The Next Naval War

Front matter

THE

BY

CAPT. S. EARDLEY-WILMOT, R.N.

WAR DECLARED

THE NEXT NAVAL WAR.

I. WAR DECLARED.

Though the announcement in the morning papers of March the 1st, 1895, that the French Ambassador had presented to our Minister of Foreign Affairs the afternoon previously a demand for an early evacuation of Egypt by our troops, came upon the country like a clap of thunder, it was soon evident that for some years France had been secretly but energetically preparing for war. The great irritation against England of recent years, due to our prolonged stay in Egypt, had been much increased by the Congo treaty and the gradual extension of our influence north of Uganda. There was no doubt a footing in Khartoum from the south would soon follow, and we should thus obtain a hold upon Egypt, compared with which our present position in its northern portion is unimportant.

The bitter animosity against Germany now was diverted to ourselves. Such questions—openly said the French papers—will never be satisfactorily settled till France has a navy of which England is afraid. A recent inquiry had discomfited all the critics and demonstrated that the French fleet had never been in such an efficient condition. Moreover, the people were convinced not only that the appliances of modern naval warfare tended to equalise the combatants, while the torpedo would give additional chances to the country which had developed it to the highest degree, but that their past defeats were mainly due to the terrible disorganisation of their Navy which the Revolution of 1789 brought about. This had been lost sight of in England, or rather it had not been put forward in any naval history until an American writer had shown under what disadvantages in this respect the French fought at sea in the old wars. Experienced commanders were ruthlessly dismissed, or fled to escape the guillotine, while their places were taken by inexperienced adherents of the Republic. To what other result than that which followed could such a procedure lead?

To my mind, seeing how much depends upon the traditions and discipline of centuries in the efficiency of a fleet being preserved unbroken, the marvel is not that the English were able to sweep the seas, but that the disorganised Navy of France should have made so gallant a stand under such disadvantageous circumstances. There was much justification, therefore, in assuming that this inequality being removed by a united Republic, the fleets would meet once more with nothing specially to favour either side.

From the close of the Franco-German war, when it was evident that a fleet to perform efficient service must be not only strong in numbers but ready to act at short notice, great labour had been bestowed, and no expense spared, in France to gradually build up a naval force which in some respects could not be surpassed even in this country. With the special gift of organisation and talent for mechanical invention for which France has always been famous, the establishments she created for the manufacture of warlike material, and the extended experiments on which every step was based, gave her great advantages in the marvellous development of ordnance which had been going on for thirty years. In this country, having starved experimental work and given the cold shoulder to inventors, we were content to adopt our neighbours' designs, and plod on just ten years behind them in this most important branch.

The same with armour. While the rest of the world had seen that steel must replace iron, we had long adhered to the latter for some fanciful reason that, though it let the projectiles into the ship more easily, it did not crack to the same extent as the harder material. It was not recognised that if a plate kept out six shells and then fell into the sea in fragments it had done more useful work than by allowing them to pass through and remaining attached to the vessel.

The special preparations in France had begun some seven years previously, when a thorough overhaul of the dockyards had been undertaken; old stores and machinery had been removed, the plant in all respects improved, and many old officials replaced by others with modern ideas. At the same time a change of policy in the distribution of the fleet took place. Formerly Brest had been the principal naval port, in which a large portion of the fleet was usually located; but gradually, as ships were completed here and at Cherbourg, they were sent to Toulon. This passed unnoticed at first, until England woke up to find that in the Mediterranean there was a force equal to that which she maintained in those waters and in the Channel combined; while France had a squadron in the north that, being always in commission, had a great advantage over any reserve which only comes together once a year.

It must not be supposed that this could be achieved with a fleet numerically smaller than our own, and other points remain as well guarded. We had been beguiled into retaining a number of slow vessels on foreign stations by observing that France had followed a like policy, and hence under such a condition we were not at a disadvantage. But our rival pursued this system as a blind, for arrangements had been made that at a given time these ancient craft were to be laid up in their colonial ports, and their crews and armament transferred to the best vessels of the mercantile marine. These had been carefully prepared for this purpose during construction, so that their equipment as cruisers could be completed in twenty-four hours, while, as the officers and crews had all under the Maritime Inscription served in the Navy, they readily fell into the positions assigned to them under the new régime. These vessels would then be ready to swoop down upon the small craft of England still retained abroad for what had been vaguely termed the police of the seas; they would next make a determined attack on our commerce, while their speed enabled them to run from the few swift cruisers we had sent to distant stations.

