International Politics and the Search for Peace

Front matter

AND

N WAHE SARC

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

Contents

Foreword 6

Preface 1

INTRODUCTION: Perspectives on the Problems of International Politics ------- 15 I. The Transformation of the Struggle for Power 16

Preface

Writing involves forming a clear position and developing a commitment to that position. I felt this to be particularly true when I was writing this book.

In the past, I wrote on my thoughts concerning specific issues in Japan's foreign and security policies. Of course, these thoughts were developed from my own basic way of thinking, which then became firm convictions through discussions with others. It would be fair to say that my thoughts on international politics have been shaped by that process. Still, as I once again thought about international politics in general while reconfirming basic points I had made earlier, it made me think more deeply about points that had been left vague. Since I ordinarily tend not to think in conceptual terms, that was a demanding process, but I have learned a lot from it.

For example, it is possible to lay out the pros and cons of possessing a military force in given situations without necessarily having to lay out one’s own fundamental attitude towards it, because one can still comment about a current event by saying what one thinks is happening and what the results will be in a given situation. Observers have long employed the logic that “current conditions demand that we use armaments” and “military forces are a necessary evil.” In contrast, by specifying our basic principles on peace and the use of military force, we will be compelled to not make excuses that are dependent on circumstances and instead be forced to clearly state our own position that

II should be applicable in any situation.

The reader will discover that this book does not advocate any specific measures as a credible pathway to peace. Instead, it argues that no such thing exists. This does not change the fact that in this book I have made my own positions clear. Indeed, I take up and explore several specific measures for achieving peace. I have reached the conclusion that all of them are, in the end, inadequate, and that we should treat each of them with strong reservations rather than simply praise them.

When we talk about peace, we seem to think about it in the abstract. We pin our hopes on this abstract peace, and contrast that peace with our fears of the real world. Peace, however, does not exist in the abstract. Every instance of peace has required conditions attached to it. This places us in a difficult situation. But we have a duty to face up to the difficulties.

As I was writing this book, I reflected on the studies and debates I have joined, and what I have tried to say each time. ‘These reflections have provided the framework for this book, but they have also highlighted certain inadequacies, which I have tried to correct.

This process also made me realize—much to my delight—that my research and ideas have been built upon certain unwavering principles, and I owe a debt of intellectual influences to many people. It is my pleasure to acknowledge them here. First, I am indebted to Hagihara Nobutoshi, Nagai Yonosuke, and Tominaga Ker’ichi, who all have done so much for me through our many discussions in recent years. In particular, Mr. Hagihara taught me how deeply confused Japanese politicians were after World War I. Also, while writing this book I gleaned numerous ideas from actual examples of European diplomacy, and I need to express my deep gratitude to Taoka Ryoichi, who repeatedly advised me on the importance of research on European diplomatic

I2

Preface history ever since I finished my undergraduate studies. I am also indebted to Inoki Masamichi for developing my ability to look at historical sources from a variety of angles—including the angle of confirming the authenticity of the history that the materials portray—and to engage in free thoughts about those materials.

The list of people to whom I owe thanks is endless; it is one that I could even take back to my childhood. For example, I have been blessed by having had exceptional teachers from elementary school through senior high school. And I owe much to my father, Kosaka Masaaki. ‘Things he told me made me see Immanuel Kant as difficult, and stirred my interest in Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I believe that the tastes I developed then remain with me today.

Finally, the fact that I had the chance to meet with George F. Kennan and have a friendly chat with him about Anton Chekhov is due to an invitation I received from Matsumoto Shigeharu, and I wish to express my thanks to him as well.

