The Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology

Front matter

THE SHIFTS IN

'S IDEOLOGY

HIZBULLAH

Preface

Primacy to Political Program (1991 to 2005)

A Specific Perspective on the General Shifts Epilogue: Conclusion and Implications

Appendices

Map of Lebanon

Hizbullah’s Statements Parliamentary Elections Programs 2004 Municipal Elections Program Chronology of Events (1975-2005) Glossary

A 77™ ON WD >

Notes English Summary Dutch Summary (Nederlandse samenvatting)

A Note on Transliteration

The transliteration of Arabic words into English in the dissertation is in conformity with the transliteration system of the International Journal of Middle East Studies, with a few modifications.

Acknowledgements

| would like to extend my deepest gratitude and appreciation to the Chairs, the Academic Director, Prof. Dr. Asef Bayat, the Executive Director, Prof. Dr. Dick Douwes, staff, and colleagues of the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM), without whom none of this research would have been possible. | am very grateful to ISIM's generous financial and academic support throughout my M. Phil. and Ph.D. years. | started my research with Prof. Dr. Martin van Bruinessen of Utrecht University on “The Effects of the Liberalization Process in Iran on Hizbullah’s Gradual Integration in the Lebanese Public Sphere”. After two and a half years, | changed the topic of my research to studying “The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology”, concentrating specifically on the Lebanese dynamic. | would like to profusely thank my promotor Prof. Dr. Antonie Wessels of the Free University and co-promotor Drs. Paul Aarts of the University of Amsterdam who generously and patiently guided me in my endeavours to write a coherent dissertation and transform it into a book in less than two and a half years. Their rightful guidance, unwavering support, and systematic dedication coupled with their much-appreciated help and guidance resulted in this book. Nevertheless, | take full responsibility of any shortcoming in the final product.

| would like to wholeheartedly thank my colleagues and friends who took the time to read and comment on earlier drafts of this manuscript, especially Dr. Frank Peter and Dr. Vahid Behmardi who conveyed their non-abating assistance in spite of the heavy load of their work. | am indebted to all my colleagues — especially Egbert Harmsen, Nadia Sonneveld, Mujiburrahman, Sindre Bangstad, Caco Verhees, and Robbert Woltering - who have sacrificed their precious time in order to render themselves of service to me and my research, and all those whom | failed to remember. Also, special thanks to Dennis Janssen for his logistical, computer, and technical assistance. | am very grateful to my friend Serge Veldhuizen, who has supplied the photo for the book cover, and who has helped me in collecting sources. Last but not least, | would like to convey my gratitude to the people whom | have interviewed, to the Hizbullah people who helped me piece things up and who gave me access to their archive material and activities.

Prologue

Personal account: My interest in the subject

Lebanon is a myriad of 18 recognized minorities that coexisted in relative peace! till April 13, 1975, the date of the outbreak of the 16-year old civil war. From being the “Switzerland of the Middle East”, Lebanon plunged into the law of the jungle where various militias undermined the Lebanese state's sovereignty and curved out their own cantons, most of the times based on sectarian affiliation. | am writing from personal experience as a member of what came to be called the “war generation”, meaning someone who has witnessed and survived the entire civil war — in all its atrocities and futilities - from 1975 till 1990. Through out the course of the war | lived as a “neutral” civilian, who neither belonged to any political party nor had any knowledge of using any kind of weapon, as such | never participated in the civil war in any capacity whatsoever. As a child, these events left in me a sense of helplessness, helplessness at the internal situation (the civil war), and the external factor (the Israeli invasion). Later on as | matured | endeavoured to understand why so many people gave their lives in the 16-year appalling civil war? Was it in vein? Was it for a cause? Was it for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon? The Israeli army was portrayed as the “invincible army”. Was it then a matter of beating a dead horse to fight it back?

| was only 14 when Israel occupied Beirut on September 14, 1982 after 83 days of besieging it. The 1982 Israeli invasion left a great mark on my personality because of the physical injury that | have incurred and the psychological scars that | have suffered from. While filling water from the well of the Near East School of Theology (NEST), | was injured in my shoulder and knee, injuries that never healed completely until this present day. On September 24 of that year, my friends and | went to Hamra Cinema Theatre to watch a movie by Bud Spencer and Terence Hill. In the midst of the movie, the Israeli army stormed the theatre, kicked us out, and beat us up ordering us to go home. | was wondering what have we done to be treated this way? The answer was simple: a Lebanese member of the resistance targeted Israeli soldiers at the nearby Wimpy Restaurant, killed three of them with his pistol, and escaped unharmed. This incident among others heralded the withdrawal of the Israeli army 13 days after occupying Beirut. The Lebanese Resistance gained momentum and in 1985, the Israelis withdrew to their 1978 (first Israeli invasion) declared “security zone”. After 1985, Hizbullah spearheaded the Lebanese resistance, and the Islamic Resistance, its mil-

