Chapter XXXIV

Chapter XXXIV

_Outline of European Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century, and the early part of the Eighteenth._

HAVING in the second volume of this work referred to the state of philosophy in relation to the Reformation, and the influence of that revolution in stimulating inquiry, an outline of the philosophic thought of Europe in the seventeenth century and the early part of the eighteenth will be an appropriate introduction to the subsequent history of Scottish philosophy. This will enable us to estimate the position and the claims of Scottish philosophy. Although the stream of European thought seems to run in several channels, these meet and influence each other at many points, and thus it is impossible to attain a just appreciation of the philosophy of one school or nation, without some general knowledge of the preceding and contemporaneous schools. So far as we know, there is nothing in the universe completely isolated, as all systems of philosophy are more or less related to each other, an entirely original idea is a rare phenomenon. But the field thus opened is exceedingly wide, and cannot be covered within the limits at my disposal. Therefore, it is to be distinctly understood that the aim of this outline is only to indicate the historical antecedents of the philosophy which subsequently arose in Scotland,――a matter of such interest and importance as to justify the attempt to elucidate its historic significance and relation to preceding systems of thought.

After the series of struggles which issued in the Reformation, the human mind continued to strive after independence and freedom for more than a century. Most of the philosophers of the sixteenth century were scholars and men of research, rather than unfettered thinkers, and exerted themselves in collecting old manuscripts, translating, annotating, and lecturing on the writings of Aristotle and Plato, while some of them manifested a tendency to theosophy, and others to materialism and scepticism. The veneration for the opinions of antiquity and the shackles of authority were not easily broken, and many curious moves were made ere reason and common-sense attained sway. At length men began to enter more and more on independent investigation of nature and mind, and the problem of moral freedom.

When undeterred by fear, interest, or authority, the human mind is the most powerful and wonderful agent in the universe. This was anew exemplified in the rapid development of mathematical science, and the adoption of more accurate methods of investigation in the seventeenth century, and ever since the progress of discovery and of invention have been continuous. It is my task to indicate briefly some of the intense wrestlings of those strong and exalted minds who have contributed to weaken the power of traditional authority, to brave the force of ignorance, of biting scorn, and of death itself.

Giordano Bruno was one of the boldest thinkers in the sixteenth century. Born at Nola――in the province of Naples――in 1548, he entered the Order of the Dominicans, but relinquished it when he found his convictions in conflict with the doctrines of the Church. From that time onward he lived a wandering life, sometimes sojourning in France, in England, in Germany, and sometimes in other countries. But having returned to Venice, he fell into the hands of the Inquisition in 1592, and after suffering a long imprisonment in Rome, was tried for heresy, condemned, and burned in 1600.

He was a voluminous author, and wrote both in Italian and in Latin, but several of his treatises and tracts have been lost. He was gifted with a lively, warm, and exuberant imagination, which often impelled him to express his views in a poetical form, and thus sometimes he embodied his thoughts in a haze of clouds; at other times, however, he delivered his opinions with remarkable force and clearness. The elements of sympathy were excessively strong in him, and entered into his modes of thought and coloured all his philosophic efforts.

Bruno boldly essayed the reconstruction of the universe on the principle of the unity and universality of substance. In astronomy he embraced the Copernican view, and expounded it. According to him, the universe is infinite in time and in space, the solar system being merely one of innumerable worlds, of which God is the original and immanent cause. The attributes of God are power, wisdom, and love. The stars are not moved by a prime mover, but by the souls inherent in them. He rejected the idea of a dualism of matter and form, and identified the form or moving cause with the end and matter of all organic things; thus matter contains in herself the forms of all things, and brings them forth from her own bosom as the travailing mother expels her offspring. The elements of all that exists are the monads, which are a kind of points, not entirely unextended but spherical, and at once material and psychical. The soul is a monad, and it is never wholly without a body. God is the monad of monads, and He is the least, as all things are external to Him, and the greatest, because all things are in Him. God caused the worlds to spring out of Himself, not by an act of mere will, but by an inner necessity, moving freely and without any compulsion. The worlds being nature realised, and God nature working, thus God is present in all things. Each of the worlds is perfect in its kind, and there is no positive evil. All individual objects and living organisms are subject to change, but the universe remains in its entire perfection always like itself.

Bruno’s philosophy is full of the unity of being, which is the principle and end of all philosophy. God is the infinite All, the One, the prime and universal substance, of Himself, excluding all delimitation, and is not to be sought beyond the universe and the infinity of things. “Why think of any twofold substance, one corporal and another spiritual, when in sum these have but one essence and one root, for corporal substance, which manifests to us that which it involves, must be held a thing divine, parent of natural things; and if you think aright, you will find a divine essence in all things.” Yet he occasionally speaks of the supernatural. “The highest contemplation which transcends nature is impossible and null to him who is without belief, for we attain to this by supernatural, not by natural light; and such light they have not who hold all things to be corporal, and who do not seek Deity beyond the infinite world and the infinity of things, but within this and these.”¹

¹ The works in which Bruno chiefly developed his system were written in Italian, and of these the most important is the “Della Causa, Principio et Uno,” 1584, and in the same year appeared his “De l’Infinito Universo e Mondi.” A complete list of his writings is given in the second volume of Ueberweg’s History of Philosophy (page 469). In the present century the extant writings of Bruno have been carefully studied and ably expounded by several eminent writers and historians of philosophy.

It is obvious that Bruno’s philosophy is a form of pantheism, one of the most fascinating systems of thought ever propounded. The system originates from the difficulty of conceiving the action of the mind or thought except when conjoined with a body――an insuperable and far-reaching difficulty, because there is no direct evidence anywhere of a mind operating without the conjunction of an organism. Hence the strong temptation to identify God and the universe in one idea or principle: that is, the universe is God, and God is the universe. This is a proposition which imparts no light, but it is, nevertheless, the fundamental idea of the system which figures the external substance of the universe as God, from which step by step all things have issued. Thus the prime idea of pantheism is a constant quantity or unity, although the developments of the system in the hands of different thinkers has assumed varied modifications in detail.

Bruno’s views have influenced the subsequent developments of several once famous philosophies. The noted Spinoza was indebted to him for several of his ideas, but the fundamental idea of pantheism is much older than the times of either of the two philosophers, as it stretches back to an early period in the evolution of human thought. Through Spinoza’s system German speculation has been largely influenced, and even some recent Scottish speculations bear distinct traces of a similar descent.

In France, during the latter part of the sixteenth century, the Jesuits were the most active instructors and disseminators of doctrine. Their schools were planted in all the chief towns of the nations. They encouraged the study of classical literature, and prepared the best text-books and lexicons. But they were a conservative and obstructive body, and wielded much influence over the intellect of the French. At the same time a form of ancient scepticism was revived in France by Montaigne. “In fact, Montaigne represents, if he did not inaugurate, the school of French satirists, who, standing between, as it were, Calvin and Rabelais, avoided both the coarseness and abandon of the latter, and the ascetic sternness and awkward pleasantries of the former.”¹ His sceptical views were more or less directed to the doctrines of Christianity, but from whatever motive or reason, he generally concluded with a recognition of the necessity of a revelation, and thus avoided a conflict with theology. In their ultimate result his reflections pointed to such conclusions as――whether we are not a rather presumptuous class of beings in fancying that we have any higher faculties than those which are bestowed on other animals; whether the pursuit of truth may not be a pleasant amusement, rather than one that promises any result; whether religious forms may not be serviceable to the business of life, and therefore to be defended; whether they do not become mischievous when they lead to conflicts and to persecutions; whether a full recognition of our folly, ignorance, and uncertainty, might not save us from the dogmatism which produces such things? A similar strain of thought was indulged in by Charron and other French writers.²

¹ Van Laun’s History of French Literature, Volume II., pages 299‒300.

² Montaigne’s Essays. He states himself that Buchanan was one of his preceptors; and some traces of this Scotsman’s opinions may be found in the easy and self-satisfied Frenchman’s writings.

Another Frenchman, Gassendi, undertook the defence of Epicureanism, showing that it contained the best doctrine of physics, and also attempting to combine it with Christian theology. In physics, he embraced the theory of atomism; but he saw its weak side, namely, the difficulty of explaining the derivation of sensation out of atoms and space. He discussed this problem at great length, but admitted that there was something left unexplained. He was a voluminous writer.

Gassendi has been claimed by the historians of materialism as the chief reviver of systematic materialism in modern times. “We lay especial stress upon this, that Gassendi drew again into the light, adapted to the circumstances of the time, the fullest of the materialistic systems of antiquity, that of Epikuros.” Again, in reference to his historical qualifications, “Gassendi, whose thorough philological and historical training equipped him with a knowledge of all the systems of antiquity, embraced with a sure glance exactly what was best suited to modern times, and to the empirical tendency of his age. Atomism, by his means drawn again from antiquity, attained a lasting importance, however much it was gradually modified as it passed through the hands of later inquirers.” Once more, “Gassendi is, of all the most prominent representatives of materialism, the only one gifted with a historic sense, and that he has in an eminent degree. Even in his ‘Syntagma Philosophicum,’ he treats every subject at first historically, from all possible points of view.”¹

¹ Lange’s History of Materialism, Volume I., pages 253‒269. “The evolution and dissolution of things is nothing but the union and separation of atoms. When a piece of wood is burned, the flame, smell, and ashes, and so on, have already existed in their atoms, only in other conditions. All change is only movement in the constituents of a thing, and hence the simple substance cannot change, but only continues its movements in space.”――Ibid., page 267.

Descartes was born in 1596 at La Haye, in the province of Touraine. At the age of eight he was sent to the Jesuit College of La Flèche, and placed under the instruction of the Jesuits, where he remained for eight years, and received his general education. He was a contemporary of Gassendi, and a more famous philosopher; each represented opposite systems and assailed one another, but neither of them influenced the other in his views. The two were contrasted in every way. Descartes always aimed at being original, and often was so, while Gassendi was more historical and dependent, and more learned, but he lacked the genius of his contemporary; both, however, were the fathers of great modern schools of thought. In philosophy and in scientific method, the real turning-point came in the early part of the seventeenth century, and in the great movement Descartes holds a foremost place, entitling him to some account, however brief, in this exposition.

Descartes was eminent both as a philosopher and as a mathematician; in the latter department of science he takes a position among the great mathematicians of the seventeenth century. In algebra he was the first to place the doctrine of powers on a clear basis, freeing it from its dependence on geometry, which prevented its proper expansion; while, by introducing the index notation, he gave the science a new and potent means of expression. He also advanced the treatment of negative quantities, and first brought into prominence the equal significance of the negative roots, and for determining a limit to their number, gave the rule which still bears his name. But his fame as a mathematician rests chiefly on his application of algebra for “the expression of continuously varying quantity.” By this invention he may be considered as the founder of analytic geometry, or the algebraic treatment of curves, and he is well entitled to a place in the history of the mathematical achievements which ultimately led to the discovery of the Differential Calculus.¹

¹ Descartes, by J. P. Mahaffy, pages 207‒209, 1880. It was a curious feature in the character of Descartes that he designedly so composed his Essay on Geometry as to be very difficult, “and only understood by mathematicians of a high order. He omitted what was obvious, and in the solving of problems only gave the means of solution, and not each step in the demonstrations. He even chuckles in his letters at the number of professed mathematicians who were unable to follow his arguments, and tells us that not a single professor in the new universities of Holland was able to open his mouth upon the subject.”

In physics, his achievements were mainly in the science of optics. He at least contributed to the discovery and statement of the law of refraction, though his independent discovery of this law has been keenly disputed. He explained the colours of the rainbow, and it appears that he originated the undulatory theory of light. But his positive contributions to science were not the most important elements of his philosophy, as its influence sprang more from its spirit and method, which were the expression of his own acute and determined mind.

Descartes’ philosophy is fundamentally a deductive system, based on mathematical principles, but in its development it assumed the form of a methodical and rather dogmatic rationalism. Although the initial steps of his method are founded in doubt, this is not the most distinctive feature of his philosophy. His doubt, at the threshold, merely gave him the data of his own thought and existence, and enabled him to assert a right to discard authority, and to erect a standard independent of all former times and thinkers. In the development of his system he attempted to find the ultimate principle in the order of synthesis, which would afford the conditions of philosophy and of science, or that something which is the highest of all. This principle must be self-evident, and Descartes found it in his famous “cogito ergo sum;” then he struggled hard and determinedly to connect this with the idea of God, and thus associating the criterion of truth with the perception of Deity, makes the one in a sense dependent on the other. In his first published work, which appeared in 1637, and marks an epoch in the history of human thought, he enunciated four rules of method in the following order:――“1. Never to accept anything as true which was not clearly known to be such; that is, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to include nothing more in my judgment than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt. 2. To divide each of the difficulties into as many parts as possible, and as might be necessary for its adequate solution. 3. To conduct my thoughts in order, by commencing with objects, the simplest and easiest kind to know, that I might ascend by degrees, as it were, step by step, to the knowledge of the more complex; assigning in thought a definite order even to objects which in their own nature do not stand in a relation of antecedence and sequence. 4. In every case to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so general, that I might be assured that nothing was omitted.”¹ This work was entitled, “Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences; also the Dioptrics, the Meteors, and the Geometry, which are Essays in this Method.” Thus Descartes introduced his Method to the world with the recommendation of his own discoveries in mathematics, and with the solution of problems which were then beyond the reach of ordinary minds, as was indicated in the last note. The three essays presented as applications of his Method have long been superseded or absorbed in later works, but the discourse on Method will always be valuable. The volume containing the whole was written in French, which in that day was itself a bold innovation.

¹ Discourse on Method, Part II.

The Discourse on Method though only a short treatise, which might be read at a single sitting, nevertheless was a memorable proclamation against the ages of inert formalism, and the thraldom of the human mind. It contains details relating to the formation of his opinions, and the beginning of the development of his system. It is a book of absorbing interest, and should be carefully read by every student of philosophy. It is divided into six parts, which treat of the following topics: ――1. Various considerations touching the Sciences. 2. The principal rules of the author’s method, the heads of which I have stated above. 3. Some rules of morals deduced from this method. 4. His reasonings establishing the existence of God and of the human soul. 5. The order of the questions in physics, the explanation of the motion of the heart and of some other difficulties, as also the difference between the soul of man and that of the brutes. 6. What he believes to be requisite in order to greater advancement in the investigation of nature than has yet been made, with the reasons that have induced him to write. I had transcribed several passages for quotation, but space forbids their insertion; and as the work is now easily accessible to English readers, long quotations are unnecessary. But to lighten the exposition, I may briefly dispose of some of his peculiar views touching the organisation of man and the lower animals.

He adopted a mechanical theory of the universe, attributing to matter only pressure and impulsion, by which to explain all material phenomena. Then developing his theory in accounting for life, plants, and animals, he ultimately arrived at the conclusion that the functions and actions of animals and living organisms are purely the result of heat and motion, as mechanically as the going of a clock is the result of cog-wheels and pulleys. Thus man so far as his body is concerned, is merely an automaton, while all the lower animals are automatons, mere machines, constructed by the Deity according to the general laws which He has impressed upon matter: they have no rational soul, as they use no language, or perform any actions which cannot be proved to be the direct result of their internal organism.

Touching the origin of the human soul, he followed the very old notion of supposing that God infused a soul into every human being at the first moment of its existence, and thus the soul was radically distinct from the body, though closely united with it. As an unextended entity, however, the soul can be in contact with the body only at one point, which is the brain, or more precisely, in the single centre of the mass, the conarium, or pineal gland. He says, “Although the human soul is united to the whole body, it has, nevertheless, its principal seat in the brain, where alone it not only understands and imagines, but also perceives, and this by the medium of the nerves, which are extended like threads from the brain to all the other members, with which they are so connected that we can hardly touch any one of them without moving the extremities of those nerves which are collected in the brain round the seat of the soul.” Again, “It is clearly established, however, that the soul does not perceive in so far as it is in each member of the body, but only so far as it is in the brain, when the nerves by their movements convey to it the diverse actions of external objects that touch the parts of the body in which they are inserted.”¹

¹ Principles of Philosophy, IV., 189, 196.

The Discourse on Method contained in a condensed form the principles and chief characteristics of Descartes’ system, and it was followed by his “Meditations,” which were published in 1641. As the subject was so full of difficulties, and thus liable to much misunderstanding and misconception, he had manuscript copies of his “Meditations,” submitted for criticism to some of the most learned men and philosophers of the time, among whom were Gassendi, Arnauld, Hobbes, and others. A summary of their objections, with his replies, was published, and many of their criticisms were able and just. But Descartes so firmly believed in his own system, and was so convinced that he saw it all clearly and distinctly, that he could hardly be moved to change any of his settled ideas. He simply wanted these learned men’s objections, that he might refute them, and thus more effectually establish the certainty of his own system in other minds. To the Catholic theologians only, for the sake of their patronage and peace, he conceded some trifling points.

The Meditations are an expansion of the metaphysics of his Discourse on Method, and the work embraced six meditations, which treat on the following subjects: “Of the Things of which we may Doubt; of the Nature of the Human Mind, and that it is more easily known than the body; of God, that He Exists; of Truth and Error; of the Essence of Material Things, and of God; of the Existence of Material Things, and of the real distinction between the mind and body of man.” In his preface to these Meditations he says: “Now that I have once, in some measure, made proof of the opinions of men regarding my work, I again undertake to treat of God and the human soul, and at the same time to discuss the principles of the entire First Philosophy, without, however, expecting any commendation from the crowd for my endeavours, or a wide circle of readers. On the contrary, I would advise none to read this work unless such as are able and willing to meditate with me in earnest, to detach their minds from commerce with the senses, and likewise to deliver themselves from prejudice; and individuals of this character are, as I well know, remarkably rare. But with regard to those who, without caring to comprehend the order and connection of the reasonings, shall study only detached clauses for the purpose of small but noisy criticism, as is the custom with many, I may say that such persons will not profit greatly by the reading of this treatise; and although, perhaps, they may find opportunity for cavilling in several places, they will yet hardly start any pressing objections, or such as shall be deserving of reply.”

Thus the Meditations were intended to be a discussion on the first or fundamental principles of philosophy, but their main drift is to prove that the knowledge of God and of the mind is the most certain of all things. This was attempted in two ways: first, by showing the uncertainty of all our knowledge of bodies, and then by presenting demonstrations of our own existence as thinking beings, and of the existence of the Deity. The first Meditation expounded the grounds on which we may doubt of all things, and especially of all material objects. After showing the uncertainty of all things, save some points in arithmetic and geometry, he affirmed his own strong belief in the existence of an all-powerful God, who created him such as he was, and then says: “If, however, it were repugnant to the goodness of God to have created me subject to constant deception, it would seem likewise to be contrary to his goodness to allow me to be occasionally deceived, and yet it is clear that this is permitted. Some, indeed, might perhaps be found who would be disposed rather to deny the existence of a Being so powerful than to believe that there is nothing certain. But let us for the present refrain from opposing this opinion, and grant that all which is here said of God is fabulous, nevertheless, in whatever way it may be supposed that I reached the state in which I exist, whether by fate, or chance, or by an endless series of antecedents and consequents, or by any other means, it is clear (since to be deceived and to err is a certain defect) that the probability of my being so imperfect as to be the constant victim of deception, will be increased exactly in proportion as the power possessed by the cause, to which they assign my origin, is lessened. To these reasonings I have assuredly nothing to reply, but am constrained at last to avow that there is nothing of all that I formerly believed to be true of which it is impossible to doubt.” Having now disposed so far of all material objects, in the second, he repeats his argument affirming from the fact of doubt, our own existence as doubting beings. “But what, then, am I? A thinking thing, it has been said. But what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, that imagines also, and perceives. Assuredly it is not little, if all these properties belong to my nature. But why should they not belong to it? Am I not that very being who now doubts of almost everything, who, for all that, understands and conceives certain things, who affirms one alone as true, and denies the others, who desires to know more of them, and does not wish to be deceived”; and so on in the same line of argument. He next showed that external objects can only be known when they become or are made the objects of thought, and then makes a vigorous effort showing that mind itself is more clearly known than any or all the objects of the external world. “But, finally, what shall I say of the mind itself, that is, of myself? for as yet I do not admit that I am anything but mind. What, then? I who seem to possess so distinct an apprehension of the piece of wax,――do I not know myself, both with greater truth and certitude, and also much more distinctly and clearly? For if I judge that the wax exists because I see it, it assuredly follows, much more evidently, that I myself am or exist, for the same reason, it is possible that what I see may not in truth be wax, and that I do not even possess eyes with which to see anything; but it cannot be that when I see, or, which comes to the same thing, when I think I see, I myself who think am nothing. So, likewise, if I judge that the wax exists because I touch it, it will still also follow that I am, and if I determine that my imagination, or any other cause, whatever it be, persuades me of the existence of the wax, I will still draw the same conclusion. And what is here remarked of the piece of wax is applicable to all the other things that are external to me.”

In the third Meditation he unfolded his chief argument for the existence of God. He insisted that as the idea of God in the human mind is innate, God himself is its cause. And he described God thus:――“By the name of God, I understand a substance infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself, and every other thing that exists, if any such there be, were created.” Here he associates God, or the idea of God, with his own criterion of truth. In the fourth, he proceeded to show that all which we clearly and distinctly perceive must be true, and then explained the nature of intellectual error. Referring to the will as the cause of error, he says: “I have no reason to complain because God has given me a will more ample than my understanding, since, as the will consists only of a single element, and that indivisible, it would appear that this faculty is of such a nature that nothing could be taken from it without destroying it; and certainly, the more extensive it is, the more cause I have to thank the goodness of Him who bestowed it upon me.... For as often as I so restrain my will within the limits of my knowledge, that it forms no judgment except regarding objects which are clearly and distinctly represented to it by the understanding, I can never be deceived, because every clear and distinct conception is doubtless something, and as such cannot owe its origin to nothing, but must of necessity have God for its author――God, I say, who, as supremely perfect, cannot, without a contradiction, be the cause of any error, and consequently it is necessary to conclude that every such conception or judgment is true.”

He began the fifth Meditation by expounding the essence of material things, giving some examples from quantity and form. And he asserted that the figure of a triangle ♦and other mathematical figures possess a certain determinate form, or essence, which is immutable and eternal; and again repeated that whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is true, truth being identical with existence. He then proceeded to demonstrate in a somewhat new form his arguments for proving the existence of God, and making all knowledge dependent upon this. “But I remark further that the certainty of all other truths is so absolutely dependent on it, that without this knowledge it is impossible ever to know anything perfectly.... And thus I very clearly see that the certainty and truth of all science depends on the knowledge alone of the true God, inasmuch that, before I knew him, I could have no perfect knowledge of any other thing. And now that I know him, I possess the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge regarding innumerable matters, as well relating to God himself and other intellectual objects as to corporeal nature.” In the sixth he explained the difference between imagination and pure intellection; reviewed the errors of the senses, pointing out the means of avoiding them, the distinct difference of the mind and the body, and their relation to each other, and then adduces the evidence from which the existence of the external world may be inferred, and all with the aim of showing that our knowledge of external objects is not so clear and distinct as the knowledge which we have of our own minds and of God. Thus far I have attempted to explain Descartes’ own efforts to develop his philosophy.

♦ “aud” replaced with “and”

But it is in his work entitled The Principles of Philosophy, written in Latin, and published in 1644, that he developed his theories and ideas systematically, and gave the most complete exposition and representation of his system.¹ In this work he expounded his philosophy synthetically. It is divided into four parts, which treat consecutively of the principles of human knowledge, of the principles of material things, of the visible world, and of the earth. The first part contains an orderly summary of his metaphysical views, repeating what had been stated in the Discourse and the Meditations, and adding some new elucidations. And it is chiefly to this part that I must direct attention, as being most consonant to the aim of this chapter.

¹ In a long preface to the French translation of his Principles of Philosophy, which appeared in 1647, Descartes enters at some length on several topics of an interesting character, which are still well worth reading.

But not to leave his physics altogether unnoticed, the following is a brief indication of his physical theory. Basing his ideas on mathematics, he boldly asserted that extension is an eternal attribute of matter, and that to us it is the very essence of matter. “Give me extension and motion,” he exclaims, “and I will construct the universe.” Matter is infinite or unlimited in space or time, and it is everywhere identical with extension, all differences of quality being simply produced by a different mechanical composition, and a difference of motion in its parts.

In the second part of his Principles, he reduces all the phenomena of nature to variations of size, figure, and motion, in the minute particles of a homogeneous matter, there being but one kind of matter in the whole universe. He gave special laws of motion, which are now superseded. In the third part he treated on the theory of the solar system, and on the nature and origin of the fixed stars, and assuming three elements of various density in degree, explained the whole universe by the theory of vortices or of circular motion. In the fourth part he treated of the earth and its formation, of water, fire, and other matters.

“When he gives a priori explanations of all manner of phenomena in heaven and in earth, deduced from the motion of diverse particles, he confesses that the plurality of causes which may produce the same effect is his great difficulty. He feels that endless time and outlay is required to verify his theories by crucial experiments, and till that has been done, he can offer nothing but the satisfactoriness and simplicity of the explanation as a guarantee of its truth. Once, indeed, he advances the statement that the veracity of the Deity would come into question if he permitted us to be deceived in following such strict and sober demonstrations. But in general the distinction of purely mathematical and physical proof is acknowledged by Descartes, and he confesses the possibility, though he never admits the fact, that he might be mistaken.”¹

¹ Descartes, by J. W. Mahaffy, page 163.

The most notable peculiarities of Descartes’ metaphysics are his conception of God and his definition of Substance. He says that in the concept of God is comprised absolutely necessary and external existence, while our concept of other things merely includes contingent existence. God is also omniscient, all-powerful, absolutely perfect, absolutely veracious, and the source of all light, “so that it is plainly repugnant for him to deceive us.”¹ He exerted his great powers to make this clear, and if his premisses were true, the conclusions of course would follow, but his assumption of an innate idea of God in the human mind of such a character as he assigned to it, is nowhere to be found save among a small section of the most cultivated of the race. Besides it is very questionable if this idea of God be obtained at all in the way which he maintained. Then he defined substance thus: “By substance we can conceive nothing else than a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence. And, in truth, there can be conceived but one substance which is absolutely independent, and that is God.” We perceive that all other things can exist only by the concourse of God; and, accordingly, the term substance does not apply to God and the creatures in the same sense, and no meaning of this word can be distinctly understood which is common to God and them. Created substances, however, of all kinds may be conceived as things existing by the concourse of God, but existence by itself is not observed by us. Every substance has one principal attribute, as thinking of the mind, extension of the body. Thus extension in length, breadth, and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance, and thought the nature of thinking substance. For everything else that can be attributed to body presupposes extension, and is only some mode of an extended thing, just as all the properties which we discover in the mind are only different modes of thinking.²

¹ Principles of Philosophy, I. 22, 23, 29.

² Principles of Philosophy, I., 51, 52, 53.