Kosaka Masataka August 1966

I3

Preface

Introduction

Perspectives on the Problems of International Politics

« R eal civilization cannot exist

[ | in the absence of a certain play-element, for civilization presupposes limitation and mastery of the self, the ability not to confuse its own tendencies with the ultimate and highest goal, but to understand that it is enclosed within certain bounds freely accepted. Civilization will, in a sense, always be played according to certain rules, and true civilization will always demand fair play.” Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play- Element in Culture, 1938'

l © The Transformation of the Struggle for Power

“Complex Mysteries”

“Complex mysteries” (fukuzatsu kaiki)—with this well-remembered phrase, then-prime minister Hiranuma Kiichir6 and his cabinet resigned at the end of August 1939, following the news that Germany and the Soviet Union had entered into a Non-Aggression Pact (commonly known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact). The fact that Germany, which with its strongly anti-communist ideology had served as the fortress protecting Europe from communism and had concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan—now formed this alliance with its former arch enemy, threw both Japan’s government and its people, neither of which were capable of understanding the world in terms of power politics, into a state of complete confusion.

At the risk of overstatement, the failure of Japan’s prewar diplomacy manifests itself in the particular turn of phrase: “complex mysteries.” It is a matter of course for international politics to comprise a bundle of complex mysteries. This is not particularly surprising, and it certainly would not amount to something that, for example, constitutes legitimate grounds for a cabinet to resign.

At that time, however, nearly every Japanese was baffled by the “complex mysteries” of international politics and had no idea what Japan as a nation should do. Consequently, the Japanese government could not devise an adequate response to cope with the vicissitudes of international politics of that time. After the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was concluded, the Japanese government initially made a knee-jerk attempt to approach Great Britain and the United States. However, this fell through in the face of a chilly response from the United States. Then in the wake of Germany's eye-opening victories in Europe, Japan vacillated and again sought to strengthen bilateral ties with Germany. Just one year after Berlin and Moscow launched their pact, Japan and Italy joined with Germany in signing the Tripartite Pact to create the Axis Powers.

Thus, the fact is that Japan, without any firm intentions one way or the other, had been swept up in developments without fully understanding what was happening, and this is one of major reasons why it stumbled into war.

Of course, the causes of the Pacific War, like those of any war, should not be oversimplified. As many scholars have pointed out, there is no doubt that the chief reason why Japan led itself into war is because it was unable to keep in check the two forces driving the nation in that direction: the distinctive character of Japan's military; and its social system, which made it unclear where ultimate responsibility lay. Nonetheless, it is also true that developments in international politics prior to World War II were highly complex, and the responsibility for engaging in war is not limited to the Japanese leaders who were mistaken in their forecasts.

Even Josef Stalin himself, so proficient a schemer, mistakenly thought that Adolf Hitler would not attack the Soviet Union. But the fact is that when it came to deception, Hitler was a real genius. The dramatic changes then occurring throughout the world were what made such deceptions possible. Therefore, we should first acknowledge just how difficult it was to weather those changes.

Also, we would be wrong to think that the people who spoke about

“complex mysteries” were simple and ignorant. That turn of phrase has

|. The Transformation of the Struggle for Power the flavor of a graybeard worldliness that deals with failure without assigning blame to any of the parties involved. Furthermore, turning to domestic power politics, “complex mysteries” presented Japanese politicians with a convenient opportunity to take advantage of how baffled people were by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and use that situation to make changes in domestic politics. For better or worse, Japanese politicians certainly didn’t take a back seat to anyone when it came to political plotting. However, the undeniable fact is that Japan's politicians, whose approach to domestic politics is very much of a power-politics type, were incapable of adapting to that type of politics in the international arena.

Peculiar Perceptions of International Politics

This discrepancy is due to the difference in the assumptions that Japanese make when observing domestic politics in contrast to international politics. When people look at the world, they do not do so from a blank slate. They do not deal with issues free from their preconceived attitudes. People take notice of certain facts, and have assumptions that influence how they decide what those facts mean. Present realities are seen through the lenses of such assumptions.

