The Complexity of Evil

Front matter

Complexity of Evil

Perpetration and Genocide

TIMOTHY WILLIAMS

Conclusion

Appendix: List of Interviewees Acknowledgments

Glossary

Notes

ABBREVIATIONS

CIA ECCC KGB

MRND

RPF RTLM

S-21 SAT UN

Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. secret service

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia

Komitet gossudarstwennoi besopasnosti (Committee for State Security), Russian secret service

Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement (Republican, National Movement for Democracy and Development), Rwandan party of President Habyarimana Rwandan Patriotic Front, Tutsi rebel army

Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (Free Radio-Television of the One Thousand Hills), hard-liner Rwandan media broadcaster

Santebal-21, meaning Security Center 21

Situational Action Theory

United Nations

In APRIL 2015, I was milling through a crowd of people at an exhibition that I was about to open, when I overheard a woman speaking to her companion. The exhibition was on perpetrators of the Cambodian genocide and included eleven portraits of former cadres of the Khmer Rouge and several text panels that discussed the motivations of low-level perpetrators for participating in genocidal violence, including a number of original quotes from individual perpetrators themselves.! This woman remarked that one could see the evil in the eyes of the man whose picture she had been looking at—the portrait that in a more anonymized version adorns the cover of this book. I looked back at the picture and saw a man whom I had sat opposite and whose story he had told me. I saw no evil in those eyes, and I am almost certain that the woman would not have seen it either, if she had not been at an exhibition on perpetrators. This man is an ordinary man, a farmer in a Cambodian province. But the actions he undertook during the rule of the Khmer Rouge are anything but ordinary; one might even say that these acts were evil.

There are manifold other examples of such evil acts throughout history: Rounding up Jewish people and herding them to the woods to be killed. Ghettoizing, deporting, and then killing Jews, Roma and Sinti, homosexual men, disabled people, and other “antisocial elements”—sometimes by gassing, sometimes by shooting. Constructing roadblocks, raiding homes, and patrolling the marshes to root out and kill every last Tutsi in Rwanda. Imprisoning, torturing, and killing people who were suspected to be internal enemies of the revolution in Cambodia. Expelling Armenians from their homes and sending them on a death march into the desert where they were free to be looted, raped, and killed. Holding Bosniaks in concentration camps, then raping and killing them in the dissolving former Yugoslavia. These are just a fraction of the actions committed in just a few of the cases of genocide, but they highlight the extraordinarily brutal and cruel topic of this book. And yet remarkably, the people participating in these actions are generally ordinary people who are in no way demographically and psychologically aberrant from the rest of the population—as I discuss later in this introduction. So, if it is not the inherent evil of these men and women that drives these actions, what is it? To this end, the research question that this book seeks to answer is, Why do individuals participate in genocide?

It is a simple question with a complex answer. This book approaches the question of why people participate in genocide by offering a model that demonstrates at once the complexity of such motivations and their everyday, banal character. It develops the Complexity of Evil model, which draws on research in social psychology, sociology, political science, criminology, psychology, and anthropology and their theoretical, experimental, and empirical insights into various cases. Thus, it provides the conceptual underpinning to help us understand individual low-level perpetrators and their actions in genocide and offers researchers a tool for explaining perpetration comparatively across different cases.

The Complexity of Evil model pulls together research from this broad array of disciplines and synthesizes previous findings to create an innovative approach to understanding perpetration. The model creates an abstract model that can serve as a heuristic for readers for understanding participation in genocide across various different cases. The Complexity of Evil model provides an approach that systematically orders the various factors according to their causal effect, differentiating among motivations, facilitative factors, and contextual conditions. Motivations are the actual impulse for participation, without which it would not occur, and can be differentiated between motivations driven by the perpetrator’s ingroup, motivations emanating from the victim group, and motivations that are based on the opportunistic self-service of the actor. The presence of a motivation is causally necessary for participation to occur, and each individual motivation can be sufficient, although the specific motivation depends on the individual.” Facilitative factors make participation easier for the perpetrator, but these factors alone would not make someone participate; while they are causally neither sufficient nor necessary, they do increase the likelihood that participation will occur if a motivation is present. Finally, contextual conditions provide the macro-level, genocidal context within which participation occurs; the context is thus a necessary foundation within which everything else develops. The focus here is on how this context is perceived by the individuals acting within it and how it impacts their perpetration. This book will comprehensively go through the various elements of the model, introducing and explaining their relevance empirically and conceptually for individuals’ decision to participate in genocide.

