Front matter

SpringerBriefs in International Relations Yuichi Hosoya - Hans Kundnani_ Editors

The Transformation

of the Liberal International Order Evolutions and Limitations

Introduction: Japan and the Reform of the Liberal

Yuichi Hosoya

American Strategy and the Liberal International Order ...

Chapter 1 R) Introduction: Japan and the Reform geai of the Liberal International Order Yuichi Hosoya

Abstract Facing the rise of authoritarian states—namely Russian and China—the liberal international order has arguably declined and retreated during the last decade. The United Nations adopted a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion in Ukraine on March 2, 2022, but forty nations either voted against or abstained. Countries labelled as global swinging states or the global south criticize the liberal international order of being dominated by Western civilization. The following chapters of this book aim to find possible shared perceptions and junctures between Japan, Europe, the United States and Indo-Pacific countries, which could reform the liberal international order, giving it a more global outlook and a better reach.

The Decline of the Liberal International Order

In the last decade, the decline of the liberal international order has been continuously debated. Many point out that the liberal international order, as we know it, has retreated, particularly with the rise of authoritarian regimes such as China and Russia.

A sense of crisis was enhanced when Donald Trump was elected as the new American president in November 2017. Professor John Ikenberry of Princeton University argued that: “For the first time since the 1930s, the United States has elected a president who is actively hostile to liberal internationalism.”! In addition to this, Ikenberry also argued that: “Britain’s decision to leave the EU, and a myriad other troubles besetting Europe, appear to mark an end to the long postwar project of building a greater union.”? Thus, we needed to ask whether we would be able to defend the existence of the resilient liberal international order even before Russia began its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

! John Ikenberry (2018).

Ibid.

Y. Hosoya (EX) Faculty of Law, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan

International Order, SpringerBriefs in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4729-4_1

2 Y. Hosoya

The decline of the liberal international order was not simply caused by the ideology and the actions of a new American president who often expressed criticism towards liberal internationalism. A much deeper problem lies in the decline of American power and influence in the international community. Thus, there are several reasons why the problem of the decline of American influence has been debated by various influential thinkers.

First, the failure of American attempts to expand democracy both in Afghanistan and in Iraq has nurtured an impression of limitations to the power projection of the U.S. The spread of the Islamic State in Iraq and in Syria, as well as the reluctance of the U.S. government to engage in the region, has illuminated uncertainty for the future of the liberal international order. With the retreat of American forces in the region, the reputation and the authority of the U.S. in the international community has been seriously damaged. It was not so difficult for China and Russia to fill the vacuum that the retreat of American forces left in the region. Russian unilateral annexation of Crimea in 2014 is one example of how the authoritarian powers began to expand their influence around them.

It is broadly perceived that the age of great power competition began with the decline of the liberal international order in the late 2010s. Given this view, it is more important than ever to observe how China and Russia expand their influence in each region in the world today.

Second, the rise of the so-called Global South has been transforming the norms and values of the international order that the West had consolidated in the last few centuries. The two most populous powers, India and China, have repeatedly criticized how Western Civilization has dominated the international order while their own values are not seriously taken into consideration. In short, it is repeatedly argued that the international order today must be more globalized now than in previous centuries when the West was able to dominate.

Even though the decline or the crisis of the liberal international order has been thoroughly debated by many commentators, it is now necessary to link it with the rise of the Global South and also the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has seriously been undermining the liberal international order as we have known it. In this volume, we have assembled valuable arguments on the limitations of the liberal international order in a time of crisis.

Japan and Europe Defend the Liberal International Order

Having faced the abdication of global leadership by President Trump who favored “America First” policies, Ikenberry emphasizes the importance of the role of other leading liberal democracies such as Japan and Germany. He wrote in his article in Foreign Affairs that:

1 Introduction: Japan and the Reform of the Liberal International Order 3

If the liberal international order is to survive, leaders and constituencies around the world that still support it will need to step up. Much will rest on the shoulders of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan and Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, the only two leaders of consequence left standing who support it.?