‘THE SHIFTS IN HIZBULLAH'S IDEOLOGY!

itary wing, inflicted heavy casualties through a war of attrition on Israeli soldiers occupying Lebanese soil. Hizbullah employed hit and run tactics as well as guerrilla attacks that eventually drove Israel to withdraw out of Lebanon in May 2000.

The civil war taught me to live day by day; thus, my only achievement during that time was survival. After the civil war ended and the barriers between different Lebanese regions were removed, especially the notoriously renowned demarcation line between West Beirut (The Muslim sector where | live) and East Beirut (The Christian sector), | toured Lebanon in order to get to know “the other”. At the beginning | was frightened from and critical of Hizbullah’s notion of the Islamic state, especially since it was clearly stated on their flag, back then, “The Islamic Revolution in Lebanon”. The watershed occurred in 1996 as a direct result of the Israeli “Grapes of Wrath” military campaign, which resulted in an unprecedented national solidarity with Hizbullah, most notably from the Christians who adhered to a diametrically opposed ideology. Fear of the other as well as the bulwark or veil of misconceptions were replaced by sociability and compassion. This encouraged me in 1997 to start attending Hizbullah’s activities that were open to the public. This close encounter aroused my interested in the party; my interest was in its “resistance identity” and its achievements on the battlefield. What added to my interest is that, unlike other militias and political parties, Hizbullah did not take part in the civil war?, concentrating all its energy on driving the Israeli army out of Lebanon. This led me to seek contact with Hizbullah’s “Central Information Office”, which opened the door for me to a closer look on Hizbullah’s social and political activities. Eventually, this prompted me to write my dissertation on Hizbullah in order to construe how can Hizbullah be faithful to its Islamic identity, on the one hand, and at the same time function as a mainstream political party working in a confessional-sectarian system, on the other? This interest led me to start serious research about the party. This dissertation is a result of this research.

Preface

1. Hizbullah’s identity and brief history

The basic aim of this dissertation is to study the Lebanese Shiʻite resistance movement Hizbullah as an identity-based movement from its rudimentary foundations in 1978, passing through its official inauguration in 1985, and ending in 2005, thus surveying a period that covers more than a quarter of a century. | question how the movement has tried since its transition to a political party in the 1990s to maintain and integrate its identity through the interplay between religion and politics. My research analyses how Hizbullah’s identity construction is taking place by focusing on three key components: religious ideology, political ideology, and political program. Thus, this dissertation studies how Hizbullah’s identity as an “Islamic jihadi (struggle) movement” changed in the following three stages: (1) from propagating an exclusivist religious ideology; (2) to a more encompassing political ideology; and (3) to what can be considered a pragmatic political program.

Hizbullah defines its identity as an Islamic jihadi movement, “whose emergence is based on an ideological, social, political and economical mixture in a special Lebanese, Arab and Islamic context”? I study the constituents or contents of this identity throughout Hizbullah’s historical development. The body of the dissertation consists of the three parts below, which are explained in the following sequence.

1.1. The development of Hizbullah’s ideology:

saliency of religious ideology: (1978-1984/5)

Since Hizbullah absolves itself from abiding by a specific date for its birth, | argue that Hizbullah was founded in 1978 as an Islamic movement of social and political protest by various sectors of Lebanese Shi‘ite clergy and cadres, with Iranian ideological backing. The constituents of Hizbullah’s religious ideology are the following: (1) belief in Shi‘a Islam; (2) wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent or jurisconsult); (3) and jihad (struggle) in the way of God.* Ever since its emergence, Hizbullah has been a party in which the ‘ulama (Muslim religious scholars) played, and still play, an important role. In this chapter, | try to find out what is so specific and different about Hizbullah’s interpretation of the Shi'ite religious ideology? In particular, | gauge the role of the ‘ulama in the formation and development of Hizbullah’s Islamist ideology under the presumed Iranian influence.

‘THE SHIFTS IN HIZBULLAH'S IDEOLOGY!