The Complexity of Evil model thus provides a schematic approach to participation in genocide that synthesizes previous approaches and systematically orders the relevant factors. In this way, the model emphasizes how diverse and complex reasons for participating in genocide can be, while at the same time highlighting how mundane and simple many of the motivations are. By integrating empirical insights from various cases throughout the book, the comparability of perpetration across various cases is emphasized. The Complexity of Evil model allows researchers to approach perpetrators’ reasons for participating in different kinds of genocide around the world and throughout history in a comparative manner.

The title of this book, The Complexity of Evil, references Hannah Arendt’s ({1963] 1994) iconic phrase of “the banality of evil,” which she coined in her seminal book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Arendt broke with the interpretation of Holocaust perpetrators being psychopaths, ideological fanatics, or in other ways aberrant. Instead, she suggested that Adolf Eichmann was “terribly and terrifyingly normal” (276) and that in the context Eichmann was situated in, the evil acts he committed did not require evil motivation, his motivations were quite banal, and indeed he was just “thoughtless” regarding the moral consequences of his acts.°

I take up and adapt this notion of the banality of evil to develop the idea of the Complexity of Evil model by arguing that individuals’ motivations to participate in genocidal action are indeed most often banal, but they are also manifold and complex. The Complexity of Evil model systematically differentiates between different types of motivations, facilitative factors, and contextual conditions, arguing for a complex understanding of genocidal motivations. At the same time, these factors are hardly extraordinary and reveal less about the depths of human depravity, but instead they highlight the banal, simple, and quotidian reasons why many people participate and how similar they are to many of the factors that motivate action in many other walks of life. I focus here not on those individuals in the highest echelons of power, the people who dreamed up the hellish ideologies with which the countries were ravaged, the brains behind the operation. Instead, I focus on the people on the ground who participated, the foot soldiers who implemented these genocidal policies.

Heinrich Popitz once wrote that “a human never has to, but can always act violently, he never has to, but can always kill—individually or collectively— together or with division of labor—in all situations . . . in different moods... for all imaginable ends—anyone” (Popitz 1986, 76; my translation). It is the aim of this book to unpack why people take this step, to act violently, to kill, to participate in genocide. Before introducing previous work on this question and explaining what this book will contribute to the extant broader literature, I will demonstrate what the various elements of the research question mean precisely. The question implies an interest in causality, and the Complexity of Evil model provides a systematic approach to integrating various types of factors that together make individuals participate in genocide and with this provide a framework that differentiates various types of factors.+ This causal answer includes motivations, facilitative factors, and contextual conditions that together can explain why people participate in genocide.

The question also defines the focus of this book as directed toward the individual who commits these acts of violence and his or her reasons for doing so. In order to do this, the perspective of the individual must be taken on; we must put ourselves in the shoes of these people. Rather than distancing ourselves and understanding these people as “evil others,” this book upholds the consensus in the literature that these perpetrators are quite like everyone else, although this makes it all the more unsettling to take on their perspective. The Complexity of Evil model allows us to delve into history and understand it through the eyes of the actors who made it reality, the low-level perpetrators, to try to grapple with the experienced unfolding of events that at the time were their lived present and only in retrospect became the grand sweeps of history (see Neitzel and Welzer 2011b, 27). While the individual is firmly at the center of this analysis, the individual and his or her motivations can only be fathomed by heeding the situation one is in, by acknowledging the broader genocidal context, and by reflecting on the group dynamics and relations one has. These various levels are included in the Complexity of Evil model, but are always related back to the individual and their perceptions of them. It is their perceptions of the situation, context, and so on that interest us in order to gauge what part they play in pushing the individuals toward participation in genocide.

