XXXVII. ON THE GRAMMATICAL POSITION OF THE WORDS MINE AND THINE…

XXXVII. ON THE GRAMMATICAL POSITION OF THE WORDS MINE AND THINE

s. 446. The inflection of pronouns has its natural peculiarities in language; it has also its natural difficulties in philology. These occur not in one language in particular, but in all generally. The most common peculiarity in the grammar of pronouns is the fact of what may be called their convertibility. Of this convertibility the following statements serve as illustration:--

1. Of case.--In our own language the words my and thy, although at present possessives, were previously datives, and, earlier still, accusatives. Again, the accusative you replaces the nominative ye, and vice vers[^a].

2. Of number.--The words thou and thee are, except in the mouths of Quakers, obsolete. The plural forms, ye and you, have replaced them.

3. Of person.--Laying aside the habit of the Germans and other nations, of using the third person plural for the second singular (as in expressions like wie befinden sie sich = how do they find themselves? instead of how do you find yourself?) the Greek language gives us examples of interchange in the way of persons in the promiscuous use of [Greek: nin, min, sphe], and [Greek: heautou]; whilst sich and sik are used with a similar latitude in the Middle High German and Scandinavian.

4. Of class.--The demonstrative pronouns become

a. Personal pronouns. b. Relative pronouns. c. Articles.

The reflective pronoun often becomes reciprocal. {381}

These statements are made for the sake of illustrating, not of exhausting, the subject. It follows, however, as an inference from them, that the classification of pronouns is complicated. Even if we knew the original power and derivation of every form of every pronoun in a language, it would be far from an easy matter to determine therefrom the paradigm that they should take in grammar. To place a word according to its power in a late stage of language might confuse the study of an early stage. To say that because a word was once in a given class, it should always be so, would be to deny that in the present English they, these, and she are personal pronouns at all.

The two tests, then, of the grammatical place of a pronoun, its present power and its original power, are often conflicting.

In the English language the point of most importance in this department of grammar is the place of forms like mine and thine; in other words, of the forms in -n. Are they genitive cases of a personal pronoun, as mei and tui are supposed to be in Latin, or are they possessive pronouns like meus and tuus?

Now, if we take up the common grammars of the English language as it is, we find, that, whilst my and thy are dealt with as genitive cases, mine and thine are considered adjectives. In the Anglo-Saxon grammars, however, min and thin, the older forms of mine and thine, are treated as genitives; of which my and thy have been dealt with as abbreviated forms, and that by respectable scholars.

Now, to prove from the syntax of the older English that in many cases the two forms were convertible, and to answer that the words in question are either genitive cases or adjectives, is lax philology; since the real question is, which of the two is the primary, and which the secondary meaning?

s. 447. The [`a] priori view of the likelihood of words like mine and thine being genitive cases, must be determined by the comparison of three series of facts.

1. The ideas expressed by the genitive case, with particular reference to the two preponderating notions of possession and partition. {382}

2. The circumstance of the particular notion of possession being, in the case of the personal pronouns of the two first persons singular, generally expressed by a form undoubtedly adjectival.

3. The extent to which the idea of partition becomes merged in that of possession, and vice vers[^a].

s. 448. The ideas of possession and partition as expressed by genitive forms.--If we take a hundred genitive cases, and observe their construction, we shall find, that, with a vast majority of them, the meaning is reducible to one of two heads; viz., the idea of possession or the idea of partition.

Compared with these two powers all the others are inconsiderable, both in number and importance; and if, as in the Greek and Latin languages, they take up a large space in the grammars, it is from their exceptional character rather than from their normal genitival signification.

Again, if both the ideas of possession and partition may, and in many cases must be, reduced to the more general idea of relation, this is a point of grammatical phraseology by no means affecting the practical and special bearings of the present division.

s. 449. The adjectival expression of the idea of possession.--All the world over, a property is a possession; and persons, at least, may be said to be the owners of their attributes. Whatever may be the nature of words like mine and thine, the adjectival character of their Latin equivalents, meus and tuus, is undoubted.

The ideas of partition and possession merge into one another.--A man's spade is the possession of a man; a man's hand is the part of a man. Nevertheless, when a man uses his hand as the instrument of his will, the idea which arises from the fact of its being part of his body is merged in the idea of the possessorship which arises from the feeling of ownership or mastery which is evinced in its subservience and application. Without following the refinements to which the further investigation of these questions would lead us, it is sufficient to suggest that the preponderance of the two allied ideas of partition and possession is often determined by the {383} personality or the non-personality of the subject, and that, when the subject is a person, the idea is chiefly possessive; when a thing, partitive--caput fluvii=the head, which is a part, of a river; caput Toli=the head, which is the possession, of Tolus.

But as persons may be degraded to the rank of things, and as things may, by personification, be elevated to the level of persons, this distinction, although real, may become apparently invalid. In phrases like a tributary to the Tiber--the criminal lost his eye--this field belongs to that parish--the ideas of possessorship and partition, as allied ideas subordinate to the idea of relationship in general, verify the interchange.

s. 450. These observations should bring us to the fact that there are two ideas which, more than any other, determine the evolution of a genitive case--the idea of partition and the idea of possession; and that genitive cases are likely to be evolved just in proportion as there is a necessity for the expression of these two ideas.--Let this be applied to the question of the [`a] priori probability of the evolution of a genitive case to the pronouns of the first and second persons of the singular number.

s. 451. _The idea of possession, and its likelihood of determining the evolution of a genitive form to the pronouns of the first and second person singular._ --It is less likely to do so with such pronouns than with other words, inasmuch as it is less necessary. It has been before observed, that the practice of most languages shows a tendency to express the relation by adjectival forms--meus, tuus.

An objection against the conclusiveness of this argument will be mentioned in the sequel.

s. 452. _The idea of partition, and its likelihood of determining the evolution of a genitive form, &c._--Less than with other words.

A personal pronoun of the singular number is the name of a unity, and, as such, the name of an object far less likely to be separated into parts than the name of a collection. Phrases like, some of them, one of you, many of us, any of them, few of us, &c., have no analogues in the singular number, such as one of me, a few of thee, &c. The partitive words that can {384} combine with singular pronouns are comparatively few; viz., half, quarter, part, &c.: and they can all combine equally with plurals--half of us, a quarter of them, a part of you, a portion of us. The partition of a singular object with a pronominal name is of rare occurrence in language.

This last statement proves something more than appears at first sight. It proves that no argument in favour of the so-called singular genitives, like mine and thine, can be drawn from the admission (if made) of the existence of the true plural genitives ou-r, you-r, thei-r. The two ideas are not in the same predicament. We can say, one of ten, or ten of twenty; but we cannot say one of one--Waes hira Matheus sum=Matthew was one of them; Andreas--Your noither=neither of you; Amis and Ameloun--from Mr. Guest: Her eyder=either of them; Octavian.--Besides this, the form of the two numbers are neither identical, nor equally genitival; as may be seen by contrasting mi-n and thi-n with ou-r and you-r.

s. 453. Such are the chief [`a] priori arguments against the genitival character of words like mine and thine.

Akin to these, and a point which precedes the [`a] posteriori evidence as to the nature of the words in question, is the determination of the side on which lies the onus probandi. This question is material; inasmuch as, although the present writer believes, for his own part, that the forms under discussion are adjectival rather than genitival, this is not the point upon which he insists. What he insists upon is the fact of the genitival character of mine and thine requiring a particular proof; which particular proof no one has yet given: in other words, his position is that they are not to be thought genitive until proved to be such.

It has not been sufficiently considered that the prim[^a] facie evidence is against them. They have not the form of a genitive case--indeed, they have a different one; and whoever assumes a second form for a given case has the burden of proof on his side.

s. 454. Against this circumstance of the -n in mine and thine being the sign of anything rather than of a genitive case, and against the prim[^a] facie evidence afforded by it, the {385} following facts may, or have been, adduced as reasons on the other side. The appreciation of their value, either taken singly or in the way of cumulative evidence, is submitted to the reader. It will be seen that none of them are unexceptionable.

s. 455. _The fact, that, if the words mine and thine are not genitive cases, there is not a genitive case at all._--It is not necessary that there should be one. Particular reasons in favour of the probability of personal pronouns of the singular number being destitute of such a case have been already adduced. It is more likely that a word should be defective than that it should have a separate form.

s. 456. _The analogy of the forms mei and [Greek: emou] in Latin and Greek._--It cannot be denied that this has some value. Nevertheless, the argument deducible from it is anything but conclusive.

1. It is by no means an indubitable fact that mei and [Greek: emou] are really cases of the pronoun. The extension of a principle acknowledged in the Greek language might make them the genitive cases of adjectives used pronominally. Thus,

[Greek: To emon] = [Greek: ego], [Greek: Tou emou] = [Greek: emou], [Greek: Toi emoi] = [Greek: emoi].

Assume the omission of the article and the extension of the Greek principle to the Latin language, and [Greek: emou] and mei may be cases, not of [Greek: eme] and me, but of [Greek: emos] and meus.

2. In the classical languages the partitive power was expressed by the genitive.

"---- multaque pars mei Vitabit Libitinam."

This is a reason for the evolution of a genitive power. Few such forms exist in the Gothic; part my is not English, nor was dael min Anglo-Saxon,=part of me, or pars mei.

s. 457. The following differences of form, are found in the different Gothic languages, between the equivalents of mei and tui, the so-called genitives of ego and tu, and the equivalents of meus and tuus, the so-called possessive adjectives. {386}

Moeso-Gothic meina = mei as opposed to meins = meus. theina = tui " theins = tuus. Old High German m[^i]n = mei " m[^i]ner = meus. d[^i]n = tui " d[^i]ner = tuus. Old Norse min = mei " minn = meus. thin=tui " thinn = tuus. Middle Dutch m[^i]ns = mei " m[^i]n = meus. d[^i]ns = tui " d[^i]n = tuus. Modern High German mein = mei " meiner = meus. dein = tui " deiner = tuus.

In this list, those languages where the two forms are alike are not exhibited. This is the case with the Anglo-Saxon and Old Saxon.

In the above-noticed differences of form lie the best reasons for the assumption of a genitive case, as the origin of an adjectival form; and, undoubtedly, in those languages, where both forms occur, it is convenient to consider one as a case and one as an adjective.

s. 458. But this is not the present question. In Anglo-Saxon there is but one form, min and thin=mei and meus, tui and tuus, indifferently. Is this form an oblique case or an adjective?

This involves two sorts of evidence.

s. 459. Etymological evidence.--Assuming two powers for the words min and thin, one genitive, and one adjectival, which is the original one? or, going beyond the Anglo-Saxon, assuming that of two forms like meina and meins, the one has been derived from the other, which is the primitive, radical, primary, or original one?

Men, from whom it is generally unsafe to differ, consider that the adjectival form is the derived one; and, as far as forms like m[^i]ner, as opposed to m[^i]n, are concerned, the evidence of the foregoing list is in their favour. But what is the case with the Middle Dutch? The genitive m[^i]ns is evidently the derivative of m[^i]n.

The reason why the forms like m[^i]ner seem derived is because they are longer and more complex than the others. Nevertheless, it is by no means an absolute rule in philology that the least compound form is the oldest. A word may be {387} adapted to a secondary meaning by a change in its parts in the way of omission, as well as by a change in the way of addition. Such is the general statement. Reasons for believing that in the particular cases of the words in question such is the fact, will be found hereafter.

As to the question whether it is most likely for an adjective to be derived from a case, or a case from an adjective, it may be said, that philology furnishes instances both ways. Ours is a case derived, in syntax at least, from an adjective. Cujus (as in cujum pecus) and sestertium are Latin instances of a nominative case being evolved from an oblique one.

s. 460. Syntactic evidence.--If in Anglo-Saxon we found such expressions as dael min=pars mei, haelf thin=dimidium tui, we should have a reason, as far as it went, for believing in the existence of a genitive with a partitive power. Such instances, however, have yet to be quoted; whilst, even if quoted, they would not be conclusive. Expressions like [Greek: sos pothos]=desiderium tui, [Greek: se promethiai] = providenti[^a] propter te, show the extent to which the possessive expression encroaches on the partitive.

1. The words min or thin, with a power anything rather than possessive, would not for that reason be proved (on the strength of their meaning) to be genitive cases rather than possessive pronouns; since such latitude in the power of the possessive pronoun is borne out by the comparison of languages--[Greek: pater hemon] (not [Greek: hemeteros]) in Greek is pater noster (not nostrum) in Latin.

s. 461. Again--as min and thin are declined like adjectives, even as meus and tuus are so declined, we have means of ascertaining their nature from the form they take in certain constructions; thus, _min_ra=_me_orum, and _min_re=_me_ae, are the genitive plural and the dative singular respectively. Thus, too, the Anglo-Saxon for of thy eyes should be eagena thinra, and the Anglo-Saxon for to my widow, should be wuduwan minre; just as in Latin, they would be oculorum tuorum, and viduae meae.

If, however, instead of this we find such expressions as eagena thin, or wuduwan min, we find evidence in favour of a {388} genitive case; for then the construction is not one of concord, but one of government, and the words thin and min must be construed as the Latin forms tui and mei would be in oculorum mei, and viduae mei; viz.: as genitive cases. Now, whether a sufficient proportion of such constructions (real or apparent) exist or not, they have not yet been brought forward.

Such instances have yet to be quoted; whilst even if quoted, they would not be conclusive.

s. 462. A few references to the Deutsche Grammatik will explain this.

As early as the Moeso-Gothic stage of our language, we find rudiments of the omission of the inflection. The possessive pronouns in the neuter singular sometimes take the inflection, sometimes appear as crude forms, nim thata badi theinata=[Greek: aron sou ton krabbaton] (Mark ii. 9.) opposed to nim thata badi thein two verses afterwards. So also with mein and meinata.--Deutsche Grammatik, iv. 470. It is remarkable that this omission should begin with forms so marked as those of the neuter (-ata). It has, perhaps, its origin in the adverbial character of that gender.

Old High German.--Here the nominatives, both masculine and feminine, lose the inflection, whilst the neuter retains it--thin dohter, s[^i]n quen[^a], min dohter, sinaz l[^i]b. In a few cases, when the pronoun comes after, even the oblique cases drop the inflection.--Deutsche Grammatik, 474-478.

Middle High German.--Preceding the noun, the nominative of all genders is destitute of inflection; s[^i]n l[^i]b, m[^i]n ere, d[^i]n l[^i]b, &c. Following the nouns, the oblique cases do the same; ine herse s[^i]n.--Deutsche Grammatik, 480. The influence of position should here be noticed. Undoubtedly a place after the substantive influences the omission of the inflection. This appears in its maximum in the Middle High German. In Moeso-Gothic we have mein leik and leik meinata.--Deutsche Grammatik, 470.

s. 463. Now by assuming (which is only a fair assumption) the extension of the Middle High German omission of the inflection to the Anglo-Saxon; and by supposing it to affect the words in question in all positions (i.e., both before and {389} after their nouns), we explain these constructions by a process which, in the mind of the present writer, is involved in fewer difficulties than the opposite doctrine of a genitive case, in words where it is not wanted, and with a termination which is foreign to it elsewhere.

To suppose two adjectival forms, one inflected (min, minre, &c.), and one uninflected, or common to all genders and both numbers (min), is to suppose no more than is the case with the uninflected the, as compared with the inflected thaet.--See pp. 251-253.

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XXXVIII. ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WEAK PRAETERITE

s. 464. The remote origin of the weak praeterite in -d or -t, has been considered by Grimm, in the Deutsche Grammatik. He maintains that it is the d in d-d, the reduplicate praeterite of do. In all the Gothic languages the termination of the past tense is either -da, -ta, -de, -dhi, -d, -t, or -ed, for the singular, and -don, -ton, -t[^u]m[^e]s, or -dhum, for the plural; in other words, d, or an allied sound, appears once, if not oftener. In the plural praeterite of the Moeso-Gothic we have something more, viz. the termination -d[^e]dum; as nas-id[^e]dum, nas-id[^e]duth, nas-id[^e]dum, from nas-ja; s[^o]k-id[^e]dum, s[^o]k-id[^e]duth, s[^o]k-id[^e]dum from s[^o]k-ja; salb-[^o]d[^e]dum, salb-[^o]d[^e]duth, s[^a]lb-[^o]d[^e]dun, from salb[^o]. Here there is a second d. The same takes place with the dual form salb-[^o]d[^e]duts; and with the subjunctive forms, salb-[^o]d[^e]djan, salb-[^o]d[^e]duts, salb-[^o]d[^e]di, salb-[^o]d[^e]deits, salb-[^o]d[^e]deima, salb-[^o]d[^e]deith, salb-[^o]d[^e]deina. The English phrase, we did salve, as compared with salb-[^o]d[^e]dum, is confirmatory of this.--Deutsche Grammatik, i. 1042.

s. 465. Some remarks of Dr. Trithen's on the Slavonic praeterite, in the Transactions of the Philological Society, induce me to identify the d- in words like moved, &c., with the -t of the passive participles of the Latin language; as found in mon-it-us, voc-at-us, rap-t-us, and probably in Greek forms like [Greek: tuph-th-eis].

l. The Slavonic praeterite is commonly said to possess genders: in other words, there is one form for speaking of a past action when done by a male, and another for speaking of a past action when done by a female.

2. These forms are identical with those of the participles, masculine or feminine, as the case may be. Indeed the praeterite is a participle; and the fact of its being so accounts for {391} the apparently remarkable fact of its inflection. If, instead of saying ille amavit, the Latins said ille amatus, whilst instead of saying illa amavit they said illa amata, they would exactly use the grammar of the Slavonians.

3. Hence, as one language, the Slavonic gives us the undoubted fact of an active praeterite growing out of a passive participle (unless, indeed, we chose to say that both are derived from a common origin); and as the English participle and praeterite, when weak, are nearly identical, we have reason for believing that the d, in the English active praeterite, is the t in the Latin passive participle.

s. 466. The following extract exhibits Dr. Trithen's remarks on the Slavonic verb:--

"A peculiarity which distinguishes the grammar of all the Slavish languages, consists in the use of the past participle, taken in an active sense, for the purpose of expressing the praeterite. This participle generally ends in l; and much uncertainty prevails both as to its origin and its relations, though the termination has been compared by various philologists with similar affixes in the Sanscrit, and the classical languages.

"In the Old Slavish, or the language of the church, there are three methods of expressing the past tense: one of them consists in the union of the verb substantive with the participle; as,

Rek esm' chital esmi' Rek esi' chital esi' Rek est' chital est'.

"In the corresponding tense of the Slavonic dialect we have the verb substantive placed before the participle:

Yasam imao mi' smo imali Ti si imao vi' ste imali On ye imao omi su imali.

"In the Polish it appears as a suffix:

Czytalem czytalismy Czytales czytaliscie Czytal czytalie.

"And in the Servian it follows the participle:

Igrao sam igrali smo Igrao si igrali ste Igrao ye igrali su.

"The ending ao, of igrao and imao, stands for the Russian al, as in some English dialects a' is used for all."

