Observing Conflict Escalation in World Society

Front matter

Richard Bösch

Political Science | Volume 148

QoL Lux esses und die Open Library Community Politik 2023 - einem Netzwerk wissenschaftlicher Bibliotheken zur Förderung von Open Access in den Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften:

Part I: Theoretical Foundations

2.3 Staking Overlapping Claims: Conflict Resolution, Conflict Transformation,

and Conflict Escalation i 353552 see isn 44 S.1 Lühmann Revisited oee reis tk ee garen 55

Part Il: Case Studies Preliminaries 4.2.4... a een ee diet ee sen ee 113

Chapter 5. Observing a Developing Conflict System:

Part Ill: Synthesis

Appendix... 2er fatale ka: 365 A.3: Additional’ Material: u.a gear O 422 Bibliography... 2.02.42: 22 aan 425

Prologue

Figure 1: Photography showing visitors of The Art Institute of Chicago while watching a photography that shows earlier visitors ofthe museum looking at the painting Rue de Paris, temps de pluie by Gustave Caillebotte (1877); OfObserving the Observers of Observers

© Maurits de Wijs, 2010

“The best way to begin is by approaching your dissertation in your imagination, preparing to write in and about this thesis at every stage and to become the researcher of your own work process.” (Bolker 1998: 3-4).

“But whom are you writing for?” the professor asked. “Well, I’ve been interested in the topic of conflict escalation for a long time now. First of all, I’m writing for me, to implement an inspiring idea that, to my knowledge, did not show up before and thus to get this dissertation done!” the PhD candidate answered impulsively right after the presentation of his project while he was yet thinking about a more ‘scientific’ answer he would give ina moment. “I mean, who are the readers you have in mind? Who are the people you wish to engage with the things that matter most to you?” the professor eagerly added. “Well, since I was socialised as a political scientist with a focus on International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies in the first stages of my professional career”, the PhD candidate replied, “I cannot hide my ambition to make a modest contribution to conflict analysis within this field. On the other hand, however, during my research in the last years, I’ve been dealing with sociological theories extensively, particularly concerning Luhmann’s work. Therefore, I would be happy to promote systems theoretical thinking with regard to empirical research on violent conflict in general. I am convinced that this perspective will open up what I have increasingly experienced as narrow horizons.”

In a straight reaction to this statement, one of the other participants of the PhD students colloquium asked, “So, would you label your dissertation as an interdisciplinary project?” Okay, I hope that this question won't be the starting point of an epical debate on the pros and cons of inter-or transdisciplinary research designs, the PhD candidate thought, then he frankly answered. “Let me put it this way: If youre interested in the following question — How do conflicts escalate? — I don't mind whether you see yourself as a sociologist, a political scientist, an IR-specialist, a peace researcher or, let’s say, ... a historian. You will definitely find a comprehensible part to the answer in my work which I would dub as a Peace and Conflict Studies dissertation!”

While diverse feedback on the presentation was collected in plenary, the PhD Candidate could only listen with halfan ear. He was still pondering about his last statement. Do I really offer a study that is comprehensible for such a diverse range of readers? As he increasingly felt the urge to consolidate his argument, he once again raised his hand and referred to the fundamental work of Niklas Luhmann. “You can criticise Luhmann for many things”, he continued his prior remarks, “for example, for the hypercomplex character and elitist style of his language or the virtual indifference concerning empirical research. However, what I find deeply enlightening is Luhmann’s understanding of communication as the very essential building block of the social and, based on that, his concept of social systems. I am convinced that his complex thoughts can be fruitfully developed for empirical conflict research, particularly when it comes to Luhmann's all-encompassing idea of observation. Therefore, any observation, which means every act of communicative distinction and indication, has its blind spot since it cannot observe itself. For me, it is both a provocative and comforting thought to realise that any observation, be it, for example, in the context of the media, politics, science and, perhaps most striking (!), in my dissertation, is a product of the observing system. Having this in mind, the many rivalries over epistemological competences within and between the disciplines that bother us so

Prologue often in this research colloquium and beyond can be viewed in a different light, right? In other words, contrary to the all-embracing ambition often ascribed to systems theory, its take on science is rather modest, saying: Don't let us attach too much importance and absoluteness to theories! Inthe end, they’re based on contingent observations that could have been done differently. So, coming back to the initial question, I would say that I wish those people to engage with my work who are not too much stuck in disciplinary thinking and those who like to let themselves be positively irritated by research that cannot be immediately classified in conventional ways... Any questions left? ©”

On the way home from university, the PhD candidate was reflecting on the many thought- provoking remarks the participants of the colloquium gave him to take along. While he was thinking about how to integrate them in his work, he remembered the key sentence from Joan Bolker’s very common PhD- guide, which a good colleague had warmly recommended at the beginning of the project. To write in and about this thesis at every stage and to become the researcher of your own work process. “I think it’s working...” the PhD candidate muttered under his breath while going home.

