Autonomy: a Matter of Content

Front matter

Rafaela Giovagnoli p

® Autonomy a Matter of Content

STUDI E SAGGI

Preface

A man may go through life, systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change in his opinions. But this method of fixing belief will be unable to hold its ground in practice. The social impulse is against it. The man who adopts it will find that other men think differently from him, and it will apt to occur to him, in some saner moment, that their opinions are quite as good as his own, and this will shake his confidence in his belief: This conception, that another man’s thought or sentiment may be equivalent to one’s own, is a distinctly new step, and a highly important one. It arises from an impulse too strong in man to be suppressed, without danger of destroying the human species. Unless we make ourselves hermits, we shall necessarily influence each other’s opinions; so that the problem becomes how to fix belief, not in the individual merely, but in the community.

C.S. Peirce

We search through our congested, urbanized, cacophonous world for affirmation of personal worth. But everywhere, from the each of our beginnings, we face potential coercion and oppression. Each society has its practices, expressed through family, work, the arts, religion, etc., into which we are thrown and by which we are made. We are indeed social creatures: we are products of powerful, even overwhelming, forces of socialization, largely unchosen by anyone in particular. They create in us without our even noticing, convictions and commitments that color all our actions and relationships. From the beginning of learning our native tongues, we see the world and one another from a narrowed, usually misleading, perspective that merely reflects the accidents of birth. The problem of personal autonomy, which is the subject of this thoughtful book, is how to be more than what the social world makes us, how to turn the enormous weight of socialization into an adventure of discovering, perfecting and practicing our own personal worth where life has value beyond mere service to norms and values determined mindlessly and imposed by others. This book’s ambitious and essentially optimistic goal is to show the way.

x AUTONOMY: A MATTER OF CONTENT

Raffaela Giovagnoli here offers a wide-ranging but coherent, erudite but well-focused account of personal moral autonomy, its nature, its development and its challenges. She draws on many sources to generate a powerful and novel analysis, the key ideas of which are (1) the need for an open, pluralistic society providing the ground in which autonomy can take root, (2) the development of critical and self-critical rationality capable of discerning not only subjective reasons for action but also the objective reasons that there are, and (3) a deontic social structure sensitive to many kinds of reasons that provides non-oppressive, practical norms enabling agents to be not merely authentic but to achieve personal autonomy.

As Kant, Habermas and others have noticed, we exercise reason in variety of ways. Relevant here is the contrast between instrumental and substantive reason. Reason can be indeed and often is made the slave of the passions. It is hard to see how a rational species like ours could have arisen or survived unless this were so. In the “practical” world of getting and spending, acquisition and consumption — maintenance, as I like to call it — instrumental rationality rules. Nevertheless, over and above and often against this we have the capacity to progressively develop enough independence of judgment to free reason from its bondage, to attain attitudes and standards that enable us, if we are fortunate, to critically evaluate the desires, commitments and goals that drive instrumental reason. The way out, on Giovagnoli’s reading, is to socialize reason itself, to let it occupy a “public space,” as Sellars and Brandom call it, to dialogically expose it to the public critique of other rational points of view so that it can learn to stand on its own, confident of its substantive constitution by acceptable and appropriate self-imposed norms. In such a Socratic enterprise, one comes to recognize reasons that are not merely subjective but which can be embraced from many perspectives, indeed universally; this way lie objectively valid norms. This is a more realistic approach than, e.g., the theoretical construct of Rawls’ original position. Following Kant and Korsgaard, Giovagnoli insists that we are not merely moments in the universal causal mechanism but actors in a self-determined and self-justifying drama. The justificatory moment comes, as Susan Wolf says, by confronting objective reasons, “the reasons that there are,” aiming at defining the true and the good.