The assertion which had often been made in this country that the newest steamers of the Messagerie Maritime carried guns below during their peaceful voyages was so far incorrect, and had probably arisen from observing these special preparations. It was obvious that such vessels could not be transformed in mid-Atlantic, but must seek a port, and would require a war crew. Under these circumstances no benefit would arise from carrying the guns as lumber in the hold.

Though it was hoped that a few auxiliary cruisers of this nature would be able to effect considerable damage before being brought to bay, there was no intention of leaving them unsupported. It had been remarked that all the newest unarmoured war ships of France had been kept in the home ports. But the intention was, on the outbreak of war, to despatch them in squadrons to various points where they would find isolated British vessels which their superior force would enable them to overcome, and thus taking the enemy in detail, soon diminish the numerical superiority on which we had counted. There were several advantages in this idea. The ships had all the resources of the home dockyards to remedy defects and keep them in the most efficient condition; whereas it had often been found that English vessels when first commissioned, and at once sent abroad, spent several months on arrival under repairs for what should have been ascertained before leaving their ports. Then the French vessels were able to leave at the earliest moment for an unknown destination and without trace of the route taken. Having a clear start, they must arrive before reinforcements could reach the point aimed at. Had they been distributed abroad previously, this country would—as she always has done—have strengthened her foreign station squadrons to a degree consistent with a superiority over any possible enemy.

All the writings of those who have commented upon the failure of France in the past to acquire naval supremacy, attribute it to the pursuit of a false policy in first directing her aim upon territorial attack and ignoring the opposing fleet; or imposing upon her naval commanders a defensive attitude towards it as the best means of ensuring success for the expedition. Though here and there a temporary gain may follow, a naval war thus pursued must in the end be disastrous.

Jurien de la Gravière had proclaimed, "There is but one way to avoid the danger of being half conquered before the first battle; that way is, to be both active and provident, to keep line-of-battle ships ready to be manned at the first signal, and to threaten the enemy's coasts before he can blockade ours."

Lissa showed that any other objective than the enemy's fleet at the first onset is hazardous in the extreme. Careful students of cause and effect, the French had now determined to be first in the field, and strike heavy blows before our forces could be concentrated for the same purpose. To this end all their recent organisation had been directed. The newest ships not in commission so nearly approached this condition, that all they required to take the sea were a small portion of the crew, and certain stores that could be shipped in a few hours. The principal elements for immediate service were on the spot. The first and second in command had been in the ships from the beginning, and such was the discipline maintained, that both could not be absent night or day together. No delay could ensue in completing the ships with officers or men. In France every naval officer is attached to one of the naval ports, and makes that his headquarters unless he has special leave to reside elsewhere. Hence he is ready to embark at a moment's notice. There is no half-pay. If not afloat he is in barracks, though given regular leave on return from foreign service. All this sounds simple and natural, but it is noticed as distinct from our system, in which officers on promotion are given a pittance, and retire to a cottage and grow cabbages until their turn comes for a command. All is then new to them, and the first year is spent in digesting the latest regulations and becoming familiar with the various advances gunnery and tactics, &c., have made in the interval.

As regards the men, no time could have been better for obtaining an ample supply. Outside the force actually serving in the Navy, the best seamen of France are perhaps those who go every year to the Newfoundland and Iceland fisheries in great numbers. They mostly belong to the Maritime Inscription, and have served their time in the fleet. To get them at any moment, they must be called out before going off for the summer fishing. In the Crimean war transports had to be sent out to Newfoundland and Iceland to bring numbers of these men back to man the fleet. Hence the delay which led to our fleet being first in the Baltic. At all the French ports there is an agent of the Maritime Inscription who keeps an account of every sailor, and knows where to put his hand on them. These agents had been secretly warned. The notices calling out the reserves up to the age of thirty-five had been posted on the afternoon of February 28th. The next day 10,000 men were on their way by train for the chief naval port of their district. Long existent arrangements with the railway companies enabled this to be carried out without delay or difficulty. There was some resistance to the decree among certain of the coast fishermen, who endeavoured to avoid service by putting to sea in their fishing boats, but these were in nearly all cases pursued and arrested. As a choice between prison and service, they readily chose the latter.

