Placing Empire

Front matter

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Part II. The Geography Of Cultural Pluralism

3. Boundary Narratives 83 4. Local Color 103 5. Speaking Japanese 135 Conclusion 160 Appendix: Place Names 177 Notes 181 Selected Bibliography 221

N AYP Y PY a

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10. 11.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

MAPS

Map of Northeast Asia 20

“Abbreviated Transportation Map of Korea-Manchuria-China, 1931

“Abbreviated Transportation Map of Taiwan,” 1931 22

FIGURES

Map of “Great Japan” 12

The remains of a cannon at 203-Meter Hill 37

Travelers consult a map as they climb 203-Meter Hill 39 The loading of soybeans at Dairen wharf 65 Kitashirakawa's uniform on display at Tainan Shrine 67 “The Wretched Ruin of the West Tower" 69

The Government General Museum and “Secret Garden" at Chandók. Palace 71

“Hakui no Chosen e yuku” (Going to the Korea of white robes) "*Utsukushii shima' Taiwan o nozoku" (Peering into Taiwan, the “beautiful island") 123

“Pose of Powerful Coolies" 126

“Tsugitaka sancho o mezashite" (Heading for the summit of Mt. Tsugitaka) 131

School for indigenous children at Kappanzan 158 xii

1. A suggested itinerary for Korea-Manchuria travel 59

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

“Nihon hari no shukusho to yon dai shima no mensekizu' (Ihe reduction of the area of Japan and area map of the

four main islands) "Nihon no ichi" (The place of Japan)

TABLES

A suggested itinerary for Taiwan travel 3. Place names d

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project started with a simple question. What did Japanese travelers see when they went to colonial Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan? Put differently, what did it mean to "see" Korea, Manchuria, or Taiwan as a Japanese traveler under empire—what did it mean to see territories that were once decidedly foreign and then, suddenly, were not? Japanese travelers in the early 1900s remembered clearly the transformation of these lands into Japanese colonies. But the issue is not one of Japanese history alone. Early American travelers to Hawaii traveled with memories of the independent Hawaiian kingdom and its overthrow by American colonists in 1893. And though travelers from Great Britain and France operated within empires of longer standing, they too found themselves struggling to negotiate how the many pasts of colonized lands could reasonably be transformed into evidence of the progressive history of their imperial nations.

Because of the global context in which we might ask this question, its answer bears directly on long-held assumptions about the uniqueness of Japanese imperialism. In the first major English-language study of the Japanese Empire as a whole, Mark R. Peattie set out what would become the standard framework for defining the Japanese Empire within the larger history of modern imperialism. “As the only non-Western imperium of recent times,” he wrote, “the Japanese colonial empire stands as an anomaly of modern history? He further elaborated on the peculiar nature of Japanese imperialism: “Because it was assembled at the apogee of the ‘new imperialism by a nation which was assiduously striving to emulate Western organizational models, it is not surprising that it was formally patterned after the tropical empires of modern Europe. Yet the historical and geographic circumxiii xiv PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS stances of the overseas Japanese empire set it apart from its European counterparts and gave it a character and purpose scarcely duplicated elsewhere?"

For Peattie, the unique circumstances were three. One, Japan had become an imperial power at precisely the moment when it extracted itself from its own unequal treaties with the United States and other Western powers. Thus, the Japanese government saw clearly the significance of territorial expansion to geopolitical power. Two, the Japanese Empire was late to the scene, in the sense that Japan acquired its first formal colony, Taiwan, in 1895. The lateness of Japan's empire meant that there were few unclaimed territories, especially in Asia, which had been the site of intense colonization by European empires for over a hundred years. And three, the cultural and ethnic makeup of the territories Japan did acquire was markedly different from what the world had seen in European and American empires. “Because it was an Asian empire,’ Peattie argued, “its most important colonies, Taiwan and Korea, were well-populated lands whose inhabitants were racially akin to their Japanese rulers with whom they shared a common cultural heritage. This sense of cultural affinity profoundly shaped Japanese attitudes toward colonial governance once the empire was established.”

