From Darwinian Metaphysics towards Understanding the Evolution of Evolutionary Mechanisms

Front matter

Momme von Sydow

From Darwinian Metaphysics towards Understanding the Evolution of Evolutionary Mechanisms

QA Universitätsverlag Göttingen

Preface

It is a dating task for a single author to embark on an interdisciplinary inquiry dealing with Darwinism historically, biologically and philosophically; even more so if one finally proposes a critique of assumptions central to current Darwinian paradigms. Interdisciplinary work requires specialized devotion to various fields, merely to gain an overview of pertinent research — be it on the historical person of Darwin or on some current dispute in philosophy of biology. Yet, I consider it a genuine task of philosophy to undertake such broad interdisciplinary investigations. Moreover, the outcome demonstrates that more is at stake than some theories in biology. That is this interdisciplinary study in fact points to a Darwinian metaphysic virtually omnipresent in the Zeitgeist at the turn of the millennium. This metaphysics is not influential in biology, epistemology and psychology, but even in politics and economics. Moreover, in this work several lines of arguments ate developed providing the basis for a systematic critique of this metaphysics.

Appropriately, my thoughts on the matter underwent a kind of evolution. For this reason I wish to provide a short, somewhat personal account of how I came to my present interdisciplinary interest.

Ata point, Sita von Richthoven, a friend of mine, gave me a copy of the book The Selfish Gene by Richard Dawkins that I have been engaged with fundamental questions in the field of sociobiology and evolutionary biology — sometimes even in dreams. It was immediately clear to me that this provocative book had a bearing on many philosophical topics; but it was not until later that I realised the book itself warranted philosophical examination. Perhaps it was due to some critical prepartation I had received through the classical writings of Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and particularly Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, that I had been resisting some of tacit assumptions of Darwinian metaphysics und gene-Darwinism. However, over the years the idea of the “selfish gene” did gain futher popularity. In fact, I would concede that this idea did have some positive effects: for instance, it provided a kind of intellectual inoculation against naive utopias and outdated biological theories of altruism. And yet I think that the idea has proliferated so quickly that critical objections have not received due attention, not just by me but by the scholarly world in general, and hence gene- Darwinism had become a major pest to our intellectual ecology. Although in this last decade the “selfish gene” idea has increasingly had to share the spotlight with other tendencies in biology and even in behavioural economics, what still remains to be worked out is a synthesis of these alternative approaches into a convincing paradigm.

Although a large part of current work in the field is concerned with biological theories of gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism, such theories do not touch on all areas of Darwinian metaphysics. It was clear to me, having studied philosophy and psychology, that there were structural similarities between the Darwinian process of mutation-and-selection and Thorndike’s psychological approach of trial-and-error learning. Moreover, the Darwinian metaphysic is fundamentally connected with philosophical issues linked to Hume’s problem of induction. While working on these

VIII Preface topics I became increasingly aware that this metaphysic is present in many other subject areas as well, such as the theory of science or of economics. Furthermore, across the globe it seems to have played a crucial role in the neo-liberal policies of unconstrained market-competition and privatisation at the turn of the millennium.

My present work begins with a historical investigation of the background to biological Darwinian paradigms. This background is no irrelevant ornament to the main theme of systematically discussing Darwinism; rather, it provides the basis from which to establish differences between Darwinian paradigms and detect the conceptual core of universal Darwinism. The definition of this core in turn has an incontrovertible impact on the systematic critique of gene-Darwinism, process- Darwinism and Darwinian metaphysics in general.

Although I have done my best to address the different subject-areas, the broad scope of this work nevertheless has the disadvantage of not being able to treat all broached discourses in the depth they deserve. That being said, I still maintain that it would be more unfortunate, if not negligent, to underplay, at the expense of other discourses, the one long argument that acts as the constant thread throughout the book — that is the historically grounded explication and definition of Darwinism and Darwinian metaphysics, enableing a systematic critique of biological as well as metaphysical Darwinism.

In recent years I have worked at the University of Göttingen and now at the University of Heidelberg in psychology in a quite positivistic and technical manner on issues like Bayesian hypothesis-testing. Hence, I am inclined to reconsider this book, based as it is on earlier thought, and I can see that parts of the book are rather speculative. Moreover, I am aware that it could profit from further polishing and updating. This book is based on my PhD thesis in philosophy from 2001 and this edition has only partly been updated and shortened. I have elaborated the section on the problem of induction in more detail in a later PhD thesis in psychology and in my further research, but this later work has not been explicitly concerned with the critique of Darwininian metaphysics, but with logical, statistical and psychological issues. I had the opportunity to keep in touch with recent discussions in evolutionary theory and sociobiology in the Courant Research Centre Evolution of Social Behavior at the University of Göttingen, and therefore I am aware that the book does not account for many of the recent developments in evolutionary biology, sociobiology, and genetics.

Nonetheless, the overall argument of this book still applies. On the one hand, since the time of my earlier work some of its claims — such as the advocacy of multilevel selectionism and the role of evolutionary constraints — have become hotly disputed topics in biology and the philosophy of biology. In this regard I appear to have come closer to the academic mainstream; yet even more darting claims are made in this book. For my ideas challenging Darwinian metaphysics, and in particular Darwinian process-monism, are still innovative, roughly 150 years after The Origin of Species first came out. And it may well be that many scholars will find these ideas are too innovative. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the evolution of ideas will go on and eventually question Darwinian process-monism, in biology as well as in other areas dominated by Darwinian metaphysics. Many lessons can and should be learned from Darwinian metaphysics, but I advocate here that such a metaphysic, postulating

Preface IX the inalterable blindness of the evolutionary process, should be replaced by the idea of an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms themselves, with the potential or even the propabilistic inherent tendency to overcome the primordial blindness.

Facts ate not at issue; nor is the idea of evolution itself. The crux here is how to interpret evolution. The proposed interpretation of evolution is of course of no minor significance. First, it may contribute to a new framework that may allow for the integration of recent biological developments (concerning, for instance, systemtheoretical biology, morphological constraints, Bayesian genetics, and multilevel selection). Moreover, although it cannot be questioned that we can learn very much from Darwinism, it is claimed that Universal Darwinism as an interpretative framework can and should be replaced by an account of the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms — both in biology and in metaphysics.

Mommie v. Sydow, Heidelberg, 2011

Acknowledgments

My greatest debt is to the authors — friend and foe alike — whom I have read, and whose texts alone made my further work possible. I should mention especially Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett. Their writings inspired me, even if in many respects I ultimately came to different conclusions.

Although I tried mainly to radicalise and then transcend gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism from within, I of course also owe much to historical and present critics of Darwinism, both paving the way for my argumentation and me confirming me that a different approach was both possible and necessary.

More directly, I am deeply grateful to Professor Dr. David Knight, supervisor of my philosophical (and historical) doctoral thesis on this matter, for his constantly patient, supportive and friendly help. His advice and encouragement helped me substantially, when writing the thesis, in bringing this complex work to a close.

I am indebted to the German Heinrich-Böll Stiftung, the Deutscher Akademischer Alustauschdienst and the Kölner Gymnasial- und Studienstiftung, whose scholarships made the work possible.

I gratefully acknowledge the substantial help and critical advice of Peter Bowler, Matthew D. Eddy, Paul Embleton, Mary Midgley, Fiona Pierce, Bill Pollard, Soran Reader, Jennifer Smith, Rob Talbot, and Alistair Wright. Additionally, I want to thank my father, Friedrich v. Sydow, not only for having taught me a love of truth early on, but because he had proof read several parts of the original thesis with his own logical rigour and linguistic sensitivity. Finally, when editing the present revised edition of this work, I received considerable help from Martha Cunningham and Johanna Frisch.

In recent years, I have been concerned with the normative and descriptive models of Bayesian reasoning, providing a wholely different approach to knowledge-acquisition from that of blind (Darwinian) trial-and-error processes. And although the current book does not focus on novel Bayesian approaches within biology, the success of the Bayesian paradigm per se (even if mainly in cognitive psychology) contributed to my confidence in a critique of Darwinian metaphysics in the face of Hume’s problem of induction. With this in mind, I would like to express my gratitude to the cognitive psychology lab at Göttingen and to the researchers I met in this sometimes quite technical — but not philosophically irrelevant — field of research. I also want to thank the German Research Foundation for supporting the research on Bayesian models (DFG Sy 111-1, Sy 111-2). When I became affiliated with the Courant Research Centre of the Evolution of Social Behaviour (University of Göttingen), funded by the German Academic Excellence Initiative, I enjoyed the interdisciplinary conferences, such as “Darwin Among the Disciplines,” organised by this group. Even more important, I am very grateful to the heterogeneous and interesting group of researchers at the Courant Centre, who have kept me up-to-date with the debates currently operating in the fields of biology and primatology. Although many of these researchers would call themselves Darwinians — perhaps with a different meaning than the one developed here — it can be concluded from this first hand experience that bio-

Acknowledgment XI logy is much mote diverse and multifaceted than a pure metaphysics of Darwinism or the somewhat narrow popularisations of biological research would suggest.

Finally, personal debts can never be adequately acknowledged; but I want to thank my parents, Anne and Friedrich, and my wife, Sandra, who have provided me with the support, help and love to finish this work.

Table of Contents

Preface date ee eege eege VII e X The Nature of Philosophy and Its Relation to Science... 3 a) Metaphysics as an Essential Task of Philosophy... 3 b) Metaphysics Entrenched in Boenee, ENEE 4 c) Science as Philosophy and Amt, 5 d) The Dialogue Between Philosophy and Science... 6 a) The Glory and Poverty of Gene-Darwinism —

‚IheNeed tora, Third Wayne Hrn 8 c) From Darwinism to an Evolutionary Theory of Evolution ..s..seesssessse... 12

d) The Philosophy of Nature after Times of Ecological and Economic EISE u 16 e) Darwinism, Religion and Philosophy... 18 One Long Argument — Outline of the Book. ENEE 22

Part I: Sociobiology and Its Ethical Implications

1.1, “Two Basic Postülatesin.anaennensenee kenn a 33 b) The Postulate of Genic or Biological Deremmmunism. 35

1.2 The Main Theories of the Evolution of Apparent Altruism — SOO biolopical! Theorems rss.s, ju.sjacscsesstaa dees svssuveesensasa gues chnsasedsvensteaseenqrnadorvdversds 36 a) The Theory of Kin Selecione ora 37 b) The Theory of Reciprocal ‘Altruism? een 38 2.1 Biology and Ethics: Different but Not Unrelarted cscs 42

2.2 Philosophical Reactions and Some Accounts of a Socioblological Ethics asien lesen sinn 45

Table of Contents XII

2.3 The Moral ofthe Gene? —

“The Currency Used in the Casino of Evolution Is Survival’... 51 2.4 Meme ‘Altruisms’? — A Further Extension of the Sociobiological Paradigm en 57 a) Memes — A Limited Comeback of the Idea of Logos... 57 b) Problems of the Extended Genetic-Memetic Approach aS a Basis tor Ethics. naar enaeainan 59 2.5 The Need for a New Paradigm in Biology... 62

Part II: The Unfolding of Logos in Regard to the

Chapter 3: The Unfolding of the Pre-Darwinian Philosphical Conceptions Of Nature sunnn en nne 69 3.1 The Ancient Views of pbotg — Nature as Organism oo. 69 a) From Myth to the Pre-Socratics — The Development of Basic Nogons, ENEE 70 bi Platonism — Physis as Techie ees, 71 a) The World as “Machina Mund? use 74 b) The Human as “Alter lee? aeren 75 a) The Rise of Science — The Alter Deus Explores the Clockwork of God: Copernicus, Bacon, Newton. 76 b) Humanism — The Alter Deus Replaces the Christian Deus ....ss..sss1.s11... 78 c) Descartes and Kant —

Dualism of Human Freedom and the Clockwork of Nature... 79

(i) ‘Naturphilosophie’ and Idealism ee 82

(i) Unity, Dynamism and Creamnicem, EE 84

(iii) The Breakdown of Romantic Science... 86

3.4 The Rise of Biology as Science —

Torn between Eternal Form and Evolution... 87 b) Romanticising Materialistic Biology — Buffon, Lamarck... 90 c) Transcendental and Essentialist Biology — Cuvier, (early) Owen, ADAS SiZ NEEN 92

XIV Table of Contents d) Romantic Biology — Oken, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, (late) Owen. 95 e) Conclusion: Overview of the Preceding Three Schools... 98

Chapter 4: The Internal Logic of Evolutionary Theories —

From Darwin to Dawvkns. an 102 4.1 From Darwin to Weismann — The Birth of Darwinism uo... eee 106 a) Darwin — Not a Darwinist in the Strict enge, 106 c) Darwin’s Descent of Man — Social Darwinism? nennen 112 (i) Explaining Man, Culture and Ethics... 115 d) Neo-Darwinism: Weismann Turns Darwin’s Theory into RE 118 4.2 Darwinism on Its Deathbed een 121 4:3. Evolutionafy'Synthesis.:.a.a.aunaiseanenne man EEEE EERE 123 b) Second Phase — Population Structure and Macroscopic Mechamems. 127 d) Disengagement from Ideological Programmes? ue 134 a) Germ-Line Reducnomtam irit AE 139 ENEE 140 €) Darwinian: Process: Mons eege, 142 4.5 Criticism — A Better Synthesis in Sigbtd, een 144 a) New Views in Micro- and Macrobiolog NEE 146 D) Mulä-Leve Darwis M ENNEN 153 (i) Multi-Level-Evolutionism: Developmental Approaches and Selforganisational Approaches ENEE 156 Chapter 5: The External History of Darwinism — 5.1 Darwin — a) Romanticism and Romanticising Materialism... cesses 163 b) The Impact of Newtonism — Darwin’s Process-Monism ~... 168 c) Thomas Malthus, Adam Smith — The Influence of Economic Thought and Practice wees 173 d) God — A Blind and Brute Creaton. ee 183

Table of Contents XV

5.2 Evolutionary Synthesis —

Thermodynamics and the Philosophical Zeitgeist... 184 a) The Influence of Thermodynamics EN 184 b) The Impact of the Philosophical Zeitgeist and the Development of Logical Positivism and Logical Aromiemg E 186 G.) Philosophy at the Time of the Eclipse of Darwinism „s.s... 187 (it) Parallels of Logical Atomism and Logical Positivism tO Bish erste: nassen ash cesaseieestien RRE 188 (iii) Contextual Turns in Philosophy and Biology... 190 a) The Different Biological Legacies of the Schools of b) A Misled Neo-Romantic Aspiration for Unification and Interdiseiplinattty. ses sense 193 c) ‘Naturalistic Turn’ — Reductionism and Materialism in Philosophy... 197 d) ‘Import’ of Economical Concepts — Gene-Capitalism? ue 198 5.4 Summary: Biology as "Geisteswissenschaft d... 202

Chapter 6: Darwinian Metaphysics —

6.1 The Problem of Induction — a) Darwinism Seen as Universal Dneple, ue 209 b) The Problem of Induction (Hume and Poppet) ue 210 c) Toward a Critique of a Falsificationist Necessity of Universal Datwinism. unse ann 212 6.2 Biologistic Darwinism — Gene-Darwinism as Brorotepe 215 a) Darwinian Biological Epistemology and Darwinian Process Epistemology EEN 221 b) Operant Conditioning — Learning as Darwinian Drocess? 227 c) Popper’s Falsificationism — Science as Darwinian Broeecss?, 232 a) Antibodies and Neurones NEEN 235 b) Darwinian Economics: Beau 236

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Part IV: Transcendence of Gene-Darwinism and

Universal Process-Darwinism ....sssessssessssseeoeeeeeesessseeeeeeeeee 243 8.1 Problems of Physicalism and Reductionism in General... 245 a) The Difference between Explanation and (Downward) Reduction....245 c) Logical Problems of the Modern Understanding of Substance —

(EERSTEN EI 248 d) The Inconsistency between Biologism and Physicalism — Genes or Information versus Quarks? ue 255 8.2 Genetic Reductionism I: Gene-Atomistic Reductionism and Its Transcendence... ese 264 a) Gene-Atomism — Empty or Wrong Cam. 264 b) Higher Genetic Units — Despite the Meiotic Shuffle... 267 ii) Higher Genic Units Despite the Meiotic Shuffle eee 269 1) The Relationship of Higher-Level Genes and Downward: E 272 ii) The Stability of Higher-Level Genes on Different Joe. 274 ii) The Tautological Claim of Gene -Aromtsm 280 e) Higher-Level Properties of Different Organisms — Four Possibilities for Achieving the Good of the Group... 284 ii) Four Possibilities for Achieving the Good of the Group, 289 f) Stable Synergetic Properties and Selection above Groups — Species and: HCOSySteMssssvccevsssecssvetassssvessshosvsisvasssvisvesasessestenctssesbiaesdesiieee 301 Me 302 W GE 304 8.3 Genetic Reductionism II: Germ-Line Reductionism and Its Transcendence e 311 a) Germ-Line Reductionism — The Strong Interpretation of the Weismann Battier een 311 G) Different Interpretations of the Central Dogma... 312

Gi) Violations of the Weismannian Dogma? e 313

Table of Contents XVII

(iit) The Central Dogma as Only Partial Description of the

Relationships between Genotype and Dhenopvpe 315 b) Information, Exformation and Phenotype as Evyòlutonary: EE 316 1) The General Concept of Bstormanon, cise 316 ii) Exformation and the Stuffness of the Phenotype... 317 iv) Stuffness and Inner Dynamics of the Phenotype... 321 v) Phenotype as Evolutionary Factor in Its Own Right... 322 c) Forms, Fields and the Concept of External Memory... 324 1) Environmental Forms and Fields... 324 1); External, MEOT sisses nesre r a E EAE 326 d) A Partial Revival of Morphological Taxonomy? uses 329 1) The Evolutionary Factor of Constraints as Object Of KE 330 ii) Morphological Resonance as Object of Taxonomy... 331 et 331 Chapter 9: Transcendence of Process-Reductionism eessen 333 9.1 Inconsistencies and Tautologies of a Darwinian Mono-Mechanistic Metapbusie, EEN 336 c) On the Tautological Basis of Dan. Selectomem. ee 350 9.2 Re-defining the Notions of Darwinism and Lamarckism.... ne 358 a) A Strict Definition of Darwinism NN 358 b) A Spectrum between Darwinism and LLamarchkiesm neen 359 9.3 Toward Radical Evolutionism — a) Synthesis versus Pure Diversification of Information — Discussion of the First Criterion for a Darwinian Process... 364 b) Directed Variation versus Blind Variation — Discussion of the Second Creton, 368 1) Not Blind by Definition EEN 371 ii) Different Types Of Variation EE 374 iv) Adaptive Variation as Reaction to the Environment... 389 v). Summary and Conclusion eesriie ienen eni aE EEEE 392 c) From Hetero-Selection to Auto-Selection — Discussion of the Third Criterion... ENEE 394 H Darwinian Extetnälism. unse! 395

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(iit) Auto-Selection and Autonom. 398 d) The Evolution of Evolutionary Mechanisme, 405

D The Necessary Concept of an Evolution of Evolutionary.Mechanistns. users ns 405 (it) Process-Emergence, Circularity and Autonom, 409 Béyond'the Two Cultures istie ae eegend 427 Somma enen EE EE 428 An Outlook — Towards Ecological Ldealem, ENEE 434 Bibhography ans ann 437

This work proposes and elaborates a philosophy of nature that, although influenced by Darwinism, aims ultimately to transcend Darwinism. My particular focus is on two purified versions of Darwinism: gene-Darwinism (9 pp. 138 f., 191 f., 215 f.) and process-Darwinism (Si pp. 205 f.). The essential claims of these two approaches are first explicated and then subjected to criticism. This elaborated critique is not exogeneous to Darwinism, proposing another philosophy of nature from the outset; instead an immanent critique is developed, starting from within the investigated Darwinian paradigms (Gi pp. 243 E). Focussing on internal inconsistencies of these patadigms, reveals tendencies that will lead us beyond Darwinism.

But not only theories can transcend themselves, the central claim of this work is that Nature, due to inner or outer necessities, continually transcends itself, not only in its products but in its evolutionary mechanisms. As theories are moulded not only by external forces, but by inherent tendencies as well (where the rules of change may sometimes depend on the theory itself), also evolution may depend on evolved evolutionary mechanisms. It is defended that the emergence of new entities and organisational levels may have real causal impact. Hence, in contrast to gene-Darwinism, this work supports a hierarchical theory of evolution. Additionally, the emergence of new evolutionary processes is proposed. Please note, this view needs not to imply a Heraklitian philosophy of nature. Instead it is suggested that evolution and the proposed evolution of evolutionary mechanisms have the potential and even an inherent tendency to overcome blindness (the primordial Darwinian process of blind mutations and external retentions). Emphasising change even of evolutionary mechanisms does not preclude that these changes may refer to or take part in — perhaps even eternal — Platonic forms (merhexis).

This work started as an investigation into what is called here ‘gene-Darwinism’, challenging its atomism, determinism and process-reductionism. More generally, Darwinian tenets can be found in other sciences as well, such as psychology, economics, and the theory of science itself. Moreover, Darwinism, implicitly or explicitly, has long become a Weltanschaunng influencing Western culture to the point where it may justify the epithet “universal”. The explication of universal Darwinism led me ultimately to criticise Darwinism in general as incomplete and inconsistent. Although the biological and philosophical applications of Darwinism have undeniably yielded profound insights, Darwinism is closely tied to entity reductionism and process reductionism that are not only grossly simplifying, but, in my view, false. In particular, this work stresses that Darwinism, in its strict formulation, is processmonistic. Correspondingly, Darwinism has sometimes been solely defined by the evolutionary process of natural selection (where, of course, much depends on the definition of natural selection). The process monism at the heart of Darwinism (© pp. 102, 142, 216, 358) has at times been concealed by reasonable extensions of the Darwinian paradigm, such as the so-called evolutionaty synthesis, often referred to as Darwinian. In other cases, however, a purified, essential form of Darwinism has in fact been clarified, such as in radical gene-Darwinism.” Although this patadigm is severely criticised in this work, this paradigm and particular the clarification of the meaning of Darwinism has great merits. In any case, it would be inappropriate to define Darwinism by evolutionary change alone; doing so would mean that biologists in the Romantic Era, advocating an entirely different idea of evolution long before Darwin, would have to be called Darwinians as well. To the contrary, it is argued here that Darwinism — paradoxically still in a Paleyan manner — advocates one eternal law of nature: simple, predetermined and invariant. Despite the evident antagonism today between the two forms of adaptationism — on the one hand, the theological neo- Paleyan religious adaptationism of the creationists, and on the other hand, the radicalised biological adaptationism of gene-Darwinians — there are paradoxically close historical connections between natural theology and natural selection. The new casting of the world as based on evolution did not change the fact that Darwinians conceive the mechanism of evolution as being static, as if it were God given. Like in a Newtonian universe, the laws of nature are taken as being given from the outset; the mechanisms of evolution ate taken to be static. Hence, evolution itself does not evolve. These thoughts, with obvious theistic underpinnings, have not only eroded theology, but, even more crucially, in their current gene-Darwinian application to morals they erode other areas essential to the understanding of human life as well.

It is proposed here that this metaphysic should be replaced by a more flexible and truely evolutionary picture of evolution. Moreover, it is suggested that evolutionary mechanisms (for instance, due to inner constraints and systemic feedback loops) may gain some autonomy from external determination by (external) selection pressures. Philosophically, however, the emphasis on evolution even of the evolutionary process needs not imply that there is no underlying “Platonic” necessity is involved in the unfolding of nature. Yet, no complete antithesis to biological or philosophical Darwinism is envisaged here, nor a concept of evolution purged of Darwinian tenets. Indeed, much use must be made of originally Darwinian concepts. For example, I take it as given that variational evolution plays an indispensable role in evolutionary theory. Nevertheless, I shall argue that a mono-mechanistic picture, central to the Darwinian paradigm, is inaccurate. The envisioned paradigm shift would indeed casts new light on many biological concepts, but it would also require to incorporate knowledge accumulated in part under the Darwinian paradigm — just as Darwinism incorporated results of originally non-Datwinian Mendelism. Perhaps the question of whether the resulting partly Datwinian view could still be called “Darwinian” is of secondary importance. More crucial is whether one can achieve a paradigm-shift that dismisses the radical substance-reductionism and process-reductionism at the core of traditional Darwinism.

When a philosopher of biology dares to challenge such important biological concepts, the underlying assumption is a specific understanding, both of the philosophy of nature and of the nature of philosophy. In this introduction, first, an account of the advocated nature of philosophy and its relation to science is given. What follows is a discussion of some underlying ideas for developing a philosophy of nature transcending the Darwinian paradigm. Finally, the “one long argument” of the book is outlined.

