A series of intercepted letters in Mexico

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A SERIES OF

INTERCEPTED

MEXICAN LETTERS:

CAPTURED BY THE

AMERICAN GUARD,

AT TACUBAYA.

AUGUST 22, 1847.

PUBLISHED BY ROBERT H. SMITH, A WOUNDED SOLDIER.

Second Edition, enlarged and improved.

COLUMBUS, OHIO: STATESMAN STEAM PRESS. 1848.

Entered according to Act of Congress in the year 1848,

By Robert H. Smith,

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the State of Ohio.

Dedication

The publisher of this work volunteered in the Baltimore Batallion of Volunteers, under Col. George W. Hughes, July 4th, 1847, and was discharged January 12th, 1848, in consequence of a wound received at the Battle of Chapultepec. He is now on his return to his mother, who is a widow with five small children, who will be pendent in a great measure on his exertions for support. He then

DEDICATES THIS HUMBLE EFFORT,

first:

Introduction and letters

INTRODUCTION

Major General Scott entered the village of Tacubaya and established his headquarters there on the 21st of August, 1847. Tacubaya is one mile from Chapultepec (a fortified hill), which is itself about a mile and a half from one of the gates of the city of Mexico. On the morning of the 22d of August, a Mexican mail was intercepted by the American guards, containing two parcels of letters, one addressed to Toluca, the capital of the State of Mexico, and the other to Moreha. These letters are now in the possession of the Inspector General of the army—translations of them, carefully prepared by a capable hand, are here offered to the public, for reasons which will be manifest to the considerate reader. To make them intelligible, some few facts must be stated, which occurred before the letters were written, and a few also which transpired after the capture of the letters; but we wish it understood that it is not our purpose to give a history of the operations of the American army before and at the Mexican capital: we speak only of what the army has done as an army. No attempt is made to do justice to individuals, and we select this course for two reasons—we wish only to make the letters intelligible, and with our information and means, we cannot hope to award what is due to all. We therefore omit names, and deal only with events. Impartial history will in due time do justice to all. The distinguished judgment, ability and zeal of our engineer officers of both corps, will then stand out in broad relief, and the providence and skill of our ordnance officers will also be conspicuous, and justly so, as they are not content with service under cover in the arsenals, preparing guns and ammunition, but they follow to the field their heavy ordnance, and under the fire of the enemy give practical proof of its excellence and power. In like manner justice will be done to the judicious arrangements and abundant supplies of the quar and commissaries' departments, without which the army could neither move nor remain in position. Justice will also be done to the talents, i?kill and humanity of our admirable corps of medical officers. So also a just view of the army will exhibit to the world its great excellence of personnel in officers and men, in all the different regiments and corps. Then, too, will be made manifest the extraordinary ability of the commander of this army, in all respects worthy of it, as he has given the most abundant proofs, by the directness and greatness of his objects, and the certainty and comparative ease with which he has accomplished them. Such splendid results could only be achieved by a commander gifted with the highest powers of combination, capable of the clearest views, and endowed with the most unwavering firmness and steadiness of purpose.

Excepting some very few of the letters, they were written on the 21st of August, and refer principally to the events of the few preceding days, especially to those of the 20th of August. The letters were written by Mexicans to Mexicans—they exhibit the unrestrained outpourings of friends to friends, when all motives of concealment and misrepresentation seem to have been entirely out of the question. These letters. therefore, furnish valuable testimony on the points within the knowledge of the writers, though they contain some unintentional errors when statements are made respecting facts not personally known. Thus, when these letters state, as they do. that the aggregate strength of the army concentrated by Gen. Santa Anna for the defence of Mexico exceeded thirty thousand men, there is every reason for relying upon this statement; and thus, in the same manner, we have unquestionable evidence that not fewer than twenty-six thousand men were engaged in battle on the Mexican side, on the 20th of August. But the evidence is not equally good when the letters refer to the strength of the American army; for the fact could not be equally well known. Thus, it is not true, though stated in some of these letters, that the American army was twelve thousand strong; but it happens to be true, as stated in others, that the American force was about ten thousand—though not all of this force was at any one time engaged in battle. Valencia's entrenched camp at Contreras was taken in seventeen minutes, by the watch, by about fifteen hundred men, without artillery and without cavalry—he having five thousand men, with twenty-three pieces of fine artillery, covered with about two thousand cavalry. The fruits of this brilliant surprise, in the immediate vicinity of Contreras, in prisoners, &c., were secured by other troops, besides the assaulting columns, post for the purpose; but the actual defeat and almost annihilation of Valencia's division, so often referred to in the following letters, was accomplished, as stated, in seventeen minutes instead of two hours, as stated in several of the letters.