The idea that its geographic contiguity and internal cultural cohesion set the Japanese Empire apart from European and, indeed, all other modern empires, has had a long life. In their widely influential introduction to Tensions of Empire, Ann Stoler and Frederick Cooper refrained from addressing "the meaning of empire in regard to contiguous territory . .. in which the colonial pattern of reproducing difference might in theory be mitigated by the geographic possibility of absorption more readily than was the case overseas? Though Stoler and Cooper have each more recently revised this earlier position, other broad, comparative studies within the growing field of *new imperialism studies" have similarly excluded territorially contiguous empires while simultaneously slipping between theoretical discussions of “modern imperialism” and “modern Western imperialism.”

Yet, as did their imperial counterparts in the United States, Great Britain, and France, hundreds of thousands of Japanese people traveled to the Japanese colonies of Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan during the first half of the twentieth century to pursue precisely this question of whether their imperial territories were, or would necessarily produce, a coherent political, historical, linguistic, and cultural space. Indeed, it was the apparent need for an answer to this question that motivated their travel in the first place. Querying what it meant for a Japanese traveler to “see” Korea, Manchuria, or Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule thus became a concrete approach for exploring questions of deep relevance not just to the provincial realm of modern Japanese history but also to the history of modern empire: what do representations of place have to do with the production and reproduction of imperial formations in the context of colonialism, capitalism, and nationalism? How does place bear on the postcolonial history of settler colonialism, which,

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS XV since most colonial empires did not abandon the entirety of their colonial holdings, is not so “post” colonial after all? And what does imperial tourism, a phenomenon of equally global provenance, have to do with all of the above?

The answer that this book proposes is that place was a key tool for sustaining imperialism in a period in which the world's major empires, including the Japanese, largely disavowed territorial conquest as a practice of legitimate states. The shift from empire as a project of territorial acquisition to one of territorial maintenance necessitated the production of new social and spatial imaginaries of the nation that could coexist with the imperial territory of the state. In this endeavor, place, like race and ethnicity, served both as an axis along which colonial difference could be defined and exploited and as a symbol of national identity that could encompass the entirety of the imperial territory without distinction. Tourism emerged in this era as the technology par excellence for producing firsthand experiences and representations of the space of the nation and of the colonies as places within it. These experiences and representations legitimated imperial claims to colonized land while at the same time presenting the colonies as spaces of exception to metropolitan political, economic, and social norms.

While many ofthe conflicts that motivated the spatial politics of Japanese imperialism had contours that were specific to the Japanese Empire, the underlying need to legitimate the territorial claims of the state in the language of nationalist attachments to the land was rooted in the broader social and historical forces that shaped the global transition from a world of empires to a world of nation-states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. From this perspective, the historical significance of the geography of the Japanese Empire is not the uniqueness of its contiguity or the cultural cohesion that this contiguity implied. Rather, it is the variety of ways in which colonial boosters and imperial travelers made the relationships between the empires places meaningful. From history to language to memory and to movement itself, imperial travelers and colonial boosters saw and experienced colonized lands in ways that legitimated their incorporation into the Japanese Empire and promoted the territorialization of a Japanese national identity on colonized land. In other words, the historical significance of the geography of the Japanese Empire lies not its uniqueness but rather in how it exposes the centrality of spatial politics to the survival of empire in the twentieth century.

Ibegan this project over ten years ago, in a research seminar led by Tak Fujitani. The question I explored then was of the politics of tourist guidebooks. In the intervening years, I have found it necessary to expand and revise my analysis of tourism in the Japanese Empire from one that focused on how tourist guidebooks reflected broader discourses of Japanese imperialism to one that argues that tourism was essential to the maintenance of empire itself. In a nearly decade of research, I discovered a truly astonishing quantity and geographic diversity of materials related xvi PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS to travel and tourism in the Japanese Empire—ranging from travel accounts to anticolonial manifestos to the history of national parks. The most important forces behind the evolution of this project, however, were the generous encouragements, suggestions, and critiques that colleagues, editors, fellow panelists, and interested individuals offered at every stage of the project. I am truly grateful for their time and engagement.

My greatest debts are to my advisors, Tak Fujitani and Stefan Tanaka, who guided me through the difficult task of analyzing nationalism and imperialism historically and who, through their regular and rigorous feedback, constantly pushed me to embrace ambiguity and complexity. Sanae Isozumi at the University of California, San Diego Library introduced me to the Japan Travel Bureau library and its collection of the travel magazine Tabi. In Japan, I had the great pleasure of working with Mizuno Naoki and Komagome Takeshi at Kyoto University, two scholars whose attention to the inadequacy of general categorizations such as “inner” and “outer” territory to frame the history of the Japanese Empire deeply influenced my own approach. Patrick Patterson introduced me to the history of tourism as a field and gave generously of his time to teach me how to write effective fellowship proposals and presentations, both of which were essential to the completion of this project. Gary Fields introduced me to critical human geography, which shaped the argument of this book and, more broadly, my very approach to history. Max Rorty has been my first and last reader, strongest supporter, and bluntest critic. Every part of this book has benefited from her attention.