Acknowledgements

“If you want to travel fast, travel alone; if you want to travel far, travel with others” (Anonymous proverb, most probably of African origin)

In 2006, during an internship with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Mali, I became aware of this proverb for the first time. Since then, it has time and again come to my mind in various situations of my life - especially in view of the present dissertation.

Yes, this dissertation has a clearly named sole author: me, Richard Bösch. Though, while working on the project for several years, I have somewhat realised that this work has many supporters, mentors, and sponsors without whom writing this dissertation would not have been possible. From the bottom of my heart, I am deeply grateful for the help, the constructive and critical backing, and the encouragement I experienced from many generous people in my environment.

I am especially grateful to my supervisor Christoph Weller who supported this project from its very beginningto completion; constructively challenged my thinking about theory and empirical conflict research; provided invaluable feedback that helped me find my perspective and consolidate my project; and supported me in funding my work within the framework of a PhD scholarship. I particularly appreciate that he showed immense confidence in my ability to develop and finalise my dissertation and had great patience while going this way with me. I also wish to thank my dear former colleagues at the University of Augsburg, Julika Bake, Andreas Bock, Melanie Hartmann, Bernhard Ludwig, Lena von Naso, Pia Popal, Ulrich Roos, Charlotte Rungius and Michaela Zöhrer, and the participants of the PhD and Master colloquium organised by the Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies. It was a great academic pleasure and a wonderful personal experience to learn and work in this inspiring environment.

Iam also indebted to Mathias Albert, who got involved with my work as second supervisor with keen interest and showed great patience with the development of my project. As we discussed my work during personal meetings and on the occasion of scientific conferences, he gave crucial feedback which helped me to continuously redefine the guidelines of my proceedings. Of course, his own research in the field encouraged me to follow up on a Luhmannian systems theory perspective on conflict analysis.

This project could not have been completed without the financial and ideational support ofthe Cusanuswerk. I particularly appreciate that the PhD scholarship not only gave me the opportunity to become an independent researcher backed up by a generous funding and a supportive organisation but also offered me the chance to meet and exchange with a huge number of fellows and get inspired by diverse and progressive minds.

I also wish to express my gratitude to the board of the international catholic peace movement pax christi, Reinhold Gieringer, Wiltrud Résch- Metzler, Wolfgang Gramer, my assistant Sabine Seebacher, and the head of the department “Church and Society” in the Diocese of Rottenburg- Stuttgart, Joachim Drumm. As my employers and colleagues, they complaisantly encouraged me to continue my academic career and provided me open space to finalise my dissertation within the framework of special leaves for research purposes.

Also, I am especially grateful to my good old university friends, Benjamin Bräuer, Philipp Brugger and Jonas Gasthauer. As members of the self- declared “Proletarian Institute”, they were and still are an important source of my academic curiosity, particularly concerning our special interest in metatheoretical issues in social sciences and schools of thought in International Relations. I will never forget our intense debates for nights on end on the streets of Tübingen! As far as my university years in Tübingen are concerned, I am also indebted to Thomas Nielebock. Throughout my studies, he was the right person at the right time, as specialist for IR theories, as a university teacher with great methodical diversity and as ‘a mentor of good will’.

Lastly, and most importantly, my deepest gratitude goes to my family. Throughout my studies and in the course of writing this dissertation, my parents, Hildegard and Paul Bösch, my sisters and brother, Lydia, Christine and Günther, have always been supportive and loyal and encouraged their fourth child and little brother’ to pursue his plans. The mostimportant contribution to the successful completion ofthis project comes from Kerstin Bosch. I am eternally grateful for my wife being a major moral support during the ups and downs while working on this dissertation. Without her love, encouragement, belief, motivation, and relief, I would never have been able to bring my work to an end. Only together with Kerstin and our children, Salomé and Leonard, I could stand the adventure of writing this dissertation. Meine Lieblingsmenschlein, das ist für euch!

