How Is It Between Us?

Front matter

Essays IN ETHNOGRAPHIC THEORY

The ethnographic essay provides a creative form for new work in anthropology. Longer than a journal article, shorter than a conventional monograph, ethnographic essays are experiments in anthropological thought, probing particular cases, topics, or arguments, to propose in-depth but concentrated analyses with unusual insight. In the past these were often published by research institutes or academic departments, but in recent years the style has enjoyed less space than it deserves. Hau Books is pleased to offer room for renewing the essay as an anthropological genre. Our Essays IN ETHNOGRAPHIC THEORY are published as short books, in print and open-access PDF editions.

How Is It Between Us?

Contents

Acknowledgments xi Preface xiii CHAPTER I How Is It Between Us? 1 CHAPTER 2 Truth, Thinking, Ethics 29 CHAPTER 3 Justice (considered relationally) 51 CHAPTER 4 What is Data (Ethics)? 73 CHAPTER 5 Ethics Beyond the Human 93 References 117

Acknowledgments

All texts are collective efforts even if, in the end, only one name appears on the front cover. This book is no different. I would like to thank the following persons and group for important conversations, comments, debates, feedback, and support over the years. Without them, this book and the thoughts expressed herein would not have been possible: Talal Asad, Joel Robbins, Jason Throop, Cheryl Mattingly, Thomas Schwarz Wentzer, Rasmus Dyring, Sylvia Tidey, Simon Critchley, Chris Hann, Elinor Ochs, Lisa Guenther, Maria Louw, Alessandro Duranti, Lone Grøn, Lotte Meinert, Anne O'Byrne, Ghassan Hage, Patrick Neveling, Jonathan Lear, China Scherz, Megan Raschig, Joshua Burraway, Samuele Collu, Paul Scherz, Aidan Seale-Feldman, Tal Brewer, Luis Felipe Murillo, Charles Mathewes, Samuel Lengen, Christopher Stephan, Devin Flaherty, and Team Phenomenology. I would also like to thank Deborah Durham for her editorial guidance and support.

Preface

Perhaps it is time to admit that today’s dominant ethical theories are no longer adequate to the contemporary condition. This should be no surprise. For moments of transformation and interruption—or what I call breakdown—are oftentimes also moments when already existing ethical (as well as political and epistemological) theories are revealed as inadequate to the new conditions of existence brought about through such transformation. Today, we! are most certainly living through such a historical moment—from unprecedented global interdependence and mobility to its populist-cum-fascistic response; from the growing technological dominance of everyday life to the rise of data surveillance; from increasing calls for justice heard around the world to the planet

1. Throughout the book, I occasionally use the first-person plural we. In doing so, I follow the lead of the anthropologist Rebecca Lester (2019: xxviii) when she writes of her choice to use this rhetorical strategy: “I wish to be clear that these rhetorical choices [to use the first-person plural we] do not mean that I presume to speak for all people . . . Rather, such choices reflect my knowledge and understandings of [the topics and issues addressed in the book based on twenty-five years of ethnographic research on them].” And yet, as Lester continues, “I remain acutely aware that exceptions, counterexamples, and alternative interpretations may abound.” The rhetorical use of the first-person plural is ot meant to erase differences that I fully understand cannot be erased—indeed, any attempt to do so would run counter to the very ethical theory I am offering in the book. Rather, this rhetorical strategy is offered as an invitation to the reader to settle in for a hundred or so pages and join me within a certain perspective for understanding what might be meant by the word ethics.

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itself calling for justice.* Increasingly it is clear that ethical theory has proven itself incapable of addressing the breakdowns these transformations have brought about in our political, social, and personal lives.

We need look no further than the “Big Three” ethical theories— virtue, deontological, and consequentialist ethics—to see that times of transformation and breakdown give way to the development of new ethical theories. For each of these developed as a response to such moments in the past. From the upheavals of city-states being enveloped within empires (virtue theory), to the emergence of Newtonian physics and Cartesian rationality (deontology), to the development of industrial capitalism, colonialism, and their consequent bureaucracies (consequentialism), each of the “Big Three” are best understood as having developed in response to and as eventual support for these worldly conditions. We no longer live in those worlds.