These letters also furnish ample evidence that the Mexican army was most abundantly supplied with munitions of war of all kinds, especially with ammunition in all its forms of prepation; most of which is now in the hands of the Americans.

One of the chief points of value in the evidence furnished by these letters, has been superceded by the events of the 12th, 13th and 14th of September: we refer to the fact that the American Army, by the victories of the 20th of August. . had entirely defeated the Mexican army, and could have entered the capital, had it been the pleasure of the general, on the evening of that day: a fact which no one can now dispute, since the Mexicans were unable to prevent the occupation of the capital by the Americans, after having bad from the 20tl: of August to the 12th of September, to recuperate and recover from the blow inflicted on the first of these dates—over twenty days—during which time the fragments of the Mexican army were brought together and reorganized into a force of about twenty thousand men, having been reduced to about eight thousand, as the letters testify. The fortifications had also been immensely increased between the 20th of August and 12th of September, on the side of the city threatened by the Americans; and at the same time enabled the Mexicans to withdraw all their artillery from the Penon and other points not in danger, and dispose it on the southern and south-western side of the city, where they knew the attack was to be made. All this did not avail. The American army effected a lodgment in the city, at two points, on the evening oi the 13th of September; and on the 14th, entered the grand plaza, the headquarters of the army being established in the National Palace,—over which waved the star-spangled banner—what remained of the Mexican army on the evening of the 13th, having been withdrawn during the night. At that time the effective American force was less than eight thousand men.

A few words on the subject of the armistice may not be amiss. It is very generally believed that before the army left Puebla. intercourse of some kind, looking towards a peace, had been partially established between the Americans and Mexicans, but it was said that the Mexican authorities were restrained by public opinion, which was unable to conceive it was possible that the immense preparations in Mexico could fail in securing the city; but as the object of General Scott, in the whole of his operations in this country, has been to bring about an honorable peace, he gave out, in advance, before he left Puebla, precisely what he would do before he would, by force of arms, enter the capital.

The Mexican army being so large, and its appointments so complete, while the fortifications, which astonish all who see them, were constructed with scientific skill—all these facts made it necessary for Gen. Scott to move from Puebla and strike a severe blow near the capital, as the only means of convincing the Mexicans that, notwithstanding all their preparations, they could not resist the American army, small as it was. There was some hope that by thus opening the eyes of the Mexican people in the capital, negotiations might be entered upon, and a peace secured; to accomplish which important object Gen. Scott was willing to forego all the eclat of a forcible entrance into the capital. We know that all this was distinctly within the contemplation of Gen. Scott before he put foot in the stirrup to leave the city of Puebla. His foresight and deliberate plan, in this respect, is one of the most remarkable incidents, all things considered, that has ever occurred in the history of wars. Let his position be considered—his distance from home—the extent of his march to Puebla—the distance yet to be overcome—the smallness of his force—the character of the city to be assailed, the great capital of a great country, defended by an army full three times his numbers, and known to be so—that capital surrounded by lakes or swamps, and only to be approached by narrow causeways, with deep ditches on either side, and swept by artillery in front and in flank. In view of all this, Gen. Scott said, before he left Puebla, in so many words, that he would march to the neighborhood of the capital, and either defeat the Mexican army in the open field if they would give him battle; or he would take a strong position from the enemy, and then, if he could restrain the enthusiasm of his army, he would pause without the city, and summon it to surrender, in order to give the authorities within the city an opportunity and a motive (the safety of the capital,) for making a peace. He did precisely what he designed. He marched from Puebla in four columns, with the interval of a day's march between each two columns, and arrived himself, being with the leading column, at Ayotla, before the Penon, on the 11th of August.