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V. SYNTAX

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I. ON SYNTAX IN GENERAL

s. 467. The word syntax is derived from the Greek syn (with or together), and taxis (arrangement). It relates to the arrangement, or putting together of words. Two or more words must be used before there can be any application of studied syntax.

Much that is considered by the generality of grammarians as syntax, can either be omitted altogether, or else be better studied under another name.

s. 468. To reduce a sentence to its elements, and to show that these elements are, 1, the subject, 2, the predicate, 3, the copula; to distinguish between simple terms and complex terms,--this is the department of logic.

To show the difference in force of expression, between such a sentence as great is Diana of the Ephesians, and Diana of the Ephesians is great, wherein the natural order of the subject and predicate is reversed, is a point of rhetoric.

I am moving.--To state that such a combination as I am moving is grammatical, is undoubtedly a point of syntax. Nevertheless it is a point better explained in a separate treatise, than in a work upon any particular language. The expression proves its correctness by the simple fact of its universal intelligibility.

I speaks.--To state that such a combination as I speaks, {393} admitting that I is exclusively the pronoun in the first person, and that speaks is exclusively the verb in the third, is undoubtedly a point of syntax. Nevertheless, it is a point which is better explained in a separate treatise, than in a work upon any particular language. An expression so ungrammatical, involves a contradiction in terms, which unassisted common sense can deal with. This position will again be reverted to.

There is to me a father.--Here we have a circumlocution equivalent to I have a father. In the English language the circumlocution is unnatural. In the Latin it is common. To determine this, is a matter of idiom rather than of syntax.

I am speaking, I was reading.--There was a stage in the Gothic languages when these forms were either inadmissible, or rare. Instead thereof, we had the present tense, I speak, and the past, I spoke. The same is the case with the classical languages in the classical stage. To determine the difference in idea between these pairs of forms is a matter of metaphysics. To determine at what period each idea came to have a separate mode of expression is a matter of the history of language. For example, vas l['a]isands appears in Ulphilas (Matt. vii. 29). There, it appears as a rare form, and as a literal translation of the Greek [Greek: en didaskon] (was teaching). The Greek form itself was, however, an unclassical expression for [Greek: edidaske]. In Anglo-Saxon this mode of speaking became common, and in English it is commoner still.--Deutsche Grammatik, iv. 5. This is a point of idiom involved with one of history.

Swear by your sword--swear on your sword.--Which of these two expressions is right? This depends on what the speaker means. If he mean make your oath in the full remembrance of the trust you put in your sword, and with the imprecation, therein implied, that it shall fail you, or turn against you if you speak falsely, the former expression is the right one. But, if he mean swear with your hand upon your sword, it is the latter which expresses his meaning. To take a different view of this question, and to write as a rule that {394} verbs of swearing are followed by the preposition on (or by) is to mistake the province of the grammar. Grammar tells no one what he should wish to say. It only tells him how what he wishes to say should be said.

Much of the criticism on the use of will and shall is faulty in this respect. Will expresses one idea of futurity, shall another. The syntax of the two words is very nearly that of any other two. That one of the words is oftenest used with a first person, and the other with a second, is a fact, as will be seen hereafter, connected with the nature of things, not of words.

s. 469. The following question now occurs. If the history of forms of speech be one thing, and the history of idioms another; if this question be a part of logic, and that question a part of rhetoric; and if such truly grammatical facts as government and concord are, as matters of common sense, to be left uninvestigated and unexplained, what remains as syntax? This is answered by the following distinction. There are two sorts of syntax; theoretical and practical, scientific and historical, pure and mixed. Of these, the first consists in the analysis and proof of those rules which common practice applies without investigation, and common sense appreciates, in a rough and gross manner, from an appreciation of the results. This is the syntax of government and concord, or of those points which find no place in the present work, for the following reason--they are either too easy or too hard for it. If explained scientifically they are matters of close and minute reasoning; if exhibited empirically they are mere rules for the memory. Besides this they are universal facts of languages in general, and not the particular facts of any one language. Like other universal facts they are capable of being expressed symbolically. That the verb (A) agrees with its pronoun (B) is an immutable fact: or, changing the mode of expression, we may say that language can only fulfil its great primary object of intelligibility when A = B. And so on throughout. A formal syntax thus exhibited, and even devised [`a] priori, is a philological possibility. And it is also the measure of philological anomalies. {395}

s. 470. Pure syntax.--So much for one sort of syntax; viz., that portion of grammar which bears the same relation to the practice of language, that the investigation of the syllogism bears to the practice of reasoning. The positions concerning it are by no means invalidated by such phrases as I speaks (for I speak), &c. In cases like these there is no contradiction; since the peculiarity of the expression consists not in joining two incompatible persons, but in mistaking a third person for a first--and as far as the speaker is concerned, actually making it so. I must here anticipate some objections that may be raised to these views, by stating that I am perfectly aware that they lead to a conclusion which to most readers must appear startling and to some monstrous, viz., to the conclusion that there is no such thing as bad grammar at all; that everything is what the speaker chooses to make it; that a speaker may choose to make any expression whatever, provided it answer the purpose of language, and be intelligible; that, in short, whatever is is right. Notwithstanding this view of the consequence I still am satisfied with the truth of the premises. I may also add that the terms pure and mixed, themselves suggestive of much thought on the subject which they express, are not mine but Professor Sylvester's.

s. 471. Mixed syntax.--That, notwithstanding the previous limitations, there is still a considerable amount of syntax in the English, as in all other languages, may be seen from the sequel. If I undertook to indicate the essentials of mixed syntax, I should say that they consisted in the explanation of combinations apparently ungrammatical; in other words, that they ascertained the results of those causes which disturb the regularity of the pure syntax; that they measured the extent of the deviation; and that they referred it to some principle of the human mind--so accounting for it.

I am going.--Pure syntax explains this.

I have gone.--Pure syntax will not explain this. Nevertheless, the expression is good English. The power, however, of both have and gone is different from the usual power of those words. This difference mixed syntax explains. {396}

s. 472. Mixed syntax requires two sorts of knowledge--metaphysical, and historical.

1. To account for such a fact in language as the expression the man as rides to market, instead of the usual expression the man who rides to market, is a question of what is commonly called metaphysics. The idea of comparison is the idea common to the words as and who.

2. To account for such a fact in language as the expression I have ridden a horse is a question of history. We must know that when there was a sign of an accusative case in English the word horse had that sign; in other words that the expression was, originally, I have a horse as a ridden thing. These two views illustrate each other.

s. 473. In the English, as in all other languages, it is convenient to notice certain so-called figures of speech. They always furnish convenient modes of expression, and sometimes, as in the case of the one immediately about to be noticed, account for facts.

s. 474. Personification.--The ideas of apposition and collectiveness account for the apparent violations of the concord of number. The idea of personification applies to the concord of gender. A masculine or feminine gender, characteristic of persons, may be substituted for the neuter gender, characteristic of things. In this case the term is said to be personified.

The cities who aspired to liberty.--A personification of the idea expressed by cities is here necessary to justify the expression.

It, the sign of the neuter gender, as applied to a male or female child, is the reverse of the process.

s. 475. Ellipsis (from the Greek elleipein=to fall short), or a falling short, occurs in sentences like I sent to the bookseller's. Here the word shop or house is understood. Expressions like to go on all fours, and to eat of the fruit of the tree, are reducible to ellipses.

s. 476. Pleonasm (from the Greek pleonazein=to be in excess) occurs in sentences like the king, he reigns. Here the word he is superabundant. In many pleonastic {397} expressions we may suppose an interruption of the sentence, and afterwards an abrupt renewal of it; as the king--he reigns.

The fact of the word he neither qualifying nor explaining the word king, distinguishes pleonasm from apposition.

Pleonasm, as far as the view above is applicable, is reduced to what is, apparently, its opposite, viz., ellipsis.

My banks, they are furnished,--the most straitest sect,--these are pleonastic expressions. In the king, he reigns, the word king is in the same predicament as in the king, God bless him.

The double negative, allowed in Greek and Anglo-Saxon, but not admissible in English, is pleonastic.

The verb do, in I do speak, is not pleonastic. In respect to the sense it adds intensity. In respect to the construction it is not in apposition, but in the same predicament with verbs like must and should, as in I must go, &c.; i. e. it is a verb followed by an infinitive. This we know from its power in those languages where the infinitive has a characteristic sign; as, in German,

Die Augen thaten ihm winken.--GOETHE.

Besides this, make is similarly used in Old English.--But men make draw the branch thereof, and beren him to be graffed at Babyloyne.--Sir J. Mandeville.

s. 477. The figure zeugma.--They wear a garment like that of the Scythians, but a language peculiar to themselves.--The verb, naturally applying to garment only, is here used to govern language. This is called in Greek, zeugma (junction).

s. 478. My paternal home was made desolate, and he himself was sacrificed.--The sense of this is plain; he means my father. Yet no such substantive as father has gone before. It is supplied, however, from the word paternal. The sense indicated by paternal gives us a subject to which he can refer. In other words, the word he is understood, according to what is indicated, rather than according to what is expressed. This figure in Greek is called pros to semainomenon (according to the thing indicated). {398}

s. 479. Apposition.--Caesar, the Roman emperor, invades Britain.--Here the words Roman emperor explain, or define, the word Caesar; and the sentence, filled up, might stand, Caesar, that is, the Roman emperor, &c. Again, the words Roman emperor might be wholly ejected; or, if not ejected, they might be thrown into a parenthesis. The practical bearing of this fact is exhibited by changing the form of the sentence, and inserting the conjunction and. In this case, instead of one person, two are spoken of, and the verb invades must be changed from the singular to the plural.

Now the words Roman emperor are said to be in apposition to Caesar. They constitute, not an additional idea, but an explanation of the original one. They are, as it were, laid alongside (appositi) of the word Caesar. Cases of doubtful number, wherein two substantives precede a verb, and wherein it is uncertain whether the verb should be singular or plural, are decided by determining whether the substantives be in apposition or the contrary. No matter how many nouns there may be, as long as it can be shown that they are in apposition, the verb is in the singular number.

s. 480. Collectiveness as opposed to plurality.--In sentences like the meeting was large, the multitude pursue pleasure, meeting, and multitude are each collective nouns; that is, although they present the idea of a single object, that object consists of a plurality of individuals. Hence, pursue is put in the plural number. To say, however, the meeting were large would sound improper. The number of the verb that shall accompany a collective noun depends upon whether the idea of the multiplicity of individuals, or that of the unity of the aggregate, shall predominate.

Sand and salt and a mass of iron is easier to bear than a man without understanding.--Let sand and salt and a mass of iron be dealt with as a series of things the aggregate of which forms a mixture, and the expression is allowable.

The king and the lords and commons forms an excellent frame of government.--Here the expression is doubtful. Substitute with for the first and, and there is no doubt as to the propriety of the singular form is. {399}

s. 481. The reduction of complex forms to simple ones.--Take, for instance, the current illustration, viz., the-king-of-Saxony's army.--Here the assertion is, not that the army belongs to Saxony, but that it belongs to the king of Saxony; which words must, for the sake of taking a true view of the construction, be dealt with as a single word in the possessive case. Here two cases are dealt with as one; and a complex term is treated as a single word.

The same reasoning applies to phrases like the two king Williams. If we say the two kings William, we must account for the phrase by apposition.

s. 482. True notion of the part of speech in use.--In he is gone, the word gone must be considered as equivalent to absent; that is, as an adjective. Otherwise the expression is as incorrect as the expression she is eloped. Strong participles are adjectival oftener than weak ones; their form being common to many adjectives.

True notion of the original form.--In the phrase I must speak, the word speak is an infinitive. In the phrase I am forced to speak, the word speak is (in the present English) an infinitive also. In one case, however, it is preceded by to; whilst in the other, the particle to is absent. The reason for this lies in the original difference of form. Speak - to=the Anglo-Saxon spr['e]can, a simple infinitive; to speak, or speak + to=the Anglo-Saxon to spr['e]canne, an infinitive in the dative case.

s. 483. Convertibility.--In the English language, the greater part of the words may, as far as their form is concerned, be one part of speech as well as another. Thus the combinations s-a-n-th, or f-r-e-n-k, if they existed at all, might exist as either nouns or verbs, as either substantives or adjectives, as conjunctions, adverbs, or prepositions. This is not the case in the Greek language. There, if a word be a substantive, it will probably end in -s, if an infinitive verb, in -ein, &c. The bearings of this difference between languages like the English and languages like the Greek will soon appear.

At present, it is sufficient to say that a word, {400} originally one part of speech (e.g. a noun), may become another (e.g. a verb). This may be called the convertibility of words.

There is an etymological convertibility, and a syntactic convertibility; and although, in some cases, the line of demarcation is not easily drawn between them, the distinction is intelligible and convenient.

s. 484. Etymological convertibility.--The words then and than, now adverbs or conjunctions, were once cases: in other words, they have been converted from one part of speech to another. Or, they may even be said to be cases, at the present moment; although only in an historical point of view. For the practice of language, they are not only adverbs or conjunctions, but they are adverbs or conjunctions exclusively.

s. 485. Syntactic convertibility.--The combination to err, is at this moment an infinitive verb. Nevertheless it can be used as the equivalent to the substantive error.

To err is human=error is human. Now this is an instance of syntactic conversion. Of the two meanings, there is no doubt as to which is the primary one; which primary meaning is part and parcel of the language at this moment.

The infinitive, when used as a substantive, can be used in a singular form only.

To err=error; but we have no such form as to errs=errors. Nor is it wanted. The infinitive, in a substantival sense, always conveys a general statement, so that even when singular, it has a plural power; just as man is mortal=men are mortal.

s. 486. The adjective used as a substantive.--Of these, we have examples in expressions like the blacks of Africa--the bitters and sweets of life--all fours were put to the ground. These are true instances of conversion, and are proved to be so by the fact of their taking a plural form.

Let the blind lead the blind is not an instance of conversion. The word blind in both instances remains an adjective, and is shown to remain so by its being uninflected.

s. 487. Uninflected parts of speech, used as substantive.--When King Richard III. says, none of your ifs, he uses the word if as a substantive=expressions of doubt. {401}

So in the expression one long now, the word now=present time.

s. 488. The convertibility of words in English is very great; and it is so because the structure of the language favours it. As few words have any peculiar signs expressive of their being particular parts of speech, interchange is easy, and conversion follows the logical association of ideas unimpeded.

The convertibility of words is in the inverse ratio to the amount of their inflection.

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II. SYNTAX OF SUBSTANTIVES

s. 489. The phenomena of convertibility have been already explained.

The remaining points connected with the syntax of substantives, are chiefly points of either ellipsis, or apposition.

Ellipsis of substantives.--The historical view of phrases, like Rundell and Bridge's, St. Pauls', &c., shows that this ellipsis is common to the English and the other Gothic languages. Furthermore, it shows that it is met with in languages not of the Gothic stock; and, finally, that the class of words to which it applies, is, there or thereabouts, the same generally.

A. 1. The words most commonly understood, are house and family, or words reducible to them. In Latin, Dianae=aedem Dianae.--Deutsche Grammatik, iv. 262.

2. Country, retinue.--Deutsche Grammatik, iv. 262.

3. Son, daughter, wife, widow.--Deutsche Grammatik, iv. 262.--[Greek: Neleus Kodrou], Greek.

B. The following phrases are referable to a different class of relations--

1. Right and left--supply hand. This is, probably, a real ellipsis. The words right and left, have not yet become true substantives; inasmuch as they have no plural forms. In this respect, they stand in contrast with bitter and sweet; inasmuch as we can say he has tasted both the bitters and sweets of life. Nevertheless, the expression can be refined on.

2. All fours.--To go on all fours. No ellipsis. The word fours, is a true substantive, as proved by its existence as a plural.

From expressions like [Greek: poterion psuchrou] (Matt. xiv. 51), {403} from the Greek, and perfundit gelido (understand latice), from the Latin, we find that the present ellipsis was used with greater latitude in the classical languages than our own.

s. 490. Proper names can only be used in the singular number.--This is a rule of logic, rather than of grammar. When we say the four Georges, the Pitts and Camdens, &c., the words that thus take a plural form, have ceased to be proper names. They either mean--

1. The persons called George, &c.

2. Or, persons so like George, that they may be considered as identical.

s. 491. Collocation.--In the present English, the genitive case always precedes the noun by which it is governed--the man's hat=hominis pileus; never the hat man's=pileus hominis.

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III. SYNTAX OF ADJECTIVES

s. 492. Pleonasm.--Pleonasm can take place with adjectives only in the expression of the degrees of comparison. Over and above the etymological signs of the comparative and superlative degrees, there may be used the superlative words more and most.

And this pleonasm really occurs--

The more serener spirit. The most straitest sect.

These are instances of pleonasm in the strictest sense of the term.

s. 493. Collocation.--As a general rule, the adjective precedes the substantive--a good man, not a man good.

When, however, the adjective is qualified by either the expression of its degree, or accompanied by another adjective, it may follow the substantive--

A man just and good. A woman wise and fair. A hero devoted to his country. A patriot disinterested to a great degree.

Single simple adjectives thus placed after their substantive, belong to the poetry of England, and especially to the ballad poetry--sighs profound--the leaves green.

s. 494. Government.--The only adjective that governs a case, is the word like. In the expression, this is like him, &c., the original power of the dative remains. This we infer--

1. From the fact that in most languages which have {405} inflections to a sufficient extent, the word meaning like governs a dative case.

2. That if ever we use in English any preposition at all to express similitude, it is the preposition to--like to me, like to death, &c.

Expressions like full of meat, good for John, are by no means instances of the government of adjectives; the really governing words being the prepositions to and for respectively.

The most that can be said, in cases like these, is that particular adjectives determine the use of particular prepositions--thus the preposition of, generally follows the adjective full, &c.

s. 495. The positive degree preceded by the adjective more, is equivalent to the comparative form--e. g., more wise=wiser.

The reasons for employing one expression in preference to the other, depend upon the nature of the particular word used.

When the word is, at one and the same time, of Anglo-Saxon origin and monosyllabic, there is no doubt about the preference to be given to the form in -er. Thus, wis-er is preferable to more wise.

When, however, the word is compound, or trisyllabic, the combination with the word more, is preferable.

more fruitful fruitfuller. more villanous villanouser.

Between these two extremes, there are several intermediate forms wherein the use of one rather than another, will depend upon the taste of the writer. The question, however, is a question of euphony, rather than of aught else. It is also illustrated by the principle of not multiplying secondary elements. In such a word as fruit-full-er, there are two additions to the root. The same is the case with the superlative, fruit-full-est.

s. 496. The 9th Chapter of Part IV., should be read carefully. There, there is indicated a refinement upon the current notions as to the power of the comparative degree, {406} and reasons are given for believing that the fundamental notion expressed by the comparative inflexion is the idea of comparison or contrast between two objects.

In this case, it is better in speaking of only two objects to use the comparative degree rather than the superlative--even when we use the definite article the. Thus--

This is the better of the two

is preferable to

This is the best of the two.

This principle is capable of an application more extensive than our habits of speaking and writing will verify. Thus, to go to other parts of speech, we should logically say--

Whether of the two

rather than

Which of the two.