Our worlds are much more complex. Oftentimes today making the simplest decision entails sifting through an overabundance of information (some of which may contradict others), at a speed hitherto unprecedented, with persons who may be situated halfway around the world, through the medium of technology, which itself may factor into the decision even if unbeknownst to the humans involved, at a level of uncertainty that is simply beyond ordinary human calculation. Ethics is no longer about being virtuous in the public square, or mobilizing the law of noncontradiction for moral action, or applying some principles that seem to lead to the best outcome. Far from it.

An ethics adequate to the contemporary condition must navigate worlds connected and intertwined so complexly that situatedness is no longer a description of locality. Rather, situatedness must be understood in terms of relations, no matter how dispersed these relations may be. Indeed, ethical theory today must account for and respond to worlds where it is much more likely that we encounter difference than sameness; worlds where such encountered differences include technologies that increasingly replace and often mimic other humans; worlds where truth and decision are replaced by data and algorithms; worlds that are no longer limited to the human but must be capaciously understood to include a range of nonhuman existents—from animals to geological

2. Just a very few examples: B. Alexander 2008; Connolly 2013; Agamben 2015; Scranton 2015; Berardi 2016; O’Neil 2016; Povinelli 2016; Cheney- Lippold 2017; Noble 2018; Benjamin 2019; Zuboff 2019; Chakrabarty 2021; Dyring 2021; P. Scherz 2022, 2016 xiv

Preface formations to climate. In complex worlds, ethical theory above all must not offer preestablished principles, laws, or criteria, but rather recognize that to attempt to act ethically is to do so with risk and uncertainty. The traditional ethical theories are simply inadequate to such worldly conditions.

Recognizing this transformation of our worldly conditions and the concomitant breakdown of ethical adequacy, the philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy has called for an ethics of the world.’ Nancy’s notion of world is more capacious than traditional conceptions of world as, for example, a human-centric horizon of meaning. Rather, for Nancy “existence strives toward” and makes a world, and “a world is this: that everything is here and demands to be greeted insofar as it’s here.”* We could call this—following Ian James—a singularly realist and materialist post-phenomenological philosophy of existence that posits existence—all existents—as striving to make a world in common.’ This is a process that entails a relational ethics that enacts what I call throughout this book attunement and openness.

Such an ethics begins in between. Just as Hannah Arendt’s postfoundationalist political theory rejects the Western tradition’s assumption that there is something political that belongs to a supposed human essence and argues, instead, that “politics arises between men,” the chapters in this book argue that we must reject this same tradition’s assumption that there is something ethical about the human as such. Rather, if there is one big takeaway from the book it is that tHe human is an-ethical. For, ethics arises between singular humans, as well as between singular humans and other singular nonhuman existents, and so is quite outside of the human as such. Ethics arises in what lies between and is established as relations. Consequently, the following chapters will make the point in various ways that the most important ethical question we can ask is: how is it between us?

Do we have conceptual resources for articulating such an ethics? The essays that make up this book are a wager that thinking sociocultural

These last several sentences are almost a direct quote from Arendt’s essay in ‘The Promise of Politics: “politics arises between men” (2005: 95) but with the substitution of ethics for politics and, to bring them up to date, replacing man and men with the human and singular humans.

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anthropology along with the phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition (broadly understood) offers the best available conceptual resources for articulating this ethical theory. In contrast to, for example, analytic philosophy, which has mostly turned away from the world to focus on such things as mind experiments or strict logical analyses of argument, sociocultural anthropology and the phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition have both—in their own ways—largely focused their inquisitive and theoretical gaze on the lived and experienced messiness of the world. Put another way, these are the best intellectual resources we have for thinking the untidiness of existence and how one, nevertheless, makes their way as a part of it.

Recently, some anthropologists have explicitly engaged other disciplines in their anthropological theorizing to creatively develop concepts in an interdisciplinary manner. Thus, for example, Joel Robbins has written a book of what he calls interdisciplinary anthropological theorizing through a transformative dialogue with theology, Veena Das has done something similar through a deep engagement with the philosophy of Wittgenstein, and Nils Bubandt and Thomas Schwarz Wentzer have edited a collection of essays written by various anthropologists showing “how the encounter between philosophy and fieldwork is fertile ground for analytical insight to emerge.”’ This book is an attempt to contribute to this emerging literature.