Summary

How do conflicts escalate? This is one ofthe major and overarching questions in conflict research. The present study offers further answers to this question. Therefore, it has a tripartite agenda: First, it develops an empirical research strategy including a constructivist methodology for the study of conflict escalation. This strategy is embedded in a Luhmannian systems theoretical world society perspective; argues that conflicts can be understood as social systems in their own right; looks at the process of conflict escalation by analysing communication; follows a reconstructive approach informed by grounded theory and the documentary method. Second, to probe the plausibility of the approach, this study analyses two processes of conflict escalation prior to violent conflict within the framework of two systematic case studies (Maidan protests/Ukraine 2013-2014; Mali’s crisis/2010-2012). Third, on the basis of the case study insights gained and the experiences made with the empirical research strategy developed here, the present work gives some impulses and ideas on how this kind of systems theoretical research can be beneficial for Peace and Conflict Studies and conflict analysis in general.

The present dissertation is written in English. It follows spelling, grammar and punctuation rules that are referred to as British English. Nota bene: Since the use of quotation marks in British and American English is different but, at the same time, evolving, their usage within the framework of this dissertation is determined as follows: Double quotation marks (” ”) are used with direct quotes, including block quotations. Single quotation marks (‘’) are used to highlight certain words or expressions. They are not used with direct quotes. In all direct quotes, italics are used to highlight the most important parts. Apart from quotations, italics are used to emphasise the importance of a central term in a larger context.

Index of Abbreviations

AA ACLED AFISMA AI AKUF

AQMI

ATNMC

BCEAO

BSEC CONIAS COW

CIS CPLR CU DSF

DM EBRD ECOWAS EU

FTA GovMali GovUkr GT

HIIK

ICG

Association Agreement (between Ukraine and the EU)

Armed Conflict and Event Data Program

African-led International Support Mission in Mali

Amnesty International

Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (German)/Working Group for Research on the Causes of War (University of Hamburg) Al-Qaida au Maghreb Islamique (French)/al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

Alliance Touareg Nord Mali pour le Changement (French)/North Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change

Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (central bank for the common “CFA- Franc” currency)

Black Sea Economic Cooperation

Conflict Information and Analysis System (University of Heidelberg) Correlates of War Project (University of Michigan/University of Califonia, Davis)

Commonwealth of Independent States

Centre of Policy and Legal Reforms

Customs Union

Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung/German Foundation for Peace Research

Documentary Method

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

Economic Community of West African States

European Union

Free Trade Area

Government of Mali

Government of Ukraine

Grounded Theory

Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Reearch

International Crisis Group

IBRD

IMF

IRF

IR

MFA MINUSMA MMIC MNA

MNLA

MUJAO

NATO OSGS

PACE PCS Polisario

PSPSDN

QDA RE UAH UCDP UEMOA

UHHRU Ukrainian GTS UkrN

UN

UNOCHA USIP

USD ($)

USSR

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

International Monetary Fund

International Renaissance Foundation (Ukraine)

International Relations (as an academic discipline)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ukraine)

Multinational Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Maidan Monitoring Information Center

Mouvement National de Azawad (French)/National Movement of Azawad

Mouvement National de Libération de lAzawad (French)/National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad

Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (French)/ Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Observatoire Sahélo- Saharien de Géopolitique et de Stratégie/Observatory of Geopolitical and Strategic Affairs in the Sahelian- Saharian Zone Parliamentary Assembly ofthe Council of Europe

Peace and Conflict Studies

Frente Popular para la Liberaciön de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro (Spanish)/Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro

Programme Special pour la Paix, la Securite et le Development dans le Nord du Mali (French)/Special Programme for Peace, Security and Development in Northern Mali

Qualitative Data Analysis

Russian Federation

Ukrainian Hryvnia (national currency in Ukraine since 1996)

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Uppsala University, Sweden)

Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (Economic and Monetary Union of French-Speaking West African States)

Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union

Ukrainian Gas Transit System

Ukraine Nachrichten/Ukraine News

United Nations

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs United States Institute of Peace (Washington D.C.)

United States Dollar

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (“Soviet Union”)

Part I: Theoretical Foundations

Chapter 1. Introduction: A Sneak Peek at the Subject Matter

“That each by observation might satisfy his mind.” (John Godfrey Saxe, 1872, in The Blind Men and the Elephant)

“Behind every analysis of violent conflict is a set of assumptions. Assumptions about what moves human action and how to study it, and about the interests, needs, instincts, structures, and choices that explain why and how people resort to violence” (Demmers 2012: 1).