1.2 The development of Hizbullah’s ideology: prominence to

political ideology (1984/5-1990)

In 1985 Hizbullah forged its “Open Letter” in which it declared its political manifesto to the public, thus engaging directly in Lebanese political life after operating clandestinely for some years. Over the period 1985 to 1990 Hizbullah became a full-pledged social movement “in the sense of having a broad overall organization, structure, and ideology aiming at social change” and social justice. The components of Hizbullah’s political ideology are the following: oppressors and oppressed; Islamic order; relations with the Lebanese Christians; perspective on Israel; unity of the Muslims; stance vis-a-vis the West; and jihad and martyrdom. The questions | raise intend to shed light on the reasons and methods through which Hizbullah shifted its emphasis from a religious ideology to a political ideology.

How did Hizbullah employ the transnational link of Iranian political ideology in its dealings with domestic Lebanese politics as well as regional and international relations? Does this explain why Hizbullah followed domestically a radical-violent approach towards the Christian militias and an uncompromising attitude anathematising the Lebanese political system in its entirety, regarding the Lebanese government as an infidel? Does this also account for Hizbullah’s regional and international militancy towards Israel, France, and the US?

13 The development of Hizbullah’s ideology:

paramount to political program (1991 to 2005)

Since the early 1990s Hizbullah evolved, more and more, into a mainstream political party, with an extensive network of social services that benefits both Muslims and Christians. Hizbullah participated in elections, assuming not only parliamentary and municipal responsibility, but also governmental responsibility by joining the cabinet in 2005. Hizbullah’s political program is based upon the following constituents: oppressors and oppressed; perspectives on the Islamic state; dialogue with the Lebanese Christians; jurisprudential stipulations of parliamentary, municipal, and governmental work; socio-economic program: Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and civil institutions; Lebanonisation and infitah (“opening up”); relations with Syria and Iran; perspective on Israel; and jihad and martyrdom. | bring up the following questions in order to underscore the rationale and way in which Hizbullah altered its accent from a political ideology to a political program.

PREFACE

Lebanonisation or infitah refers to Hizbullah’s integration policy in the Lebanese public sphere or Hizbullah’s enrolment in Lebanese domestic political life starting the early 1990s.° What is the place of Islam in Hizbullah’s idea of integration, infitah, or Lebanonisation? Can Hizbullah, as a social movement and a full pledged political party, vitally affect society and become a powerful force for social change while functioning within the confessional-sectarian system it anathematised for more than a decade? How could Hizbullah modify its identity from an Islamic jihadi movement towards a political party having a “prominent” political role in the Lebanese milieu by propagating a detailed political program? Did the liberalisation process in Iran influence the Lebanese national standard that Hizbullah is trying to portray, or was it Lebanese authenticity all along? How could Hizbullah sell to its followers its commitment to Islamic identity while it abides by a pragmatic political program? Did Hizbullah manage to maintain an Islamic reputation through its parliamentary, municipal, and governmental work, or did it sacrifice its Islamic identity and ideological principles in its bargaining and compromise with other political parties and groups?

In what way did Hizbullah want to appeal to strata and sectors of the population, mainly Christians and Sunnis, it did not reach out to before? What are the implications of including them in Hizbullah’s election lists? Are there conditions for representing Hizbullah and speaking in its name? Is it simply Realpolitik or pragmatism? Are there usual stable alliances and cooperation with other political parties? How does this resonate inside the party? What has transformed Hizbullah to a mainstream political party that managed to receive the highest number of votes in the 2000 and 2005 parliamentary elections? Is Hizbullah mobilizing all its resources and capabilities to integrate in the Lebanese public sphere?

These questions point out to a process that is reshaping Hizbullah's identity and suggest that the party is going through a remarkable transformation. Each of the three components of Hizbullah’s identity — religious ideology, political ideology, and political program — is essential in one of the three stages, prompting a better explanation of the shifts from one stage to the other.

‘THE SHIFTS IN HIZBULLAH'S IDEOLOGY!

2. Analytical framework

| offer the working definition of ideology that this dissertation employs and | endeavour to explain how resource mobilization is important to the survival of a social movement.

