An Antidote Against Atheism

Front matter

An

Antidote

against

The Preface

1. The Authour's Apologie for writing this Treatise, there being so many already on the same Subject. 2. That what he has wrote are the proper Emanations of his own Minde, and may have their peculiar serviceableness for men of the like Genius. 3. That he affects not Rhetorick, nor Philologie, nor the pompous numerosity of more popular Arguments, but solid and unresistible reason in a perspicuous Method. 4. That he has undeniably demonstrated the Existence of God, this one Postulate being but admitted, That our Faculties are true. 5. His peculiar Management of the first Argument of Des-Cartes: 6. And the Reasons of his Rejection of the rest. 7. His caution and choiceness in the managing such Arguments as are fetch'd from the more general Phænomena of Nature: 8. As also in those from Animals. 9. His carefull choice in such Histories as tend to the proving of Spirits. 10. His assuredness of that kinde of Argument. 11. The reason of his declining the recitall of the miraculous Stories of Holy Writ. 12. His studied Condescension and compliance with the Atheist to win him from his Atheism.

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BY what inducements I was drawn to publish this present Treatise, notwithstanding the Numerosity of the Writings of this kinde, I had rather leave to thine own quick-sightedness to spy out, then be put upon so much immodesty my self as to speak any thing that may seem to give it any precellency above what is already extant in the world about the same matter. Onely I may say thus much that I did on purpose abstain from reading any Treatises concerning this Subject, that I might the more undisturbedly write the easie Emanations of mine own Mind, and not be carried off from what should naturally fall from my self, by prepossessing my thoughts by the inventions of others.

2. I have writ therefore after no Copy but the eternal Characters of the Minde of Man, and the known Phænomena of Nature. And all men consulting with these that endeavour to write sense, though it be not done alike by all men, it could not happen but I should touch upon the same Heads that others have that have wrote before me: who though they may merit very high commendation for their learned atchievements; yet I hope my endeavours have been such, that though they care not to be corrivals or partners in their praise & credit, yet I do not distrust but they will doe their share towards that publick good that such performances usually pretend to aim at.

For that which did embolden me to publish this present Treatise was not, as I said before, because I flatter'd my self in a Conceit that it was gayer or more plausible then what is already in the hands of men, but that it was of a different sort, and has its peculiar serviceableness and advantages apart and distinct from others; whole proper preeminences it may aloof off admire, but dare not in any wise compare with. So that there is no Tautology committed in recommending what I have written to the publick view, nor any lessening the labours of others by thus offering the fruit of mine own. For considering there are such several complexions and tempers of men in the world, I do not distrust but that, as what others have done has been very acceptable and profitable to many, so this of mine may be well relish'd of some or other, and so seem not to have been writ in vain.

3. For though I cannot promise my Reader that I shall entertain him with so much winning Rhetorick and pleasant Philology as he may find elsewhere; yet I hope he will acknowledge, if his mind be unprejudic'd, that he meets with sound and plain Reason, and an easie and clear Method.

And though I cannot furnish him with that copious variety of Arguments that others have done; yet the frugal carefulness and safeness of choice that I have made in them may compensate their paucity.

For I appeal to any man, whether the proposal of such as will easily admit of evasions (though they have this peculiar advantage, that they make for greater pomp, and at first sight seem more formidable for their multitude) does not embolden the Atheist, and make him fancy, that because he can so easily turn the edge of these, the rest have no more solidity then the former; but that if he thought good and had leisure, he could with like facility enervate them all.

4. Wherefore I have endeavoured to insist upon such alone as are not only true in themselves, but are unavoidable to my Adversary, unless he will cast down his shield, forsake the free use of the natural Faculties of his Mind, and profess himself a mere puzzled Sceptick. But if he will with us but admit of this one Postulate or Hypothesis, That our Faculties are true; though I have spoke modestly in the Discourse it self, yet I think I may here, without vanity or boasting, freely profess, that I have no less then demonstrated That there is a God: and by how much more any man shall seriously endeavour to resist the strength of my Arguments, that by so much the more strong he shall find them; (as he that presses his weak finger against a wall of Marble) and that they can appear slight to none but those that carelessly and slightly consider them. For I borrowed them not from Books, but fetch'd them from the very nature of the thing it self, and indeleble Ideas of the Soul of Man.

