues of self-denial and self-command are founded on our effort to attune our passions and feelings to such a pitch as others can approve. The harmonious operation of these two sides of virtue, feeling much for others, and little for ourselves, restraining our selfish, and cultivating our benevolent affections, constitutes the highest perfection of human nature.¹

¹ Smith’s work must be read itself to attain a full conception of the richness of its illustrations and its attractive character.

He does not directly face the problem of the supreme end of life, nor propose the question whether virtue and morality are only means to the attainment of happiness; but it is pretty evident that he admits the utilitarian view of happiness. He makes no great effort to analyse human happiness, but says that it consists in tranquility and enjoyment; for without tranquility there can be no enjoyment, and with it there is scarcely anything that may not prove a source of pleasure. “In ease of body and peace of mind all the different ranks of life are nearly on a level, and the beggar who suns himself by the side of the highway possesses that security which kings are fighting for.... What can be added to the happiness of the man who is in health, who is not in debt, and has a clear conscience? If you would live freely, fearlessly, and independently, never come within the circle of ambition.... Power and riches are enormous and operose machines, consisting of springs the most nice and delicate, and which, in spite of all our care, are ready every moment to burst into pieces, and to crush in their ruins their unfortunate possessors.”

One of the most interesting parts of his book is the account which he gives of the many fortuitous circumstances which affect the sentiments and moral judgments of men. The most important of these irregular influences spring from the different positions of prosperity and adversity, custom or fashion. As those in high social positions are not exactly judged with the same strictness as the poor and humble, in equal degrees of merit there is hardly anyone who does not show more respect for the rich and great than for the poor and humble; while an equal, or even a far greater, amount of vice and folly is regarded with less aversion and contempt in the former, than in the latter. He explains that this arises in our sympathetic emotions: as these enter more vividly into the joys than into the sorrows of others, we consequently feel far more pleasure in the condition of the rich than in that of the poor; for we are apt to imagine the one class happy, but the other wretchedly unhappy. So, it is agreeable to sympathise with joy, but painful to enter into grief; and where there is no envy in the case, our inclination to sympathise with joy is much stronger than our propensity to sympathise with sorrow; and hence our disposition to admire the rich and powerful, and to despise the poor and lowly.

The longest and concluding division of his treatise is devoted to a review of other systems of moral philosophy; and from his own standpoint he gives an able and interesting account of them.

To sum up according to Smith, conscience is a derived faculty:――1. We do not begin with a moral consciousness by which we learn to judge of others, but from our judgments about others we acquire a moral consciousness of ourselves. Thus conscience is formed from the central principle of sympathy. 2. The general rules of morality are ultimately founded on experience of what, in particular instances, our moral sentiments approve or condemn; they are not intuitions supplied by nature. Moral rules are formed from experience, by an inductive process, not deduced from a general principle. The sense of duty and the feeling of obligation are both acquired from experience. 3. He recognises the existence of a benevolent and all-wise Being, who will ultimately redress all injustice; but what the Supreme Being approves must be inferred from the principles of benevolence. Our regard for Him should be shown, not in frivolous observances and ceremonies, but by a course of just and beneficent action.

Although his theory of morals cannot be accepted as satisfactory, still it holds an important place in the history of ethical systems. Its defects have often been pointed out, and it is unnecessary to enter into any further criticism of it. Smith did great service in developing the varied operations and manifestations of the sympathetic principle.

Let us now turn to his other famous work, The Wealth of Nations. It consists of five Books, each of which are divided into a number of chapters, but many of the chapters are again divided into parts and articles; and although there is a principle of method in it, still it is defective in the arrangement of materials, and abounds with digressions. Some of the subjects embraced in it are not economical, except in the most general sense; and though this wide range of topics enhances the value of the work, the task of presenting a just account of it is rendered more difficult.

The first book deals with the causes of improvement in the productive powers of labour, and of the order in which its produce is naturally distributed among the people. The treatment of this subject extends to eleven chapters, with a long digression concerning the variations in the value of silver throughout the four preceding centuries; the variations in the proportion between the respective values of gold and silver; and the different effects of the progress of improvement upon three different kinds of rude produce. This digression occupies about a third of the book; but it contains a vast and varied mass of facts and economical information.

Smith begins his great exposition with the simple proposition that labour is the real source of wealth; that the amount of labour expended upon any article is the true measure of its value, and that when this is ascertained as between different commodities, their exchange value will, in the long run, be regulated by it; that all exchangeable commodities are wealth, and not gold and silver only. “What is bought with money or with goods is purchased by labour as much as what we acquire by the toil of our own body.... Labour is the first price, the original purchase money that was paid for all things. It was not by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased; and its value, to those who possess it and who want to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labour which it can enable them to purchase or command.... But, though labour be the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities, it is not that by which their value is commonly estimated. It is often difficult to ascertain the proportions between the two different quantities of labour. The time spent in two different kinds of work will not always alone determine this proportion. The different degrees of hardship endured, and the ingenuity exercised, must likewise be taken into account,” and many other circumstances.¹

¹ Introduction, Book I., chapter 5, pages 31, 32. I uniformly refer to Rogers’ edition of The Wealth of Nations, in two volumes, published in 1869. Touching labour, Smith further says:――“Labour, therefore, it appears evidently, is the only universal, as well as the only accurate measure of value, or the only standard by which we can compare the values of different commodities at all times and places.”――Ibid., page 38.

He explains the division of labour; the origin and use of money; the component parts of the price of commodities; the natural and market price of commodities; wages; the profits of stock; wages and profits in the different employments of labour and stock; inequalities arising from the nature of the employments themselves, and inequalities occasioned by the policy of Europe. Then comes a long chapter on the rent of land, concerning which he is explicit and exceedingly interesting. Among other things he says:――

“As soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they have never sowed, and demand a rent even for its natural produce. The wood of the forest, the grass of the field, and all the natural fruits of the earth, which, when land was in common, cost the labourer only the trouble of gathering them, come, even to him, to have an additional price fixed upon them. He must then pay for the licence to gather them, and must give up to the landlord a portion of what his labour either collects or produces. This portion, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of this portion, constitutes the rent of land.”

He states that the landlord exacts from the tenant for the use of a portion of land the highest rent which the latter can afford to pay in the circumstances, and that he even sometimes demands rent for what is utterly incapable of human improvement. He adduces telling evidence of this, in connection with the kelp trade and the fishing trade, in Scotland, thus:――“Kelp is a species of sea-weed, which, when burnt, yields an alkaline salt, useful for making glass, soap, and several other purposes. It grows in several parts of Britain, particularly in Scotland, upon such rocks only as lie within the high-water mark, which are twice every day covered with the sea, and of which the produce, therefore, was never augmented by human industry. The landlord, however, whose estate is bounded by a kelp-shore of this kind, demands a rent for it as much as for his corn-fields.

“The sea in the neighbourhood of the Islands of Shetland is more than commonly abundant in fish, which make a great part of the subsistence of their inhabitants. But in order to profit by the produce of the water, they must have a habitation upon the neighbouring land. The rent of the landlord is in proportion, not to what the farmer can make by the land, but to what he can make both by the land and by the water. It is partly paid in sea-fish; and one of the very few instances in which rent makes a part of the price of that commodity is to be found in that country.

“The rent of land, therefore, considered as the price paid for the use of the land, is naturally a monopoly price. It is not at all proportioned to what the landlord may have laid out upon the improvement of the land, or to what he can afford to take; but to what the farmer can afford to give.”¹

¹ Book I., chaps. 6, 7, Volume I., pages 52, 153, 171, 175, et seq. Smith treats the subject of land rent at great length, and with marked ability; although his exposition in some points is defective, still he comes much nearer the truth than Ricardo, who accounts for the origin of rent on merely abstract and imaginary grounds.

In the second book, he treats of the nature, the accumulation, and the employment of stock; and through five chapters expounds this division of political economy. He explicates the nature of stocks, the effects of its accumulation into capitals of different kinds; the effect of the different employments of these kinds of capital; the nature and operation of money, considered as a particular branch of the general stock of society; and the different effects which the different employments of capital immediately produce upon the quantity both of national industry and of the annual produce of land and labour.

His exposition of these matters is minute and exhaustive. Commencing with the man of the most limited means, or the individual who has no income but what he derives from his labour, he then proceeds to show how the man who possesses stock and capital, after reserving a sufficient quantity for his own immediate consumption, may employ his capital in manufacturing wares, producing goods, and selling them again for a profit. Or it may be employed in the improvement of land, and in many other ways.