His doctrine of the concourse of God is thus explained: “Because I was in existence a short time ago, it does not follow that I must now exist, unless in this moment some cause create me anew as it were, that is, conserve me. In truth, it is perfectly clear and evident to all who attentively consider the nature of duration, that the conservation of a substance, in each moment of its duration, requires the same power and act that would be necessary to create it, supposing it were not yet in existence; so that it is manifestly a dictate of the natural light that conservation and creation differ merely in respect of our mode of thinking and not in reality.” Again, “From the fact that we now are, it does not necessarily follow that we shall be a moment afterwards, unless some cause, namely, that which first created us, shall, as it were, continually recreate us, that is, conserve us. For we easily understand that there is no power in us by which we can conserve ourselves, and that the being who has so much power as to conserve us out of himself, must also by so much the greater reason conserve himself, or rather stand in need of being conserved by no one whatever, and, in fine, be God.”¹

¹ Meditation, III.; Principles of Philosophy, I., 21.

It is pretty evident that the above view of substance contained an element of pantheism. Since that substance which exists entirely in itself and absolutely independent of aught beyond itself, is declared to be God; and since there is only one kind of matter in the universe, the sum and essence of substance being included in extension, what is God but the universe. Hence Spinoza adopted this Cartesian conception, and placed it at the summit of his pantheistic system of the universe; while Descartes’ doctrine of conservation or continuous creation seems to have suggested to his distinguished follower Geulinx the doctrine of Occasional Causes; and Malebranche also made a modification on the former doctrine in his own theory of seeing all things in God, who is the place of spirits.¹ In truth, Descartes’ theory of the relation of body and mind, even when supported by divine conservation, was unsatisfactory and scarcely conceivable.

¹ Geulinx’s _Commentaries on Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy_; Malebranche’s De la Recherche, etc.

Touching his first principle, and the criterion of truth, which are involved in each other, he said:――“I think, therefore, I am, and this proposition is of all others the first and most certain which occurs to one philosophising orderly.” Thus knowledge must begin with a definite act of a conscious being, self-revealed in the conscious act. He did not, indeed, analyse the conditions of the object of which the self-conscious being takes notice, or trace how the conscious act has originated. Nevertheless, it was an important step towards placing investigation on the true basis of conscious experience; though, of course, on the subjective and notional side, it has often been carried to extremes, and was so in the end by Descartes himself. He endeavoured to deduce a criterion of truth from his first certain proposition, and this he founded on clearness and distinctness of knowledge. This test he defined in these words:――“I call that clear which is present and manifest to the mind giving attention to it, just as we are said clearly to see objects when, being present to the eye looking on, they stimulate it with sufficient force, and it is disposed to regard them; but the distinct is that which is so precise and different from all other objects as to comprehend in itself only what is clear.” As already stated, he called in the veracity of God to support this criterion of truth.¹ But it is vague and comparatively useless in its application, since it must be admitted that the clearness and distinctness of an idea, a conviction, or an opinion, in the mind of the person holding them, is not always a guarantee of their truth; although it is a very good reason for such opinions and ideas being strongly asserted and firmly maintained.

¹ Principles of Philosophy, I., 45, IV., 206; Meditations, IV.

Descartes’ metaphysics does not reach the external world by a distinct perception, but by an indirect or mediate inference. First, he resolved to prove his own existence as a thinking being, and then deduced the existence of God from the fact that thinking beings exist who possess the idea of him, before the external world came into view at all. He presented his demonstration of God’s existence under three forms, which, however, are all essentially founded on the idea that he himself had of God; and they are neither wholly new nor at all satisfactory, and raised a storm of controversy which raged long and widely.

Turning to Descartes’ psychology, which is not separately or exhaustively treated in his writings, and on some points there is a little difficulty in ascertaining his views. He called the mind a thinking substance or thinking thing; the word thought meant all that we are immediately conscious of; and, accordingly, not only to understand, to will, to imagine, but even to perceive, have here the same meaning as thinking. There are only two modes of thinking of which we are conscious, namely, the perception or operation of the understanding, and volition or the operation of the will; thus to perceive through the senses, to imagine, and to conceive purely mental objects, are only different modes of perceiving; but to desire, to be averse from, to affirm, to deny, to doubt, are different modes of willing.¹

¹ Principles of Philosophy, I., 9, 32. He says that the simplest self-evident notions are only obscured by logical definitions, as these are not to be reckoned among the cognitions acquired by study, but as born with us. Ibid., 10.

The word perception has a wider meaning in the writings of Descartes and his followers than in the philosophic literature of the present time. With them perception was generally employed to indicate an act of mind by which we apprehended any mental object, as distinguished from an affirmation or judgment concerning it; and thus in their writings perception is nearly equivalent to cognition. All acts of memory, of imagination, of sense, and of pure intellect, are merely modes of perceiving, as in each we only know as being conscious of the object of the act.

But here we come face to face with the relation of the mind to the objects of its knowledge, which is the crucial problem in philosophy and in psychology. As already implicitly stated above, according to Descartes, the mind has no immediate perception of external objects or of the material world. On the principles of his theory, the mind can have no immediate knowledge of anything beyond its own modifications. Although the mind is only conscious of its own modifications or ideas, still it is not solely modified by its own energy, and in many instances it is affected by the antecedent affections of the body, owing to its junction therewith. Thus some of the modifications of the mind are affections originating from the body, and mainly relative to it; others, though not quite independent of corporeal contact, must be more especially considered as affections of the mind; while others are in themselves purely or absolutely intellectual energies in their origin and in their continuance. The point of alliance of the mind with the body is the brain, at this point all organic changes from external causes terminate, and through these the mind is, owing to the nature of its junction, hyperphysically determined to a relative modification. There also all corporeal movements, at the call of the will, commence, and thus produce the bodily movement answering to the volition of the mind. The mind only perceives objects as its seat in the brain, and not at the point of affection in the organs.¹

¹ Principles of Philosophy, I., 48, 53; III., 2, 3; IV., 189, 196‒198. Hamilton’s Reid, note N.

Thus we have only a mediate perception of an external object: a representation of the object is all that is known to us, as it is that only which comes within the seat of the conscious mind. This mental representation of the external object is called an idea.¹ The organic movement at the point of junction in the brain may also metaphorically be called an impression, as it is the result of an external impulse, though at the same time it has no natural resemblance to the external object; it may be termed an image, as in some way suggesting the representation to the mind; or it may be named a corporeal species, though nothing similar to itself is transmitted from the object; or it may be styled an idea, though it is not the immediate object of the mind. If any one say that this theory of mediate perception retains no evidence of the reality of an external world consistent with the representations of our own minds, Descartes replies, that in consequence of our early and deep-rooted prejudices we are led to attribute to the immediate objects of our perceptions an external and chief, instead of internal and vicarious, existence. “Hence arose the belief that there was more substance or body in rocks and metals than in water or air, because the mind perceived in them more hardness and weight. Moreover, the air was thought to be merely nothing so long as we experienced no agitation of it by the wind, or did not feel it hot or cold. And because the stars gave hardly more light than the slender flames of candles, we supposed that each star was but of this size. Again, since the mind did not perceive that the earth moved on its axis, or that its superficies was curved like that of a globe, it was on that account more ready to judge the earth immovable and its surface flat.” Of course, he also appeals to the veracity of the ♦Deity.²

¹ But whether his idea is to be considered as having an existence independent of the mind or not, was a disputed point among Descartes’ followers.

♦ “Diety” replaced with “Deity”

² Principles of Philosophy, I., 66‒72.

Descartes used the term idea to denote both mental objects and mental acts, applying it indifferently to a material or a mental modification, in relation to sense and imagination. Hence throughout his writings this term appears under many relations and many different meanings. It is often employed as an object of consciousness, as a representative thought; while sometimes an objective and sometimes a subjective meaning is attached to it, and this in all degrees and relations of mind itself and its objects.

Touching his doctrine of innate ideas, which is a necessary part of his theory of body and mind, the hyperphysical element of his system, which he seems to have deemed requisite to cover and assist the purely mathematical and mechanical principles upon which his philosophy is essentially founded. By innate ideas he meant mental modifications existing in the mind prior to all experience, and that they come into consciousness whenever the mind begins to think and reflect. To the class of innate modifications belong the ideas of God, of substance, of unity, and others. These ideas might remain long inactive in the mind, but they always exist in it potentially. And it is in relation to these ideas that the veracity of the Deity is all-important, because a malign Creator could have made us believe innate falsehoods.¹

¹ “With respect to ideas, some of them appear to me to be innate.” Meditations III. “The mind first of all discovers within itself the ideas of many things ... the mind also discovers certain common notions out of which it frames various demonstrations that carry conviction to such a degree as to render doubt of their truth impossible, so long as we give attention to them. For example, the mind has within itself ideas of numbers and figures; and it has also among its common notions the principle that if equals be added to equals the whole will be equal, and the like.”――_Principles of Philosophy_, I., 13.

“In the first place, I discover that it is impossible for God ever to deceive me, for in all fraud and deceit there is some imperfection: and although it may seem that the ability to deceive is a mark of subtlety or power, yet the will testifies without doubt of malice and weakness; and such, accordingly, cannot be found in God. In the next place, I am conscious that I possess a certain faculty of judging or discerning truth from error, which I doubtless received from God, along with whatever else is mine; and since it is impossible that he should will to deceive me, it is likewise certain that he has not given me a faculty that will ever lead me into error, provided I use it aright.”――Meditations IV.

His exposition of the senses, or sensation, is comparatively brief, but interesting and important.

In his treatise on the passions, he admitted six primitive passions or emotions, namely, admiration, love, hate, desire, joy, and sadness. From these he sought to deduce all the other passions and emotions, but his exposition is mainly an echo of the views of Aristotle. He, however, stated that the most perfect of all emotions is intellectual love to God.

Touching ethics, Descartes expressly declined to produce a formal work, on the ground that it would be liable to violent and unfair criticism from his opponents; for a similar reason he refrained entirely from treating of religion or of faith, preferring, as he says, to adhere to the faith, and to submit to the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, in which he had been educated from childhood. Yet occasionally in his writings he touches on moral subjects, and in his letters on the sovereign good, in his criticism of Seneca, and in his treatise on the passions, he has indicated his ethical views. But he contributed nothing specially original in this department, as he approached the subject from the ancient standpoint, not from the modern, and he does not treat the question of the moral faculty, or moral obligation. Still his views, so far as they go, are generally wise and just.

But, as already indicated, the influence of Descartes did not quite depend on the positive results of his philosophy. The emphatic doubt at the threshold of his system was, in my opinion, the most influential element in his philosophy. He had many disciples and many opponents, while theologians generally were his bitterest enemies. Nevertheless, Cartesianism spread in France and held its ground till about the middle of the eighteenth century; while the influence of his system was felt in other countries of Europe, especially in Holland. As for the general tendency of his system in subsequent speculation and in literature, it appeared in idealism, rationalism, and especially in scepticism and nihilism.

The philosopher whose thought I have now to explain, Benedict Spinoza, is an interesting character, sprung from a remarkable race. He was born at Amsterdam, in November, 1632, a Jew by birth, and was carefully educated in the Jewish religion and in the Hebrew language and literature. But his energy of mind soon made him an object of suspicion amongst his brethren, and in his twenty-fourth year he was excommunicated, according to the Jewish ritual, from the Synagogue, and from all intercourse with any of the tribes of Israel.¹ He earned his livelihood by the art of grinding and polishing lenses for optical instruments, a kind of work at which he became very skilful. He was thus able to support himself in comparative ease and independence, as his wants were few, and his mode of life extremely simple.

¹ Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy, by F. Pollock, 1880. The chief authority for the life of Spinoza is John Colerus, a minister of the Lutheran Church, at the Hague, who first published his account of Spinoza in the Dutch language, in 1705, and it appeared in French in 1706 and 1733.

As he adopted a mathematical method, his system is deductive, and the chief characteristics of his philosophy may be stated briefly as follows. His fundamental conception is the unity of substance, and by this he meant that which is in itself and is conceived by itself. There is but one substance in the universe with infinite attributes, and that is God. Two only of the attributes of this substance are cognisable by man, namely, thought and extension: there is no extended substance really distinct from thinking substance. All individual existence is included among the changing modes of these attributes, but such existence does not belong to God, else he would be finite, and not absolute, since all determination is negation. God is the immanent cause of all things, and operates according to the inner necessity of his nature, and in this consists his freedom. But he produces all finite effects only indirectly by finite causes, and nowhere proceeds with a view to ends, and there is no such thing as human freedom apart from causality. All that can be said is, that one mode of extension merely acts upon another mode of extension, and one mode of thought upon another mode of thought, and so on continually throughout the universe. Between thought and extension, on the other hand, there is a complete agreement, as the order of thought is identical with the order and connection of things, each thought in every case being merely the idea of the corresponding mode of extension. Our ideas vary in clearness and in value from the confused representations of the imagination to the adequate knowledge of the intellect, which conceives all particulars from the standpoint of the whole which contains them, and comprehends all things under the form of eternity, and as necessary. From those confused mental representations which cannot rise above the finite, spring passions and the bondage of the will, while intellectual knowledge may assume the form of pure love to God, in which our happiness and freedom consist.¹

¹ Compare Ueberweg’s History of Philosophy, Volume II., page 55, 1874.

Spinoza’s first published work was an exposition of the principles of Descartes’ philosophy, which appeared in 1663. It contained the exposition of two parts of Descartes’ Principles, and a fragment of a third part, with an appendix of “Metaphysical Reflections.” He adopted the geometric method of statement and argument, and so far as he went, gave a pretty fair account of Descartes’ system. His next work was entitled “Tractatus Theologico-politicus,” 1670. It is an elaborate and able defence of freedom of thought and speech in matters of religion. His final contention was, that “in a free state it should be lawful for every man to think what he will and to speak what he thinks.” In the development of his own thoughts, Spinoza seems to have been much influenced by his study of Maimonides, yet the two philosophers held different views touching the Jewish Scriptures; Spinoza adopting a theory which permitted him to treat the Bible historically and critically, while the earlier philosopher maintained that the Law was given to the Jews as a revelation of the highest truths. He was the author of several other treatises, but his chief work is his Ethics.

Spinoza’s Ethics was not published till after his death, but it was written several years before; and he seems to have gradually elaborated it with much care. This work contains the fullest exposition of his system, and is divided into five parts, which treat respectively of God, of the nature and principle of the mind, of the source and nature of the affections, of human slavery or the power of the passions, and of human freedom or the power of the intellect. It is in this treatise that he developed his leading idea of substance and other subjects. But it is not at all an attractive work. The method of demonstration by definitions, axioms, propositions, postulates, corollaries, and scholia, is tedious and difficult to follow to the last degree. However, it is requisite to give some specimens of his method and form of thought.

In the first part of the Ethics, touching God, the following definitions are stated at the beginning:――“1. By self-caused I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that which cannot be conceived as non-existing. 2. A thing is called finite in its kind which can be limited by another of the same nature. 3. By substance I understand that which is self-contained and is conceived by itself. 4. By attribute I understand that which the mind perceives in substance as constituting its essence. 5. By mode I understand the affections of substance, or that which is in something else, through which it is apprehended. 6. By God I understand a Being absolutely infinite, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each expressing an eternal and infinite essence. 7. A thing is called free which by the sole necessity of its own nature is determined to action by itself alone, but constrained, if it is determined by something else, to exist and to act in a fixed manner. 8. By eternity I understand existence itself, so far as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition of an eternal thing.” The first definition is vague, for strictly speaking, the term self-caused is an irrational conception; because if anything is said to cause itself, it is assumed that it exists before itself, in order that it may cause itself. But Spinoza intended the definition to express the dependence of existence on essence; still the latter cannot cause the former, unless it already exists itself, thus what was to be caused already existed before being caused. The definition might have been put in this form: the first cause in the universe is self-existent and eternal and immutable in its essence. Others of his definitions involve inconsistencies, but it is unnecessary to go over them.

The axioms are next stated thus:――“1. All that is, is either in itself, or in some other than itself. 2. That which cannot be conceived by another thing, must be conceived by itself. 3. From a determinate cause an effect must follow; without such a cause no effect can follow. 4. Knowledge of an effect depends on the knowledge of the cause and involves the same. 5. Things that have nothing in common cannot explain each other. 6. A true idea must agree with its object. 7. Everything that can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve existence.”

From these definitions and axioms, he proceeded in a series of propositions to develop his ideas of God and the universe. These propositions extend to thirty-six, and he attempted throughout to give them the form and the reality of demonstrations.

His main conclusions in this part of the Ethics are these:――“Besides God, no substance can exist or be conceived to exist. Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be, nor can anything be conceived to be, without God.” He demonstrated this at some length, using geometrical illustrations, and then enunciated that “God acts by the sole laws of his own nature, and by constraint of nothing. God is the immanent indwelling, not the outside, cause of all things. God and all his attributes are eternal. The existence and the essence of God are one and the same thing. All that follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must have existed from eternity. God is not only the efficient cause of the existence of things, but also their essence. The thing that is determined to effect anything is necessarily so determined by God, and that which is not determined by God cannot determine itself to act, and therefore ♦the thing that is determined by God to do anything cannot render itself undetermined. The individual finite thing that has determinate existence cannot be determined to exist and act, unless it be itself determined to exist and act by another cause, which is also finite and possessed of determinate existence, and this cause again can neither exist nor be determined to act save by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence, and this yet again by another, and so on to infinity. In the nature of things there is no contingency; as all things are determined by the necessity of the Divine nature to exist and to act in a definite manner.”

♦ duplicate word “the” removed

“Understanding, whether as finite or infinite, must comprehend the attributes and the affections of God, and nothing else. Will cannot be called a free cause, but a necessary cause only. Things could have been produced by God in no other order than as they have been produced. Nothing exists from the nature of which some effect does not follow.” These are some of the principal ideas which Spinoza essayed to demonstrate; but at the end of this part of his work, he was aware that many prejudices existed among mankind, which would prevent them from adopting his views; and therefore he deemed it worth his trouble to examine such prejudices more fully in an appendix, in which he assailed the doctrine of final causes, and exerted his power of sarcasm to extinguish it.

He began the second part of his Ethics, on the nature and origin of the mind, as before, with definitions and axioms; and then proceeded to demonstrate his views in a series of propositions. The first four propositions are couched in the following terms:――“Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking entity. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended being. The idea of his own essence, as all things that necessarily follow from it, necessarily exist in God. The idea of God whence infinities follow in infinite modes can only be single.” The idea of an individual thing existing in act is considered as effected by another idea of an individual thing existing in act, of which God is also the cause, in so far as he is effected by a third idea existing in act, and so on to infinity; the order and chain of ideas and causes being the same throughout the universe.

“The human mind does not know the human body in itself, nor does it know that the body exists except through the ideas of the affections by which the body is influenced. There is also present in God an idea or consciousness of the human mind, and this follows in the same way, and is referred to God in the same manner, as the idea of consciousness of the human body. This idea of the mind is united with the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united with the body. The mind not only perceives the affections of the body, but the ideas of these affections also. The mind has no consciousness of itself, save in so far as it perceives ideas of the affections of the body. The human mind involves no adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body. The idea of each affection of the human body does not involve knowledge of an external body. The human mind perceives no external body as existing in fact, save through ideas of affections of the body. The idea of any state or affection of the human body does not involve the adequate cognition of the human body itself. Ideas of the affections of the human body, in so far as they are referred to the mind only, are not clear and distinct, but confused. The idea of each of the affections of the human body does not involve the adequate cognition of the human mind. All ideas in so far as they are referred to God, are true. Falsehood consists in the absence of the cognition which inadequate and confused ideas involve. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity as clear and distinct ones.”

All these statements are elaborated at length. Then he distinguished three degrees of cognition. First, opinion, which is the development of perceptions and general notions from the impression of the senses, represented to the understanding confusedly, or through certain words retained in the memory, which may represent imperfect ideas of things. The second kind of cognition he called reason, which consists of common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things. The third and highest kind of cognition is intuition, which proceeds from the adequate idea of the real essence of some of the attributes of God, to the requisite cognition of the essence of things. Cognitions of the first kind may be uncertain or untrue; those of the second and third kind are necessarily true, and teach us to distinguish the true from the false. He who has a true idea, is at the same time certain of its truth. The human mind in so far as it has true ideas, is a part of the infinite intellect of God; and so its clear and distinct ideas are as necessarily true as are the ideas of God.¹ As reason considers things as they really are in themselves, it concludes that they are not contingent but necessary. This necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, reason apprehends things under a certain form of eternity. Every idea of an actual concrete object necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God, which pervades all alike, and is therefore adequately cognised by the human mind.

¹ The very core of Cartesianism.

But there is no such thing in the mind as free-will, since it is a certain and determined mode of thought. “It is determined to will this or that by a cause which is determined by another cause, this by another, and so on to infinity.” The will to affirm or deny ideas is not a mere causeless act, it is the necessary consequence of the ideas; as distinct volitions and ideas are identical, so also are will and understanding one and the same.

The third part of the Ethics, treating on the affections and the emotions, as usual opened with definitions. By affections and emotions, he meant states of the body, whereby its power to act is increased or diminished, aided or controlled, together with the mental ideas of these affections. Opposing natures which would destroy each other cannot exist in the same individual; and each individual thing as far as it can strives to conserve its life. The idea of anything which increases or diminishes the power of the body to act, in an equal degree increases or diminishes the thinking power of the mind; hence the mind strives to imagine such things as increase the power of the body to act. Desire is conscious appetite, and appetite is the very essence of man, in so far as he is determined to those actions that subserve his own preservation.

Spinoza gave a wide meaning to the word desire, including under it efforts, impulses, appetites, and volitions of every kind. Still this part of his work is the most valuable portion of his philosophy.

He recognised only three primary affections, namely, joy, sorrow, and desire. Joy is explained as the transition from a less to a higher state of perfection, while a change in the opposite sense causes sorrow. Love is joy associated with the idea of an external object. Hate is sorrow accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Liking is joy accompanied by the idea of an object which is accidentally the cause of joy. Devotion is love of that which we admire. Scorn is pleasure sprung from this――that something we despise is imagined in the thing we hate. Hope is wavering joy sprung from an idea of something past or to come, of the issue of which we are more or less in doubt. Fear is unstable sorrow arising from the idea of something past or future, of the issue of which we are in some degree doubtful. Security is joy derived from the idea of something past or future in connection with which all cause of doubt is removed. Despair is sorrow sprung from the idea of a future or past thing combined with no cause of doubt. Thus it appears, that security may be associated with hope, and despair with fear. Sympathy is love so affecting man that he rejoices in another’s weal, and on the other side, grieves over another’s woe.

Thus his descriptions of the affections are generally brief, but careful and well stated. His general description of the affections is to this effect: “The affection which is characterised as a passion of the mind is a confused idea, whereby the mind affirms a stronger or weaker power of existing than was before experienced in its body, or some parts of its body, and which being affirmed, the mind itself is determined to think of this thing rather than of that.” He also stated that all our ideas of bodies rather proclaim the actual constitution of our own body than the nature of any external body, and that those ideas which constitute emotional forms must indicate or express the constitution of the body, or some of its parts, increasing or diminishing its power of acting.

The fourth part of the Ethics treated on the strength of the affections, or human slavery, by which he meant that man is impotent in the direction and the restraint of his own passions. In his introduction to this part, he says: “I call man’s inability to moderate and to control the affective and emotional element in his nature, Slavery. For man under the dominion of his affections is not master of himself, but is controlled by fate, as it were, so that in seeing and even in approving of the better course, he, nevertheless, feels himself constrained to follow the worse.” He repeats his view that there is no final causes or free-will, and then states: “We have shown that nature does not act with a purpose, for the eternal and infinite Being whom we call God, or Nature, as he exists of necessity, so does he act of necessity; and we have shown that by the same necessity that God exists, by the same necessity does he act. The reason, therefore, why God exists and why he acts, is one and the same, and as he does not exist for any end or purpose, so he does not act for any end or purpose; for as he is without beginning or end, as regards his existence, so is he infinite and eternal as regards his acts. Now a final cause, as it is called, is nothing but a human appetite or desire, considered as the cause of anything.”

In this part, his moral views are mainly founded on the following definitions of good and evil:――“By good I understand that which we know to be useful to us. By evil I understand that which we know prevents us from enjoying something good.” The knowledge of good and evil is nothing more than an emotion of joy or of sorrow, so far as we are conscious of this; hence we call that good or evil which favours or opposes the continuance of our life, or anything which assists or hinders our powers of action. To act virtuously is merely to act for our own life, and to preserve ourselves by the dictates of reason. Man always seeks to preserve his life for the sake of nothing but that which he thinks useful to him. The mind in so far as it reasons, desires nothing but to understand; nor does it judge anything to be useful to it save that which leads to understanding――and therefore we know nothing certainly as good save that which leads truly to understanding; and on the other hand, nothing is evil save that which prevents us from understanding. “The supreme good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the highest virtue is to know God.” This is the highest knowledge that the human mind can attain. “Therefore that which is supremely useful or good to the mind is the knowledge of God ... the absolute virtue or power of the mind is, therefore, to understand. But the height of the mind’s understanding is God; consequently, the supreme power of the mind is to know God.”

We call that evil which is the cause of grief or pain to us. In so far as anything agrees with our nature, so far it is good; hence the more that anything accords with our nature, the more useful it is to us, and the more it is good; and so the more useful anything is to us, the more does it agree with our nature. “Nothing, therefore, save in so far as it accords with our nature, can be good; even as the more a thing accords with our nature, the more useful it is.”

The good that the virtuous man desires for himself he also desires for his fellow-men, and this the more ardently as he has a high cognition of God. “Therefore does the votary of virtue desire for all men the good he desires for himself.... Thus, therefore, the greater the conception of God involved in the essence of the mind, the greater will be the desire of the disciple of virtue that any good he enjoys himself should also be enjoyed by others.” Moreover, “the good which a man desires, he will love and desire more constantly if he see that others love and desire it also; and so he will strive to make others love it; and because this good is common to all, and all may equally share it, he will further strive that all should enjoy it, and this so much the more as he himself enjoys it the more.”

All that conduces to the order of society, and tends to make men live in amity, is good; while whatever brings disorder into the state is evil, as everything that causes men to live amicably together, at the same time causes them to live in conformity with reason, and is therefore good. “The man led by reason is freer when he lives as a member of a community under compact and bond of law, than when he lives in solitude and obeys himself alone.... The man, therefore, who is led by reason and desire to live in freedom is careful to observe the common laws of his country.”

To make this part of his work more clear and compact, he gave in an appendix an excellent summary of the whole, and concluded with the following:――

“Man’s power is very limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; and, therefore, we have no absolute power of adapting to our own use things external to ourselves. Still, we should bear with an even mind that which befalls us against the conditions of our advantage, if we are aware that we have fairly done our duty, and that the power we possess could not have gone so far as to avoid those evils, and that we are a part of the whole order of nature, and bound thereby. And understanding this much clearly and distinctly that the part of us which is called intellect, our better part, will therein be contented, and will seek to persist in that content. For, so far as we understand, we consider only that which is necessary, and can rest in nothing but the truth, and, therefore, so far as we rightly understand these things, the endeavour of our better part accords with the universal order of nature.”

