Secretary Kissinger's Talks in China, November 1974

Front matter

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S TALKS IN CHINA | November 25 - 29, 1974 | |

| | Originals | SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Report to the President

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 27, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT:

HAK Talks with the Chinese

Secretary Kissinger sent the following message to you on his talks with the Chinese.

"I had an extremely cordial session with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping this morning during which the Chinese invited you to visit here during 1975. In retrospect, I believe their invitation to Schlesinger was designed precisely to bring about your visit. I told them that a visit by Schlesinger would cause U.S. difficulties since we had repeatedly turned down a similar Soviet offer, but said that we would keep it in mind and would be prepared to send any other cabinet officer. I indicated a visit by you would be the most effective way of symbolizing the continuing strengthening of our bilateral relations. Teng, who obviously had authority from the Chairman in advance, immediately suggested that we say publicly that the visit would take place during 1975 and indicated that in practice this would mean in the latter part of the year. Significantly, at no time did he link such a visit to completion of the normalization process. They still might attempt to do this, but as of now, it looks like we can look toward your visit without any such conditions -- which is of course the optimum situation for us.

We will talk further with the Chinese on when to release the announcement of your trip. Clearly it should be part of the general communique we will be issuing as a result of this visit. My tentative thinking is to announce your trip at the White House some time Saturday morning. In this way it would not conflict with the coverage of your press conference the previous day but would make the Sunday newspapers. I could brief the travelling press on the plane and they would arrive in Washington in time to file their stories for the Sunday papers. We cannot hold this news until after I return to Washington because I would have to dodge questions from the press on the return trip and would mislead them. Also, I will have to brief the Japanese on your visit and they certainly will not keep

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

it for long. I would appreciate your letting me know as soon as possible your views on timing so that I can work this out with the Chinese.

The Mood at this morning's meeting warmed up considerably as we got onto their favorite subject -- the Soviet Union, and Teng began to express Chinese positions on various issues. The Soviet threat clearly remains their overriding preoccupation and they made clear that their recent message to Moscow on a nonaggression pact contained nothing new. In any event, Brezhnev's speech yesterday in Mongolia meant to them that no progress was possible and even principles agreed upon in 1969 were "gone with the wind." I spend considerable time stressing our military strength and the advantages of the agreement you made in Vladivostok. That meeting, by the way, has clearly gotten the Chinese attention and I believe is helping us enormously on this visit. The Chinese also emphasized the need for Europe to keep up its guard at which point I emphasized that the demoralization of Europe through the oil crisis is not in the Chinese interest. We could go it alone on economic grounds, but we were cooperating with our friends in order to shore up Western unity and defenses.

We are meeting again this afternoon and I will send you another report this evening."

Teng/Ch'iao/HAK Memcon

[Note: The discussion began with members of the American press party traveling with the Secretary in the room. Some of Vice Premier Teng's remarks seemed oriented to this press presence.]

Vice Premier Teng: I would like to take this opportunity to once again express our welcome to the Doctor on his seventh visit to China. I might also say this is the third time we have had the opportunity to exchange views this year. And we hear that the Doctor has made a trip around the globe recently. So we are happy to have this opportunity to have an exchange of opinions again with the Doctor and all the other friends on your staff -- to provide us with the opportunity to exchange views not only with old familiar friends, but with new friends like, for instance, Mr. Rumsfeld

Secretary Kissinger: I want to thank you on behalf of my colleagues for the very warm reception we have received here. We have, as you said, had three exchanges this year with you and with the Foreign Minister, and we always progress in our relationship.

Vice Premier Teng: It probably would be good if one day we would be able to exchange views in Washington.

Secretary Kissinger: I hope we can do that very soon --

Vice Premier Teng: I think it is a commnon desire, and that is good.

Secretary Kissinger: -- because your Foreign Minister always refuses

Vice Premier Teng: It is difficult for him to come now. What will he do if he meets the Chiang Kai-shek Ambassador in Washington?

[Note: At this point in the conversation the press is ushered from the room.]

Secretary Kissinger: I thought he wanted to wait until the Ambassador's [Huang Chen's] residence was fully furnished. I think we can arrange a visit so that there is no danger of his meeting anybody there he wishes to avoid.

Vice Premier Teng: It might be difficult.

Secretary Kissinger: That we could arrange, and we are prepared on this visit to discuss the whole question of normalization.