Extending his view, he states that the general stock of any civilised country is the same with that of all its inhabitants, and naturally divides itself into three portions, each of which has a different function. The first portion is reserved for immediate consumption, and its characteristic is, that it affords no profit, as it consists of the stock of food, clothes, household furniture, and so on. The second portion of the general stock is the fixed capital, and its characteristic is that it affords a revenue without circulating or changing masters. It consists chiefly of the following things:――(1) All useful machines and instruments which facilitate or abridge labour; (2) all those profitable buildings which are the means of procuring a revenue, not only to their proprietor, who lets them for a rent, but to the person who occupies them, and pays that rent for them――such as shops, warehouses, workshops, halls, farmhouses, and so on; (3) improvements of land, by clearing, draining, enclosing, manuring, and reducing it to the fittest condition for tillage; (4) the acquired and useful abilities of all the members of the community, which represent a considerable amount of fixed capital, yielding income. The third and last portion of the general stock is the circulating capital, and its characteristic is that it affords profit only by circulating or changing masters. He explains the functions of money at great length, and shows that it is merely a circulating medium of convenience and exchange. “The great wheel of circulation, the great instrument of commerce, like all other instruments of trade, though it makes a part of the capital, makes no part of the revenue of the society to which it belongs; and though the metal pieces of which it is composed, in the course of their annual circulation, distribute to every man the revenue which properly belongs to him, make themselves no part of that revenue.”¹

¹ Book II., chapters 2, 5; Volume I., pages 287, 289, 290, 379. Mr. Rogers gives some very interesting notes on capital, of which the following is a part:――“Most writers on political economy, misled by the fact that the advances of the capitalist are the means by which labour is for a certain present period supported, have given excessive prominence to the doctrine of a ‘labour fund,’ and have exaggerated the importance of this fund to those who live by wages. The fact is, the capitalist employer is nothing but a representative of the division of labour, or of employments.... The capitalist is only a convenience to labourer and consumer. This distinction is very important. There is no fund, except temporarily, between the capitalist and the labourer. Both are paid wages, one for producing, the other distributing; and the consumer pays the wages of both.”――Note by Rogers, Volume I., page 362.

His third book is the most interesting in the work. It is mainly historical, and deals with the progress of opulence in different nations. He first explains the natural progress of opulence; then the state of agriculture in Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire; the rise and progress of cities after the fall of the Empire; and, finally, how the commerce of the towns contributed to the improvement of the country. On all these subjects, though his evidence was necessarily incomplete, Smith manifested a wonderful sagacity and accuracy in his general conclusions.

Within the compass of little more than forty pages, he presents a luminous exposition of the important topics indicated in the preceding paragraph; and in no part of his work was his peculiar powers and insight exhibited to better advantage. In subjects on which I have made special inquiries, I find his statements, in general, very accurate. But it is in the clear explanation of the causes of change and progress, that this book specially excels.

The fourth book treats on systems of political economy――that is, the mercantile system――and those systems which represent land as either the sole or the principal source of the revenue and wealth of every country. In this book also he dealt with the subject of colonies; the advantages which Europe has derived from the discovery of America, and from the discovery of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, and treaties of commerce.

He discusses the mercantile system then in vogue with great force, and exposed its errors and inconsistencies most effectively. The prevailing notion was that wealth consisted in money, in pieces of metal, and therefore the great affair always was to get money; to grow rich was to get money, and wealth and money were, in common language, considered exactly synonymous. “In consequence of these popular notions, all the different nations of Europe have studied, though to little purpose, every possible means of accumulating gold and silver in their respective countries.” Accordingly, they have either prohibited their exportation, or subjected it to a considerable duty. He shows the fatuity of these notions, and exposes the common theory of commerce or protection at great length, and with a weight of argument and a fullness of illustration as yet unmatched. He discusses the subjects of drawbacks, of bounties, the corn trade, and the corn laws; and throughout argues in favour of free trade.¹

¹ Book IV., chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; Volume II., pages 2‒3, 62‒63, 108‒109, et seq.

It was in this book also that Smith made his memorable attack upon the East India Company. For once he thoroughly exposed the pretentions of this Company, the mischievous character of its government, and the wrongs which it was committing, in the most fearless and effective style. He showed that something more and higher was required of the rulers of a great country with a dense population, than the mere mercantile spirit of buying and selling――making profits and paying large dividends. He demonstrated that the selfish interests of the Directors of the Company as merchants and traders utterly disqualified them for being wise and just rulers of the vast population under their sway; moreover, all the servants of the Company, from the highest to the lowest, were actuated by the same self-seeking, money-making, and trading spirit. These servants all traded more or less on their own account, as Smith puts it:――

“All the members of the administration, besides, trade more or less upon their own account, and it is vain to prohibit them from so doing. Nothing can be more foolish than to expect that the clerks of a great counting-house at ten thousand miles’ distance, and consequently almost quite out of sight, should, upon a simple order from their masters, give up at once doing any sort of business upon their own account, abandon for ever all hopes of making a fortune, of which they have the means in their hands, and content themselves with the moderate salaries which those masters allow them, and which, moderate as they are, can seldom be augmented, being commonly as high as the real profits of the company’s trade can afford. In such circumstances, to prohibit the servants of the Company from trading upon their own account can have scarce any other effect than to enable the superior servants, under the pretence of executing their master’s orders, to oppress such of the inferior ones as have had the misfortune to fall under their displeasure. The servants naturally endeavour to establish the same monopoly in favour of their own private trade as of the public trade of the Company. If they are suffered to act as they could wish, they will establish the monopoly openly and directly, by fairly prohibiting all other people from trading in the articles in which they choose to deal; and this is, perhaps, the best and least oppressive way of establishing it. But if, by an order from Europe, they were prohibited from doing this, they will, notwithstanding, endeavour to establish a monopoly of the same kind, secretly and directly, in a way that is more destructive to the country. They will employ the whole authority of the Government, and pervert the administration of justice, in order to harass and ruin those who interfere with them in any branch of commerce, which, by means of agents, either concealed, or at least not publicly avowed, they chose to carry on.”

He states that the interests of the masters of the Company are the same as that of the country which they govern, but that the greed of the mercantile spirit prevents them from seeing this. The real interests of the servants of the Company, however, were very different from the interests of the country: the sole aim of these servants was to make fortunes to themselves by whatever means they could. “It is a very singular government in which every member of the administration wishes to get out of the country, and consequently to have done with the government, as soon as he can, and to whose interest, the day after he has left it, and carried his whole fortune with him, it is perfectly indifferent though the whole country was swallowed up by an earthquake.”¹

¹ Book IV., chapter 7, Volume II., pages 221‒225.

The fifth and last book of this great work treats of the revenue of the Commonwealth, and in connection with this Smith handles many important subjects, such as the defence of the State, which leads him into a discussion of military organisation and standing armies, the administration of justice, and the expense of public works. In relation to the latter subject, he treats at length on education; and following his usual historical method on this subject, he is exceedingly interesting. He gives a clear and instructive account of educational institutions, the systems of thought taught in the Universities and schools, including the Church and religious instruction. Space will not permit me to follow him into details, but a quotation or two will indicate some of his views.

The common course of philosophical education in the greater number of the Universities of Europe was this:――“Logic was first taught; ontology in the second place; pneumatology, comprehending the doctrine concerning the nature of the human soul, and the Deity, in the third; and in the fourth followed a debased system of moral philosophy, which was considered as immediately connected with the doctrine of pneumatology, with the immortality of the human soul, and with the rewards and punishments which, from the justice of the Deity, were to be expected in a life to come: a short and superficial system of physics usually concluded the course.

“The alterations which the Universities of Europe thus introduced into the ancient course of philosophy, were all meant for the education of ecclesiastics, and to render it a more proper introduction to the study of theology. But the additional quantity of subtlety and sophistry, the casuistry and the ascetic morality which these alterations introduced into it, certainly did not render it more proper for the education of gentlemen or men of the world, or more likely to improve the understanding or to mend the heart.”¹

¹ “This course of philosophy is what still continues to be taught in the greater part of the Universities of Europe, with more or less diligence, according as the constitution of each particular University happens to render diligence more or less necessary to the teachers. In some of the richest and best endowed Universities, the tutors content themselves with teaching a few unconnected shreds and parcels of this corrupted course; and even these they commonly teach very negligently and superficially.

“The improvements which, in modern times, have been made in the several different branches of philosophy, have not, the greater part of them, been made in Universities; though some no doubt have. The greatest part of Universities have not even been very forward to adopt those improvements after they were made; and several of these learned societies have chosen to remain for a long time the sanctuaries in which exploded systems and obsolete prejudices found shelter and protection, after they had been hunted out of every corner of the world. In general, the richest and best endowed Universities have been the slowest in adopting these improvements, and the most averse to permit any considerable change in the established plan of education. These improvements were more easily introduced into some of the poorer Universities, in which the teachers, depending upon their reputation for the greater part of their subsistence, were obliged to pay more attention to the current opinions of the world.”――Book V., chapter 1, Volume II., pages 356‒357.