The fifth and last part of the Ethics treats on the power of the understanding or human freedom. He repeated his doctrine that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order of things.¹ Spinoza’s aim in this part is mainly to expound the relation between emotion and reason, the power of the latter over the energy of the former. A passion itself is a confused idea, but whenever we are able to form a clear and distinct idea of it, it ceases to be a passion; hence it follows that to know the passions is the best way to restrain them; understand the passions that you may be master of them. The more that the mind recognises all things as necessary, the less does it suffer from the passions. He who clearly and distinctly knows himself and his passions, rejoices, because such knowledge is accompanied with the idea of God. The love of God ought chiefly to fill the mind, as it is associated with all the higher emotions. “God is without passions or any emotion of joy or sorrow, because all ideas so far as they are referred to God are true; again, God cannot pass from a greater to a less, or from a less to a greater state of perfection. Therefore, as God is not affected by joy nor sorrow, he can neither love or hate anyone. No one can hate God, because the idea of God within us is adequate and perfect; and so far as we contemplate him, to that extent do we act, and consequently, there can be no pain associated with the idea of God. He that loves God cannot seek that God should love him in return; because if man looked for this, he would thereby desire that God should not be God. This love towards God is the highest good which man under the dictates of reason can desire; it is common to all mankind, and we can wish that all should enjoy it as much as ourselves; thus the love of God is not liable to be narrowed by envy or jealousy, on the contrary, it must be cherished the more, the greater the number of our fellow-men we imagine to enjoy it.”

¹ This identity of thought with the order of development in things was adopted by Hegel.

Touching the duration of the human mind, though it cannot remember anything that is past, save during the continuance of the body, yet, as God is the cause of its existence, and also of its essence, there is an idea in God which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity. Thus the human mind cannot be wholly destroyed with the body, something of it survives which is eternal. This idea which expresses the essence of body under the form of eternity is a certain mode of thought belonging to the essence of the mind, and necessarily eternal. This, however, cannot be determined by a reference to duration in time, as we cannot remember to have existed before our bodies; nevertheless we feel and are persuaded that we are eternal, as the ground of this feeling and conception is logical demonstration. Our mind can only be said to endure, and its existence to be limited to a certain time, in so far as the existence of the body is involved, and thus far only has the mind the power of apprehending things under the form of time.

The highest effort of the mind and the highest virtue is to understand things through the most perfect kind of cognition; and this is the cognition proceeding from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate conception of the essence of things, and the more we comprehend things in this way, the more we know of God. The more apt the mind is to know things in this way the greater its desire for such knowledge, and from this springs the highest satisfaction of the mind. “Our mind in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity, thus far has it a requisite knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is conceived through God. This kind of intuitive cognition depends on the mind itself as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal. The farther we advance in this kind of knowledge, the more conscious are we of ourselves and of God, we take delight in it, and our joy is associated with the idea of God as its cause. From this intuitive cognition arises the intellectual love of God, which is eternal. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love. The intellectual love of the mind for God is the very love of God――the love wherewith God loves himself, not as He is infinite, but as He can be interpreted by the essence of the human mind considered under the form of eternity; that is, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves Himself. Hence it follows, that in so far as God loves Himself, He loves mankind, and that the love of God for man, and the intellectual love of the mind of man for God, are one and the same. From this we clearly understand wherein consists our salvation, our happiness, and our liberty. It is this eternal love of God, which in sacred scripture is spoken of as glory, and with truth, for whether it be referred to the mind of man or of God, it is rightly designated peace of mind, which, in fact, is not to be distinguished from the glory of scripture. There is nothing in nature opposed to this intellectual love, or to abrogate it, and the greater the number of things that the mind knows, according to the second and the third kinds of cognition, the less does it suffer from evil passions, and the less does it fear death.”

He touched on other points of interest to this effect. Inasmuch as the most perfect peace of mind arises from intuitive cognition, it follows that the human mind may be of such a nature that what we have shown to be liable to pass away and perish with the body, when contrasted with what remains, may be of no significance. He who has a mind capable of many things, has a mind the greatest part of which is eternal. Inasmuch as human bodies are capable of a great variety of actions, it is not doubtful that their nature may be such as to be referable to minds which have extensive knowledge of God and of themselves, and of which the principal part is eternal, so that they have scarcely any fear of death. The more perfect anything is it is the more real, and the more active it is the less it suffers; hence the more perfect a thing is the more active it is. From this it is assumed to follow that the part of the mind which remains after the death of the body, whatever be its quantity, is more perfect than the rest. Now, the eternal part of the mind is the understanding, by which we say that we act, but the part that perishes we have shown to be that wherewith the imagination is connected.

From what is stated above, and in other parts of his works, it appears that the human mind, in so far as it is possessed of understanding, is an eternal mode of thought, which is determined by another eternal mode of thought, this by another, and so on to infinity――so that all together constitute the eternal and infinite intelligence of God. Thus, whatever portion of the mind of man may survive the body, is merged in the divine mind. It has no conscious or distinct existence of its own. It is merely a mode of thought controlled by another and another mode of thought till united and centred in the one eternal essence of the universe.

Spinoza then made some remarks on what he had stated on morality in other parts of the work, and concluded with these words: “Herewith I have finished all that I proposed to say touching the power of the mind over the emotions and her freedom. Whence it is evident how great is the wise man’s power and his advantage over the ignorant man who is driven by blind desire. For as such a man is distracted by external influences, and in many ways besides, and never attains true contentment in his soul; he lives, as it were, without sense of himself and God and the nature of things, and no sooner ceases to suffer than he ceases to be. Whereas the wise man, if we take him as such, is of a constant mind, and being aware of himself and of God and the nature of things in a way of eternal necessity, does never cease to be, but is ever in possession of true contentment. And if the way I have shown to lead hither seems exceedingly hard, yet it may be discovered. That truly must be hard which is seldom found. For if salvation were so easy and could be found with little trouble, how should it come to pass that nearly all mankind neglect it? But every excellent work is as difficult as it is rare.” Thus, in the final result, Spinoza came near to the Stoics’ position: which is, that the way is open to everyone alike, but as things stand, the mass of mankind are ruled by the coarser motives, which alone they appreciate. He does not seem to have believed in any great improvement of the body of mankind; and considering the state of Europe in his day, and all the circumstances around him, who could blame him? Even now and here, it must be confessed that the most sanguine thinker, and the most hopeful reformer, frequently meet with many things which might shake the confidence of the firmest mind and the warmest heart.

Viewing Spinoza’s work as a system of the universe, or as a philosophy of existence, it falls far short of its end. Both in its principles and in its details it is defective, and it contains many inconsistencies which have often been pointed out.

But it is chiefly as a moral system that it is interesting to us. Though he treated many moral points ably and fairly, and freely admitted and even insisted on the value of the principle of utility, yet the defects of his system, considered as a moral philosophy, are obvious. If morality and religion are related subjects, which in various ways strengthen each other, then little can be made of his system――since a God of infinite and eternal existence, of infinite intelligence and perfection, but without will or purpose, or moral attributes of any kind, could hardly be an object of worship to ordinary men. But apart from this, and taking morality in the narrowest sense, his ethical system is defective in many points, which it is needless to particularise.

Spinoza in several parts of his writings greatly underrated the complexity of the problems of ethical and political science. He nowhere signalised the distinction between positive morality and positive law. He was often astonishingly wrong in believing that he had found a short road to certain and perfect knowledge, and this is especially noticeable in his treatment of politics. He thought that no important experiment in politics remained to be tried that had not been already discovered and attempted. He manifested no grasp of the method of the gradual development of society and political institutions; such shortcomings, however, were common to the philosophers of the period.

But finally, as a philosopher, and as a man, Spinoza manifested great moral energy and force of character. He was gifted with an intellect of a keen and original cast, though not of the most comprehensive and highest order. His doctrine of the eternity of the human mind is one of the boldest efforts of speculative thought on record, and exhibited a grasp of mind rarely attained, while it has produced memorable results. His identification of the human mind with God seems to have suggested the speculations of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel touching the comprehension of the Absolute or God, which raised such a stir in Germany and in France in the first half of the present century; and, indeed, historically, Spinoza’s writings have had much influence in various directions.

An account of Spinoza’s philosophy is given in the chief histories of philosophy, and there are several works which specially treat on his system, among which may be mentioned, Pollock’s Life and Philosophy of Spinoza, 1880; Willis’s Life, Correspondence, and Ethics of Spinoza, 1870; and others in French and German. Soon after the publication of Spinoza’s system, a considerable number of works appeared in which his views were combated. Though not at all a believer in the philosophy of Spinoza myself, nevertheless, I can honestly join with Schleiermacher, who said:――“Offer reverentially with me a lock to the manes of the holy, rejected Spinoza! He was filled with the lofty world-spirit; the infinite was his beginning and his end; the universe his only and eternal love. In holy innocence and deep humility he saw himself in the mirror of the eternal world, and saw how he too was its most lovely mirror; full of religion was he, and full of holy spirit, and hence he stands there alone and unrivalled, master in his art, but exalted above the profane guild, without disciples and without civil right.”

Leibnitz, a contemporary of Spinoza, is usually regarded as the founder of the German philosophy of the eighteenth century.¹ He attained to eminence both in philosophy and in mathematics, and wrote on many subjects. But he nowhere developed his philosophical views in a systematic and complete form; a mere summary of his doctrines was presented in his exposition of the monadology.

¹ Born 1646, and died 1716. A list of the books which specially treat on the life, the writings, and the philosophy of Leibnitz, is given in the second volume, Ueberweg’s _History of Philosophy_, pages 94‒96.

He adopted the dogmatic form of philosophising, that is, he believed that the power of human thought, when aided by clear and distinct ideas, could transcend the limits of experience, and attain to perfect truth. But he overstepped both the dualism of Descartes and the monism of Spinoza, by the recognition of a graduated scale of beings. Eternal truths are in the divine understanding, distinct from the divine will; the divine mind being the source of the possibility of things, while the divine will is the cause of their reality; and hence all truth must by its nature be rational. In psychology he adopted a form of the doctrine of innate ideas, associated with the principles of identity and contradiction. Error arises from a want of clearness and distinctness; while dark and confused knowledge may be raised by demonstration to clearness and distinctness.

The aim of his theory of monads¹ is to ascertain the existence and to determine the nature of the simplest elements of substance, into which all other things and beings might be resolved. The primary monads seem to be something like atoms, or units of matter and of mind, endowed with life and ideas. All the monads have ideas, but of different degrees of clearness. God is the first monad, the primitive substance, and all His ideas are perfect. The souls of animals have sensation and memory. Every soul is a monad, as its power of acting proves its substantiality, and all substances are monads. Inorganic nature is merely an aggregate of undeveloped monads, while plants and minerals are a kind of sleeping monads with unconscious ideas; but in plants these ideas are formative forces. Man is a monad that has been waked up. The monads are not distinguishable in kind, but only in degree; the difference between them consists in the separate stages of development which each has attained. Every conscious monad has the clearest perception of those parts of the universe to which it is most nearly related; and thus from its own standpoint it is a mirror of the universe.

¹ Leibnitz seems to have borrowed the term monads from Bruno; see page 400.

His theory of “pre-established harmony” is thus expressed by himself: ――“Every body acts as if there were no soul, and every soul acts as if there were no body; and yet both act as if each was influenced by the other.” So between the succession of the ideas, and the motions of the monad, there is a harmony pre-established by God. The soul and body of man agree, as it were, like the two clocks originally set together, and exactly moving at the same rate. In the same way each part of the universe harmonises with every other part. Creation simply consisted in first establishing, once for all, the laws of this unity and harmony; everything being arranged, the parts assigned to their places, every thought and every motion having been foreseen and provided for, when the universe was first called into existence. The existing world, therefore, is the best of all possible worlds, whether our limited minds can understand it in this light or not. The continuity of physical law is never broken, and yet the moral world is in harmony with the physical world, as the course of nature in all cases must be in accord with the highest interest of the soul.¹

¹ Compare Stewart’s Dissertion, pages 254‒257, 560‒561, edition, 1854; and Ueberweg’s History of Philosophy, Volume II., pages 106‒113.

Though Leibnitz endeavoured to unite the cosmological and the theological ideas, the origin of the world from God, and its explanation by physical laws, yet he completely failed to establish a real harmony of the two conceptions; as everyone before and after him has failed in their attempts to unite opposite elements in one conception. The inconsistencies of his philosophy have often been exposed; nevertheless, it is only justice to state that his writings contained many valuable suggestions, which subsequently proved to be true.¹

¹ For instance, his view of the unconscious modifications of the mind, or latent mental modifications.

Bayle, the author of the Historical and Critical Dictionary, exercised a pretty wide influence on philosophical opinions.¹ He had a sceptical cast of mind, and directed his shafts against all forms of dogmatism, often indulging in sallies of ironical humour. He was a man of considerable erudition, an acute critic, and endowed with much logical tact and metaphysical subtlety. There are other philosophers whose works I should have deemed it necessary to notice, if I had been writing a complete history of philosophy, such as Malebranche, De la Forge, Sylvain Regis, Arnauld, P. Nicole, Pascal, Du Hamel, Wolff, and others.

¹ Born 1647, died 1706.

Turning to English philosophy, it may be noted that at the present time many in England are conversant with the philosophy of Germany and of France; and the influence of the speculations of both these nations on the English thought of the nineteenth century is probably much greater than is commonly believed. While in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially in the latter, English philosophy greatly influenced the philosophy of France, and in a less degree that of Germany, and in the present century all sides have influenced each other; although it appears that German speculation has recently been in the ascendant in some quarters of England, and even in Scotland.

The place of Lord Bacon in the history of philosophy has often been very differently estimated, according to the standpoint of those who have essayed to discuss the subject.¹ Bacon’s avowed aim was to increase the power of man by enlarging the range of his knowledge. But to affect this, the mind must be freed from prejudice and superstition of every sort, so that it may be enabled to apprehend things in their real relations. Knowledge must begin with experience, starting from observation and experiment, whence by induction it should proceed methodically, first to the simpler propositions, and then to others of higher generality, rising gradually step by step to higher universality; and then finally, from these to descend to the particular, and thus to arrive at discoveries which should extend the power of man over nature. To attain such results he insisted strongly on the value and the necessity of a patient collection and accurate comparison of facts.

¹ Born 1561, died 1625.

Bacon’s plan for the reorganisation of the sciences embraced a general review of the whole intellectual field. This was followed by his doctrine of method, and then by an exposition of the sciences themselves, with their application to new discoveries. His conception was grand, and his end highly laudable; but the development of the principles of his method is far from complete. His own attempts at original investigation in applying his method is often crude, and fall much below some of the efforts of his own contemporaries. Still, he succeeded in indicating several of the fundamental points of induction; and thus he became the founder of the empirical school of modern philosophers, though he himself was greater as a critic than as a philosopher. His greatest merit was that he emphatically insisted on the importance of the collection, arrangement, and comparison of facts. On the other hand, he undervalued the method of deduction, and the value of the syllogism for deductive and mediate knowledge.

His writings have had much influence in Britain, and in other countries of Europe, especially in France; and thus his method of induction has contributed at home and abroad to the progress of physical science.¹

¹ An excellent account of Bacon and his philosophy is given by Kuno Fischer in a work entitled, “Franz Baco von Verulam, die Real-philosophie und ihr Zeitalter,” 1856.

The eccentric Lord Herbert of Cherbury was a writer of some note.¹ In his remarkable work, “De Veritate,” he treated on various points of mental philosophy. He distinguished the faculties of the mind into four, namely, natural instinct, the inner sense, the external sense, and the discursive faculty. Each of these powers affords a certain class of truths, and all truth must become known to us through one or other of these faculties. But the truths of natural instinct are relatively higher and more certain than any other. By this faculty (which might have been called intellectual instinct) we apprehend the common notions touching the relations of things, and especially those which tend to our own preservation. They are implanted in us by nature, and represent something of the divine image and wisdom. They are primary notions, since they are necessary, independent, universal, certain, and instantaneous in their manifestation.

¹ Born 1581, died 1648.

The inner sense under the direction of natural instinct, or the common notions, embraces all the powers which are associated with the particular forms of the agreeable and the disagreeable, of good and evil, whether these are dependent on the body or on the mind. The chief internal sense is conscience, which judges what is good and evil in their various relations, and thus determines what ought to be done.

The external senses depend on the special effects of external objects upon our external organs, jointly with the corresponding internal senses and the natural instincts. The discursive faculty gives that knowledge of objects presented by the internal and external senses, which depends on special capacities for investigation, and on the common notions; and it has reference to existence, qualities, quantities, relations, and especially to their causes.

He was also the author of several religious treatises and historical works. He distinguished man from animals, not merely by the gift of reason, but specially by the capacity of religion, which is peculiar to the former. He held that all men had the five following notions of religion:――That there is a God; that He ought to be worshipped; that virtue and piety are the chief elements of worship; that repentance is a duty; and that there is a future life, with rewards and punishments. He maintained that a revelation is possible to individuals, and affirmed that a special revelation was made to himself; but, since nothing can be admitted as revealed which contradicts the five common notions, and anything beyond these can be of no importance to the human race, therefore, no such revelation should be made public. His views had some influence on the subsequent lines of English thought, and he has sometimes been signalised as the earliest of that class of writers called the English Deists.

But the most famous English philosopher of the Rebellion period was Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Born in 1588, he was in the prime of life when the struggle between the parliament and Charles I. began in earnest. Hobbes firmly maintained the view that the King had an unquestionable right to absolute and supreme power in the State; and it is palpably evident that his philosophy, and especially his political and religious speculations, were much influenced by the struggles of his own day in England. He was deeply touched by the sight which the Civil War presented, and the imprisonment and execution of the King, the religious rancour and the hypocrisy which were mingled in the conflict, and the consequent suffering of the nation. In such circumstances, with his prepossessions, it would be unreasonable to expect from him sound opinions and conclusions on politics; nevertheless, he was an original thinker of great power, and a man of varied accomplishments. None of his philosophical or political works were published till he was past fifty years of age, so they were not the crude performances of youth, but the deliberate outcome of his matured thought. In his different treatises and works, however, he again and again repeated his chief psychological views and political doctrines, in slightly varied language, but identically the same in ideas and thought.

In his “Elements of Philosophy,” published in 1655, and divided into four parts, which treated of logic, of the first grounds of philosophy, of the proportions of motions and magnitudes, and of physics, he defines philosophy as the knowledge of effects by their causes, and of causes from their observed effects, by means of true inferences. The end of philosophy is the application of our knowledge of effects to the utmost of our strength, for the benefit of human life, as the end of knowledge is power, which should result in action. The utility of philosophy is especially seen in physical science, in geometry, in astronomy, and in navigation. From his conception of philosophy, he excluded the doctrine of God, because He is “eternal, ingenerable, incomprehensible, and in Whom there is nothing either to divide or compound, or any generation to be conceived”;¹ and also knowledge acquired by divine inspiration, and all false doctrines, such as astrology and divinations: for all that which we know by legitimate deduction can neither be false nor doubtful. I may state that Hobbes’s idea of God was entirely negative. In his “Leviathan,” after running over a number of terms and expressions which should not be applied to God, he says:――“He that will attribute to God nothing but what is warranted by natural reason, must either use such negative attributes as infinite, eternal, incomprehensible; or most high, most great; or indefinite, as good, just, holy; and in such sense as if he meant not to declare what he is.... There is but one name to signify our conception of his nature, and that is, I AM; and but one name of his relation to us, and that is God.” He distinguished philosophy into natural and civil. But in order to understand the properties of a commonwealth, it is necessary first to know the dispositions and manners of men; and so civil philosophy is divided into two parts, the one treating of men’s dispositions and manners, called ethics, and the other treating of their civil duties, called political philosophy.² In the Leviathan, published in 1651, he gives a kind of classification of the sciences, a pretty complete formulation of the knowledge and science of the time. He reduced everything to consequences. Matter or bodies being assumed, motion and quantity are placed at the top of the scale; while consequences from quantity, and motion indeterminate, which being the principles or first foundation of philosophy, “philosophia prima,” forms the basis of the whole. Then follow consequences from quantity, and motion determined――Mathematics, Geometry; consequences from motion and quantity determined――Cosmography, Astronomy, Geography, and so on, politics being classed with physics as a part of natural philosophy.³

¹ Part I., Chapter I., Section 2, et seq. All my references are to the collective ♦edition of Hobbes’s English works, by Sir William Molesworth.

♦ “dition” replaced with “edition”

² Leviathan, Part II., Chapter XXXI.

³ Part I., Chapter IX.

Thinking or reasoning is merely a process of computation, of addition and subtraction. He says, “to compute is either to collect the sum of many things that are added together, or to know what remains when one thing is taken out of another. Ratiocination, therefore, is the same with addition and subtraction; and if any man add multiplication and division, I will not be against it, seeing multiplication is nothing but addition of equals one to another, and division nothing but a subtraction of equals one from another, as often as possible. So that all ratiocination is comprehended in these two operations of the mind, addition and subtraction.” The same doctrine is stated in his “Leviathan,” and illustrated as applicable to all things that can be added together, or taken one out of another. Thus, “writers of politics add together pactions to find men’s duties; and lawyers, laws and facts, to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men. In sum, in whatever matter there is place for addition and subtraction, there also is place for reason; and where these have no place, there reason has nothing at all to do.” Finally, reason considered as a faculty of the mind, is nothing but reckoning, “that is, adding and subtracting of the consequences of general names agreed upon for marking and signifying of our thoughts: I say, marking them, when we reckon by ourselves, and signifying, when we demonstrate our reckonings to other men.”¹

¹ Elements of Philosophy, Part I., Chapter I., Section 2. Leviathan, Chapter V., page 30.

This was Hobbes’s form of nominalistic doctrine, and he has some good remarks on names, the use of words, and the use and abuse of speech. He explained this branch of knowledge both in the “Elements of Philosophy” and in the “Leviathan” in the former at length, and in the latter briefly. “The general use of speech is to transfer our mental discourse into verbal, or the train of our thoughts into a train of words; and that for two purposes, whereof one is the registering of the consequences of our thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they were marked by. So that the first use of names is to serve for marks or notes of remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words, to signify, by their connection and order, one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, fear, or have any other passion for. And for this use they are called signs. Special uses of speech are these: first to register what by cogitation we find to be the cause of anything, present or past, and what we find things present or past may produce or effect; which in sum, is acquiring of art. Secondly, to show to others that knowledge which we have attained, which is, to counsel and teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills and purposes, that we may have the mutual help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight ourselves and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.” To these uses of speech there are four corresponding abuses. When we register our thoughts wrong, by using improper words, and stating as our conception that which we never conceived, and thus deceive ourselves; when we use words in an unusual sense, and thereby deceive others; when we declare by words that to be true which we know to be false; when people use words to grieve one another: “for seeing nature has armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of speech to grieve him with the tongue, unless it be one whom we are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and to amend.”

He explained the use of different kinds of names, the necessity of definitions, and stated that everything which can enter into an account may be considered a subject for names. He gave four forms or scales of predicaments under the heads of body, quantity, quality, and relation, which are formed with great care. And further, he explained negative words, and then added: “All other names are but insignificant sounds, and those of two sorts; one when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by definition, whereof there have been abundance coined by schoolmen and puzzled philosophers.”¹

¹ Elements of Philosophy, Part I., Chapter II.; Leviathan, Part I., Chapter IV.; also his treatise Human Nature, Chapter V.

Motion is the prime and fundamental idea in Hobbes’s philosophy. It runs through all his writings, and enters into almost every explanation which he has given of anything. He treated sense and sensation at length as a part of physics in his “Elements of Philosophy,” and in almost all his different works he touches more or less on this subject. His psychology has the merit of being pretty distinct; as sensation and thought both proceed from motion, their explanation is not a difficult matter. Concerning sense, he says: “I have shown that no motion is generated but by a body contagious and moved: whence it is manifest that the immediate cause of sense or perception consists in this, that the first organ of sense is touched or pressed. For when the uttermost part of the organ is pressed, it no sooner yields but the part next within it is pressed also; and, in this manner, the pressure or motion is propagated through all the parts of the organ to the innermost. And thus, also, the pressure of the uttermost part proceeds from the pressure of some remote body, and so continually till we come to that from which, as from its fountain, we derive the phantasm or idea that is made in us by our sense. And this, whatever it be, is what we commonly call the object. Sense, therefore, is some internal motion in the sentient, generated by some internal motion of the parts of the object, and propagated through all the media to the innermost part of the organ.... Moreover, I have shown that all resistance is endeavour opposite to another endeavour, that is to say, reaction...; so that when that endeavour inwards is the last action in the act of sense, then from the reaction, however little the duration of it be, a phantasm or idea has its being; which, by reason that the endeavour is now outwards, does always appear as something placed without the organ.” ... Then we get this definition: “Sense is a phantasm made by the reaction and endeavour outwards in the organ of sense, caused by an endeavour inwards from the object, remaining for some time more or less.” How much importance he attached to motion in the derivation of sensation, ideas, and thought is indicated in the following passages: “Now [that] all mutation or alteration is motion or endeavour (and endeavour also is motion), in the internal parts of the thing that is altered, as has been proved.... Sense, therefore, in the sentient, can be nothing else but motion in some of the internal parts of the sentient, and the parts so moved are parts of the organs of sense.” Again, “the original of life being in the heart, that motion in the sentient, which is propagated to the heart, must necessarily make some alteration or diversion of vital motion, namely, by quickening or slackening, helping or hindering the same. Now, when it helps, it is pleasure; when it hinders, it is pain, trouble, grief, and so on.... Now vital motion is the motion of the blood, perpetually circulating (as has been shown from many infallible signs and marks by Dr. Harvey, the first observer of it) in the veins and arteries. Which motion, when it is hindered by some other motion, made by the action of sensible objects, may be restored again, either by bending or setting straight the parts of the body; which is done when the spirits are carried now into these, now into other nerves, till the pain, as far as is possible, be quite taken away. But if vital motion be helped by motion made by sense, then the parts of the organ will be disposed to guide the spirits in such manner as conduces most to the preservation and augmentation of that motion, by the help of the nerves. And in animal motion this is the very first endeavour, and found even in the embryo; which while it is in the womb, moves its limbs with voluntary motion, for the avoiding of what troubles it, or for the pursuing of what pleases it. And this first endeavour, when it tends towards such things as are known by experience to be pleasant, is called appetite, that is, an approaching; and when it shuns what is troublesome, aversion, or flying from it.”¹ He goes on to associate appetite and will, and shows that the same thing is called both will and appetite. More briefly, he says that all ideas and thought originate from sensation, thus: “The original of them all is that which we call sense, for there is no conception in a man’s mind which has not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original.” Again, originally, all conceptions proceed from the action of the thing itself, whereof it is the conception: now when the action is present, the conception it produces is also called sense; and the thing by whose action the same is produced, is called the object of the sense.² Hobbes stated the conditions of sensation and perception very well. In order to make them clear, he distinguished the subject and object of sense, the former being the perceiving person, and the latter the thing perceived; and it is more correct to say that we see the sun than that we see the light; because light and colour, heat, sound, and other qualities, are not properly objects, but ideas in the mind. He further stated that there must always be a variety and difference among the objects of perception, and discriminated other points.

¹ Elements of Philosophy, Past IV., Chapter XXV., Section 2; Sections 2, 12, 13.

² Leviathan, Part I., Chapter I.; Human Nature, Chapter II., Section 2.

In further explaining his views of mind, he calls imagination “a decaying sense,” by which he means the impressions, images, or ideas of external objects remaining in the mind after the sensations which caused them were past. His exposition of the subject is this:――“That when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it, though the reason be the same, namely, that nothing can change itself, is not so easily assented to.” ... Therefore, “when a body is once in motion, it moves, unless something else hinder it, eternally; and whatever hinders it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees; and as we see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rolling for a long time after; so also it happens in that motion which is made in the internal parts of a man, then, when he sees, dreams, and so on. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it the Latins call imagination, from the image made in seeing.... But the Greeks call it a fancy, which signifies appearance, and is as proper to one sense as to another. Imagination, therefore, is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men, and in many other living creatures, as well sleeping as waking.