Around this time, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe began to promote an important new diplomatic initiative, called “the free and open Indo-Pacific” vision. As the longest-serving prime minister in Japanese political history, Prime Minister Abe could enjoy a strong political foundation where he could present important diplomatic initiatives that previous prime ministers could not during their short terms in office.

Thus, Jeffrey Hornung of Rand Corporation wrote that, “Under the current prime minister, Shinzo Abe, Japan’s role in supporting the international order has been particularly notable.”* Hornung also argued that: “It was part of his broader Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, which the Trump administration later endorsed and which places more of the burden on Japan for protecting freedom, the rule of law, and market economies in the region.”»

At the opening session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) on August 27, 2016, Prime Minister Abe proposed to link the two oceans, the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, by promoting both the rule of law and the connectivity in and among sub-regions there. He then advocated to further accelerate the economic growth of the Indo-Pacific region. While the U.S. government under President Trump began to present a more confrontational approach to China around this time, Japan defended an alternative vision both to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and to the Trumpian inward-looking MAGA (Make American Great Again) approach. As Japan’s approach is both broader and more inclusive in its regional order vision, Japan’s free and open Indo-Pacific vision has been embraced by leading powers in Asia and in Europe.’

By proposing a broader vision in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan has been regarded as a leading defender of the liberal international order. Thus, Yoichi Funabashi and John Ikenberry wrote that “it is unsurprising that the world is turning to Japan to shoulder greater responsibility in shaping the liberal international order.” According to Funabashi and Ikenberry, “Japan has begun taking on this mantle as the primary driver of the Comprehensive Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) negotiations after the U.S. withdrawal, and through signing an Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU.” Japan has been playing a crucial role as “Japan would suffer the

3 John Ikenberry (2017).

s Hornung (2018).

> Ibid.

6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2016).

8 Funabashi and John Ikenberry, “Introduction: Japan and the Liberal International Order” in Funabashi and Ikenberry (eds.), The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism, p. 3.

4 Y. Hosoya greatest strategic losses” with the decline of the postwar liberal international order, as Funabashi and Ikenberry have argued.”

It should be noted that, with Japan’s role as such, the Indo-Pacific region has become the center of global politics in recent years. At the same time, the U.S. and China are not just struggling to expand their power and interests in the region; they are also struggling to present a more attractive vision of the regional order. Japan and the U.S. have been working together to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific. Even though the emphasis and rhetoric are different, the Trump administration also published its own version of Indo-Pacific strategy on June 1, 2019—two years later than Japan began this diplomatic initiative.'°

On 17 July 2018, Japan and the European Union signed the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) together with the Strategic Partnership Agreement in Tokyo. Although there existed several sensitive issues between the two sides, the EU showed its strong energy to conclude and also to ratify these agreements at the time when the American president repeatedly criticized its own allies across the Atlantic Ocean. It was generally perceived that the EU needed its closer cooperation with Japan in order to defend the rules-based international order that was under attack.

Thus, leading European countries, such as France, Germany and the Netherlands published their own versions of the Indo-Pacific strategy between 2019 and 2020. The EU itself also published its Indo-Pacific strategy entitled, “The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” on 16 September 2021.'! It became clearer that Japan and Europe were willing to take on more leading role, as proposed by Ikenberry, when Donald Trump came into the presidential office.

Between the West and the Rest

However, it should be questioned whether the liberal international order that the West had documented mainly after 1945 could be appropriately embraced by the “Rest.” Thus, Hans Kundnani argues that “these documents based on liberal principles were signed only by Western powers” and: “There was no document that laid out the basis for a specifically liberal international order that was agreed on by all the world’s powers.”!* Kundnani rightly argued that “it is not only in authoritarian states such as China and Russia that the liberal international order, and American ‘hegemony’, is perceived differently than in the West.”!?

In this way, the liberal international order must be truly globalized with a broader and stronger foundation. However, with the General Assembly of the United Nations “Adopts Resolution Demanding Russian Federation Immediately End Illegal Use of

? Ibid.

10 The Department of Defense (2019), The U.S. Department of State (2019). 1 European Commission (2021).

12 Hans Kundnani (2017).

'3 Ibid.