Motivations for participation in genocide are at the center of analysis— that is, the book studies the motivations for actions, not for becoming a certain type of person. The Complexity of Evil model is not interested in thinking about participation through the simplistic and essentialist categories of perpetrator, victim, bystander, or rescuer. This is an important distinction, as perpetrators can also engage in any number of further acts in the context of genocide: rescuing victims, being bystanders, or even becoming victims themselves (see Williams 2018b). These gray zones of people’s actions make it necessary not to essentialize individuals as perpetrators but to focus on their motivations for specific actions. I would argue that a more accurate understanding of perpetrators accepts that people are perpetrators precisely because, and only insofar as, they perpetrate. At the same time, they may also be bystanders, rescuers, or victims. Therefore, I think that an action-centric conception is more helpful, as it allows us to interrogate the connection between the actor and the action. At the same time, it is important to note that the model explains participation in genocide as a broad process—it is not a model that explains why people join genocidal organizations (although this can sometimes factor into their motivations to participate in genocide). Further, as the viewpoint is firmly rooted in the individual’s perspective, organizational structures and strategies are interesting only insofar as how they influence the individual, but will not be studied in and of themselves.

Wuy CONDUCT RESEARCH ON PARTICIPATION IN GENOCIDE?

Conducting research on participation in genocide is important because we can only really understand and explain how the dynamics of genocide manifest if we also understand the individuals who implement them. Perpetrator research allows us to go beyond simplistic explanations and fathom the more complex realities as they occur on the ground while genocide unfolds. A deeper look at perpetrators also allows us to unpack questions of agency and make it “at least conceivable that a number of those actors could have made different choices” (Gross 2003, 12), thus impacting the way the genocide evolved. Genocide is not a static occurrence but a process (see Rosenberg 2012), and this process is the product of a multitude of individual actions. Only by understanding these actions will we be able to truly understand the genocidal process as a whole. It is important not to treat “the ‘masses’ as an undifferentiated whole,” as this will not allow a differentiation between the more ambitious and the more passive and may overstate the role of volition (Fujii 2009, 9). It is thus important to account for local dynamics and go beyond emphasizing just top-down, elite perspectives (Kalyvas 2004; 2006, 43).

Further, it is important from an ethical point of view to emphasize that the endeavor of understanding these participants to genocide and the necessary step of taking their viewpoint in no way endorses their actions. As Christopher Browning succinctly puts it, “Explaining is not excusing; understanding is not forgiving” ([1994] 2001, xx). It is about taking a nonnormative, analytical perspective that forwards understanding about, rather than judgment for, these individuals’ actions. An interesting perspective is taken by Janine Natalya Clark, who pushes this further, claiming that “by demonizing and dehumanizing perpetrators, we thereby engage in the very same processes that helped to make their crimes possible in the first place” (2009, 424). A significant part of genocidal violence is that it strips the victims of their identity and their individuality, rendering them identical for all intents and purposes from the perpetrator perspective. We should certainly be wary of doing this ourselves as researchers, toward both victims and perpetrators, and try to grapple with the albeit more difficult perspective of these individuals who participated in genocide. Just as all victims are individuals and not all identify with the victim group (Kühl 2014, 44), so too are all perpetrators individuals and should be treated as such. This book takes this perspective seriously, and the Complexity of Evil model provides a tool to understand each of these individuals, while at the same time opening the space to compare them within and across cases.

However, taking on the perpetrator perspective does bear problems in relation to the victims of this violence, as there are “pervasive differences between perpetrator and victim perspectives” and the events “typically seem worse to the victim than to the perpetrator” (Baumeister 2002, 243). Thus, researchers can understand motivations for participating only by—at least temporarily—viewing the violence through the eyes of the perpetrators and by trying to understand how they perceive these acts, which is undoubtedly very different from how victims perceive them. While Roy Baumeister (2002, 243) distills from this a “genuine moral danger,” I believe that from an academic viewpoint this is not problematic, as long as it does not lead the researcher to relativize the relevance or nature of the acts themselves. Also, there is an equal danger in research on victims, about taking on the victim perspective and exaggerating the acts. Thus, researchers studying both sides of the genocidal violence need to be aware of these biases in individual perceptions.