2.1 Working definition of ideology

Ideology is any kind of a coherent and systematic whole of ideas on politics and society. This systematised whole functions as a rationale for political and social action. As such, it connotes a worldview held by any social group to justify their actions. Such a worldview can be subject to re-description and reformulation, and it does not have to be accepted in its entirety; it could be amended and reinterpreted. However, an ideological view does not undergo the stringent criterion of empirical tests in the way scientific theories and hypotheses are subjected to. Intellectual ideology is defined as a formal system of belief and a coherent system of thought, which includes political programmes/manifestos, philosophical orientations and religious codification.’ | employ the latter usage in this dissertation.

2.2 The survival of a social movement and the role of resource mobilization

A social movement is defined as “purposive collective actions whose outcome, in victory as in defeat, transforms the values and institutions of society”? In studying the shifts in the ideology of a social movement, | mainly employ the concept of resource mobilization. Resource mobilization refers to the way a social movement mobilizes its capabilities or resources - such as money, political influence, access to the media, and personnel — in order to confront and survive strategic difficulties and challenges facing it. A principal advantage of the theory of resource mobilization is that it attaches a high degree of importance to the survival of a social movement i.e. how it copes with strategic difficulties and challenges while standing its grounds. Thus, a social movement might shift its ideology to facilitate adjustment to a world that is in incessant flux, or else it would risk demise or might not remain a viable-throbbing social movement.’

Gramsci argued that all the fundamental sociological questions boil down to political science questions.'® Thus, paraphrasing Gramsci, social movements are nothing but political movements."'. Not all Islamists aim at only mobilizing civil society through a bottom-up process, rather their objective is to take power and govern through a top-down process. As such, Islamism could be conceived as the most salient unitary mobilizational

PREFACE power behind political change and transformation in the Arab and Muslim world.!? Islamists seem to be effective in pointing at grievances and in expressing them, but this is not enough. In order to eradicate these grievances Islamists must actualise their potential role by constructively addressing societal needs through effective allocation of their resources. Islamism is holistic in its approach since it is “a religious-cultural-political framework for engagement on issues that most concern politically engaged Muslims”

And so, social movements thrive on propagating their social, economic, and political legitimacy through efficient resource mobilization. This seems to make up their main modus operandi of mobilization in order to acquire a substantial following and backing in society. Indeed, the way and extent to which social movements acquire resources from their constituencies shape their activities. Thus, resource mobilization dwells on the notion of social movement in a very broad sense. It covers all activities, or even beliefs (ideologies) and preferences (identities), to change society by collective mobilization.

3. Sources

The part and parcel of my research is based upon Hizbullah’s primary sources. | have analysed Hizbullah’s religious ideology, political ideology, and political program, mainly relying on primary sources in Arabic; some secondary sources in Arabic, English, and French; and conducted interviews of representative samples of Hizbullah’s rank and file. Primary sources are available in abundance in Lebanon at Hizbullah's Central Information Office (CIO); Hizbullah’s think tank, Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation (CCSD); the Khumayni’s Cultural Centre in Beirut; the Cultural Centre of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in Lebanon”, and other Iranian and Hizbullah affiliated institutions and publishing houses. In addition to many Arabic books, articles, archive material, communiqués, documents, speeches, political declarations, and other Hizbullah publications, the primary sources that | have studied and which provided me with information on Hizbullah’s ideology and program are the following: (1) the Open Letter or political manifesto; (2) the parliamentary and municipal election programs of 1992, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004, and 2005; (3) “Views and Concepts”; (4) “Statement of Purpose”; (5) and “Identity and Goals’, Hizbullah’s latest self-description.'° Also, | made use of Hizbullah’s Internet sites pertaining to the topics researched. Nevertheless, my reliance on publicly available primary sources has its own inevitable limitations in exposing Hizbullah’s clandestine nature, given the largely secretive nature of the party and its operations.

‘THE SHIFTS IN HIZBULLAH'S IDEOLOGY!

4. Organisation of the Chapters

The chapters shed light on the different levels in which Hizbullah’s ideology is shifting. The first chapter surveys Hizbullah’s historical development from 1978 until 2005. Chapters two, three, and four study the development of Hizbullah’s ideology from a phase of religious intensity (1978-1984/5), to a phase of political orientation (1984/5-1990), and to the phase of infitah or integration in the Lebanese public sphere (1991 to 2005). Chapter five sheds light on the general shifts in the constituents of Hizbullah’s ideology in the three stages. Chapter six offers a conclusion on the main findings of the dissertation in relation to the shifts in Hizbullah’s ideology.

1 A Survey of Hizbullah’s History Its Development from Its Rudimentary Foundations in 1978 until 2005