Ménaka, Gao region, northern Mali, mid-January 2012. An armed conflict between the Malian central government on the one hand and a newly founded alliance of different ethnic groups based in northern Mali including the Tuareg as a driving force on the other hand breaks out.’ Although having a wide range of military equipment at its disposal, the Malian army, abruptly entangled in a guerrilla war, is later forced to withdraw from strategic cities in the course of the attacks.

Bamako, the capital, southern Mali, March 2012. Low and mid-level soldiers, frustrated with the poor handling of the so-called ‘rebellion in the north, overthrow the democratically elected president and his government. Ironically, however, during the troubles of this coup d’état the Malian army is expelled from the northern regions and northern Mali is declared an independent state named ‘Azawad’. In the meantime, the anti- government forces led by the Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA)

1 The first paragraphs of the present introduction summarise a number of widely shared observations in media, science and politics concerning the situation in Mali in 2011/2012 (see e.g. Hainzl 2013; Heyl and Leininger 2012; Cline 2013; Heyl and Leininger 2013; Lacher 2013; Klute and Lecocq 2013; Pabst 2013; Ruf 2013; Schreiber 2013; Thurston and Lebovich 2013; Wiedemann 2014). These analyses largely rely on a broad range of media reports (for considerations on the role of mass media within the methodological approach presented here see Chapter 3/4; for the case study on “Mali’s crisis 2010-2012” see chapter 6).

have enlarged their alliance by several Islamist groups.” Though, this larger alliance proves to be a fragile and unequal one: local and foreign Islamist militants increasingly dominate the agenda and marginalise the more secular MNLA more or less by force.

A few months later, after intensive mediation efforts led by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the military junta returns power to a civilian administration. However, in the aftermath of a near- collapse of the army and Malian democratic institutions, the country experiences a de facto division and a massive and long-term international military intervention.

By the end of 2010, a year before the armed conflict broke out, nobody expected such a dramatic chronology of events. At that time, the Republic of Mali was regularly cited, both by local and international observers, as an outstanding example of a peacefully developing democracy in West Africa.* So, how could the Malian landscape change in such a drastic way? And how did the process of conflict intensification gather momentum? As a matter of course, there are various analytical accounts on Mali’s crisis in 2010-2012 from different disciplines with elaborated explanatory approaches based on specific theoretical perspectives and rich empirical data. Lecocq et al. (2013) made it their scientific business to compile those topics and factors that have been referred to as the most relevant ones in miscellaneous conflict analyses:

2 In particular Ansar al-Dine (“Defenders of Faith’; Mali- based Tuareg Islamists), the Mouvement pour lUnicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO; Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa) and Al-Qaida au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI; al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb).

3 In January 2013, the anti- government-alliance was rapidly advancing to the south of Mali. In the light of this massive offensive, the Malian government asked France for military support. Right after the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 2085 Malian and French units, and later ECOWAS troops, started an operation to fight the insurgents back and to recapture northern Mali. By and large, the mission was successful, notably concerning strategic towns. In July 2013, the United Nations Multinational Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) took over responsibility from the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) established before, under UN Security Council resolution 2100. At that time, Mali’s transitional government, with support of MINUSMA, organised presidential elections that international and local poll observers described as peaceful, transparent, and credible. In 2015, the Algiers peace agreement was signed, bringing the conflict parties back into a political process. However, its implementation remains weak (see UCDP 2018c). In 2021, still, 18.343 UN-peacekeepers are in the field trying to fulfil their mandate of gradually stabilising the country (see UN 2021).

4 In 1992, after several years of armed conflict, the Malian government and the Tuareg signed a peace agreement, the ‘Pacte National’. In this agreement, apart from the obligation to lay down arms, the Tuareg were guaranteed a fair share of natural resources, more autonomy rights in a federal system to be reformed, and the abolition of ethnic and political discrimination. Although the efforts of rapprochement between the different Tuareg factions and the Malian government continued, the Tuareg’s political, economic, and social integration in the Malian state remained low (see Cline 2013: 618-621). From 2006 to 2009, again smaller insurgencies of the Tuareg emerged, partly as ‘side effect’ of the armed conflict between the Tuareg and the government in neighbouring Niger. However, the main players in multi-ethnic Mali succeeded in keeping the situation largely peaceful, although there were sporadic violent incidences (Wing 2013; UCDP 2018c).