Following on from this, a note on the use of language in this book is in order, particularly in the context of taking on perpetrator perspectives. In the following three points, I draw on Kiihl (2014, 39-44), who argues that researchers should use a neutral vocabulary and speak, for example, of mass killings rather than mass murder in order that one opens up the possibility for some perspectives at some points in time to see this as murder, while others will not see it as such. Equally, we should only critically adopt the language used by the perpetrators of genocide and indicate this throughout, as these often include euphemisms such as “deportations,” “pacification actions,” “Final Solution,” “ethnic cleansing,” and so on. Finally, and quite fundamentally, we should be wary of dichotomous language use that differentiates, for instance, between “Germans,” “Poles,” and “Ukrainians,” on the one hand, and “Jews,” on the other, as this suggests that Jews were not also members of these nationalities. In dichotomizing Jews and these nationalities, we foreground religion, as it was ascribed to the victims (many of whom did not even identify as Jews), and take on the National Socialist perspective on society. Thus, when referring to these groups, I will instead opt to use terminologies such as Jewish and non-Jewish Germans, Poles, and Ukrainians.

Finally, it should also be noted that by individualizing our perspective on low-level participants of genocide, we avoid the danger of collectivizing the guilt of these actions (Clark 2009, 425), allowing individuals to be held accountable for their actions and not tarring with the same brush all members of the group perpetrating the genocide. The Complexity of Evil model allows just this: to understand each individual and his or her motivation for various actions, but without assuming that each person’s pathway must be the same as the others.

GENOCIDE AND PERPETRATION: APPROACHING

THE CONCEPTS

Before we embark on this journey of exploring why people participate in genocide, it is important to lay some conceptual foundations of what I understand as genocide and perpetration in it. Although the model, along with the book, is titled the Complexity of Evil, this is an admittedly slightly polemic use of the word “evil.” This allows the book to be tied to Arendt’s phrase and placed in line with a row of other works on genocide (Card 2010; Miller 2004; Staub 1989; Vetlesen 2005; Waller 2002). However, this book does not use evil as an analytical concept (for a more systematic treatment, see French, Wettstein, and Goldberg 2012) but simply uses it as a synonym for participating in horrific acts of genocide, which is admittedly and undeniably a colloquial usage. While focusing solely on participation in genocide limits the scope of my arguments vis-à-vis participation in mass killing or even state-sanctioned crime more generally, it allows the model to be precise for this type of violence, not stripping it of the possibility of being tested for possible application to other forms of violence at a later point (see Overmann 2016).

Coined by Raphael Lemkin (1944), “genocide” is a fundamentally legal term defined in Article II of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (United Nations 1948).

The Genocide Convention has been juridically implemented through various ad hoc UN or hybrid courts, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). While prosecution of genocidal crimes is enabled by this convention, its wording has been criticized strongly in academic literature, primarily for its reductive enumeration of who could be classed as a victim group (see Alvarez 2001, 74; A. Jones 2006, 22; Shaw 2010, 158), its too-inclusive nature regarding the acts that constitute genocide, broadening it beyond mass killing (see Jonassohn 1992, 21; A. Jones 2006, 22; Thornberry 1991; for counterarguments see Shaw 2010, 161), its failure to specify the perpetrating agents as a state (Alvarez 2001, 10), and the puzzling use of the phrase “as such” (for a discussion of this, see Boghossian 2010a, 77; 2010b, 108; Schabas 2010, 96—97; Weitz 2010, 103). This critique has led some to distance themselves from the legal phrasing for academic use (Sémelin 2005b, 83—84; 2012, 27), and a plethora of academic definitions have arisen. However, there is no consensus on how an alternative academic definition should read, and it seems unlikely that agreement will be reached on this. There is, however, remarkable overlap on the cases identified as genocide, even if there is no consensus on the definition of the concept.

I would like to emphasize that while mass killing is central to the idea of genocide, other acts against members of the target group can also be committed that fortify the effects of the mass killing. For instance, other forms of one-sided violence against members of the target group could include, but are certainly not limited to, sexualized violence, torture, and assault; furthermore, the elimination of the group’s constitutive space could be pursued by the perpetrator group. Moreover, cultural discrimination, assimilation, or any other policies designed to undermine the viability of the group’s continued existence can also exist. These further acts do not constitute genocide as such but certainly amplify the suffering of the victims and contribute to certain mechanisms such as dehumanization.