Like these recent interdisciplinary engagements, I do not invoke anthropology as a resource for relativized descriptions of local ways of being. In these chapters, I am not particularly interested in describing, as the saying goes, how the natives think or act. I believe anthropology has much more to offer than that. I take it that anthropology has something to say about the very structure of social and human existence. In particular, as a longtime contributor to what is now called the anthropology of ethics, I want to say something about the structure of what has been called moral experience.’

7. Robbins 2020; Das 2020; Bubandt and Wentzer 2023, quote from back cover.

8. Please note that I do not mean “structure” in the sense of any of the various structuralisms. Rather, I mean it in the philosophical anthropological sense of that which makes possible. Thus, for example, the structure of moral experience is that which makes possible the very possibility of morality and ethics.

9. See, for example, Zigon and Throop 2014.

Preface

I will say more about this ethical turn within anthropology in the first chapter. But for now, let me note for those who may not be familiar with the anthropology of ethics that in the mid-2000s it had become clear that a number of anthropologists were interested in addressing what they saw as a lacuna within the anthropological literature—that is, a lack of both an ethnographic and anthropological-theoretical focus on morality and ethics. Although several ethnographies were published in this first wave of the ethical turn, the best of this work—in my view—has not been ethnographically descriptive work on this or that way of being ethical in this or that particular society. Rather, the most significant contributions of the anthropology of ethics have been meta-ethical.’° Indeed, because of this theoretical focus, many of these anthropologists engage significantly and deeply with philosophical texts and philosophers themselves. In so doing, the very question of what it is to be human has often been implicit—if not entirely explicit—within many of the key texts of the anthropology of ethics.

Similarly, my reading of the anthropological tradition in general is that its most significant contribution has been coming to a broad agreement of what it is to be human in a world with others—or what we can call sociality. To be sure, what I take as a broad agreement is regularly articulated in terms of conceptual disagreement and theoretical turf wars. Still, I will take the risk of claiming that most anthropologists today— despite how they might want to conceive and theorize them—would agree that there is now something like an anthropological consensus around at least three aspects of sociality: relationality, situatedness, and sensibility (by which I mean a bodily-affective-cognitive openness and receptivity).

I have a similar reading of the phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition. This is a less controversial reading than that of anthropology. Few of those who count themselves a part of this tradition would likely disagree that relationality, situatedness, and sensibility have been central to phenomenological hermeneutics from its beginning. Still, although such a

10. For example: Robbins 2004; Zigon 2007, 2009a, 2014a; Lambek 2010b; Faubion 2011; Das 2012; Mattingly 2012; Laidlaw 2014; Throop 2014; Zigon and Throop 2014; Keane 2015; Dyring 2018a; Wentzer 2018a.

11. Just a very few examples of many: Hirschkind 2006; Stewart 2007; Robbins 2010; Sahlins 2011a, 2011b; Ingold 2013; Zigon 2015; Holbraad and Pedersen 2017; Mazzarella 2017; Amrute 2019; Lester 2019; Strathern 2020.

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claim is relatively uncontroversial, much like within anthropology there are disagreements over how best to conceive and articulate them. For example, while Husserlians may insist on concepts such as intersubjectivity or empathy, Heideggerians likely prefer being-with and Levinasians infinite responsibility or transcendence. And yet, the real differences between these concepts do not take away from the fact that each of them attempts to articulate the experience of worldliness in terms of relationality, situatedness, and sensibility.

The attempt to conceive ethics by thinking anthropology and phenomenological hermeneutics together, then, is to conceive ethics in terms of relationality, situatedness, and sensibility. Importantly, these three should not be considered as distinct qualities or characteristics. Rather, they are best considered as three mutually constituting aspects of worldly existence, for together they constitute the very possibility of being worldly—human or otherwise. For example, because sensibility is the bodily-affective-cognitive openness and receptivity of being-inthe-world, it is essential to what makes an existent both relational and situated. For how could one be relational without already being open and receptive? And situatedness itself is both the condition for and conditioned by the temporal arrival of various existents open and receptive—or perhaps as Nancy might put it, relationally striving—to being in a world together.