The Maritime Prefects at all the naval ports had also been warned previously of what was contemplated. Without any unusual stir they saw that the various stores for every ship in the reserve were provided and ready for shipment, while lighters were placed in convenient positions for this service. When, therefore, the single word "mobilise" was telegraphed from the Ministry of Marine in Paris at 8 a.m. the next morning to the ports, there was no confusion. The trains had been coming in during the night with the reserve seamen, who on arrival were marched into barracks, told off to their ships, given their kit and breakfast, so that when the order arrived they were at once marched on board. By 2 o'clock in the afternoon the port officials could report to the Ministry of Marine that the different squadrons were ready for sea.

What in the meantime was going on in England? The Prime Minister having been informed of the demand, a Cabinet Council was at once called, and orders were sent for the Commander-in-Chief and Senior Naval Lord of the Admiralty to attend. Though the French note only required that an assurance that steps would be taken within twentyfour hours to remove the English troops in Egypt, it was felt that the situation was very serious. But by the time the Cabinet had assembled it was too late in the day to set the dockyards in motion. Moreover, the incident had occurred at an unfortunate time for us. The Channel fleet had just returned from their winter's sojourn on the coast of Spain; the ships were refitting, while half the officers and crew were on leave. <A week earlier, and the squadron could have proceeded to Gibraltar from Arosa Bay instead of coming home, and thus strengthened our Mediterranean fleet. Doubtless this fact had influenced the date at which the demand had been put forward. However, orders were at once sent to recall officers and men, and to complete the ships for service with all despatch. To each of the Port Admirals a telegram was sent: "Prepare to mobilise the fleet at six o'clock tomorrow morning." Then a portion of the Cabinet proceeded to discuss the answer that should be given to the French Ambassador, while the repre of the two services sketched the operations to be adopted in case the result should be unfavourable. This led to some curious revelations. Hach had a plan of campaign cut and dried for such an eventuality, but it had been prepared without reference to the other, and its success depended on a preliminary warning of at least some days. To the Army had been confided the task of defending all the ports and our outlying possessions, but it had never struck its officials to inquire what the nature of the attack might be coming over sea, and it was assumed that an expedition could be as easily equipped for distant service aS for a dash at pomts within easy range. Having been told they could expect no assistance from the fleet, that is to say, ships could not be permanently retained in any locality to await an attack which might never come, the military scheme of defence provided for resisting a large fleet and the landing of a numerous body of troops. Such a view entailed small armies in each place for garrisons, so that in the words of a former Secretary of State for War, "The garrisoning of the ports and coaling stations would require the services of no less than 125,000 men, in addition to local levies in certain foreign stations." These had not been provided, and now the Admiralty were suddenly asked to provide transport and convoy for the troops required to complete the garrisons to full strength. It required some argu to show that the operation, besides being one of extreme danger at such a time, could not be undertaken, in view of other services which the fleet would be required to perform.

The Navy, on the other hand, seeing the danger to which we were exposed from the French holding certain commanding positions on two of our trade routes, had counted upon despatching immediately on the outbreak of war a combined force to occupy them. But they had omitted to work this out with the military authorities, and now found that the organisation of the Army did not readily admit of the prompt embarkation of such a force. Carried away by some desire to emulate Continental Powers, we had directed all our efforts to form three army corps of about 35,000 men each, and now could be seen the result of much hard work. The Cabinet was informed with triumph that the 1st Army Corps could be embarked in a week's time. But the Admiralty did not want a Crimean expedition; their modest demands were only for 5000 men, complete in all respects, and this could not be done. It would dislocate the whole military organisation. Why not take the marines? That was all very well, but this body was mcorporated as an integral part of the Navy, to assist in manning the ships, and those not afloat in time of peace were a portion of the reserve we counted upon when additional ships were manned. It is true they had been utilised on many occasions other than for this purpose. If a portion of Ireland was turbulent the Admiralty were applied to for one or more companies of marines. In small wars they had been found an excellent force for doing the rough preliminary work and clearing the way for those who reaped the chief honour and glory. But this would be—if war ensued—a struggle in which the Navy could not spare a man. How had we lost sight of the fact that the best military organisation for this country is one which enables it to despatch expeditions with promptitude to any part of the world? Not only one, but several. In 1809 we had forces operating in Walcheren, Sicily and Portugal. After an unseemly wrangle, it was agreed that four regiments of the line and a battalion of marines should be allotted for the duty.