He touches on the question whether the State ought to give any attention to the education of the people, and if so, in what manner should it be attempted. In connection with this, he notices a very serious result of the minute division of labour――namely, that it reduces the greater part of workers physically and mentally to a comparatively helpless state; in fact, to be incapable of doing anything, save the one or two simple operations to which they have been accustomed. “But the understanding of the greater part of men is necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become.... The uniformity of his stationary life naturally corrupts the courage of his mind ... and even the activity of his body, and renders him incapable of exerting his strength with vigour and perseverance in any other employment than that to which he has been bred. His dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in this manner, to be acquired at the expense of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues. But in every improved and civilised society this is the state into which the labouring poor, that is, the great body of the people, must necessarily fall, unless the government takes some pains to prevent it.”¹

¹ Book V., chapter 1; Volume II., pages 364‒366. The manufacturing population of our large towns are not quite so bad as they seem to have been in Smith’s time; still there is no doubt of the truth of the tendency of the minute division of labour which he points out.

He argues that the public should encourage and assist the education of the whole people, but he does not say that it should be made compulsory. He insists upon its utility from various points of view, especially from the political side.

He treats at length on the institutions for the religious instruction of the people in all ages, and his long article on this is especially well worth reading and study. Smith himself was singularly free from prejudice, sectarian or narrow views, and in this respect he is greatly superior to Hume.

The concluding chapters deal with the revenue of the State, taxes, and national debts. His treatment of the general subject of taxation is comprehensive and enlightened, and, like the other parts of his work, full of information, suggestion, and instruction. He has good articles on taxes upon land.

Finally, we may aver that few works have had more influence in stimulating industry, controlling legislation, and promoting reform than the Wealth of Nations. But whether this influence will be permanent in its results――whether capital will still continue to dominate labour as it has done in the past――is a social problem, which is constantly coming more and more to the front, and it must ere long be resolutely met.

Spotted a typo or a problem in this chapter? Tell us

Chapter XXXVII

Reid, Ferguson, Stewart, and other Writers.

SECTION I.

Reid.

DR. THOMAS REID attained distinction as an opponent of scepticism on the principles of common sense. He was born on the 26th of April, 1710, in the parish of Strachan, Kincardineshire, where his father was minister for the long period of fifty years. Dr. Reid was educated at Marischal College, Aberdeen, and having studied for the Church, was appointed pastor of the parish of New Machar in 1737. In this position he quietly performed his parochial duties for fifteen years, and gained the esteem of the inhabitants of the parish. In 1752, he was elected Professor of Philosophy in King’s College, Aberdeen, an office which he held for eleven years. He was chosen in 1763 to succeed Adam Smith in the Chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow, and in this famed seat of learning continued to instruct a large class of students for a period of eighteen years.¹ Thus, Reid performed the functions of a professor for a period of nearly thirty years.

¹ Stewart’s Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. Reid.

He was gifted by nature with a strong constitution. Although rather under the middle height, his frame was vigorous, and his muscular force unusually great. To these advantages he joined habits of exercise and temperance and an unclouded serenity of temper. “His countenance was strongly expressive of deep and collected thought; but when brightened up by the face of a friend, what chiefly caught the attention was a look of goodwill and kindness.”¹

¹ Stewart’s Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. Reid. Stewart says:――“The merits of Dr. Reid as a public teacher were derived chiefly from that rich fund of original and instructive philosophy which is to be found in his writings, and from his unwearied assiduity in inculcating principles which he conceived to be of essential importance to human happiness. In his elocution and mode of instruction, there was nothing peculiarly attractive. He seldom, if ever, indulged himself in the warmth of extempore discourse; nor was his manner of reading calculated to increase the effect of what he had committed to writing. Such, however, was the simplicity and perspicuity of his style, such the gravity and authority of his character, and such the general interest of his young hearers in the doctrines which he taught, that, by the numerous audiences to which his instructions were addressed, he was heard uniformly with the most silent and respectful attention. On this subject, I can speak from personal knowledge; having had the good fortune, during a considerable part of the winter of 1772, to be one of his pupils.”――Ibid., section 1.

Dr. Reid’s writings consist of――(1) An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, published in 1764; (2) Essays on the Intellectual Powers of the Mind, 1785, and Essays on the Active Powers of the Mind, 1788; (3) An Account of Aristotle’s Logic; (4) An Account of the University of Glasgow; (5) An Essay on Quantity.

The most polished of his works is the Inquiry into the Human Mind. It consists of seven chapters, each of which is divided into a number of sections. Excepting the first and the concluding chapters, the work is mainly occupied with the treatment of the five external senses: an analysis of sensation, in the following order:――Smelling, tasting, hearing, touching, and seeing. The work throughout has a somewhat polemical tone, with occasional touches of sarcasm; still it has rare merits. His treatment of the senses is often accurate, though not always. In the history of philosophical opinions he is frequently inaccurate, and sometimes quite wrong; imperfect knowledge of previous systems of thought was his weakest point.

Reid avows that it was Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature which prompted him to undertake his own Inquiry into the Mind, and to reclaim against the principles which had issued in such sceptical conclusions. He desired to place the fundamental principles of knowledge upon firmer grounds, though, in the execution of his task, he often declaims rather than reasons on some of the questions at issue.

His treatment of the external senses, especially of sight and touch, is valuable. He makes true and ingenious remarks on natural language and signs. Such signs he conceived to be of two kinds――(1) those which have their meaning assigned by tacit agreement; and (2) those which, prior to all agreement, have a distinct meaning which man understands by the principles of his nature. Thus “language, so far as it consists of artificial signs, may be called artificial; so far as it consists of natural signs, I call it natural.” He argues that, if mankind had not a natural language, they could never have invented an artificial one. He thinks that the signs which are naturally expressive of man’s thoughts may be reduced to three kinds――modulations of the voice, gestures, and features. His explanation of this subject is interesting and instructive.¹

¹ Hamilton’s Reid, Volume I., pages 95‒96, 117‒118, et seq.

Reid’s doctrine of signs is connected with his view of perception. He distinguished perception from sensation, and stated that the simplest operations of the mind do not admit of logical definition. He often states that the sensations are merely signs, and that the objects themselves are the things signified; but he does not maintain that the sign resembles the original. He observes that the same mode of expression is used to denote sensation and perception, but sensation has more of the element of feeling in it than perception: mere sensation consists in its being felt and in nothing else; when it is not felt, it is not. Thus a sensation of pain signifies no more than the feeling of pain: the agreeable odour of a rose considered by itself is a pure sensation, which affects the mind in a certain way; and this affection of the mind may be conceived, without any thought of the rose. This doctrine, according to Reid, is applicable to every other mere sensation.¹

¹ Ibid., Volume I., page 182, et seq.; and in _Essays on the Intellectual Powers_, page 310.

On the other hand, perception, as understood by Reid, has always an external object, or an object distinct from the act by which it is perceived――an object which may exist whether it be perceived or not. He maintained that we have an immediate perception, a direct intuition of the primary qualities of bodies. Our senses give us a direct and distinct notion of these qualities, as to what they are in themselves; but of the secondary qualities of bodies, our senses give us only a relative and obscure notion.

An act of perception of an external object he thus describes:――(1) “We have some conception or notion of the object perceived; (2) a strong and irresistible conviction and belief of its present existence; (3) that this conviction and belief are immediate, and not the effect of reasoning.” He also distinguishes perceptions into two classes――those which are original, and those which are acquired by experience.¹

¹ Ibid., Volume I., pages 313‒314, 258.

Thus Reid’s doctrine of perception seems to be explicit. It has to be observed, however, that in his accounts of the views of other philosophers, and in his criticisms on them, he did not search out the various theories of representative or mediate perception. This lack of exhaustive discrimination unintentionally led him into some mistakes which partially vitiated his criticisms of the doctrines of other philosophers, and rendered even the cardinal point of his own doctrine doubtful; for some hold that he is an idealist, and others that he is a realist. A brief explanation of this seems to be requisite.

1. First, then, some philosophers admit an immediate knowledge of a not-ego, but not of an external not-ego; while they do not limit the immediate knowledge of the mind to its own states, yet conceiving it impossible that the external reality can be brought within the sphere of consciousness, they suppose that it is represented by an image, numerically different from the mind, but placed somewhere, either in the brain or mind, within the sphere of consciousness. 2. Others deny to the mind any consciousness of a not-ego at all, and hold that what the mind immediately perceives, and mistakes for an external object, is merely the ego itself peculiarly modified. Each of these chief theories of a representative perception, admits of several subordinate varieties.

Thus, taking the first of the above hypotheses, it is subdivided according as the immediate object of perception is viewed――(1) as material, (2) as immaterial, (3) or as neither, (4) or as both, as something physical, as propagated from the external object, as generated in the medium or as fabricated in the mind itself; and the latter either in the intelligent mind or in the animal life, as infused by God or by angels, or as identical with the divine substance――as in the system of Spinoza, and in other pantheistic theories. In the second, the representative modification has been sometimes viewed as a mere product of the mind itself; or as innate, and so independent of any mental energy.¹

¹ Hamilton’s Reid, Volume II., pages 816‒819; Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, Volume II., pages 29‒30.