While the rear was coming up, he reconnoitered the Penon and country around, and satisfied himself of the practicability of a march by the way of Chalco to San Augustin. As the rear columns came up they were directed towards Chalco, and taking up that route himself, the General went to San Augus , 15 or 17 miles—the road, as the letters will show, being deemed impracticable by the Mexicans—arriving there on the 17th of August, being then 12 miles from the capital, and in front of the fortifications of San Antonio, which are about two and a half or three miles from San Augustin. These fortifications were threatened by a division, while the General, on the 19th, ordered a force to open a road in order to turn them to the left. This force had to pass what, in the letters, is called Pedregal, i. e., a surface of volcanic scoria, broken into every possible form, presenting sharp stones and deep fissures, exceedingly difficult for the passage of infantry, and impossible for that of cavalry, except by a single road, in front of which, and perfectly commanding it. General Valencia had established an entrenched camp on elevated ground, which camp he occupied with his division of 5000 men from San Luis Potosi, every where in the letters spoken of as the "flower" of the Mexican army. He had twenty-three pieces of superb artillery, and was covered by a large body of cavalry.—There was firing from and upon this entrenched camp during the afternoon of the 19th of August, but no serious demonstration was made upon it that day, the time being employed by the engineers in looking at the position and studying the grounds around it; so that the Mexicans both in the camp and in the city imagined they had gained a victory, merely because our army had not yet defeated them. The bells in the city were rung for joy, and Gen. Valencia distributed honors among the leading officers of his camp as the shades of evening left him in security with his lines.

During the night of the 19th, a body of our troops passed along a ravine under cover of a night made doubly dark by a heavy rain, and in the morning they had gained the rear of the entrenched camp, into which they plunged headlong before the astonished Mexicans had time to put themselves in position for defence. The assault was commenced and completed in the short period of seventeen minutes, though our troops were engaged during an hour or two in picking up the scattered fragments of the proud "division of the North"—Valencia himself disappearing altogether. Several names are applied to this entrenched camp, (San Geronimo, Padiernas, Magdalena, &c.,) but it is generally called Contreras, and it is about five or six miles from San Augustin, to the left of the San Antonio road. Passing by Contreras our troops, before mid-day, were in full march by San Angel and Coyoacan, towards Churubusco, where the Mexicans were in force in a church or convent strongly fortified. About five or six hundred yards beyond this convent the road by San Angel, &c., comes into that of San Antonio at a point where, by a bridge, the San Antonio road or causeway crosses a small stream, or canal, called the Churubusco river. This bridge was defended by a perfectly constructed, scientific tete-de-pont, the defences here and at the convent forming a system mutually supporting each other.

No time was to be lost; and at a few minutes before 1 p. m. our troops were pushed forward to the attack of the fortified convent, where the firing became very severe with both artillery and small arms. There had been some firing at San Antonio on the 18th and again on the 19th; but on the 20th, after the defeat of the enemy at Contreras, Gen. Santa Anna saw that our troops, by the way of San Angel, would soon be in the rear of his fortified position at San Antonio, and he therefore ordered that place to be abandoned, directing some few of the guns, which there was no time to remove, to be spiked; but the American division in front, by passing a column to the left, had already turned the position and succeeded in cutting the line of the retreating troops, which were also attacked along the causeway itself by another portion of the division, and thus the Mexican force at San Antonio was broken and in great part dispersed or taken prisoners, only a few reaching the tete-de-pont—the American division now passing down to the attack of that place, while the attack upon the convent of Churubusco was going on. At about half past 1 p. m. the Mexicans were in force at the church or convent, and at the tete-de-pont, and had, besides, an immense body of infantry to their left, (our right,) along and behind the Churubusco river, nearly at right angles to the San Antonio causeway; they had also another body of infantry and an immense body of cavalry extending along the causeway itself from the tete-de-pont towards the city. The American general being on the San Angel road, in front of Churubusco, directed the whole of the operations, which soon after 1 p. m. became general, extending throughout the entire Mexican army. He directed columns to support the main attack in front, and other colums to the right to support the San Antonio division in the attack upon the tetede-pont and the extensive line of infantry along the Churubusco river; other columns again, to the left, in order to turn both the convent and the tete-de-pont, in which operation the enemy's force along the causeway beyond the tete-de-pont was engaged. The battle now raged at all points and in all directions, wherever the enemy was found in position, and continued without intercession during a period of nearly three hours, when the convent and the tete-de-pont were both carried, and the enemy was driven from the river and the causeway, and compelled to fly in consternation towards the city, entering it by the gate of San Antonio in confusion and dismay, followed by a considerable body of our troops at least a mile and a half beyond the tete-de pont, while a body of cavalry pushed the pursuit into the very gate itself, about a mile and a half still further, not hearing or heeding the recall which had been sounded from the rear. This cavalry charge is frequently referred to in the following letters and no doubt amazed the Mexicans to an extraordinary degree, both by its boldness and by the little loss attending its successful retirement to the main army, which had halted near a place called in the letters Portalis. The American force, at about 4 p. m. was in the entire possession of all the outer defences of the city, on the San Antonio causeway, and could have entered the city that evening without serious difficulty. But the General had accomplished exactly what he had designed before he left Puebla. He therefore halted the troops, and after giving necessary instructions, returned by the San Antonio road to San Augustin. arriving there about dusk in the evening, having been the whole day in the saddle, directing the important operation briefly recited above.