1 Introduction: Japan and the Reform of the Liberal International Order 5

Force in Ukraine, Withdraw All Troops” on 2 March 2022, 40 nations either abstained or were opposed to the sanction against Russia.'* This result showed that even the most vital norms of the liberal international order are not so easily shared by all member states of the United Nations. There exists a gap between the West and the authoritarian states, thus Daniel M. Kliman and Richard Fontaine aptly labelled some states as “Global Swing States” a decade ago before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022.!°

Reforming the Liberal International Order

In this volume, we will examine how the current liberal international order is perceived in each country in Asia and in Europe. Unlike the U.S. and China, Japan alone does not have sufficient resources to maintain and enhance the liberal international order. At the same time, we need to face the more existential problem of how to define the liberal international order. On this issue, it is necessary to remember that the liberal international order needs to be reformed with a more global outlook. Japan is a kind of a “frontline state” and the U.S.-China structural confrontation has been defining the future of the international order. Thus, we need to ask how the liberal international order will be affected by these recent trends in global politics.

Even though the U.S. remains at the center of global politics, we should not overlook the role of other powers in Asia, Europe and beyond, in defending, and also in reforming, the existing liberal international order. I hope that this volume will contribute to addressing these discussions.

Acknowledgment The LIO Project under the Asia Pacific Initiative (API) up to June 30, 2022 and under the International House of Japan (IHJ) since July 1, 2022 was funded by the National Endowment for Democracy. I thank all supporters of this Project.

European Commission. (2021). Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/jointcommunication-indo-pacific_en

Hornung J. W. (2018). The fate of the world order rests on Tokyo’s shoulder. Foreign Policy. https:/ /foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/30/the-fate-of-the-world-order-rests-on-tokyos-shoulders/

Hosoya, Y. (2019). FOIP 2.0: The evolution of Japan’s free and open Indo-Pacific strategy. Asia- Pacific Review, 26(1), 18-28.

John Ikenberry, G. (2017). The plot against American foreign policy. Foreign Affairs 3.

John Ikenberry, G. (2018). The end of liberal international order? International Affairs, 94(1), 7.

'4 The United Nations, GA/12407 (2022). 15 Kliman and Fontaine (2012).

6 Y. Hosoya

Kliman, D. M., & Fontaine R. (2012). Global swing states: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey and the future international order. The German Marshall Fund of the United States/Center for New American Security. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/global-swing-states-brazilindia-indonesia-turkey-and-the-future-of-international-order

Kundnani H. (2017). What is the liberal international order? The German Marshall Fund of the United States. https://www.gmfus.org/news/what-liberal-international-order

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2016). Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the opening session. In Sixth Tokyo international conference on African development (TICAD VI). https:// www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html

The Department of Defense. (2019). Indo-Pacific strategy report: Preparedness, partnerships, and promoting a networked region. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/ 1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEG Y-REPORT-2019.PDF

The U.S. Department of State. (2019). The U.S. Department of State also issued its own version of the Indo-Pacific strategy later in the same year. A free and open Indo-Pacific: Toward a shared vision. The Department of State. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/1 1/Free-and- Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf

The United Nations, GA/12407 (2022) General assembly overwhelmingly adopts resolution demanding Russian federation immediately end illegal use of force in Ukraine, withdraw all troops. https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12407.doc.htm

Funabashi, Y. (202). Preface. In Y. Funabashi & G. J. Ikenberry (eds.), The crisis of liberal internationalism: Japan and the world order (p. viii). Brookings Institution Press (p. viii).

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Chapter 2 A) American Strategy and the Liberal get International Order Zack Cooper

Abstract Is the world unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar? This is a fundamental question for international relations scholars, many of whom stress the importance of structure on patterns of state behavior (see, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Waveland Press (1979)). But on this critical issue, Americans are deeply divided. Furthermore, there are substantial differences between the views of Americans and those of key allies and partners abroad. As a result, there is a growing divide between how many Americans see the world—as either unipolar or bipolar—and how it is perceived by most others: increasingly multipolar. This has substantial implications for U.S. strategy. Most importantly, it will impede efforts to build strong and sustainable coalitions, which are necessary to bolster the liberal international order.