Vice Premier Teng: That is good. We have just received news that Tanaka has resigned.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I think I told your Foreign Minister last night that we knew he would resign this morning. Our indications are that there will now be a rush of consultations in which --. All the candidates are in favor of consultation because they think they will emerge as the Prime Minister. I think there will be an election around December 9. We think that Ohira is the most likely to succeed him, and if he doesn't make it then Shiina will probably become the successor.

Vice Premier Teng: What about Fukuda?

Secretary Kissinger: We don't think Fukuda can make it now, and therefore if they want Fukuda they will first put in Shiina as a transitional figure.

Vice Premier Teng: But you should also know that Fukuda would be voted for by the Soviet Union too.

Secretary Kissinger: This I frankly would not know.

Vice Premier Teng: Their relationship is growing closer day-by-day.

Secretary Kissinger: Between Fukuda and Shiina, or between the Japanese and Soviets?

Vice Premier Teng: No, between Fukuda and the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger: This I was not aware of.

Vice Premier Teng: Would you vote for Ohira?

Secretary Kissinger: I, personally? Ohira personally is a good friend of mine. And we would be very content with Ohira. And we are certainly not supporting Fukuda.

Vice Premier Teng: So we would have similar opinions.

Secretary Kissinger: We have no difficulty at all with Ohira. He would support the policy we are familiar with.

Vice Premier Teng: That is so, and we also feel that one of the characteristics of Ohira is that what he says counts. And perhaps, in this respect, if he carries out a certain policy he might be even more firm than Tanaka.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, he is more experienced than Tanaka. In any event, we think that in all probability Ohira will be Prime Minister. And if for any reason he should not be, which we do not expect - - but it isn't certain where it could line up. My student [Nakasone] has not yet declared himself. He has his uses. But if there should be some other Prime Minister, you should know that the U.S. believes that the Japanese foreign policy is continuing, and we will encourage them to maintain the course they have begun, particularly regarding China.

Vice Premier Teng: Even if Fukuda should be Prime Minister, we don't think it would be of any great consequence. Perhaps there might be some twists and turns because in the development of events there are always difficulties. Secretary Kissinger: We think Japan would have to be very careful to come closer to the Soviet Union. It is a very dangerous course for Japan.

Vice Premier Teng: But no matter whoever comes to office, they still have a fundamental issue they cannot solve. This issue we discussed last night. The question of the Northern Territories [the four northern islands which Japan wants the Soviets to return].

Secretary Kissinger: We will know in ten days, which is more than you can say of most international events. Perhaps after the Prime Minister is selected, if there is an unexpected development, we can exchange ideas.

Vice Premier Teng: So how do you think we should carry on our talks?

Secretary Kissinger: I think perhaps we can make a few observations now of a general nature, and then we might work in smaller groups. One set of views should concern our usual review of the international situation, and then discussion of continuing the process of normalizing relations. The second set of views covers more technical issues, which we should have discussed among our experts.

On the bilateral issues, if I could perhaps say one word before the experts get carried away with their enthusiasm: Such issues as the bilateral exchanges and cultural agreements are essentially a symbolic aspect of our foreign policy, of our political relations, and therefore we will deal with them in this context. Frankly I am indifferent as to whether there is a million dollars more or less in settling the question of blocked accounts, or whether one group more or less goes back and forth between the United States and China. We should use these as a symbol of our overall relationship. So when you want to settle them. [the claims/assets problems] you let us know, and we will find a way of settling them.

We believe that, hopefully conditions are favorable to show some advance in our relationship. We think this is, would be, a fulfillment of the principles of the Shanghai Communique as well as some of the discussions we had when we made our first visits to China. We think it is desirable in terms of the overall international situation, so that there is no misunderstanding about the evolution of our relationship in the eyes of other countries.

So we are prepared. On the other hand, we won't press you, and you let us know at what speed you want to proceed on these technical bilateral issues. The advantage of discussing them while I am here is that the complexity of the issues tends to increase by the size of my staff, and on this basis you and I and the Foreign Minister can talk and we can cut through the complexities somewhat more rapidly.

To return to the more decisive issues I spoke about with the Foreign Minister in New York in October: With respect to our general views on normalization, and this is one of the topics we can discuss with greater precision when we meet in smaller groups, I simply wanted to say that we are prepared to discuss seriously and in an attempt to meet the time limit we previously discussed in my past meetings with the Prime Minister [Chou En-lai].