However, people’s assumptions regarding domestic politics and international politics clearly differ. They naturally expect the complex power struggles that unfold in domestic politics. They do not unpackage these assumptions even when they talk about law and justice. However, Japanese tend to see international politics through the lenses of assumptions that are simpler and more abstract. Naturally, such simpler assumptions get undercut by how international politics actually unfold. And as international politics develop people get confused and cannot adapt to what happens. “Complex mysteries” is indeed the archetypical verbal description of this situation. International politics usually is regarded as a complex mystery. The reason why that is the case is because the people who observe such politics do so based on simplistic assumptions. The failure of prewar Japanese diplomacy was rooted in the gap between Japanese assumptions about international politics and the realities of how such politics actually played out.

As observers have often noted, no such gap existed during the Meiji period (1867-1912). In those days, Japanese politicians acted based on an acute awareness of power politics in international society. This is how a small country like Japan was able to survive the vicissitudes of power politics from the end of the nineteenth century through the start of the twentieth century.

That said, merely praising Meiji-period politicians and censuring as mediocre those who immediately followed them does not enable us to understand either the tragedy of the Pacific War or the difficulties of international politics. The changes that caused the difficulty occurred in international politics, not in the attitudes or behavior of

Japanese politicians.

The Transformation of International Politics

The nature of international politics clearly was transformed after World War I. Put simply, following that conflict, states began to discuss the problems of international politics in terms of “peace.”

When Japan joined international society in the mid-nineteenth century, naked and brazen power politics was the norm and it was so up until World War I. Each state tried to pursue its national interest by skillfully balancing powers. Wars were legitimate means of foreign policy. Major powers agreed on spheres of influence over, and at the expense of, small nations in the name of maintaining the balance of power.

|. The Transformation of the Struggle for Power

It is not correct to assume that international politics at the time was merely an arena without any order, ruled only by violence. Nakae Choémin, in his famous work Sansuijin keirin mondo (A Discourse by Three Drunkards on Government), criticized such notions as “overthinking” (karyo). While international politics is, at its core, power politics (that is to say, a struggle for power), the struggle takes place under certain rules and within a certain framework. However, it is also a fact that international politics in the pre-World War I period took as their basic principles considerations of power and national interests.

In contrast, the Soviet Union and the United States—the two exemplars of the “new diplomacy” of the post-World War I period— applied different concepts and principles to their thinking about international politics and decisions about their behavior. Although Vladimir Lenin and Woodrow Wilson were the political leaders responsible for their respective countries, both clearly rejected power politics. Both called out to the general public in ideological language. Moreover, what they were saying was not mere propaganda. ‘This was very confusing for those who had lived through the era when power politics were being pursued so nakedly.

Perhaps the diary of Privy Council member It6 Miyoji, published as Suiuso nikki (Diary of the Green-rain Villa), can give us a glimpse of how confusing the American “new diplomacy” was for Japanese politicians. The members of the Japanese government’s ad hoc Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs (Rinji Gaiko Chésa-kai, commonly known as the Gaikō Chésa-kai), established in 1917 to deal with the emerging situation in international politics after World War I, were unable to get an adequate grasp of this new international situation, although they did recognize that US diplomacy was disrupting the conventional pattern of international politics. An example of this bewilderment can be seen in Ito's remarks in regard to the Siberian Intervention, namely, Japan’s part in the joint intervention by the Allied Powers into the Russian Civil War after the revolution.

The fact is that there are fundamental differences in thinking between Japan and the United States. [emphasis in the original] Therefore, it is of no surprise that there are differences in our respective attitudes. That said, these differences in thinking do not exist solely between Japan and the United States. They also exist between the United States and the Allied Powers. A short list would be:

First, the United States is single-mindedly obsessed by the possibility of hurting Russian national sentiments.

Second, due to that concern over Russian sentiments, Americans claim they cannot afford to devote any time to considering what is at stake in terms of their own national interests. (For now, we will set aside the question of what their true intentions are here.)

Third, based on that attitude, the United States skillfully avoids labeling their dispatch of troops on Vladivostok as an

“intervention, even though it is clearly an intervention of a sort.