“The decay of sense in men waking is not the decay of the motion made in sense but an obscuring of it, in such manner as the light of the sun obscures the light of the stars.... For as at a great distance of place, that which we look at appears dim and without distinction of the smaller parts, so also, after great distance of time, our imagination of the past is weak, and we lose, for example, of cities we have seen, many particular streets, and of actions, many particular circumstances. This decaying sense, when we would express the thing itself, I mean fancy itself, we call imagination; but when we would express the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called memory.” So that imagination and memory are but one thing with different names.¹

¹ Leviathan, Part I., Chapter II.; see also Human Nature, Chapter III., Sections 1, 7.

Hobbes manifested a fair knowledge of the operation of those principles which subsequent psychologists have termed the laws of association and mental modifications and ideas. He points out and distinguishes various ways in which ideas and thoughts are associated, though he does not use the term association of ideas, but uses the expressions, trains of imaginations, and trains of thoughts. But I can only afford space for a few of his illustrations:――

“When a man thinks on anything, his next thought after is not altogether so casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently.... All fancies are motions within us, relics of those made in the sense: and those motions that immediately succeed one another in the sense, continue also together after sense; inasmuch as the former coming again to take place and be predominant, the latter follows, by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner as water upon a plain table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger.” Again, “The cause of the coherence or consequence of one conception to another, is their first coherence at that time when they are produced by sense; as, for example, from St. Andrew the mind runs to St. Peter, because their names are read together; from St. Peter to a stone, for the same cause; from stone to foundation, because we see them together; and for the same cause, from foundation to church, and from church to people, and from people to tumult: and according to this example, the mind may run almost from anything to anything. But as in the sense the conception of cause and effect may succeed one another, so may they after sense in the imagination: and for the most part they do so.” He stated and illustrated other ways in which the train of thoughts is regulated.

Of reminiscence he says: “Beginning with the appetite to recover something lost, proceeding from the present backwards, from thought of the place where we miss it, to the thought of the place whence we came last; and from the thought of that to the thought of a place before, till we have in our mind some place wherein we had the thing we miss: and this is called reminiscence.” Further, “The remembrance of succession of one thing to another, that is, of what was antecedent, and what consequent, and what concomitant, is called an experiment, whether the same be made by us voluntarily, as when a man puts anything into the fire, to see what effect the fire will produce upon it, or not made by us, as when we remember a fair morning after a red evening. To have had many experiments is what we call experience, which is nothing but remembrance of what antecedents have been followed by what consequents.”¹

¹ Leviathan, Part I., Chapter III.; Human Nature, Chapter IV., Sections 2, 5, 6.

On the side of feeling, emotion, and will, Hobbes’s psychology is of less value. His description of the passions, feelings, and emotions, though on some points clear and accurate, is, as a whole, imperfect and lacking in consistency. His theory of the will was this: “In deliberation, the last appetite, as also the last fear, is called will, namely, the last appetite, will to do, or will to omit. It is all one, therefore, to say will and last will. Will, therefore, is the last appetite in deliberating.... Appetite, fear, hope, and the rest of the passions, are not called voluntary, for they proceed not from, but are the will; and the will is not voluntary, for a man can no more say he will will, than he will will will, and so make an infinite repetition of the word will, which is absurd and insignificant. Forasmuch as will to do is appetite, and will to omit fear, the cause of appetite and fear is the cause also of our will.” With Hobbes, will and appetite are the same thing, till deliberation is brought into operation; so that the action of appetite is necessitated, “and, therefore, such a liberty as is free from necessity is not to be found either in the will of men or beasts.” But he admits the relation of will and belief.¹

¹ Human Nature, Chapter XII., Sections 2, 5, 6; Leviathan, Part I., Chapter VI. Elements of Philosophy, Part IV., Chapter XXV., Section 13.

Hobbes’s politics need not detain us long, as his political theory is simple and distinct. He maintained that by nature all men were nearly equal: that all society and government originated, not in social feelings, or any elements of sympathy for each other, but in their mutual fear of one another; and that by nature every man was his own judge, and had a right to all things, but which in effect was no right at all; because in the state of nature mankind were continually at war and killing one another: then every man was an enemy to every other man, each depending on his own strength; and as there was no security, but everything uncertain, so there was no place for industry, no culture of the earth, no navigation or means of communication, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, and no society; and what was worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death prevailed; and the life of man was solitary and poor, brutish and short.¹

¹ De Corpore Politico, Part I., Chapter I., Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; Leviathan, Part I., Chapter XIII.; also his treatise, _Elements of Philosophy, or a True Citizen_, Chapter I., Sections 2, 3, 10, 11, 12. He indeed says, “It may perhaps be thought there never was such a time, or condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so over all the world: but there are many places where they live so now in that brutish manner which I have described.”――Leviathan.

Such being the state of mankind originally, how to get out of it was the great problem. It seems reason at last dictated to every man that it was for his own good to seek after peace, as far as there was any hope of attaining it,¹ then to strengthen himself as much as he can for his own defence against those who would not come to terms of peace. And it follows from this law of reason or nature, that every man by common consent should divest himself of the right to all things which he has by nature, and to be content with a limited liberty.² Hobbes proceeded to describe the circumstances and the proceedings relating to that once famous “Contract Theory of Society,” when at some far-off and unknown period in the history of the race, a multitude of men assembled with the intention of uniting themselves, and thus established peace and regular government.³ When men met to form regular governments for the first time, then as to what they sanctioned, “it is to be understood that each man has consented to it, and not the majority only. Secondly, though thus assembled with intention to unite themselves, they are yet in that estate in which every man has right to everything, and consequently, as has been said, Chapter I., Section 10, in an estate of enjoying nothing. And, therefore, meum and tuum has no place amongst them. The first thing, therefore, they are to do, is expressly every man to consent to something, by which they may come near to their ends, which can be nothing else imaginable but this, that they allow the wills of the majority of their whole number, or the wills of the majority of some certain number of men by them determined and named; or lastly, the will of some one man, to involve and be taken for the wills of every man. And this done, they are united, and a body politic. And if the majority of their whole number be supposed to involve the wills of all the particulars, then they are said to be a democracy, that is, a government in which the whole number, or so many of them as please, being assembled together, are the sovereign, and every particular man a subject. If the majority of a certain number of men, named or distinguished from the rest, be supposed to involve the wills of every one of the particulars, then are they said to be an oligarchy or aristocracy, which two words signify the same thing, together with the diverse passions of those that use them.... Lastly, if their consent be such, that the will of one man, whom they name, shall stand for the wills of them all, then is their government or union called a monarchy, and that one man a sovereign, and all the rest subjects.

¹ “As long as this natural right of every man to everything endures, there can be no security to any man, however strong or wise he may be, of living out the time which nature commonly allows men to live. And consequently, it is a general rule of reason that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all means to defend himself.”――Leviathan, Part I., Chapter XIV.

² “From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour peace, is derived this second law: that a man be willing, when others are so, as far forth, as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things, and be content with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself.”――Ibid., also De Corpore Politico, Part I., Chapter II., Sections 1, 2, 3.

³ Leviathan, Part I., Chapter XIV.

“And these several unions, governments, and subjection of man’s will, may be understood to be made absolutely for all future time, or for a limited time only. But as we speak here of a body politic, instituted for the perpetual benefit and defence of them that make it, which, therefore, men desire should last for ever, I will only treat of this class.”¹

¹ De Corpore Politico, Part II., Chapter I., Sections 2, 3, 4.

Thus having found the state, he proceeded to develop his political philosophy. As a matter of logical sequence it fell to the state to determine the distinctions of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, of good and bad; and therefore, whatever the supreme power of the state sanctioned and commanded was good, and the opposite bad. Religion and superstition are both the same, in so far as they embody the fear of invisible powers, whether imaginary or believed on tradition; and whichever of these the state recognised, is religion, the others superstition. Anyone who places his private religious convictions in opposition to the faith sanctioned by the state, thereby commits a revolutionary act which tended to dissolve society; and, therefore, no man has any just pretence for making religion a cause of disobedience to the laws of the commonwealth. For God speaks through the supreme powers on earth, “by sovereign kings, or such as have sovereign authority as well as they.” But, though the rights of sovereignty should be as absolute as it is possible to make them, yet the sovereign has duties, namely, to procure the safety of the people, to which he is obliged by the law of nature, and to render an account of this to God, the author of that law, and to none but him. And for the same reason the sovereign authority is bound to establish that religion which in their conscience they believe to be best, inasmuch as eternal good is better than temporal; and unless they do this, it cannot really be said that they have done their utmost for their people.¹

¹ De Corpore Politico, Part II., Chapters VI., VII., IX.; Leviathan, Part II., Chapters XVIII., XIX., XX., XXX. This was the current view of the king’s power, which we find so emphatically stated and reiterated in the Scots Acts of Parliament from the Restoration to the Revolution.

But he is specially emphatic in placing the civil power above the ecclesiastical. He quoted an enormous quantity of Scripture, and treated at great length on its meaning and interpretation; and maintained throughout that the king himself was the supreme pastor of his people, and therefore he had a right to appoint all other pastors within his kingdom. The King also in virtue of his office, might preach and baptise if he pleased, and read lectures on science too, in any university within his kingdom. In short, Christian sovereigns have all manner of power over their subjects which can be given to man for the regulation of men’s external actions, both in policy and religion; and may make whatever laws they should think fittest for the government of their own subjects, as they are the commonwealth and the church, and both state and church being the same men.¹

¹ Leviathan, Part IV., Chapter XLII.

Hobbes has some good remarks on law, and on moral philosophy too, and clearly distinguished moral law and positive law. But owing to the conception and the necessities of his political views and opinions, he took a short cut, and made the positive or civil law the standard and measure of right and wrong: and consequently, whatever the supreme sovereign forbade was wrong, and whatever it commanded was right.¹ This feature of his ethical theory, as well as the heterodoxy of many of his religious and theological opinions, called forth a host of opponents.

¹ De Corpore Politico, Part II., Chapter X.

There is no evidence in Hobbes’s writings that he had any conception of the historical growth of society, or the gradual development of a nation. The complex organisation of human society can only be understood by a careful examination and study of the long processes of development. Man as we now find him is the product of many forces, which have operated for a long series of ages, and gradually modified his character. But Hobbes failed to grasp or even to recognise this, and hence we have his imaginary state of nature――continual war, and the equally imaginary social contract theory.

Some of Milton’s prose writings touched on political principles, and also on some important moral points, as in his treatise on divorce. Although he is not usually regarded as a philosopher, nevertheless he was a thinker of exceptional power, a masterly writer, vehement and impassioned, often abusive, and not always fair to his opponents. His pamphlets and controversial writings during the period of the great Rebellion and the Commonwealth form a study of themselves; and altogether he was one of the great men of the Commonwealth.

Milton threw the whole force of his mind into the anti-episcopal pamphlets, and they are extremely vehement and bold. He entered deeply and warmly into the Church questions which were then so fiercely contested; and in some of his pamphlets he wrote decidedly in favour of the democratic and presbyterian form of polity. In his pamphlet entitled, “Of Reformation touching Church Discipline in England, and the causes that hitherto have hindered it,” he discussed both the question of fact and of reason involved in the subject, as why the English Church had not been thoroughly reformed. He made some scathing charges against the bishops, and concludes his work with a prayer, which for fire and force is unmatched in English literature.

His treatise entitled, “The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates,” was published a fortnight after the King’s execution, and a week after the Republic was proclaimed. The chief aim of the treatise was to argue for the democratic principle, on which he insisted strongly. Touching the right of a nation to depose a king who had become a tyrant, Milton followed Buchanan’s line of argument. He assumed throughout that Charles I. was unquestionably a tyrant, and explicitly avowed that the people were justified in bringing the King, and such as he, to account and punishment. In short, he justified Cromwell and his colleagues in bringing the King to trial and execution. He continued a warm and powerful defender of the Commonwealth and its leaders.

I will quote a single specimen of Milton’s power as a defender of the Commonwealth, from his attack on Salmasius’s “Defence of Charles I.” Salmasius himself was a voluminous writer and commentator, a very learned man, with a European reputation; but he had oftener than once changed some of his opinions, and now appeared as the defender of the late King. So it fell to Milton to reply to this learned man’s book; and the following quotation is a specimen of how he executed his task: ――“Who are you that bark at us? You, a learned man, who seem rather to have been turning over lexicons and glossaries and collections of extracts all your life, than to have read good authors with judgment and profit; whence your chatter is of nothing but codices, various readings, disarrangements and corruptions of text, while you show that you have not imbibed even the smallest drop of more real learning? You a wise man, who are constantly quarrelling about the merest minutiæ, and carrying on beggarly wars, and making railing attacks, now on astronomers, now on medical men, of good credit in their respective sciences, though yourself without skill or accomplishment in either; who, if anyone should try to snatch from you the petty glory of a little word, or a little letter, restored by you in some copy, would interdict him, if you could, from fire and water? And yet you are angry, and yet you show your teeth, because people call you a grammarian. In some trifling book of yours, you openly call Hammond, the beloved and most favoured of the late King’s chaplains, a rascal, merely because he had called you a grammarian; and you would be ready, I believe, to say the same of the King himself, and to retract this whole defence of him, if you heard that he had approved of his chaplain’s criticism of you. Take notice then how I, one of those English, whom you dare to describe as ‘fanatical, unlearned, obscure, blackguardly,’ do here on my private account (for that the English nation itself should publicly think anything at all about a weevil like you would be a degradation), do here, I say, on my private account, despise you and make a laughing-stock of you, declaring that, turn you upside down, downside up, round about, or anyhow, you are still nothing but a Grammarian; ay, and that, as if you had made a more foolish promise to some god than even Midas did, whatever you touch, except when you commit solecisms, is still only grammar. Whoever, then, of these ‘dregs of the common people,’ that you so denounce (for those truly noble men among us, whose wisdom, virtue, and nobility are proved by their illustrious acts, I will not so dishonour as to think of comparing you to them or them to you), whoever, I say, of these dregs of the common people, has only persuaded himself to this principle, that he was not born for kings, but for God and his country, is a far more learned, far wiser, far better, man than you are, and deserves to be esteemed of far greater worth to all time. For he is learned without letters; you have letters but no learning, who know so many languages, turn over so many volumes, write so many yourself, and are but a sheep after all.”¹

¹ Masson’s Life of Milton, Volume IV., pages 264‒265.

As an advocate of freedom, Milton has great merit, though he is not always consistent. His “Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,” was a scathing and powerful attack on the existing laws of censorship of the press and licensing of books. It is comparatively short, but it has much historic interest, though the doctrine which he so ably pleaded for is now fully admitted in Britain.

James Harrington was the author of a political romance, entitled “The Commonwealth of Oceana,” which was published in 1656, and attracted some attention. In 1658 he issued another treatise, called “The Prerogative of Popular Government,” reasserting his views in a more direct style. He drew up a constitution for a commonwealth, the legislative part consisting of two houses, and both to be elected by the people. One of the houses should have the power of proposing and debating laws; while the other, which was to be the largest body, should have the power of passing or rejecting the laws thus proposed by the smaller house. Further, it was proposed that a third of the members of both houses should retire every year, not to be re-eligible for a considerable time, and their places filled by newly-elected members: thus the whole membership of both houses would be entirely renewed every third year.

Richard Cumberland, bishop of Peterborough, was an ethical writer of historical note, and an opponent of the moral doctrines of Hobbes. His views were expressed in a work entitled “De Legibus Naturæ Disquisitio Philosophica,” etc., etc., which appeared in 1672, and an English translation of it was published in 1727. His chief aim was to show that there are moral laws made known by nature, but not in the way enunciated by Hobbes. He began with an exposition of the nature of man and of things, and whence proceeded to derive the special ethical duties. The fundamental law of morality was enunciated thus:――“The greatest benevolence of every rational agent towards all, forms the happiest state of each and of all the benevolent, as far as in their power; and it is essentially requisite to the happiness which they can attain; and, therefore, the common good is the supreme law.”

He insisted that the mind has an original regulative faculty, and earnestly contended that the social feelings and the disinterested affections are original elements of man’s nature. The human mind is endowed with certain innate capacities, and has the power of apprehending first principles, and whence deducting conclusions. True propositions agree with the nature of things, and the dictates of practical reason are propositions which point out the ethical end, and the means by which it should be attained.

In the last half of the seventeenth century there arose in England a class of writers sometimes called Platonists, Cambridge men, or English Cartesians, but it should be observed that these writers held diverse views on some important points, though they generally agreed in assailing the psychology and the ethics of Hobbes. The most distinguished amongst them all was the learned Ralph Cudworth.¹ In his great work, “The Intellectual System of the Universe,” which he did not live to complete, he assumed a plastic principle in nature, and by this explained organic development. He supposed that this power, or unconscious force, possessed a general and a special activity which produced the results of design. He contended that the doctrine of efficient causes does not exclude the possibility of final causes. He attacked the position of the unlimited power of God as taught by Descartes, on the ground that it would annul logical and geometrical reasoning, and obliterate moral distinctions. He assailed Hobbes’s nominalism, and his limitation of the powers of the human mind to sense and fancy, and maintained that there was a higher faculty of reason. Cudworth exhibited an enormous amount of learning and considerable reasoning power. He gave many quotations from ancient writers, and those who have the courage and perseverance to read his “Intellectual System of the Universe,” will find that it is a curious and valuable work, and a great monument of erudition.²

¹ Born 1617, died 1688.

² The True Intellectual System of the Universe, 1678; compare Dr. Tulloch’s _Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century_, Volume II.

His “Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality,” and also one on “Free-will,” are unfinished fragments of long discussions, originally designed to complete his Intellectual System, and not published till long after his death. He argued for the independence of moral distinctions, and maintained that they were discovered directly by human reason.

Henry More was the author of several theological and ethical works of an essentially Platonic and transcendental cast, interwoven with his own notions and dreams. The leading principle of his ethics was that moral goodness is simple and absolute, and that reason is the judge of its nature and truth; but its distinctive beauty is felt by a special capacity, a something like the moral sense of later writers. All moral goodness may be called intellectual and divine. By the aid of reason we are enabled to state the principles of ethics in propositions, and hence derive the special maxims and rules.

An Englishman who holds a distinguished place in the history of modern philosophy, and especially in psychology, now claims attention, namely, John Locke. In political theory he was the chief expounder of the principles of the Revolution of 1688; and indeed his political writings became the source whence the Whig politicians drew their arguments for several generations. But the “Social Contract Theory,” of which he was an able exponent, is now entirely obsolete.

In his “Essay concerning Human Understanding,” the fundamental idea is that all our knowledge is derived from experience. The work was mainly directed to the exposition of two questions, namely, first to ascertain the origin of human knowledge, and then to determine the limits and the degrees of objective truth. His method was that of observation, the object of investigation being his own mind, “looking into it and seeing how it wrought.” He could find no innate ideas or principles in the mind. The primary source of all our knowledge is sensation or external perception, and reflection or internal perception; the former embraced the apprehension of external objects through the senses, while the latter comprised the apprehension of mental objects by internal or self-reflection, a subjective operation of thought. The different objects of external perception are variously related to objective reality. Thus extension, figure, motion, and other qualities of bodies, belong to the external objects themselves; while colour, sound, and sensible qualities are only in ourselves, and not properly in the objects perceived, being signs not copies of changes which take place in external things. In the reception of simple ideas the mind is merely passive, it cannot refuse to have them, or blot them out, any more than a mirror can refuse to receive, alter, or obliterate the images reflected on it; all that man can do is to unite them together, classify them or separate them. By internal reflection we know the action of our thinking and willing faculties; while through sensation and reflection together we obtain the feelings of pleasure and pain, the ideas of power, unity, existence, and others, but we have no clear idea of substance.

The word idea has a wide meaning in Locke’s Essay, as he uses it to denote whatever we apprehend, whether it be a mental modification of an external object, or a subjective thought, the perception or consciousness of feelings and passions; as when I form a mental picture or image of anything, or am conscious of a pleasant sound――when I see the moon or any external object, and when I remember any of these, again when I understand the meaning of right, of property, or any other abstract term――in all such cases, according to Locke, I am having ideas. Thus he employed the term idea in its most unrestricted universality. The theory of knowledge requires some definite word or words to indicate the dependence of what is known on the power of knowing. Descartes, Locke, and others, used the word idea in this relation, sometimes with perception, and at a later date, with impression. At present some use the term phenomenon to express those aspects of existence of which we are conscious, rather than the words, ideas, perceptions, or impressions; others, again, use the word consciousness with a wide meaning, to express mental facts, modes, or states, in their relation to the knowing mind. But all terms thus used touch the prime assumption of philosophy, namely, that the universe and all things which exist can become known to us only through our mental and self-conscious experience; and thus arises the problem of the relation of the human mind to the external world.

Now as already indicated in this chapter, there is a real difficulty involved in understanding and stating the exact relation between mind and matter; and the nature of the relation of the object known and the knowing mind is still unknown. All that we know is that knowledge consists in a certain relation of the object known to the knowing subject. Of mind in itself or matter in itself we know nothing; simply because we know only the qualities of our own faculties of knowledge, as relations to their objects, and we only know the qualities of their objects as relations to our minds: thus all qualities both of mind and of matter are only known to us as relations, we know nothing in itself.¹

¹ Hamilton’s Reid, Note N., page 965.

In Locke’s Essay the word idea is used to recall the truth that external things become known to us through our presentative and representative conscious experience; but on the other side of his theory, ideas also represent qualities which exist external to our conscious mind; thus they are, as it were, “effects in us,” produced by powers that are independent of us: that is, he assumed that the mind is merely passive in the reception of simple ideas.

Locke devoted the First Book of his Essay to the refutation in detail of the doctrine of innate ideas. The argument that certain speculative and practical principles are universally accepted as true, he disputed, by showing that there was a mass of evidence against this alleged agreement, and that though it were otherwise, innate ideas would not be proved, as it might be shown that such agreement had arisen in other ways. He had little difficulty in proving that the principles of identity and of contradiction are unknown to children, and to all who are not specially educated: and, therefore, it could not be maintained that truths are inherent in the mind of which it has no consciousness and no knowledge. To say that an idea is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to admit that the mind is ignorant of it, and never took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. But it is true that the capacity to know is innate, though all actual knowledge is and must be acquired. And, therefore, those who adopt the theory of innate ideas should distinguish them from other ideas which are not innate; and thus they must hold that innate knowledge is from the first conscious knowledge, for to be in the understanding means to be understood. If it be asserted, that these principles are recognised and admitted by all men when they come to exercise their reason, this is not true or conclusive, whether in the sense that we know them deductively by the use of reason, or in the sense that we think them when we arrive at the use of reason, for we know many things before them. That the bitter is not sweet, that a rod and a cherry are not the same thing, are known by a child long before he understands and assents to the universal proposition that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same moment. Practical principles stand upon the same footing as speculative ones, none of them being innate; and, moreover, they are not so clear or so universally received as the principle just indicated. If principles are innate, the ideas involved in them must also be innate. Now the most general principles contain the most abstract ideas, which are the furthest from the thoughts of children, and are unintelligible to them, and can only be clearly formed after they have attained some degree of attention and reflection. The ideas of identity of difference, possibility and impossibility, and others of a similar character, are not in the child’s consciousness at birth; and they are farthest removed in the order of development from the sensations of hunger and thirst, heat and cold, pleasure and pain, which in reality are the earliest conscious experiences of a child.

Locke strongly maintained that the idea of God is not innate. And he attempted to prove that some tribes in the lowest stages of civilisation had no idea of God at all. He also pointed out the fact that the ideas and conceptions which the various tribes and nations of mankind have of God differed greatly.

Having thus cleared the ground, Locke, in his Second Book, proceeded to show whence the understanding receives its ideas. He asks, “Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience: in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either about external or sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understanding with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from which all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.”¹ Thus experience is twofold, external and internal, sensation and reflection, according as its object is the outer world of things, or the internal operations of our own minds. The senses in contact with external objects supply the mind with the elements and materials of ideas; and thus we attain the ideas of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, and all those called sensible qualities. Then when the mind attends and thinks on its own internal operations, the understanding thence attains another set of ideas: such as perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different operations of our minds of which we are conscious and observe within ourselves.

¹ Book II., Chapter I., Section 2.

When the first impression is made on his senses, man begins to have ideas. But before the first sensible impression, the mind no more thinks than it does afterwards in a deep and dreamless sleep. That the mind always thinks is as groundless an assertion as that all bodies are continually in motion.

Some of our ideas are simple, others are complex; and of the former class, some come into the mind by one sense only, some by more senses than one, others through reflection, while some come both by the senses and reflection. The simple ideas received by touch are heat, cold, solidity, roughness, hardness, smoothness, and many others; by the sense of sight, the ideas of light and colours; while the ideas which we receive by more than one sense, by sight and touch, are those of space, figure, rest, and motion. The simple ideas of reflection which the mind acquires when it becomes conscious and observes its own operations, are mainly two, namely, perception or thinking, and volition or willing. But the other simple ideas acquired through all the channels of the senses and reflection, are those of pleasure and pain, power, existence, unity, and succession.

But most of the ideas of sensation are no more like anything existing externally to ourselves, than words are like the ideas for which they stand, and which they serve to recall to the mind. The inseparable qualities of bodies themselves are those of bulk, figure, number, position, motion and rest; and these he called the primary qualities of body. Now our ideas of these primary qualities of bodies are copies of these qualities; that is, they represent the thing mentally as it is in itself. But the secondary qualities of bodies affect us in a different way, they operate on the senses, and cause in us the sensations of colours, sounds, smells, and the like, which are not in the bodies themselves, but in our own minds. He further names a third class of qualities: these are the powers of some bodies, which, owing to the constitution of their primary qualities, make such changes in the bulk, figure, and motion of other bodies as cause them to operate upon our senses differently from what they did before; among these he instances the power of the sun to make wax white, and of fire to melt lead.¹

¹ Book II., Chapters I.‒VIII.

Under the head of simple ideas acquired by reflection, he minutely investigated the faculties of perception, retention, discerning, compounding, abstracting, and other operations of the mind. The faculty of perception distinguished man from animal and plant. The faculty of memory is the power of preserving ideas by continued contemplation, or by reviving them after their temporary absence from the mind, which is too limited to be conscious at the same time of many ideas. Memory is common to man and the lower animals. The power of abstraction is peculiar to man. By this generalising faculty the ideas of single objects are separated from all accidental qualities, and raised to the rank of universal conceptions of the genera to which they belong.