The second category of problems is our usual detailed review of the international situation. The press always asks me before I come here whether I am coming to reassure the Chinese. They also always tell me that our relationship has deteriorated. But you cannot reassure serious people by words. What we have done, as you know and as all our friends who have been at these meetings [know], is to give you as detailed a description of our intentions and strategy as is possible -- and I would say more detailed than with any other country. As you know -- I think you may have learned that our word counts, and that you have not been surprised by an foreign policy moves we have made. I think that during the course of the last year things have evolved about as we discussed when I was here [in November, 1973]. And we are prepared to do this [review] again for the near future.

This would seem to me to be the most useful way we could spend our time, but we are open to any suggestions as to approaches that you would suggest.

Vice Premier Teng: That's all?

Secretary Kissinger: It is one of my shortest speeches. [Laughter] I also have a fifty minute version, as your Foreign Minister knows.

Vice Premier Teng: As for the way of holding the talks, we are in agreement that some questions can be discussed in smaller groups as you suggested. And in the Doctor's discussions with the Foreign Minister this October, you laid stress on both bilateral and especially international issues. And we welcome the words expressed by Dr. Kissinger in his toast yesterday to the effect that you would foresee further progress on the issue of normalization along the lines of the Shanghai Communique. Outside there are many opinions in the world and a lot of talk saying that our relations have chilled and our speed has slowed down. But in the essence I believe that both sides hold that the progress of our relations has been normal.

But we should also say it is not correct to say that there is no ground whatsoever for such talk. For instance, the Doctor mentioned yesterday and also in October in his discussions with the Foreign Minister that our cannon are sounding more frequently.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and also becoming more accurate.

Vice Premier Teng: And it is only natural that there should be some speculation and talk when you send an Ambassador to Taiwan, and when they increase the number of their consulates in the United States.

Secretary Kissinger: Especially since you will never believe that some of our actions are the result of stupidity and not planning. I never knew about the consulates until it had been done.

Vice Premier Teng: As for our views on the question of normalization, I believe the Doctor and other American friends are familiar with these: that is, the Japan way. And in this aspect, you have expressed the desire that we on our side should put forward specific mode of how we should do it. But actually we have given our opinion long ago: that is, the Japan way. On our side we would also hope that you on your side can move forward a few steps.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. [Vice] Prime Minister, the point in reflecting about what you said -- you have given us a general idea, which is the Japan way. But it is always said the Japanese imitate us. Now you are forcing us to imitate the Japanese. This is a new style. But we can accept that basic principle. But we have a number of special circumstances which the Japanese do not have. And at various stages of our relationship we have found means, which were consistent with your principles, which also took into account our necessities. It is perhaps not proper to ask you to make a specific proposal on an issue that is of such profound principle to you. I remember when we drafted our first communique, on my very first visit, when I did not have the pleasure of knowing the Foreign Minister -- I was still being treated gently by the Chinese. But Ambassador Huang Hua, with whom I was drafting the communique, before we started working on the text said let us have a frank talk about what we must have, each of us, and when we do we can find the words. And it worked out that way.

And I think that within the framework of the Japanese model we should have a frank talk of some of our necessities consistent with your principles, and then see whether we can find some way to reach our goal. After this then we can put forward a specific proposal.

Vice Premier Teng: We perhaps can go into more detail in the smaller groups.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree.

Vice Premier Teng: But I must first fire a cannon.

Secretary Kissinger: At me?

Vice Premier Teng: Well, empty or full, as you like. That is, on this issue, as we see it, you owe us a debt. We don't have to discuss it now.

As for the bilateral issues, as we have said many times, and as Chairman Mao has said and also as Premier Chou En-lai has said in the past, we can sum up our views in two sentences: According to our wishes, we would like this matter to come more quickly; but secondly, we are not so much in a hurry. That is to say, if we are able to reach a point acceptable to both sides in a relatively quicker period of time, we would welcome this.

But Chairman Mao has also said in his talk with the Doctor that we pay special attention to international issues. And therefore we agree with the Doctor that it would be good to do as you proposed; that is, to exchange views on international and bilateral issues in smaller groups.

So we can nominate some people on both sides to discuss the more technical issues and bilateral matters.

Secretary Kissinger: On our side, Secretary Habib and Mr. Armstrong, and maybe one or two others, will be having our discussions. And Mr. Holdridge from the Liaison Office.

Vice Premier Teng: On our side we will have Director Lin P'ing and Mr. Tsien Ta-yung from our Liaison Office, and also a few others. Would you agree?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Vice Premier Teng: See how easy it is to reach an agreement. [Laughter]

Secretary Kissinger: Our first agreement. We should make a special announcement.

Vice Premier Teng: So do you think that is about all for this section of our discussion?

Secretary Kissinger: We can now go into smaller groups.

Vice Premier Teng: And we can leave it to that group to decide themselves when they would like to meet and what they would like to discuss. Good.

Secretary Kissinger: Good.

Vice Premier Teng: So would you want to rest?

[The meeting adjourned at 11:00 a.m.]

Teng/Ch'iao/HAK Memcon

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017128

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL. . . . . . . Memorandum of Conversation

TITLE . . . . . . . . . . . . President's Visit; Nuclear War: SALT; Yugoslavia

DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . Participants: Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Henry Kissinger, et. al [9:45-11:32 a.m.]

CREATION DATE . . . . . . . . 11/27/1974

VOLUME. . . . . . . . . . . . 17 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033100019

COLLECTION TITLE. . . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. KISSINGER REPORTS ON USSR, CHINA, AND MIDDLE EAST DISCUSSIONS

BOX NUMBER. . . . . . . . . . 2

FOLDER TITLE. . . . . . . . . November 25-29, 1974 - Kissinger's Trip (2)

DATE WITHDRAWN. . . . . . . . 11/03/2003

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

REDACTED

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

| PARTICIPANTS: | Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council, People's Republic of China Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amb. Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office, Washington, D. C. Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs Lien Cheng-pao, (Notetaker). | Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Amb. George Bush, Chief of the U. S. Liaison Office, Peking Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff Bonnie Andrews, Secretary's Office (Notetaker)

| DATE AND TIME: | Wednesday, November 27, 1974 9:45 - 11:32 a.m.

| PLACE: | Guest House #18 Peking

| SUBJECT: | President's Visit; Nuclear War: SALT; Yugoslavia.

Kissinger: When the Foreign Minister spoke at the United Nations, his most violent attacks were not understood by most Americans.

Teng: You mean including the interpreters?

Kissinger: Oh no, they understood.

Teng: On yes. And before I forget, the Marshall [Yeh Chien-ying] asked yesterday evening that I send greetings to the Doctor and his wife.

Kissinger: I appreciate that very much; he is an old friend.

Teng: And he also asked me to say that because of his busy schedule, he will not be able to meet with you. I think he has met you several times.

Kissinger: I understand. He greeted me on my first visit.

Teng: Actually, on our side, he is the Minister of National Defense and Chief of the General Staff. And that is why he is very happy that our government has extended the invitation to your Secretary of Defense.

Kissinger: Yes. I wondered if that meant that he would speak only to the Secretary of Defense and not to the Secretary of State.

Teng: I don't think it means that. It means that the U.S. Secretary of Defense is invited to Peking and in that event I don't think it would be very easy for people to say that our relations have become even more cold.

Kissinger: That's true. Let me make a few observations if I may. First, we agree on the desirability of demonstrating not only that our relations have not become colder, but in fact our relations are becoming warmer. We think that is in the interest of both of our countries. And we are prepared to do this not only symbolically, but substantively.

Now, in the security field, I had some discussions with the Prime Minister on my last evening here last time and I want you to know that those principles we still maintain.

Now, about the invitation of the Secretary of Defense. This presents us with a problem. The Soviet leaders have repeatedly invited our Secretary of Defense to Mowcow and have asked for a reciprocal exchange of visits between our Secretary of Defense and their Minister of Defense. And we have consistently refused. And then they proposed meetings of military commanders in Europe, and we have turned that down too. So if we begin using our Secretary of Defense for diplomatic travels, he will begin going to places that I don't believe are desirable.

But we have two possibilities. First, we would approve a visit by any other Cabinet member to Peking. And secondly, I believe also that we could consider an invitation to President Ford if that were considered desirable. So it is not a lack of interest in demonstrating a close relationship.

Teng: So, as the Doctor just now mentioned this, if President Ford desires a possibility to come to China, we would welcome him.

Kissinger: I suppose we could envisage it for the second half of next year. Or, what are your ideas?

Teng: Anytime would be all right for us.

Kissinger: We don't have to fix an exact date. When I was here the first time, we did not fix a date -- only a certain time period.

Teng: It can be decided upon on a different time.

Kissinger: Let us agree then in 1975.

Teng: I think that is all right.

Kissinger: And I think that would be an important event.

Teng: So then we can later on go into specific dates, because we don't have to settle now.

Kissinger: We don't have to settle now. What is your idea? Should we announce the invitation and acceptance at the end of my visit?

Teng: What would you think?

Kissinger: I think it's a good idea. We should have a communique at the end of my visit -- which we would perhaps publish Saturday or Sunday -- in which we should announce this, yes.