Instrumental reason can produce nothing more than a procedural conception of autonomy that sets moral autonomy equivalent to personal authenticity rather than genuine autonomy. There is little to be gained by failing to recognize that authenticity, as integration of character, is of real moral value. But one can, of course, be completely authentic in the service of morally deplorable ends, so that it is not of unconditional moral worth. By contrast, autonomy, as critical reflection on the moral acceptability of desires, etc., goes beyond aiming to make the desires one finds in oneself coherent, to actually changing or eliminating or at least not acting on them. On the

PREFACE Xi

Frankfurtian scheme of authenticity — wanting to want what one wants — desires at one level are justified so long as they cohere with desires at “higher” levels. But here is a potentially immobilizing regress that merely complicates decision-making. Wanting what we want does not set us free, since at every level our desires may be manipulated even without our realizing it. The key, as Giovagnoli has it, is the possibility to resist desire formation. Nor is self-criticism to be understood as a quest to discover some underlying “real self,” since, on her view, the self is constructed by this very process, which is social and not merely introspective. Approaches based on the assumption that an account of autonomy is merely an account of personal identity are, in a sense, too demanding. For we can and do fixate, i.e., “identify with” or identify ourselves through, all sorts of things, even the most trivial. We take ownership for our desires even when we should not.

Again, the implication is the need for realistic and objective assessment of the true and good and there is no hope of carrying out this project apart from open, public discourse. As realists have long maintained, what is needed is a persistent “standing back,” a willingness never to be complacent about given results, no matter how attractive. We need and are able to develop what Giovagnoli calls “normative competence” to overcome the traps of socially distorted development. Women, e.g., can resist the debilitating effects of common stereotypes by reflecting on the inappropriate and false content of social norms. On the other hand, if normative competence is conceived too aggressively it becomes another trap. Here Giovagnoli follows Brandom in opting for “weak normative competence” because it enables us to distinguish between autonomous self-rule and being subject to the right rule. The weaker version lends itself more readily to concrete application to one’s own acts, to claiming ownership by speaking for oneself, by treating oneself as authority. Again, this requires critical dialogue in a public space of reasons.

Giovagnoli combines a model of discursive “scorekeeping” from Brandom with a position I have taken on normativity. Normativity in any field entails the possibility of mistake and mistakes are objectively discernible only in public view. Famously, Wittgenstein took advantage of this structure to refute Cartesian subjectivism about language. I have used it to suggest the sociality of genuine moral norms. Giovagnoli’s dialogical interpretation of sociality reinforces this perspective with Brandom’s scorekeeping model, which is grounded in his expressivist and inferentialist theory of meaning. Thinking and saying are ways of understanding commitments in the open space of reasons where we play the game of asking for and giving reasons for actions. Thus we hold one another to account and keep score by the quality of our reasons. Practicing this game is maturing into non-oppressive and non-oppressing rational autonomy. Normative freedom must be rational because it means consistency with norms. In the social space of reasons we are accountable for and required to justify our commitments and entitlements, a task accomplished in the xii AUTONOMY: A MATTER OF CONTENT role of scorekeeper. The important point Giovagnoli makes is that we are all occupants o this role insofar as we pursue genuine personal autonomy. Since no one is expert in advance, we are all apprentices of each other. As Kant would say, we are all the same before the moral law. Realism about the true and the good demands that we come as close as possible to tracking all possibilities, which seems a very strident demand and there may be doubt as to whether, even if we could succeed in this, we could ever communicate it to anyone else. This might well threaten the dialogical social structure of scorekeeping. But Giovagnoli stresses that our normal social practice of giving and asking for reasons is reliable and our best hope of keeping the good and the true in sight.

Far from a mere liberty of indifference, much less sheer license for selfindulgence, the condition of personal moral autonomy amounts to being bound by desire-independent conceptual (and therefore linguistic) rules that hold beyond a personal point of view because they express objective reasons for action. The “content” of meaning of what is expressed, if it is to be objective, can only be determined dialogically through recognition of commitments and entitlements. So giving and asking for reasons depends on social practices. Thus we come to the crucial Kantian capacity of acting not merely according to rules but according to the conception of rules. We come, as Giovagnoli says, to “intend [Brandom’s] notion of ‘autonomous discursive practice’ as the structure of personal autonomy.” Autonomy entails social accountability for claims we make. We are not merely social creatures, we are dialogical creatures, i.e., we are and must remain sensitive to what Brandom calls “material incompatibities,” which Giovagnoli identifies as the “source” of autonomy. I am entitled only to what I can justify. Rationality enables finding and repairing incompatibilities, precisely the task of the scorekeeper.