The simple ideas being the elements of the complex ones, he reduced complex ideas to three classes, namely, modes, substances, and relations. Modes are complex ideas, but not involving existence by themselves, being merely modifications of simple ideas when their elements are similar, and mixed modes or modifications when their elements are dissimilar. Ideas of substances are those combinations of simple ideas employed to represent things existing by themselves. The ideas of relation arise from the comparison of one idea with another. To the purely modal ideas belong the mental modifications of space, time, thought, power, and other abstract conceptions. Our own experience and observation of the constant change of ideas in the mind, partly depending on the impressions of external objects, and partly on our own choice, soon leads the understanding to the conclusion that the same changes as have already been observed will continue to take place in the same objects through the same causes; accordingly, the understanding conceives in one thing or object a liability to change its form, and in another, the possibility of being the agent of that change, and thus the mind attains the idea of a power. Thus the clearest idea of power is derived from observing the activities of our own minds, as internal experience teaches us that by a mere volition we can set in motion parts of the body which were before at rest. If a substance possessing a power manifest it by an action, it is called a cause; and that which it brings to pass is called its effect. A cause is that through which something else begins to be; an effect is that which depends for its existence on something besides itself. The idea of substance itself contains nothing but the supposition of an unknown something serving as a support for qualities; we have no clear idea of it. Nor is our idea of material substance more distinct than our idea of spiritual substance. There is no reason for assuming that a spiritual substance cannot exist; we have no more reason to doubt or deny the existence of spirits, than we have to deny the existence of bodies. Locke, in his treatment of the term substance――the term which plays so great a part in the systems of Descartes and Spinoza――plainly admitted his impotence. He says, “If anyone will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities, which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If anyone should be asked, what is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid, extended parts; and if he were demanded, what is it that solidity and extension adheres in,” he would be in much the same plight as the Indian was who supported the world on the broad-backed tortoise. “And thus here, as in all other cases where we use words without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children.... The idea then we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist without something to support them, we call that support, substantia, which means in plain English, standing under, or upholding.” But again, in comparing our ideas of spirit and of body, he says, “In short, the idea we have of spirit, compared with the idea we have of body, stands thus: the substance of spirit is unknown to us; and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us.”¹ An idea of substance in itself, that is, apart from any qualities in relation to our minds, is utterly barren; as we only conceive it as inconceivable ――as nothing at all.

¹ Chapter XXIII., Section 2, Section 30.

He treated at length of relations, including that of cause and effect, of identity and diversity, of clear and distinct, obscure and confused ideas, of adequate and inadequate ideas, of real and fanatical ideas, of true and false ideas. Strictly speaking, truth and falsehood belong only to propositions; but ideas are sometimes termed true or false, though when so styled, there is some tacit proposition assumed, as ideas are but bare perceptions in our own minds, and cannot in themselves be said to be true or false. Any idea which we have in our minds, whether it accords or not with the existence of things, or with any ideas in the minds of other men, cannot properly for this alone be called false. But an idea is false when formed of inconsistent qualities or elements, or when it is judged to contain in it the real essence of any existing body, whereas it only contains a few of these; or again, when the mind judges its own idea to be the same as it is in other men’s minds, signified by the same word, when in fact it is not the same. He closed the Second Book with a short and interesting chapter on the “Association of Ideas.” He was among the first to use this expression which is now so familiar to all students of psychology.

In the Third Book, Locke treated on language at length as the medium of stating and expressing our ideas and thoughts. Words are signs and marks which are necessary for communication――general terms and names of our ideas, considered as aids to the acquisition of knowledge, and for recording and communicating our thoughts. This part of the work is valuable, and contains some of Locke’s best thoughts. He sums up his view of general terms in the following sentence:――“All the great business of genera and species, and their essences, amounts to no more but this, that men, making abstract ideas, and settling them in their minds, with names annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves to consider things, and to discourse of them, as it were in bundles, for the easier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge; which would advance but slowly were their words and thoughts confined only to particulars.”¹

¹ Chapter III., Section 30.

The Fourth Book dealt with knowledge and opinion, and extended to twenty-one chapters, in which many important and interesting matters are handled with great candour and ability. Such as the degrees, the limits, and the reality of our knowledge, of truth, universal propositions, maxims, the existence of God; the improvement of our knowledge, probability, and the degrees of assent; reason, faith and reason, and the causes of error, were all handled.

According to Locke, knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas; this agreement being fourfold, namely, identity or diversity, relation, co-existence or necessary connection, and real existence. He explained these kinds of knowledge and relations of ideas at length, and proceeded to show that we know our own existence, and the existence of God. His reasoning and arguments to prove the existence of God are founded on the principle of mediate inference, the only method which his system of the mind permitted; but on this ground he argues well and wisely.

Locke discussed the provinces of faith and reason, and though faith in divine revelation transcends rational knowledge, nevertheless nothing can be regarded as a revelation which directly contradicts well ascertained and distinct rational knowledge.¹

¹ Chapter XVIII.

In the discussion of the limits of human knowledge, though he made many true and sagacious statements, yet it was here, perhaps, that his main inconsistency culminated. Notwithstanding his doctrine that we have only an obscure and relative idea of substance, he adopted and expounded the distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities of bodies, describing the primary qualities as those which are inseparable from the conception of body. The primary qualities are really in bodies, whether our senses perceive them or not, and when we do perceive primary qualities, our ideas of them are resemblances of qualities really existing in these bodies. His own words are “that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves.” While, on the other hand, “the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves.” Thus it seems we know primary qualities, not simply as manifested to us, but as they exist in themselves; thus too the primary qualities of bodies must be independent of the human mind. Hence when he came to treat of the limits of knowledge, no necessary connection between the primary and the secondary qualities could be discovered; because the ideas obtained through the primary qualities of bodies were entirely different from the ideas obtained through the secondary qualities, there was no common root among these ideas for comparison, and consequently no knowledge. There was no science of bodies, or definite physics: “because we want perfect and adequate ideas of those very bodies which are nearest to us, and most under our command. Those which we have ranked into classes under names, and we think ourselves best acquainted with, we have but very imperfect and incomplete ideas of.... Adequate ideas, I suspect, we have not of any body.”¹ Here the door was opened for the scepticism which Hume deduced from the principles of Locke’s Essay. In treating on the limits of our knowledge, Locke says:――“He that knows anything, knows this in the first place, that he need not seek long for instances of his ignorance. The meanest and most obvious things that come in our way have dark sides, that the quickest sight cannot penetrate into. The clearest and most enlarged understandings of thinking men find themselves puzzled, and at a loss, in every particle of matter. We shall the less wonder to find it so when we consider the causes of our ignorance, which, I suppose, will be found to be chiefly these three:――1. Want of ideas; 2. Want of discoverable connection between the ideas we have; 3. Want of tracing and examining our ideas.”

¹ Book II., Chapter VIII.; Book IV., Chapter III.

I have not space to speak of Locke’s other writings, and restrict myself to a few words on his ethical doctrines. He maintained that morality is solely based on the Will of God, and that what is most conducive to the public welfare is to be regarded as the expression of the Divine Will. Each man is required by the Divine Law to do all the good and prevent all the evil that he can; and good and evil being resolved into pleasure and pain, the ultimate test of moral conduct is its tendency to promote the pleasures and to avert the pains of mankind. Book I., Chapter III., Section 6; Book II., Chapter XXVIII.

Locke also maintained that morality is a science which can be demonstrated as clearly as mathematics. Book IV., Chapter III., Section 18; Chapter IV., Section 7; Chapter XII., Section 8.

Touching the will, he held that though a man is free to act, the will itself is always determined by motives; this theory is usually called determinism. Book II., Chapter XXI.

Although we have now a more scientific psychology than was possible in Locke’s day, nevertheless, his “Essay concerning Human Understanding” is a great monument of his genius, and one of the most interesting works in this department of literature. Its merit consists in its method, its general scope, its vast variety of topics, and the spirit of candour which pervades it. It has had a wide and remarkable influence on subsequent speculation, and on psychology, though at first it met with opposition in various quarters.

At any given time, the causes favourable to the success of a novel line of thought are various and complicated, and without at all pretending to exhaust them, I may indicate some of the conditions which conduced to the acceptance of Locke’s philosophy. A well-marked though slow transformation of thought had been proceeding in Europe for several centuries prior to Locke, which embraced in its sweep with more or less distinctness physical science, religion, ethics, and politics, while its social effects were manifested partly in the long political struggles of the different nations among themselves, and especially in the civil wars and internal conflicts of each nation within itself. This vast movement had a general tendency throughout toward greater freedom of thought, and religious and political liberty; but these results were more keenly and earnestly fought for, and sooner obtained in some of the nations than in others; in Britain the struggle for political and religious freedom was very severe but not prolonged. Hence Locke’s philosophy being in accord with the general movement of the period, and more directly in unison with the intellectual and social tendencies of England, as manifested in the Revolution of 1688, it became a great power in history.¹

¹ Soon after the publication of Locke’s Essay, opponents and critics, as well as defenders of it appeared, and Locke himself entered the field to defend some of his views, his controversy with Stillingfleet is well-known; indeed, many attacks were made upon his philosophy, but it is unnecessary to particularise them here.

There is a correlation between the creeds of a community and its political and social organisation. The belief in the divine right and the absolute power of a king, or a caste, the prevalence of certain moral views touching the nature of marriage, or the highest ends of national life, are often necessary for the continuance of a certain order of society. When the belief is modified, the order shakes and disappears, and the ties which hold a community together then assume a somewhat different form. Anything which involves an attack upon the theories implied in the existing social order, may modify the principles or notions upon which power rests. As a struggle between two different forms of government compels each to consider its own constitution, this may issue in strengthening or in weakening the chief features of their respective beliefs. In short, anything which really stirs the social organism, afford a chance for the progress of fresh seeds of thought and belief.¹

¹ It is mainly by the thorough investigation of the subjects indicated above, in the two preceding paragraphs, and other cognate matters, ♦and the proper use of the sources of facts thus obtained, that philosophers can hope that at some future day there will be a science of sociology. “Then we shall unravel the laws of the growth of the social organism, and determine the conditions of its health or disease. Then, and not till then, will it be possible to present political science as a coherent body of doctrines, deduced from certain axioms of universal validity, but leading to different conclusions, according to the varying conditions of human society. We shall be able to say what form of government is most favourable to the happiness of a nation at any given period of its development.... But we are still so far from possessing anything like a science of politics, that most of the current maxims involve conceptions which could hardly find place in a scientific system. Fragments of the old theories by which men endeavoured to explain the origin of government, or to show how it might be best administered, still perplex our discussions, and hinder the attempt to lay a sound foundation of theory.

“The difficulty of discovering anything approaching to an historical development of political theory is the greater, inasmuch as theories have followed, more than they have guided, events. Happy is the nation which has no political philosophy, for such philosophy is generally the offspring of a recent, or the symptom of an approaching revolution. During the quieter hours of the eighteenth century, Englishmen rather played with political theories than seriously discussed them. The interest in politics was chiefly personal. References to general principles are introduced in rhetorical flourishes, but do not form the basis of serious argument. In the mass of pamphlets and speeches which fill our library shelves, it is rare to find even the show of political philosophy. The Tory argument is that De Foe has been put in the pillory; the Whig argument is that the French wear wooden shoes. Walpole’s friends rail at the Pope and the Pretender; and Bolingbroke’s friends abuse the excise and the Hanoverian subsidies.”――Stephen’s History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, Volume II., pages 130‒131.

♦ “aud” replaced with “and”

Before the close of the seventeenth century, the discoveries in physical science, wider geographical knowledge than formerly, and many other influences, had enlarged men’s conceptions of the universe. This was modifying religious ideas, while a marked tendency towards rationalism was manifesting itself in the current theology, as well as in philosophy. The movement in England appeared in various forms. Discussions and disputes touching the immortality of the soul began in the seventeenth century, increased amazingly after the Revolution, and were continued through the greater part of the eighteenth century. Locke had stated that matter might be endowed with the power of thinking. The opponents of Christianity maintained that the future existence of the soul was impossible, and many writers engaged in the discussion of this subject.

English Deism was in some degree effected by the philosophy of Locke. But the deistic creed was not essentially strong, as it was not founded on the deepest convictions, or associated with the most powerful emotions of the human breast, while its leaders lacked the glowing sympathetic feeling, and the warm aspiration, the intense earnestness, and the simple note of sincerity, which characterise the genuine apostles of mankind. The conception of the Supreme Being which the Deists presented, could not excite fervour in the heart of worshippers; yet, though Deism soon decayed and died, rationalism and scepticism have continued to spread.

Among the most eminent of the Deists who assailed the doctrines of Christianity, were John Toland, Matthew Tindal, and Anthony Collins; while on the other side may be mentioned, Samuel Clark, Bishop Berkeley, and Dr. Butler, and many other less known men. But the grounds and the methods of the attack and the defence of Christianity have undergone a transformation since the middle of the eighteenth century.

Toland published in 1696, “Christianity not Mysterious.” The aim of this work was to show that there is nothing in the New Testament contrary to reason, or above it, and, therefore, no Christian doctrine can properly be called a mystery. Adopting Locke’s definition of knowledge, he explained what was within man’s reach of knowing; and maintained that statements which contradicted reason cannot be admitted, and if above reason they cannot be understood. Reason was our only safe guide; and Christianity itself does not claim to be mysterious. Many of his explanations, however, were crude and unsatisfactory.¹

¹ Toland is the author of many pamphlets and unfinished fragments, political, religious, and on other subjects. A full account of his writings was given in Leland’s _View of the Principal Deistical Writers_, 1754‒56; compare Skelton’s Deism Revealed, 2 volumes, 1749; A. F. Farrar’s _Critical History of Free Thought_.

Anthony Collins was a prominent representative of Deism, and is the author of several treatises, which were famous in their day. His “Discourse on Free Thinking” appeared in 1713, and in it he argued that all sound belief must be based on free inquiry, and seemed anxious to show that the adoption of this tenet would not necessitate the relinquishment of a belief in the supernatural. In 1724 he published his work entitled, “A Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion,” containing a plausible attack on Christianity. But the most important of his works is the “Inquiry concerning Human Liberty and Necessity,” and he gives the following account of its scope:――“1. Though I deny not liberty in a certain meaning of that word, yet I contend for liberty, as it signifies a power in man to do as he wills or pleases. 2. When I affirm necessity, I contend only for moral necessity, meaning thereby that man, who is an intelligent and sensible being, is determined by his reason and senses; and I deny man to be subject to such necessity, as in clocks, watches, and such other things, which for want of intelligence are subject to an absolute physical and mechanical necessity. 3. I have undertaken to show that the notions advanced are so far from being inconsistent with, that they are the sole foundations of morality and laws, and of awards and punishments in society; and that the notions I explode are subversive of them.” The arguments which he advanced in support of his theory were six, namely: “1. From experience; 2. From the impossibility of liberty; 3. From the imperfection of liberty, and the perfection of necessity; 4. From the consideration of the divine prescience; 5. From the nature and use of rewards and punishments; 6. From the nature of morality.” He worked out these arguments with much skill and ingenuity, and the following six objections were concisely but ably answered:――“1. That if men are necessary agents, punishments are unjust; 2. And are useless; 3. Reasoning, entreaties, blame, and praise, are useless; 4. Also the use of physical remedies is useless; 5. The reproaches of conscience are groundless; 6. The murder of Julius Cæsar could not possibly have been murder.” The treatise is characteristic throughout, and had some influence on subsequent speculation.

Mathew Tindal held a fellowship in All Souls at Oxford, and was past seventy years of age when the first volume of his work, “Christianity as Old as the Creation,” was published in 1732. Though the work was not remarkable for its method or grasp of thought, the arrangement being confused and abounding in repetitions, yet it attracted much attention. Tindal maintained that natural religion is complete and sufficient, consequently a revelation is unnecessary, so there can be no obligation to accept it. All religion must have one aim, which is to attain human perfection of character by a life in accord with human nature. In a word, his theory is this: “Whosoever so regulates his natural appetites as will conduce most to the exercise of his reason, the health of his body, and the pleasures of his senses, taken and considered altogether, since herein his happiness consists, may be certain he can never offend his Maker; who, as He governs all things according to their natures, cannot but expect His rational creatures should act according to their natures.” He stated that there is no difference between religion and morality, save that the one is acting according to the reason of things considered in themselves, the other according to the same reason of things considered as the rule of God; Christianity being only a republication of the law of nature.¹

¹ Christianity as Old as the Creation, pages 2, 14, _et seq._, page 270; compare Stephen’s _History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century_, Volume I., pages 134‒145.

Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, may be noticed among those whose writings have influenced subsequent ethical views. He was essentially a moralist, his chief aim being to show how a rational scheme of life might be formed. A belief in God was an element of his system. “For whoever thinks that there is a just God, and pretends formally to believe that He is just and good, must suppose that there is independently such a thing as justice and injustice, truth and falsehood, right and wrong, according to which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true. If the mere will, decree, or law of God be said absolutely to constitute right and wrong, then are these latter words of no significance at all.” Thus it seems a sound theism follows from morality, not morality from theism. Hence also religion, according to the conception which it presents of the character of God, “is capable of doing great good or harm, and atheism nothing positive in either way.”¹ Atheism indicates an unhealthy state of mind, as nothing can be more distressing “than the thought of living in a distracted universe from which many ills may be suspected, and where nothing good or lovely presents itself, nothing which can satisfy in contemplation or raise any passion, besides that of contempt, hatred, and dislike.” This tends to embitter the temper, and “to impair and ruin the very principle of virtue, namely, natural and kind affection.” In the main, he argued that whoever has a firm belief in a just and benignant God has a far stronger incentive to virtuous action than those who have no such belief; and there is thus a relation between virtue and piety, as where piety is wanting “there can neither be the same benignity, firmness, or constancy, the same good composure of the affections, or uniformity of mind.”²

¹ Characteristics: An Inquiry concerning Virtue, Book I., Part 3, Section 2.

² Ibid., Section 3.

He contended strongly for the existence of disinterested affection in man, and used the term “moral sense” to express his doctrine. He indicated the rise of this moral sense, and argued that it has a foundation in nature. “There is in reality no rational creature whatsoever who knows not that when he voluntarily offends or does harm to anyone, he cannot fail to create an apprehension and fear of like harm, and consequently a resentment and animosity in everyone that observes him. So that the offender must be conscious of being liable to such treatment from everyone, as if he had in some degree offended all ... of this the wickedest creature living must have a sense. So that if there be any farther meaning in this sense of right and wrong, if in reality there be any sense of this kind which an absolutely wicked creature has not, it must consist in a real antipathy or aversion to injustice or wrong, and in a real affection towards equity and right for its own sake, and on account of its natural beauty and worth.

“It is impossible to suppose a mere sensible creature, originally so ill-conditioned and unnatural, as that from the moment he comes to be tried by sensible objects, he should have no good passion towards his kind, no foundation either of piety, love, kindness, or social affection. It is fully as impossible to conceive that a rational creature coming first to be tried by rational objects, and receiving into his mind the images or representations of justice, generosity, gratitude, or other virtue, should have no liking of these, or dislike of their contraries, but be found absolutely indifferent towards whatsoever is presented to him of this sort. A soul, indeed, may as well be without a sense, as without admiration in the things of which it has any knowledge.... Sense of right and wrong, therefore, being as natural to us as natural affection itself, and being a first principle in our constitution, there is no speculative idea or belief which is capable immediately or directly to exclude or destroy it.”¹ From these passages and from others of a similar import, it may be observed that several of Shaftesbury’s ethical views were transferred into Scottish philosophy. His influence is also notable on Kant’s doctrine of the relation between Morality and Religion.

¹ Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II., Section 3; Part III., Section 1; Moralist, Part III., Section 3.

Shaftesbury was a real optimist, and held that there was no positive evil in the world. He exerted all his eloquence and ingenuity in efforts to exalt the wondrous harmonies of nature. “Everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.” In the opening section of the “Inquiry concerning Virtue,” he argued that there can be no real ill in the universe. “If everything which exists be according to good, and for the best, then, of necessity, there is no such thing as real ill in the universe, nothing ill with respect to the whole.... To believe, therefore, that everything is governed, ordered, and regulated for the best, by a designing principle or mind, necessarily good and permanent, is to be a perfect theist.”¹

¹ Part I., Section 2; also his Moralist, Part III., Section 1. The influence of these views is observable in the theory of the harmony between the kingdoms of nature and grace, developed in the “Théodicée” of Leibnitz; indeed, Shaftesbury’s views had considerable influence in various directions.

His usual method of arguing is that of placing alternatives before the mind; he manifests no great metaphysical grasp of principles, and his power of exposition was very limited. He often repeats himself, and his style, though sometimes vigorous, is diffuse and stilted.

Dr. Samuel Clarke was a great authority in his day, both in theology and in philosophy. But as his method of philosophising has almost ceased to have influence in Britain, I will only give a brief statement of his ethical theory and views.

His moral theory may be shortly stated as follows:――All existing things have their necessary relations one to another. Man must attribute the same law of perception to every being to whom he attributes thought, and, therefore, he must believe that the sum of the relations of all things to each other must have always been present to God; and these relations, then, are eternal, however recent the things may be between which they subsist; and the whole together constitute truth. These eternal different relations of things, one to another, involve a consequent eternal fitness in the application of things one to another, with regard to which the will of God always chooses, and which also ought to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings. Such eternal relations make it fit and reasonable for the creatures thus to act; and, indeed, it becomes their duty so to act, prior to and independent of any foreseen advantage or reward.¹

¹ Being and Attributes of God, Proposition 12; Evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion.

The three great classes of primary duties, namely, the duties we owe to God, to each other, and to ourselves, might be deduced in the same way as the propositions of geometry. Thus Clarke attempted to give the rules of morality a mathematical cast; and his theory also sought to found moral distinctions solely upon reason. But reason can never be a complete basis for morality, because it does not afford the motives of action. “The abusive extension of the term reason to the moral faculties, one of the predominant errors of ancient and modern times, has arisen from causes which it is not difficult to discover. Reason does in truth perform a great part in every case of moral sentiment. To reason often belong the preliminaries of the act; to reason altogether belongs the choice of the means of execution. The operations of reason, in both cases, are comparatively slow and lasting, they are capable of being distinctly recalled by memory. The emotion which intervenes between the previous and succeeding exertions of reason is often faint, generally transient, and scarcely ever capable of being reproduced by an effort of the mind. Hence the name of reason is applied to this mixed state of mind, more especially when the feeling, being of a cold and general nature, and scarcely ruffling the surface of the soul, such as those of prudence, and ordinary kindness, and propriety, almost passes unnoticed, and is irretrievably forgotten. Hence the mind is, in such conditions, said by the moralists to act from reason, in contra-distinction to its more excited and disturbed state, when it is said to act from passion. The calmness of reason gives to the whole compound the appearance of unmixed reason. The illusion is further promoted by a mode of expression used in most languages. A man is said to act reasonably when his conduct is such as may be reasonably expected.”¹

¹ Mackintosh’s Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy, pages 155‒156, 1837.

Bishop Berkeley is the author of a form of idealism, explained in several works which appeared at different periods of his life. He maintained that the external world had no real existence in itself, apart from thinking and reasoning beings. By this he meant that matter and all external objects have only a phenomenal existence, an appearance, but no real existence at all, distinct from their being perceived by some person, or mind and spirit. If, therefore, we detach external objects from perception, they cease to be, because they have no existence apart from perception. All the choir of heaven, and all the bodies composing the mighty frame of the world, have not any substance without a mind; and that their very being is to be perceived as part of the significant sense-experience of a conscious person; “consequently, so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not actually exist in my mind, or in that of any created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or they must exist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit.”¹

¹ Compare. Berkeley’s Works, edited by Professor Fraser, and the excellent volume by the same author on Berkeley and his Philosophy, in the series of “Philosophical Classics for English Readers.”

Thus in result, Berkeley’s external world consisted of spirits, as it were, external to his own spirit; conscious, in concert with himself, of intelligible sense-impressions, by which they could communicate with one another. By a refined process of thought, he arrived at the conclusion that there was an external will and an external intellect, and that will and intellect constituted spirit. This was his explanation of the problem of the relation of the human mind to the external world.

In the later stage of the development of his views, he attempted to explain what is meant by God. He maintained that the supreme power is Spirit; God is more than the unknowable behind the phenomena of nature. God means the eternally sustaining spirit――the active conscious reason of the universe; the Supreme Spirit or Universal Mind. But he did not intend to reduce all to God and phenomena; he recognises the existence of finite free agents, responsible and subject to a moral government. Still he seemed to approach the principle of pantheism.

The aim of his speculations was to extinguish the scheme of materialism; he thought that, when matter was expelled out of nature, sceptical and impious ideas would have no ground to stand upon. But in the hands of subsequent thinkers, his principles have yielded very different results.

Berkeley wrote a fine pleasing style, and contributed much to excite the philosophic mind in England and Scotland. Indeed, he said himself that his reasonings had been nowhere better understood than among a club of young Scotchmen in Edinburgh.

* * * * *

In conclusion, the period covered in this volume has been exceedingly important in the history of Scotland. After the Union of the Crowns, the king’s power was vastly increased, and one of the baneful results of this was that the kings used their power to enforce their own religious and political views upon the people, and attempted to extinguish their freedom of thought and speech, and their civil rights. Hence the Covenanting struggle, and after the Restoration the long and severe persecution of the Covenanters; yet, despite all the harassments of war, of persecution, and oppression, the Covenanters executed their work heroically and successfully, and contributed considerably to the Revolution of 1688, and to the freedom of the British people. Peace and glory to the memory of the heroes, who boldly faced danger, privation, and death for the tenets of their faith! The proceedings connected with the passing of the Union were narrated; and an account of the subsequent disaffection in Scotland, and the risings of 1715 and 1745 was presented. A detailed and exhaustive account of the social condition of the people, and the introduction of manufactures, the progress of industry and commercial enterprise were given. I then treated the ballad and Jacobite literature and other branches, historically, and noted the progress of science, of education, and art. In the closing chapter, I have presented an outline of European Thought, in which the systems of Bruno, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Hobbes, Locke, Shaftesbury, and others are concisely expounded, in order to show the historic relations of the philosophy which subsequently arose in Scotland.

INDEX.

Abercorn, i., 116; castle of, 343, 390; Earl of, iii., 19.

Abercromby, Dr. Patrick, iv., 143.

Aberdeen, i., 148, 151, 234, 238‒9, 264, 284, 288, 306, 325, 366, 370, 386‒7, 390; ii., 116, 123, 192, 202, 212, 241, 247; iii., 28, 90, 91, 219, 223, 228; iv., 370, 375; University of, i., 415, 467; ii., 412, 413; iii., 62, 392‒3; iv., 60, 139, 317‒320.

Aberdeen, Earl of, iv., 482.

Aberdeenshire, i., 28, 49, 52, 68, 75, 90, 95, 140, 184, 271, 284, 287, 325; ii., 154; iii., 244; iv., 370, 371.

Abernethy, i., 114, 165, 245.

Aboyne, i., 174; Viscount of, iii., 93.

Ada, daughter of Earl David, i., 204, 256.

Adam, Dr. Alexander, iv., 153; William, Robert, James, 402.

Adamson, Archbishop of St. Andrews, ii., 182‒4, 189, 271, 380.

Aed, King, i., 136.

Agricola, General, i., 105, 109.

Agriculture, i., 100, 133, 150, 250‒254, 376‒381; ii., 266, 289, 290; iii., 303‒305; iv., 332‒339.

Aidan, King of Dalriada, i., 117‒8.

Aikman, iv., ♦429.

♦ page number provided by transcriber

Airlie, Earl of, iii., 90; castle of, 337.

Alan, Lord of Galloway, i., 211.

Albany, Duke of, i., 319, 321‒2, 324‒6; Murdoch, 326, 327, 328; Alexander, 348‒351; John, Regent, ii., 36‒37.