5. And I found, that keeping my self within so narrow a compass as not to affect any Reasonings but such as had very clear affinity and close connexion with the Subject in hand, I naturally hit upon whatever was material to my purpose; and so contenting my self with my own, received nothing from the great store and riches of others. And what I might easily remember of others, I could not let pass, if in my own judgement it was obnoxious to evasion. For I intended not to impose upon the Atheist, but really to convince him. And therefore Des-Cartes, whose Mechanical wit I can never highly enough admire, might be no Master of Metaphysicks to me. Whence it is that I make use but of his first Argument only, if I may not rather call it the School's, or mine own. For I think I have manag'd it in such sort, and every way so propt it and strengthened it, that I may challenge in it as much interest as any.

6. But as for his following Reasons, that suppose the Objective Reality of the Idea of God does exceed the efficiency of the Mind of man, and that the Mind of man, were it not from another, would have conferr'd all that perfection upon it self that it has the Idea of, and, lastly, that it having no power to conserve itself, and the present and future time having no dependence one of another, that it is continually produc'd, that is, conserv'd, by some higher Cause, which must be God; these grounds, I say, being so easily evaded by the Atheist, I durst not trust to them, unless had the Author's wit to defend them, who was handsomly able to make good any thing. But they seem to me to be liable to such evasions as I can give no stop to.

For the Mind of man, as the Atheist will readily reply, may be able of her self to frame such an actual Idea of God as is there disputed of, which Idea will be but the present modification of her, as other Notions are, and an effect of her essence and power, and that power a radical property of her essence. So that there is no excess of an Effect above the efficiency of the Cause, though we look no further then the Mind it self; for she frames this Notion of God as naturally and as much without the help of an higher Cause, as she does any thing else whatsoever.

And as for the Mind's contributing those perfections on her self she has an Idea of; if she had been of her self, the Atheist will say, it implies a contradiction, and supposes that a thing before it exists may consult about the advantages of its own existence. But if the Mind be of it self, it is what it findes it self to be, and can be no otherwise.

And therefore, lastly, if the Mind finde it self to exist, it can no more destroy it self then produce it self; nor needs any thing to continue its Being, provided that there be nothing in Nature that can act against it and destroy it; for whatever is, continues so to be, unless there be some Cause to change it.

7. So likewise from those Arguments I fetch'd from external Nature, as well as in these from the innate properties of the Mind of Man, my carefull choice made very large defalkations; insisting rather upon such things as might be otherwise, and yet are far better as they are, then upon such as were necessary, and could not be otherwise. As for example, When I consider'd the distance of the Sun, I did not conceive that his not being placed so low as the Moon, or so high as the fixed Stars, was any great argument of Providence, because it might be reply'd, that it was necessary it should be betwixt those two distances, else the Earth had not been habitable, and so mankinde might have waited for a Being, till the agitation of the Matter had wrought things into a more tolerable fitness or posture for their production.

Nor simply is the annual Motion of the Sun, or rather of the Earth, any argument of Divine Providence, but as necessary as a piece of wood's being carried down the stream, or straws about a whirl-pool. But the Laws of her Motion are such that they very manifestly convince us of a Providence; and therefore I was fain to let go the former, and insist more largely upon the latter.

Nor thought I it fit to Rhetoricate in proposing the great variety of things, and precellency of one above another; but to press close upon the design and subordination of one thing to another; shewing that, whereas the rude motions of the Matter (a thousand to one) might have cast it otherwise, yet the productions of things are such as our own Reason cannot but approve to be best, or as we our selves would have design'd them.

8. And so in the consideration of Animals, I do not so much urge my Reasons from their diversity and subsistence, (though the framing of Matter into the bare subsistence of an Animal is an Effect of no less Cause then what has some skill and counsel;) but what I drive at is, the exquisite contrivance of their parts, and that their structure is far more perfect then will merely serve for their bare existence and continuance in the world: which is an undeniable Demonstration that they are the effects of Wisdome, not the results of Fortune or fermented Matter.

9. Lastly, when I descend to the History of things miraculous and above the ordinary course of Nature, for the proving that there are Spirits, that the Atheist thereby may the easier be induced to believe there is a God; I am so cautious and circumspect, that I make use of no Narrations that either the avarice of the Priest, or the credulity and fancifulness of the Melancholist may render suspected.

10. Nor could I abstain from that Subject, it being so pat and pertinent unto my purpose; though I am well aware how ridiculous a thing it seems to those I have to deal with. But their confident ignorance shall never dash me out of countenance with my well-grounded knowledge: for I have been no careless Inquirer into these things, and from my Childehood to this very day have had more reasons to believe the Existence of God and a Divine Providence, then is reasonable for me to make particular profession of.