However, the question was exactly how Japan was to cope with the new conditions of international politics. For example, people such as Shidehara KĶijūrō, the noted early-twentieth century diplomat and later the prime minister of Japan, saw this new diplomacy on the part of the United States to be the diplomacy of peace and naively supported American initiatives as the basic guideline for Japanese foreign policy. But Shidehara did not fully realize that even though

|. The Transformation of the Struggle for Power international politics was being discussed in terms of peace, this did not mean that power politics had come to an end. Also, he did not pay sufficient attention to the ideological implications of peace diplomacy.

Conversely, there were also those who tried to deal with this change in international politics as though it was no change from the power politics of the earlier age. As It6 Miyoji said, whatever one may call it, intervention is intervention. By no means was this an inappropriate way of looking at the situation. For military strength, after all, is the ultimate tool of international politics. However, the observers wound up ignoring the change in how that power was used.

Therefore, Japanese views of international politics split into two extreme schools of thought, with one group talking about peace and the other continuing to engage in power struggles.

Moreover, the Russian Revolution introduced an ideological element that obscured the distinction between international and domestic politics. Fundamentally, the Soviet Union had an ideology that called for solidarity among the workers of the world. At the same time, it positioned itself as the motherland of that ideology. This posed an extremely difficult problem in terms of the relationship between how other countries dealt with the Soviet Union as an independent state and how they dealt with the expansion of communism. Some tried to deal with the Soviet Union as a sovereign state, and accordingly treated it as a power in international politics, while others attempted to deal with it essentially as the proponent of an ideological movement. Japanese politicians saw communism as something that itself was inseparable from the Soviet Union. Thus, Japanese tended to attribute any Soviet moves to its ideology. This assumption was greatly shaken by the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact.

Where the Problem Lies Although the basic conditions of the world changed considerably after

World War I due to a strong pacifist sentiment and the rise of communist ideology, neither the Japanese people nor politicians possessed any intellectual framework that allowed them to correctly understand international politics. This divided Japanese national opinion and led to the coining of the phrase “complex mysteries” (fukuzatsu kaiki). Perhaps this shortcoming continues to exist even today. At the very least, the new circumstances of international politics that emerged after World War I still persist. Are we intellectually better prepared to understand international politics today? Is it possible that we are repeating the same mistakes by trying to interpret international politics through some simple schema, or by giving up on trying to understand international politics and merely talking about its “complex mysteries?”

I become apprehensive when I see issues such as power politics, peace movements, and ideology being discussed as if they were completely unrelated. People seem to think that aspirations toward peace have no connection with power politics. Furthermore, most people seem to think that ideology and peace movements are different matters altogether. However, the desires for peace that exist today are ideologically colored to some degree and are supported by one power or another.

This is because the aspirations for peace and one or another ideological worldview both aim toward achieving a certain kind of international order. The peace diplomacy of the United States is colored by its specific ideology. The reason communist ideology is attractive to people is related to the fact that it offers one possible path toward peace. Both sets of aspirations for peace are rooted in their respective ideologies. Until World War I, diplomats did not seek a universal order, but were satisfied with an incomplete international order provided by a balance

|. The Transformation of the Struggle for Power of power. However, for various reasons, after that war they came to want a more firmly established order.

Still, one should expect that any order would be underpinned by a specific value system (ideology) and by specific powers. That is why power struggles arise in the quest for order.

Of course these new struggles differ from traditional ones. In conducting foreign policy, no country can ignore its own beliefs, which limit the scope of its actions. The current realities of international politics are not consistent with the nineteenth-century worldview that accepted the naked conduct of power politics. However, this does not mean that nations now eschew power politics in their practice of international politics. Power struggles take place in the form of questioning what sort of peace is being sought.

Accordingly, regardless of the subjective intent of the person raising such questions, talking about peace is inevitably connected to the struggle for power. What we can say is that our understanding of present-day international politics begins and ends with our understanding of its complexity.