Importantly our task as would-be autonomous agents is not merely to take up attitudes and beliefs that have been previously screened, since this may once again entail oppression. No. For Giovagnoli our task is to learn to take them up critically, which requires exposure to panoply of options provided by a fully open, pluralistic society where the agent can give and evaluate reasons besides her own. Thus, autonomy means internalizing the normative structure of dialogical rationality. Here Giovagnoli moves beyond Brandom and Habermas to admit that reasons besides the moral may legitimately determine the autonomous will. This widens the conception of personal autonomy and identity and requires a wider, more nuanced, normative vocabulary to express a wider plurality of norms while also avoiding norms that are too abstract or strident for practical application.

Nor does Giovagnoli limit autonomy to personal goals but affirms a view I have defended, along with others working on collective intentionality, that common or shared goals often entail personal goals, thus emphasizing social practice, and deepening the necessity of justification through

PREFACE xiii openly, critically giving and asking for reasons in social groups. Thus, it is doubtful that anyone can ever by fully autonomous but we can practice, if not perfect, autonomy by engaging one another dialogically.

As we have seen, a fundamental thesis of Giovagnoli’s work is that socialization can engender oppressive norms but that we can overcome them. Since socialization is largely a feature of political culture, oppressive norms must be rejected first in the public political arena. Because social norms favor the powerful, autonomy is, in rhetoric as well as reality a more decisive goal of the few than of the many who therefore realistically see equality as their wiser collective route to autonomy. Society’s commitment to protect the conditions for the development of personal autonomy is therefore crucial and means engendering respect and trust of oneself as essential aspects of socialization. A primary means to this end is discouragement of stereotyping, “profiling” in the current jargon. Here Habermas’ analysis of the ideal speech situation is of help. Though for Giovagnoli, Habermas’ accounts only for procedural autonomy, he at least recognizes the problem and that the solution demands respectful public discourse. Giovagnoli favors Brandom’s scorekeeping model, despite its not taking adequate account of the threat that the authoritative collective perspective poses, as it may itself easily make autonomy seem redundant or impossible. Giovagnoli’s quarry, personal autonomy, instead requires public asking for and giving reasons to establish one’s voice and authority over oneself by criticizing existing social norms and power structures and enacting those critiques. Autonomy as deontic intersubjective structure presents agents with their best chance of finding the best reasons for acting as they do, for being who they are. Personal autonomy conceived most broadly requires a universal “politics of difference” where each person formulates and expresses her personal narrative in public space in order to expose oppression and oppressor for what they are. Each of us can be witness for the true and the good by expressing our reasons in public dialogue. The public, argumentative structure needed, is each one of us taking responsibility for what we know best, viz., our own case, about which even the least of us can understand the deontic structure and its implications. Any adequate philosophy of autonomy must account for the possibility of saying, “No.” Key is the account of the social development of a self “able to do what is required to take something [different] as a self,” to understand, in Hegelian terms, the “I that is we and the we that is I.”

In a globalize, pluralistic world such as ours, morally defensible identity able to support self-confidence entails public accountability for our reasons by common standards, readiness to face dissent. The readiness is the all.

J. K. Swindler Illinois State University (April 24, 2007)

Introduction

The concept of “autonomy” is one of the most important topics in moral and political philosophy. The recent publication of the books Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism (Christman & Anderson 2005) and Personal Autonomy. New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy (Taylor 2005) shows that most contemporary authors aim at superseding the metaphysical questions of determinism and free will. I think that this is the right step to take in emphasizing the dimensions of individual choice and also the role of socialization in order to develop capacities for critical reflection. In this context, my contribution tries to give an original account of the notion of autonomy in social terms.