Ale, i., 251, 399, 400, 401, 402, 404; ii., 291‒292; iii., 217‒219; iv., 395.

Alexander I., reign of, i., 200, 201.

Alexander II., reign of, i., 209‒212, 242.

Alexander, III., coronation of, i., 213; reign of, 213‒217.

Alexander, William, iv., 209‒211.

Alison, Rev. Archibald, iv., 86; Sir Archibald, 155‒6; Dr. William, 312.

Allan, David, iv., 433; Sir William, 443.

Alloa, iv., 433.

Alnwick castle, i., 143, 300.

Amberley, Viscount, ii., 43, 44.

Anderson, Dr. Joseph, i., 52, 55, 57, 61, 65, 66, 168, 180; William, ii., 68; James, iv., 143, 144; Robert, 173.

Angles, i., 113, 118, 119.

Angus, Pictish King, i., 120; Angus, Chief, 116, 202; Angus Duff, 329; Angus, Lord of the Isles, 218, 285, 292, 293; Angus, Earl of, 342, 343, 350, 351; ii., 36, 37, 38, 61, 63, 64, 65, 181, 195, 212.

Annandale, i., 26, 203, 223, 349.

Annandale, Earl of, iii., 179.

Anne, Queen, iii., 204, 205, 209, 211, 220, 222.

Anstruther, ii., 192.

Arbroath, monastery of, i., 249, 296, 432, 433, 434; town of, 238, 409; iii., 93, 301; iv., 375.

Arbuthnot, Alexander, ii., 372, 373, 413; Dr. John, iv., 228‒230.

Architecture, i., 157‒165, 247‒250, 428‒431; ii., 396, 397; iii., 396‒7; iv., 401‒411.

Ardnamurchan, i., 24, 261, 356; iii., 90.

Ardoch, i., 106.

Argyle, Earl of, i., 356‒7, 364, 365; ii., 63, 64, 89, 96, 97, 130, 134, 135, 145, 150, 181, 201, 202, 224, 226, 229; iii., 90, 91, 92, 99, 104, 121, 123, 159, 167, 192; Duke of, 206, 223, 241.

Argyleshire, i., 53, 116, ♦117, 121, 127, 210, 261, 369; iii., 91; iv.

♦ “177” replaced with “117”

Arkinholm, battle of, i., 343.

Armada, ii., 191, 192.

Armstrong, John, a marauder, ii., 224, 225; Dr. John, iv., 169.

Arran, island of, i., 23, 95, 216, 286, 379, 380.

Arran, Earl of, i., 346; Regent, ii., 63, 65, 67, 70, 74, 78, 86, 87; Stewart, Earl of Arran, 175, 177, 181, 184, 185, 187.

Arrowheads, i., 49, 50.

Art, early, i., 52, 75‒79, 166‒174, 176‒180, 241‒243, 470, 471; ii., 423‒425; iii., 393‒396; Progress of, in Scotland, iv., 428.

Aryan race, i., 38‒42; language of, 43.

Arth, a friar, ii., 51‒53.

Asceticism, i., 131, 156, 157, 244; ii., 43‒46, 261, 262.

Assembly, General, ii., 115, 129, 149, 151, 160, 166, 167, 169, 188, 193, 211, 213; iii., 28, 34, 36, 39, 69‒72, 77, 83, 84, 98, 104, 186; iv., 465‒485.

Athole, Earl of, i., 208, 209, 214, 217, 255, 263, 283, 285, 305, 306, 335, 337; ii., 143, 148; iii., 110; Marquis of, 174; Duke of, 207, 212.

Attwood, iv., 143, 144.

Auldearn, battle of, iii., 94.

Ayr, Burgh of, i., 240, 356, 359, 386, 387; ii., 69; iii., 303; iv., 369‒372; Castle of, i., 215, 248, 274, 287.

Ayrshire, i., 29, 114, 286, 287, 379; ii., 78; iii., 134, 153; iv., 341, 342.

Aytoun, William E., iv., 194.

Bacon, Lord, ii., 395; iii., 434‒435.

Badenoch, i., 211, 276, 356; iii., 181.

Badenoch, Lord of, i., 217, 256, 271, 274, 275, 277.

Baillie, General, iii., 93, 94, 95; Rev. Robert, 75, 76, 87, 88, 357, 358.

Bain, Dr. Alexander, ii., 420; iv., 139, 140, 141, 155.

Balcanqhall, Walter, ii., 177, 184, 187, 206.

Balfour, Sir James, ii., 75, 135, 144, 146; John, of Burley, iii., 151, 153, 343; Sir Andrew, 369.

Baliol, Bernard de, i., 203.

Baliol, King John, i., 256, 258, 259, 260‒262, 263, 264, 366; Edward, 304, 305, 306, 307.

Ballads, early, i., 184‒5, 441‒450; ii., 76, 77, 244, 245, 341‒345; referring to the Civil War and persecution, iii., 237‒346; Jacobite ballads, 346‒353.

Balmerino, Lord, iii., 18, 60.

Bancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury, iii., 32.

Bane, Donald, King, i., 144.

Banff, i., 148, 248, 307, 385, 390, 391; iii., 301; iv., 373.

Bank of Scotland established, iii., 327‒329.

Bannatyne, George, ii., 371, 372.

Bannockburn, battle of, i., 291‒295.

Barbour, John, i., 451‒454.

Barclay, Robert, iii., 258; Dr., iv., 308.

Barlow, Bishop, ii., 54, 56.

Barmekyn hill, fort on, i., 90.

Barony, i., 223, 225.

Barton, Captain, i., 359, 363.

Beaton, James, Archbishop, ii., 38, 58; David, Cardinal, 58, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70‒72, 79.

Beaumont, Henry, i., 301, 305, 306.

Beck, Bishop of Durham, i., 266, 270.

Bede, i., 116, 122, 126.

Bellhaven, Lord, iii., 197, 211‒12.

Bell Rock, i., 23.

Bell, Dr. John, iv., 306, 307; Sir Charles, 307, 308.

Bellenden, John, ii., 317, 318; Sir John, 158; Sir Lewis, 274.

Berkeley, Bishop, iii., 470, 471.

Berwick-North, i., 387, 389.

Berwick, i., 206, 233, 234, 236, 238, 239, 248, 259, 260, 263, 264, 268, 279, 285, 295, 305, 350, 382; Treaty of, ii., 100, 272.

Bible, translations of, ii., 25‒27, 49, 170.

Bisset, Thomas, i., 271.

Black, David, ii., 204‒206; Dr. Joseph iv., 260‒263, 273, 276, 278.

Blackadder, John, iii., 139.

Blackie, John S., iv., 247‒249.

Blakey, Robert, iv., 160.

Blacklock, Dr. Thomas, iv., 171, 172.

Blair, Robert, iv., 169, 170; Dr. Hugh, 215.

Blair Athole, iii., 90.

Blair Castle, iii., 181.

Bœce, Hector, ii., 316.

Bondmen, i., 252, 380‒382.

Book of Common Order, ii., 113, 114; Book of Discipline, the first, 105‒113; the second, 171‒173.

Book of Canons, iii., 45, 46.

Boot and shoe manufactures, iv., 392, 393.

Borders, state of, i., 309, 315‒318, 322, 324, 342; ii., 223‒225; order established on the Borders, iii., 20‒28.

Borthwick Castle, ii., 143.

Bothwell, Earl of, i., 353, 426; ii., 69, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138‒145; Francis Stewart, Earl of, 198, 272, 273, 274‒276.

Bothwell Bridge, Battle of, iii., 153, 154.

Botriphnie, i., 378; iv., 197.

Bower, Walter, i., 376, 463.

Boyd, Robert, of Kilmarnock, i., 283; Robert, Lord Boyd, 345, 346, 347; Sir Thomas, created Earl of Arran, 146, 147.

Boyd, Zachary, iii., 358, 359.

Braemar, iii., 222.

Brahmanism, ii., 428, 429, 431, 433.

Braxfield, Lord, iv., 458.

Breadalbane, Earl of, iii., 190, 191.

Brechin, i., 138, 164, 183, 238, 249, 276, 409; Castle of, 264, 276; Battle of, 342.

Bridges, Early, i., 250.

Briggs, Henry, ii., 389, 390, 391.

Brigham, treaty of, i., 218.

Britons of Strathclyde, i., 113, 114, 117, 123‒125, 138.

Britons and Scots, early laws of, i., 151‒153.

Brochs, i., 157‒163.

Brodick Castle, i., 286.

Brodie, Alexander, iii., 255; William, iv., 454.

Bronze weapons and tools, i., 74‒79.

Brooches, i., 117‒119.

Brown, Janet, ii., 231; Dr. Thomas, iv., 87‒97; John, 216; Dr. John, 217; Dr. William L., 218, 219.

Bruce, Robert, of Annandale, i., 203, 218, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260; Robert, Earl of Carrick, 266, 267, 271, 276, 278, 281‒283.

Bruce, Nigel, Thomas, Alexander, i., 285; Edward, 287, 290, 291, 292; Robert, ii., 201, 208, 216, 381, 382; Michael, iv., 177.

Brude, King of the Picts, i., 127.

Bruno, Giordano, writings of, iii., 399‒401.

Brunston, Laird of, ii., 69.

Buchan, Earl of, i., 208, 209, 211, 213, 217, 262, 287, 288, 319, 325, 352, 353, 373.

Buchan, Peter, i., 446.

Buchanan, George, ii., 58, 145; writings of, 364‒369, 409; Thomas, 260; Dr. Robert, iv., 224.

Buddha, his life and work, ii., 429‒432.

Buddhism, ii., 233, 432.

Burghs, the origin and organisation of, i., 33, 82, 83, 152, 232‒237; Custom and trade of, 382‒391; Social life and characteristics of the burghal communities, 397‒408, 414, 438, 439; ii., 230‒243, 291‒294; iii., 245‒248, 274‒278, 283‒289.

Burghs of regality, barony, and church, i., 226, 237, 238, 408, 409.

Burial dues exacted by the Church, ii., 39, 40.

Burnet, Bishop, his works, iii., 364‒366; John, iv., 441.

Burns, Robert, iv., 179‒182.

Burntisland, iii., 301.

Burton, Dr. John H., iv., 160.

Caerlaverock Castle, i., 247, 272.

Cairns, burial, chambered, i., 53‒64, 91, 92.

Caithness, prehistoric structures in, i., 53‒58; Norseman inroads, 136, 138, 139.

Caithness, Earls of, i., 207, 208; ii., 227; iii., 237, 238, 239.

Calderwood, David, iii., 38, 356, 357.

Caledonians, i., 105‒109, 110, 111, 114.

Caledonian Canal, iv., 354.

Calvin, ii., 119, 357‒360.

Cambuskenneth, i., 249, 367.

Cameron of Lochiel, i., 356; iii., 181.

Cameron, Richard, iii., 155, 156.

Cameronians, iii., 155, 174, 185, 186, 187.

Campbell of Glenlyon, iii., 192.

Campbell, Sir Colin, iii., 395; Dr. John, iv., 144; Dr. George, 85, 86; Thomas, his writings, 185‒187; Colin, architect, 402; Thomas, sculptor, 454.

Candlish, Dr. R. T., iv., 221, 222.

Canterbury, Archbishop of, i., 200, 201, 272.

Cantyre, i., 21, 215, 261, 285, 348.

Canute, i., 139, 192.

Carberry Hill, ii., 144.

Cardross, i., 302, 303.

Cargill, Donald, iii., 155, 156, 157.

Carham, battle of, i., 138.

Carlisle, i., 210, 318; iii., 227.

Carlyle, Thomas, iv., 156‒159; Dr. Alexander, 19, 43, 44.

Carmichael, Lord, iii., 186, 187.

Carmichael, John, of ♦Meadowflat, iii., 27; William, 151; Gershom, iv., 18.

♦ “Meadowflatt” replaced with “Meadowflat”

♦Carmon, Colonel, iii., 183.

♦ Printed out of alphabetic order.

Carrick, Earl of, i., 217, 266, 271, 278, 281, 302, 305, 314, 316.

Carswell, John, ii., 108.

Carstairs, William, iii., 178, 179.

Carved woodwork, i., 430; ii., 423.

Casket Letters, ii., 141, 142; iv., 145.

Cassillis, Earl of, i., 365; ii., 69, 150; iii., 19, 56, 87, 99, 104.

Castellio, Sebastia, ii., 359.

Castles, i., 247, 248, 428, 430; ii., 422, 423.

Catechisms, ii., 77, 78, 85, 109, 110; iii., 89.

Caterthun, hill fort, i., 89, 90.

Cathen, the King’s adviser, i., 125.

Caves, i., 43, 83, 163.

Celestius, ii., 356.

Celibacy, i., 131, 156, 244, 245; ii., 21, 22, 41‒43, 45, 46, 261, 262.

Celtic tribes, i., 44, 45, 90, 100, 101, 105, 110, 113‒116, 119.

Censorship of the press, ii., 277, 278.

Chalmer, James, ii., 90.

Chalmers, George, iv., 153; Dr. Thomas, 219‒221.

Chambered Cairns, i., 53‒65.

Chambers, Thomas, i., 336, 337; David, ii., 138; Dr. Robert, iv., 163.

Charles I., reign of, iii., 42‒100; policy of, 43‒50, 51‒54, 57, 58, 59, 63‒65, 66‒68, 71, 73‒75, 76, 77, 78‒82, 90, 95, 96, 97.

Charles II., reign of, iii., 103, 107, 110, 119‒163.

Charles Stewart, prince, iii., 226‒229.

Charters, i., 148, 201, 223‒225, 227, 232‒234, 373, 387, 422.

Chartularies, i., 247.

Chatelherault, Duke of, ii., 86, 130.

Chemical Science, iv., 260‒266, 273, 286, 296‒298, 397.

Chepman, Walter, ii., 300‒302.

Christian I., King of Denmark, i., 346.

Christianity, introduced, i., 121‒129; early form of, 130‒134; influence of, 134, 135, 168, 181, 186, 232, 245, 248‒250, 288, 289, 466, 467; ii., 437‒439, 443.

Church, early, i., 130‒134, 155‒157, 200, 201; re-organisation of, 212, 213, 243‒245; property of, 227, 252‒254, 380, 431‒433; state of, 332, 333, 431, 432; ii., 40‒43, 51, 76‒78, 79, 102.

Church, the Reformed, organisation of, ii., 104‒115; conflict with the Government, 165‒173, 177‒189, 192‒194, 197‒220; iii., 20‒42, 46‒82, 83‒87, 95‒101, 110, 120‒163, 164‒169; internal struggles of, iv., 467, et seq.

Circuit Courts, i., 222, 355, 356, 424; Lords of Council, Judicial Committee, i., 370, 371; Court of Session, ii., 216, 223; iii., 112, 113, 124, 232‒235; iv.; Church Courts, i., 227, 230, 371.

Cists, i., 55, 93, 95.

Civilisation, primary causes of, i., 19‒20, 31‒33, 34, 35; ii., 426, 427; gradual progress of, i., 53, 70, 71, 98‒102, 119‒121, 135, 149‒151, 161, 164, 169, 170, 181‒188, 232‒241, 245‒55, 330‒332, 366‒371, 382‒397, 408, 418‒422, 465‒472; ii., 109, 278‒291, 398, 419; iii., 101, 102, 294‒335; rapid development of, iii., 215; iv., 142‒145, 165, 284, 324‒332; et seq., 341‒400.

Clackmannan, iv., 343.

Claim of Right, of the Scotch Parliament, iii., 176, 177; Claim of Right, of General Assembly of the Church, iv., 480, et seq.

Clan, i., 146; iii., 225.

Clan Canan, i., 150.

Clan Morgan, i., 150.

Clanranald, chief of, i., 356; ii., 226; iii., 242, 243.

Cleland, William, iii., 153.

Clunymore, i., 378.

Coal, early notice of, i., 238, 409; mining, ii., 286; iii., 292‒293; iv., 341‒343.

Cochrane, Robert, i., 348‒350.

Cockburne, of Henderland, ii., 224.

Cockburn, Sir Richard, Sir John, iii., 18.

Coinage, i., 238, 394‒397; ii., 279‒282; iii., 320‒327; paper currency, 327‒329.

Coldingham, i., 209, 246.

Colin, King, i., 137.

Colliers, iii., 291‒292; iv., 342‒344.

Colville, John, i., 448.

Commerce, i., 239‒240, 391‒394; ii., 286‒290; iii., 112, 300‒303, 311; iv., 352‒357, 359‒363, et seq.

Compurgators, i., 228‒229.

Comyn, Clan, i., 213‒214.

Comyn, John, i., 217, 256, 271, 275, 277; slaughter of, 281.

Confessions of Faith, ii., 34‒35, 102, 204‒205; iii., 89.

Constantine, Roman general, i., 112.

Constantine I., son of Kenneth M‘Alpin, i., 136.

Constantine II., 136‒137.

Constantine III., 138.

Conventicles, acts against, iii., 130, 131, 133, 138, 140, 146, 148, 149.

Convention of Royal Burgh, i., 234, 235.

Convention of Estates, iii., 173‒177.

Cope, Sir John, iii., 226, 227.

Corrichie, battle of, ii., 123, 124.

Cotterel, Colonel, iii., 110, 111.

Covenant, National, iii., 59‒62; Solemn League and Covenant, 83‒86.

Covenanters, iii., 68‒73, 74‒77, 78‒82, 86, 89‒102, 103‒105, 107.

♦Craftsmen, i., 335, 336, 404‒408; ii., 240, 241, 242, 293, 294; iii., 287‒289.

♦ “Craftesmen” replaced with “Craftsmen”

Craig, John, ii., 110, 158, 167, 185; Sir Thomas, 384; Andrew, iii., 245.

Craigellachie, iv., 354.

Craigmiller Castle, i., 349.

Craigphadrig, vitrified fort, i., 91.

Crannogs, i., 42, 84‒87.

Cranstoun, Sir William, iii., 21, 24, 25, 27.

Crawar, Paul, i., 332.

Crawford, Earl of, i., 321, 340, 341, 342, 343, 364; iii., 120, 179, 186.

Crawford, Sir William, i., 388, 389.

Crawford Moor, ii., 282; iii., 293.

Crichton, Sir William, i., 338, 339, 340.

Crinan, Abbot of Dunkeld, i., 139, 140.

Cromwell, iii., 99, 108, 100, 110, 111, 112‒115.

Culblean, battle of, i., 306.

Cullen, burgh of, i., 385, 386.

Culloden, battle of, iii., 229, 230, 351, 352; iv., 172, 173.

Cumberland, i., 105, 125, 142.

Cumberland, Duke of, iii., 228, 229.

Cummene, i., 181.

Cunningham, Allan, iv., 192, 193.

Cupar, i., 465; iii., 157.

Curates, under Charles II., iii., 130, 132, 173.

Dacre, Lord, ii., 62.

Dalkeith, iii., 227; castle of, i., 316, 342; ii., 423.

Dalriada, i., 116, 117, 127.

Dalry, iii., 133.

Dalrymple, Sir John, iii., 191‒193, 233, 234.

Dalziel, General, iii., 134, 135, 342.

Dancing, i., 457, 468; ii., 124, 125, 415; iv., 416.

Darien Colony, iii., 196‒204.

Darnaway Castle, i., 360; ii., 124.

Darnley, ii., 128, 129, 130‒136, 137, 138.

Dauney, William, iv., 416.

David I., reign of, i., 201‒204, 221, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 230, 232, 234, 235, 243, 244.

David II., reign of, i., 304, 306, 307‒313, 429.

David, Earl of Huntingdon, i., 204, 256.

Davidson, John, ii., 198, 214, 373, 374; Thomas, 302, 303; John, Principal of the University of Glasgow, 352, 408; Dr. Patrick, iv., 164.

Dean of Lismore’s Book, i., 442, 443.

Defence of the Country, armour, weapons, organisation of the army, i., 409‒413.

Denmark, marriage treaty, i., 346.

Descartes, method and principles of his system, iii., 403‒418.

Dickson, David, iii., 61, 359.

Dingwall, i., 385, 386.

Divorce, ii., 265, 266.

Donald I., i., 136.

Donald II., i., 136.

Donald Bane, i., 144.

Donald Balloch, i., 329, 330.

Donald, Lord of the Isles, i., 324‒326.

Douglas, Sir William, i., 266, 267; Sir James, 283, 286, 287, 290, 292, 300, 303; Sir Archibald, 305, 306; Sir William, 307; Sir John of Dalkeith, 342; Sir James, 435; Sir William of Drumlanrig, 389; Sir James, ii., 225; George of Parkhead, 284, 285; Sir Archibald, iii., 18.

Douglas, Earl of, i., 316, 317, 318, 321, 323, 326, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 349, 388, 389, 390.

Douglas, Gavin, ii., 36, 310‒315; Dr. James, iv., 320.

Drumclog, battle of, iii., 153.

Drummond, Lord, i., 360; ii., 228; Earl of Perth, iii., 171, 172; Lady Margaret, i., 360.

Drummond, General, iii., 135; James, 227; William, 366, 367.

Dryburgh, Monastery, ii., 66.

Duff, King, i., 137; Angus Chief, 329;

♦Dumbarton, i., 114, 121; castle of, 248, 278; ii., 149, 154, 155; burgh of, i., 386, 391; iii., 302, 303; iv., 361.

♦ Separate item, not part of Duff.

♦Dumfries, Castle of, i., 248, 290; burgh of, 282, 356, 384; ii., 131, 186; iii., 24, 27, 134, 212, 228, 342, 386; iv., 371.

♦ Printed out of alphabetic order.

♦Dumplin, battle of, i., 305.

♦ Printed out of alphabetic order.

Dunaverty Castle, i., 285, 355.

Dunbar, Castle, i., 263, 383; ii., 133, 140, 141, 143, 149; town of, i., 383, 503; iii., 227, 300, 387; battle of, 109.

Dunbar, Earl of, i., 212, 214, 217, 218; iii., 18, 25, 26, 30.

Dunbar, William, ii., 303‒310.

Dunblane, cathedral, i., 249; ii., 423; city of, i., 238, 408.

Duncan I., i., 139, 140.

Duncan II., i., 143, 144.

Duncan, Dr. Andrew, iv., 302‒304.

Dundee, i., 83, 119, 248, 265, 267, 288, 387, 391, 437; ii., 69, 93, 197, 202, 233, 235, 237, 240, 243, 400; iii., 93, 223, 301, 303; iv., 243, 331, 357, 358, 375, 376.

Dundee, Viscount, iii., 174, 175, 181, 182, 183.

Dunfermline, Abbey of, i., 141, 144, 156, 239, 248, 252, 303, 385; burgh of, 238, 258, 408; ii., 400; iv., 375.

Dunfermline, Earl of, iii., 18, 30.

Dunkeld, i., 119; church of, 120, 134; abbot of, 138, 139, 143; bishopric of, 210, 218, 222, 225.

Dunlop, John, iv., 155; Alexander, 480.

Dunnichen, i., 116.

Dunnotter, i., 136.

Duns Law, iii., 74.

Dunsinnane, i., 91, 92, 140.

Dupin, Nicolas, iii., 313, 318, 333.

Durham, i., 203; battle of, 308; iii., 97.

Durham, James, iii., 359.

♦Durrisdeer, i., 91.

♦ Printed out of alphabetic order.

Durward, Alan, i., 214, 216.

Dury, John, ii., 167, 178, 179, 182.

Eadmer, i., 200, 201.

Earth-houses, i., 65‒70.

Earthenware, iii., 317; iv., 365, 366.

Edgar, King, i., 143, 144, 148.

Edinburgh, annexed, i., 137, 144, 151, 233, 247, 258, 276, 301, 306, 312, 317, 319, 338, 352, 354, 370, 388, 389; ii., 35, 54, 58, 65, 66, 78, 89, 90, 91, 93, 97, 99, 100, 115, 117, 119, 124, 128, 132, 133, 135, 140, 143, 148, 151, 154, 163, 167, 179, 183, 203, 206, 213, 219, 237; iii., 37, 41, 42‒44, 48, 49, 54, 55, 56, 67, 81, 99, 110, 120, 129, 134, 135, 147, 153, 163, 168, 171‒173, 174‒176, 180, 182, 186, 203, 206, 213, 219, 227, 236, 241, 274, 285; iv., 44, 70, 75, 87, 97, 144, 148, 165, 174, 178, 194, 211, 222, 234, 330, 391, 405‒6; Castle of, i., 248, 264, 274, 307, 322, 339, 349, 350, 358, 429; ii., 101, 134, 142, 144, 149, 152, 155; iii., 73, 159, 174, 175, 227; University of, ii., 414‒419; iii., 392, 393; iv., 18, 69, 70, 74, 75, 87, 97, 102, 103, 136, 148, 156, 157, 167, 257, 263, 274, 291‒315.

Edinburgh, treaty of, ii., 100.

Edmund, i., 143.

Education, i., 184, 245, 466; first Educational Act, 466, 467, 468; ii., 109, 110, 397‒422; iii., 375‒393; iv., 324‒330.

Edward I., policy of, i., 218, 219, 255‒260, 261, 262, 263‒265, 266, 269‒271, 272, 273‒279, 283, 287.

Edward II., i., 287, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 296, 298, 299, 300.

Edward III., Invasions of Scotland, i., 305, 306, 307; policy of, 309, 310, 311, 312.

Edward IV., i., 348, 349, 351.

Edward VI., ii., 75, 86, 87.

Egfrid, defeat of, i., 116.

Eglinton, Earl of, ii., 140, 229; iii., 56, 75, 99.

Elgin, i., 139, 264, 385, 390; ii., 251; iii., 92, 94; iv., 370;

Elizabeth, wife of Robert I., i., 303.

Elizabeth, Queen, ii., 92, 93, 99, 100, 145, 150, 220; iv., 147.

Elliot, Robert, iii., 27.

Ellon, iv., 370.

Elphinstone, Bishop, i., 467; ii., 300, 301.

Elphinstone, Lord, iii., 19; master of, 292.

England, policy of toward Scotland, i., 206, 214, 218, 257‒260, 261, 263‒265, 271, 273, 278, 280, 283, 287, 299, 300, 301, 305, 306, 309, 310, 322, 349, 361, 362; ii., 54‒57, 63‒67, 76, 99‒101, 155; iii., 179, 183, 184, 190‒193, 198, 201‒204, 206, 217‒221.

English language, i., 441, 443, 464.

English money, i., 396; ii., 282; one standard fixed, iii., 216.

Eocha, King, i., 136.

Episcopacy, ii., 108, 109, 157‒160, 164‒171, 177, 182‒185, 188, 210‒218; iii., 28‒42, 44‒69; abolished, 70‒72; reintroduced, 122‒128; again abolished, 180, 181, 184.

Erc, Chief, i., 116.

Eric II., King of Norway, i., 217, 259.

Errol, Earl of, i., 365, 373; ii., 195, 196, 199, 201, 212; iii., 19.

Erskine, Lord Robert, i., 334; John, of Dun, ii., 88, 89, 93, 108, 158, 185; Rev. Ebenezer, iv., 213; Rev. Ralph, 213; Dr. John, 213, 214; Thomas, Lord, 232‒234.

Ethnology, i., 38‒43; of Scotland, 43‒47, 114, 115, 116, 118.

Etive, Loch, vitrified fort on, i., 91.

Evans, Dr. John, i., 50, 51.