Either the father or the son,

but not

Either the father, the son, or the daughter.

This statement may be refined on. It is chiefly made for the sake of giving fresh prominence to the idea of duality expressed by the terminations -er and -ter.

s. 497. The absence of inflection simplifies the syntax of adjectives. Violations of concord are impossible. We could not make an adjective disagree with its substantive if we wished.

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IV. SYNTAX OF PRONOUNS

s. 498. The syntax of substantives is, in English, simple, from the paucity of its inflections, a condition which is unfavourable towards the evolution of constructional complexities; the most remarkable exception being the phenomenon of convertibility noticed above.

The same is the case with adjectives. The want of inflexion simplifies their syntax equally with that of the substantives.

But with the pronouns this is not the case. Here we have--

1. Signs of gender; 2. Signs of case; 3. Signs of number, to a greater extent, and with more peculiarities, than elsewhere.

Furthermore, the pronouns exhibit in a great degree the phenomena of conversion indicated in p. 400.

s. 499. Pleonasm in the syntax of pronouns.--In the following sentences the words in italics are pleonastic.

1. The king he is just. 2. I saw her, the queen. 3. The men, they were there. 4. The king, his crown.

Of these forms, the first is more common than the second and third, and the fourth more common than the first.

s. 500. The fourth has another element of importance. It has given rise to the absurd notion that the genitive case in -s (father-s) is a contraction from his (father his).

To say nothing about the inapplicability of this rule to feminine genders, and plural numbers, the whole history of the Indo-Germanic languages is against it. {408}

1. We cannot reduce the queen's majesty to the queen his majesty.

2. We cannot reduce the children's bread to the children his bread.

3. The Anglo-Saxon forms are in -es, not in his.

4. The word his itself must be accounted for; and that cannot be done by assuming to be he + his.

5. The -s in father's is the -is in patris, and the -[Greek: os] in [Greek: pateros].

s. 501. The preceding examples illustrate an apparent paradox, viz., the fact of pleonasm and ellipsis being closely allied. The king he is just, dealt with as a single sentence, is undoubtedly pleonastic. But it is not necessary to be considered as a mere simple sentence. The king--may represent a first sentence incomplete, whilst he is just represents a second sentence in full. What is pleonasm in a single sentence, is ellipsis in a double one.

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V. THE TRUE PERSONAL PRONOUNS

s. 502. Personal pronouns.--The use of the second person plural instead of the second singular has been noticed in p. 246. This use of one number for another is current throughout the Gothic languages. A pronoun so used is conveniently called the pronomen reverentiae.

s. 503. In English, however, there is a second change over and above the change of number, viz. that of case. We not only say ye instead of thou, but you instead of ye.--(See p. 245).

Mr. Guest remarks, "that at one time the two forms ye and you seem to have been nearly changing place in our language.

As I have made ye one, Lords, one remain; So I grow stronger you more honour gain.

Henry VIII. 4, 2.

What gain you by forbidding it to teaze ye, It now can neither trouble you nor please ye.

DRYDEN."

In German and the Danish the pronomen reverentiae is got at by a change, not of number, but of person--in other words, the pronoun of the third person is used instead of that of the second; just as if, in the English, we said will they walk=will you walk, will ye walk, wilt thou walk.

s. 504. Dativus ethicus.--In the phrase

Rob me the exchequer.--Henry IV.

the me is expletive, and is equivalent to for me. This expletive use of the dative is conveniently called the dativus ethicus. It occurs more frequently in the Latin than in the {410} English, and more frequently in the Greek than in the Latin.

s. 505. The reflected personal pronoun.--In the English language there is no equivalent to the Latin se, the German sich, and the Scandinavian sik, and sig.

It follows from this that the word self is used to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case.

I strike me is awkward, but not ambiguous.

Thou strikest thee is awkward, but not ambiguous.

He strikes him is ambiguous; inasmuch as him may mean either the person who strikes or some one else. In order to be clear we add the word self when the idea is reflective. He strikes himself is, at once, idiomatic, and unequivocal.

So it is with the plural persons.

We strike us is awkward, but not ambiguous.

Ye strike you is the same.

They strike them is ambiguous.

This shows the value of a reflective pronoun for the third person.

As a general rule, therefore, whenever we use a verb reflectively we use the word self in combination with the personal pronoun.

Yet this was not always the case. The use of the simple personal pronoun was current in Anglo-Saxon, and that, not only for the two first persons, but for the third as well.

The exceptions to this rule are either poetical expressions, or imperative moods.

He sat him down at a pillar's base.--BYRON.

Sit thee down.

s. 506. Reflective neuters.--In the phrase I strike me the verb strike is transitive; in other words, the word me expresses the object of an action, and the meaning is different from the meaning of the simple expression I strike.

In the phrase I fear me (used by Lord Campbell in his Lives of the Chancellors), the verb fear is intransitive or neuter; in other words, the word me (unless, indeed, fear mean terrify) {411} expresses no object of any action at all; whilst the meaning is the same as in the simple expression I fear.

Here the reflective pronoun appears out of place, i. e., after a neuter or intransitive verb.

Such a use, however, is but the fragment of an extensive system of reflective verbs thus formed, developed in different degrees in the different Gothic languages; but in all more than in the English.

s. 507. Equivocal reflectives.--The proper place of the reflective is after the verb.

The proper place of the governing pronoun is, in the indicative and subjunctive moods, before the verb.

Hence in expressions like the preceding there is no doubt as to the power of the pronoun.

The imperative mood, however, sometimes presents a complication. Here the governing person may follow the verb.

Mount ye=either be mounted, or mount yourselves. In phrases like this, and in phrases

Busk ye, busk ye, my bonny, bonny bride, Busk ye, busk ye, my winsome marrow,

the construction is ambiguous. Ye may either be a nominative case governing the verb busk, or an accusative case governed by it.

This is an instance of what may be called the equivocal reflective.

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Chapter VI

ON THE SYNTAX OF THE DEMONSTRATIVE PRONOUNS, AND THE PRONOUNS OF THE THIRD PERSON.

s. 508. Reasons have been given in p. 249, for considering the so-called pronouns of the third person (he, she, it, they) demonstrative rather than truly personal.

s. 509. As his, and her, are genitive cases (and not adjectives), there is no need of explaining such combinations as his mother, her father, inasmuch as no concord of gender is expected. The expressions are respectively equivalent to

mater ejus, not mater sua; pater ejus, -- pater suus.

s. 510. From p. 250, it may be seen that its is a secondary genitive, and it may be added, that it is of late origin in the language. The Anglo-Saxon form was his, the genitive of he for the neuter and masculine equally. Hence, when, in the old writers, we meet his, where we expect its, we must not suppose that any personification takes place, but simply that the old genitive common to the two genders is used in preference to the modern one limited to the neuter, and irregularly formed. This has been illustrated by Mr. Guest.

The following instances are the latest specimens of its use.

"The apoplexy is, as I take it, a kind of lethargy. I have read the cause of his effects in Galen; it is a kind of deafness."--2 Henry IV. i. 2.

"If the salt have lost his flavour, wherewith shall it be seasoned. It is neither fit for the land nor yet for the dunghill, but men cast it out."--Luke xiv. 35.

"Some affirm that every plant has his particular fly or caterpillar, which it breeds and feeds."--WALTON'S Angler.

"This rule is not so general, but that it admitteth of his exceptions."--CAREW.

{413}

"The genitive its is of late introduction into our language. Though used by our dramatists and many of their cotemporaries, it does not occur in the versions of our Bible, the substitute being his or the compound term thereof."--Phil. Trans., No. 25.

s. 511. For the archaic and provincial use of him and he for it see ibid.; remembering that the two cases are different. His for its is an old form retained: him and he for it are really changes of gender.

s. 512. Take them things away.--Here we have them for those. The expression, although not to be imitated, is explained by the originally demonstrative power of them.

Sometimes the expression is still more anomalous, and we hear the so-called nominative case used instead of the accusative. In the expression take they things away, the use of they for them (itself for those) is similarly capable of being, down to a certain period of our language, explained as an archaism. The original accusative was tha, and tho: the form in -m being dative.

s. 513. This and that.--The remarks upon the use of these words in certain expressions is brought at once to the Latin scholar by the quotation of the two following lines from Ovid, and the suggestion of a well-known rule in the Eton Latin Grammar.

Quocunque aspicies nihil est nisi pontus et aer; Nubibus hic tumidus, fluctibus ille minax.

Here hic (=this or the one) refers to the antecedent last named (the air); whilst ille (=that or the other) refers to the antecedent first named (the sea).

Now on the strength of this example, combined with others, it is laid down as a rule in Latin that hic (this) refers to the last-named antecedent, ille to the first-named.

s. 514. What is the rule in English?

Suppose we say John's is a good sword and so is Charles's; this cut through a thick rope, the other cut through an iron rod. Or instead of saying this and that we may say the one and the other. It is clear that, in determining to which of the {414} two swords the respective demonstratives refer, the meaning will not help us at all, so that our only recourse is to the rules of grammar; and it is the opinion of the present writer that the rules of grammar will help us just as little. The Latin rule is adopted by scholars, but still it is a Latin rule rather than an English one.

The truth is, that it is a question which no authority can settle; and all that grammar can tell us is (what we know without it) that this refers to the name of the idea which is logically the most close at hand, and that to the idea which is logically the most distant.

What constitutes nearness or distance of ideas, in other words, what determines the sequence of ideas is another question. That the idea, however, of sequence, and, consequently of logical proximity and logical distance, is the fundamental idea in regard to the expressions in question is evident from the very use of the words this and that.

Now the sequence of ideas is capable of being determined by two tests.

1. The idea to which the name was last given, or (changing the expression) the name of the last idea may be the nearest idea in the order of sequence, and, consequently, the idea referred to by the pronoun of proximity. In this case the idea closest at hand to the writer of the second line of the couplet quoted above was the idea of the atmosphere (aer), and it was, consequently, expressed by (this) hic.

2. Or the idea to which the name was first given, or (changing the expression) the name of the first idea may be the nearest idea in the order of sequence, and consequently the idea referred to it by the pronoun of proximity; inasmuch as the idea which occurs first is the most prominent one, and what is prominent appears near. In this case, the idea closest at hand to the writer of the second line of the couplet quoted above would have been the idea of the sea (pontus), and it would, consequently, have been the idea expressed by this (hic).

As Ovid, however, considered the idea at the end of the last half of one sentence to be the idea nearest to the {415} beginning of the next, we have him expressing himself as he does. On the other hand, it is easy to conceive a writer with whom the nearest idea is the idea that led the way to the others.

As I believe that one and the same individual may measure the sequence of his ideas sometimes according to one of these principles, and sometimes according to another, I believe that all rules about the relations of this and that are arbitrary.

It is just a matter of chance whether a thinker take up his line of ideas by the end or by the beginning. The analogies of such expressions as the following are in favour of this, in English, applying to the first subject, that to the second; since the word attorney takes the place of this, and applies to the first name of the two, i. e., to Thurlow.

"It was a proud day for the bar when Lord North made Thurlow (1) and (2) Wedderburn (1) Attorney (2) and Solicitor General."--Mathias from Lord Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors.

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VII. ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORD SELF

s. 515. The undoubted constructions of the word self, in the present state of the cultivated English, are three-fold.

1. Government.--In my-self, thy-self, our-selves, and your-selves, the construction is that of a common substantive with an adjective or genitive case. My-self=my individuality, and is similarly construed--mea individualitas (or persona), or mei individualitas (or persona).

2. Apposition.--In him-self and them-selves, when accusative, the construction is that of a substantive in apposition with a pronoun. Him-self=him, the individual.

3. Composition.--It is only, however, when himself and themselves, are in the accusative case, that the construction is appositional. When they are used as nominatives, it must be explained on another principle. In phrases like

He himself was present.

They themselves were present.

There is neither apposition nor government; him and them, being neither related to my and thy, so as to be governed, nor yet to he and they, so as to form an apposition. In order to come under one of these conditions, the phrases should be either he his self (they their selves), or else he he self (they they selves). In this difficulty, the only logical view that can be taken of the matter, is to consider the words himself and themselves, not as two words, but as a single word compounded; and even then, the compound will be of an irregular kind; inasmuch as the inflectional element -m, is dealt with as part and parcel of the root.

s. 516. Her-self.--The construction here is ambiguous. It is one of the preceding constructions. Which, however it is, {417} is uncertain; since her may be either a so-called genitive, like my, or an accusative like him.

Itself--is also ambiguous. The s may represent the -s in its, as well as the s- in self.

This inconsistency is as old as the Anglo-Saxon stage of the English language.

s. 517. In the exhibition of the second construction of the word self it was assumed that the case was a case of apposition, and that self was substantival in character. Nevertheless, this is by no means a necessary phenomenon. Self might, as far as its power is determined by its construction alone, in words like himself as easily be an adjective as a substantive. In which case the construction would be a matter, not of apposition, but of agreement. To illustrate this by the Latin language, himself, might equal either eum personam (him, the person), or eum personalem (him personal). The evidence, however, of the forms like myself, as well as other facts adduceable from comparative philology, prove the substantival character of self. On the other hand, it ought not to be concealed that another word, whereof the preponderance of the adjectival over the substantival power is undoubted, is found in the Old English, with just the same inconsistency as the word self; i.e., sometimes in government (like a substantive), and sometimes in either concord or apposition, like a word which may be either substantive or adjective. This word is one; the following illustrations of which are from Mr. Guest.--Phil. Trans. No. 22.

In this world wote I no knight, Who durst his one with hym fight.

Ipomedon, 1690.

thah ha hire ane were Ayein so kene keisere and al his kine riche.

St. Catherine, 90.

Though she alone were Against so fierce a kaiser, and all his kingdom.

Here his one, her one, mean his singleness, her singleness.

He made his mone Within a garden all him one.

GOWER, Confess. Amant.

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Here him one = himself in respect to its construction.

s. 518. As to the inflection of the word -self, all its compounds are substantives; inasmuch as they all take plural forms as far as certain logical limitations will allow them to do so--ourselves, yourselves, themselves.

Myself, thyself, himself, itself, and herself, are naturally singular, and under no circumstances can become plural.

Themselves is naturally plural, and under no circumstances can become singular.

Ourselves and yourselves are naturally plural; yet under certain circumstances they become singular.

a. Just as men say we for I, so may they say our for my.

b. Just as men say you for thou, so may they say your for thy.

In respect to the inflection in the way of case, there are no logical limitations whatever. There is nothing against the existence of a genitive form self's except the habit of the English language not to use one, founded on the little necessity for so doing.--Are you sure this is your own? Yes, I am sure it is my own self's. Such an expression is both logic and grammar.

When an adjective intervenes between self and its personal pronoun the construction is always in the way of government; in other words, the personal pronoun is always put in the genitive case.

His own self, not him own self. Their own selves, not them own selves.

s. 519. The construction of self and a personal pronoun with a verb may be noticed in this place. It is only in the case of the two pronouns of the singular number that any doubt can arise.

1. When myself or thyself stands alone, the verb that follows is in the third person--myself is (not am) weak, thyself is (not art) weak. Here the construction is just the same as in the proposition my body is weak.

2. When myself or thyself is preceded by I or thou, the verb that follows is in the first person--I, myself, am (not is) weak; thou, thyself, art (not is) weak.

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VIII. ON THE POSSESSIVE PRONOUNS

s. 520. The possessive pronouns fall into two classes. The first class contains the forms connected, partially in their etymology and wholly in their syntax, with my and thy, &c. The second class contains the forms connected, partially in their etymology and wholly in their syntax, with mine and thine, &c.

The first class is the class of what may be called the oblique possessives; the name being founded upon the etymological fact of their being connected with the oblique cases of the pronominal inflection.--My, thy, his (as in his book), her, its (as in its book), our, your, their. These are conveniently considered as the equivalents to the Latin forms mei, tui, ejus, nostrum, vestrum, eorum.

The second class is the class of what may be called the absolute possessives; the name being founded upon the syntactic fact of their being able to form the term of a proposition by themselves; as whose is this? Mine (not my).--Mine, thine, his (as in the book is his), hers, ours, yours, theirs are conveniently considered as the equivalents to the Latin forms meus, mea, meum; tuus, tua, tuum; suus, sua, suum; noster, nostra, nostrum; vester, vestra, vestrum. How far either or both of these two classes of pronouns are cases, or adjectives, is a point of etymology that has already been noticed (Part IV., chap. 37).

How far either or both are cases or adjectives is, in syntax, a matter of indifference.

s. 521. There is, however, a palpable difference between the construction of my and mine. We cannot say this is mine hat, and we cannot say this hat is my. Nevertheless, this {420} difference is not explained by any change of construction from that of adjectives to that of cases. As far as the syntax is concerned the construction of my and mine is equally that of an adjective agreeing with a substantive, and of a genitive (or possessive) case governed by a substantive.

Now a common genitive case can be used in two ways; either as part of a term, or as a whole term (i. e., absolutely).--1. As part of a term--this is John's hat. 2. As a whole term--this hat is John's.

And a common adjective can be used in two ways; either as part of a term, or as a whole term (i. e., absolutely).--1. As part of a term--these are good hats. 2. As a whole term--these hats are good.

Now whether we consider my, and the words like it, as adjectives or cases, they possess only one of the properties just illustrated, i. e., they can only be used as part of a term--this is my hat; not this hat is my.

And whether we consider mine, and the words like it, as adjectives or cases, they possess only one of the properties just illustrated, i. e., they can only be used as whole terms, or absolutely--this hat is mine; not this is mine hat.

For a full and perfect construction whether of an adjective or a genitive case, the possessive pronouns present the phenomenon of being, singly, incomplete, but, nevertheless, complimentary to each other when taken in their two forms.

In the absolute construction of a genitive case, the term is formed by the single word only so far as the expression is concerned. A substantive is always understood from what has preceded.--This discovery is Newton's=this discovery is Newton's discovery.

The same with adjectives.--This weather is fine=this weather is fine weather.

And the same with absolute pronouns.--This hat is mine=this hat is my hat; and this is a hat of mine=this is a hat of my hats.

In respect to all matters of syntax considered exclusively, it is so thoroughly a matter of indifference whether a word be an adjective or a genitive case that Wallis considers the {421} forms in -'s like father's, not as genitive cases but as adjectives. Looking to the logic of the question alone he is right, and looking to the practical syntax of the question he is right, also. He is only wrong on the etymological side of the question.

"Nomina substantiva apud nos nullum vel generum vel casuum discrimen sortiuntur."--p. 76.

"Duo sunt adjectivorum genera, a substantivis immediate descendentia, quae semper substantivis suis praeponuntur. Primum quidem adjectivum possessivum libet appellare. Fit autem a quovis substantivo, sive singulari sive plurali, addito -s.--Ut man's nature, the nature of man, natura humana vel hominis; men's nature, natura humana vel hominum; Virgil's poems, the poems of Virgil, poemata Virgilii vel Virgiliana."--p. 89.

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IX. THE RELATIVE PRONOUNS

s. 522. The word that, although originally, when a demonstrative pronoun, a neuter singular, is now used as a relative for all genders, and both numbers.