To be in a world, then, is to be relational, situated, and sensitive. Ethical theory must be adequate to this ontological fact. For nearly twenty-five years I have been trying to think this adequacy with the help of the various people around the globe with whom I have been doing ethnographic research—from Moscow and St. Petersburg to New York City, from Vancouver to Copenhagen to Denpasar and beyond. ‘That research and subsequent ethnographic writing may have focused on particular topics, such as the ways in which some Muscovites experienced the collapse of the Soviet Union and how those experiences altered their moral ways of being and speaking, or the ways in which drug rehabilitation and therapeutics are best considered in terms of ethical self-work and moral transformation, or the ways in which political activism is best conceived in terms of worldbuilding, that is, as the alteration of the ethical and moral relations that constitute our worlds. Most importantly for this

12. Inspired by the work of Levinas, some have already attempted to articulate such a theory. See, for example: Butler 2005; Guenther 2006; Critchley 2007.

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Preface book, however, is that all that research allowed me to conceptualize and articulate an ethnographic theory of ethics. By this I mean a theory of ethics that has emerged recursively by putting what I learned from this ethnographic research into a critical conversation with already established ethical theory.” I call this ethnographic theory relational ethics.

The following chapters attempt to articulate such an ethics. The order in which the essays are presented is significant for understanding the development of this ethnographic theory of ethics and how its various conceptual moves come together. Thus, the first chapter is vital for setting the theoretical scene of precisely what I mean by relationality, attunement, and the between, from which the theoretical and empirical work in the rest of the chapters build. The second chapter further develops this relational basis but now in terms of what I call moral breakdown and thinking. I do this theoretical work through the question of how to live in worlds that are often described today in terms of post-truth. The third chapter builds on all of this to articulate the relationality of moral assemblages, which is a concept that helps us make sense of the often fragmentary and incongruous nature of ethical demands and the possible responses to them in our complex contemporary condition. I do this by considering the very possibility of justice in a world increasingly driven by algorithms and algorithmic judgment.

By the end of the third chapter, the general framework of relational ethics is largely articulated. In the remaining chapters, then, I go on to address some of the most pressing ethical questions of our day in terms of relational ethics. In doing so, I try to offer a more convincing way to take up these problems than that of traditional ethical theory, while also adding some nuance to various aspects of the theoretical work I did in the first three chapters. Thus, the fourth chapter considers the ethical dilemmas raised by the increased datafication of our everyday lives, and the concomitant concern of data extraction. The final chapter is an attempt to think ethics beyond the human to offer a more capacious notion of ethics that would include nonhuman animals, climate, and yes, even rocks.

Therefore, while the ethnographic theory of ethics I articulate here emerged from nearly twenty-five years of ethnographic research, I engage some of that ethnographic material only in the first three chapters. Otherwise, the rest of the chapters engage other anthropological,

13. On recursivity and anthropological theorizing, see Holbraad 2012; see also Zigon 2018.

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empirical, and philosophical/theoretical sources through the relational ethics framework. Throughout all the chapters, however, I hope to show that relational ethics addresses some of our contemporary ethical problems better than the more traditional and still dominant ethical theories, or what above I called, perhaps a bit too glibly, the “Big Three.”

This approach is distinctive within the anthropology of ethics literature, as well as within the discipline of anthropology in general. It is, however, absolutely necessary—vital not only for the importance of anthropology’s contribution to ethical theory, but also for anthropology’s significance in our contemporary worlds. For it is my contention that if anthropology as a discipline is to have a future in our increasingly complex worlds, anthropologists must become more ambitious in our assertion that what we learn ethnographically can be taken up more abstractly and theoretically—that is, contextually and situationally transferable— to address other topics, concerns, and problems in other localities and times. To my mind, this is what ethnographic theory can and ought to offer. It is what I am offering in this book.

CHAPTER I How Is It Between Us?

“How is it between us?” is the question I would like to consider as the most fundamental of all ethical questions. I will take this consideration up through an engagement with a debate concerning transcendence and the transcendental that has arisen recently within the anthropology of ethics'—though what is at stake within this debate has repercussions for the discipline of anthropology in general; indeed, for any study of social life. Ultimately, this is a debate about relationality and the relational structure of social existence. By entering this debate, I contrast what I call relational ethics with ordinary ethics. In doing so, I hope to show not only that relational ethics is a more convincing anthropological theory of ethics, but also that it offers a conception of relationality, situatedness, and sensibility that is more appropriate for contemporary anthropological concerns in general.