Differing Views of Power and Influence

Americans tend to be convinced that maintaining a military edge is important and are relatively confident in the U.S. military’s current edge. In 2022, 51% of American said the United States is number one in the world militarily, while 47% said it was one of several leaders.'! Furthermore, 68% called it important that the United States be top in the world militarily. A 2019 poll reflected similar figures, with 61% of Americans saying that U.S. policies should try to keep America the only military superpower.” Notably, this was a more popular view among conservatives (80% of whom supported the proposition) than liberals (only 40% of whom agreed). These

1 “U.S, Position in the World,” Gallup (2022) https://news.gallup.com/poll/116350/position-world. aspx. 2 Pew Research Center (2019).

Z. Cooper (EX) American Enterprise Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, USA e-mail: zack.cooper @ aei.org

8 Z. Cooper numbers suggest that a majority of the American public not only believes in the importance of American military primacy, but also believes that it still exists.

The economic situation is viewed more pessimistically by Americans.’ Only 16% of Americans said that the United States has the world’s top economy in 2022, compared to 82% who responded that the United States is one of several leading economic powers.* And a slim plurality of 50% of Americans say it is important for the United States to remain number one in the world economically, compared to 49% who responded that it was not that important as long as the United States remains among the leading economic powers. Yet, despite these figures, confidence in U.S. economic staying power is substantial. In 2021, more Americans said the United States would be the world’s leading economic power in 20 years than thought it was the leading economic power at the time.* This is remarkable optimism given economic trends over the past few decades.

When foreign experts are asked to rate American military and economic power, they tend to be far more skeptical. Trans-Atlantic polling shows that European allies see China and the European Union as more influential than do their American counterparts.° Nonetheless, 59% of those polled in Europe still expect the United States to be a stronger power than China in ten years.’ But the picture is worse for the United States in other regions. For example, only 29% of Southeast Asian experts see the United States as having the most political and strategic influence in their region. The figure was even lower—just 9% —when asked whether the United States has the most economic influence in Southeast Asia. Surveys on U.S. influence in African countries often reflect similar dynamics.” In short, outside the United States there is more skepticism about America’s level of power and influence abroad—in fact, many think Washington’s time in the sun has already passed.

Does it matter that American views of U.S. power and influence differ from those abroad? After all, one can make an argument for either a unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar world. Indeed, the United States remains by far the world’s largest economy, suggesting to some that a unipolar order still exists. For example, the United States is first in accumulated wealth, with an estimated $126 trillion for 2020, compared

3 See, for example, Smeltz et al. (2021). 4 “U.S. Position in the World,” Gallup. 5 “U.S. Position in the World,” Gallup.

6 “Transatlantic Trends 2021,” The German Marshall Fund of the United States and Bertelsmann Foundation (August 2021) https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/202 1-08/TT2021_Web_ Version.pdf.

7 Krastev and Leonard (2021). 8 Seah et al. (2022). ° Ward et al. (2021).

2 American Strategy and the Liberal International Order 9 to China with $74 trillion.!° These two figures together account for 48% of global wealth. No other economy comes close, with Japan next at $27 trillion (6.5% of global wealth), followed by Germany, the United Kingdom, and France, each with $15-20 trillion.

These figures suggest that the United States and China are clearly the world’s two largest economies (although China still stands at only 58% of U.S. wealth). Yet, this still does not mean that the world is either unipolar or bipolar. Europe, if aggregated, still has roughly $100 trillion in wealth—roughly on par with the United States and China. With many European leaders calling for greater autonomy— effectively greater distance from the United States—many in Europe argue that it must be recognized as a separate pole. The same could be true of India, which is still seeking an approach that allows it substantial flexibility, as well as a number of other major countries from Japan to Russia.

This creates an unusual situation in which many of the leading powers disagree not just on their relative power, but on the very polarity of the system itself. Such differences should come as no surprise to international relations scholars, since assessments of one’s own power are often overly optimistic, even far after the point at which one’s relative power has peaked and started to decline.'! Leaders and their publics tend to focus on the metrics that show their country is powerful and influential over those that suggest weakness and decline.