1. He that spoke.--Masculine gender. 2. She that spoke.--Feminine gender. 3. They that fought.--Plural number. 4. The man that I struck.--Objective case.

s. 523. Etymologically, which is no true neuter of who, but a compound word. It is used, however, with less latitude than that. The beginning of the Lord's Prayer exhibits it in combination with a masculine noun. Generally, however, it is confined to the neuter gender; in which it is common to both numbers.

1. The dagger which stabbed Caesar.--Nominative singular. 2. The daggers which stabbed Caesar.--Nominative plural. 3. The dagger which I grasp.--Objective singular. 4. The daggers which I grasp.--Objective plural.

s. 524. Which has so nearly replaced what that the general use of this last word with its proper power, as a neuter relative, is, in the present English, vulgar, e.g.,

1. The dagger what stabbed Caesar. 2. The dagger what I grasp.

In one case, however, what is used as a true relative, viz., when the antecedent is either this or that.

This is what I mean; not, this is which I mean. That is what I mean; not, that is which I mean.

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s. 525. The word as, properly a conjunction, is occasionally used as a relative--the man as rides to market.

This expression is not to be imitated. It ought, however, to be explained. As is a conjunction denoting comparison. The ideas of comparison and equivalence are allied. The relative is ex vi termini the equivalent, in one part of a sentence, to the antecedent in another.

(1) The man--(2) who speaks.

Here who=man.

(1) As white--(2) as snow.

Here snow=white.

s. 526. It is necessary that the relative be in the same gender as the antecedent--the man who--the woman who--the thing which.

s. 527. It is necessary that the relative be in the same number with the antecedent. As, however, who, which, whom, are equally singular and plural, and as what, which is really singular, is not used as a relative, the application of this law is limited to the word whose. Now whose is, etymologically, a genitive case, and a genitive case of the singular number. Hence the expression the men whose daggers stabbed Caesar can only be justified by considering that the word whose is plural as well as singular. Such is the case. If not the expression is as illogical as homines cujus sicae, &c. would be in Latin.

s. 528. It is not necessary for the relative to be in the same case with its antecedent.

1. John, who trusts me, comes here. 2. John, whom I trust, comes here. 3. John, whose confidence I possess, comes here. 4. I trust John who trusts me.

s. 529. The reason why the relative must agree with its antecedent in both number and gender, whilst it need not agree with it in case, is found in the following observations.

1. All sentences containing a relative contain two verbs--John who (1) trusts me (2) comes here.

2. Two verbs express two actions--(1) trust (2) come.

3. Whilst, however, the actions are two in number, the {424} person or thing which does, or suffers them is single--John.

4. He (she or it) is single ex vi termini. The relative expresses the identity between the subjects (or objects) of the two actions. Thus who=John, or is another name for John.

5. Things and persons that are one and the same, are of one and the same gender. The John who trusts is necessarily of the same gender with the John who comes.

6. Things and persons that are one and the same, are of one and the same number. The number of Johns who trust, is the same as the number of Johns who come. Both these elements of concord are immutable.

7. But a third element of concord is not immutable. The person or thing that is an agent in the one part of the sentence, may be the object of an action in the other. The John whom I trust may trust me also. Hence

a. I trust John--John the object. b. John trusts me--John the agent.

As the relative is only the antecedent in another form, it may change its case according to the construction.

1. I trust John--(2) John trusts me. 2. I trust John--(2) He trusts me. 3. I trust John--(2) Who trusts me. 4. John trusts me--(2) I trust John. 5. John trusts me--(2) I trust him. 6. John trusts me--(2) I trust whom. 7. John trusts me--(2) Whom I trust. 8. John--(2) Whom I trust trusts me.

s. 530. The books I want are here.--This is a specimen of a true ellipsis. In all such phrases in full, there are three essential elements.

1. The first proposition; as the books are here.

2. The second proposition; as I want.

3. The word which connects the two propositions, and without which, they naturally make separate, independent, unconnected statements.

Now, although true and unequivocal ellipses are scarce, {425} the preceding is one of the most unequivocal kind--the word which connects the two propositions being wanting.

s. 531. One or two points connected with the construction of those sentences wherein relative pronouns occur, are necessary to be familiarly understood in order for us to see our way clearly to certain real and apparent anomalies in the syntax of this class of words.

1. Every sentence wherein a relative occurs, is complex, i.e., it consists of two propositions--the man who rides is come=(1) the man is come; (2) who rides. Here the relative who has no meaning in itself, but takes a meaning from the noun of the preceding clause.

2. The relative is the demonstrative or personal pronoun under another form.--The two propositions (1) the man is come; (2) who rides=(1) the man is come; (2) he rides.

3. The demonstrative or personal pronoun is the substantive in another form.--The two propositions (1) the man is come; (2) he rides=(1) the man is come; (2) the man rides.

4. Hence the relative is the equivalent to a demonstrative pronoun, or to a substantive, indifferently.

5. But the relative is the equivalent to the pronoun and substantive, and something more. In sentences like

The man is come--he rides-- The man is come--the man rides.

The identity between the person mentioned in the two propositions is implied, not expressed. This the relative expresses; and hence its use in languages.

6. From these observations we get a practical rule for determining doubtful constructions.

a. Reduce the sentence to the several propositions (which are never less than two) which it contains.

b. Replace the relative by its equivalent personal or demonstrative pronoun, or by its equivalent substantive.

c. The case of the demonstrative or substantive, is the case of the relative also.

By applying this rule to such expressions as

Satan, than whom None higher sat, thus spake

{426} we find them, according to the current etymology, incorrect--

Satan spake--none sat higher than he sat. Satan spake--none sat higher than Satan sat.

Hence the expression should be,

Satan than who None higher sat.

Observe.--The words, according to the current etymology, indicate an explanation which, rightly or wrongly, has been urged in favour of expressions like the one in question, and which will be noticed in a future chapter.

s. 532. Observe.--That three circumstances complicate the syntax of the relative pronoun.

1. The elliptic form of the generality of the sentences wherein it follows the word than.

2. The influence of the oblique interrogation.

3. The influence of an omitted relative.

s. 533. This last finds place in the present chapter.

When the relative and antecedent are in different cases, and the relative is omitted, the antecedent is sometimes put in the case of the relative.

He whom I accuse has entered.

Contracted according to p. 424.

He I accuse has entered.

Changed, according to the present section,--

Him I accuse has entered.

And so (as shown by Mr. Guest, Philological Transactions), Shakspeare has really written,--

Him I accuse, The city gates by this has entered.

Coriolanus, v. 5.

Better leave undone, than by our deeds acquire Too high a fame, when him we serve's away.

Antony and Cleopatra, iii. 1.

The reason of this is clear. The verb that determines {427} the case of the relative is brought in contact with the antecedent, and the case of the antecedent is accommodated to the case of the relative.

The Greek phrase, [Greek: chromai bibliois hois echo], is an instance of the converse process.

s. 534. When there are two words in a clause, each capable of being an antecedent, the relative refers to the latter.

1. Solomon the son of David who slew Goliah. This is unexceptionable.

2. Solomon the son of David who built the temple. This is exceptionable.

Nevertheless, it is defensible, on the supposition that Solomon-the-son-of-David is a single many-worded name.

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X. ON THE INTERROGATIVE PRONOUN

s. 535. Questions are of two sorts, direct and oblique.

Direct.--Who is he?

Oblique.--Who do you say that he is?

All difficulties about the cases of the interrogative pronoun may be determined by framing an answer, and observing the case of the word with which the interrogative coincides. Whatever be the case of this word will also be the case of the interrogative.

DIRECT.

Qu. Who is this?--Ans. I. Qu. Whose is this?--Ans. His. Qu. Whom do you seek?--Ans. Him.

OBLIQUE.

Qu. Who do you say that it is?--Ans. He. Qu. Whose do you say that it is?--Ans. His. Qu. Whom do you say that they seek?--Ans. Him.

Note.--The answer should always be made by means of a pronoun, as, by so doing we distinguish the accusative case from the nominative.

Note.--And, if necessary, it should be made in full. Thus the full answer to whom do you say that they seek? is, I say that they seek him.

s. 536. Nevertheless, such expressions as whom do they say that it is? are common, especially in oblique questions. The following examples are Mr. Guest's.--Philological Transactions.

"And he axed hem and seide, whom seien the people that I am? Thei answereden and seiden, Jon Baptist--and he seide to hem, But whom seien ye that I am?"--WICLIF, Luke ix.

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"Tell me in sadness whom she is you love."

Romeo and Juliet, i. 1.

"And as John fulfilled his course, he said, whom think ye that I am?"--Acts xiii. 25.

Two circumstances encourage this confusion. 1. The presence of a second verb, which takes the appearance of a governing verb. 2. The omission of a really oblique antecedent or relative. 3. The use of accusative for nominative forms in the case of personal pronouns.

s. 537. The presence of a second verb, &c.--Tell me whom she is. Here tell is made to govern whom, instead of whom being left, as who, to agree with she.

s. 538. The omission, &c.--Tell me whom she is you love. Here the full construction requires a second pronoun--tell me who she is whom you love; or else, tell me her whom you love.

s. 539. To the question, who is this? many would answer not I, but me. This confusion of the case in the answer favours a confusion of case in the question.

It is clear that much of this reasoning applies to the relative powers of who, as well as to the interrogative.

But, it is possible that there may be no incorrectness at all: insomuch as whom may have become a true nominative. Mr. Guest has truly remarked that such is the case in the Scandinavian language, where hve-m=who=qui.

This view, if true, justifies the use of whom after the conjunctions than and as; so that the expression,--

Satan than whom None higher sat,

may be right.

Nevertheless, it does not justify such expressions as--

None sit higher than me. None sit higher than thee. None sit higher than us. None sit higher than her.

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The reason of this is clear. Whom is supposed to be admissible, not because the sentence admits an accusative case; but because custom has converted it into a nominative. For my own part, I doubt the application of the Danish rule to the English language. Things may be going that way, but they have not, as yet, gone far enough.

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XI. THE RECIPROCAL CONSTRUCTION

s. 540. In all sentences containing the statement of a reciprocal or mutual action there are in reality two assertions, viz., the assertion that A. strikes (or loves) B., and the assertion that B. strikes (or loves) A.; the action forming one, the reaction another. Hence, if the expressions exactly coincided with the fact signified, there would always be two propositions. This, however, is not the habit of language. Hence arises a more compendious form of expression, giving origin to an ellipsis of a peculiar kind. Phrases like Eteocles and Polynices killed each other are elliptical, for Eteocles and Polynices killed--each the other. Here the second proposition expands and explains the first, whilst the first supplies the verb to the second. Each, however, is elliptic. The first is without the object, the second without the verb. That the verb must be in the plural (or dual) number, that one of the nouns must be in the nominative case, and that the other must be objective, is self-evident from the structure of the sentence; such being the conditions of the expression of the idea. An aposiopesis takes place after a plural verb, and then there follows a clause wherein the verb is supplied from what went before.

s. 541. This is the syntax. As to the power of the words each and one in the expression (each other and one another), I am not prepared to say that in the common practice of the English language there is any distinction between them. A distinction, however, if it existed would give strength to our language. Where two persons performed a reciprocal action on another, the expression might be one another; as Eteocles and Polynices killed one another. Where more than two {432} persons were engaged on each side of a reciprocal action the expression might be each other; as, the ten champions praised each other.

This amount of perspicuity is attained, by different processes, in the French, Spanish, and Scandinavian languages.

1. French.--Ils (i.e., A. and B.) se battaient--l'un l'autre. Ils (A. B. C.) se battaient--les uns les autres. In Spanish, uno otro=l'un l'autre, and unos otros=les uns les autres.

2. Danish.--_Hin_ander=the French l'un l'autre; whilst hverandre=les uns les autres.

The Lapplandic, and, probably other languages, have the same elements of perspicuity.

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XII. THE INDETERMINATE PRONOUNS

s. 542. Different nations have different methods of expressing indeterminate propositions.

Sometimes it is by the use of the passive voice. This is the common method in Latin and Greek, and is also current in English--dicitur, [Greek: legetai], it is said.

Sometimes the verb is reflective--si dice=it says itself, Italian.

Sometimes the plural pronoun of the third person is used. This also is an English locution--they say=the world at large says.

Finally, the use of some word=man is a common indeterminate expression.

The word man has an indeterminate sense in the Modern German; as, man sagt=they say.

The word man was also used indeterminately in the Old English, although it is not so used in the Modern.--Deutsche Grammatik.

In the Old English, the form man often lost the -n, and became me.--Deutsche Grammatik. This form is also extinct.

The present indeterminate pronoun is one; as, one says=they say=it is said=man sagt, German=on dit, French=si dice, Italian.

It has been stated in p. 257, that the indeterminate pronoun one has no etymological connection with the numeral one; but that it is derived from the French on=homme=homo=man; and that it has replaced the Old English, man or me.

s. 543. Two other pronouns, or, to speak more in accordance with the present habit of the English language, one {434} pronoun, and one adverb of pronominal origin are also used indeterminately viz., it and there.

s. 544. It can be either the subject or the predicate of a sentence,--it is this, this is it, I am it, it is I. When it is the subject of a proposition, the verb necessarily agrees with it, and can be of the singular number only; no matter what be the number of the predicate--it is this, it is these.

When it is the predicate of a proposition, the number of the verb depends upon the number of the subject. These points of universal syntax are mentioned here for the sake of illustrating some anomalous forms.

s. 545. There can only be the predicate of a subject. It differs from it in this respect. It follows also that it must differ from it in never affecting the number of the verb. This is determined by the nature of the subject--there is this, there are these.

When we say there is these, the analogy between the words there and it misleads us; the expression being illogical.

Furthermore, although a predicate, there always stands in the beginning of propositions, i.e., in the place of the subject. This also misleads.

s. 546. Although it, when the subject, being itself singular, absolutely requires that its verb should be singular also, there is a tendency to use it incorrectly, and to treat it as a plural. Thus, in German, when the predicate is plural, the verb joined to the singular form es (=it) is plural--es sind menschen, literally translated=it are men; which, though bad English, is good German.

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XIII. THE ARTICLES

s. 547. The rule of most practical importance about the articles is the rule that determines when the article shall be repeated as often as there is a fresh substantive, and when it shall not.

When two or more substantives following each other denote the same object, the article precedes the first only. We say the secretary and treasurer (or, a secretary and treasurer), when the two offices are held by one person.

When two or more substantives following each other denote different objects, the article is repeated, and precedes each. We say the (or a) secretary and the (or a) treasurer, when the two offices are held by different persons.

This rule is much neglected.

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XIV. THE NUMERALS

s. 548. The numeral one is naturally single. All the rest are naturally plural.

Nevertheless such expressions--one two (=one collection of two), two threes (=two collections of three), are legitimate. These are so because the sense of the word is changed. We may talk of several ones just as we may talk of several aces; and of one two just as of one pair.

Expressions like the thousandth-and-first are incorrect. They mean neither one thing nor another: 1001st being expressed by the thousand-and-first, and 1000th + 1st being expressed by the thousandth and the first.

Here it may be noticed that, although I never found it to do so, the word odd is capable of taking an ordinal form. The thousand-and-odd-th is as good an expression as the thousand-and-eight-th.

The construction of phrases like the thousand-and-first is the same construction as we find in the king-of-Saxony's army.

s. 549. It is by no means a matter of indifference whether we say the two first or the first two.

The captains of two different classes at school should be called the two first boys. The first and second boys of the same class should be called the first two boys. I believe that when this rule is attended to, more is due to the printer than to the author: such, at least, is the case with myself.

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XV. ON VERBS IN GENERAL

s. 550. For the purposes of syntax it is necessary to divide verbs into the five following divisions: transitive, intransitive, auxiliary, substantive, and impersonal.

Transitive verbs.--In transitive verbs the action is never a simple action. It always affects some object or other,--I move my limbs; I strike my enemy. The presence of a transitive verb implies also the presence of a noun; which noun is the name of the object affected. A transitive verb, unaccompanied by a noun, either expressed or understood, is a contradiction in terms. The absence of the nouns, in and of itself, makes it intransitive. I move means, simply, I am in a state of moving. I strike means, simply, I am in the act of striking. Verbs like move and strike are naturally transitive.

Intransitive verbs.--An act may take place, and yet no object be affected by it. To hunger, to thirst, to sleep, to wake, are verbs that indicate states of being, rather than actions affecting objects. Verbs like hunger, and sleep, are naturally intransitive.

Many verbs, naturally transitive, may be used as intransitive,--e.g., I move, I strike, &c.

Many verbs, naturally intransitive, may be used as transitives,--e.g., I walked the horse=I made the horse walk.

This variation in the use of one and the same verb is of much importance in the question of the government of verbs.

A. Transitive verbs are naturally followed by some noun or other; and that noun is always the name of something affected by them as an object. {438}

B. Intransitive verbs are not naturally followed by any noun at all; and when they are so followed, the noun is never the name of anything affected by them as an object.

Nevertheless, intransitive verbs may be followed by nouns denoting the manner, degree, or instrumentality of their action,--I walk with my feet=incedo pedibus.

s. 551. The auxiliary verbs will be noticed fully in Chapter XXIII.

s. 552. The verb substantive has this peculiarity, viz. that for all purposes of syntax it is no verb at all. I speak may, logically, be reduced to I am speaking; in which case it is only the part of a verb. Etymologically, indeed, the verb substantive is a verb; inasmuch as it is inflected as such: but for the purposes of construction, it is a copula only, i.e., it merely denotes the agreement or disagreement between the subject and the predicate.

This does not apply to the infinitive mood. The infinitive mood of the so-called verb substantive is a noun; not, however, because it is a verb substantive, but because it is an infinitive mood.

For the impersonal verbs see Part IV., Chapter 27.

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XVI. THE CONCORD OF VERBS

s. 553. The verb must agree with its subject in person, I walk, not I walks: he walks, not he walk.

It must also agree with it in number,--we walk, not we walks: he walks, not he walk.

Clear as these rules are, they require some expansion before they become sufficient to solve all the doubtful points of English syntax connected with the concord of the verb.

A. It is I, your master, who command you. Query? would it is I, your master, who commands you, be correct? This is an example of a disputed point of concord in respect to the person of the verb.

B. The wages of sin is death. Query? would _the wages of sin are death_ be correct? This is an example of a disputed point of concord in respect to the number of the verb.

s. 554. In respect to the concord of person the following rules will carry us through a portion of the difficulties.

Rule.--In sentences, where there is but one proposition, when a noun and a pronoun of different persons are in apposition, the verb agrees with the first of them,--I, your master, command you (not commands): your master, I, commands you (not command).

To understand the nature of the difficulty, it is necessary to remember that subjects may be extremely complex as well as perfectly simple; and that a complex subject may contain, at one and the same time, a noun substantive and a pronoun,--I, the keeper; he, the merchant, &c.

Now all noun-substantives are naturally of the third person--John speaks, the men run, the commander gives orders. Consequently the verb is of the third person also. {440}

But, the pronoun with which such a noun-substantive may be placed in apposition, may be a pronoun of either person, the first or second: I or thou--I the commander--thou the commander.--In this case the construction requires consideration. With which does the verb agree? with the substantive which requires a third person? or with the pronoun which requires a first or second?