Il - Lhe Three Levels of International Politics

The Good Egg/Bad Egg Theory

The question of peace has always been perceived in an overly simplistic manner. Perhaps it is due to our intellectual laziness. The good egg/ bad egg way of thinking posits that peace can be achieved by discovering the motives for a specific power’s decision to go to war and then eliminating that motive or motives. This premise is a key reason why intellectual laziness exists even if we work hard on our ability to take action. Humans have adopted exactly the same attitudes since antiquity whenever they face a difficult situation. At such times, we look for the “bad egg”—someone or something to blame—and satisfy ourselves by punishing them.

This does away with the burden of hard thinking in two ways. First, it is clear and straightforward. Second, it allows people to live without having to make any changes. Needless to say, this approach does not actually solve any problems. The passion to eradicate bad eggs does, however, incite our fighting instincts and encourage us to take action. Outright conflict does break out occasionally between good and bad. Fighting is intoxicating because it leads us to believe that our problems will be solved through victories. It is also true that conflicts can solve problems to some extent by delivering societies a jolt.

This pattern of behavior has manifested itself repeatedly when the risk of war threatens us, and we wish to avoid it. This tendency is all the more apparent when we discuss the question of peace. This

Il. The Three Levels of International Politics is because the concept of peace is abstract and hard to grasp. In the eighteenth century, monarchs and nobility were cast in the role of bad actors. Wars were thought to arise at the caprice of such personages. This is expressed well by the following well-known anecdote of the time. Frangois-Michel le Tellier, Marquis of Louvois and a minister of state to King Louis XIV, had built the Trianon palaces at Versailles for that monarch. However, the king did not like the shape of the windows. Accordingly, or so the story goes, as a way to turn Louis XIV’s attention to other matters, Louvois started a war with Austria.

Whether this story is apocryphal or not is not the issue here. The fact is that this sort of anecdote is a good illustration of the general way of thinking in that era. This led people to think that having representatives of the people, who could restrict the authority of monarchs, would be the road to peace. A proposal made by the noted French thinker Nicolas de Condorcet (1743-1794) is a prime example. He was certain that the people loved peace, and he believed that wars would not occur if the will of the people was directly represented. In fact, he came up with a detailed procedure wherein, in the event of enemy attack, any declaration of war would have to be approved by the legislature while starting a war could only be approved by a newly elected legislature.

In the nineteenth century, the landed aristocrats and landowners were generally believed to be bad actors. It was widely believed then that peace would prevail with the introduction of free trade, which would eliminate barriers among nations. Furthermore, some people believed that peace would come if free trade, which had the potential to eliminate all barriers among nation-states, were comprehensively instituted. In fact, Richard Cobden (1804-1865), a leading figure in the free-trade movement, was convinced that it would produce peace and prosperity for every nation. When he learned that Napoleon III had rejected complete free trade in his negotiations with the UK, he thought at first that the report was an error. He then even insisted on going to France in an attempt to persuade Napoleon III in person. This episode illustrates how sincerely he believed in free trade.

In the twentieth century, the roles of bad actors have been assigned one after another; after one was done away with another was created. Kaiser Wilhelm and Germany’s militaristic system, Hitler and fascism, capitalism, and the new imperialism of communism have all been treated as bad eggs, and the self-avowed good eggs have fought wars with them. Wars of this century have been all the more intense and bloody because they have been regarded as ones between good and evil. Thus, one country after another has been branded as a bad egg. But since the good eggs that defeated the bad eggs turned out to have their own failings, the credibility of this Manichean way of thinking came to be questioned. Even so, this way of thinking is so deeply rooted in human nature, it continues to implicitly influence our attitudes toward questions of war and peace.

Simplifying the Problem

In addition to this Manichean “good egg/bad egg” attitude, we cannot ignore how the structure of international politics is oversimplified. Discourse on international peace is generally based on a surprisingly simple view of the structure of international politics. In this regard, the most typical view is that peace can be achieved by doing away with armaments. This thinking is grounded in the perception that states are in a staring contest with weapons in hand. If people did not think that way, then they would never be so certain that peace could be attained just by getting rid of weapons.