In the evening he was visited by some Englishmen from the city, for what purpose is not precisely known—but the next morning the general, starting on the San Antonio road, turned to the left and was met at Coyoacan, near Churubusco, by a deputation from the Mexican government, under a flag, proposing some terms, which, whatever they were, were instantly rejected; and the general sent by the deputation a paper he had himself prepared, offering to grant an armistice on certain conditions, the first being that the Mexican government should appoint Commissioners to receive and consider the propositions of the American government to be presented by an American Commissioner then at the headquarters of the American army. This communication being sent, the general, with one division of his army, continued on to Tacubaya, about six miles from Coyoacan, and entered that village as sated at the commencement of this preface.

The proposal of the American general was agreed to by general Santa Anna, and on the 24th of August, the ratifications of an armistice were duly exchanged.

Commissioners met to treat of peace, and this is an important point in the history of the events before the Mexican capital. The army, one is disposed to think, had accomplished its mission. It had brought commissioners together to treat of peace after the government of both countries had declared that a peace was desired that should be honorable to both nations. But peace was not made. It is proper to say that the General-in-Chief had no power confided to him by his government authorizing him to act as a commissioner in concluding a treaty of peace—he was sent to this country as a military man exclusively. He, therefore, is in no manner responsible for the failure of the negotiations, which nevertheless he has all the merit of having brought about, after the events of the 20th August.

It is equally proper to say, injustice to the talented and experienced gentleman selected by the government of the United States, and sent to the headquarters of Major General Scott as the commissioner to treat for peace, was trammelled by the instructions of the government, in so much, that it will remain a problem as to whether more enlarged powers would not have enabled him to have made a treaty "honorable to both nations."

The ultimatum of our Commissioner was handed to the Mexican Commissioners early in September, about the 2d of the month, and very soon afterwards, reports began to reach the general and accumulated very rapidly, that the Mexicans were engaged, in violation of the articles of the armistice, in fortifying the city, especially at night. On the 6th, the Mexican Commissioners, it was expected, would give their answer to the propositions of our Commissioners, and they did so, refusing to accept them. Simultaneously with this, the general sent a paper to general Santa Anna, declaring that as the articles of the armistice had been violated by the Mexican authorities, he felt at liberty to terminate the armistice at his pleasure, but would allow until the next day at noon for explanations. Up to 12 o'clock of the 7th of September, the general had not only made no reconnoissance, but had ordered the engineers to make none, in strict compliance with the armistice.

Soon after 12 M. on the 7th September, the general rode to the heights of Tacubaya over against Chapultepec, where a building was pointed out to him a few hundred yards from the base of the Chapultepec hill, which was said to be a foundry in full operation, casting cannon from bells removed from the churches in the city. As he rode away from the place of observation, he remarked that he would, the next morning, destroy the foundry, so as to prevent the enemy from making any more cannon, and would then at his leisure lay down his plan for a final attack upon the city.

The battle of the 8th of September, called the battle of the Molino del Rey, was the result of this determination, this being the name of the building pointed out as the Foundry. The enemy, anticipating an attack in that direc , had moved out, on the 7th, a very large force, said by some prisoners taken on the 8th, to be 8,000 men, besides a thousand within the works of Chapultepec. This force was covered by buildings and entrenchments extending full a mile in length, its left being at the Molino del Rey, near some woods at the base of the Chapultepec hill, while its right was within a strongly built hacienda, of stone, as usual.