Undoubtedly the idea which comes first is the leading idea; and, undoubtedly, the idea which explains, qualifies, or defines it, is the subordinate idea: and, undoubtedly, it is the leading idea which determines the construction of the verb. We may illustrate this from the analogy of a similar construction in respect to number--a man with a horse and a gig meets me on the road. Here the ideas are three; nevertheless the verb is singular. No addition of subordinate elements interferes with the construction that is determined by the leading idea. In the expression I, your master, the ideas are two; viz. the idea expressed by I, and the idea expressed by master. Nevertheless, as the one only explains or defines the other, the construction is the same as if the idea were single. Your master, I, is in the same condition. The general statement is made concerning the master, and it is intended to say what he does. The word I merely defines the expression by stating who the master is. Of the two expressions the latter is the awkwardest. The construction, however, is the same for both.

From the analysis of the structure of complex subjects of the kind in question, combined with a rule concerning the position of the subject, which will soon be laid down, I believe that, for all single propositions, the foregoing rule is absolute.

Rule.--In all single propositions the verb agrees in person with the noun (whether substantive or pronoun) which comes first.

s. 555. But the expression it is I, your master, who command (or commands) you, is not a single proposition. It is a sentence containing two propositions.

1. It is I. 2. Who commands you.

{441}

Here, the word master is, so to say, undistributed. It may belong to either clause of the sentence, i.e., the whole sentence may be divided into

Either--it is I your master-- Or--your master who commands you.

This is the first point to observe. The next is that the verb in the second clause (command or commands) is governed, not by either the personal pronoun or the substantive, but by the relative, i.e., in the particular case before us, not by either I or master, but by who.

And this brings us to the following question--with which of the two antecedents does the relative agree? with I or with master?

This may be answered by the two following rules:--

Rule 1.--When the two antecedents are in the same proposition, the relative agrees with the first. Thus--

1. It is I your master-- 2. Who command you.

Rule 2.--When the two antecedents are in different propositions, the relative agrees with the second. Thus--

1. It is I-- 2. Your master who commands you.

This, however, is not all. What determines whether the two antecedents shall be in the same or in different propositions? I believe that the following rules for what may be called the distribution of the substantive antecedent will bear criticism.

Rule 1. That when there is any natural connection between the substantive antecedent and the verb governed by the relative, the antecedent belongs to the second clause. Thus, in the expression just quoted, the word master is logically connected with the word command; and this fact makes the expression, It is I your master who commands you the better of the two.

Rule 2. That when there is no natural connection between the substantive antecedent and the verb governed by the {442} relative, the antecedent belongs to the first clause. It is I, John, who command (not commands) you.

To recapitulate, the train of reasoning has been as follows:--

1. The person of the second verb is the person of the relative.

2. The person of the relative is that of one of two antecedents.

3. Of such two antecedents the relative agrees with the one which stands in the same proposition with itself.

4. Which position is determined by the connection or want of connection between the substantive antecedent and the verb governed by the relative.

Respecting the person of the verb in the first proposition of a complex sentence there is no doubt. I, your master, who commands you to make haste, am (not is) in a hurry. Here, I am in a hurry is the first proposition; who commands you to make haste, the second.

It is not difficult to see why the construction of sentences consisting of two propositions is open to an amount of latitude which is not admissible in the construction of single propositions. As long as the different parts of a complex idea are contained within the limits of a single proposition, their subordinate character is easily discerned. When, however, they amount to whole propositions, they take the appearance of being independent members of the sentence.

s. 556. The concord of number.--It is believed that the following three rules will carry us through all difficulties of the kind just exhibited.

Rule 1. That the verb agrees with the subject, and with nothing but the subject. The only way to justify such an expression as the wages of sin is death, is to consider death not as the subject, but as the predicate; in other words, to consider the construction to be, death is the wages of sin.

Rule 2. That, except in the case of the word there (p. 434), the word which comes first is always the subject, until the contrary be proved. {443}

Rule 3. That no number of connected singular nouns can govern a plural verb, unless they be connected by a copulative conjunction. _The sun and moon shine_,--the sun in conjunction with the moon shines.

s. 557. Plural subjects with singular predicates.--The wages of sin are death.--Honest men are the salt of the earth.

Singular subjects with plural predicates.--These constructions are rarer than the preceding: inasmuch as two or more persons (or things) are oftener spoken of as being equivalent to one, than one person (or thing) is spoken of as being equivalent to two or more.

Sixpence is twelve halfpennies. He is all head and shoulders. Vulnera totus erat. Tu es deliciae meae.

[Greek: Hektor, atar su moi essi pater kai potnia meter,] [Greek: Ede kasignetos, su de moi thaleros parakoites].

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XVII. ON THE GOVERNMENT OF VERBS

s. 558. The government of verbs is of two sorts, (1.) objective, and (2.) modal.

It is objective where the noun which follows the verb is the name of some object affected by the action of the verb,--as he strikes me; he wounds the enemy.

It is modal when the noun which follows the verb is not the name of any object affected by the verb, but the name of some object explaining the manner in which the action of the verb takes place, the instrument with which it is done, the end for which it is done, &c.

The government of all transitive verbs is necessarily objective. It may also be modal,--I strike the enemy with the sword=ferio hostem gladio.

The government of all intransitive verbs can only be modal,--I walk with the stick. When we say, I walk the horse, the word walk has changed its meaning, and signifies make to walk, and is, by the very fact of its being followed by the name of an object, converted from an intransitive into a transitive verb.

The modal construction may also be called the adverbial construction; because the effect of the noun is akin to that of an adverb,--I fight with bravery=I fight bravely: he walks a king=he walks regally. The modal (or adverbial) construction (or government) sometimes takes the appearance of the objective: inasmuch as intransitive verbs are frequently followed by a substantive; which substantive is in the objective case. Nevertheless, this is no proof of government. For a verb to be capable of governing an objective case, it must be a verb signifying an action affecting an object: and {445} if there be no such object, there is no room for any objective government. To break the sleep of the righteous, is to affect, by breaking, the sleep of the righteous: but, to sleep the sleep of the righteous, is not to affect by sleeping the sleep of the righteous; since the act of sleeping is an act that affects no object whatever. It is a state. We may, indeed, give it the appearance of a transitive verb, as we do when we say, the opiate slept the patient, meaning thereby, lulled to sleep; but the transitive character is only apparent.

To sleep the sleep of the righteous is to sleep in agreement with--or according to--or after the manner of--the sleep of the righteous, and the construction is adverbial.

In the grammars of the classical languages, the following rule is exceptionable--Quodvis verbum admittit accusativum nominis sibi cognati. It does so; but it governs the accusative case not objectively but modally.

s. 559. Modal verbs may be divided into a multiplicity of divisions. Of such, it is not necessary in English to give more than the following four:--

1. Appositional.--As, she walks a queen: you consider me safe. The appositional construction is, in reality, a matter of concord rather than of gender. It will be considered more fully in the following section.

2. Traditive.--As, I give the book to you=do librum tibi. I teach you the lesson=[Greek: didasko se ten didaskalian]. In all traditive expressions there are three ideas; (1.) an agent, (2.) an object, (3.) a person, or thing, to which the object is made over, or transferred, by the agent. For this idea the term dative is too restricted: since in Greek and some other languages, both the name of the object conveyed, and the name of the person to whom it is conveyed are, frequently, put in the accusative case.

3. Instrumental.--As, I fight with a sword=pugno ense=feohte sweorde,--Anglo-Saxon.

4. Emphatic.--As, he sleeps the sleep of the righteous.

s. 560. Verb and nominative case.--No verb governs a nominative case. The appositional construction seems to require such a form of government; but the form is only apparent. {446}

It is I. It is thou. It is he, &c.

Here, although the word is is followed by a nominative case, it by no means governs one--at least not as a verb.

It has been stated above that the so-called verb substantive is only a verb for the purposes of etymology. In syntax, it is only a part of a verb, i. e., the copula.

Now this fact changes the question of the construction in expressions like it is I, &c., from a point of government to one of concord. In the previous examples the words it, is, and I, were, respectively, subject, copula, and predicate; and, as it is the function of the copula to denote the agreement between the predicate and the subject, the real point to investigate is the nature of the concord between these two parts of a proposition.

Now the predicate need agree with the subject in case only.

1. It has no necessary concord in gender--she is a man in courage--he is a woman in effeminacy--it is a girl.

2. It has no necessary concord in number--sin is the wages of death--it is these that do the mischief.

3. It has no necessary concord in person--I am he whom you mean.

4. It has, however, a necessary concord in case. Nothing but a nominative case can, by itself, constitute a term of either kind--subject or predicate. Hence, both terms must be in the nominative, and, consequently, both in the same case. Expressions like this is for me are elliptic. The logical expression is this is a thing for me.

Rule.--The predicate must be of the same case with its subject.

Hence--The copula instead of determining[60] a case expresses a concord.

{447}

Rule 1.--All words connected with a nominative case by the copula (i.e., the so-called verb-substantive) must be nominative.--It is I; I am safe.

Rule 2.--All words in apposition with a word so connected must be nominative.--It is difficult to illustrate this from the English language from our want of inflexions. In Latin, however, we say vocor Johannes=I am called John, not vocor Johannem. Here the logical equivalent is ego sum vocatus Johannes--where--

1. Ego, is nominative because it is the subject.

2. Vocatus is nominative because it is the predicate agreeing with the subject.

3. Johannes, is nominative because it is part of the predicate, and in apposition with vocatus.

N.B. Although in precise language Johannes is said to agree with vocatus rather than to be in apposition with it, the expression, as it stands, is correct. Apposition is the agreement of substantives, agreement the apposition of adjectives.

Rule 3.--All verbs which, when resolved into a copula and participle, have their participle in apposition (or agreeing) with the noun, are in the same condition as simple copulas--she walks a queen=she is walking a queen=illa est incedens regina.

Rule 4.--The construction of a subject and copula preceded by the conjunction that, is the same in respect to the predicate by which they are followed as if the sentence were an isolated proposition.

This rule determines the propriety of the expression--I believe that it is he as opposed to the expression I believe that it is him.

I believe=I am believing, and forms one proposition.

It is he, forms a second.

That, connects the two; but belongs to neither.

{448}

Now, as the relation between the subject and predicate of a proposition cannot be affected by a word which does not belong to it, the construction is the same as if the propositions were wholly separate.

N.B. The question (in cases where the conjunction that is not used), as to the greater propriety of the two expressions--I believe it to be him--I believe it to be he--has yet to be considered.

s. 561. The verb and genitive case.--No verb in the present English governs a genitive case. In Anglo-Saxon certain verbs did: e.g., verbs of ruling and others--weolde thises middangeardes=he ruled (wealded) this earth's. Genitive cases, too, governed by a verb are common both in Latin and Greek. To eat of the fruit of the tree is no genitive construction, however much it may be equivalent to one. Fruit is in the objective case, and is governed not by the verb but by the preposition of.

s. 562. The verb and accusative.--All transitive verbs govern an accusative case,--he strikes me, thee, him, her, it, us, you, them.

The verb and dative case.--The word give, and a few others, govern a dative case. Phrases like give it him, whom shall I give it, are perfectly correct, and have been explained above. The prepositional construction give it to him,--to whom shall I give it? is unnecessary. The evidence of this is the same as in the construction of the adjective like.

s. 563. The partitive construction.--Certain transitive verbs, the action whereof is extended not to the whole, but only to a part of their object, are followed by the preposition of and an objective case. To eat of the fruit of the tree=to eat a part (or some) of the fruit of the tree: to drink of the water of the well=to drink a part (or some) of the water of the well. It is not necessary, here, to suppose the ellipsis of the words part (or some). The construction is a construction that has grown out of the partitive power of the genitive case; for which case the preposition of, followed by the objective, serves as an equivalent.

s. 564. It has been already stated that forms like I believe {449} it to be him, and forms like I believe it to be he, had not been investigated. Of these, the former is, logically, correct.

Here, the word, to be, is, in respect to its power, a noun.

As such, it is in the accusative case after the verb believe.

With this accusative infinitive, it agrees, as being part of the same complex idea. And him does the same.

In English we have two methods of expressing one idea; the method in question, and the method by means of the conjunction, that.

1. I believe it to be him. 2. I believe that it is he.

In the first example, it is the object; and it-to-be-him forms one complex term.

In the second, he agrees with it; and it is the subject of a separate, though connected, proposition.

Of these two forms the Latin language adopts but one, viz., the former,--credo eum esse, not credo quod illud est ille.

s. 565. The expression ob differentiam.--The classical languages, although having but one of the two previous forms, are enabled to effect a variation in the application of it, which, although perhaps illogical, is convenient. When the speaker means himself, the noun that follows, esse, or [Greek: einai], is nominative,--[Greek: phemi einai despotes]=I say that I am the master: ait fuisse celerrimus=he says that he himself was the swiftest--but, [Greek: phemi einai despoten]=I say that he (some one else) is the master; and ait fuisse celerrimum=he says that he (some one else) is the swiftest. This, though not adopted in English, is capable of being adopted,--He believes it to be he (i.e., the speaker) who invented the machine; but, he believes it to be him (that is, another person) who invented it.

s. 566. When the substantive infinitive, to be, is preceded by a passive participle, combined with the verb substantive, the construction is nominative,--it is believed to be he who spoke, not it is believed to be him.--Here there are two propositions:

1. It is believed.-- 2. Who spoke.

{450} Now, here, it is the subject, and, as such, nominative. But it is also the equivalent to to be he, which must be nominative as well. To be he is believed=esse-ille creditur,--or, changing the mode of proof,--

1. It is the subject and nominative.

2. Believed is part of the predicate; and, consequently, nominative also.

3. To be he is a subordinate part of the predicate, in apposition with believed--est creditum, nempe entitas ejus. Or, to be he is believed=esse-ille est creditum.

As a general expression for the syntax of copulas and appositional constructions, the current rule, that copulas and appositional verbs must be followed by the same case by which they are preceded, stands good.

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XVIII. ON THE PARTICIPLES

s. 567. The present participle, or the participle in -ing, must be considered in respect to its relations with the substantive in -ing. Dying-day is, probably, no more a participle than morning-walk. In respect to the syntax of such expressions as the forthcoming, I consider that they are either participles or substantives.

1. When substantives, they are in regimen, and govern a genitive case--What is the meaning of the lady's holding up her train? Here the word holding=the act of holding.--Quid est significatio elevationis pallae de parte foeminae.

2. When participles, they are in apposition or concord, and would, if inflected, appear in the same case with the substantive, or pronoun, preceding them--What is the meaning of the lady holding up her train? Here the word holding=in the act of holding, and answers to the Latin foeminae elevantis.--Quid est significatio foeminae elevantis pallam?

For the extent to which the view differs from that of Priestley, and still more with that of Mr. Guest, see Phil. Trans., 25.

s. 568. The past participle corresponds not with the Greek form [Greek: tuptomenos], but with the form [Greek: tetummenos]. I am beaten is essentially a combination, expressive not of present but of past time, just like the Latin sum verberatus. Its Greek equivalent is not [Greek: eimi tuptomenos]=I am a man in the act of being beaten, but [Greek: eimi tetummenos]=I am a man who has been beaten. It is past in respect to the action, though present in respect to the state brought about by the action. This essentially past element in the so-called present expression, I am beaten, will be again referred to.

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XIX. ON THE MOODS

s. 569. The infinitive mood is a noun. The current rule that when two verbs come together the latter is placed in the infinitive mood means that one verb can govern another only by converting it into a noun--I begin to move=I begin the act of moving. Verbs, as verbs, can only come together in the way of apposition--I irritate, I beat, I talk at him, I call him names, &c.

s. 570. The construction, however, of English infinitives is twofold. (1.) Objective. (2.) Gerundial.

When one verb is followed by another without the preposition to, the construction must be considered to have grown out of the objective case, or from the form in -an.

This is the case with the following words, and, probably, with others.

I may go, not I may to go. I might go, -- I might to go. I can move, -- I can to move. I could move, -- I could to move. I will speak, -- I will to speak. I would speak, -- I would to speak. I shall wait, -- I shall to wait. I should wait, -- I should to wait. Let me go, -- Let me to go. He let me go, -- He let me to go. I do speak, -- I do to speak. I did speak, -- I did to speak. I dare go, -- I dare to go. I durst go, -- I durst to go.

Thou shalt not see thy brother's ox or his ass fall down by the way.

We heard him say I will destroy the temple.

{453} I feel the pain abate.

He bid her alight.

I would fain have any one name to me that tongue that any one can speak as he should do by the rules of grammar.

This, in the present English, is the rarer of the two constructions.

When a verb is followed by another, preceded by the preposition to, the construction must be considered to have grown out of the so-called gerund, i.e., the form in -nne, i.e., the dative case--I begin to move. This is the case with the great majority of English verbs.

The following examples, from the Old English, of the gerundial construction where we have, at present, the objective, are Mr. Guest's.

1. Eilrid myght nought to stand tham ageyn.

R. Br.

2. Whether feith schall mowe to save him?

WICLIF, James ii.

3. My woful child what flight maist thou to take?

HIGGINS, Lady Sabrine, 4.

4. Never to retourne no more, Except he would his life to loose therfore.

HIGGINS, King Albanaet, 6.

5. He said he could not to forsake my love.

HIGGINS, Queen Elstride, 20.

6. The mayster lette X men and mo To wende.

Octavian, 381.

7. And though we owe the fall of Troy requite, Yet let revenge thereof from gods to lighte.

HIGGINS, King Albanaet, 16.

8. I durst, my lord, to wager she is honest.

Othello, iv. 2.

9. Whom, when on ground, she grovelling saw to roll, She ran in haste, &c.

F. Q. iv. 7, 32.

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s. 571. Imperatives have three peculiarities. (1.) They can only, in English, be used in the second person: (2.) They take pronouns after, instead of before, them: (3.) They often omit the pronoun altogether.

s. 572. For the syntax of subjunctives, see the Chapter on Conjunctions.

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XX. ON THE TENSES

s. 573. Notwithstanding its name, the present tense in English, does not express a strictly present action. It rather expresses an habitual one. He speaks well=he is a good speaker. If a man means to say that he is in the act of speaking, he says I am speaking.

It has also, especially when combined with a subjunctive mood, a future power--I beat you (=I will beat you) if you don't leave off.

s. 574. The English praeterite is the equivalent, not to the Greek perfect but the Greek aorist. I beat=[Greek: etupsa] not [Greek: tetupha]. The true perfect is expressed, in English, by the auxiliary have + the past participle.

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XXI. SYNTAX OF THE PERSONS OF VERBS

s. 575. For the impersonal verbs see Part IV. Chapter 27.

s. 576. The concord of persons.--A difficulty that occurs frequently in the Latin language is rare in English. In expressions like ego et ille followed by a verb, there arises a question as to the person in which that verb should be used. Is it to be in the first person in order to agree with ego, or in the third in order to agree with ille? For the sake of laying down a rule upon these and similar points, the classical grammarians arrange the persons (as they do the genders) according to their dignity, making the verb (or adjective if it be a question of gender) agree with the most worthy. In respect to persons, the first is more worthy than the second, and the second more worthy than the third. Hence, the Latins said--

Ego et Balbus sustulimus manus. Tu et Balbus sustulistis manus.