Il. The Three Levels of International Politics

The idea that peace can be achieved through the United Nations likewise rests upon a similar understanding of current realities. It follows for some that it would be best if all countries gave up their military capabilities, created a world federation, and had that federation’s police force maintain order. Such a way of thinking would be correct if each nation were simply a unit of power, and if international politics was an arena in which these units of power simply existed side by side.

However, the reality is that nations are not simple units of power. A nation is both a system of interests and of power. It is the most important unit for the economic activities of its population. Certainly, international trade is conducted across national borders and the household and the workplace are the most directly tied to people's lives. But it is the nation that provides the framework for these varied economic activities, including the flow of money and goods. It is also within the framework of the nation that economic plans are developed and economic policies are adopted for the welfare of its members.

Japans prosperity is directly linked to the standard of living of Japanese people. In contrast, although the prosperity of the United States or China or Korea may actually be connected to how we Japanese live, the connection with the prosperity of each of those nations is incomparably smaller. Each nation comprises a system of interests that sometimes harmonize with and sometimes conflict with the interests of other nations. It is simply impossible to separate questions about international peace from the interests involved. We cannot argue about the problem of peace without considering the interest relationships among nations.

Moreover, nations also comprise systems of values along with systems of powers and interests. Each of us makes our own decisions and chooses how to live our lives. We can do so without causing chaos in a society because we are tied together by invisible threads such as shared patterns of behavior and systems of values. Institutions ranging from states to families are not sustainable without these invisible threads.

“Justice” Is Defined by Common Sense

Our patterns of behavior and value systems have been shaped by our histories. Thus, they are more deeply rooted in our identities than we normally realize. These are not universally shared but are distinct and different from country to country. Hence, what separates countries from each other are not arbitrarily drawn borders, but rather the differences in norms for behavior and value systems as embodied in language and customs. One could say in short that Japan, like every other country, has its own version of common sense.

Let me illustrate this with an example close at hand. When a Japanese person wants to urge someone to eat a dish that they have prepared, they often humbly say, “This might not be up to your expectations.” An American, in contrast, more likely will directly say, “I worked hard cooking this, so please enjoy it.” This is a hackneyed example on a trivial matter, so perhaps some readers will wonder what connection this has to international politics. The point is that it offers a tip-of-the-iceberg glimpse at the differences between what comprises social practices in Japan, where people usually do not strongly assert themselves, and such practices in the United States, where people often do.

This is why Japanese working abroad often become perplexed by the different assumptions about what is common sense. One sometimes hears Japanese talking about how they are not good at being assertive or at arguing by using logic and reasoning like non-Japanese do; in saying this they are talking about the same sort of issue that ll. The Three Levels of International Politics arises in international politics. Put simply, Japanese find it easy to work in Japan; it is comfortable for them. That is largely because virtually all Japanese share the same versions of common sense and the same guidelines regarding behavior.

In a different vein, many examples can also be found around the world of people who have different versions of common sense but who have tried forcibly to create a nation, only to have their efforts fail. For example, before Singapore was split off from Malaysia, Malaysia had been a nation in which Malays and ethnic Chinese lived in roughly the same numbers. But relations between the two groups did not go well, resulting in the separation of Singapore. Regarding this, someone said: “It’s only natural that relations between people who eat pork and people who do not would not go well.” Chinese like to eat pork, as can be seen from a look at their cuisine. In contrast, Malays, as Muslims, are forbidden to eat pork. Eating or not eating the meat of the pig is a relatively trivial matter, and is an issue related to the Islamic precepts that ban that practice. However, setting aside the question of whether eating pork is right or wrong, Islam has a crucial impact in providing many people with behavioral norms and a value system (common sense). The overseas Chinese likewise live based on their own common sense, and this is extremely important to them. They cannot simply discard what they believe to be common sense.