Early in the morning of the 8th, the attack was made by a division of our troops, and the fight was continued rather more than an hour and a half, when the enemy was driven from his entire line with the loss, besides killed, of many prisoners and of several pieces of field artillery, all he ventured to bring into the engagement.

As the enemy supposed this attack was intended to lead the way to Chapultepec, and as Chapultepec was not assailed, the opinion in the city was quite decided that we had sustained a defeat, although we had in fact most completely accomplished the only object in view. Our loss in the fight was very great, and although something like the means of casting cannon had been found and destroyed—although we had taken many prisoners (several hundreds) and several pieces of artillery—still, we believe the army would much rather have dispensed with the glories of that day, as it was accompanied with unusual sorrow and mourning for many of its noblest spirits.

The general then began his preparations for a final attack. He ordered a depot of sick and wounded, of captured artillery, &c., including prisoners, to be established at a small village called Miscoac, to the right of Tacubaya, through which he had passed in coming from Coyoacan; and in front of this village, at a place called Piedad, he posted a division to threaten the city in that direction. Immediately there was seen an immense number of laborers busily engaged night and day in fortifying the causeways, by which the city was accessible from Piedad. It was wonderful to see the activity with which they worked.

At the end of three or four days, the fortifications in that direction seemed very complete, and lined with artillery and men.

It was evident that the enemy looked upon that as the contemplated place of attack, and for this very reason, perhaps, the general made his arrangements to attack, not there on the right, but at Chapultepec on his left, but still he kept up a show of attack from the Piedad. On the morning of the 12th of September, the firing commenced from three or four batteries upon Chapultepec, but no show of force was made, and the enemy thought it a feint, keeping his principal force in the direction of the Piedad. The firing continued all day on both sides with very little effect.

It was resumed the next morning, and continued about three hours, when it ceased by order of the general, the cessation being the signal or time determined for the advance of two assaulting parties of 250 men each, supported by strong columns, the artillery resuming its fire as soon as the movement was in full operation, and in about an hour the heights were ascended by our troops and the scaling ladders being placed against the walls, our intrepid officers and soldiers passed over into the main work, driving the enemy either out of the work altogether, or into buildings where they surrendered at discretion. The enemy, during the night of the 12th, had sent additional force to defend Chapultepec, though evidently at a loss to know where the real attack was to be made. The defence, however, was desperate, the fight being maintained at a multitude of points in the woods near the hill—at batteries and breastworks at the base of the hill, and from various points and different positions on the sides of the hill. This fight was, on the whole, one of the most remarkable that has occurred during the war.

But I design merely an outline. As the military school was at that place, the superintendent, professors and students, became prisoners of war, with a large body of other officers and men, including the celebrated veteran, general Bravo.

Chapultepec having fallen, our troops were directed in two columns along two causeways, one leading directly to the city, and the other to the left, to intersect the San Cosme causeway, and now the fight was resumed inch by inch upon each route, but the infantry of the enemy was driven, and his batteries taken in rapid succession along a distance upon each causeway of more than a mile and a half, and at night both columns had made a lodgement within the gates of the capital.

Our force at Piedad was not unoccupied on either of the two days. A field battery opened its fire upon the enemy, and movements were made as if to attack in that direction, thus occupying the enemy, already strongly in the belief that the real attack was to be there—but after Chapultepec was taken, and our forces had nearly penetrated the city, the force was withdrawn from Piedad, and sent to the support of one of the attacking columns in the city. The deeds of valor by our troops oh this day, as on previous occasions, deserves to be recorded by a Tacitus, or a Livy. or a Thucydides, and therefore we do not attempt it. The general, after directing in person the entire operations of the day, giving the most minute and exact instructions for every movement, finally returned after dark to Tacubaya. where he was called upon in the night, towards morning, by a deputation from the city council, with information that Gen. Santa Anna had left the city and had withdrawn the army, and they desired the general to give them some assurances or conditions before entering the city. This he declined doing, telling them in substance, that he would agree to no conditions until he should first go into the city, and then only to such as should be self-imposed, but that his course would be such as the dignity and honor of the United States required.

At 9 o'clock on the morning of the 14th of September, the general dismounted within the court of the National Palace, and ascending the broad flight of stairs to the saloons above, sat down and wrote a brief order, announcing his occupation of the capital of Mexico.

San Antonio, 99th August.

(Extract.)