Now Reid never adequately distinguished these views of representative perception, either in their historical relation or as possible in theory, but directed his attacks against what he usually calls the “common theory of ideas,” which was merely one of the cruder forms of the representative theory of perception; and thus it happens that his onslaughts on Berkeley and Hume are often misdirected and ineffective, as he did not establish the fact of the two cognitions, the presentative and the representative, single out their contents or evolve their conditions; and, in particular, did not show which of these was the kind of cognition competent in our perception of the external world. He failed to observe that representation is possible under two forms――the egoistical and the non-egoistical; and each of which, if perception be reduced to a representative faculty, affords premises equally available to the absolute idealist and the sceptic. Hence he was led into various inconsistences of a historical character, especially in the exposition of his own doctrine of perception.¹

¹ Hamilton’s Reid, Volume I., pages 106, 128, 130, 131, 210, 226, 256, 257, 269, 274, 277, 293, 299, 318, 427.

Yet, notwithstanding these defects of development and exposition, Reid performed good service to psychology by banishing the imaginary images interposed between perception and its objects.

Having indicated Reid’s view of perception, I proceed to give a brief account of his treatment of the other phenomena of the mind. He divides the mental phenomena into the intellectual powers and the active powers; and he classified the intellectual powers thus:――(1) The External Senses; (2) Memory; (3) Conception or Simple Apprehension; (4) Abstraction; (5) Judgment――First Truths; (6) Reasoning; (7) Taste. He distributed the active powers into three parts:――I. Mechanical principles of actions――(1) Instinct, (2) Habit; II. Animal principles ――(1) Appetites, (2) Desires, (3) Affections; III. Rational principles ――(1) Self-love, (2) Duty.¹

¹ This classification is not founded upon any essential principle of division of mental phenomena.

Following the order just indicated, the first essay is devoted to an explication of terms and principles taken for granted. The second essay treats of the external senses, which we have already considered; in it also he reviews at great length the opinions of various philosophers touching the perception of the external world. He then passes to memory, which he treats at length, and affirms that it is an original faculty. He states that by memory we have an immediate knowledge of things in the past,¹ and that it is always accompanied with the belief of that which we remember. Under the head of memory he discusses duration and personal identity. Of the latter he says:――“The conviction which every man has of his identity, as far back as his memory reaches, needs no aid of philosophy to strengthen it; and no philosophy can weaken it, without first producing some degree of insanity.... A person is something indivisible, and is what Leibnitz calls a monad.... The identity of a person is a perfect identity; wherever it is real, it admits of no degrees, and it is impossible that a person should be in part the same, and in part different; because a person is a monad, and is not divisible into parts.”²

¹ This is a mistake: we can only have a mediate knowledge of past things or events――that is, only a representative knowledge.

² Hamilton’s Reid, Volume I. pages 339‒345.

He describes conception, and says that conceiving, imagining, apprehending, and understanding are words used to express that operation of the mind called simple apprehension; the having an idea of a thing is, in common language, used in the same sense. He refers to the train of thought in the mind, but he adduces nothing specially original on the association of thoughts and ideas, and in fact he was behind some of his predecessors in this important branch of mental science.

In his essay on abstraction, he explains general words, general conceptions, and the process of classification. Then, under the general heading of judgment, he discusses common sense and first principles. Common sense he regards as a special faculty, and the following quotation will indicate what Reid meant by this phrase:――

“In common language, sense always implies judgment. A man of sense is a man of judgment. Nonsense is what is evidently contrary to right judgment. Common sense is that degree of judgment which is common to men with whom we can converse and transact business.... Men rarely ask what common sense is; because every man believes himself possessed of it, and would take it for an imputation upon his understanding to be thought unacquainted with it.

“It is absurd to conceive that there can be any opposition between reason and common sense. It is indeed the first-born of reason, and as they are commonly joined together in speech and in writing, they are inseparable in their nature. We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident; the second to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province, and the sole province, of common sense.”¹

¹ Ibid., Volume I., pages 421‒425.

Thus Reid considered it the province of common sense to judge of first principles; and he further avers that, to judge of first principles require no more than a sound mind free from prejudice and a clear conception of the question. The learned and the unlearned, the philosopher and the day-labourer, are upon a level, and will pass the same judgment, when they are not misled by some bias. He then proceeds to deliver his views of first principles.

Although first principles are self-evident, and cannot be proved by arguments, yet a certain kind of reasoning may be applied in their support:――1. To show that the principle rejected stands upon the same footing with others that are admitted. 2. As in mathematics, a reduction to absurdity may be employed. 3. The consent of ages and nations, of the learned and unlearned, ought to have great authority with regard to first principles, where every man is a competent judge. 4. Opinions that appear so early in the mind, that they cannot be the effect of education, or of false reasoning, have a good claim to be considered as first principles.

He asks whether the conclusions of common sense can be enumerated and digested in such a form as all reasonable men will assent to it. He recognises the difficulties besetting this, and admits that his own enumeration is not perfectly satisfactory. His classification proceeds on the distinction between necessary and contingent truths, and may be summarised thus:――

(A.) Principles of Contingent Truths:――1. Everything that I am conscious of exists.¹ The irresistible conviction of the reality of what we are conscious of is not the effect of reasoning; it is immediate and intuitive, and therefore a first principle. 2. The thoughts that I am conscious of are the thoughts of a being that I call myself, my mind, my person. 3. Those things did really happen that I distinctly remember. 4. Our own personal identity and continued existence, as far back as we remember anything distinctly. 5. Those things do really exist that we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be. 6. We have some degree of power over our actions and the determinations of our will. The origin of our idea of power is not easily assigned. Power is not an object of sense or consciousness. We see events as successive, but not the power whereby they are produced. We are conscious of the operations of our minds; but power is not an operation of the mind. It is evidently, however, implied in every act of volition, and in all deliberation and resolution. Likewise, when we approve or disapprove, we believe that men have power to do or not to do. 7. The natural faculties, whereby we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious. 8. Our fellow-men with whom we converse are possessed of life and intelligence. 9. Certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of mind. The signification of those things we do not learn by experience, but by a kind of natural perception. Children, almost as soon as they are born, may be frightened by an angry or threatening tone of voice. 10. There is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion. 11. There are many events depending on the will of man, possessing a self-evident probability, greater or less, according to circumstances; as in men of sound mind we expect a certain degree of regularity in their conduct. 12. In the phenomena of nature, what is to be will probably be like what has been in similar circumstances. Hume has shown that this principle is not grounded on reason, and has not the intuitive evidence of mathematical axioms.

¹ Reid treats consciousness as a special faculty which cannot be defined.

(B.) Principles of Necessary Truths. Regarding those Reid deemed it enough to divide them into classes, and to mention some of each class.

I. Grammatical Principles:――1. Every adjective in a sentence must belong to some substantive expressed or understood. 2. Every complete sentence must have a verb.

II. Logical Principles:――1. Any contexture of words that does not make a proposition is neither true nor false. 2. Every proposition is either true or false. 3. No proposition can be both true and false at the same time. 4. Reasoning in a circle proves nothing. 5. Whatever may be truly affirmed of a genus may be truly affirmed of all its species, and of all the individualps belonging to that species.

III. The Mathematical Axioms.

IV. The Principles of Taste:――1. The fundamental rules of poetry, music, eloquence, and dramatic action; and 2. those of painting have always been the same, and will be so to the end of the world.

V. First Principles in Morals:――1. An unjust action has more demerit than an ungenerous one. 2. A generous action has more merit than a merely just one. 3. No man ought to be blamed for what it was not in his power to hinder.

VI. Metaphysical Principles:――1. The qualities that we perceive by our senses must have a subject, which we call body, and the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject, which we call mind. The distinction between sensible qualities and the substance to which they belong is not the invention of philosophers, but is found in the structure of all languages. 2. Whatever begins to exist must have a cause. 3. Design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred with certainty, from marks or signs of them in the effect.

Reid has sometimes been severely handled for his multiplication of first principles; and it must be admitted that his scheme is crude, lacking in discrimination, in logical consistency, and in precision of statement; that it includes various truths as first principles which have no real claim to such a character; still it embodies, in a plain form, a considerable quantity of important truths.

He concludes his exposition of the intellectual powers with an essay on Taste. He notices the force of custom, of fancy, and of casual associations, in modifying taste; and observes that men differ more in their standard of taste than their judgments in matters of truth and error.

His treatment of the active powers of the mind occupies five essays. In the first, he treats of active powers in general; in the second, of the will; in the third, of the principles of action, which he distinguishes as already stated; in the fourth, he discusses the liberty of moral agents; and the fifth and last essay deals with morals.