The chapter unfolds in two movements. First, I engage extensively with the transcendence debate, through which I lay out some of the basic theoretical concepts of relational ethics. Here I ask for readers’ patience—I promise that the work will pay off as you make your way through the various chapters of the book. For the second movement of the chapter, I offer some examples from a long-term research project of mine to show how the ethnographic theory of relational ethics I begin delineating in this chapter has emerged from my fieldwork.

How Is It Between Us?

Ultimately, I hope to make clear that relational ethics begins with a demand that emerges from a situation within which one finds oneself with others, a demand that pulls one out of oneself to respond in a modality of concern and care for the between, where we dwell together. This response is both an ethical and a political one; it is a response that opens possibilities for being-together-otherwise. Such possibilities, I will argue throughout, can only begin with a relational ethics.

Transcendence and the Transcendental

The issue of transcendence and the transcendental within the anthropology of ethics was first explicitly raised, to the best of my knowledge, by Veena Das. In doing so, Das made a dichotomous distinction between conceptions of the ethical focused on “orienting oneself to transcendental, objectively agreed-upon values” and done in “a domain that is set apart,” and an anthropology of ethics conceived as ordinary ethics.’ In response to this claim, Joel Robbins has asked: “what is the matter with transcendence?” He continues by arguing for the place of religion in the anthropology of ethics and concludes that “the ways ritual allows people to touch transcendent values in their fullest forms ... enables the desirability of single values to gain a hold on people that it can rarely manage to secure in everyday life ... [such that] even in the course of everyday life, some of the desirability of values that is produced in transcendent encounters with them must surely still be felt.”

What should be noted here, and where I would raise a concern, is that Robbins seems to accept Das’s dichotomy that separates the transcendental as a “domain set apart” from the ordinary by means of, in this case, ritual, but tries to argue for a necessary and significant bridge, as it were, between the two. As such, Robbins’s argument might be paraphrased as something like this: Das is right to make a distinction between the transcendental and the ordinary, but she is mistaken in her claim that the transcendental offers little, if anything, to the ethics of the ordinary; for the values fully realized in the separate “domain” of the transcendental offer a significant force for motivating ethical life, and ritual and religion are one of the primary transcendental “domains” where this force is

How Is It Between Us?

produced. For Robbins, then, the transcendental “domain” remains separated from the ordinary yet remains an important resource for everyday ethical life.

Here it is important to point out that while Robbins seems to consider synonymously the two terms “transcendence” and “transcendental,” and thus uses them as merely nominal and adjectival forms, Das, to the best of my knowledge, only uses the word “transcendental.” The key lines in Das are the following: “I [that is, Das] will argue for a shift in perspective from thinking of ethics as made up of judgments we arrive at when we stand away from our ordinary practices to that of thinking of the ethical as a dimension of everyday life in which we are not aspiring to escape the ordinary but rather to descend into it as a way of becoming moral subjects ... not by orienting oneself to transcendental, objectively agreed-upon values but rather through the cultivation of sensibilities within the everyday.”*

On first reading, these lines seem rather straightforward as they appear simply to equate “stand away from,” “escape the ordinary,” and “transcendental,” such that the latter just means something like a dichotomous separation from the ordinary. One might be tempted to ask, however, to where would one escape or step away? Where is the not-ordinary in human life? Robbins, at least for the sake of his argument, is fine accepting religion as a “domain” of the not-ordinary. But I’m too much of an Asadian regarding religion,’ and a phenomenologist regarding the human condition,° to go along with that, and instead must insist that we never escape the ordinary. To put this in phenomenological terms, we are always and never with exception embodied beings in the world.’ Still, Robbins is most certainly correct to point out that for ordinary ethicists “the explicit, the known and believed, the codified rule, values, and the transcendent” are all markers of the not-ordinary. Here, then, we seem to have quite an unusual position taken by an increasingly

For example: Heidegger 1996; Merleau-Ponty 2012.

To be sure, Heidegger was no great fan of everyday life. But he recognized that while it may be possible to inhabit different modalities of the everyday—what has been translated as inauthentic or authentic modalities—it is impossible to escape the everyday. See, for example, Heidegger 1996: 41-42.