For all these reasons, many Americans still view the United States as the world’s leading (or only) superpower, while many abroad see the world as increasingly multipolar. But China has been catching up quickly in recent decades, implying that a bipolar world may be emerging. To the extent that Americans recognize other great powers, they are therefore likely to identify China as the main (and often only) real rival to the United States. Yet, few abroad share this diagnosis, and even some leading Americans are now starting to question whether we are in or entering an era of multipolarity.'”

There is a growing risk that American policymakers will view competition with China through the lens of bipolarity, while their counterparts abroad perceive an increasingly multipolar world. The Trump administration talked frequently about the need to focus on “great power competition” in which the countries recognized as great powers tended to be the United States, China, and Russia.'? The Biden administration has abandoned this terminology but embraced “strategic competition” and cited China as the “pacing challenge.”'* Both these approaches suggest that

3“Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,” U.S. Department of Defense (2018) https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National- Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

4 “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” The White House (March 2021) https://www. whitehouse. gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.

10 Z. Cooper the United States sees itself and China (and less frequently Russia) as the main protagonists on the international scene.

The problem with these framings is that they downplay the role of other key countries, including a number of U.S. allies—such as Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France—that are crucial players in their own right. By suggesting that the world is bipolar, American leaders effectively deprive these allies of agency. Furthermore, this framing undermines what makes an American-led world most attractive to others: the notion that the United States has adopted a more inclusive approach to order-building (especially when it comes to other leading liberal states) than most previous hegemons.!>

(Mis)Managing Multipolarity

The reality is that the current order is multipolar and growing more so by the year. Gone is the unipolar moment in which the United States had no serious challenger. China’s rapid economic development and military modernization have catapulted it to the level of a superpower. Moreover, a number of the world’s other great powers are increasingly seeking more autonomy from the United States and China, rather than alignment with either of these powers.'’ Unlike the Cold War when most of the world’s top economies were clearly aligned with either the United States or the Soviet Union, circumstances today are far different. Few countries are openly aligned with the United States or China—most are trying to maintain the ability to adjust their policies and alignments as their interests demand. This bears all the hallmarks of a multipolar system.

How must the United States alter its approach if itis to adapt to this more multipolar world? Most importantly, U.S. leaders must look to build coalitions rather than attract countries into the U.S. orbit.!8 Many U.S. allies and partners are willing to cooperate with the United States when their interests demand it, but few are willing to “choose” between the United States and China. Most countries want to maintain good relations with both Washington and Beijing.!? The key question, therefore, is not how the United States can convince other countries to join its side in a bipolar rivalry. Instead, Washington will have to accept that different countries will align on different issues at different times.

The central challenge in the years ahead will be managing shifting coalitions composed of various poles. The United States cannot do this coalition-building on its own. After all, U.S. objectives will shift with American elections, so relying on

15 John Ikenberry (2019). 16 On definitions of unipolarity, see Monteiro (2014).

17 Lim and Cooper (2015) https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2015.110 3130?journalCode=fsst20.

'8 Brands and Cooper (2020). 19 Loong (2020).

2 American Strategy and the Liberal International Order 11

Washington alone will inhibit a robust international architecture. Instead, the United States needs a small handful of countries that share its interests and values, not in one domain but in many. The United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada are all wellpositioned to provide guidance as part of a central “steering group” that might advise the United States on how best to approach this coalition building effort.

But in many ways, Japan is an even more obvious strategic partner. Japan is the most capable U.S. treaty ally in the most important part of the world. Japan boasts the world’s third largest economy. Japan is a technology leader. And Japan holds similar views on a range of global governance issues. For all these reasons, Japan is perfectly positioned to help the United States develop and build the coalitions needed for managing an increasingly multipolar system. Japan can help guide the United States when it needs advice, and pick up the pieces (as with the Trans-Pacific Partnership) when it missteps. But this will only be possible if U.S. leaders recognize the need to devolve more power and responsibility to other poles in the system.

The word “multipolarity” does not appear in the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, but the reality is that the world is increasingly multipolar. The faster U.S. leaders recognize and accept this reality, the sooner they will be able to develop strategies designed not to maintain a unipolar moment that has passed or win a mischaracterized bipolar competition, but adapt the liberal international order for the new reality of emerging multipolarity.