Exchequer, i., 221.

Excise, difficulties connected with, iii., 217‒219; iv., 395, 396.

Excommunication of Robert I., i., 295, 303; form of, ii., 255, 257.

Fairfax, iii., 342.

Falasie, i., 192.

Falkirk, battle of, i., 269‒271; iii., 228.

Falkland Castle, i., 323, 430; ii., 213, 274.

Fast Castle, i., 324, 353.

Fasting, i., 131; ii., 257‒260; iii., 272, 273.

Fergus, King, i., 120; Chief, 116, 205.

Ferguson, David, ii., 352; Adam, iv., 69‒74, 152.

Fergusson, Robert, iv., 178, 179.

Feudalism, i., 161, 190, 193, 198, 199, 201, 203, 209, 211, 220‒228, 256, 260, 261, 269, 337, 371‒376, 411.

Fife, Earl of, i., 143, 204, 209, 213, 217, 225, 271, 308, 314, 317, 319, 333.

Fifeshire, i., 105, 119, 121, 136, 304; ii., 66; iii., 151; iv., 142, 143, 341, 373.

Finlay, John, i., 446.

Firth of Forth, i., 23, 28, 109, 110, 115, 119.

Fisheries, i., 239, 377, 390, 391, 432; ii., 40, 54; iii., 301, 302, 303, 308; iv., 400.

Flanders, Count of, i., 240, 241, 391, 392.

Fleming, Robert, i., 283; Malcolm, 327, 339.

Fleming, Lord, i., 345; ii., 150.

Fletcher, Sir John, iii., 120; Andrew, of Saltoun, 179, 206, 255.

Flint weapons and tools, i., 48‒52.

Flodden, Battle of, i., 363‒365.

Forbes, Lord, i., 353, 354.

Forbes, Patrick, Bishop, iii., 362; Dr. John, 362, 363; Professor, iv., 266, 268.

Fordoun, iii., 94.

Fordun, John, i., 463.

Forest, free, i., 223; forest laws, 225, 417.

Forfar, Castle of, i., 248, 267, 288; burgh of, 373, 387; iv., 375.

Forfarshire, i., 89, 121, 202, 264, 378; ii., 88; iii., 90, 110; iv., 373.

Forfeited estates, i., 343, 344, 347; ii., 60; iii., 217, 224; iv., 336.

Forman, Andrew, Archbishop of St. Andrews, i., 428; ii., 36.

Forres, i., 248, 372, 385.

Forrest, Thomas, martyred, ii., 58.

Forrester, Robert, martyred, ii., 58.

Four Burghs, court of, i., 234, 235.

France, Alliance with, i., 262, 274, 275, 299, 300, 315; French troops in Scotland, 316, 317, 330, 363; ii., 76, 97.

Franchise, iv., 456, 460, 461‒463.

Francis II., ii., 97, 116.

Frankfort, ii., 75.

Fraser, William, Bishop of St. Andrews, i., 217, 246, 255.

Fraser, Sir Simon, i., 275, 277, 285; Alexander, 283; James, 305; Simon, 305; Captain Simon, iv., 421.

Free Trade with England under Cromwell, iii., 112.

French refugees, ii., 189.

Fyvie, i., 50, 432; iii., 91.

Fyvie, Lord, ii., 204; iii., 18.

Gaelic, i., 148, 175, 183, 184, 442‒444.

Galgacus, Chief, i., 106‒109.

Galloway, i., 115, 122, 201, 203; risings in, 205, 206, 211, 212, 272; law of, 229, 230; castles of, 290.

Galloway, Lord of, i., 211, 230, 256; Bishop of, 212; ii., 153.

Galt, John, iv., 204.

Game laws, i., 417.

Garioch, i., 325.

Gasklune, battle of, i., 319, 320.

Geddes, Sir William, iv., 142.

Geneva, ii., 75, 89, 113, 114, 359.

Geology, iv., 268‒271.

George I., iii., 222.

Gibbs, James, iv., 402‒404.

Gibson, James, ii., 188.

Gilbert, Chief, i., 206.

Gillespie, George, iii., 87, 362.

Gillies, Dr. John, iv., 152, 153.

Gladstanes, Archbishop of St. Andrews, iii., 19.

Glammis, Lord, i., 373; Master of, ii., 177, 181; iii., 19.

Glasgow, Bishop of――Wishart, i., 266, 273, 277, 283, 294; Turnbull, 466, 467; Laing, 467; Archbishop of, ii., 38, 59; iii., 19, 35, 363; Cathedral of i., 249.

Glasgow, city of, i., 125, 238, 403, 408, 465; ii., 97, 252, 400, 402, 403; iii., 50, 69, 128, 153, 218, 228, 245, 246, 248, 254, 284, 302, 303, 319, 328, 330, 331; iv., 348‒351, 360‒363, 370, 376, 378, 380, 383, 389, 392‒393, 395, 397‒399, 406‒409, 428; University of, i., 466; ii., 408‒410; iii., 388, 390, 391, 392; iv., 18, 19, 44, 60, 102, 260‒263, 266, 272‒275, 284, 315‒317.

Glass, introduction of, i., 420; Glass-making, iii., 315‒317; iv., 363‒365.

Glencairn, Earl of, ii., 69, 88, 89, 97, 130, 133, 145, 148, 177; iii., 120, 124.

Glencoe, iii., 191‒193.

Glenfinnan, iii., 226.

Glengarry, chief, iii., 190, 191, 226.

Glenlivet, battle of, ii., 201, 202.

Glenmore, i., 25, 215.

Godly Ballads, ii., 341‒345.

Gold ornaments, ancient, i., 79‒81.

Goodal, Walter, iv., 145.

Goodsir, John, iv., 306.

Gordon, Duke of, iii., 174, 175; iv., 421, 454.

Gordon, Sir Adam, i., 298, 305; Sir Alexander, 338; Sir John, ii., 124; George, 124; Sir Robert, iii., 237, 238; Sir Alexander, 238; Lord Gordon, 238, 239; Robert, 247; George, 267, 268; Dr., iv., 309; Sir John W., 446.

Gourlay, Norman, burned, ii., 54.

Gow, Neil, iv., 418, 420; Nathaniel, 421, 422.

Gowrie, Earl of, ii., 177, 179, 180, 181, 218, 219.

Gowrie, Carse of, i., 28.

Graham, Sir John, i., 271; David de, 277; Sir Robert, 327, 334, 335, 336, 337; William, iii., 313; John of Claverhouse, 153; George F., iv., 416.

Grammar Schools, i., 465, 466; ii., 399‒405; iii., 380‒388; iv., 327.

Grant, James, iv., 208.

Gray, Lord, iii., 238.

Gray, David, iv., 195.

Greenock, i., 409; iii., 303; iv., 394.

Gregory, James, iii., 371, 372; David, 372, 373; Dr. John, iv., 300, 302; Dr. James, 302.

Greyfriars Church, iii., 49.

Greyfriars Churchyard, iii., 61, 154.

Grub, Dr. George, iv., 164.

Gruoch, i., 139, 140.

Guilds, laws of, i., 235‒236, 404.

Guinea, iii., 330.

Guise, House of, ii., 57, 92, 93, 116, 124, 125.

Grum John, iv., 422.

Guthrie, James, iii., 123, 326; William, iv., 150; Dr. Thomas, 222.

Hackston, of Rathillet, iii., 151, 153, 156.

Haco, i., 215, 216.

Haddington, i., 307, 386, 387, 465; ii., 69, 303, 315; iv., 370.

Haddington, Earl of, iv., 335.

Haddingtonshire, i., 271; iv., 343, 373.

Hailes, Lord, iv., 146, 151, 152.

Halidon Hill, battle of, i., 306.

Hall, Sir John, i., 336.

Hamilton, Lord, i., 345, 346; Lord Claud, ii., 150, 155, 208; Marquis of, iii., 63, 64, 65, 67, 70, 71, 74; Duke of, 98, 99, 174, 175, 177, 179, 181, 193, 207, 211.

Hamilton, Patrick, martyred, ii., 49, 50.

Hamilton, of Bothwellhaugh, ii., 152; John, Archbishop of St. Andrews, 71, 77, 87, 96, 138, 150, 154, 406; Sir Thomas, of Monkland, iii., 18; James, Master of Paisley, 19; Sir Robert, 154; William, iv., 167; William, of Bangour, 170; Sir William, his writings, 102‒135.

Hamilton town, iii., 153; iv., 295, 296.

Harlaw, battle of, i., 324‒326, 450.

Harold, King, i., 194.

Harold, Earl of Orkney, i., 207, 208.

Harrington, James, iii., 450.

Hastings, John, i., 256, 259, 260; Henry de, 204.

Hawick, iv., 369, 370, 371.

Hawley, General, iii., 228, 229.

Hay, Gilbert, of Errol, i., 283; Hugh, 283, 284; Alexander, iii., 19; Sir James, 19.

Hebrides, i., 22, 23, 118, 134, 144, 156, 215, 217, 329, 346, 348, 355, 356, 357; ii., 60; iii., 242, 243.

Henderson, James, ii., 238; Alexander, iii., 52, 55, 60, 61, 70, 87, 88, 362.

Henry, the minstrel, i., 458‒462.

Henry I., i., 195, 202.

Henry II., i., 205, 206.

Henry III., i., 214.

Henry IV., i., 322, 324.

Henry VI., i., 345.

Henry VII., i., 353, 358, 361, 362.

Henry VIII., i., 362, 363; ii., 37, 51, 54‒56, 57, 61, 63‒67, 69, 76.

Henry II. of France, ii., 97.

Henry, Dr. Robert, iv., 151.

Henryson, Robert, i., 376, 462, 463; Dr. Edward, ii., 383.

Hepburn, William, i., 353; Patrick, Lord Hailes, 353; John, ii., 36, 406.

Hereditary jurisdiction, i., 220, 221, 223, 225, 226, 228, 237, 238, 372, 411, 424‒426; iii., 213, 225, 226.

Heresy, i., 37, 327, 332; ii., 18, 19, 49, 53, 58‒60, 68‒70, 74, 75, 78, 81, 91.

Hermitage Castle, i., 309.

Herries, Ralph, i., 285.

Herries, Lord, ii., 150.

Hertford, Earl of, ii., 65‒67.

Hexham, i., 253, 254, 268.

High Commission, Courts of, iii., 34, 132, 133.

Highlands, i., 23‒25, 27, 29, 206‒208, 329, 348, 355‒357; ii., 226, 227, 290; iii., 237‒239, 241‒244; iv., 353, 354.

Hill, Dr. George, iv., 219, 470.

Hill forts, i., 88‒92.

Historic Interpretation, i., 33‒37.

Historical conditions, i., 19, 45, 46, 85, 88, 101, 102, 113, 119, 120, 121, 135, 136, et seq., 227, 228, 255‒265; ii., 1, 2, et seq., 100, 103, 220; iii., 17‒20, 176, 177, 214, 215.

History of Scottish philosophy, iv., 17‒142.

Hogarth, George, iv., ♦422, 423, 427, 429.

♦ page numbers supplied by transcriber

Hogg, James, iii., 344; iv., 189‒191.

Holland, John, iii., 328.

Holyrood Abbey, i., 221, 222, 249, 338; Palace of, ii., 117, 130, 133, 136, 142, 179, 206, 209, 215, 273, 275, 423; iii., 396; Chapel of, ii., 119, 138; iii., 37, 51, 169, 172.

Home, Lord, i., 364; ii., 199, 224.

Home, John, iv., 174.

Homeldon Hill, battle of, i., 323.

Homil, James, i., 348, 350.

Hope, Sir Thomas, iii., 84, 367.

Howard, Lord, i., 363.

Hume, Lord, ii., 143, 145, 148.

Hume, Alexander, ii., 377, 378; Alexander, 402, 403; Sir Patrick, iii., 179; David, his philosophical writings, iv., 25‒44; history, 146‒148.

Huntingdon, Earl of, i., 204.

Hunter, Dr. Henry, iv., 217, 218; Dr. William, 320, 321; Dr. John, 321‒323.

Huntly, Earl of, i., 342, 350, 354, 356, 357, 358, 364; ii., 63, 64, 78, 116, 123, 124, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 150, 152, 155, 192, 195, 196, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204, 206, 212; Marquis of, iii., 68, 74, 90, 94, 104, 222.

Hurry, General, iii., 93, 94.

Icolmkill, statutes of, iii., 242, 243.

Inchaffary, Abbot of, i., 292.

Inchcolm, ruins of monastery, i., 163.

Inchkeith, i., 23.

Inchmahome, i., 249.

Incontinence, i., 155, 244, 245; ii., 41.

India-rubber manufactures, iv., 391, 392, 393.

Indulf, King, i., 137.

Independents, iii., 88, 96, 97.

Influence of surrounding nature upon the Mind, i., 19, 20, 31‒33, 66; ii., 427.

Innermaith, Lord, ii., 145, 146.

Innes, Thomas, iv., 145; Cosmo, 162.

Invercharron, iii., 105, 106.

Inveresk, iv., 418.

Inverkeithing, i., 307, 387; iii., 301.

Inverlochy, battle of, iii., 92.

Inverness, i., 83, 91, 127, 151, 207, 233, 240, 306, 329, 356, 385, 390, 404; ii., 226, 227; iii., 94, 225, 226, 227, 228, 288, 302; iv., 354, 373, 374.

Inverurie, i., 278‒287; iii., 74.

Iona, i., 127‒134, 156, 175, 181, 182.

Ireland, 21, 48, 70, 77, 78, 126, 127, 133, 161, 174, 181, 211, 285, 291, 357; iii., 65, 85, 90, 297, 302, 303.

Irish, early writings, i., 117, 150; note illuminated manuscripts, 172, 173.

Iron works and manufactures, iv., 345‒352.

Irvine, i., 267, 391, 434; iii., 134.

Irvine, Sir Alexander, i., 328.

Irving, Dr., ii., 367; iv., 163.

Isles, lordship of forfeited, i., 348, 355.

Isabella, daughter of Earl David, i., 204, 256.

Jack, Thomas, ii., 402.

Jacobites, iii., 175, 176, 181‒183, 190, 193, 195, 196, 201, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 211, 213, 218, 219, 220, 222‒224, 226‒230.

Jacobite Songs, iii., 346‒353.

James I., reign of, i., 226‒337.

James II., reign of, i., 338‒344.

James III., reign of, i., 344‒352.

James IV., reign of, i., 353‒365.

James V., reign of, ii., 38‒39, 49‒62.

James VI., reign of, ii., 169‒220; iii., 17‒42.

James VII., policy of, iii., 163‒172.

James VIII., Pretender, iii., 223.

Jamesone, George, painter, iii., 393‒396.

Jamieson, Dr., i., 280, 461.

Jedburgh, 238, 356, 383, 426; ii., 292; iii., 24, 27, 380; iv., 371; castle of, i., 248, 264, 324; abbey of, 248; ii., 66.

Jeffrey, Lord, iv., 234‒236.

Jesuits, ii., 82‒84, 192, 195.

Joanna, Queen of David II., i., 302, 306, 307, 310.

John, King of England, i., 208, 209, 210.

Johnstone, of Johnstone, ii., 186, 224; Archibald, of Warriston, iii., 60, 61, 70, 87, 121, 123; Dr., 380; Mrs., iv., 204, 205.

Justiciary, i., 214, 222, 330, 386, 424.

Jury trial, i., 221, 230, 371.

Justice of the Peace, iii., 248, 249, 294.

Kay, John, iv., 366.

Kells, Book of, illuminated manuscripts, i., 172, 173.

Keith, iii., 244.

Keith, Sir Robert, i., 292, 293, 305, 367; Sir William, of Inverugy, ii., 228; Dr. William, iv., 319.

Kelso, i., 238, 344, 384; iv., 369; Abbey of, i., 216, 249, 250, 252‒254, 432; ii., 66.

Kennedy, Bishop of St. Andrews, i., 340, 345; Walter, ii., 309; Quintin, 349, 352, 353.

Kennedy, Lord, i., 360; ii., 309.

Kenneth I., M‘Alpin, i., 120, 121, 136.

Kenneth II., i., 138.

Kenneth, M‘Duff, i., 138.

Ker, George, ii., 195, 196; Mark, 224; Robert, iii., 19; Dr. David, iv., 319.

Kilconcath, William, i., 246.

Kildelith, i., 246.

Kildrummy Castle, i., 247, 264, 276, 284, 285, 306, 307.

Killiecrankie, Battle of, iii., 181‒183.

Kilmarnock, i., 409; iii., 297; iv., 369, 371, 372.

Kilpatrick, West, i., 110.

Kilsyth, battle of, iii., 95.

Kincardineshire, i., 136, 137, 378.

Kinghorn, i., 217, 258.

Kinghorn, Earl of, iii., 19.

Kirk-of-Field, ii., 135.

Kirkcaldy, iii., 301, 303; iv., 375.

Kirkcaldy, Sir William, of Grange, ii., 71, 149, 152, 153, 155, 156.

Kirkpatrick, i., 282.

Knapdale, i., 348.

Knox, John, ii., 69, 72, 73, 74, 75, 87‒89, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 104, 118, 119, 120, 123, 124‒127, 130, 134, 147, 153, 154, 159, 160‒165; his writings, 345‒349, 352‒354, 360‒364; Andrew, minister of Paisley, 195; Bishop of the Isles, iii., 242, 243; Dr., iv., 309.

Laing, David, ii., 300, 305, 331, 340, 343, 346; iv., 163.

Lamberton, Bishop of St. Andrews, i., 274, 281, 283, 285.

Lanark, i., 356, 387; ii., 181; iii., 160; iv., 373.

Lanarkshire, i., 29, 81, 114, 271, 279; iii., 134; iv., 341, 342, 343, 344, 347, 378, 381, 388.

Land, in connection with the tribe, and organisation of society, i., 100, 146‒150, 202, 223‒228, 250‒254, 371‒376, 377‒380, 380‒382, 421, 422; ii., 39, 40, 110, 266, 297; iii., 305; iv., 336‒339.

Langside, battle of, ii., 150.

Largs, battle of, i., 216.

Latin, i., 183, 245, 463, 464; ii., 5, 6, 379, 380.

Laud, Archbishop, iii., 45, 63, 66.

Lauder Bridge, i., 350.

Lauder, Sir Thomas D., iv., 206.

Lauderdale, Earl of, iii., 14, 129, 137, 142, 348.

Laws, early, i., 151‒153, 221, 222, 228‒231, 370, 371.

Lawson, James, ii., 162, 167, 184, 421.

Le Crocke, ii., 161.

Leibnitz, theory of monads, iii., 432‒434; iv., 255, 256.

Leighton, Bishop, iii., 141, 363‒364.

Leith, i., 316, 333, 346, 358, 359, 419; ii., 66, 89, 97, 98, 99, 100, 117, 132, 158, 275, 291, 294; iii., 74, 84, 300, 301, 303, 309, 313, 331, 332; iv., 357, 369.

Lennox, Earl of, i., 217, 283, 285, 327, 328, 354, 364, 365; ii., 37, 128, 131, 139, 152, 154, 155; Duke of, iii., 54.

Lennox, Esme Stewart, Duke of, ii., 175, 176, 177, 179.

Lesley, Norman, ii., 71.

Leslie, General Alexander, iii., 73, 76, 79, 338; General David, 95, 338; Sir John, iv., 263‒265.

Lesly, John, ii., 116.

Lesmahagow sanctuary, i., 232.

Leven, Earl of, iii., 175.

Lewis, island, i., 22, 357.

Leyden, University of, iv., 287, 292, 293, 304.

Leyden, John, ii., 319; iv., 184, 185.

Liddel, Dr. Duncan, ii., 393, 394.

Lindisfarne, i., 126.

Lindores, i., 323.

Lindsay, Alexander, i., 267, 277; Sir James, 317; Sir William, 321, 322; David, Lord of Crawford, 434; David, ii., 158, 167, 188.

Lindsay, Lord, ii., 132, 134, 143, 145, 148, 155, 175, 181, 206, 207.

Linlithgow, i., 258, 264, 274, 276, 290, 294, 307, 326, 345, 358, 387, 390; ii., 120, 152, 207, 349, 400; iii., 29, 80, 54; iv., 370.

Linlithgow, Palace of, i., 333, 360, 377, 429, 430, 470; ii., 62.

Linlithgow, Earl of, iii., 19.

Linlithgowshire, i., 29, 119; iv., 341, 342, 343, 373.

Lismore, Book of the Dean of, i., 442.

Literature, early, i., 181‒185, 215‒247, 441‒464; Poetry, ii., 301‒315, 331‒341, 370‒380; Ballad, 341‒345; Historical and various, 315‒330, 345‒364, 364‒370, 380‒385, 393‒396; Ballad and Jacobite Song, iii., 336‒355; Historical and various, 356‒368; Historical, iv., 143‒154, 154‒164; Poetry, 165‒182, 183‒198; Fiction, 199‒212; Religious, 213‒228; Miscellaneous, 228‒254.

Liturgy, iii., 44, 46‒50, 51‒58, 62, 63.

Livingston, Sir Alexander, i., 338, 339, 340; John of Livingston, 389, 390; Sir William, iii., 19.

Livingston, Lord, i., 345; ii., 150.

Livingstone, Dr. David, iv., 250.

Lochaber, i., 329, 356; iii., 181.

Lochiel, chief of the clan Cameron, i., 356; iii., 181, 226.

Lochindorb Castle, i., 247, 276.

Lochleven, i., 140; ii., 144, 145, 147, 150.

Lochmaben, Castle, i., 281; town of, 372, 468.

Locke, John, writings of, iii., 452‒462; iv., 17, 18, 27.

Lockhart, Colonel, iii., 113; Sir George, 148, 233; Sir George of Carnwath, 208, 209, 210, 214; John G., iv., 207, 208.

Logan, John, iv., 177, 178.

Logic, iii., 437‒439; iv., 130‒133.

Logie, Margaret, i., 310.

Lomond, Loch, i., 29.

London, i., 271, 279, 280, 285; ii., 99, 220; iii., 54, 82, 86, 116, 118, 173, 179, 183, 198, 229, 296; iv., 167, 173, 245.

Long Parliament, iii., 80, 84, 86, 87, 89, 96, 97.

Lord of the Isles, i., 285, 292, 312, 324, 325, 329, 330, 341, 348, 355.

Lords of the Articles, i., 369, 370; iii., 37, 38, 129, 130, 180, 183, 184.

Lords of the Congregation, ii., 89, 91, 93, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100.

Lorne, Lord of, i., 284, 312; black knight of, 338; ii., 89.

Lothian, i., 47, 116, 138, 185, 189.

Lothian, Earl of, iii., 18, 188, 189, 190.

Loudon, Lord, iii., 55, 57, 58, 60, 61.

Loudon Hill, battle of, i., 286, 287.

Lowe, Dr. Peter, ii., 393.

Lovat, Lord, i., 386.

Lubeck, i., 268.

Lude Hill, iii., 181.

Lulach, i., 140.

Lumphanan, battle of, i., 140.

Luther, ii., 17, 32‒34, 49.

Lyndsay, Sir David, ii., 42, 331‒340.

M‘Ancrum, Donald B., ii., 229.

M‘Angus, William, iii., 237.

Macbeth, i., 139, 140, 148.

M‘Cowane, Donald C., ii., 229.

M‘Crie, Dr. Thomas, iv., 154.

M‘Culloch, Horatio, iv., 449.

Macdonald, Lord, i., 163.

Macdonald, Sir Donald, iii., 190; Chief of Glencoe, 191‒192; of Boisdale, Glengarry, Keppoch, 191, 226; Donald Gorm of Sleat, Donald of Ylanterim, Captain of Clanranald, Angus of Dunivaig, 242, 243.

Macdonald, Alaster, iii., 90.

Macduff, i., 261, 271.

Macgill, James, ii., 146, 158, 274.

MacGregors, clan of, iii., 243; Patrick Roy, 244.

MacHeth, i., 205, 207, 209.

Mackay, ii., 227; Donald, iii., 237, 238; Dr. Charles, iv., 196; Angus, 425.

Mackay, General, iii., 176, 181‒183.

Mackenzie, Kenneth, iii., 19; Sir George, 144, 146, 147, 234, 368; Henry, iv., 199, 200.

Mackinnons, i., 117, note; Rory, iii., 242.

Mackintosh, of Borlum, iii., 224; Sir James, iv., 97‒101; Robert, 421.

Macknight, Dr. James, iv., 216, 471.

Maclean of Lochbuy, i., 357; Lauchlan, iii., 242; Hector of Duart, 242; Lauchlan of Lochbuy, 242.

Macleod, of Lewis, i., 357; Rory, of Harris, iii., 242; Dr. Norman, iv., 223, 224.

MacNeil of Barra, i., 357.

Macpherson, James, iv., 175, 176.

Macquharrie, Gellespie, iii., 242.

M‘Sevir, Farquhar, ii., 229.

MacWilliam, i., 207, 208, 209.

Magi, i., 128, 129.

Magnus VI., King of Norway, i., 216.

Maid of Norway, i., 217, 218, 219.

Mair, John, ii., 51, 315, 316.

Maitland, Sir Richard, i., 445; ii., 370, 371; William, 99, 100, 120, 121, 135, 141, 152, 155, 156, 157.

Malcolm I., reign of, i., 137.

Malcolm II., reign of, i., 138, 139.

Malcolm III., reign of, i., 140‒143.

Malcolm IV., reign of, i., 204, 205.

Malise, Earl of Strathern, i., 203.

Mallet, David, iv., 169.

Man, Isle of, i., 216, 301.

Manufactures, Textile, woollen, i., 100, 133, 150, 162, 241, 390, 392, 406, 407; ii., 294; iii., 306‒310; iv., 366, 369‒372; linen, iii., 311‒313; iv., 372‒376, 377; jute, 375‒377; cotton, 377‒379, 383; thread, 379‒380; silk, 380; mixed fabrics, 380, 381.

Mar, Earl of, i., 208, 214, 216, 217, 304, 305, 312, 325, 334, 348, 349; ii., 139, 145, 148; elected Regent, 155, 177, 184; iii., 19; John, Secretary of State, 210; his rising, 222‒224.

March, Earl of, i., 255, 270, 305, 321, 322, 328, 333, 334.

Marchmont, Earl of, iii., 262.

Margaret, Queen of Malcolm III., i., 141, 143, 155‒157; Queen of James III., 346, 351; Queen of James IV., 360‒362; ii., 36, 37.

Marischal, Earl, i., 358; ii., 86, 419; iii., 19, 222.

Marriage, i., 99, 153‒156, 428; ii., 229, 261‒266; iii., 264, 278‒281.

Mathematical Science, progress of, ii., 386‒391; iii., 371‒374, 403; iv., 254‒260.

Marston Moor, battle of, iii., 95.

Mary of Gueldres, Queen of James II., i., 340, 344, 345.

Mary of Guise, Queen of James V., ii., 57, 86, 87, 90, 91, 93, 95, 97, 98, 101.

Mary, Queen of Scotland, ii., 62, 63, 79; reign of, 116‒147; imprisonment of, 144; escape, flight to England, 150; her execution, 189, 190.

Mary, Queen of England, ii., 87, 92.

Maxwell, Lord, i., 345; ii., 186, 187, 224; Master of, 225; iii., 27.

Maybole, ii., 353.

Mechanical Science, i., 408; ii., 384‒386; progress of, iv., 271‒285.