Touching the sense of duty, he recognises and insists that we have an original moral faculty, which we call conscience. We have the conceptions of right and wrong in human conduct, of merit and demerit, of duty and moral obligation; and by this faculty we perceive some things to be right in human conduct and others to be wrong; that the first principles of morals are the dictates of the same faculty, and that we have the same reason to rely upon those dictates as upon the determinations of our senses, or our other natural faculties.

Reid contends earnestly for the freedom of the will, and discusses the counter doctrine of necessity at length, and with much vigour.¹ In the concluding essay, he attacks the utilitarian theory of morals as propounded by Hume, and his objections to several points of it were well and effectively directed. He showed that this theory did not recognise or take account of moral rules as established and enforced among men by the dictation of authority, which does not leave to individuals the power of reference to ultimate ends, and that it failed to distinguish between obligatory and non-obligatory useful acts.

¹ In 1793, An Essay on Philosophical Necessity appeared, by Alexander Crombie, A.M., and in which the views of Dr. Reid on the freedom of the will are adversely discussed and criticised, with much acuteness and ingenuity.

To sum up, though Reid’s writings are in many points imperfect, yet they have much psychological merit and interest. His intellect was active and vigorous, but not of the highest and widest order; his analytic and critical powers were limited; but he was painstaking and patient in investigation. In truth, the natural bent of his mind drew him more to the concrete and practical side of philosophy than to speculation in the higher region of thought; subjectively, he was not strong. Still his thinking power in certain directions, his native sagacity and force of character, his candour and fairness, and the favourable circumstances in which he was placed, enabled him to found a school, in which some of his disciples have outvied their master in analytic power and speculative thought.

SECTION II.

Adam Ferguson.

Adam Ferguson is the author of a work on moral and political philosophy, and also of some historical books, which will be noticed elsewhere.¹ He was appointed to the chair of moral philosophy in the University of Edinburgh in 1764, an office which he held, with some intervals of absence, till the year 1785. In 1766, he published an outline of his lectures for the use of his class, and from these heads and notes he explained his system orally to the students, always keeping his mind open for the reception of whatever new light might dawn upon it. After his retirement from the professorship, he rearranged his lectures into a systematic form, and published them in 1792, under the title of Principles of Moral and Political Science. In his preface he says:――“Many, no doubt, may be conscious, that in a continued pursuit of the same subject for so long a time, they themselves could have done better; but in this, it is to be regretted, that they have not done so: For in this field there is room for many labourers; and the subject, though never new, is always interesting. It is so in the specimen of every particular life; in the history of every particular age or nation, and even in the lucubrations of every faithful transcriber of what nature suggests.

¹ He was a son of the minister of Logierait, and was born in 1723. Having passed through the arts classes at St. Andrews, he came to Edinburgh to study for the Church in 1742. Thus he became one of the literary coterie consisting of Robertson, Blair, Home, Carlyle, Hume, and others, who were then students in the University, or living in Edinburgh. In 1745, he was offered a chaplaincy to the 42nd Regiment――“The Black Watch,” and though only twenty-two years of age, and having only completed two sessions of the divinity course, he obtained ordination from the General Assembly on account of his high testimonials. He accompanied this regiment to the battle of Fontenoy, and was with difficulty prevented from rushing into action with a broadsword. He remained with his regiment till 1754, and obtained much influence over the Highland soldiers; he took a keen interest in military matters, and gained a knowledge of them which was afterwards of use to him as a historian. He gave up the idea of becoming a minister, as he felt that he had not the requisite qualities for a popular preacher.

Having returned to Edinburgh, he was appointed to succeed Hume as Librarian of the Advocates’ Library in 1757; but after a few years, he resigned this post, and became tutor to the sons of Lord Bute. In July, 1759, he was appointed to the chair of natural philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, and by the month of October he was ready to meet his class, which drew from Hume the remark, that “Ferguson had more genius than any of them, as he had made himself so much master of a difficult science――viz., natural philosophy――which he had never studied but when at college, in three months as to be able to teach it.” He occupied this chair for five years, and it is recorded that he gave universal satisfaction, by rendering his subject attractive and popular. He published a short summary of his course for the use of his class.――Sir A. Grant’s Story of the University of Edinburgh, Volume II., pages 349, 350.

A contemporary and friend of Ferguson’s says of him:――“He was the son of a Highland clergyman, and had the pride and spirit of his countrymen.... He had the manners of a man of the world, and the demeanour of a high-bred gentleman, insomuch that his company was much sought after; for though he conversed with ease, it was with a dignified reserve.... He had another talent, unknown to any but his intimates, which was a boundless vein of humour, which he indulged when there was none others present, and which flowed from his pen in every familiar letter he wrote.”――Autobiography of the Rev. Dr. Alexander Carlyle, pages 281‒283. 1860.

“Although, therefore, an author may have been preceded by men of distinguished ability in former or in present times, it implies no degree of arrogance to follow even such reapers, in gleaning materials from this inexhaustible field of reflection, on which mankind have been employed from the beginning, and on which they will continue to be employed to the end of time.”

This work consists of two parts. The first treats of the most general phenomena in the nature and state of man, and extends to three chapters, which consecutively explain Man’s place in the scale of Being; Mind, or the characteristics of Intelligence; and Man’s Progressive Nature. Each of these chapters is divided into a number of sections, in which many important questions and interesting subjects are examined and discussed with rare candour and ability. The third chapter is especially attractive, as it explains the gradual progress and organisation of human society, the influence of habit, the progress of political and commercial arts, the pursuits and attainments of science, the fine arts, and the progress of moral apprehension.

The second part contains six chapters, which, under the following headings of a moral and political character, expound the Specific Good incident to Human Nature; the Fundamental Law of Morality, and its immediate Application and Sanctions; Jurisprudence, or Compulsory Law; Touching the Defences of Men; Moral Action, and the characteristics of a virtuous and happy Life; and, finally, Politics. Of these chapters, the first, the second, and the fourth are the most interesting, and present a body of well-digested information and reflection.

Ferguson was a well-informed man, and fairly equipped with a knowledge of the science of his time, as his method and conceptions clearly manifest. His moral ideas were distinct and comprehensive; his conception of human progress was accurate; and he approached nearer to the modern idea of a gradual development of human society and political institutions than any of his predecessors. Although, in some points, he was a follower of Hutcheson and Reid, in others he rose above them, especially in his admission of the idea of perfection in morality, and generally in his grasp of reality and of principles.

For instance, he says:――“Mind, we have reason to believe, predominates in nature; so that, in a comprehensive survey of all that exists, whatever is not mind, would be as nothing.... The essence of Almighty God we must conceive as most simple, being that which necessarily exists from eternity. Of His supreme intelligence, we have full evidence in the system of nature, and of His distinguishing the opposite conditions of moral good and evil, there is equally irresistible proof.”¹

¹ Volume I., pages 31, 129.

The following sentences will give an idea of his method:――“Most subjects in nature may be considered under two aspects――under that of their actual state, and under that of a specific excellence, or aspect, of which they are susceptible. Under the first, they are subjects of mere description, or statement of fact; under the second, they are objects of estimation or contempt, of praise or censure. In respect to what men have actually done or exhibited, human nature is a subject of history and physical science. Considered in respect to the different measures of good and evil, of which men are susceptible, the same nature is a subject of discipline and moral science. In treating of man, as a subject of history, we collect facts and endeavour to conceive his nature as it actually is, or has actually been, apart from any notion of ideal perfection or defect.

“In treating of him as a subject of moral science, we endeavour to understand what he ought to be; without being limited, in our conception, to the measure of attainment or failure, exhibited in the case of any particular person or society of men.

“To have an object or purpose, and to employ means for the attainment of it, is the distinctive condition of mind or intelligent being; the first implies will and choice; the second implies energy and power. For man, therefore, to know his province, and to be qualified for his station, requires equally that he should be acquainted with the foundation of both.”¹

¹ Volume I., Introduction, pages 1, 2.

Thus the method of investigation in the study of human nature, according to Ferguson, is in the first place to ascertain, on the most comprehensive and exhaustive scale, what man actually has been in the past and what he is now; and then, upon this knowledge, to frame a more reasonable conception of the improvable capacity of man, a juster idea of what he ought to be, and to devise more available and effective moral means for advancing the progress, the happiness, and the perfection of mankind. He insists much on this view, and often returns to it throughout his work.

In accordance with his progressive conception of man, Ferguson at once discarded Hobbes’ theory that the state of nature was a continual war. He argues that “a child may be considered apart from his parent, and the parent apart from his child; but the latter could not have existed without the former. And if we trace human society back to its simplest state, even there the society was real――resting upon the fundamental feelings of human nature; and if we trace human thought back to its simplest exertions, even there it was an exercise of understanding and some effort of invention or skill.” He also rejected the contract theory of the origin of government, and argued consistently for the historical view of the gradual growth and development of society.¹

¹ Volume I., pages 190‒197, et seq.