The debate on autonomy is very lively in different fields. There are therefore many conceptual distinctions worthy of consideration. For the sake of my discussion, the most important distinction is between “moral” autonomy and “personal” autonomy. Generally speaking, the theorists of personal autonomy I shall consider in my contribution try to give an account of autonomy that is conceived not only as moral agency. This move allows the consideration of several patterns of practical reasoning that imply several kinds of reasons for acting. My book is divided into two parts because I think that it is very important to consider the context of the discussion together with the theoretical proposal. The first part refers therefore to the contemporary debate on autonomy in moral and political philosophy, and the second part is dedicated to my account of autonomy.

As we shall see in the first part, we can describe personal autonomy in “procedural” or in “substantive” terms. Procedural theories emphasize the structural conditions of the process of “identification” with one’s own motives. Even if these conditions are relevant, substantive theories rightly point to the role of the content of our reasons for autonomous agency. This perspective requires substantive standards according to which we can recognize and criticize oppressive norms. The discussion of these questions grounds the shift from moral to personal autonomy based on a substantive account.

I underscore the question of normativity because a person is autonomous not only if he is able rationally to recognize reasons for acting but also to “take responsibility” for subjective reasons (i.e. desires and preferences) and objective reasons (moral norms) for acting. As I will show in the second part of my book, autonomy requires the possibility of taking deontic attitudes in order to make explicit the material structure of the content of our reasons for acting, that play a suitable role in autonomous agency.

What are the steps necessary to move from moral to personal autonomy?

In the first chapter, I describe the Kantian account starting also from some relevant interpreters of the contemporary debate on autonomy. Following Kant, an agent is autonomous in a moral sense when her own rules for acting are included in her will as universal law (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals section 2 IV). Moving from the primacy of the categorical imperative as the principle of the unity of will, I underscore some relevant consequences for modern proponents of this theoretical option. According to Christine Korsgaard and Thomas Hill, we can recognize two senses of autonomy or self-determination. In one sense, to be autonomous or self-determined is to be governed by the principles of your own causality, principles that are definitive of your will. In another deeper sense, to be autonomous or self-determined is to choose the principles that are definitive of your will. This is the kind of determination that Kant called “spontaneity”. Every agent, even an animal agent, is autonomous and self-determined in the first sense, or it would make no sense to attribute its movement to it. Only responsible agents, human agents, are autonomous in the second and deeper sense. However, I maintain that an autonomous agent must refer also to substantive characteristics of the content of reasons for acting. The important result of Susan Wolf’s analysis, which I discuss in the last section, is that the freedom necessary for responsibility is not just the freedom that allows one’s action to be governed by one’s own reason, but also a freedom that allows one’s reasons to be governed by what reasons there are. The assumption of what Wolf calls “normative pluralism” shows a different way of interpreting the objectivity of “normative facts”: seeing the world rightly involves seeing reasons for and against many different options. We must consider the plurality of values belonging to different cultures: these values as normative facts are the content of our practical reasoning.

Despite this interesting conclusion, the task of a theory of autonomy is, in my opinion, to give a plausible account of the way in which a person can criticize the commitments implied by the nonrational determinants of the agent’s identity “...if it is the case”. This requirement is fulfilled if we can describe the normative (rational) structure of that point of view that allows the agent to be autonomous, i.e. able to discern and justify a wide range of (subjective and objective) commitments.

INTRODUCTION 3

If we accept this conclusion, must we embrace a procedural account of personal autonomy? In the second chapter I provide different interpretations of the classical procedural account in order to make clear that structural conditions of individual reflection are necessary for autonomy but not sufficient.

Procedural theories consider recognition as successful when certain structural conditions of critical reflection are satisfied. These conditions are fulfilled when the identification of the agent with his own desires occurs. Harry Frankfurt and Gerald Dworkin introduced the hierarchical model: we are autonomous when we want, via our volitions of the second order, the content of desires of the first order to be realized. For instance, a person may have a higher-order volition that her lower-level desire to drink water be fulfilled.