Chapter 1. Introduction: A Sneak Peek at the Subject Matter e the formation of a new political movement in November 2010 (“Mouvement National de l'Azawad”) claiming true political representation and economic opportunities for the population in the north;

e the return of ex-soliders and alleged mercenaries, mostly Tuareg, with military experience and weapons from Libya beginning with the gradual collapse of the Gadhafi regime in March 2011;

« the gradual appropriation of the Sahel, particularly the northern parts of Mali, as a safe haven for global terrorist networks;

e the emergence of local Islamist state-building aspirations beginning in mid-2011 with the formation of MUJAO and Ansar al-Dine;

e the creeping decline of the fragile Malian multi- party system and its president-centred institutions;

e agrowing number of both criminal and terrorist attacks on uranium mines of international companies in the Sahel;

e agrowing number of kidnappings of Western tourists in northern Mali and Niger;

« the far-reaching regional influence on conflict prevention and management exercised by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and thus the increasing attention of the international community;

e the growing importance of northern Mali for transnational crime, especially human and arms trafficking and illegal drug trade.

Obviously, explanations that solely consider, for example, the underrepresentation of the population in the north, especially of the Tuareg, in the Malian political system and therefore interpret the conflict as an issue of domestic insurgence would fall short (see, e.g., Klute and Lecocq 2013). Likewise, interpreting the violent conflict against the background of geostrategic economic interests only, with regard to the France- backed company Areva for instance, which mainly holds the mining rights for uranium and other rare earths in northern Mali where the security situation was rapidely deteriorating in 2011 due to increasing cross- border activities in the Sahelian zone, would not be satisfactory either (see, e.g., Kohl 2013). According to the authors of the above- cited meta- study, “no single scholar can claim full understanding of all these domains” (Lecocq et al. 2013: 344). Indeed, on the one hand, it can be disillusioning to learn that there are multiple and occasionally contradicting explanations of the Malian case according to the conditions set up at the beginning of the analysis. On the other hand, empirical examples like the Malian case urge scientific observers to be sensitive to and to analytically deal with the ofteninconsistent multi-layered nature of social conflict.

Conflicts do not speak - only we do!

As the sneak peek at the Malian crisis illustrates, conflicts do not speak for themselves - it is the journalists, policymakers, activists, analysts, and scientists who speak about conflicts when observing and taking advantage of all sorts of abstraction and, as a consequence thereof, reproducing their own maybe even competing conflict narratives.” Following this, conflicts represent social phenomena that cannot be approached as self- explanatory and material facts. Once becoming aware of and dealing with a social conflict, all kinds of observers, whether they like (and know) it or not, necessarily rely on forms of symbolic representations:

“As a field of knowledge, Conflict Studies is situated in and shaped by highly political and messy practices of categorizing and coding. It is therefore not only important to engage in systematic research on individual cases of violent conflict, but also to study the ways conflicts are labelled and coded and to think through the consequences of these representations.” (Demmers 2012: 2)

Against this backdrop, the present study demonstrates a reflexive approach to conflict analysis that takes the multifaceted nature of social conflict into account and enables observers to focus on aspects from different conflict- related domains at once. For this purpose, it draws on a fundamental systems theoretical understanding of ‘the social’ according to which communication constitutes the basic unit of all social entities, including conflicts:

“Conflicts are highly integrated social systems, they tend to draw the host system into conflict to the extent that all attention and all resources are claimed for the conflict.” (Luhmann 1995: 390)

Conflict research more or less centres on a common gretchenfrage: How do conflicts escalate? To further elaborate on this fundamental question, this contribution adopts a process perspective on conflict conceptualised as a

“capturing social system, i.e. an evolving discursive space where contradicting communication from various social subsystems gets structurally coupled and stabilised” (own working definition; see also Bosch 2017).

Conflict escalation can thus be thought of as a cascade of communicative events. Hence, to approach the process of conflict escalation, it is worth to have a systematic look at the evolution of communication. At various times, conflict communication, understood as a vague field of relational references, tells different stories about how ‘the conflict’ is actually perceived by diverse observers. Indeed, the composition of a conflict, which means its issues, parties, positions, actions, environment etc., or, in other words, the difference between the inside and outside of a conflict system might continuously change in the course of conflict escalation, but - and that is one of the principal arguments of this contribution - it can be empirically studied via its discursive representations over time.