Ten years offers a lot of time for research, writing, and thinking. Yet the time would not have been so valuable if not for the many people and institutions whose invitations made it possible for me to develop and receive feedback on each aspect of the project. In Japan, Mizuno Naoki and the Institute for Research in Humanities at Kyoto University hosted me during 2008-2010 for my initial research. Yanagisawa Asobu's generous offer of a temporary visiting appointment at Keio University's Faculty of Economics in the summer of 2013 allowed me to complete the research for the manuscript. Daniel Milne and Andrew Elliott’s invitation to participate in a workshop and special issue on war and tourism for Japan Review provided a crucial framework for the revision of chapter 1. Cho Sóng-un, Itagaki Hiroshi, Kim Baek-Young, Aleksandra Kobiljski, Sang-Ho Ro, Senjü Hajime, and Suzuki Nobuko offered essential conversations, sources, and funding at key points in the project's development.

In the United States, I am grateful to Chris Hanscom, Todd Henry, Shigehisa Kuriyama, Tamara Loos, Ian Miller, Morgan Pitelka, Nathaniel Smith, Dennis Washburn, and Sam Yamashita for inviting me speak on their campuses. These talks were essential proving grounds for the theoretical and historical framework of the project, and the comments and critiques that I received from faculty members and graduate students on each campus enriched the book immensely. Paul

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xvii

Barclay has been a generous colleague and interlocutor since the first days of my graduate research; many of the images in this book come from the East Asia Digital Images Collection at Lafayette College Libraries, of which he is the director. An encounter with David Ambaras at the Association for Asian Studies annual meeting sparked an ongoing conversation, which fundamentally altered how I thought about the spatial politics of tourism's mobility and led to the research that became chapter 3. At the University of California, Santa Barbara, Sabine Frühstück, W. Patrick McCray, and Luke Roberts have been extraordinary mentors and collaborators.

I owe a special thank you to those individuals who read and commented on the manuscript. In addition to David Ambaras, my modern Japan colleagues Andre Haag, Helen J. S. Lee, and Ryan Moran, as well as my UCSB colleagues Peter Alagona, Sherene Seikaly, and Gabriela Soto Laveaga, each read and commented on the manuscript in its entirety. Mary V. Rorty read the entire penultimate draft and offered many constructive criticisms. Three anonymous readers pushed me to go further in analyzing not just the what of imperial tourism but the why as well. These gifts of time and attention are the foundation of the scholarly enterprise, yet they are the ones that are the least rewarded. The insightful comments and critiques that each reader offered helped me to refine the foundation and argument of each chapter as well as the manuscript as a whole.

The research and writing for this project would not have been possible without generous financial assistance from the Fulbright ITE Graduate Research Program, the University of California Pacific Rim Foundation, the Joseph K. Naiman Fellowship in Japanese Studies, the Northeast Asia Council of the Association for Asian Studies, the University of California President's Faculty Research Fellowship in the Humanities, the Graduate Division of UC San Diego, and the Academic Senate at UC Santa Barbara. The UCSB Open Access Fund made it possible to publish this book in an open-access format. An earlier version of chapter 5 appeared as "Speaking Japanese: Language and the Expectation of Empire, in The Affect of Difference: Representations of Race in the Japanese Empire, edited by Christopher P. Hanscom and Dennis Washburn, 159-79 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2016). I thank the University of Hawai'i Press for permission to print a revised and expanded version of the chapter here. Ellen Broidy at Academic Editorial clarified many of the manuscripts key points and streamlined each chapter. Eun-Joo Ahn, Seokwon Choi, Brett Collins, ChunHui Chuang, Julie Johnson, and Ema Parker provided essential research assistance. The constant good cheer, good sense, and rapid responses of Bart Wright at Lohnes-- Wright Cartography made the production ofthe maps a pleasure. Jennifer Eastman carefully copyedited each page of the manuscript and adjusted her schedule to fit my own, for which I am profoundly grateful. At UC Press, Reed Malcolm and Zuha Khan kept the project on time and on point. Thank you.