By this time the Prime Minister and his colleagues had agreed upon an answer to the French demand. It was to the effect that while they recognised their pledge to withdraw the troops maintained in Egypt as soon as the condition of the country warranted such a step—and it should be redeemed the moment this condition had been reached—this country could not consistently with its dignity afford the assurance that any directions would be given within the limit of time stated in the French note. While all felt that no other answer could be given, it seemed certain that war between the two countries must inevitably follow.

It being now considerably past midnight the Cabinet broke up, having arranged to meet again at ten to receive the answer of the French Government, while the naval and military forces were to be at once put on a war footing.

The next day there was an official communication in all the papers in the terms already stated, but adding that Her Majesty's Government trusted, in view of the assurance given, no rupture of our friendly relations with France would ensue. 'This however, was not to be realised, for after considerable working of the wires between London and Paris, the French Ambassador handed in a note at the Foreign Office at 2 P.M., which stated that, failing to procure any satisfactory reply to the temperate demand of his Government, he had been instructed to inform the representatives of Her Majesty that the chiefs of the naval and military forces of the Republic had been directed to carry out reprisals upon the dominions and subjects of Her Majesty.

At 3 P.M. the same day the French fleet steamed out of Toulon.

STATE OF EUROPE

II. STATE OF EUROPE.

Pausing now before the first act of the great drama is performed, we may briefly review the state of Europe at this time, and see what chances of assistance there were for either from the other Powers.

The Triple Alliance was practically at an end. Italy had found the strain too heavy to bear, and been obliged to make considerable reductions in her Army and Navy. A large section of the Italian nation saw that a mistaken policy had been adopted. The weak point of Italy was her immense extent of coast line. Consequently the danger was from the sea, should she find herself opposed to a nation with ports in close proximity and possessing a powerful Navy. Her comparatively short land frontier was easily guarded by an army based on a series of strong positions, and such a defensive policy did not necessitate the maintenance of a large land force. On the other hand, being nearly surrounded with water and possessing several islands of great importance and extent, it was obvious that Italy's chief requirement was a Navy in proportion. This had been recognised to a great extent, and large sums spent in the creation of a fleet: but with an ambition that had not measured its strength, a few vessels of immense size had been constructed, whereas a greater number of moderate dimensions would have more effectually secured the sea approaches. In calculating the chances of injury from all directions it was now seen that the Central Powers could afford Italy no help in the direction she most needed it. The triple fleets were unequal to France alone, while if the latter had an ally with only a moderate amount of sea power, the position was so much worse. The triple armies were no doubt formidable, but then, as I have said, Italy did not need this support in a purely defensive attitude. As for any help from this country, why should this be counted upon? Our foreign policy was notoriously unstable and opposed to any binding engagement. We wisely preserved an attitude of neutrality, and Italy now regretted she had not done the same. As a neutral she would have had more claim on our sympathy, and be more likely to obtain our active support if attacked by either side. In a fit of pique Italy embraced a cause in which she had greatest risks. Our fantastic acquisition of Cyprus gave France a free hand in Tunis, and Italy henceforth became her enemy. We gained nothing, for an island without a harbour is hike a dockyard without a dock, but it fulfilled a long-cherished dream of Lord Beaconsfield, and France became, in Bizerta, the owner of perhaps the finest harbour in the world. Though naturally aggrieved at such a place not falling to her lot, Italy had been wiser to have kept on friendly terms with France, and not launched forth into the expenditure her later alliance entailed. Such were the arguments held forth by an influential portion of the Italian press during the summer and autumn of 1894. They were skilfully supported by similar reasoning in the French journals, and by the end of the year Italy had detached herself from the Triple Alliance.

The other countries were not disposed to move at present. They were too busy watching each other on land to participate in what was intended to be a trial of strength at sea. Russia did not want to cripple herself in the Baltic, where her ironclad construction had long been designed to meet the new fleet of Germany. But she was ready to join France should Austria or Germany intervene. As, however, the struggle did not affect the immense armies in the east and west of Europe, those countries saw little reason to assist us. Indeed Germany stood to gain in any event. Many had been declaring for the last few years that events seemed to point to our decline in commerce and the rise of Germany. Her trading ships were now found in every sea, in some places more numerous than our own. Wherever her sons emigrated they prospered. Had not other nations dominated the ocean as we, and then dropped out of the race? Who could have foreseen the substitution of Holland for Spain, and then the transfer of the world's carrying trade to this country. Might we not in turn give place to Germany? England at war meant more trade to neutrals; England defeated, its commerce gone, perhaps never to return. England victorious would, on the other hand, weaken France, and this also was not unpleasing to Germany. The great military power saw no advantage in assisting a competitor in trade.