Now, in English, the plural form is the same for all three persons. Hence we say I and you are friends, you and I are friends, I and he are friends, &c., so that, for the practice of language, the question as to the relative dignity of the three persons is a matter of indifference.

Nevertheless, it may occur even in English. Whenever two or more pronouns of different persons, and of the singular number, follow each other disjunctively, the question of concord arises. I or you,--you or he,--he or I. I believe that, in these cases, the rule is as follows:--

1. Whenever the words either or neither precede the {457} pronouns, the verb is in the third person. Either you or I is in the wrong; neither you nor I is in the wrong.

2. Whenever the disjunctive is simple (i. e. unaccompanied with the word either or neither) the verb agrees with the first of the two pronouns.

I or he am in the wrong. He or I is in the wrong. Thou or he art in the wrong. He or thou is in the wrong.

The reasons for these rules will appear in the Chapter on Conjunctions.

Now, provided that they are correct, it is clear that the English language knows nothing about the relative degrees of dignity between these three pronouns; since its habit is to make the verb agree with the one which is placed first--whatever may be the person. I am strongly inclined to believe that the same is the case in Latin; in which case (in the sentence ego et Balbus sustulimus manus) sustulimus agrees, in person, with ego, not because the first person is the worthiest, but because it comes first in the proposition. That the greater supposed worth of the first person may be a reason for putting it first in the proposition is likely enough.

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XXII. ON THE VOICES OF VERBS

s. 577. In English there is neither a passive nor a middle voice.

The following couplet from Dryden's "Mac Flecnoe" exhibits a construction which requires explanation:--

An ancient fabric, raised to'inform the sight, There stood of yore, and Barbican it hight.

Here the word hight=was called, and seems to present an instance of the participle being used in a passive sense without the so-called verb substantive. Yet it does no such thing. The word is no participle at all; but a simple preterite. Certain verbs are naturally either passive or active, as one of two allied meanings may predominate. To be called is passive; so is, to be beaten. But, to bear as a name is active; so is, to take a beating. The word, hight, is of the same class of verbs with the Latin vapulo; and it is the same as the Latin word, cluo.--Barbican cluit=Barbican audivit=Barbican it hight.

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XXIII. ON THE AUXILIARY VERBS

s. 578. The auxiliary verbs, in English, play a most important part in the syntax of the language. They may be classified upon a variety of principles. The following, however, are all that need here be applied.

A. Classification of auxiliaries according to their inflectional or non-inflectional powers.--Inflectional auxiliaries are those that may either replace or be replaced by an inflection. Thus--I am struck=the Latin ferior, and the Greek [Greek: tuptomai]. These auxiliaries are in the same relation to verbs that prepositions are to nouns. The inflectional auxiliaries are,--

1. Have; equivalent to an inflection in the way of tense--I have bitten=mo-mordi.

2. Shall; ditto. I shall call=voc-abo.

3. Will; ditto. I will call=voc-abo.

4. May; equivalent to an inflection in the way of mood. I am come that I may see=venio ut vid-eam.

5. Be; equivalent to an inflection in the way of voice. To be beaten=verberari, [Greek: tuptesthai].

6. Am, art, is, are; ditto. Also equivalent to an inflection in the way of tense. I am moving=move-o.

7. Was, were; ditto, ditto. I was beaten=[Greek: e-tuphthen]. I was moving=move-bam.

Do, can, must, and let, are non-inflectional auxiliaries.

B. Classification of auxiliaries according to their non-auxiliary significations.--The power of the word have in the combination of I have a horse is clear enough. It means possession. The power of the same word in the combination I have been is not so clear; nevertheless it is a power which has grown out of the idea of possession. This shows that {460} the power of a verb as an auxiliary may be a modification of its original power; i. e., of the power it has in non-auxiliary constructions. Sometimes the difference is very little: the word let, in let us go, has its natural sense of permission unimpaired. Sometimes it is lost altogether. Can and may exist only as auxiliaries.

1. Auxiliary derived from the idea of possession--have.

2. Auxiliaries derived from the idea of existence--be, is, was.

3. Auxiliary derived from the idea of future destination, dependent upon circumstances external to the agent--shall. There are etymological reasons for believing that shall is no present tense, but a perfect.

4. Auxiliary derived from the idea of future destination, dependent upon the volition of the agent--will. Shall is simply predictive; will is predictive and promissive as well.

5. Auxiliary derived from the idea of power, dependent upon circumstances external to the agent--may.

6. Auxiliary derived from the idea of power, dependent upon circumstances internal to the agent--can. May is simply permissive; can is potential. In respect to the idea of power residing in the agent being the cause which determines a contingent action, can is in the same relation to may as will is to shall.

"May et can, cum eorum praeteritis imperfectis, might et could, potentiam innuunt: cum hoc tamen discrimine: may et might vel de jure vel saltem de rei possibilitate dicuntur, at can et could de viribus agentis."--WALLIS, p. 107.

7. Auxiliary derived from the idea of sufferance--let.

8. Auxiliary derived from the idea of necessity--must.

"Must necessitatem innuit. Debeo, oportet, necesse est urere, I must burn. Aliquando sed rarius in praeterito dicitur must (quasi ex must'd seu must't contractum). Sic, si de praeterito dicatur, he must (seu must't) be burnt, oportebat uri seu necesse habuit ut ureretur."--WALLIS, 107.

9. Auxiliary derived from the idea of action--do.

C. Classification of auxiliary verbs in respect to their mode {461} of construction.--Auxiliary verbs combine with others in three ways.

1. With participles.--a) With the present, or active, participle--I am speaking: b) With the past, or passive, participle--I am beaten, I have beaten.

2. With infinitives.--a) With the objective infinitive--I can speak: b) With the gerundial infinitive--I have to speak.

3. With both infinitives and participles.--I shall have done, I mean to have done.

D. Auxiliary verbs may be classified according to their effect.--Thus--have makes the combination in which it appears equivalent to a tense; be to a passive form; may to a sign of mood, &c.

This sketch of the different lights under which auxiliary verbs may be viewed, has been written for the sake of illustrating, rather than exhausting, the subject.

s. 579. The following is an exhibition of some of the times in which an action may take place, as found in either the English or other languages, expressed by the use of either an inflection or a combination.

Time considered in one point only--

1. Present.--An action taking place at the time of speaking, and incomplete.--I am beating, I am being beaten. Not expressed, in English, by the simple present tense; since I beat means I am in the habit of beating.

2. Aorist.--An action that took place in past time, or previous to the time of speaking, and which has no connection with the time of speaking.--I struck, I was stricken. Expressed, in English, by the praeterite, in Greek by the aorist. The term aorist, from the Greek [Greek: a-oristos]=undefined, is a convenient name for this sort of time.

3. Future.--An action that has neither taken place, nor is taking place at the time of speaking, but which is stated as one which will take place.--Expressed, in English, by the combination of will or shall with an infinitive mood. In Latin and Greek by an inflection. I shall (or will) speak, [Greek: lek-so], dica-m. {462}

None of these expressions imply more than a single action; in other words, they have no relation to any second action occurring simultaneously with them, before them, or after them.--I am speaking now, I spoke yesterday, I shall speak to-morrow. Of course, the act of mentioning them is not considered as an action related to them in the sense here meant.

By considering past, present, or future actions not only by themselves, but as related to other past, present, or future actions, we get fresh varieties of expression. Thus, an act may have been going on, when some other act, itself an act of past time, interrupted it. Here the action agrees with a present action, in being incomplete; but it differs from it in having been rendered incomplete by an action that has past. This is exactly the case with the--

4. Imperfect.--I was reading when he entered. Here we have two acts; the act of reading and the act of entering. Both are past as regards the time of speaking, but both are present as regards each other. This is expressed, in English, by the past tense of the verb substantive and the present participle, I was speaking; and in Latin and Greek by the imperfect tense, dicebam, [Greek: etupton].

5. Perfect.--Action past, but connected with the present by its effects or consequences.--_I have written, and here is the letter._ Expressed in English by the auxiliary verb have, followed by the participle passive in the accusative case and neuter gender of the singular number. The Greek expresses this by the reduplicate perfect: [Greek: te-tupha]=I have beaten.

6. Pluperfect.--Action past, but connected with a second action, subsequent to it, which is also past.--_I had written when he came in._

7. Future present.--Action future as regards the time of speaking, present as regards some future time.--_I shall be speaking about this time to-morrow._

8. Future praeterite.--Action future as regards the time of speaking, past as regards some future time.--_I shall have spoken by this time to-morrow._ {463}

These are the chief expressions which are simply determined by the relations of actions to each other, and to the time of speaking, either in the English or any other language. But over and above the simple idea of time, there may be others superadded: thus, the phrase, I do speak means, not only that I am in the habit of speaking, but that I also insist upon it being understood that I am so.

Again, an action that is mentioned as either taking place, or as having taken place at a given time, may take place again and again. Hence the idea of habit may arise out of the idea of either present time or aorist time.

[alpha]. In English, the present form expresses habit. See p. 455.

[beta]. In Greek the aorist expresses habit.

Again, one tense, or one combination, may be used for another. I was speaking when he enters.

The results of these facts may now be noticed:

1. The emphatic present and praeterite.--Expressed by do (or did), as stated above. A man says I do (or did) speak, read, &c., when, either directly or by implication, it is asserted or implied that he does not. As a question implies doubt, do is used in interrogations.

"Do et did indicant emphatice tempus praesens, et praeteritum imperfectum. Uro, urebam; I burn, I burned: vel (emphatice) I do burn, I did burn."--WALLIS, p. 106.

2. The predictive future.--I shall be there to-morrow. This means simply that the speaker will be present. It gives no clue to the circumstances that will determine his being so.

3. The promissive future.--I will be there to-morrow.--This means not only that the speaker will be present, but that he intends being so. For further observations on shall and will, see pp. 471-474.

4. That the power of the present tense is, in English, not present, but habitual, has already been twice stated.

s. 580. The representative expression of past and future time.--An action may be past; yet, for the sake of bringing it more vividly before the hearers, we may make it present. {464} _He walks (for walked) up to him, and knocks (for knocked) him down._ This denotes a single action; and is by no means the natural habitual power of the English present. So, in respect to a future, I beat you if you don't leave off, for I will beat you. This use of the present tense is sometimes called the historic use of the present tense. I find it more convenient to call it the representative use; inasmuch as it is used more after the principles of painting than of history; the former of which, necessarily, represents things as present, the latter, more naturally, describes them as past.

The use of the representative present to express simple actions is unequivocally correct. To the expression, however, of complex actions it gives an illogical character,--As I was doing this he enters (for entered). Nevertheless, such a use of the present is a fact in language, and we must take it as it occurs.

s. 581. The present tense can be used instead of the future; and that on the principle of representation. Can a future be used for a present? No.

The present tense can be used instead of the aorist; and that on the principle of representation. Can a past tense, or combination, be used for a present?

In respect to the perfect tense there is no doubt. The answer is in the affirmative. For all purposes of syntax a perfect tense, or a combination equivalent to one, is a present tense. Contrast the expression, I come that I may see; with the expression, I came that I might see; i.e., the present construction with the aorist. Then, bring in the perfect construction, I have come. It differs with the aorist, and agrees with the present. I have come that I may see. The reason for this is clear. There is not only a present element in all perfects, but for the purposes of syntax, the present element predominates. Hence expressions like I shall go, need give us no trouble; even though shall be considered as a perfect tense. Suppose the root, sk-ll to mean to be destined (or fated). Provided we consider the effects of the action to be continued up to the time of speaking, we may say _I have been destined to go_, just as well as we can say _I am destined to go_. {465}

The use of the aorist as a present (except so far as both the tenses agree in their power of expressing habitual actions) is a more difficult investigation. It bears upon such expressions as I ought to go, &c., and will be taken up in p. 475.

s. 582. Certain adverbs, i.e., those of time, require certain tenses. I am then, I was now, I was hereafter, &c., are contradictory expressions. They are not so much bad grammar as impossible nonsense. Nevertheless, we have in Latin such expressions as

"Ut sumus in ponto ter frigore constitit Ister."

Here the connection of the present and perfect ideas explains the apparent contradiction. The present state may be the result of a previous one; so that a preterite element may be involved in a present expression. Ut sumus=since I have been where I am.

It is hardly necessary to remark that such expressions as since I am here (where since=inasmuch as) do not come under this class.

s. 583. Two fresh varieties in the use of tenses and auxiliary verbs may be arrived at by considering the following ideas, which may be superadded to that of simple time.

1. Continuance in the case of future actions.--A future action may not only take place, but continue: thus, a man may, on a given day, not only be called by a particular name, but may keep that name. When Hesiod says that, notwithstanding certain changes which shall have taken place, good shall continue to be mixed with bad, he does not say, [Greek: esthla michthesetai kakoisin], but,

[Greek: All' empes kai toisi memixetai esthla kakoisin].

Opera et Dies.

Again,--

[Greek: Epeith' ho polites entetheis en katalogoi] [Greek: Oudeis kata spoudas metengraphesetai], [Greek: All' hosper en to protun engegrapsetai].

ARISTOPH. Equites, 1366.

{466}

Here [Greek: metengraphesetai] means change from one class to another, [Greek: engegrapsetai] continuance in the same.--See Mathiae, ii. s. 498.

Upon the lines,--

[Greek: Hothen pros andron husteron keklesetai] [Greek: Doureios hippos].

Troades, 13, 14.

Seidler remarks that [Greek: klethesetai], est nomen accipiet; [Greek: keklesetai], nomen geret.

Now it is quite true that this Greek tense, the so-called paulo-post-futurum, "bears the same relation to the other futures as, among the tenses of past time, the perfectum does to the aorist."--(Mathiae.) And it is also true that it by no means answers to the English shall have been. Yet the logical elements of both are the same. In the English expression, the past power of the perfect predominates, in the Greek its present power.

2. Habit in the case of past actions.--I had dined when I rode out. This may apply to a particular dinner, followed by a particular ride. But it may also mean that when the speaker had dined, according to habit, he rode out, according to habit also. This gives us a variety of pluperfect; which is, in the French language, represented by separate combination--j'avais din['e], j'eus din['e].

s. 584. It is necessary to remember that the connection between the present and the past time, which is involved in the idea of a perfect tense ([Greek: tetupha]), or perfect combination (I have beaten), is of several sorts.

It may consist in the present proof of the past fact,--I have written, and here is the evidence.

It may consist in the present effects of the past fact,--I have written, and here is the answer.

Without either enumerating or classifying these different kinds of connexion, it is necessary to indicate two sorts of inference to which they may give origin.

1. The inference of continuance.--When a person says, I have learned my lesson, we presume that he can say it, i. e., that, he has a present knowledge of it. Upon this principle {467} [Greek: kektemai]=I have earned=I possess. The past action is assumed to be continued in its effects.

2. The inference of contrast.--When a person says, I have been young, we presume that he is so no longer. The action is past, but it is continued up to the time of speaking by the contrast which it supplies. Upon this principle, fuit Ilium means Ilium is no more.

In speaking, this difference can be expressed by a difference of accent. _I have learned my lesson_, implies that I don't mean to learn it again. _I have learned my lesson_, implies that I can say it.

s. 585. The construction of the auxiliary, may, will be considered in the Chapter on Conjunctions; that of can, must, and let, offer nothing remarkable. The combination of the auxiliary, have, with the past participle requires notice. It is, here, advisable to make the following classifications.

1. The combination with the participle of a transitive verb.--I have ridden the horse; thou hast broken the sword; he has smitten the enemy.

2. The combination with the participle of an intransitive verb,--I have waited; thou hast hungered; he has slept.

3. The combination with the participle of the verb substantive,--I have been; thou hast been; he has been.

It is by examples of the first of these three divisions that the true construction is to be shown.

For an object of any sort to be in the possession of a person, it must previously have existed. If I possess a horse, that horse must have had a previous existence.

Hence, in all expressions like I have ridden a horse, there are two ideas, a past idea in the participle, and a present idea in the word denoting possession.

For an object of any sort, affected in a particular manner, to be in the possession of a person, it must previously have been affected in the manner required. If I possess a horse that has been ridden, the riding must have taken place before I mention the fact of the ridden horse being in my possession; inasmuch as I speak of it as a thing already done,--the participle, ridden, being in the past tense. {468}

I have ridden a horse=I have a horse ridden=I have a horse as a ridden horse, or (changing the gender and dealing with the word horse as a thing)=I have a horse as a ridden thing.

In this case the syntax is of the usual sort. (1) Have=own=habeo=teneo; (2) horse is the accusative case=equum; (3) ridden is a past participle agreeing either with horse, or with a word in apposition with it understood.

Mark the words in italics. The word ridden does not agree with horse, since it is of the neuter gender. Neither if we said I have ridden the horses, would it agree with horses; since it is of the singular number.

The true construction is arrived at by supplying the word thing. I have a horse as a ridden thing=habeo equum equitatum (neuter). Here the construction is the same as triste lupus stabulis.

I have horses as a ridden thing=habeo equos equitatam (singular, neuter). Here the construction is--

"Triste ... maturis frugibus imbres, Arboribus venti, nobis Amaryllides irae."

or in Greek--

[Greek: Deinon gunaixin hai di' odinon gonai].

The classical writers supply instances of this use of have. Compertum habeo, milites, verba viris virtutem non addere=I have discovered=I am in possession of the discovery. Quae cum ita sint, satis de Caesare hoc dictum habeo.

2. The combination of have with an intransitive verb is irreducible to the idea of possession: indeed, it is illogical. In I have waited, we cannot make the idea expressed by the word waited the object of the verb have or possess. The expression has become a part of language by means of the extension of a false analogy. It is an instance of an illegitimate imitation.

3. The combination of have with been is more illogical still, and is a stronger instance of the influence of an illegitimate imitation. In German and Italian, where even intransitive verbs are combined with the equivalents to the English have {469} (haben and avere), the verb substantive is not so combined; on the contrary, the combinations are

Italian; io sono stato=I am been. German; ich bin gewesen=ditto.

which is logical.

s. 586. I am to speak.--Three facts explain this idiom.

1. The idea of direction towards an object conveyed by the dative case, and by combinations equivalent to it.

2. The extent to which the ideas of necessity, obligation, or intention are connected with the idea of something that has to be done, or something towards which some action has a tendency.

3. The fact that expressions like the one in question historically represent an original dative case, or its equivalent; since to speak grows out of the Anglo-Saxon form to sprecanne, which, although called a gerund, is really a dative case of the infinitive mood.

When Johnson (see Mr. Guest, Phil. Trans. No. 44) thought that, in the phrase he is to blame, the word blame was a noun, if he meant a noun in the way that culpa is a noun, his view was wrong. But if he meant a noun in the way that culpare, ad culpandum, are nouns, it was right.

s. 587. I am to blame.--This idiom is one degree more complex than the previous one; since I am to blame=I am to be blamed. As early, however, as the Anglo-Saxon period the gerunds were liable to be used in a passive sense: he is to lufigenne=not he is to love, but he is to be loved.