Having defined what constitutes genocide, I now turn to the issue of defining perpetrators and perpetration. The focus here is on low-level perpetrators, the ordinary men and women who participated in genocide but were not the national instigators or intellectual ideologues of it. Given the complex situations that arise when genocide is unfolding at the local level, ideally we would be able to make a clear distinction between perpetrators and nonperpetrators. Unfortunately, the black-and-white categorization of perpetrators and nonperpetrators is empirically difficult as people engage in different actions at different points of time and thus can be seen variously as perpetrators, rescuers, victims, or bystanders. Thus, rather than essentializing the category of perpetrator, it would be better to study various types of actions that are possible in the context of genocide and from here categorize who is our subject of interest.

For a more in-depth dealing of various action categories, I refer to a typology of genocidal action that I have published elsewhere (Williams 2018b) that is empirically useful in helping to position individuals’ actions within genocide along two axes of individual impact and proximity to the killing. The resulting typology includes fourteen types of genocidal actions, including acts of perpetration, rescuing, and bystanding. In the end, “perpetrators,” in the narrowest sense of the word, would only be engaged in the type “enforcing,” which occurs proximately to the killing and has the impact that certain people die who otherwise would not have died; these are people who execute the genocidal policies and kill other people. However, a broader understanding of perpetration allows people who are assisting in this process to be seen as perpetrators with their actions also being necessary for individual victims to be killed but more distant from the killing itself—for example, arresting, guarding, or transporting the victims or enabling the killing process in other ways. Without these actions, the killing would not be possible, as there would be no victims available to kill. Further yet, some forms of active facilitating and active encouraging, such as onlookers cheering and giving moral support, could be seen as perpetrator actions also, when these actions change the situation to such a degree that they are pivotal for driving the killing forward. Thus, the “low-level perpetrators,” who are the focus of this book, includes in its definition of a perpetrator a broad array of actions that are pivotal to the successful implementation of genocide. Beyond direct perpetrators, these people are who Markusen (2002, 86) terms as accomplices, with their contributions in articulating, rationalizing, and distributing a genocidal ideology, writing and implementing discriminatory legislation, developing and maintaining the necessary technology for killing, and, most importantly, actually arresting, guarding, and preparing the victims for their deaths. Given the important role of organization and the division of labor in the perpetration of genocide, due to its extremely broad attempt to destroy an entire group, these people who “merely” enable the process through political, logistical, or bureaucratic means actually play a pivotal role. Thus, the term “accomplice” perhaps does not go far enough, as used by Markusen. Without these people’s participation, the genocide would not occur; thus, their inclusion as perpetrators is necessary. Perpetration is more than just killing; perpetration includes all manner of action that is involved in the complex process leading up to and supporting this killing.

PARTICIPATION IN GENOCIDE: WHAT ARE THE CURRENT RESEARCH TRENDS?

This is not the first book on participation in genocide, so it stands in a long and rich tradition. Scott Straus has done the field a service by repeatedly analyzing various trends, postulating the development of a “second-generation, comparative” scholarship after the first, primarily Holocaust-centric generation (2007a), looking at the emergence and shortcomings of various theories on genocide (2012), and, with Evgeny Finkel, differentiating various levels of analysis in macro-, meso-, and micro-level research (Finkel and Straus 2012). Here I will only briefly discuss some of the developments in the field as salient to this book, but refer to this other work for a deeper and broader treatment. First, I will discuss how research on perpetrators has morphed from a focus on individual dispositions to a focus on the situations these individuals are acting within, before today emphasizing more an interaction between the individual and the situation; second, I will demonstrate the development in the type of scholarship from the study of one case, via comparative research to disaggregated studies; third, I will discuss the controversial role of ethnicity across studies of participation in genocide and genocide studies more broadly; finally, I will introduce the previous, most systematic work specifically on motivations.

IO THE COMPLEXITY OF EVIL

From Dispositions to Situations as Motivators for Genocide

Research on perpetrators originated after the Second World War when scholars became interested in trying to explain why people participated in the Holocaust. Their research focused on the individual characteristics of those participating, and Theodor Adorno and others (1950; see also Altemeyer 1981) advanced the idea of an authoritarian personality that was ethnocentric and obedient to authority and thus naturally predisposed to Nazi ideology. This dispositional conception is also prominent in media reports today that boil participation down to certain individual characteristics of the perpetrators, portraying participants in genocide as evil or “sick,” and certainly as different from “ordinary” people. Such portrayals of perpetrators as different from ordinary people are appealing, as they firmly place most people outside the circle of potential participants. Very few scholars, however, have accepted the idea that genocidal perpetrators can be categorized as merely deviant others. Instead, they prefer to think of them for the most part as ordinary people—to use a broader formulation of the “ordinary men” who were the topic of Browning’s ([1994] 2001) seminal, eponymous book®—who were “extraordinary only by what they did not by who they were” (Waller 2002, 8).