Thus once more the two great rivals at sea since the Dutch ceased to contest, were to strive for the supremacy of the ocean. To us events during the past eighty years of naval peace—for the Crimean war did not tax our resources in this respect—had made the retention of naval supremacy a matter of life and death. To France, self-supporting, with an insignificant ocean commerce, and colonies which were of little strength to the mother country, defeat at sea would not materially impair her position. What could have been more complete than her loss of sea power in 1815? Yet in 1840 she was ready to challenge the mistress of the seas, and her best naval officers declared the fleet was in matériel and personnel equal to our own. Victory, on the other hand, would enable her to pay off an old score and regain her hold upon countries which she considered hers by right. It would also give an impetus to that colonial expansion now ardently desired. Meanwhile her strength on land would be unimpaired even if an expedition or two were undertaken.

ORGANISATION FOR WAR

III. ORGANISATION FOR WAR.

Such was the general position when on the afternoon of March 1st the two countries were about to test those preparations which by organisation and manœuvres they had striven to bring to perfection. And how had each considered the many points that a condition of war entails? The provision of an armed force, whether for use at sea or on land, is—or should be—a separate function to that of handling it when required. If a high official attempts to administer all the petty details in the creation and maintenance of fleets or armies, he will have no time to study the strategical and tactical problems in their use. This is the duty of a general staff: to say first, what force is required, and then prepare plans of campaign adapted to every eventuality. The administrative portion of the department is charged with the duty of seeing that these demands are complied with. This system has been brought to great perfection in Continental armies, and it necessarily has had considerable influence in imparting like methods to their fleets. It was a wise policy which placed two generals in succession at the head of the German Navy, for they gave it an organisation for war, equal, if not superior, to that of states which have maintained a fleet for centuries. France has for years had a general naval staff whose work is clearly defined in preparation for war. But it is also supplemented by a superior Naval Council, composed of the most eminent naval officers, who meet periodically in Paris and report to the Minister of Marine on all important subjects connected with the development of attack and defence at sea. On this Council are the Commanders-in-Chief of the Mediterranean and northern squadrons, the Préfets Maritimes of the five ports, and other officers of experience. Created only a few years ago, its formation excited no attention abroad, but it is evident that such a board is well qualified to work out strategical problems, and give valuable assistance to the minister at the head of a large service. This Council had been sitting as usual for two months, and when the members departed to their other duties a complete plan of action had been drawn up. Not the least of the attaching advantages of this Council was, that it comprised people who were to carry out the operations, or on whom depended for the most part a successful result. They were ready to act, and when the order came, first to mobilise and then to proceed in execution of previous orders, no further inquiries were necessary.

What was the procedure on this side of the Channel? The Board of Admiralty as an administrative body had a good record in the past. It had brought us successfully through severe con- flicts, and in the war with Russia of 1854 had compared favourably with the system by which our small army is organised. But the Crimean war was more a question of transport, and in this particular work we are unrivalled. In fact the British Navy had triumphed in spite of, rather than owing to, the system. There had, however, been some tendency to go with the times. In face of considerable opposition on the part, not only of those who resisted every increase of the naval element at head-quarters, but even of admirals who had never troubled to consider that a condition of war was essentially different to that of peace, a special department had been organised to deal with intelligence of foreign navies, and provide means for rapidly equipping our own force. Though small it had done good work, but as our system provided that the representative of the Navy in the House of Commons often was a man unversed in war ships, though he may have successfully directed a small line of merchant ships or other commercial undertaking, the new department spent most of its time in preparing returns on every conceivable subject to enable this gentleman to reply to the continual questions with which those in the House possessing a little more knowledge were able to ply him. It became the fashion for everybody to fancy he was qualified to make elaborate comparisons between our fleet and that of other nations. This led to continual reference to the Intelligence Department, which one day was directed to draw up a statement showing our squadrons everywhere stronger than any two others combined, while shortly afterwards a new Government, desirous of support to a demand for increased Navy estimates, had a form prepared which clearly demonstrated that we had now sunk to a second-rate naval power.