The principle of this confusion may be discovered by considering that an object to be blamed, is an object for some one to blame, an object to be loved is an object for some one to love.

s. 588. Shall and will.--The simply predictive future verb is shall. Nevertheless, it is only used in the first person. The second and third persons are expressed by the promissive verb will.

The promissive future verb is will. Nevertheless, it is only used in the first person. The second and third persons are expressed by the predictive verb shall. {470}

"In primis personis shall simpliciter praedicentis est; will, quasi promittentis aut minantis.

"In secundis et tertiis personis, shall promittentis est aut minantis: will simpliciter praedicentis.

"Uram=I shall burn. Ures=Thou wilt burn. Uret=He will burn. Uremus=We shall burn. Uretis=Ye will burn. Urent=They will burn.

nempe, hoc futurum praedico.

"I will burn. Thou shalt burn. He shall burn. We will burn. Ye shall burn. They shall burn.

nempe, hoc futurum spondeo, vel faxo ut sit."

Again--"would et should illud indicant quod erat vel esset futurum: cum hoc tantum discrimine: would voluntatem innuit, seu agentis propensionem: should simpliciter futuritionem."--Wallis, p. 107.

s. 589. Archdeacon Hare explains this by a usus ethicus. "In fact, this was one of the artifices to which the genius of the Greek language had recourse, to avoid speaking presumptuously of the future: for there is an awful, irrepressible, and almost instinctive consciousness of the uncertainty of the future, and of our own powerlessness over it, which, in all cultivated languages, has silently and imperceptibly modified the modes of expression with regard to it: and from a double kind of litotes, the one belonging to human nature generally, the other imposed by good-breeding on the individual, and urging him to veil the manifestations of his will, we are induced to frame all sorts of shifts for the sake of speaking with becoming modesty. Another method, as we know, frequently adopted by the Greeks was the use of the conditional moods: and as sentiments of this kind always imply some degree of intellectual refinement, and strengthen with its increase, this is called an Attic usage. The same name too has often been given to the above-mentioned middle forms of the future; not that in either case the practice was peculiar to the Attic dialect, but that it was more general where the feelings which produced it were {471} strong and more distinct. Here again our own language supplies us with an exact parallel: indeed this is the only way of accounting for the singular mixture of the two verbs shall and will, by which, as we have no auxiliary answering to the German werde, we express the future tense. Our future, or at least what answers to it, is, I shall, thou wilt, he will. When speaking in the first person, we speak submissively: when speaking to or of another, we speak courteously. In our older writers, for instance in our translation of the Bible, shall is applied to all three persons: we had not then reacht that stage of politeness which shrinks from the appearance even of speaking compulsorily of another. On the other hand the Scotch use will in the first person: that is, as a nation they have not acquired that particular shade of good-breeding which shrinks from thrusting itself[61] forward."

{472}

s. 590. _Notice of the use of will and shall, by Professor De Morgan._--"The matter to be explained is the synonymous character of will in the first person with shall in the second and third; and of shall in the first person with will in the second and third: shall (1) and will (2, 3) are called predictive: shall (2, 3) and will (1) promissive. The suggestion now proposed will require four distinctive names.

"Archdeacon Hare's usus ethicus is taken from the brighter side of human nature:--'When speaking in the first person we speak submissively; when speaking to or of another, we speak courteously.' This explains I shall, thou wilt; but I cannot think it explains I will, thou shalt. It often happens {473} that you will, with a persuasive tone, is used courteously for something next to, if not quite, you shall. The present explanation is taken from the darker side; and it is to be feared that the [`a] priori probabilities are in its favour.

"In introducing the common mode of stating the future tenses, grammar has proceeded as if she were more than a formal science. She has no more business to collect together I shall, thou wilt, he will, than to do the same with I rule, thou art ruled, he is ruled.

"It seems to be the natural disposition of man to think of his own volition in two of the following catagories, and of another man's in the other two:

Compelling, non-compelling; restrained, non-restrained.

{474}

"The ego, with reference to the non-ego, is apt, thinking of himself, to propound the alternative, 'Shall I compel, or shall I leave him to do as he likes?' so that, thinking of the other, the alternative is, 'shall he be restrained, or shall he be left to his own will?' Accordingly, the express introduction of his own will is likely to have reference to compulsion, in case of opposition: the express introduction of the will of another, is likely to mean no more than the gracious permission of the ego to let non-ego do as he likes. Correlatively, the suppression of reference to his own will, and the adoption of a simply predictive form on the part of the ego, is likely to be the mode with which, when the person is changed, he will associate the idea of another having his own way; while the suppression of reference to the will of the non-ego is likely to infer restraint produced by the predominant will of the ego.

"Occasionally, the will of the non-ego is referred to as under restraint in modern times. To I will not, the answer is sometimes you shall, meaning, in spite of the will--sometimes you will, meaning that the will will be changed by fear or sense of the inutility of resistance."[62]

s. 591. I am beaten.--This is a present combination, and it is present on the strength of the verb am, not on the strength of the participle beaten, which is praeterite.

The following table exhibits the expedients on the part of the different languages of the Gothic stock, since the loss of the proper passive form of the Moeso-Gothic.

Language. Latin datur. Latin datus est.

Moeso-Gothic gibada, ist, vas, varth gibans. Old High German ist, wirdit kepan, was, warth kepan. Notker wirt keben, ist keben. Middle High German wirt geben, ist geben. New High German wird gegeben, ist gegeben worden. Old Saxon is, wirtheth gebhan, was, warth gebhan. Middle Dutch es, bl[^i]ft ghegheven, waert, bl[^e]f ghegeven. New Dutch wordt gegeven, es gegeven worden. Old Frisian werth ejeven, is ejeven. {475} Anglo-Saxon weorded gifen, is gifen. English is given, has been given. Old Norse er gefinn, hefr verit gefinn. Swedish gifves, har varit gifven. Danish bliver, vorder given, har varet given.

Deutsche Grammatik, iv. 19.

s. 592. Ought, would, &c., used as presents.--These words are not in the predicament of shall.

They are present in power, and past in form. So, perhaps, is shall.

But they are not, like shall, perfect forms; i. e., they have no natural present element in them.

They are aorist praeterites. Nevertheless, they have a present sense.

So had their equivalents in Greek: [Greek: echren]=[Greek: chre], [Greek: edei]=[Greek: dei], [Greek: proseken]=[Greek: prosekei].

In Latin, too, would was often not represented by either volo or volebam, but by velim.

I believe that the usus ethicus is at the bottom of this construction.

The assertion of duty or obligation is one of those assertions which men like to soften in the expression: should, ought.

So is the expression of power, as denoted by may or can--might, could.

Very often when we say you should (or ought to) do this, we leave to be added by implication--but you do not.

Very often when we say I could (or might) do this, we leave to be added by implication--but I do not exert my power.

Now, if what is left undone be the present element in this assertion, the duty to do it, or the power of doing it, constitutes a past element in it; since the power (or duty) is, in relation to the performance, a cause--insufficient, indeed, but still antecedent. This hypothesis is suggested rather than asserted.

s. 593. By substituting the words I am bound for I ought, {476} we may see the expedients to which this present use of the praeterite forces us.

I am bound to do this now = I owe to do this now. However, we do not say owe, but ought.

Hence, when we wish to say I was bound to do this two years ago, we cannot say I ought (owed) to do this, &c., since ought is already used in a present sense.

We therefore say, instead, I ought to have done this two years ago; which has a similar, but by no means an identical meaning.

_I was bound to pay two years ago, means two years ago I was under an obligation to make a payment, either then or at some future time._

_I was bound to have paid, &c., means I was under an obligation to have made a payment._

If we use the word ought, this difference cannot be expressed.

Common people sometimes say, you had not ought to do so and so; and they have a reason for saying it.

The Latin language is more logical. It says not debet factum fuisse, but debuit fieri.

* * * * *

{477}

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XXIV. THE SYNTAX OF ADVERBS

s. 594. The syntax of the adverb is simpler than that of any other part of speech, excepting, perhaps, that of the adjective.

Adverbs have no concord.

Neither have they any government. They seem, indeed, to have it, when they are in the comparative or superlative degree; but it is merely apparent. In this is better than that, the word that is governed neither by better nor by than. It is not governed at all. It is a nominative case; the subject of a separate proposition. This is better (i. e., more good) than that is good. Even if we admit such an expression as he is stronger than me to be good English, there is no adverbial government. Than, if it govern me at all, governs it as a preposition.

The position of an adverb is, in respect to matters of syntax, pre-eminently parenthetic; i. e., it may be omitted without injuring the construction. He is fighting--now; he was fighting--then; he fights--bravely; I am--almost--tired, &c.

s. 595. By referring to the Chapter on the Adverbs, we shall find that the neuter adjective is frequently converted into an adverb by deflection. As any neuter adjective may be so deflected, we may justify such expressions as full (for fully) as conspicuous, and peculiar (for peculiarly) bad grace, &c. We are not, however, bound to imitate everything that we can justify.

s. 596. The termination -ly was originally adjectival. At present it is a derivational syllable by which we can convert an adjective into an adverb: brave, brave-ly. {478} When, however, the adjective ends in -ly already, the formation is awkward. I eat my daily bread is unexceptionable English; I eat my bread daily is exceptionable. One of two things must here take place: the two syllables -ly are packed into one (the full expression being dai-li-ly), or else the construction is that of a neuter adjective deflected.

Adverbs are convertible. The then men=[Greek: hoi nun brotoi], &c. This will be seen more clearly in the Chapter on Conjunctions.

s. 597. It has been remarked that in expressions like he sleeps the sleep of the righteous, the construction is adverbial. So it is in expressions like he walked a mile, it weighs a pound. The ideas expressed by mile and pound are not the names of anything that serves as either object or instrument to the verb. They only denote the manner of the action, and define the meaning of the verb.

s. 598. From whence, from thence.--This is an expression which, if it have not taken root in our language, is likely to do so. It is an instance of excess of expression in the way of syntax; the -ce denoting direction from a place, and the preposition doing the same. It is not so important to determine what this construction is, as to suggest what it is not. It is not an instance of an adverb governed by a preposition. If the two words be dealt with as logically separate, whence (or thence) must be a noun=which place (or that place); just as from then till now=from that time to this. But if (which is the better view) the two words be dealt with as one (i. e., as an improper compound) the preposition from has lost its natural power, and become the element of an adverb.

* * * * *

{479}

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XXV. ON PREPOSITIONS

s. 599. All prepositions govern an oblique case. If a word cease to do this, it ceases to be a preposition. In the first of the two following sentences the word up is a preposition, in the second an adverb.

1. I climbed up the tree. 2. I climbed up.

All prepositions in English precede the noun which they govern. I climbed up the tree, never I climbed the tree up. This is a matter not of government, but of collocation. It is the case in most languages; and, from the frequency of its occurrence, the term pre-position (or prefix) has originated. Nevertheless, it is by no means a philological necessity. In many languages the prepositions are post-positive, following their noun.

s. 600. No preposition, in the present English, governs a genitive case. This remark is made, because expressions like the part of the body=pars corporis,--a piece of the bread=portio panis, make it appear as if the preposition of did so. The true expression is, that the preposition of followed by an objective case, is equivalent, in many instances, to the genitive case of the classical languages.

s. 601. The writer, however, of a paper on English preterites and genitives, in the Philological Museum (II. 261) objects to the current doctrine concerning such constructions as, this is a picture of the king's. Instead of considering the sentence elliptic, and equivalent to this is a picture of or (from) the king's pictures, he entertains the following view,--"I confess, however, that I feel some doubt whether this phrase is {480} indeed to be regarded as elliptical, that is, whether the phrase in room of which it is said to stand, was ever actually in use. It has sometimes struck me that this may be a relict of the old practice of using the genitive after nouns as well as before them, only with the insertion of the preposition of. One of the passages quoted above from 'Arnold's Chronicle,' supplies an instance of a genitive so situated; and one cannot help thinking that it was the notion that of governed the genitive, that led the old translators of Virgil to call his poem The Booke of Eneidos, as it is termed by Phaer, and Gawin Douglas, and in the translation printed by Caxton. Hence it may be that we put the genitive after the noun in such cases, in order to express those relations which are most appropriately expressed by the genitive preceding it. A picture of the king's is something very different from the king's picture: and so many other relations are designated by of with the objective noun, that if we wish to denote possession thereby, it leaves an ambiguity: so, for this purpose, when we want to subjoin the name of the possessor to the thing possest, we have recourse to the genitive, by prefixing which we are wont to express the same idea. At all events as, if we were askt whose castle Alnwick is, we should answer, The Duke of Northumberland's; so we should also say, What a grand castle that is of the Duke of Northumberland's! without at all taking into account whether he had other castles besides: and our expression would be equally appropriate, whether he had or not."

Again, Mr. Guest quotes, amongst other passages, the following:--

Suffice this hill of ours-- They fought two houres of the nightes--

Yet neither class of examples is conclusive.

Ours does not necessarily mean of us. It may also mean of our hills, i. e., of the hills of our choice. Nightes may mean of the night's hours. In the expression, what a grand castle, &c., it is submitted to the reader that we do take into our account other castles, which the Duke of Northumberland {481} may or may not have. The Booke of Eneidos is a mistaken Latinism. As it does not seem to have been sufficiently considered that the real case governed by of (as by de in Latin) is the ablative, it is the opinion of the present writer that no instance has yet been produced of of either governing, or having governed a genitive case.

s. 602. It is not so safe to say in the present English that no preposition governs a dative. The expression give it him is good English; and it is also equivalent to the Latin da ei. But we may also say give it to him. Now the German zu=to governs a dative case, and in Anglo-Saxon, the preposition to, when prefixed to the infinitive mood, required the case that followed it to be a dative.

s. 603. When the infinitive mood is used as the subject of a proposition, i.e., as a nominative case, it is impossible to allow to the preposition to, by which it is preceded, any separate existence whatever,--to rise=rising; to err=error. Here the preposition must, for the purposes of syntax, be considered as incorporated with the noun, just like an inseparable inflection. As such it may be preceded by another preposition. The following example, although a Grecism, illustrates this:--

Yet not to have been dipt in Lethe's lake, Could save the son of Thetis from to die.

s. 604. Akin to this, but not the same, is the so-called vulgarism, consisting of the use of the preposition for. I am ready to go=I am ready for going=the so-called vulgarism, I am ready for to go. Now, this expression differs from the last in exhibiting, not only a verbal accumulation of prepositions, but a logical accumulation as well: inasmuch as for and to express like ideas.

s. 605. Composition converts prepositions into adverbs. Whether we say upstanding or standing-up, we express the manner in which an action takes place, and not the relation between two substantives. The so-called prepositional compounds in Greek ([Greek: anabaino, apothnesko], &c.) are all adverbial.

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{482}

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XXVI. ON CONJUNCTIONS

s. 606. A CONJUNCTION is a part of speech which connects propositions,--the day is bright, is one proposition. The sun shines, is another. The day is bright because the sun shines is a pair of propositions connected by the conjunction, because.

From this it follows, that whenever there is a conjunction, there are two subjects, two copulas, and two predicates: i.e., two propositions in all their parts.

But this may be expressed compendiously. The sun shines, and the moon shines, may be expressed by the sun and moon shine.

Nevertheless, however compendious may be the expression, there are always two propositions wherever there is one conjunction. A part of speech that merely combines two words is a preposition--the sun along with the moon shines.

It is highly important to remember that conjunctions connect propositions.

It is also highly important to remember that many double propositions may be expressed so compendiously as to look like one. When this takes place, and any question arises as to the construction, they must be exhibited in their fully expanded form; i.e., the second subject, the second predicate, and the second copula must be supplied. This can always be done from the first proposition,--he likes you better than me=he likes you better than he likes me. The compendious expression of the second proposition is the first point of note in the syntax of conjunctions.

s. 607. The second point in the syntax of conjunctions is the fact of their great convertibility. Most conjunctions have been developed out of some other part of speech. {483}

The conjunction of comparison, than, is derived from the adverb of time, then; which is derived from the accusative singular of the demonstrative pronoun.

The conjunction, that, is derived also from a demonstrative pronoun.

The conjunction, therefore, is a demonstrative pronoun + a preposition.

The conjunction, because, is a substantive governed by a preposition.

One and the same word, in one and the same sentence, may be a conjunction or preposition, as the case may be.

All fled but John.--If this mean all fled except John, the word but is a preposition, the word John is an accusative case, and the proposition is single. If, instead of John, we had a personal pronoun, we should say all fled but him.

All fled but John.--If this mean all fled, but John did not fly, the word but is a conjunction, the word John is a nominative case, and the propositions are two in number. If, instead of John, we had a personal pronoun, we should say, all fled but he.

From the fact of the great convertibility of conjunctions it is often necessary to determine whether a word be a conjunction or not. If it be a conjunction, it cannot govern a case. If it govern a case, it is no conjunction but a preposition. A conjunction cannot govern a case, for the following reason,--the word that follows it must be the subject of the second proposition, and, as such, a nominative case.

s. 608. The third point to determine in the syntax of conjunctions is the certainty or uncertainty in the mind of the speaker as to the facts expressed by the propositions which they serve to connect.

1. Each proposition may contain a certain, definite, absolute fact--the day is clear because the sun shines. Here, there is neither doubt nor contingency of either the day being clear, or of the sun shining.

2. Of two propositions one may be the condition of the other--the day will be clear if the sun shine. Here, although it is certain that if the sun shine the day will be clear, there is {484} no certainty of the sun shining. Of the two propositions one only embodies a certain fact, and that is certain only conditionally.

Now an action, wherein there enters any notion of uncertainty, or indefinitude, and is at the same time connected with another action, is expressed, not by the indicative mood, but by the subjunctive. If the sun shine (not shines) the day will be clear.

Simple uncertainty will not constitute a subjunctive construction,--I am, perhaps, in the wrong.

Neither will simple connection,--I am wrong because you are right.

But, the two combined constitute the construction in question,--if I be wrong, you are right.

Now, a conjunction that connects two certain propositions may be said to govern an indicative mood.

And a conjunction that connects an uncertain proposition with a certain one, may be said to govern a subjunctive mood.

The government of mood is the only form of government of which conjunctions are capable.

s. 609. Previous to the question of the government of conjunctions in the way of mood, it is necessary to notice certain points of agreement between them and the relative pronouns; inasmuch as, in many cases, the relative pronoun exerts the same government, in the way of determining the mood of the verb, as the conjunction.

Between the relative pronouns and conjunctions in general there is this point of connection,--both join propositions. Wherever there is a relative, there is a second proposition. So there is wherever there is a conjunction.