Generally speaking, procedural theories level autonomy and authenticity: an autonomous agent must be able to reflect and to accept (i.e. to identify himself with) her own desires, values, etc. The identification means that an agent possesses a volition, i.e. a second order desire, which allows the reflection on the first order desires to be in competition. The process of identification presents two difficulties, which arise either in the case of the agent’s identification as recognition (without judgment) of an aspect of her personhood, or in the case of approving it. In the first case, identification does not seem an indication of autonomy, because a person could identify, as part of her own self, coercive or imposed aspects of it. In the second case, approval is a problematic requirement because perfectly authentic aspects of the self (for which one is fully responsible) exist, even though they are not totally approved.

In order to avoid these problematic results, John Christman focuses on relevant aspects of the formation of beliefs, values and desires in the process of socialization. His analysis attempts to secure the autonomy of an agent’s higher order identifications and values by building certain historical constraints into the process of critical reflection. This account has two fundamental virtues. The first is attention to the historical dimensions of reflection. It shows how an agent may change his relation to (some of) her beliefs and values by coming to understand the processes by which they were acquired or developed. The second virtue is the compatibilist explanation of the relationship between autonomy and socialization. As long as we do not, or would not resist the process by which we acquired our beliefs, desires, values, and higher-order identifications, then they are autonomous, even if we acquired them as a result of socialization.

Theories based on authenticity refer to internal self-reflection and procedural independence; these options mean that they do not consider the role of the content of desires or preferences for the development of autonomy. In the third chapter I underscore the reasons why some philosophers maintain that an autonomous person must show not only procedural but also “substantial” independence, which rightly requires the consideration of the social context in which an action can be judged as autonomous.

Both Natalie Stoljar and Paul Benson show the limits of procedural theories. Procedural theories and their historical variants (Fisher, Ravizza, Christman) underestimate the role of the internalization of oppressive norms.

In my opinion, Benson focuses on a point that is fundamental for understanding the normative source of autonomy. He addresses himself directly to the social and discursive dimension of “taking ownership”, which explains how internalized invisibility (internalization of oppressive norms diminishing autonomy) can defeat agents’ capacity “to take ownership” of what they do. The active dimension of taking ownership implies the capacity of the agent for giving reasons for her actions and so responding to potential “challenges” arising in the social context from her own point of view. I maintain that Benson’s account rightly points to the social and discursive dimension of autonomy. This move makes it possible to take responsibility in a public context and implies also the possibility of speaking for people who are marginalized.

Starting from a social perspective, in the second part of my book I propose an account of the concept of autonomy that develops in the “‘social” space of reasons where the agent can give reasons for her actions and can answer for reasons. The necessity of introducing an intersubjective account of autonomy emerges in the contemporary studies on Hegel. Generally speaking, they move from the Hegelian concept of reason, which conflicts with the Kantian idea that reason represents the law for itself without a real confrontation with something external. Reason can be authoritative only if it is “historically”, i.e. “socially” construed; we should not consider it as something external to our social practices, as a normative standard for interpreting and revisiting them. In this context, autonomy of the agent requires a peculiar sensitivity to reason, which constitutes our projects “sedimented” in our traditions and considers them as fallible and revisable. Rationality is bound to a process of recognition between different persons, i.e. to a social process in which different standards are in competition.

In the fourth chapter I argue for the primacy of “normative freedom” based on the normativity of social practices (Swindler). Moreover, if we adopt the scorekeeping model (Brandom), there emerges the know-how implied by the “social role” of the autonomous agent as “scorekeeper”, who participates in the game of giving and asking for reasons. This social role is defined by the use of language bound to certain social attitudes (attributing and undertaking commitments and entitlements) through which the recognition of deontic status (commitments and entitlements) seems possible. Even if we accept the inferential structure of this space proposed

INTRODUCTION 5 by Wilfrid Sellars, we must also give an explanation of the social perspectives from which we can undertake and attribute commitments.

Starting with this thesis, we can conclude that the autonomous agent occupies the social role of scorekeeper, thus she is able to justify and to take responsibility for her assertions (or the assertions of others). The description of the scorekeeping model is the topic of the fifth chapter.