11. In this History of things Miraculous or Supernatural, I might have recited those notable Prodigies that happened after the Birth, in the Life, and at the Death of Christ: as the Star that led the Wise men to the young Infant; Voices from Heaven testifying Christ to be the Son of God; and, lastly, that miraculous Eclipse of the Sun, made, not by interposition of the Moon (for she was then opposite to him) but by the interposition or totall involution, if you will, of those scummy spots that ever more or less are spred upon his face, but now overflowed him with such thickness, and so universally, that day-light was suddenly intercepted from the astonished eyes of the Inhabitants of the Earth. To which direful Symptomes though the Sun hath been in some measure at several times obnoxious, yet that those latent Causes should so suddenly step out and surprise him, and so enormously at the Passion of the Messias, he whose Mind is not more prodigiously darkned then the Sun was then Eclips'd, cannot but at first sight acknowledge it a special designment of Providence.

But I did not insist upon any Sacred History, partly, because it is so well and so ordinarily known, that it seemed less needful; but mainly, because I know the Atheist will boggle more at whatever is fetch'd from establish'd Religion, and flie away from it, like a wild Colt in a Pasture at the sight of a bridle or an halter, snuffing up the aire, and smelling a plot afar off, as he foolishly fancies.

12. But that he might not be shie of me, I have conform'd my self as near his own Garb as I might, without partaking of his folly or wickedness; and have appear'd in the plain shape of a mere Naturalist my self, that I might, if it were possible, win him off from down-right Atheisme.

For he that will lend his hand to help another fallen into a ditch, must himself, though not fall, yet stoop and incline his body; and he that converses with a Barbarian, must discourse to him in his own language: so he that would gain upon the more weak and sunk minds of sensual mortals, is to accommodate himself to their capacity, who, like the Bat and Owle, can see no where so well as in the shady glimmerings of their own Twilight.

Book I: Chapter I

An

Antidote

against

Atheism.

p I.

1. That the Pronenesse of these Ages of the World to winde themselves from under the awe of Superstition makes the attempt seasonable of endeavouring to steer them off from Atheisme. 2. That they that adhere to Religion in a mere superstitious and accustomary way, if that tye once fail, easily turn Atheists. 3. The usefulness of this present Treatise even to them that are seriously Religious.

1.

T grand Truth which we are now to be imployed about and to prove, is, That there is a God: And I made choice of this Subject as very seasonable for the Times we are in, and are coming on, wherein Divine Providence more universally loosening the minds of men from the awe and tyranny of mere accustomary Superstition, and permitting a freer perusal of matters of Religion then in former Ages, the Tempter would take advantage, where he may, to carry men captive out of one dark prison into another, out of Superstition into Atheism it self.

2. Which is a thing feasible enough for him to bring about in such men as have adhered to Religion in a mere externall way, either for fashion sake, or in a blinde obedience to the Authority of a Church. For when this externall frame of Godliness shall break about their ears, they being really at the bottome devoid of the true fear and love of God, and destitute of a more free and unprejudic'd use of their Faculties, by reason of the sinfulness and corruption of their natures, it will be an easy thing to allure them to an assent to that which seems so much for their present Interest; and so being imboldened by the tottering and falling of what they took for the chief Structure of Religion before, they will gladly in their conceit cast down also the very Object of that Religious Worship after it, and conclude that there is as well no God as no Religion; that is; they have a mind there should be none, that they may be free from all wringings of Conscience, trouble of correcting their Lives, and fear of being accountable before that great Tribunall.

3. Wherefore for the reclaiming of these, if it were possible, at least for the succouring and extricating of those in whom a greater measure of the love of God doth dwell, (who may probably by some darkening cloud of Melancholy, or some more then ordinary importunity of the Tempter, be dissettled and intangled in their thoughts concerning this weighty matter) I held it fit to bestow mine endeavours upon this so useful and seasonable an enterprise, as to demonstrate That there is a God.

Book I: Chapter II

p I.

1. That there is nothing so demonstrable, that the Mind of man can rationally conclude that it is impossible to be otherwise. 2. That the Soul of man may give full Assent to that which notwithstanding may possibly be otherwise, made good by fever all Examples. 3. A like Example of Dissent. 4. The reasons why he has so sedulously made good this point. 5. That the Atheist has no advantage from the Authours free confession, that his Arguments are not so convictive but that they leave a possibility of the thing being otherwise.