Medical Science, state of, i., 414, 415; ii., 392‒394; iii., 368‒371; progress of, iv., 286‒323.

Melrose, Monastery of, i., 125, 126, 246, 254, 302, 303, 432, 438; ii., 66.

Melville, James, ii., 71; Sir James, 141, 142; Andrew, 167, 182, 201, 202, 213, 214, 409, 410, 412; iii., 32, 33; Sir Robert, iii., 19.

Melville, Lord, iii., 179, 183, 186.

♦Menteith, Earl of, i., 213, 214, 217, 218, 263, 383, 308, 317.

♦ “Monteith” replaced with “Menteith”; Printed out of alphabetic order.

Menteith, Sir John, i., 278, 279.

Metaphysics, iii., 399‒401, 405, 407‒414, 418‒452, 432‒434, 468, 469, 470; iv., 126‒130, 136‒139.

Methven, Bruce defeated at, i., 284; lands of, 377.

Middleton, Earl, Royal Commissioner, iii., 121‒123, 125‒129.

Military service under the feudal organisation, i., 409‒412.

Mill, Walter, executed for heresy, ii., 91; John S., iv., 135; James, 155.

Miller, Hugh, iv., 238‒240, 271.

Mining, ii., 282‒286; iii., 291‒294; iv., 340‒345.

Mitchell, James, 135, 147, 148; Dr. Charles, iv., 318.

Moir, Dr. James, i., 461; David, iv., 208.

Monk, General, iii., 110, 116.

Monmouth, Duke of, iii., 153, 154, 167.

Monro, John, iv., 292; Alexander, professor, 292‒294; Alexander, 304‒305; Alexander, 305‒306.

Montgomery, Sir John, i., 321; Sir Hugh, 449; Sir Matthew, ii., 229; Alexander, poems of, 375‒377; Sir James, iii., 179, 180.

Montgomery, Lord, i., 345.

Montrose, i., 276, 387, 391; ii., 69, 182, 217; iii., 301, 303, 323; iv., 369, 375, 424.

Montrose, Earl of, iii., 18, 74; Marquis of, 90‒95, 105, 106, 338, 339.

Moral philosophy, iii., 417, 418, 424‒430, 448, 451, 452, 466‒467; iv., 19‒24, 38‒40, 45‒50, 68, 69, 71‒74, 81, 82, 94‒96, 98‒101.

Moray, Sir Andrew, i., 266, 267, 268; Sir Andrew of Bothwell, 306, 307, 378; Thomas, 379.

Moray, Earl of, Randolph, i., 283, 290, 292, 296, 298, 299, 300, 302, 304, 305, 308, 317, 360; James Stewart, Earl of, ii., 123, 128, 129, 130, 131, 134, 136; elected Regent, 148‒152.

Morken, King, i., 124, 125.

Morton, Earl of, ii., 132, 133, 134, 142, 143, 145, 147, 151; elected Regent, 155, 158, 165, 169, 175, 176.

Mouat, Bernard, i., 285.

Mowbray, 291, 294.

Mure, William, iv., 163, 164.

Murray, Lord George, iii., 227, 228; Mungo, 227; Gideon, 21.

Music, i., 245, 468, 469; ii., 421‒422; iii., 386‒388; iv., 416‒428.

Musselburgh, ii., 144; iii., 300.

Nairn, i., 372, 386; castle of, 248.

Napier, John, inventor of logarithms, ii., 386‒391.

Narne, Duncan, ii., 415.

Nasmyth, iv., 436.

Navigation, teaching of, iii., 386.

Navy, under James IV., i., 363.

Negative Confession, ii., 176.

Ness, Loch of, i., 25.

Newbattle, i., 239, 434, 435.

Newbattle, Lord, iii., 18.

Newcastle, i., 318; ii., 75, 184; iii., 33, 79, 80, 97.

Nithsdale, Earl of, iii., 222.

Nithsdale, i., 26, 272.

Norham, meetings at, i., 255, 256, 258; castle of, 209, 300, 359, 363.

Normans, i., 189‒194, 196, 197, 101‒103.

Norman Conquest, i., 141, 197, 198.

Norsemen, i., 47, 118, 120, 134, 136, 214‒217.

Northallerton, battle of, i., 203, 204.

Northampton, Treaty of, i., 300, 301.

Northumberland, i., 142, 143, 262, 268, 295, 300, 318.

Northumbria, i., 116, 138, 441.

Norway, 21, 144, 215, 216, 217, 219.

Oaths associated with feudalism, i., 258, 264, 281, 372, 373.

Ochiltree, Lord, ii., 146, 275; iii., 19, 235, 236.

Odistown, i., 303.

Ogham, writing, i., 174, 175.

Ogilvie, Sir Walter, i., 319, 320.

Oliphant, Sir William, i., 277, 278.

Oliphant, Lord, i., 373; ii., 228.

Orkney Isles, i., 22, 47, 53, 58‒61, 138, 139, 158, 215, 217, 219, 346; ii., 60; iii., 302; iv., 372, 373.

Orkney, Earl of, i., 138, 139, 207, 208; iii., 239‒241.

Ormiegill, i., 55.

Ormiston, Laird of, ii., 69.

Ormond, Earl of, i., 343, 379.

Ossian, Ossianic poems, i., 442‒444; iv., 175, 176.

Otterburn, battle of, i., 318, 449.

Otterburne, Thomas, i., 468.

Oxford, i., 451, 452; iii., 372, 373, 374; iv., 102, 134.

Pae, David P., iv., 208, 209.

Painting, i., 470; ii., 423, 424; iii., 393‒396; iv., 428‒454.

Paisley, i., 83, 151, 238, 409; ii., 195; iii., 386; iv., 182, 183, 205, 206, 214, 372, 377, 378, 380; Abbey of, i., 249, 324, 355.

Paper, manufacture of, ii., 2; iii., 317‒319; iv., 384‒389.

Parliament, origin and constitution of, i., 366‒370; Meetings of, 295, 309, 310, 311, 313‒315, 316, 320, 327, 328, 329, 330, 334, 340, 343, 347, 349, 351, 353, 354, 357; ii., 38, 49, 60, 65, 68, 91, 102, 126, 139, 149, 183, 193, 213; iii., 30, 33, 37, 41, 44, 77, 81, 84, 97, 99, 103, 121‒128, 129, 137, 140, 142, 158‒160, 164‒167, 168, 180, 183, 193, 202, 203, 205, 206‒208, 210‒215.

Parliament of the United Kingdom, introduced changes in Scotland, iii., 217‒218, 220.

Paterson, Abraham, ii., 284; Robert, 289; William, iii., 196, 199.

Patronage, ii., 107, 172; iii., 103, 104, 184; iv., 467‒473 et seq.

Peasantry, in Normandy, i., 191, 193; in Germany, ii., 16, 17.

Pedro de Ayala, i., 360.

Peebles, i., 282, 356, 384, 402; ii., 260; iii., 274, 290, 307, 380; iv., 246, 369.

Peers, Scottish representative, iii., 214.

Pembroke, Earl of, i., 283, 284, 286, 287.

Pennington, Joseph, iii., 21.

Pentland Firth, i., 22.

Pentland, battle of, iii., 134.

Percy, Henry, i., 266; Sir Henry, Sir Ralph, 318, 449.

Perkin Warbeck, i., 357‒359.

Persecution, ii., 49, 50, 53, 54, 58, 68‒70, 91; iii., 130‒135, 140, 144‒154, et seq.

Perth, i., 119, 151, 205, 208, 233, 258, 264, 276, 278, 279, 283, 290, 307, 311, 320, 327, 333, 335, 369, 386, 387, 391, 433; ii., 69, 93, 94, 96, 179, 214; iii., 39‒41, 90, 193, 194, 222, 223, 226; iv., 196, 354, 373.

Perth, Earl of, iii., 171, 172.

Peterhead, iii., 223, 301, 302; iv., 370, 374.

Philip IV., of France, i., 262, 271.

Phillip, John, iv., 450, 451.

Philiphaugh, battle of, iii., 95, 338.

Philosophy, ii., 28‒30, 220; outline of European in the seventeenth century, and early part of the eighteenth, iii., 398‒471; Scottish, iv., 17‒142.

Physical Science, progress of, iv., 255‒271.

Picts, i., 112, 114, 115, 116, 119, 120, 127, 128.

Pinkerton, John, iv., 153, 154.

Pinkie, battle of, ii., 76.

Pitcairn, Dr. Archibald, iii., 371; Robert, iv., 163.

Plantations, nonconformists banished to, iii., 167, 168, 223.

Pont, Robert, ii., 158, 184, 382, 383.

Poor Laws, ii., 238, 239, 267; iii., 248‒254.

Population, i., 413; iv., 214, 495.

Postal communication, iii., 296‒296; iv., ♦352, 356.

♦ Page numbers supplied by transcriber.

Prehistoric period, Stone Age, i., 36, 47‒71; stone weapons and tools, 48‒53; modes of disposing of the dead, chambered cairns, cremation, 53‒65; earth-houses, 65‒70; primitive boats, 70; Bronze Age, 71‒74, 74‒96; bronze weapons and implements, 74‒79; ornaments, 79‒81; traces of dwellings, 81‒83; crannogs, 84‒87; hill forts, 88‒92; cairn, and urn interment, 92‒96; summary, 96‒104.

Prelacy, iii., 177.

Presbyterianism, ii., 166‒175, 193‒194; iii., 68‒72, 184‒185.

Press, censorship of, ii., 84, 277, 278.

Preston, battle of, iii., 227.

Primrose, Sir Archibald, iii., 120.

Pringle, Charles, iii., 236, 237.

Printing, introduction of, ii., 2, 25‒27, 299‒303; development of, iv., 389‒391.

Privy Council, ii., 223, 225, 229, 248, 273, 275, 279, 281, 283, 288, 403; iii., 18‒20, 24, 26, 28, 30, 47, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 59, 62, 67, 123, 124, 128, 131, 133, 134, 136, 142, 146, 147, 148, 163, 171, 182, 192, 195.

Protestantism, history of in Scotland, ii., 149‒218.

Protests, iii., 59, 65, 67.

Protesters, iii., 109, 110, 111.

Provincial councils of the Roman Catholic clergy, i., 212, 213; ii., 41, 42, 76, 77, 78.

Psalms, ii., 114, 342, 422.

Psalmody, iv., 426‒427.

Psychical faculties, i., 34, 35.

Psychological phenomenon, ii., 439, 441.

Psychology, ii., 30; iii., 414‒417, 422‒430, 435, 436, 438‒444, 453‒460, 470; iv., 20, 27‒39, 61‒68, 77‒82, 88‒96, 108‒126.

Quakers, iii., 114, 115, 256‒259.

Quarries, iv., 406, 411, 412.

Queensberry, Duke of, iii., 164, 202, 205, 210.

Quoyness, i., 59.

Raban, Edward, iii., 363.

Raeburn, Sir Henry, iv., 436‒439.

Raid of Ruthven, ii., 179‒181.

Ramorgny, Sir John, i., 322.

Ramsay, John, i., 460; Allan, ii., 305; his writings, iv., 165, 166; Allan, painter, 429‒431.

Randolph, Thomas, i., 283, 284.

Ratisbon, ii., 351.

Reader, office of, ii., 108, 174.

Reeves, Dr., i., 127, 129, 181.

Reformation, rise of, ii., 16‒31; eras of, 32, 85, 86; history of, in Scotland, 38‒54, 58‒60, 67‒103, 104, 105, 149.

Reformed Church, organisation of, ii., 104‒115, 121, 122, 161‒175.

Regalities, i., 225, 226, 373, 374, 425, 426; iii., 225.

Regality burghs, i., 234, 237, 238.

Reid, Dr. Thomas, writings, iv., 161‒169; General, 427, 428.

Religion, prehistoric in Scotland, i., 58, 63, 99; primitive, ii., 426, 428.

Renwick, James, iii., 155, 171.

Representatives of Scotland in the United Parliament, iii., 214.

Rescissory Act, iii., 122.

Resolutioners, iii., 109, 111.

Reuchlin, ii., 17, 18.

Revenue, i., 220, 221, 391.

Revocation Act of Charles I., iii., 43‒45.

Ricco, ii., 131, 132, 133, 134.

Richard, I., i., 206.

Riderch, King, i., 125.

Ripon, iii., 80, 81.

Roads, i., 256, 413; iii., 225, 294‒296; iv., 352‒355.

Robert I., reign of, i., 283‒303.

Robert II., reign of, i., 313‒319.

Robert III., reign of, i., 319‒324.

Robert, Prior of Scone, i., 201.

Robertson, William, iv., 148‒150; Joseph, 162, 163; E. W., 163; George C., 139‒142; James S., 425; Andrew, 439.

Robin Hood, i., 451.

Rollo, a Norman hero, i., 190, 191.

Rollock, Robert, ii., 380, 381, 415, 416; Hercules, 402.

Roman Catholic Church, ii., 3‒14; Power of, 14‒20; state of the clergy, 20‒23, 40‒43, 51‒77, 78, 328, 329.

Roman invasion, i., 104‒112.

Romanised tribes, i., 112, 113.

Rome, i., 45, 122, 129, 140, 341, 354, 355; ii., 5, 20, 33, 58, 82, 103, 434, 435, 438.

Roslin, battle of, i., 275.

Ross, Earl of, i., 209, 211, 217, 264, 306, 312, 324, 325, 326, 340, 341, 348.

Ross, Lord, iii., 179.

Ross, Alexander, iv., 170, 171; William, 425.

Rothes, Earl of, ii., 130, 139, 150; iii., 56, 60, 61, 120, 129, 148, 156, 165.

Rothesay, Duke of, i., 320, 321, 322, 323.

Rowll, i., 463.

Roxburgh, i., 231, 232, 245; Castle of, 248, 264, 290, 305, 364, 383.

Roxburgh, Earl of, iii., 49, 57.

Royal Burghs, i., 233‒237, 382‒387, 397‒408.

Runic Inscriptions, i., 59, 175.

Russell, Dr. William, iv., 152.

Rutherford, Samuel, iii., 359‒362.

Rutherglen, i., 386, 409; iii., 152.

Ruthven, Lord, ii., 132, 133, 134, 135, 145, 158; Master of, 219.

Ruthwell, i., 175.

Sadler, Sir Ralph, ii., 57, 65.

St. Adamnan, his life of St. Columba, i., 126, 181‒183.

St. Andrews, i., 137, 148, 200, 201, 238, 239, 277, 322, 332, 367, 387, 408, 413; ii., 49, 66, 69, 70, 91, 96, 120, 136, 153, 199; iii., 38, 151; Castle of, i., 322; ii., 49, 70, 71, 72, 73‒75; Cathedral of, i., 249; Bishop of, 137, 200, 209, 217, 255, 271, 281, 283, 285, 304, 340, 345, 353, 355, 360; ii., 36, 58, 71, 77, 78, 90, 138, 154, 159, 182, 271, 380; iii., 19, 63, 119, 124, 129, 131, 135, 147, 151; University of, i., 466; ii., 405‒408, 410‒413; iii., 390, 392, 393; iv., 136, 178, 219, 220, 224.

St. Bartholomew, massacre of, ii., 160, 161.

St. Bridget, i., 131.

St. Columba, i., 126‒131, 132‒135, 136.

St. Cuthbert, i., 125, 126.

St. Duthac, i., 436, 438.

St. Fergus, i., 439.

St. Fillan, relics of, i., 180, 439.

St. Finnian, i., 127.

St. Giles, i., 430, 431; ii., 239.

St. Kentigern, i., 124, 125.

St. Maclou, i., 431.

St. Monance, i., 430.

St. Nicholas, i., 431; ii., 239, 240.

St. Ninian, i., 122, 123; shrine of, 48.

St. Regulus, i., 148.

St. Serf, monastery of, i., 455.

St. Servanus, i., 407.

Sandlands, John, i., 358.

Salt, export of, ii., 288, 289.

Sang Schools, early, i., 245, 468; ii., 421, 422.

Sanquhar, Declaration proclaimed at, iii., 155.

Sauchie Burn, battle of, i., 352.

Saxons, i., 47, 112, 115, 116, 119, 141, 189.

Scandinavia, i., 161, 190.

Scandinavians, i., 47, 118.

Schools, i., 245, 465, 466; ii., 398‒405; iii., 375‒388; iv., 224‒327.

Schrander, Dr., i., 41.

Science, progress of, ii., 384‒391; iii., 371‒374; iv., 255‒323.

Scolocs, i., 184.

Scone, i., 119, 121, 137, 141, 204, 209, 213, 217, 221, 241, 260, 262, 264, 283, 305, 313‒315, 319, 327, 353; iii., 110, 223; Monastery of, i., 201, 227, 239, 250; ii., 94.

Scots, i., 112, 116, 118, 120, 127.

Scott of Tuschielaw, ii., 224; John, 303, 372; Walter, iii., 27; Sir Walter, iv., 187‒189, 202‒204; William B., 453.

Scrymgeour, Alexander, i., 366; Sir James, iii., 19.

Sculptured stones, i., 165‒174.

Seaforth, Earl of, iii., 92, 110, 222.

Selby, Sir William, iii., 21.

Security of the Kingdom, Act for, iii., 205, 206.

Segrave, Sir John, i., 275.

Selkirk, i., 356; ii., 189; iii., 378; iv., 371; forest of, i., 223, 274, 287, 343.

Semple, Robert, ii., 374.

Serfs, i., 250, 380‒382.

Seton, Sir Christopher, i., 283, 385, 453.

Seton, Lord, ii., 138.

Seton of Pitmedden, iii., 211.

Severus, his campaign, i., 110, 111.

Sharp, James, Archbishop of St. Andrews, iii., 118, 119, 120, 124, 129, 135, 137, 143, 147, 148, 151, 152.

Shawfield, iii., 218.

Sherifmuir, battle of, iii., 223.

Sheriffs, Sheriffdoms, i., 223, 261, 423‒426; ii., 223.

Shetland Isles, i., 22, 47, 174, 185, 215, 217, 346; ii., 60; iv., 372.

Shipbuilding, i., 133, 240, 333, 363; iv., 357‒363.

Shipping, i., 239, 240, 241, 391‒393; ii., 286‒289; iii., 300‒303; iv., 356‒357.

Sibbald, Sir Robert, iii., 370.

Sigurd, i., 138.

Silver, ancient ornaments of, i., 177‒178.

Siward, Earl of Northumberland, i., 140.

Simpson, Sir James Y., iv., 313‒314.

Simson, Andrew, ii., 400, 403; Robert, iv., 260; William, 446.

Sinclair, Oliver, ii., 62; Sir John, iv., 346.

Skene, Dr. Gilbert, ii., 392, 393; Sir John, 383, 384; iii., 18; Dr. William F., iv., 161.

Smith, Adam, iv., 25, 43, 44‒59; Alexander, 195, 196; William R., 226, 227; Robert A., 426.

Smollett, Dr., iv., 150, 172, 173, 199.

Social state of the People, i., 70, 71, 98‒103, 145‒157, 220‒254, 366‒440; ii., 222‒298; iii., 232‒335.

Solemn League and Covenant, iii., 85, 86.

Solway Firth, 21, 26, 70, 105.

Solway Moss disaster, ii., 62.

Somerled, i., 205.

Somerset, Earl of, i., 326; Duke of, ii., 76.

Soulis, John, i., 271, 274, 277; Nicholas, 256.

Southesk, Earl of, iii., 222.

Spain, i., 357, 360, 363; ii., 18, 19, 20, 131, 191, 192.

Spear-heads, flint, i., 50; bronze, 76, 77.

Spense, John, ii., 138.

Spey, i., 150; iv., 354.

Spinoza, his method and ethics, iii., 418‒432.

Spottiswood, John, ii., 104, 108, 349, 350; John, Archbishop, iii., 19, 26, 39, 63; his writings, 357.

Stair, Lord, iii., 223, 232, 235, 367, 368.

Standard, battle of, i., 203, 204.

Stephen, King, i., 202, 203.

Stevenson, Professor, iv., 18, 75.

Stevenson, Robert L., iv., 211, 212.

Steward of Scotland, i., 214, 217, 218, 267, 274, 277, 292, 306, 307, 308, 309, 312, 313.

Stewart, Lord of Brechin, i., 321.

Stewart, Sir Walter, of Jedworth, i., 321, 384; Sir Alexander, 328; Sir James, 338; Duncan, 319, 320; Sir Walter, 327; James, 360; Captain James, iii., 235; William, 236.

Stewart, Dugald, iv., 74‒84; Matthew, 260.

Stirling, i., 83, 116, 140, 151, 209, 233, 234, 238, 264, 276, 386, 387, 391; ii., 58, 93, 97, 99, 120, 124, 129, 140, 147, 152, 155, 179, 181, 187; iii., 59, 62, 123, 228; iv., 369; castle of, i., 206, 248, 277, 278, 291, 294, 307, 338, 341, 352, 430; ii., 140, 152, 181; iii., 64, 228.

Stirlingshire, i., 29, 119, 121, 265; ii., 364; iv., 341, 342, 343, 373, 378.

Stirling, James, iv., 259, 260.

Stirling, Earl of, iii., 366.

Stone circles, i., 94‒96.

Stone weapons and tools, i., 48‒53.

Stone of Destiny, i., 119, 137, 264, 265.

Stonehaven, i., 28, 106.

Stormont, Earl of, iii., 222.

Strachan, Colonel, iii., 106.

Strafford, iii., 80.

Strathbogie, i., 140, 284; castle of, ii., 123, 124, 202.

Strathclyde, i., 84, 85, 114, 139.

Strathern, i., 136, 138.

Strathern, Earl of, 203, 209, 213, 214, 217, 308, 317, 333.

Strathmore, i., 28.

Strathmore, Earl of, iii., 205.

Strathspey, i., 27, 207, 267.

Strathurd, lordship of, i., 378.

Succession Acts, i., 296, 313‒315; iii., 155.

Stuart, Lord of Aubigny, i., 362.

Stuart, John, i., 68, 69; Dr. Gilbert, iv., 151; Dr. John, 162.

Sugar works, iii., 330; refining of, iv., 394, 395.

Sunday, i., 158, 439; observance of, enforced, ii., 247, 248, 251‒254; iii., 269‒272.

Superintendents, ii., 108.

Surrey, Earl of, i., 264, 267, 268, 270, 364.

Sutherland, Earl of, i., 306, 308, 318; ii., 139; iii., 53, 61.

Sutherland, James, iii., 369.

Tables, institution of, iii., 56, 57.

Tacitus, i., 106‒108.

Tactics of the Scots, i., 412.

Taverns, i., 415.

Taxes in early times, i., 149, 150, 220, 221, 251, 386‒391.

Tay, i., 27, 105, 106, 109, 110, 119, 264, 267, 287; iv., 354.

Test Act, iii., 158, 159.

Teviotdale, i., 26.

Thane, thanage, i., 152, 251, 252.

Thrift, early laws touching, i., 128‒131.

Thomas the Rhymer, i., 446‒448.

Thomson, James, iv., 167, 168; Dr. Andrew, 219; Dr. John, 309‒311; Sir William, Lord Colvin, 266, 284; George, 434.

Thor, ii., 436.

Thorburn, Robert, iv., 452.

Thorfinn, i., 138, 139.

Tithes, i., 243, 244; ii., 40; iii., 43, 44.

Todd, Dr., i., 117.

Torture, i., 276, 427; ii., 195, 196; iii., 134, 147, 148, 158, 177.

Torwood, i., 291; iii., 156.

Traquair, Earl of, iii., 58, 59, 62, 77.

Trent, Council of, ii., 79‒85, 161.

Tucker, iii., 300, 301.

Tullibardine, Marquis of, iii., 222.

Tulloch, Dr. John, iv., 224, 225.

Turgot, Bishop, i., 156, 200.

Turnberry Castle, i., 286.

Turner, Sir James, iii., 134; William, iv., 306.

Tweed, i., 21, 138, 203, 363; iii., 79, 86.

Tweeddale, i., 26.

Tweeddale, Marquis of, iii., 206, 210.

Tyrie, James, ii., 353, 354.

Tytler, William, iv., 151; Patrick F., 155.

Ulbster, i., 55.

Umfraville, Sir Ingram, i., 274.

Union of England and Scotland, proceedings connected with, iii., 206‒215; advantages of, 216, 217, 231.

Universities, institution of, i., 466‒468; changes in, ii., 405‒419; iii., 388‒393; iv., 327‒330.

Urns, i., 92, 93‒96.

Vane, Sir Henry, iii., 84, 85.

Veitch, John, iv., 246, 247.

Vesy, John, i., 258.

Vienne, John de, i., 316, 317.

♦Vipont, i., 294.

♦ Printed out of alphabetic order.

Vikings, i., 118.

Vitrified forts, i., 90‒92.

Wade, General, iii., 224‒225.

Wager of battle, i., 228‒229.

Wake, Lord, i., 301, 315.

Wales, i., 125, 174.

Walker, William, iv., 197, 198; James, 425.

Walls, Roman, i., 109, 110.

Wallace, Sir William, i., 265‒272, 277, 278‒280.

Wallace, Adam, ii., 78; William, iv., 253.

Wanlock, lead mine, ii., 284.

Wardlaw, Dr. Ralph, iv., 221.

Warwick, iv., 342.

Watson, Dr. Robert, iv., 152.

Watt, James, iv., 272, 274‒281.

Weapons, prehistoric, i., 49, 50, 75‒78.

Webster, Dr. Alexander, iv., 214.

Wedderburn, Robert, ii., 319, 341; James, 341, 343; John, 343.

Weights and measures, i., 239, 332, 401, 402.

Wells, venerated, i., 128, 135, 260, 261.

Welsh, John, iii., 29; Dr., iv., 483.

Welwood, William, ii., 384, 385.

Wemyss, glass work at, iii., 315.

Westminster Assembly of Divines, iii., 85, 87‒89.

Whig, early use of the word, iii., 155, 342, 350, 351.

Whisky, ii., 192, 193; iv., 396, 397.

White Caterthun, i., 89, 90.

William the Conqueror, i., 142, 143, 192, 193‒195, 196, 198.

William the Lion, reign of, i., 205‒209, 222, 227, 230.

William Rufus, i., 143, 196.

William of Orange, iii., 171, 173, 174‒176, 178‒180, 183‒185, 186‒190, 192, 201‒204.

Willock, John, ii., 87, 97, 98, 101, 104, 108.

Wilson, John, iv., 105, 205, 206; Alexander, 182.

Wine, i., 393, 394, 415, 416, 432; ii., 292.

Winram, John, ii., 52, 104, 108, 158.

Winzet, Ninian, ii., 349‒352.

Wishart, Bishop of Glasgow, i., 266, 273, 283, 285; George, ii., 69; seized and martyred, 69, 70.

Witchcraft, ii., 9, 268‒277; iii., 259‒264.

Witherspoon, Dr. John, iv., 214, 215.

Wool, i., 240, 333, 387, 388; ii., 290; iii., 306, 307, 308.

Worcester, battle of, iii., 110.

Wyntoun, Andrew, i., 455, 456.

York, Duke of, iii., 156, 157, 163.

York, Archbishop of, i., 200, 201.

Young, Peter, ii., 403; Dr. Thomas, iv., 267.

Yule, i., 416, 417.

Zealand, i., 392.

END OF VOLUME III.

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