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dominant theory within anthropology that such occasional human actions as making explicit, pondering knowledge and beliefs, deliberation, and invoking rules and values are nor part of what we have come to call ordinary social life. We might want to ask, then, what is the ontological assumption that founds such a view?

Let us return once again to those lines by Das, and most particularly the last one which tells us that ordinary ethics does not make ethical judgments “by orienting oneself to transcendental, objectively agreed-upon values but rather through the cultivation of sensibilities within the everyday.” Setting aside the italicization of “within” that suggests that the “everyday” is some kind of container within which life is lived—a container conception of the world that contrasts sharply with the relational ontology that I am articulating—Das seems to suggest that the transcendental is some kind of Realist Platonic realm, where values such as the Good and the Beautiful sit next to one another like the Father and Son, and this is perhaps what Robbins was responding to. Transcendental reads here not merely as that “domain” separate from the ordinary, but something foundational to the very possibility of ethics.

This is what philosophers call the transcendental argument, which today is most closely associated with Kantianism, and goes something like this: X is the necessary condition for Y, such that X is the transcendental that founds or makes possible Y. And while transcendental arguments most certainly tend to posit objective transcendentals as opposed to any kind of subjectivism, they are not posed as “agreed-upon,” as if somehow debated and voted on, even if implicitly so. Rather, transcendentals are a priori conditions of possibility. That is, transcendentals are part of an ontological framework—let us say—that provide the foundation or ground or condition of possibility for some particular act or capacity or simply for a way of being.

Now the great unsaid of anthropology is the (primarily) neo-Kantian ontological framework or assumptions or transcendentals—that is to say, the a priori ground—upon which the discipline is built, and what I find most interesting about the ordinary ethics approach is how it so clearly discloses these ontological assumptions. Elsewhere, I have argued that ordinary ethics—despite the rhetorical emphasis placed on such things as social action and the ordinary—ultimately assumes that individual human subjects come into any world whatsoever with an a priori and normative procedural capacity for acting rightly.” For Michael

How Is It Between Us?

Lambek this is called acting according to criteria;'° for Das this is acting according to grammar." Later in this chapter, I will make clear that such transcendentally-founded proceduralism, to use a phrase of the phenomenologist Emmanuel Levinas,” reduces the Other to the Same in that acting rightly is merely a matter of procedurally projecting onto and subsuming the Other into a version of oneself.

But for now, let us recall that Robbins reminds us that the Latin root of transcendence/transcendental means to surpass or to go beyond.” Ordinary ethicists seem to intend something like this when they dichotomously separate the transcendental from the ordinary. Nevertheless, as I have been trying to argue, their ontological assumption does precisely the opposite work: that is, ontologically the ordinary ethical subject is a self-same proceduralist standing over and against that upon which it works. One might think that this “standing over and against” would allow for a kind of relationality. But at best this could only be a quasi-relationality that Marilyn Strathern has shown many anthropologists tend to articulate, whereby two self-same individuals become connected through some medium that is always already ontologically established." Think here of a line that connects two independent dots, whereby the line moves unidirectionally from one dot to the other. The line in this case is articulated as either criteria or grammar.

In contrast to this approach, perhaps transcendence could be thought in something like the opposite manner of going beyond the ordinary. That is, perhaps transcendence could be conceived as an essential constituent of the ordinary and, therefore, as constitutive not only of the ethical subject but social existence as such. In other words, transcendence could be thought as the being-with—the withness—of sociality that allows for the open space between us where ethical subjects become possible. How might this relational ontology of withness be articulated?

A Relational Ontology of Withness

To begin to answer this question, it is worth briefly considering the etymology of the word ethics. The word ethics has its roots in the ancient

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Greek word éthos, which is traditionally understood to signify “disposition, character in the sense of psychological configuration, and hence comportment, the way in which one bears oneself.” Thus, it has become quite easy to understand éthos as the habituated mind-body-affect totality of the individualized human, standing alone, as it were, in a void without context or connection. But as Claudia Baracchi reminds us, “the semantic range of the term [ézhos] exceeds this determination and signals that it must be situated in the broader context of custom, of shared usage, and even understood in the archaic but abiding sense of the accustomed place where the living (animals, plants, or otherwise) find their haunt or abode.”"®