Teng: So then we will consider the announcement and communique and discuss it with you later.

Kissinger: I think there is an advantage to relating it to my visit here. When it should be published -- Saturday or Monday -- we are open-minded. Or later even.

Teng: So we will leave it to the Foreign Minister to work out the wording of the announcement with you.

Kissinger: Must I work it out with him? We spent a week one time. He is a very tough negotiator. It will be a great pleasure.

Teng: You are both philosophers.

Ch'iao: But we two must quarrel each time we meet because we belong to two different schools of philosophy.

Kissinger: That is true. But they are related.

Ch'iao: Both linked and related.

Kissinger: Like our relationship.

Teng: But you don't have to go into such length at these meetings. Just have some more mao tai. [Laughter]

Kissinger: OK. The Foreign Minister and I will discuss what should be said in the communique.

Teng: It should be like a press communique.

Ch'iao: Brief; not long, taking two weeks.

Kissinger: Yes, one page. Not like the Shanghai Communique.

Teng: I don't think we have anything else very much now to say.

Kissinger: You mean in the communique. We could reaffirm a few general principles and then make the basic announcement.

Teng: I'll leave it to you to quarrel about.

Kissinger: We could do it in German!

Teng: They say that is a very difficult langage to read.

Kissinger: Yes. In German you know a man is on the stairs. But it may take two pages to know if he is going up or down. [Laughter]

Teng: And about the invitation to the Secretary of Defense. We request that your government continue to consider the invitation.

Kissinger: Maybe after the President visits we can arrange this. But we are prepared to do similar things in that area. If you are concerned about concrete things, we are prepared to do them.

Teng: Actually our invitation to your Secretary of Defense isn't mainly to discuss any specific issues. The meaning is in the invitation itself.

Kissinger: We understand.

Teng: As for the discussions of problems, it is probably still up to the Doctor and the President.

Kissinger: The last time we were here, we had to arrange a whole set of negotiations of extreme delicacy -- that will not be necessary this time -- between your Foreign Minister and ours. We will consider the invitation to our Secretary of Defense and if we can both determine the right moment to do it, we will certainly do it. We will be glad if there is any other Cabinet member you think would be desirable to have here. We can arrange it very quickly. But it is entirely up to you.

Teng: So this request is still for the consideration of your government.

Kissinger: Yes, and we will keep it between your Ambassador and me. That is on the assumption that he comes back soon.

Now, I wanted to tell you one other thing that I have already mentioned to your Ambassador for your information: When I was in Moscow in October, Brezhnev made a proposal for a new treaty to us and repeated it in more detail to President Ford in Vladivostok. And it is a rather novel and ingenious proposition. The proposal is as follows: The U.S. and Soviet Union should make a treaty with each other in which they will defend each other against any attack by any other country or they will defend each other's allies against nuclear attack from any other country.

[Meeting temporarily interrupted by Chinese girl opening outer door.]

Kissinger: I have people in the other room but they will join us for the later discussion.

Translator: They must be able to hear me because of my loud voice.

Kissinger: We asked for a practical explanation of how this would operate. The practical explanation is that in any use of nuclear weapons, regardless of who initiates it, in a war between the Soviet Union and another country or between the U.S. and another country, or between an ally of each, then the U.S. and Soviet Union would have to help each other, and if physical help is not possible, then they would have to observe benevolent neutrality.

We think it has two, well three, general purposes. The first is to undermine NATO, because it would specifically oblige us to cooperate with the Soviet Union against our allies if nuclear weapons were involved. Secondly, it would force those Arabs who are afraid of nuclear weapons being used by Israel into an alliance relationship with the Soviet Union.

And third, I think, China. Those seemed to us the three purposes, together with the general impression of condominium.

We did not accept a serious discussion of this proposal. Nor will we.

Ch 'iao: Actually your treaty on preventing nuclear war could be interpreted in this way also.

Kissinger: No, absolutely not.

Teng: Because your consultations know no bounds.

Kissinger: First of all, that treaty has never been invoked. We have used that treaty and intend to use it to get a legal basis for resistance in areas that are not covered by treaty obligations. The only time that treaty has been used was by the U.S. during the October alert.

Secondly, that treaty deliberately says that to prevent nuclear war, one has to avoid conventional war. And, therefore, by the reverse, to resort to conventional war involves the danger of retaliation by nuclear war. The new Soviet proposal separates nuclear war. It makes no distinction about who uses the weapons first, and it is directed at a kind of nuclear condominium.