Ferguson discussed the standard of morality at length, and also the supreme end. He admitted only a qualified and limited value to utility as a moral principle, and the same with regard to sympathy. Utility appeared to him to resolve the distinction of right and wrong into a mere difference of tendency or external effect in the actions of men. He avers that sympathy is also inadequate as the principle of moral approbation, and argues on some points conclusively against Smith’s theory; but he fully recognised that sympathy is an important factor in the social nature of man.¹

¹ Volume II., pages 57‒115, 117‒126.

His own view of the principle of moral approbation is announced thus: ――“It is the idea of perfection or excellence which the intelligent and associated being forms to himself, and to which he refers in every sentiment of esteem or contempt, and in every expression of commendation or censure.”

If it be said that mankind are not agreed on this point, his reply is:――“The idea of perfection no doubt may be associated with subjects divested of merit; but notwithstanding the effect of such association in warping the judgment, virtue is approved as the specific perfection or excellence of man’s nature; and as no one ever inquired why perfection should be esteemed, it is difficult to conceive why we should look for any other account of moral approbation than this.”¹

¹ Volume II., page 134.

In many parts of his work the ideal conception of a progress towards perfection is touched upon and illustrated. “Perfection is nowhere to be found short of the infinite mind; but progression is the gift of God to all His intelligent creatures, and is within the competence of the lowest of mankind.... Men of humble capacity may learn to think justly on these subjects; and as far as wisdom depends on a just conception of familiar objects, it is the nature of created mind in the course of experience and observation to improve its sagacity and to make a continual approach to the highest measure of intellectual ability of which it is susceptible.... But the virtue of goodness, whether operating in mere innocence or in beneficence, is surely improvable if not actually acquired by habit.”¹

¹ Volume II., page 403.

In reference to the fundamental laws of morality, Ferguson taught “that the first law of morality, relating to the mind and its affections, requires the love of mankind as the greatest good to which human nature is competent.” If it should appear, however, that mankind are not agreed as to the kinds of external actions that flow from this principle, nor in the choice of what to expect from the beneficent, it may be asked by what rule is the friend of mankind to conduct himself? His general reply to this question is to the effect that mankind in reality do not often mistake the pernicious for the useful, nor the destructive for that which tends to their own preservation; and so the beneficent man has little difficulty in determining what is in him, a natural effect of benevolence or of goodwill to his fellow-creatures.¹

¹ Ferguson died in 1816, having lived to the great age of ninety-three years.

SECTION III.

Dugald Stewart.

Ferguson was succeeded in the chair of moral philosophy by Dugald Stewart,¹ who discharged the duties of the chair for a period of twenty-five years with unmatched success. He was a son of Dr. Matthew Stewart, professor of mathematics in the University of Edinburgh, and was born in his father’s house in the old college buildings. When eight years of age, he was sent to the High School of Edinburgh, and at thirteen he entered the University and attended the arts classes. But with the object of completing his philosophical education, at the age of eighteen he went to Glasgow and studied a session under Dr. Reid, and greatly appreciated the spirit of the doctrines of his master.²

¹ Born in 1753; died in 1828.

² When speaking of Dr. Reid, Stewart says:――“Among the members of this University (Edinburgh), Mr. Ferguson was the first to applaud Reid’s success, warmly recommending to his pupils a steady prosecution of the same plan, as the only effective method of ascertaining the general principles of the human frame, and illustrated happily, by his own profound and eloquent disquisitions, the application of such studies to the conduct of the understanding and the great concerns of life. I recollect, too, when attending, about the year 1771, the lectures of the late Mr. Russell, to have heard high encomiums on the philosophy of Dr. Reid, in the course of those comprehensive discussions concerning the objects and the rules of experimental science, with which he so agreeably diversified the particular doctrines of physics. Nor must I omit this opportunity of paying a tribute to the memory of my old friend, Mr. Stevenson, then professor of logic, whose candid mind at the age of seventy gave a welcome reception to a system subversive of the theories which he had taught for forty years, and whose zeal for the advancement of knowledge prompted him, when his career was almost finished, to undertake the laborious task of new modelling that useful compilation of elementary instruction to which diffidence of his own powers limited his literary exertions.

“It is with no common feelings of respect and gratitude that I now recall the names of those to whom I owe my first attachment to those studies, and the happiness of a liberal occupation superior to the more aspiring aims of a servile ambition.”――Stewart’s Account of the Life and Writings of Reid.

In 1771, when only nineteen years of age, Stewart was entrusted by his father, whose health was failing, to teach the mathematical class in the University of Edinburgh; and, notwithstanding his youth, he maintained order and taught well. He was formally appointed to the chair of mathematics in 1775, and held it till 1785, when, as already mentioned, he obtained the chair of moral philosophy, a position more congenial to his taste and aspiration.

According to the best testimony, Stewart was a successful and eloquent professor, and was justly regarded as an ornament of this illustrious University. The lectures which he delivered to his class were declared by those who heard them to be surprisingly touching and elegant. He was a Liberal in politics, a follower and expounder of the economical doctrines of Adam Smith; and several scions of the Whig nobility were placed in Edinburgh under his care and instruction. His teaching, by means of his lectures and his writings, attained a wide influence and contributed to diffuse a taste for elegant literature and liberal opinions in politics throughout Scotland. Many of his pupils rose to eminence in law, politics, and literature.

Stewart’s teaching was influenced by the current of events and the circumstances of his time; and practical considerations greatly controlled all his opinions and speculations. He was deeply interested in the French Revolution, and intensely moved by the deplorable excesses which sprung out of it. A short quotation from the concluding sentences of his course of lectures on political economy will illustrate this and other features of his teaching:――

“It is not, however, to those who look forward to the pursuits of science that I have addressed myself in these lectures. The greater part of you are probably destined for the active walks of business; and under this impression, I have uniformly endeavoured, so far as I was able, to direct your attention to studies susceptible of a practical application to the great concerns of humanity, whether providence may allot to you the obscure but important duties of a private station, or may be pleased to call you to the great and arduous scenes of public affairs. In either event, I shall follow you with my affectionate wishes through the various fortunes which may await you. And, believe me, nothing will ever give me greater satisfaction than to hear that you have carried into the different departments of life for which you may be destined, these steady principles of religion, of integrity, and of beneficence which can alone render you happy in yourselves and bring blessings to mankind.”

This was delivered in 1804, and four years later he concluded the same course with these memorable words:――

“Now, gentlemen, when the connection is to be dissolved which has for some months past subsisted between us, may I not be permitted to express the hope which I am encouraged to entertain by the attention with which you have honoured me:――that long after the period of your academical education, you will recollect with satisfaction those studies of your youth; and that by fixing in some measure your principles concerning the nature, the duties, and the prospects of man, they may contribute, under the various vicissitudes of fortune that may yet await you, to fortify your virtuous resolutions, to elevate your views above the pursuits of a vulgar ambition, and cherish in your minds those habitual sentiments of religion, of humanity, of justice, and of fortitude, which can alone render these talents and accomplishments a source of permanent happiness and honour to yourselves, a blessing to your friends, and a pledge to your country for the perpetuity of that political fabric reared by the hand and cemented by the blood of your ancestors; now alas! standing alone amid the wreck of surrounding establishments, the last asylum and the only remaining bulwark of the liberties of Europe.”¹

¹ Collected Works, Volume IX., pages 452‒453, 464. The above passages are admirably calculated for effect; and to have heard them from the lips of Stewart, uttered with all the grace, the gravity, and the dignity which he possessed, must have produced a strong impression.

Some people, however, thought Stewart’s political opinions too liberal, and that he had shown rather much favour towards some of his French contemporaries; and he seems to have had such parties in his mind when he composed the following note:――“I think it proper for me now to add, that at the period when this memoir was read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh, it was not unusual, even among men of some talents and information, to confound studiously, the speculative doctrines of political economy, with the discussions concerning the first principles of government, which happened unfortunately at that time to agitate the public mind. The doctrine of free trade was itself represented as of a revolutionary tendency; and some, which had formerly prided themselves on their intimacy with Smith, and on their zeal for the propagation of his liberal system, began to question the expediency of subjecting to the disputations of philosophers the arena of state policy, and the unfathomable wisdom of the feudal ages.”――Stewart’s Life of Adam Smith, in Collected Works, Volume X., page 87.