Brands, H., & Cooper, Z. (2020). The great game with China is 3D chess. Foreign Policy. https:// foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/30/china-united-states-great-game-cold-war/

Edelstein, D. M. (2020). Over the horizon: Time, uncertainty, and the rise of great powers. Cornell University Press.

Gallup. (2022). https://news.gallup.com/poll/1 16350/position-world.aspx

Haass, R. N., & Kupchan, C. A. (2021). The new concert of power. Foreign Affairs. https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/202 | -03-23/new-concert-powers

John Ikenberry, G. (2019). After victory: Institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars. Princeton University Press.

Krastev, I., & Leonard, M. (2021). The crisis of American power: How Europeans see Biden’s America. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-crisis-of-ame rican-power-how-europeans-see-bidens-america/

Lim, D. J., & Cooper, Z. (2015). Reassessing hedging: The logic of alignment in East Asia. Security Studies, 24(4). https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2015.1103130?journalCode=fsst20

Loong, L. H. (2020). The endangered Asian century. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/asia/2020-06-04/lee-hsien-loong-endangered-asian-century

Monteiro, N. P. (2014). Theory of unipolar politics. Cambridge University Press.

Pew Research Center. (2019). In a politically polarized era, sharp divides in both partisan coalitions. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/12/17/6-views-of-foreign-policy/

Seah, S., et al. (2022). The state of Southeast Asia: 2022. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. https://www. iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/The-State-of-SEA-2022_FA_Digital_FINAL.pdf

12 Z. Cooper

Shorrocks, A., Davies, J., & Lluberas, R. (2021). Global wealth report 2021. Credit Suisse Research Institute. https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us/en/reports-research/global-wealthreport.html

Smeltz, D., Daalder, I., Friedhoff, K., Kafura, C., & Sullivan, E. (2021). A foreign policy for the middle class—What Americans think. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. https://globalaff airs.org/sites/default/files/202 1-10/ccs2021_fpmc_0.pdf.

Ward, G., Kiss, E., & Savage, P. (2021). The eagle and the dragon in Africa: Comparing data on Chinese and American influence. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/theeagle-and-the-dragon-in-africa-comparing-data-on-chinese-and-american-influence/

Chapter 3 A) East Asia, Europe and the High Sea: The as Geostrategic Trinity of the U.S.-Led

Order

Luis Simón

Abstract The U.S.-led international order rests on a geostrategic trinity, that is: “command of the sea,” and the other global commons such as airspace, outer space and cyber-space, and the preservation of favorable balances of power in East Asia and Europe. The U.S. and its allies’ powers and institutions underpin the international order, while the economic and political rise of China is leading to greater contestation of that order. The Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are increasingly interconnected, which could create a basis for Europeans to make more of a contribution to security in the Indo-Pacific. The Euro-Atlantic allies should avoid the trap of overpreparing to fight the war in continental Europe, and focus more on how they may contribute to deterring a future war in East Asia, and to the preservation of command of the commons.

This chapter zooms in on the hardware of the U.S.-led international order. I argue that such order rests on a geostrategic trinity: “command of the sea,” and the other global commons (i.e., airspace, outer space and cyber-space), and the preservation of favorable balances of power in East Asia and Europe. These three elements are linked. Command of the commons is critical to the effective projection of military power onto Europe and East Asia, as well as to the preservation of favorable balances in those two regions. In turn, such favorable balances help keep at bay those great powers that may otherwise be in a position to challenge command of the commons.

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The Transformation of the Liberal International Order

About this book

Front matter

Contents

Chapter 1 R) Introduction: Japan and the Reform geai of the Liberal International Order Yuichi Hosoya

Chapter 2 A) American Strategy and the Liberal get International Order Zack Cooper

The end

The Transformation of the Liberal International Order

About this book

Front matter

Contents

Chapter 1 R) Introduction: Japan and the Reform geai of the Liberal International Order Yuichi Hosoya

Chapter 2 A) American Strategy and the Liberal get International Order Zack Cooper

The end

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