Yesterday we commenced firing upon the enemy with our cannon, and killed some men and horses. To-day, up to 12 M., we have fired but few shots, and the enemy are retreating, with the object, } suppose, of going to Tacubaya by the way of Pedregal [Contreras.] They have a long distance to"' march, and I do not know what will become of them in their unfortunate situation. Every day is a loss to them and a gain to us. The struggle will be severe but favorable to us, as the measures we have taken are very good, and they v/ill not this time laugh in their beard, as the have on former occasions.

Dn. P. J.

The following letter is from a member of the Mexican Congress, and is marked private:

Mexico, August 21st, 1847.

My Bear Friend:—I have before me your welcome letter of the 10th inst., in which, among other things, you are pleased to point out to me the reasons why you had suspended our correspondence. The idea you present to me, that I ought not to leave this place before having arranged every thing relative to that 2, is a good one, but cannot be realized at present, owing to the afflicting circumstances which overwhelm us, every thing being in the greatest disorder, and there being in fact, no Congress and government occupying itself only with matters of the war, and, absolutely, no other business can be attended to. In truth, this war is going to cease, as I suppose, because, on the 19th and 20th, at the gates of Mexico, our nation has covered itself with mourning and dishonor, and our generals and chiefs in particular, with opprobrium. There is not even left to us the glory to say, with that French personage well known in history, that "all is lost but our honor;" as our army has long since lost both honor and shame, which is not necessary to prove when this capital groans with sorrow, and anger against those who call themselves its defenders. The enemy, as yet, has not soiled with his tread the palaces of the Montezumas, but that is because a suspension of hostilities has caused him to pause in his triumphant march. This suspension, which has no other object than to collect the wounded and to bury the dead, as some say, has also another purpose, and that is, to see the propositions of peace from the government at Washington, of which Mr. Nicholas Trist is the bearer. The actual government, that is to say, the President, who finds himself compromised before the nation, has sent a message to Congress, which I take to be a matter of mere form, that upon hearing the above mentioned propositions he would use only> the powers belonging to him by the Constitution. The Congress, beside the fact that it does not exist, there being assembled today but twenty-five deputies, as yet has nothing to do with the matter, so that the message of the President seems to me to be untimely; nevertheless, being so or not, Congress, as I said before, as it does not exist, can do nothing. From this I deduce, with other friends of the same opinion, the following results: That the case being an urgent one, the enemy waiting an answer at the gates of the city, a meeting of Congress being impossible in order to review treaties which must be concluded, at the latest, next week, the Executive is necessarily obliged to assume powers not conceded to it by the constitution, to wit: that of approving treaties after having made them. In a normal state of the country this would be an assumption, and against law, so that the Executive, in order to exercise this power, finds it necessary to use revolutionary means. Hence, the necessity of a Dictatorship, which is already announced to us, and I think but a few days will elapse before this will be realized. Be on the look out. If I learn any thing more I will inform you of it. It is true, that if our army had been successful we should have fallen under a Dictatorship, about which our military chiefs have so much occupied themselves, and perhaps they were dreaming of that when they were all beaten; but being beaten the same hopes remain, with this difference, that as they must have some to lean upon, that support, I suppose, will now be the Yankees. Be this as it may, I will soon ascertain and tell you. I will not occupy myself in giving you a minute description of how the action was brought on, and how lost, nor will I give you a formal opinion of the motives of the parties; however, I will tell you what I hear from rational and well informed people. Gen. Valencia, the rival of Santa Anna, wished the glory of defeating the enemy, but he needed assistance, which should have been sent him. Well, the battle once commenced, whether right or wrong, Santa Anna looked upon the rout of Valencia as a cold spectator, sending him no assistance, after which every thing was disorder and rout on our part. You can make such commentaries as you please, but bear in mind, in order to make no mistake, that our army was composed of twenty-four or twenty-five thousand men, and that of the enemy of only twelve thousand men, and that after the actions of the 19th and 20th, our forces do not amount to over eleven thousand men, all of whom are frightened to death. Among the misfortunes which have befallen us. we have in the hands of the enemy many hundreds of prisoners, including the battalions of Independence and Bravo, the loss of Perdrigan, Blanco and Frotnera and other generals, and a great many killed. The ex-President Anaya and many others are prisoners, all of our artillery lost, and our regular troops dispersed or cut to pieces.