First, I focus on the epistemological results of the previous chapter. The normative competence of the autonomous agent is bound to the social structure of the space of reasons. The entitlement to a claim can be justified (1) by giving reasons for it, or (2) by referring to the authority of another agent, or (3) by demonstrating the capacity of the agent reliably to respond to environmental stimuli. The scorekeeping model is based on a notion of entitlement that presents a structure of “default” and “challenge”. This model is fundamental in order to introduce autonomy as capacity to participate in the game of giving and asking for reasons.

I shall give an account of the autonomous agent as a scorekeeper who is able to justify and an action (her own or another agent’s) on the basis of the recognition of different kinds of reasons or practical commitments (subjective, institutional and moral commitments). The distinction of several patterns of practical reasoning leads to the thesis that autonomy is the capacity (1) for discerning subjective and objective reasons for acting and (2) for endorsing the corresponding commitments. Moreover, the acknowledgment of reasons is structured by the deontic structure of discursive practices. In this sense, we as agents are in the role of scorekeeper when we are able to attribute reasons for acting and to undertake the corresponding commitments by ourselves if it is the case. This happens in the interaction with other people, namely when we come into contact with points of view different from our own.

What are the political consequences of the social concept of autonomy I describe?

The argumentation of the last chapter considers the possibility of making individual autonomy and the public space compatible. It seems clear to me that individual theories of autonomy in their procedural or substantial variants underestimate the role of the interpersonal ambit for the agent’s development of autonomy. This observation does not imply that we have to embrace a “recognitional” model in Hegelian terms, which points to the primacy of the community’s point of view. In the fifth chapter, I introduce the normative competence required by autonomous agency. Generally speaking, the discussion falls into the contemporary debate on some Hegelian topics. In this context, I propose a comparison between intersubjective accounts that point out formal conditions of intersubjectivity, so that the concept of individual autonomy becomes redundant (Habermas, Honneth) and intersubjective accounts which, while considering the role of socialization, give weight to individual autonomy (Benson, Oshana,

Tugendhat, Ferrara). My project falls to the latter group. I think however that the scorekeeping model provides a more plausible account of the interpersonal dimension of autonomous agency. In my opinion, we must provide an exhaustive explanation of those requirements that characterize the agent’s critical point of view in the public sphere. My work aims at proposing two senses of the adjective “relational” for a new concept of autonomy: (1) the “semantic” sense that shows the inferential commitments (governed by material incompatibility) which agents must acknowledge and (2) the “pragmatic” sense that reveals the normative structure of that acknowledgment as a social net of deontic attitudes. I hope that the argumentation of my book fulfills this claim.

I wish to thank James Swindler, for his in-depth reading and helpful criticisms of my work.

A particular affectionate thought goes to Franco Bianco, who was a fundamental guide for my philosophical formation.

I would thank my friend Francesco for the moral support.

Part I From Moral Autonomy To Personal Autonomy

1. Autonomy and Freedom

The contemporary philosophical debate on autonomy presents several conceptual distinctions; one of these is the fundamental distinction between “moral autonomy” and “personal auttonomy”'. According to Kant, an agent is autonomous in a moral sense when her own rules for acting are included in her will as universal law (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals section 2 TV). Modern proponents of personal autonomy introduce rather the image of a person in charge of her life, not just following his desires but choosing which of her desires to follow? .

In this chapter I shall deal with the concept of moral autonomy. The first matter is the distinction between autonomy and freedom. Isaiah Berlin describes autonomy as “positive freedom”. Positive freedom: «(...) derives from the wish to be self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them». Indeed, Berlin also presents a kind of “negative freedom” because he thinks that a liberal government must protect citizens from external constraints. Thomas Green underlines rather the importance of positive freedom as autonomy in a Kantian sense: human will is a form of a principle that realizes itself consciously’.

' See D. Johnston, The Idea of Liberal Theory, New York, Princeton University Press, 1994; J. Waldron, Moral and Personal Autonomy in J. Christman and J. Anderson (ed.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005.