5 As pointedly reframed in the cross heading, this insight refers to an often-cited dictum from Rorty that serves as an epistemological motto for the present work: “The world does not speak. Only we do.” (Rorty 1989: 6)

Chapter 1. Introduction: A Sneak Peek at the Subject Matter An empirical approach: case studies on Ukraine and Mali

Within the framework ofthe research project presented here, analysing conflict escalation means dealing with discursive processes. When focussing on organised collective violence, i.e. armed conflict and war, these processes can be regarded as communicative prologues to violence whereby strategies of legitimating violence play a key role (see Messmer 2003: 266-272).° To empirically illustrate the analytical framework and thus to probe its plausibility, the present work comprises two case studies: the first case study deals with the public protest on Maidan square in Kiev from November 2013 to February 2014 (chapter 5); the second case study addresses the antecedent of the armed conflict in Mali from November 2010 to January 2012 (chapter 6).” Based on the idea of conflict as a social system stated above, the case studies’ agenda entails reconstructing discursive clusters that emerged around a common conflict reference, i.e. mapping conflict- related linguistic communication. Concerning the analysis of the Malian case, for example, this requires having a close look at the ‘story’ that lies in between the following statements (italics added):

“Today, we are declaring the birth of the National Movement of Azawad (MNA) which is a political organisation of Azawad that defends and approves a peaceful policy in order to achieve legitimate goals.” (Founding Statement, MNA 1.11.2010)

“President Amadou Toumani Touré straightforwardly reveals his preference for a violent confrontation to the detriment of political dialogue. [...] solely the president and the local militia under his control bear the heavy responsibility of triggering a violent upheaval in Azawad. [...] Now, the people of Azawad will claim the right to self-defence in reaction to this military invasion.” (Press Release, MNLA 12.01.2012)

Now, how did those statements emerge from the discursive space that represents the Malian conflict system? How did MNA’s/MNLAs perception of violence as a legitimate means of political action change over time? As these examples of case- specific research questions suggest, one of the main objectives of the systematic reconstruction that has been conducted within the framework of the case studies was to identify turning points or key discursive marks in the process of conflict development.

6 Even though violence is not considered to be an essential element of conflict escalation per se, understanding the legitimisation of violence, or even more in-depth, asking for what is named as ‘violence’ in specific discourses is a pivotal research interest in conflict studies (see e.g. Jabri 1996).

7 In Part I, the theoretical and methodological framework of this study will be developed step-bystep with the help of cursory examples from both case studies throughout. A more detailed argumentation regarding case selection will be given in chapter 4.2. For now, it can be stated that both Ukraine and Mali represent rather tricky cases in the light of more traditional analytical settings in conflict studies. Nota bene: The case studies have been conducted separately, as plausibility probes; the present research design does therefore not involve engaging in any form of systematic comparative case studies.

Richard Bösch: Observing Conflict Escalation in World Society World Society in Peace and Conflict Studies

In an overall view, however, this study is not only designed to contribute to case study research on armed conflict and war but also to contribute to theoretical and methodological developments in the broader context of Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS). In this regard, one ofthe main challenges is to advance those theories in social sciences that are based on the nation state as a key conceptual element, especially when it comes to its still structuring impact on the perception of conflicts.’ In this contribution, the concept of social conflict goes towards transcending some of the disciplinary orthodoxies that often narrow conflict research to certain levels of analysis or specific ideas about structures and actors.” More precisely, the idea of social conflict presented here is part of an impartial and broad systems- theoretical perspective that considers conflicts as being inherently embedded in a world societal communicative framework. With this, it draws on recent developments at the intersection of constructivist International Relations (IR) and Luhmannian systems theory and thus sees itself as further exploring the ‘IR- sociologynexus’.”°

Considering the above cited accounts on the Malian conflict, for example, a good argument can be made that the conflict emerged from a network of social, economic, political, and other relations on different transnational levels at once. The perception of its conflict parties, issues and forms is thus constituted within multiple cross- border relationships. In this sense, the Malian conflict can be understood as a conflict in world society. Seen from this angle, the present study offers a perspective on conflicts understood as specific discursive arenas developing in world society. Hence, conflict escalation is linked to communication from functionally differentiated social realms that overlap and, at the same time, produce inducements for contradiction. Or, to put it another way,