On Learning

Front matter

jects IONS

A general theory of ob t-relati jec and ob ojo =f O Q Y "O

Dav

Contents

Preface Acknowledgements Part One: The general theory 1 Introduction — learning as a concept and as a practice 2 Transcendental knowledge 3 Judgements and criteria Object-relations — research into learning

4 5

6 Difference 7 Knowledge dualities

Part Two: Learning as a concept and as a practice 11 Philosophies of learning

13 Technology, artificial intelligence and learning 14 Literacy and numeracy vii

100 112 125 140 148

157 159 173 181 194 205

CONTENTS vi

17 18 19 20 21 22

Pedagogy as reflection and imagination Curriculum and assessment

A history, archaeology and genealogy of learning Time and learning

References Index

227 240 253 270 279 286

297 304

Preface

This is a general theory of objects and object-relations.' There are five object-types in the world: discursive objects, material objects, relational objects, structural-institutional-systemic objects (this type includes discursive and material configurations) and people, including the self, which is always experienced differently from the way other people are experienced. Each of them has different characteristics and, because objects have a dynamic structure, in rare circumstances they may change their status as objects; indeed, what constitutes an object-type is also dynamic. In an object-ontology, objects, including human beings, have acquired dispositions. It is also possible to identify different types of concepts if we understand a concept-type in relation to how it can be used in a way of life. Some of these are: generalisations, abstractions, symbols in the mind, acquired dispositions (this is the use that I will be focusing on in this book), object categorisations, valued configurations, algorithmic formations and semantic conditionals. The reason for doing this is to configure and reconfigure the idea of a concept and, in the process, configure and reconfigure the concept of learning.

I had originally intended the writing of this book to be devoid of references to other philosophers and thinkers. This proved to be too ambitious and I have fully referenced, in both a borrowing and oppositional sense, some key figures in the history of thought: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Aristotle, Martin Heidegger, Robert Brandom, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Charles Taylor, Roy Bhaskar, Michel Foucault and others. There are two reasons for this: first, an inability on my part to develop the full range of ideas required to fill out a general theory of ontological objects and object-relations; and second, an acknowledgement that the theory itself includes a commitment to the way particular ideas, concepts and

1 In contrast to Maynard Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Keynes, 1936), this general theory does not have a representationalist epistemology and clear Humean (Hume, 2000) distinctions between facts and values.

PREFACE vii viii descriptors are embedded in networks of ideas, concepts and descriptors, and have a history.

At the time of writing, the world is infected with the coronavirus, and much of what I have written here seems to pale into insignificance in relation to this threat. However, this general theory is meant to apply to pandemic-ridden as well as pandemic-free societies and worlds, which is another way of saying that it is a general theory. This book, which is a culmination of everything else that I have written (in book, article or report form), is dedicated to my family: Moira, Sarah, Ben, Gail, Lucas, Robin and Jake, with thanks and love.

David Scott 1 November 2020

Acknowledgements

The section on learning in chapter 1 is an extensively amended reprint of Scott (2017a: 57-60), republished here with the permission of the publisher, Palgrave Macmillan. The section on epistemology in chapter 2 is a much-amended and abridged reprint of Scott and Usher (2011, second edition: 27-35), republished here with the permission of the publisher, Continuum Publishing, used by permission of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. The section on judgements in chapter 3 is a much-amended and abridged version of Scott (2017a: 46-53), republished here with the permission of the publisher, Palgrave Macmillan. The section on theory—practice relationships in chapter 4 is a much-amended and abridged version of Scott (2017a: 112-16), republished here with the permission of the publisher, Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 5 includes material that was originally published in Scott (2019a). It is republished here with the permission of the publisher, Springer. Chapter 6 includes a small amount of material from chapter 1 of Scott and Scott (2018), republished here with the permission of the publisher, UCL IOE Press. The short section on teacher training at the end of chapter 7 and the short section on comparative education at the beginning of chapter 8 are much-amended and shortened versions of Scott et al. (2018: 1-2; 75-7) and are republished here with the permission of the publisher, UCL Press. Chapter 11 is an amended and extended reprint of Scott (2017a: 60-73), republished here with the permission of the publisher, Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 12 borrows some ideas and expressions, in minor ways, from Scott (2017a: 74-86), and is published here with the permission of the publisher, Palgrave Macmillan. The short section on formal assessment in chapter 18 and the short section on discourses in chapter 22 are much amended and abridged versions of Scott (2017a: 2-6; 128-32), republished here with the permission of the publisher, Palgrave Macmillan. The first part of chapter 9 and the section on spatiality in chapter 21 are abridged versions of material in Scott (2019b) and are republished here with the permission of the publisher, UCL IOE Press.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS