Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Front matter

Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world?

Sverre Lodgaard

S

PART IV Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world Notes References Index

223 239 253

Abbreviations

ABACC Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials ABM anti-ballistic missile

ALCM air-launched cruise missile

ANWEFZ African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations BMD ballistic missile defence

BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China

BWC Biological Weapons Convention

CBM confidence-building measures

CD Conference on Disarmament

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CPI Counter-Proliferation Initiative

CTBT Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea E3 Britain, France and Germany

ECO Economic Cooperation Organisation

EU European Union

Euratom European Atomic Energy Community FMCT Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty

G8 Group of eight leading industrial countries GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

HEU highly enriched uranium

HWR heavy-water reactor

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IBSA India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

ICI International Court of Justice

INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces INFCIRC Information Circular (IAEA)

IRGC Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps

KEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation

LEU low-enriched uranium x Abbreviations

LWR MAD MTCR NAM NATO NFU NGO NIE NNWS NPR NPT NSG NWFW NWFZ NWS

P5 PASDARAN PLA

PSI RevCon ROK SAARC SALT SDI SLBM SLCM SLOC SORT START SWF TLAM/N TRR UNGA UNIDIR UNMOVIC UNSC UNSCOM VCLT WMD WMDFZ WTO light-water reactor

mutually assured destruction

missile technology control regime

non-aligned movement

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

no-first-use

non-governmental organisation

National Intelligence Estimate non-nuclear-weapon state(s)

Nuclear Posture Review

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Nuclear Suppliers Group

nuclear-weapon-free world nuclear-weapon-free zone

nuclear-weapon state(s)

five permanent members of UN Security Council Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps

People’s Liberation Army (China)

Proliferation Security Initiative

Review Conference (NPT)

Republic of [South] Korea

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Strategic Defense Initiative submarine-launched ballistic missile sea-launched cruise missile

Sea Line of Communication

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

Sovereign Wealth Fund

Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile/Nuclear Teheran research reactor

United Nations General Assembly

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission United Nations Security Council

United Nations Special Commission (Iraq) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties weapons of mass destruction weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone

World Trade Organisation

Introduction

When the Cold War drew to an end, the superpower leaders offered a vision of a world without nuclear weapons, in all earnest. They were heavily criticised both by their own establishments and by others, and the world was taken by surprise. Secretary of State George Shultz met the critics and proponents of status quo asking, “What’s so good about a world where you can be wiped out in thirty minutes?”

On the twentieth anniversary of the 1986 Reagan—Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik, a group of former American statesmen revived the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world (NWFW). The call was followed up by Barack Obama and leaders of other countries. In many parts of the world, states are waiting to see what comes of it. Elimination of nuclear weapons has been proposed before — the Baruch plan of 1946, the McCloy—Zorin proposal of 1961, the Reagan- Gorbachev attempt in Reykjavik in 1986, Rajiv Gandhi’s plan and plea before the UN General Assembly in 1988 — and those initiatives were short-lived. Will it fizzle out this time, too? Will the interests tied to nuclear weapon complexes hit back and reaffirm the relevance of nuclear arms? Mostly, other countries have not been negative, but they are cautiously waiting to assess the realism of it.

Some take a grimmer view. They see the call as part of a double agenda, the real purpose of which is to sustain and enhance Western unilateral advantage. The synergies of disarmament and non-proliferation may stop smaller and weaker states from acquiring the “great equaliser” — a nuclear capability of their own — and new US conventional weapons that can instantly destroy targets all around the globe are more likely to be used than nuclear systems. In a world without nuclear arms, the United States may therefore be even more superior, for nobody can match its conventional strength. At low levels of offensive nuclear forces, improved US ballistic missile defences may, furthermore, create fears of first-strike capabilities. If the shield becomes increasingly effective, others may be threatened from a position of near impunity. Seen in one or more of these ways, nuclear disarmament is not a hallmark of progressive politics, but a change to maintain the dominance of the United States and the West. Change in order to preserve.

The US unipolar moment was precisely that — a moment — yielding to a multi-centric world. Emerging powers wedded to state sovereignty, territorial integrity

2 Introduction and non-interference in internal affairs are changing the parameters of global geopolitics, and states in Asia, Africa and Latin-America cooperate more with each other to reduce their dependence on Western powers. Hence the debate about “the West and the World Without the West”. The systemic changes redefine fundamentally important questions of cooperation and conflict in international affairs.

The role of nuclear weapons is embedded in international politics. Nuclear disarmament presupposes a cooperative approach to international security. Big power cooperation is of the essence; regional cooperation likewise. Disarmament initiatives must attend to the interests of the emerging powers and to the hopes, doubts and scepticisms of states on all continents: to be effective, the initiatives must be aligned with ongoing power shifts in the international system. Part I of this book tries to situate the functions of nuclear weapons in the context of systemic change, reviewing contemporary power shifts and geopolitical orientations and discussing their implications for nuclear disarmament (Chapter 1).

The Cold War left important legacies that continue to influence nuclear weapon policies. Particularly noteworthy are the continuation of threat-based policies and nuclear deterrence doctrines, extended deterrence and policies of first-use included. President Clinton focused on the benefits of globalisation as much as on how to avert threats, but when the period of opportunity of the early 1990s was over, the politics of fear picked up again. To the extent that specific threats no longer sufficed to justify the maintenance of strong nuclear postures, they were arguably needed to defend against the unknown. In the mindset of the Cold War, uncertainties about the future had to be met by the strongest of weapons. Later, 9/11 put the terrorist threat up front; Saddam was turned into a threat beyond proportion; and Iran became a strong driver of threat-based policies. The doctrines of nuclear deterrence therefore outlived the global rivalry and confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union: they were adapted, but in essence maintained. Part II of the book starts with a review of these legacies (Chapter 2), followed by an examination of nuclear-weapon state (NWS) doctrines (Chapter 3).

The obligation to disarm is inscribed in Art. VI of the NPT. Legally speaking, failure to take “effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament” does not necessarily amount to non-compliance by any particular state. Progress depends on the seriousness of all negotiating parties and is arguably beyond the powers of any single participant. However, the political process that led to the NPT clarifies that Art. VI was conceived as part of a dynamic bargain to be implemented over time, erasing — in due course — the distinction between NWS and NNWS. Converging expectations were created and a review mechanism was set up to facilitate abolition. Although no timeline was given, “cessation of the arms race at an early date” left a sense of urgency. Art. VI therefore calls for negotiations in good faith. Attempts have been made to clarify the meaning of it and to make the commitments more explicit, binding and tangible. However, in the view of a great many parties to the Treaty, the results have been disappointing.

Introduction 3

Another part of the grand bargain — the one in the title of the NPT: nonproliferation — has held up better than expected. In addition to the five NWS recognised by the NPT, only four states have acquired nuclear weapons. Throughout the nuclear age, more than 20 states did “something” in the direction of a nuclear weapon capability at some point or other, but dropped the ambition or were stopped in their tracks.

The first half of the 1990s was the golden age of non-proliferation: Russia became the sole heir of Soviet nuclear weapons; South Africa abandoned its weapons and joined the NPT; NPT membership increased considerably; the Conference of Disarmament agreed on a mandate for negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT); and by the time the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference was convened, a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) was in sight. The US and Russian nuclear arsenals were significantly reduced. The Review Conference therefore came at the end of a period of good news, facilitating the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely. At this point in time, non-proliferation seemed to be a winning proposition.

That turned out to be flawed analysis. India, Pakistan and North Korea went on to test, and Iran became a state of growing proliferation concern. Proliferation concerns grew, disarmament negotiations came to a halt, big power relations deteriorated, and more functions were assigned to nuclear weapons in national military doctrines. The grand bargain from 1968 that led to the NPT came apart — until a new US government with high disarmament ambitions opened a new window of opportunity to revive it. Part II ends with an overview of the basic requirements of such a consensus (Chapter 4).

Part III is devoted to the problems at the outskirts of the regime. It starts with an analysis of the three-state problem (India, Pakistan, Israel), and of the nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and India in particular (Chapter 5). It continues with a review and summary of lessons learnt from 27 cases of nuclear rollback, i.e. of states that have moved towards nuclear weapons at some time or other, but that dropped the ambition or were stopped in their tracks and rolled back to non-nuclear status (Chapter 6). The chapter reviews the explanatory power of realist assumptions and idealist perspectives, and concludes with a list of 16 propositions shedding light on what it may take to turn would-be proliferators back to non-nuclear status. These lessons are, in turn, used in analyses of the Iranian and North Korean problems (Chapters 7 and 8). Part III winds up with a discussion of the relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation (Chapter 9).

In legal terms, the link between disarmament and non-proliferation is well established. More than anything else, the NPT review process has centred on the relationship between them, and the academic literature has excellent analyses of the subject. Therefore, the discussion in Chapter 9 is not conducted in the legal framework, but focuses on the political and military dimensions of the disarmament—non-proliferation relationship. Is disarmament important to align the three outliers to the non-proliferation regime? Is it important for purposes of rollback? Does it matter for North Korea and Iran? The other way around, how

4 Introduction important is non-proliferation for disarmament? How can the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) contribute to nuclear disarmament by making their non-nuclear status more convincing? Special attention is paid to the distinction between disarmament as a process and disarmament as a state of affairs, and to the concept of rank disequilibrium, which appears to have strong explanatory power in cases like Iran and India.

Looking ahead, the NPT is a regulatory mechanism for non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses all the way to zero. However, it says nothing about the precise meaning of zero and it is no more than a skeleton agreement, so new rules guiding the final approaches to a NWFW will be needed. This is the topic of the final Part of the book (Chapter 10), which starts with a discussion of the pros and cons of different versions of the vision.

To what extent can a vision be a guide to action? All the way, due respect must be paid to the path dependency of nuclear disarmament. It would be presumptuous to claim to know much about a world approaching zero: at that stage, the issues will be seen through lenses that are different from the contemporary ones. However, some force constellations are more dangerous than others, and much is known about the conditions of military stability. The chapter takes a closer look at their relevance for the structuring of nuclear disarmament, concluding with a concrete proposition regarding the final steps to a NWFW.

The book is comprehensive in its coverage of disarmament and nonproliferation issues, but stays within the confines of the state paradigm. There is nothing about international terrorism. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy — the third pillar of the NPT — are referred to intermittently in some of the chapters, but not discussed at any length. The focus is on the other pillars: disarmament and nonproliferation. The notes and cross references are made in order to enable the readers to use single chapters without having to read the entire book.

A preliminary version of Chapter 4 was presented at the Twentieth Anniversary Conference of Rajiv Gandhi’s disarmament speech at the United Nations in 1988 (Delhi, June 2008). Chapter 7 was first presented at the Nobel Symposium on “Peace, stability and nuclear order: Theoretical assumptions, historical experiences, future challenges”, Oscarsborg, Oslo, June 2009. Chapter 10 is a much expanded version of an article with the same title in Daedalus, Fall 2009.

While working on the book I have been a visiting fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, Washington, DC), at the Tsinghua University (Beijing) and at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (Centre for Nuclear Studies (CNS), Monterey, California). I have benefited greatly from colleagues at all these places. My thanks go first of all to John Hamre, Li Bin and William Potter who hosted me and shared of their rich insights with me. I received financial support from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: I am grateful to Ambassador Kaare Aas, in particular, for his cooperation and encouragement in the early phases of the work. First of all, however, my gratitude goes to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), which I had the privilege to direct for ten years and which gave me optimal working conditions when I stepped down from the directorship.

Introduction 5

I have benefited from comments by colleagues in many parts of the world — at conference tables and informally, in reference to conference papers and in freewheeling discussions. I would like to thank Steven Miller, Oystein Noreng, Benoit Pelopidas, Leon Sigal, Nikolai Sokov and Aruni Wijewardane in particular, for their inputs in the final stages of the work. The responsibility for the end result is mine alone.

Like so many times before, Jan Risvik (NUPTI) assisted me, competently and efficiently, language-wise and otherwise. Lala Kylycheva (CNS) assisted in the preparation of notes and references and in meeting other editorial requirements. Her professionalism and devotion has been impressive.

Sverre Lodgaard Monterey and Oslo, March/April 2010

Part I Disarmament, non-proliferation and the security environment

Globalisation fosters interdependence and invites rule-based international institutions. It raises the opportunity costs of hostilities and wars, and offers hope for a better-organised world where arms regulation is deemed to be in the common interest. However, state sovereignty remains a defining characteristic of the international system, and international organisations are usually asked to facilitate cooperation between sovereign states. The security sector, in particular, is not bound by growing volumes of international interaction, but follows its own logic. At the beginning of the twentieth century, trade between European states was booming, but this did not prevent the First World War. Today, China is Japan’s largest market and Japan is China’s third largest, but they remain wary of each other as far as national security is concerned. Much the same applies to India and China. Growing interdependence has not led to political integration and the formation of security communities. The European Union, where economic cooperation did develop into political integration and cooperation on security and defence issues, is an exception in this respect.

The framework conditions for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are further complicated by the ongoing shifts of power in the international system from the west to the east and south. The US hegemony is challenged. Historically, such transitions have been fraught with tension. For the hegemon, the “second country” — the state that is next to it in the international power hierarchy — has been the main problem. If the “second country” is rising, it must be stopped in its tracks. Others watch such rivalries carefully, satisfied states rallying around the hegemon and dissatisfied ones tending to side with the challenger. For the US, the “second country” is primarily China.

Even if the challenger aims at no more than equal status, what the hegemon sees is a trajectory that threatens to cross and overtake its own. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union said it aimed for no more than nuclear parity with the US, but the US had its eyes on capabilities that were rising faster than its own, leading to another round of intensified arms racing. China proceeds cautiously, stressing the peaceful nature of its development, while Americans debate their hedging strategies, some arguing that cooperation is possible and others that confrontation is unavoidable.

With Barack Obama, US unilateralism is slowing down. The state of the American economy discourages new, expensive foreign policy adventures, and American public opinion wants the administration to extricate itself from the wars in the Middle East. The confrontational foreign policy agenda of the Bush administration turned out to be too demanding even for the US. Obama emphasises international cooperation on the basis of international law. Still, the US military budget continues to increase. Cuts are seen as signs of weak leadership.

To set nuclear disarmament in motion, Obama has to come to terms with Russia. If not, the grand ambition of a nuclear-weapon-free world (NWFW) will fail before it gets started. The successor agreement to START I is no big deal, but without cancellation of the missile defence plans for Poland and the Czech Republic, it may not have been possible. Agreement on deeper cuts requires more comprehensive accommodation of national interests. Obama recognises that disarmament depends on cooperative big power relations, so his vision of an NWFW - the number-one priority in his maiden speech at the United Nations — is a driver for a cooperative security environment.

For the time being, the rationale for nuclear disarmament and the economic and political incentives for improved international cooperation therefore reinforce each other in the conduct of US foreign affairs. However, US emphasis on military superiority and the reactions and priorities of other powerful actors in an increasingly multi-centric world make the continuation open to question. The security environment may become more cooperative and so facilitate disarmament, or it may deteriorate into the traditional security dilemma that fuelled the arms race of the Cold War, where an increase in the power of one state weakens the position of others and drive them to increase their own military capabilities.' The opposite prescription is that of “common security” which says that in the nuclear age, security is something that adversaries have to build together (ICDSI 1982). Unilateral steps at the expense of others will not do: the means to enhance one’s own security must also make the others feel more secure.

The negation of the Bush administration’s priorities does not mean that unilateralism is out for ever. Unilateralism is a structural phenomenon that derives from the superior position of the US in world affairs, and it would be no surprise if the pendulum were to swing back in an effort to reconfirm US superiority and keep the challengers at bay. The Bush administration left Russia, China and others with a deep distrust of the United States, so it would be premature for them to assume that Obama’s policies are the beginning of a new, benign long-term trend. Elimination of nuclear weapons may take decades, and those who prefer a more assertive foreign policy backed by sophisticated nuclear forces may get the upper hand again before disarmament has gone very far.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is predicated on international cooperation across a broad range of issues concerning peaceful as well as military utilisations of nuclear energy. To function effectively, it requires more concord between the big powers than is common in the international system.

Only in two very brief intervals has the UN Security Council functioned the way the Charter prescribes and a smooth functioning of the NPT requires: in the periods of opportunity immediately after the Second World War and after the end of the Cold War. The Treaty also labours under conflicts of interest between states in the northwest and states in the south. The latter object to supplier-state restrictions on international nuclear commerce and sharply criticise the NWS for their failure to disarm. Under mounting pressure from both sets of conflicts, the Treaty was in jeopardy when UNSC Resolution 1887 from the Security Council summit of September 2009 reconfirmed the validity of its main elements. Many NNWS were critical of the Resolution, non-aligned countries in particular: still, the new commitment to international cooperation and nuclear disarmament did much to facilitate the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

The West

The unipolar moment

The unipolar moment in world politics — the unrivalled hegemonial position of the United States, the first truly global military power in the history of humankind — was short-lived. It came into being in the 1990s; reached its apex in the spring of 2003 following the invasion of Iraq; and dissipated quicker than anybody expected. In part, the moment was squandered by the destructive policies of the US itself; in part, it yielded to economic and political developments that had been in the making for several years.

The foreign policy of the Bush administration has been amply described by analysts in and out of the United States. Unilateralism was part and parcel of it, but not among its defining characteristics. Unilateralism grew in the 1990s, after the Cold War, and was inherited by the neoconservatives who took it to new heights. The neocons added exceptionalism to it — the idea that exceptional rules should apply to the exceptionally strong, sometimes in reference to the Roman empire and Roman law. The statutes of the International Criminal Court became an early example: the rest of the world might well adopt it, but no US citizen should ever be put before the Court. In the history of the United States, exceptionalism is not new either, but after 9/11 the Bush administration leaped ahead to take it in new directions. Notable among them were the policies of preventive action and regime change, by force if need be. Another distinguishing feature was the administration’s unwillingness to talk with its most ardent opponents.

In practice, unilateralism meant that the US withdrew from some international agreements and refrained from joining others. International rules, norms and standards were treated selectively in order to not restrict US freedom of action. However, once it decided to leave an agreement, it did so the way the treaty prescribed. If the treaty said that a party might leave on 6 months’ notice, the US did so. Unilateralism limited the scope of applicable international law, but did not challenge its foundations. This is what exceptionalism does: by advocating particular rules for the particularly strong, this philosophy takes exception to the principle of the sovereign equality of states, which lies at the root of international law.

The US National Security Strategy of 2002 announced it. It emphasised that “the struggles of the twentieth century [left the world with] a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy and free enterprise” (White House 2002). Insofar as US policies promoted these values, there would be no need to legitimise them in reference to the UN Charter, international law and multilateral organisations. The policies would legitimise themselves by their contribution to basic values. Unilateralism and exceptionalism became parts of the same continuum: at the low end of it, the US would extricate itself from international rules, norms and standards by withdrawing in orderly fashion; at the high end, it would feel free to disregard and contravene them.

On the international scene, the rule of law was therefore discarded in favour of unilateralism and exceptionalism. The National Defense Strategy of 2005 emphasised that “Our strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism” (DoD 2005). While the rule of law is based on a single standard for all parties, hegemonial rule is based on two standards, one for the hegemon and one for the subjects. The US was the global rule-maker, but did not always have to play by the rules. The National Security Strategy of 2006, which was an update along the lines of the 2002 document, provided yet another confirmation (White House 2006).

When Bush declared victory in Iraq, exceptionalism was in high standing in Washington. Iraq was supposed to be the first showcase. However, while unilateralism is almost certain to stay in some form or other, exceptionalism has been on the retreat. Retreating but not disappearing: where the US remains an undisputed number one, there will still be a propensity to act on the basis of selfdefined rules. Exceptionalism’s longest shelf life will therefore be in military affairs, where the US is likely to reign supreme in high-tech capabilities for a long time to come. Preventive military action remains an option; regime change too. Since the beginning of the Cold War, the US has toppled many governments of other countries, but the prominence given to it by the Bush administration has gone. The Bush administration stands out as being both more extreme and more straightforward in its declaratory policies than other administrations — some say more honest than many others.

US military superiority: ambition undiminished

At the core of US dominance is the use or threat of use of force. US foreign policy is heavily militarised. Under the heading Global Strike, the Bush administration planned for quick destruction of all targets of significance wherever and whenever it was deemed necessary. The plans were offensive and pre-emptive in nature and based on advanced conventional, space and information warfare capabilities. Nuclear weapons also figured prominently (Kristensen 2006). Another element was missile defence, based on the logic that Richard Nixon used in 1972 when justifying the ABM Treaty: if you have a shield, it is easier to use the sword. Parts of Global Strike were cancelled because conventional strikes could be mistaken for nuclear attacks. Other parts just went under the radar.

The network of foreign military bases tells a lot about the world’s first global military power. Towards the end of George W. Bush’s presidency, the United States had 190,000 soldiers and 115,000 civilians at 909 military facilities in 46 countries and territories. Additional to these numbers were the forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and non-declared facilities in Kuwait, the Philippines, Israel and other places. US forces trained soldiers from a majority of the world’s 200 countries.”

President Obama therefore inherited a military posture driven by the highest of ambitions. The role of military force was confined neither to preventive attack nor to national defence: the idea was to make US military superiority so overwhelming that it would dissuade others from taking up arms. The sword had become impressively potent, but the shield remained imperfect. Chinese weapons rendered US assets in outer space vulnerable, and other Asian states were exploiting US and Western military vulnerabilities by going for ballistic missiles that might do great harm to US bases. “The great equaliser” — nuclear weapons — had obvious appeal.

More than anything else, however, the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan shed doubt on the realism of the ambition. While the military instruments were sharper than ever before, their political utility left much to be desired. In Clausewitzian terms, the US military machine failed to provide an effective continuation of politics by other means. That lesson came on top of a long-term undercurrent — globalisation — that reduces the applicability of military force by raising the stakes in peaceful futures and the opportunity costs of war.

Nevertheless, the US military budget shows no sign of abating, big budget and current-account deficits notwithstanding. The US remains determined not to allow any other state or combination of states to challenge its military superiority.» During the 2008 presidential campaign, cutting the Bush administration’s defence budget for FY 2009 was anathema. Had the President asked for more, he would have had more. President Obama’s FY 2010 budget represents a further 2.1 per cent increase in real terms (SIPRI 2010), in spite of the financial crisis. Clearly, the political centre has moved to the right in this respect. Military superiority is written in stone, and political leaders know that proposals for budget cuts may be devastating for their careers.

Behind the high-tech conventional weapons there has often been a nuclear shadow. Throughout the nuclear age, the US has threatened to use nuclear weapons more than 20 times (see Chapter 3). The Bush administration widened the option of nuclear weapons use to include contingencies where the adversary has no WMDs, only conventional forces. The restrictions that previous administrations professed to abide by — always sharply criticised by NNWS for being too weak — were eliminated. As is customary for a new president, Obama set out to rewrite the doctrine: he limited the functions of nuclear weapons to a narrower spectrum of situations. At the same time, he gave new impetus to Global Strike, now referred to as Prompt Global Strike (PGS) or Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) (see Chapter 3).

US political clout: diminished

The harder it is to convert high-tech military force to lasting political gains, the more important it becomes to gain the allegiance of others by serving the interests of all. This was the way the US established its hegemonial position after the Second World War, spearheading the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions and launching the Marshall Plan. If the hegemon ignores the priorities of others, authority erodes. This century, the US has acted in blatant disregard of these ground rules and has paid a heavy price for it. In most regions of the world, US reputation has fallen dramatically. A notable exception is India, where the US-India nuclear agreement made headway.