Stewart’s works consist of――(1) Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, extending to three volumes, which were published separately in the years 1792, 1814, and 1827; but in the interval between the publication of the first and third of these volumes, (2) his Outlines of Moral Philosophy appeared in 1793; (3) his Philosophical Essays in 1810; (4) his Dissertation on the Progress of Metaphysical and Ethical Philosophy in 1814 and 1820; (5) his Biographical Account of Adam Smith in 1793, of Dr. Robertson in 1796, and of Dr. Reid in 1802; (6) his work on the Active and Moral Powers of Man appeared in 1828, the year of his death; (7) his Lectures on Political Economy which were not prepared for publication by Stewart himself, but drawn up from imperfect manuscripts, and included in Hamilton’s collected editions of his works. This edition extends to ten volumes, and to it my references are uniformly made.

When Stewart entered on the duties of the chair of moral philosophy, his mind was well trained to scientific studies, which enabled him to take a comprehensive view of the subject. In the first volume of his Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind, he explained at length what he conceived to be the nature, the object, and the utility of mental study; but he did not in any of his writings develop his view of the precise relation of psychology to the philosophical sciences, nor specify the modes of their dependence on each other; although he stated, in general terms, the common relation which the different branches of knowledge bear to the human mind. He indicates his view thus:――“To the philosophy of the mind are to be referred all our inquiries concerning the divisions and the classification of the objects of human knowledge, and also all the various rules, both for the communication and the investigation of truth. These general rules of science, and these general rules of method, ought to form the subject of a rational and useful logic.... As a philosophical system of logic would assist us in our particular scientific investigations, by keeping steadily in our view the attainable objects of human curiosity; so, by exhibiting to us the relation in which they all stand to each other, and the relation which they all bear to what ought to be their common end――the advancement of human happiness, it would have a tendency to confine industry and genius to inquiries that are of real practical utility.... From such a system of logic, too, important assistance might be expected for reforming the established plan of academical education. It is melancholy to reflect on the manner in which this is carried on in most, perhaps I should say in all the countries of Europe; and that in an age of comparative light and liberty, the intellectual and moral characters of youth should continue to be formed on a plan devised by men, who were not only strangers to the business of the world, but who felt themselves interested in opposing the progress of useful knowledge.”¹

¹ Works, Volume II., pages 55‒59, 77‒80; also Volume I. (Dissertation, pages 477, 478.) Stewart’s remarks on education are still worth reading.

Although he explicitly recognised the contrast of mind and matter, and the branches of science to which the investigation of the opposite phenomena gives rise, still he purposely refrained from attempting their scientific organisation. The leading aim of his efforts was to contribute what he could to general psychology, to diffuse a taste for reflective studies, and to induce a noble and hopeful life in man; thus raising a liberal culture upon the firm basis of self-knowledge.¹ After he had discussed and pointed out the shortcomings in the existing state of things, he enounced his own purpose in the following words:――“I have thus endeavoured to point out and illustrate a few of the important purposes to which the philosophy of the human mind is subservient. It will not, however, I flatter myself, be supposed by any of my readers that I mean to attempt a systematic work on all or any of the subjects I have now mentioned, the most limited of which would furnish matter for many volumes. What I have aimed at has been to give, in the first place, as distinct and complete an analysis as I could of the principles, both intellectual and active, of our nature; and, in the second place, to illustrate, as I proceed, the application of these general laws of the human constitution to the different classes of phenomena that result from them.... It will not, therefore, I hope, be objected to me, that I have been guilty of a blameable violation of unity in the plan of my work, till it be considered how far such a violation was useful for accomplishing the purposes for which I write.”²

¹ “It is almost unnecessary for me to remark, how much individuals would be assisted in the proper and liberal culture of the mind, if they were previously led to take a comprehensive survey of human nature in all its parts, of its various faculties, and powers, and sources of enjoyment, and of the effects which are produced on these by particular situations. It is such knowledge alone of the capacities of the mind, that can enable a person to judge of his own acquisitions; and to employ the most effective means of supplying his defects, and removing his inconvenient habits.... But education can never be systematically directed to its proper objects, till we have obtained, not only an accurate analysis of the general principles of our nature, and an account of the most important laws which regulate their operation; but also an explanation of the various modifications and combinations of these principles, which produce that diversity of talents, genius, and character, we observe among men.”――Volume II., pages 61, 62.

² Volume II., pages 89, 90.

In the discrimination of ultimate principles, Stewart manifested admirable sagacity. He called truths “The Fundamental Laws of Belief, or the Primary Elements of Human Reason,” meaning by this generally what Reid termed First Principles, or the Dictates of Common Sense. The chief point in the treatment of these principles, in which Stewart differs from Reid, is in relation to mathematical demonstration. He makes no pretension to an exhaustive enumeration of these primary truths, but so far as he goes, his mode of discriminating them is reasonable and satisfactory.¹

¹ Volume III., page 41, et seq.

His classification of cognition――the faculties of knowledge――is as follows:――1. Consciousness; 2. External Perception; 3. Attention; 4. Conception; 5. Abstraction; 6. Association of Ideas; 7. Memory; 8. Imagination; 9. Reasoning, including Logic.

This distribution of the intellectual faculties is redundant; and though consciousness is recognised as a separate attribute of the mind, it receives no satisfactory treatment. Attention, though an important function, is not a separate faculty, as it is acquired by a long series of efforts, and both its exercise and power depends upon the will.

In regard to perception Stewart followed the doctrines of Reid. Conception is explained as a power of the mind which enables us to form a notion of an absent object of perception, or of a sensation formally felt; its function being to give us an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived. He distinguishes his meaning of the term from imagination, and observes that he followed Reid in this application of the term.

A chapter is devoted to abstraction, which is treated at great length through eight sections, and in which there are many interesting observations. The last section dealt with the use and abuse of general principles in politics, and he endeavours to clear up some of the prevailing misconceptions of the economical system――an ideal theory of society. Stewart himself was always inclined to take a favourable view of the future progress of mankind and the improvement of political institutions; and in this section he directs his efforts to show that such a result was probable.¹

¹ Volume II., page 249.

Two chapters are given to the discussion of the association of ideas, which he considered from two points of view――(1) the influence of association in regulating the succession of our thoughts, and (2) its influence on the intellectual powers and on the moral character, by the more close and indissolvable combinations which it leads us to form in infancy and in early youth. His exposition of association extends to about a hundred pages, and it is interesting and well illustrated by appropriate instances and quotations. He enumerates, as obvious modes of associative connection, Resemblance, Contrariety, Vicinity in time and place; and as less obvious modes, Cause and Effect, Means and Ends, Premises, and Conclusions. In his concluding remarks he avers that “there is good reason for believing that many of the facts which consciousness would lead us to consider, upon a superficial view, as ultimate facts, are resolvable into other principles still more general.”¹

¹ Volume II., page 344.

In his treatment of memory, he endeavoured to show that it cannot be resolved into the principle of association, because association presupposes a conservative faculty in the mind itself; but, on the other hand, without the associative principle, our faculty of retention would be of little use. He discusses the varieties of memory manifested in different individuals, the improvement of memory, the connection between memory and philosophical genius; and on all these varied relations of memory Stewart says much that is interesting and instructive. There are three requisites to a good memory――“(1) to be susceptible, (2) to be retentive, (3) to be ready.”¹

¹ Volume II. page 365.

To imagination he assigns the function of making a selection of qualities and circumstances from a variety of different objects, and, by combining and arranging these, to form a new creation of its own. He gives it, however, the characteristics rather of a reproductive faculty than of a representative one. He treated imagination in its relation to some of the fine arts, and its relation to taste and genius. He also examined at length the influence of imagination on character and happiness.¹

¹ Volume II., pages 431‒435, 450, et seq.

In the second volume of his Elements of the Mind, he treats of reasoning and deductive evidence; of the Aristotelian Logic; and of the method of inquiry according to the experimental or inductive logic. These mixed logical discussions contain much that is interesting, if not always profound. The third volume of his Elements treats of language; of the principle or law of sympathetic imitation; of the varieties of intellectual character; comparisons between the faculties of man and those of the lower animals; and several other interesting subjects. His long chapter on the varieties of intellectual character is exceedingly interesting.

Stewart’s volume of philosophical essays contain some of his best compositions, and are partly historical, critical, and literary. More than one half of the volume is occupied with the discussion of topics relating to Taste――the beautiful, the sublime, and allied subjects. Explanations and criticisms of Locke, Berkeley, and the theories of ♦Hartley, Priestly, and Darwin, occupy the other parts of the volume.

♦ “Hartly” replaced with “Hartley”

He classified the active powers of the mind, the emotions, feelings, and desires thus:――

I. Instinctive { 1. Appetites. Principles { 2. Desires = Knowledge, Esteem, Power, etc. of Action. { 3. Affections = Benevolent and Malevolent.

{ 1. Prudence. II. Rational and { 2. Moral Faculty. Governing { 3. Decency, or regard to character. Principles { 4. Sympathy. of Action. { 5. The Ridiculous. { 6. Taste.