Instead, situational influences have gained explanatory traction, with Philip Zimbardo metaphorically stating that perpetrators are not bad apples but are in a bad barrel, and suggesting that “any deed that any human being has ever committed, however horrible, is possible for any of us—under the right or wrong situational circumstances” (2008, 211). Particularly experimental, social-psychological work, seminally by Stanley Milgram and Solomon Asch, propelled this fundamental shift in genocide research toward accepting that participation can be understood only by understanding the social context within which the individuals are embedded.° Situations refer to the direct environment of individuals within which decisions are made, relations to others are experienced, and the dynamics around one are perceived.

Going further than these situational explanations, others argue that situations do not drive participation in genocide unilaterally and deterministically, but that individuals themselves and their characteristics impact how they perceive their situations and thus shape their decisions on participation. Leonard Newman argues emphatically that pitting dispositional factors against situational ones is a false dichotomy, that “a given situation can have quantitatively and qualitatively different effects on people as a function of the dispositions they bring to those situations” (2002, 50), and that situations and dispositions interact with each other (2006, 110). Furthermore, individuals not only react to situations but also shape these situations through their actions (Newman 2002, 51; 2006, 115; Waller 2002, 175). Thus, throughout the process of genocide, it is possible for an individual’s participation in genocide and their

Introduction II use of genocidal rhetoric to change the situation they are in, which in turn can change the motivations as experienced by the individual.

This book is clearly located in this last camp, arguing for the fundamental importance of the situation for people’s motivations to participate in genocide, while at the same time acknowledging that different people react to situations in different ways and that they themselves interact with and shape their situations. Thus, it is an overstatement to say that in certain situations, anyone would participate, as certain people will be disposed to choose punishment or even death rather than participate; but at the same time, it is also true that many people in these situations do indeed go along with these expectations.

Making Research on Genocide Comparative and Disaggregated

Straus (2007a) argues that we have seen two generations of genocide research, beginning with a literature in the 1970s and 1980s that was case specific and mostly focused on the Holocaust (Fein 1979; Horowitz 1976; Kuper 1981; Staub 1989). The second generation was heralded by more comparative works, which over time became more systematic (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Chirot and McCauley 2006; Gerlach 2010; Kiernan 2007; Mann 2005; Melson 1992; Midlarsky 2005; Moses 2008; Rummel 1994; Sémelin 2005a; Shaw 2003; Valentino 2004; Weitz 2003), and various macro-level case studies are providing a wealth of case-specific insights on other cases (Gagnon 2004; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008; Kiernan 1996; Mamdani 2001; Prunier 2005).

Two key developments have occurred that were only nascent at publication of Straus’s (2007a) paper: First, in parallel to these more systematic, comparative qualitative studies, a new quantitative literature on genocide and mass violence also developed, which is becoming ever more sophisticated and influential (Goldsmith et al. 2013; Harff 2003; Krain 2005; Querido 2009; Rost 2013; Schneider and Bussmann 2013; Ulfelder and Valentino 2008; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Wayman and Tago 2010; R. Wood 2010).’ Second, there is now a third generation of qualitative genocide scholarship, which not only puts an emphasis on systematic comparison but also is beginning to disaggregate the genocidal process in both time and space (e.g., Burleson and Giordano 2016; Owens, Su, and Snow 2013, 70). Primarily this is achieved by eschewing the purely macro-political view and instead looking in more depth at the perpetrators and the processes of perpetration. While there has been a long tradition of researching individual perpetrators (predominantly in the Holocaust), most of these studies have been historicalbiographical in nature, particularly the German-language literature, providing a wealth of historical details and deeper understanding of these personalities and their life narratives (e.g., Abmayr 2009; Dean 2000; Fulbrook 2012; Herbert 1996; Lower 2013; Mallmann 2002; Orth 2000; Paul 2002; Schwartz 2006; Sereny [1974] 1977; 1995; Stangneth 2011; Wildt 2002). Often these