Between certain relative pronouns and those particular conjunctions that govern a subjunctive mood there is also a point of connection. Both suggest an element of uncertainty or indefinitude. This the relative pronouns do, through the logical elements common to them and to the interrogatives: these latter essentially suggesting the idea of doubt. Wherever the person, or thing, connected with an action, and expressed by a relative be indefinite, there is room for the use {485} a subjunctive mood. Thus--he that troubled you shall bear his judgment, whosoever he be.

s. 610. By considering the nature of such words as when, their origin as relatives on the one hand, and their conjunctional character on the other hand, we are prepared for finding a relative element in words like till, until, before, as long as, &c. These can all be expanded into expressions like until the time when, during the time when, &c. Hence, in an expression like seek out his wickedness till thou find (not findest) none, the principle of the construction is nearly the same as in he that troubled you, &c., or vice vers[^a].[63]

s. 611. In most conditional expressions the subjunctive mood should follow the conjunction. All the following expressions are conditional.

1. Except I be by Silvia in the night, There is no music in the nightingale.

SHAKSPEARE.

2. Let us go and sacrifice to the Lord our God, lest he fall upon us with pestilence.--Old Testament.

3.---- Revenge back on itself recoils. Let it. I reck not, so it light well aimed.

J. MILTON.

4. If this be the case.

5. Although my house be not so with God.--Old Testament.

6. He shall not eat of the holy thing unless he wash his flesh with water.--Old Testament.

Expressions like except and unless are equally conditional with words like if and provided that, since they are equivalent to if--not.

Expressions like though and although are peculiar. They join propositions, of which the one is a prim[^a] facie reason against the existence of the other: and this is the conditional element. In the sentence, if the children be so badly brought up, they are not to be trusted, the bad bringing-up is the reason {486} for their being unfit to be trusted; and, as far as the expression is concerned, is admitted to be so. The only uncertainty lies in the question as to the degree of the badness of the education. The inference from it is unequivocal.

But if, instead of saying if, we say although, and omit the word not, so that the sentence run although the children be so badly brought up they are to be trusted, we do two things: we indicate the general relation of cause and effect that exists between bad bringing-up and unfitness for being trusted, but we also, at the same time, take an exception to it in the particular instance before us. These remarks have been made for the sake of showing the extent to which words like though, &c., are conditional.

It must be remembered, however, that conjunctions, like the ones lately quoted, do not govern subjunctive moods because they are conditional, but because, in the particular condition which they accompany, there is an element of uncertainty.

s. 612. This introduces a fresh question. Conditional conjunctions are of two sorts:--

1. Those which express a condition as an actual fact, and one admitted as such by the speaker.

2. Those which express a condition as a possible fact, and one which the speaker either does not admit, or admits only in a qualified manner.

Since the children are so badly brought up, &c.--This is an instance of the first construction. The speaker admits as an actual fact the bad bringing-up of the children.

If the children be so badly brought-up, &c.--This is an instance of the second construction. The speaker admits as a possible (perhaps, as a probable) fact the bad bringing-up of the children: but he does not adopt it as an indubitable one.

s. 613. Now, if every conjunction had a fixed unvariable meaning, there would be no difficulty in determining whether a condition was absolute, and beyond doubt, or possible, and liable to doubt. But such is not the case.

Although may precede a proposition which is admitted as well as one which is doubted. {487}

a. Although the children are, &c.

b. Although the children be, &c.

If, too, may precede propositions wherein there is no doubt whatever implied: in other words it may be used instead of since.

In some languages this interchange goes farther than in others; in the Greek, for instance, such is the case with [Greek: ei], to a very great extent indeed.

Hence we must look to the meaning of the sentence in general, rather than to the particular conjunction used.

It is a philological fact (probably referable to the usus ethicus) that if may stand instead of since.

It is also a philological fact that when it does so it should be followed by the indicative mood.

This is written in the way of illustration. What applies to if applies to other conjunctions as well.

s. 614. As a point of practice, the following method of determining the amount of doubt expressed in a conditional proposition is useful:--

Insert, immediately after the conjunction, one of the two following phrases,--(1.) as is the case; (2.) as may or may not be the case. By ascertaining which of these two supplements expresses the meaning of the speaker, we ascertain the mood of the verb which follows.

When the first formula is one required, there is no element of doubt, and the verb should be in the indicative mood. If (as is the case), _he is gone, I must follow him_.

When the second formula is the one required, there is an element of doubt, and the verb should be in the subjunctive mood. If (as may or may not be the case) _he be gone, I must follow him_.

s. 615. The use of the word that in expressions like I eat that I may live, &c., is a modification of the subjunctive construction, that is conveniently called potential. It denotes that one act is done for the sake of supplying the power or opportunity for the performance of another.

In English the word that, so used, cannot be said to govern a mood, although generally followed by either may or might. {488} It should rather be said to require a certain combination to follow it. The most important point connected with the powers of that is the so-called succession of tenses.

s. 616. The succession of tenses.--Whenever the conjunction that expresses intention, and consequently connects two verbs, the second of which takes place after the first, the verbs in question must be in the same tense.

I do this that I may gain by it.

I did this that I might gain by it.

In the Greek language this is expressed by a difference of mood; the subjunctive being the construction equivalent to may, the optative to might. The Latin idiom coincides with the English.

A little consideration will show that this rule is absolute. For a man to be doing one action (in present time) in order that some other action may follow it (in past time) is to reverse the order of cause and effect. To do anything in A.D. 1851, that something may result from it in 1850 is a contradiction; and so it is to say _I do this that I might gain by it_.

The reasons against the converse construction are nearly, if not equally cogent. To have done anything at any previous time in order that a present effect may follow, is, ipso facto, to convert a past act into a present one, or, to speak in the language of the grammarian, to convert an aorist into a perfect. To say _I did this_ that I may gain by it, is to make, by the very effect of the expression, either may equivalent to might, or did equivalent to have done.

_I did this_ that _I might gain_.

_I have done this_ that _I may gain_.

A clear perception of the logical necessity of the law of the succession of tenses, is necessary for understanding the nature of several anomalous passages in the classical writers. In the following, an aorist is followed not by an optative, but by a subjunctive.

[Greek: Ouk agathon polukoiranie; heis koiranos esto,] [Greek: Heis basileus, hoi edoke Kronou pais ankulometeo] [Greek: Skeptron t' ede themistas, hina sphisin embasileuei.]

{489}

Here it is necessary to construe [Greek: edoke], has given and continues to allow, which is to construe it like a perfect[64] tense. Upon similar passages Mathiae writes, "but frequently the conjunctive is used, although the preceding word be in the time past, viz., when the verb which depends upon the conjunction shows an action continued to the present time." That means when the verb is really a perfect.

In Latin, where the same form is both aorist and perfect, the succession of tenses is a means of determining which of the two meanings it conveys. Veni ut videam=I have come that I may see. Veni ut viderem=I came that I might see.

Arnold states, from Krueger and Zumpt, that even where the praeterite was clearly a perfect (i. e., =to have with the participle), the Roman ear was so accustomed to the imperfect subjunctive, that it preferred such an expression as diu dubitavi num melius esset to diu dubitavi num melius sit. The latter part of the statement is sure enough; but it is by no means so sure that dubitavi, and similar forms in similar constructions are perfects. There is no reason for considering this to be the case in the present instance. It seems to be so, because it is connected with diu; but an action may last a long time, and yet not last up to the time of speaking. Diu dubitavi probably expresses, I doubted a long time, and leaves it to be inferred that now I do not doubt.

s. 617. It has been stated above that whilst the Latin and English have a succession of tenses, the Greek language {490} exhibits what may be called a succession of moods. This suggests inquiry. Is the difference real? If so, how is it explained? If not, which of the two grammatical systems is right?--the English and Latin on the one side, or the Greek on the other? Should [Greek: tuptoimi] be reduced to a past tense, or verberarem be considered an optative mood.

The present writer has no hesitation in stating his belief, that all the phaenomena explicable by the assumption of an optative mood are equally explicable by an expansion of the subjunctive, and a different distribution of its tenses.

1. Let [Greek: tupso] be considered a subjunctive future instead of a subjunctive aorist.

2. Let [Greek: tuotoimi] be considered an imperfect subjunctive.

3. Let [Greek: tetuphoimi] be considered a pluperfect subjunctive.

4. Let [Greek: tupsaimi] be considered an aorist subjunctive.

Against this view there are two reasons:

1. The double forms [Greek: tupsaimi] and [Greek: tupsoimi], one of which would remain unplaced.

2. The use of the optative and conjunctive in simple propositions, as--

[Greek: o pai, genoio patros eutuchesteros.]

The first reason I am not prepared to impugn. Valeat quantum, &c. The second indicates a class of expressions which tense will not explain, and which mood will. Yet this is not conclusive. Would that thou wert is thoroughly optative: yet it is expressed by a tense.

The form of the so-called optatives proves nothing. Neither the subjunctive nor the optative has any signs of mood at all, except the negative one of the absence of the augment. Their signs are the signs of tense.

In favour of the view are the following reasons:--

1. The analogy of other languages. The imperfect has a subjunctive in Latin. So has the future.

2. The undoubtedly future character of the so-called aorist imperative. To give an order to do a thing in past time is a philological contradiction. Forms like [Greek: blepson] must be future. Though [Greek: thes] and [Greek: tithei] differ in power, they both mean an {491} action subsequent to, or, at any rate, simultaneous with the order given; certainly not one anterior to it.

s. 618. Be may stand for may be. In this case the preterite is not were but might be. The sentence, what care I how fair the lady be, if she be not fair to her admirer? is accurate. Here be = may be. But, what cared I how fair the lady were, if she were not fair to her admirer? is inaccurate. It ought to run thus,--what cared I how fair the lady might be, if she were not fair to her admirer?[65]

s. 619. Disjunctives.--Disjunctives (or, nor) are of two sorts, real, and nominal.

A king or queen always rules in England. Here the disjunction is real; king or queen being different names for different objects. In all real disjunctions the inference is, that if one out of two (or more) individuals (or classes) do not perform a certain action, the other does.

A sovereign or supreme ruler always rules in England. Here the disjunction is nominal; sovereign and supreme governor being different names for the same object. In all nominal disjunctives the inference is, that if an agent (or agents) do not perform a certain action under one name, he does (or they do) it under another.

Nominal disjunctives are called by Harris, _sub_disjunctives.

In the English language there is no separate word to distinguish the nominal from the real disjunctive. In Latin, {492} vel is considered by Harris to be disjunctive, sive subdisjunctive. As a periphrasis the combination in other words is subdisjunctive.

Both nominal and real disjunctives agree in this,--whatever may be the number of nouns which they connect, the construction of the verb is the same as if there were but one--Henry or John, or Thomas, walks (not walk); the sun, or solar luminary, shines (not shine). The disjunctive isolates the subject however much it may be placed in juxtaposition with other nouns.

s. 620. Either, neither.--Many disjunctives imply an alternative. If it be not this person (or thing) that performs a certain action (or exists in a certain state) it is some other. If a person (or thing) do not perform a certain action (or exist in a certain state), under one name, he (or it) does so under another. This alternative is expressed by the word either.

When the word either is connected immediately with the copula of a proposition, it is, if not a true conjunction, at least a part of a conjunctional periphrasis.--This either is or is not so.

When it belongs more to one of the terms of a proposition than to the copula, it is a pronoun,--Either I or you is in the wrong. It is either you or I.

I use the words, part of a conjunctional periphrasis, because the full conjunction is either + or (or neither + nor); the essential conjunctions being the latter words. To these, either (or neither) is superadded, indicating the manner in which the disjunction expressed by or (or nor) takes place; i. e., they show that it takes place in the manner of an alternative. Now, this superadded power is rather adverbial than conjunctional.

s. 621. From the pronominal character of the word either, when it forms part of a term, and from the power of the disjunctive, or, in isolating the subject of the verb, combined with an assumption which will be explained hereafter, we get at the principle of certain rules for doubtful constructions.

In expressions like either you or I is in the wrong, we must {493} consider either not only as a pronoun, but as the leading pronoun of the proposition; a pronoun of which or I is an explanation; and, finally, as the pronoun which determines the person of the verb. Either you or I is wrong=one of us (you or I) is wrong.

Then, as to expressions like I, or you, am in the wrong. Here, I is the leading pronoun, which determines the person of the verbs; the words, or you, being parenthetic, and subordinate. These statements bear upon the rules of p. 457.

s. 622. Will this principle justify such expressions as either they or we is in the wrong?

Or will it justify such expressions as either he or they is in the wrong?

Or will it justify such expressions as I or they am in the wrong? In all which sentences one pronoun is plural.

Perhaps not. The assumption that has been just alluded to, as helping to explain certain doubtful constructions, is the following, viz., that in cases of apposition, disjunction, and complex terms, the first word is the one which determines the character of the sentence wherein it occurs. This is a practice of the English language, which, in the opinion of the present writer, nothing but a very decided preponderance of a difference in person, gender, or number, can overrule. Such may fairly be considered to be the case in the three examples just adduced; especially as there is also the secondary influence of the conjunctional character of the word either. Thus, although we say,--

One of two parties, they or we, is in the wrong.

We also say,--

Either they or we are in the wrong.

As for the other two expressions, they are in the same predicament, with an additional reason for the use of the plural. It contains the singular. The chief object of the present remarks has been less to explain details than to give due prominence to the following leading principles.

1. That either (or neither) is[66] essentially singular in number.

{494}

2. That it is, like any common noun, of the third person.

3. That it is pronominal where it is in apposition with another noun.

4. That when it is the first word of the proposition it determines the concord of the verb, unless its character of a noun of the singular number and third person be disguised by the prominence of some plural form, or some pronoun of the first or second person in the latter part of the term.

5. That in a simple disjunctive proposition (i.e., one where either does not occur) all nouns are subordinate to the first.

s. 623. I believe that the use of either is limited to real disjunctives; in other words, that we can say either a king or a queen always reigns in England, but that we cannot say either a sovereign or a supreme ruler always reigns in England.

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XXVII. THE SYNTAX OF THE NEGATIVE

s. 624. When the verb is in the infinitive mood, the negative precedes it.--Not to advance is to retreat.

When the verb is not in the infinitive mood, the negative follows it.--He advanced not. I cannot.

This rule is absolute. It only seems to precede the verb in such expressions as I do not advance, I cannot advance, I have not advanced, &c. However, the words do, can, and have, are no infinitives; and it consequently follows them. The word advance is an infinitive, and it consequently precedes it. Wallis's rule makes an equivalent statement, although differently. "Adverbium negandi not (non) verbo postponitur (nempe auxiliari primo si adsit; aut si non adsit auxiliare, verbo principali): aliis tamen orationis partibus praefigi solet."--P. 113.

That the negative is rarely used, except with an auxiliary, in other words, that the presence of a negative converts a simple form like it burneth not into the circumlocution it does not burn, is a fact in the practice of the English language. The syntax is the same in either expression.

s. 625. What may be called the distribution of the negative is pretty regular in English. Thus, when the word not comes between an indicative, imperative, or subjunctive mood and an infinitive verb, it almost always is taken with the word which it follows--I can not eat may mean either I can--not eat (i.e., I can abstain), or I can not--eat (i.e., I am unable to eat); but, as stated above, it almost always has the latter signification.

But not always. In Byron's "Deformed Transformed" we find the following lines:-- {496}

Clay! not dead but soulless, Though no mortal man would choose thee, An immortal no less Deigns not to refuse thee.

Here not to refuse=to accept; and is probably a Grecism. To not refuse would, perhaps, be better.

The next expression is still more foreign to the English idiom:--

For not to have been dipped in Lethe's lake Could save the son of Thetis from to die.

Here not is to be taken with could.

s. 626. In the present English, two negatives make an affirmative. I have not not seen him=I have seen him. In Greek this was not the case. Duae aut plures negativae apud Graecos vehementius negant is a well-known rule. The Anglo-Saxon idiom differed from the English and coincided with the Greek. The French negative is only apparently double; words like point, pas, mean not not, but at all. Je ne parle pas = I not speak at all, not I not speak no.

s. 627. Questions of appeal.--All questions imply want of information; want of information may then imply doubt; doubt, perplexity; and perplexity the absence of an alternative. In this way, what are called, by Mr. Arnold,[67] questions of appeal, are, practically speaking, negatives. What should I do? when asked in extreme perplexity, means that nothing can well be done. In the following passage we have the presence of a question instead of a negative:--

Or hear'st thou (cluis, Lat.) rather pure aetherial stream, Whose fountain who (no one) shall tell?

Paradise Lost.

s. 628. The following extract from the Philological Museum (vol. ii.) illustrates a curious and minute distinction, which the author shows to have been current when Wicliffe wrote, but which was becoming obsolete when Sir Thomas More wrote. It is an extract from that writer against Tyndall.

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"I would not here note by the way that Tyndall here translateth no for nay, for it is but a trifle and mistaking of the Englishe worde: saving that ye shoulde see that he whych in two so plain Englishe wordes, and so common as in naye and no can not tell when he should take the one and when the tother, is not for translating into Englishe a man very mete. For the use of these two wordes in aunswering a question is this. No aunswereth the question framed by the affirmative. As for ensample if a manne should aske Tindall himselfe: ys an heretike meete to translate Holy Scripture into Englishe? lo to thys question if he will aunswere trew Englishe, he must aunswere nay and not no. But and if the question be asked hym thus lo: is not an heretike mete to translate Holy Scripture into Englishe? To this question if he will aunswere trewe Englishe, he must aunswere no and not nay. And a lyke difference is there betwene these two adverbs ye and yes. For if the question bee framed unto Tindall by the affirmative in thys fashion. If an heretique falsely translate the New Testament into Englishe, to make his false heresyes seem the word of Godde, be his bokes worthy to be burned? To this questyon asked in thys wyse, yf he will aunswere true Englishe, he must aunswere ye and not yes. But now if the question be asked him thus lo; by the negative. If an heretike falsely translate the Newe Testament into Englishe to make his false heresyes seme the word of God, be not hys bokes well worthy to be burned? To thys question in thys fashion framed if he will aunswere trewe Englishe he may not aunswere ye but he must answere yes, and say yes marry be they, bothe the translation and the translatour, and al that wyll hold wyth them."

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XXVIII. ON THE CASE ABSOLUTE

s. 629. Broadly speaking, all adverbial constructions are absolute. The term, however, is conveniently limited to a particular combination of the noun, verb, and participle. When two actions are connected with each other either by the fact of their simultaneous occurrence, or as cause and effect, they may be expressed within the limits of a single proposition, by expressing the one by means of a verb, and the other by means of a noun and participle agreeing with each other. The door being open, the horse was stolen.

Considering the nature of the connection between the two actions, we find good grounds for expecting [`a] priori that the participle will be in the instrumental case, when such exists in the language; and when not, in some case allied to it, i.e., the ablative or dative.

In Latin the ablative is the case that is used absolutely. Sole orto, claruit dies.

In Anglo-Saxon the absolute case was the dative. This is logical.

In the present English, however, the nominative is the absolute case. He made the best proverbs, him alone excepted, is an expression of Tillotson's. We should now write he alone excepted. The present mode of expression is only to be justified by considering the nominative form to be a dative one, just as in the expression you are here, the word you, although an accusative, is considered as a nominative. A real nominative absolute is as illogical as a real accusative case governing a verb.

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