His treatment of these varied phenomena of the mind is always interesting, cautious, humane, and marked by sound judgment and sagacity; occasionally original, and, on the whole, the most valuable part of his writings.

He stated the aim of moral inquiry thus:――“The object of moral philosophy is to ascertain the general rules of a wise and virtuous conduct in life, in so far as these rules may be discovered by the unassisted light of nature, that is, by an examination of the human constitution, and of the circumstances in which man is placed.” With this end, our inquiries may be arranged under three heads, according as they refer to the intellectual powers of man; to his active and moral powers, or to consideration of man as a member of a political body.¹

¹ Outlines of Moral Philosophy.

In short, to sum up his chief moral doctrines, he maintained――1. That the Moral Faculty is an original principle of the mind; he argued this point earnestly and at length. 2. He argued against the ethical systems founded on Utility. 3. But he objected strongly to the doctrine which makes morality depend on the will of God. 4. On the question of Freewill, he contends for liberty. 5. Concerning the relation of Morality to Religion, he assumes the benevolence of the Deity, and avers that “when we are convinced that God is infinitely good, and that He is the friend and protector of virtue, this belief affords the most powerful inducements to the practice of every branch of our duty.” 6. He elaborately discussed the subject of Happiness, and presented a classification of the most important pleasures under the following heads:――(1) The pleasures of activity and repose; (2) the pleasures of sense; (3) the pleasures of the imagination; (4) the pleasures of the understanding; (5) the pleasures of taste, or fine art.

In forming an opinion upon his merits as a writer, the aims which he had in view, and the circumstances in which his works originated, should be remembered. Stewart cannot be called a great original thinker; but he was an able teacher and a good expositor. Most of his writings could have been much improved by a process of pruning and condensation.

His style is graceful, ornate, and flowing, and enriched by a liberal culture. He had the power of rendering a difficult subject attractive and easily comprehended; yet he was not, in the higher sense, a master of method. Hence his Dissertation on the History of Mental Philosophy is very defective in arrangement and in consecutive exposition. In short, the main defects of his style is diffuseness and repetition, and a lack of force and strength, with a singular and lamentable want of brief and orderly recapitulation, at the proper places. He hardly seems to have been aware of the value of a concise and luminous statement at the close or the beginning of a great subject as an aid to the understanding. But after all reasonable deductions, Stewart’s works remain a noble monument of his talents, industry, humane culture, and his kindly nature and goodness of heart.

SECTION IV.

Gerard, Beattie, Campbell, Alison.

Dr. Alexander Gerard was appointed professor of divinity in Marischal College, Aberdeen, in 1759, an office which he held for about twelve years. He is the author of an ingenious Essay on Taste which appeared in 1758, and a second edition in 1764. The essay is divided into three parts, and he handled the subject in the following order:――In the first part, Taste is resolved into its simple principles, which consist of the sense or taste of novelty; of the sense of sublimity; of beauty; of imitation; of harmony; of oddity and ridicule; and of virtue. In the second part, the formation of taste by the union and improvement of its simple principles is explained. In the third part, the province and importance of taste is discussed.¹

¹ To the second edition of this essay were annexed three other essays on the same subject, by Voltaire, d’Alembert, and Montesquieu.

He began by remarking that “a fine taste is neither wholly the gift of nature, nor wholly the effect of art. It derives its origin from certain powers natural to the mind; but these powers cannot attain their full perfection, unless they be assisted by proper culture. Taste consists chiefly in the improvement of those principles which are commonly called the powers of imagination, and are considered by modern philosophers as internal or reflex senses,¹ supplying us with finer and more delicate perceptions than any which can be properly referred to our external organs.” And he reduces these reflex senses in the way indicated in the preceding paragraph.

¹ The reference to modern philosophers was to Hutcheson’s Inquiry concerning Beauty and Virtue and his _Essay on the Passions_; and Dr. Gerard’s Treatise on Taste is only one of the many proofs of the influence of Hutcheson’s writings in Scotland.

The subject is well worked out, and his style is exceedingly clear, simple, and easy. He observes that the internal senses are assisted by a delicacy of feeling or passion; and, applying this to the pathetic, he says――“Since, therefore, the pathetic is a quality of so great moment in works of taste, a man who is destitute of sensibility of heart must be a very imperfect judge of them. He is a stranger to those feelings which are of the greatest importance to direct his judgment. If a person possessed all the internal senses in perfection, without delicacy of passion, he could estimate the principal works of genius, only by their inferior qualities.... Delicacy of passion may interest a person so much, that he cannot for some time examine a performance with critical exactness; but it gives him exquisite delight in the meantime, and enables him to pass a just sentence at last.”¹

¹ Page 83.

Dr. James Beattie¹ was elected professor of moral philosophy in Marischal College, Aberdeen, in 1760. In 1770, his Essay on the Immutability of Truth appeared, which was intended to be a refutation of Hume’s scepticism. It is rather a vehement than reasonable production, and strong in passionate assertion, but weak in argument; yet it was popular for a time, and passed through several editions.

¹ Born in 1735; died in 1803.

He is the author of a work entitled Elements of Moral Science, which was published in 1790‒93, in two volumes; which are mainly a summary of the lectures on moral philosophy delivered to his class in Marischal College. The work consists of two main divisions:――1. Psychology, under which is included cognition; the active powers――will, feelings, sentiments and passions; natural theology――the existence and attributes of God; and the nature and immortality of the soul. 2. Ethics or moral philosophy, which is followed by economics――the family and domestic relations; then politics; and finally rhetoric and logic. Such is an indication of Beattie’s scheme of philosophy, and the method of his system of instruction.

But his treatment of logic is limited to remarks on evidence; rhetoric, however, is treated at length through one hundred and ninety-three pages, and perhaps this is one of the most interesting parts of his work. Beattie’s style is orderly, his sentences are generally simple, and his line of thought easily followed; but it has not much animation or ornament, and lacks the qualities of strength and incisiveness.

Dr. George Campbell,¹ a minister of the Church of Scotland, became Principal of Marischal College, Aberdeen, in 1759. His first work, A Dissertation on Miracles, was published in 1762. It consists of two parts, and presented an examination of the principles advanced by Hume in his Essay on Miracles. In the first part, Campbell argues that miracles can be proved by testimony, “and religious miracles are not less capable of this evidence than others;” in the second part, he maintains that “the miracles on which the belief of Christianity is founded are sufficiently attested.” These chief points are well and ably worked out. His mode of controversy is candid and generous; and his examination of Hume’s principle, for there was but one principle at the root of it――namely, experience――is carried on throughout with admirable fairness and sagacity.

¹ Born in 1719; died in 1796.

Campbell insists that Hume’s chief argument from experience is founded on a false hypothesis; as it supposes testimony to derive its evidence solely from experience, which is not the case. “Testimony, it is acknowledged, is a weaker evidence than sense. But it has been already evinced that its evidence for particular facts is infinitely stronger than that which the general conclusions from experience can afford us. Testimony holds directly of memory and sense. Whatever is duly attested must be remembered by the witness; whatever is duly remembered must once have been perceived. But nothing similar takes place with regard to experience, nor can testimony, with any appearance of meaning, be said to hold of it.

“Thus I have shown, as I proposed, that the author’s reasoning proceeds on a false hypothesis.――It supposes testimony to derive its evidence solely from experience, which is false.――It supposes, by consequence, that contrary observations have a weight in opposing testimony, which the first and most acknowledged principles of ♦human reason, or, if you like the term better, common sense, evidently shows that they have not.――It assigns a rule for discovering the superiority of contrary evidence, which, in the latitude there given it, tends to mislead the judgment, and which it is impossible, by any explication, to render of real use.”¹

¹ Part I., section 1, pages 63, 64 (1797).

♦ “hnman” replaced with “human”

Thus far, it seems Campbell did sway the balance somewhat against Hume’s chief principle of estimating evidence. But his dissertation itself must be read, for a full appreciation of the accurate, masterly, and analytic power which it displays. Shortly after it appeared, it was translated into the French, Dutch, and German languages.

Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric, which appeared in 1776, is a valuable and ingenious work. It was universally recognised as the greatest work on the subject which had appeared since the time of Aristotle. His style is clear and terse, and always manifests a comprehensive grasp of the subject.

The Rev. Archibald Alison¹ was a son of an Edinburgh magistrate, and educated at Glasgow and Oxford, and finally settled down in Edinburgh as an Episcopal minister. He was the father of the well-known historian, Sir Archibald Alison, and also of William P. Alison, an eminent physician and professor in the University of Edinburgh. He himself is the author of An Essay on the Nature and Principles of Taste, which appeared in 1790, and has passed through six or seven editions.

¹ Born in 1757; died 1839.

It is a pretty elaborate production, and its leading characteristic is an attempt to explain the æsthetic emotions and feelings on the principles of association. It is a work of real merit and value, and has had a considerable influence on subsequent theories of taste and beauty.

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