The Nature of Philosophy and Its Relation to Science a) Metaphysics as an Essential Task of Philosophy

Although some forms of metaphysics have been the target of setious philosophical criticism (justified or unjustified), metaphysics per se is both indispensable and inevitable. Both in philosophy and common sense, metaphysics can be ignored, yet will nonetheless be acted upon and reveal itself, if only as a basic underlying tenet. Philosophers objecting to metaphysics generally target a specific traditional metaphysic, but in doing so they often unwittlingly preassume another metaphysics tacitly present in science or current philosophy. Although (particular) metaphysical questions have been increasingly disapproved by a tradition reaching from Hume, over Kant, to positivism and analytic philosophy, this cannot change the fact that the original contexts out of which the authors wrote presupposed a kind of metaphysical basis. It is not objectable to adopt such a metaphysical basis, but to voluntarily or involuntarily obscure such commitment, as seems to be the case in some versions of Darwinian metaphysics.

The progressive philosophical devaluation of metaphysics has many causes and served many understandable purposes. One of Kant’s reasons for criticising metaphysics was “to make room for faith”!, since the only possible metaphysic (in the context of science) was presumably a materialistic or mechanistic one. Kant still managed, however, to reconcile the Newtonian world of matter-in-motion with a strong individually binding ethics. In the case of positivism, the critical emphasis helped to eliminate the endless disputes about first principles and paved the way for a better reception of the sciences. Likewise, analytical philosophy renounced (traditional) metaphysics, but it also castigated some scientific claims as being metaphysical. However, although logical positivism considered itself antimetaphysical, it has now frequently argued that logical positivism itself introduced a particular metaphysic.? In recent decades, some analytic philosophers paradoxically have been explicitly engaged in a rival of metaphysics, while still endeavouring to keep a distance from obscure speculations.’

To delve into the problem further, however, it is useful to (re-)examine what today is meant by the term “metaphysics.” The concept is notoriously hard to define, and it may in fact be that a prima causa investigation exceeds the scope of scholarly appraisal. Postmodernism has announced ‘the end of metaphysics’ (and of politics and of history). This claim, however, may itself be deconstructed; that is, ironically, the presupposition of a kind of (postmodernist) metaphysics seems to be needed to advocate the impossibility of metaphysics.

In the current context, “metaphysics” is taken to denote the study of the most basic, systematized principles or concepts of philosophy. These principles or concepts may indeed be fragmented and not fully consistent; nonetheless the goal of a more

IT I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787/1781), Edition B, p. xxx, Ð footnote 249.

2 Such a metaphysics is greatly exemplified by: R. Carnap‘s, Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. Cf. H. Putnam, Reichenbach’s Metaphysical Picture (1991/1996), pp. 100 f.

7 E.g., J. Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time (1998).

systematic, unified and hence metaphysical understanding remains indispensable. Even if one opposes metaphysics because one wants to favour multiple perspectives or a mote domain-specific approach presupposes a particular (pluralist) understanding of truth (or goodness), even this understanding seems to presuppose a metaphysical framework. Such a framework need not be fixed, but rather may evolve over time. Metaphysical approaches, as advocated here, should not degenerate into mere dogmas, but should be open to discussions and further refinements. Correspondingly, I do not commit myself to a particular metaphysical framework at this point. Although even metaphysics, and love of wisdom (pAi/osophy) in general, in my opinion, ought to be, at least in part, grounded in fact, such an architectonic approach transcends the merely given. In this respect metaphysics resembles good theories, which go beyond being a mere summary of previous observations. Additionally, metaphysics, could — and should — go beyond particular sciences, to determine and reflect the relationship between them and the traditional philosophical disciplines (logic, epistemology, ontology and ethics).

b) Metaphysics Entrenched in Science

In my view, the traditional critique of philosophical metaphysics left a vacuum that has been partly filled by an implicit or explicit Darwinian metaphysic (despite any other intentions the critics themselves may have had). A large portion of the present work aims at explicating this individualistic (or even sub-individualistic), processmonistic metaphysics. And despite ultimately criticising universal Darwinism, it is suggested here that this position deserves to be called a metaphysic. Universal Darwinism concerns the essence of becoming and claims to mould ontology, epistemology, and logic in a unified way. A version of this metaphysic is often implicitly adopted today, an explicit formulation of which is needed, not least to render it criticisable.