But when I speak of demonstrating there is a God, I would not be suspected of so much vanity and ostentation, as to be thought I mean to bring no Arguments but such as are so convictive, that a mans Understanding shall be forced to confesse that it is impossible to be otherwise then I have concluded. For, for mine own part, I am prone to believe that there is nothing at all to be so demonstrated. For it is possible that Mathematical evidence it self may be but a constant undiscoverable Delusion, which our nature is necessarily and perpetually obnoxious unto, and that either fatally or fortuitously there has been in the world time out of minde such a Being as we call Man, whose essentiall Property it is to be then most of all mistaken, when he conceives a thing most evidently true. And why may not this be as well as any thing else, if you will have all things fatall or casuall without a God? For there can be no curb to this wilde conceit, but by the supposing that we our selves exist from some higher Principle that is absolutely Good and Wise, which is all one as to acknowledge That there is a God.

2. Wherefore when I say that I will demonstrate That there is a God, I do not promise that I will alwayes produce such Arguments, that the Reader shall acknowledge so strong, as he shall be forced to confesse that it is utterly unpossible that it should be otherwise: but they shall be such as shall deserve full assent and win full assent from any unprejudic'd mind.

For I conceive that we may give full assent to that which notwithstanding may possibly be otherwise: which I shall illustrate by severall Examples. Suppose two men got to the top of mount Athos, and there viewing a Stone in the form of an Altar with Ashes on it, and the footsteps of men on those ashes, or some words, if you will, as Optimo Maximo, or τῷ ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ, or the like, written or scralled out upon the ashes; and one of them should cry out, Assuredly here have been some men here that have done this: but the other more nice then wise should reply, Nay, it may possibly be otherwise; for this alone may have naturally grown into this very shape, and the seeming ashes may be no ashes, that is, no remainders of any fewell burnt there, but some unexplicable and imperceptible motions of the Aire, or other particles of this fluid Matter that is active every where, have wrought some parts of the Matter into the form and nature of ashes, and have fridg'd and play'd about so, that they have also figured those intelligible Characters in the same. But would not any body deem it a piece of weaknesse no less then dotage for the other man one whit to recede from his former apprehension, but as fully as ever to agree with what he pronounced first, notwithstanding this bare possibility of being otherwise?

So of Anchors that have been digged up, either in plain fields or mountainous places, as also the Roman Urnes with ashes and inscriptions, as Severianus, Ful. Linus, and the like, or Roman Coins with the effigies and names of the Cæsars on them, or that which is more ordinary, the Sculls of men in every Church-yard, with the right figure, and all those necessary perforations for the passing of the vessels, besides those conspicuous hollows for the eyes and rowes of teeth, the Os Styloeides, Ethoeides, and what not? if a man will say of them, that the Motion of the particles of the Matter, or some hidden Spermatick power has gendered these both Anchors, Urnes, Coins, and Sculls in the ground, he doth but pronounce that which humane reason must admit as possible: Nor can any man ever so demonstrate that those Coins, Anchors and Urnes were once the Artifice of men, or that this or that Scull was once a part of a living man, that he shall force an acknowledgment that it is impossible that it should be otherwise. But yet I do not think that any man, without doing manifest violence to his Faculties, can at all suspend his assent, but freely and fully agree that this or that Scull was once part of a living man, and that these Anchors, Urnes and Coins, were certainly once made by humane artifice, notwithstanding the possibility of being otherwise.

3. And what I haves said of Assent is also true in Dissent. For the Mind of man, not craz'd nor prejudic'd, will fully and unreconcilably disagree, by its own naturall sagacity, where notwithstanding the thing that it doth thus resolvedly and undoubtingly reject, no wit of man can prove impossible to be true. As if we should make such a Fiction as this, that Archimedes with the same individuall body that he had when the Souldiers slew him, is now safely intent upon his Geometricall Figures under ground, at the Center of the Earth, farre from the noise and din of this world, that might disturb his Meditations, or distract him in his curious delineations he makes with his Rod upon the dust; which no man living can prove impossible: Yet if any man does not as unreconcilably dissent from such a Fable as this as from any Falshood imaginable, assuredly that man is next door to madness or dotage, or does enormous violence to the free use of his Faculties.

Wherefore it is manifest that there may be a very firm and unwavering Assent or Dissent, whenas yet the thing we thus assent to may be possibly otherwise, or that which we thus diffent from cannot be proved impossible to be true.

4. Which point I have thus long and thus variously sported my self in, for making the better impression upon my Reader, it being of no small use and consequence, as well for the advertising of him that the Arguments which I shall produce, though I do not bestow that ostentative term of Demonstration upon them, yet they maybe effectual for winning a firm and unshaken assent as if they were in the strictest notion such; as also to re-minde him, that is they be so strong, and so patly fitted and sutable with the Faculties of mans Mind, that he has nothing to reply, but only that for all this it may possibly be otherwise, that he should give a free and full Assent to the Conclusion: and if he do not, that he is to suspect himself rather of some distemper, prejudice, or weakness, then the Arguments of want of strength.

5, But if the Atheist shall contrariwise pervert my candour and fair dealing, and phansie that he has got some advantage upon my free confession, that the Arguments that I shall use are not so convictive but that they leave a possibility of the thing being otherwise; let him but compute his supposed gains, by adding the limitation of this possibility, (viz. that it is no more possible, then that the clearest Mathematicall evidence may be false, (which is impossible, if our Faculties be true) or in the second place, then that the Roman Urnes and Coins above mentioned may prove to be the works of Nature, not the Artifice of man; which our Faculties admit to be so little probable, that it is impossible for them not fully to assent to the contrary:) and when he has cast up his account, it will be evident that it can be nothing but his grosse ignorance in this kinde of Arithmetick that shall embolden him to write himself down gainer, and not me.

Book I: Chapter III

p I.

1. That we are first to have a settled notion What God is, before we goe about to demonstrate That he is. 2. The Definition of God. 3. That there is an Idea of a Being absolutely perfect in our Minde, whether the Atheist will allow it to be the Idea of God or not. 4. That it is no prejudice to the Naturality of this Idea, that it may be framed from some occasions from without.

And now having premised thus much, I shall come on nearer to my present designe. In prosecution whereof it will be requisite for me, first to define What God is, before I proceed to demonstration That he is. For it is obvious for Man's reason to finde Arguments for the impossibility, possibility, probability, or necessity of the Existence of a thing, from the explication of the Essence thereof. And now I am come hither, I demand of any Atheist that denies there is a God, or of any that doubts whether there be one or no, what Idea or Notion they frame of that they deny or doubt of. If they will prove nice and squeamish, and profess they can frame no Notion of any such thing, I would gladly ask them, why they will then deny or doubt of they know not what. For it is necessary that he that would rationally doubt or deny a thing, should have some settled Notion of the thing he doubts of or denies. But if they profess that this is the very ground of their denying or doubting whether there be a God, because they can frame no Notion of him; I shall forthwith take away that Allegation, by offering them such a Notion as is as proper to God, as any Notion is proper to any thing else in the world.

2. I define God therefore thus, An Essence or Being fully and absolutely Perfect. I say fully and absolutely Perfect in counterdistinction to such Perfection as is not full and absolute, but the Perfection of this or that Species or Kind of finite Beings, suppose of a Lion, Horse, or Tree. But to be fully and absolutely Perfect is to be at least as Perfect as the apprehension of a man can conceive without a contradiction: for what is inconceivable or contradictious, is nothing at all to us, who are not now to wag one Atome beyond our Faculties; but what I have propounded is so far from being beyond our Faculties, that I dare appeal to any Atheist, that hath yet any command of Sense and reason lest in him, if it be not very easy and intelligible at the first sight, and that if there be a God, he is to be deemed of us such as this Idea or Notion sets forth.

5. But if he will sullenly deny that this is the proper Notion of God, let him enjoy his own humour; this yet remains undeniable. That there is in man an Idea of a Being absolutely and fully Perfect which we frame out by attributing all conceivable Perfection to it whatsoever that implies no contradiction. And this Notion is naturall and essentiall to the Soul of man, & cannot be washt out, nor conveigh'd away by any force or trick of wit whatsoever, so long as the Mind of man is not craz'd, but hath the ordinary use of her own Faculties.

4. Nor will that prove any thing to the purpose, whenas it shall be alleg'd that this Notion is not so connatural and essential to the Soul, because she framed it from some occasions from without. For all those undeniable Conclusions in Geometry which might be help'd and occasioned from something without, are so natural notwithstanding and Essentiall to the Soul, that you may as soon unsoul the Soul as divide her from perpetual assent to those Mathematical Truths, supposing no distemper nor violence offered to her Faculties. As for example, she cannot but acknowledge in her self the several distinct ideas of the five regular Bodies, as also, that it is impossible that there should be any more then five. And this Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect is as distinct and indeleble an Idea in the Soul, as the Idea of the five Regular Bodies, or any other Idea whatsoever.