Introduction

This book is about the spatial politics of Japanese imperialism, that is, how the Japanese Empire possessed colonized lands by domesticating, disavowing, and disappearing other claims to that same land. It illuminates how territorializing a Japanese national identity on colonized land shaped the modern Japanese nation and brings into focus how ideas of place sustained the legitimacy of colonialism in a period when the world's major empires, including the Japanese, largely disavowed territorial conquest. This book explores the spatial politics of empire through a study of imperial tourism, which was one of the few institutions of the era to operate on a truly empire-wide scale and one that was uniquely concerned with producing firsthand experiences of colonized land.

Japan was a great imperial power during the first half of the twentieth century. This much is well known. But it is perhaps less well known that between 1868, when the new Meiji government formally colonized the island of Hokkaido, and 1952, when the Japanese government formally renounced sovereignty over Taiwan, Korea, the Kuriles, the southern portion of the island of Karafuto (Russian [hereafter, R.] Sakhalin), and the League of Nations Mandate Territory in Micronesia (Japanese [J.] Nanyo), the Japanese government possessed no single mechanism for differentiating, legally or politically, between colonized and Japanese territory. Even after the acquisition of Taiwan in 1895, generally used to mark the beginning of Japans formal empire, there was never a coherent practice of referring to colonized lands as “colonies” (shokuminchi). Instead, they were the “new territories”; they were “regions”; they were “territories governed by governors general.” Anything but colonies. In fact, the spatial order of the empire was so liminal that when the administration of Korea and Taiwan was placed under the aegis of a new

Ministry of Colonial Affairs in 1929, Japanese residents of Korea complained so vociferously that Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi was forced to assure them that the ministry would “not treat Korea as a colony.”

In hindsight, it is obvious that Korea and Taiwan were colonies. The Japanese state acquired these lands by conquest and treaty but opted not to extend the full rights and responsibilities of citizenship to their residents. Moreover, the governors general and the imperial government treated these territories as “agricultural appendages" of Japan, setting policies that encouraged the production of basic commodities such as rice and sugar for the metropolitan market while discouraging local industrialization.? Internal border controls and overt discrimination in education limited the physical and social mobility of colonized subjects in ways not applied to most Japanese residents of the empire. Similar policies, varying only in their details, were applied to the remainder of Japan's colonized lands—local governments distributed political and economic rights unevenly in Hokkaido, Okinawa, the Kuriles, Karafuto, and the League of Nations Mandate Territory in Micronesia. At the same time, colonial governments fostered a cultural hierarchy that marked the Japanese language and official culture as the basis for public life.

To put it bluntly, there was an element of instability about the place of these lands within Japan, about the relationship between colonized land, the territory of the state, and the space of the nation. This book examines this instability from the late nineteenth century until the post- World War II period. Through a study of imperial tourism to Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan, I delineate how the question of where the colonies were shaped the conceptualization of the Japanese imperial nation and how, in turn, this spatio-social imaginary affected the way colonial difference was conceptualized and enacted. In so doing, I explore the significance of spatial politics to the maintenance of colonial hierarchies in a world in which the nation-state form has been globalized but political emancipation has not.

Japan was an empire, thus it is fair to ask why the history of its spatial politics is relevant to the larger colonial and postcolonial history of nationalism and nation-states. Indeed, despite the flexibility with which Japanese officials defined the territories of Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria in relation to Japan, they were not so shy about describing Japan as “Great Japan,” “the Japanese Empire,” or the "Great Japanese Empire? Yet the distinction between nation-state and empire was not at all clear. As Ann Stoler has argued, "distinctly rendered boundaries represent... only one end of the spectrum" of empire. Imperial formations operate precisely at the "troubled, ill-defined" boundaries of citizenship, territory, and legal rights? The “externalization of empire; the idea that nation-state and empire comprise two entirely different spaces and histories, is best considered a political narrative that arose after World War II than an accurate representation of the relationship between empires and nation-states.^

The early twentieth century was a time of global transition. Between the late nineteenth century and the middle of the twentieth, the emergence of the modern system of international relations, with its commitment to the territorial nation-state as the basis for human social and political organization, and the shift from mercantile to monopoly capitalism produced contradictory spatial formations within which imperialist and anti-imperial nationalists struggled to claim a place in the world. Like other new empires, such as the United States and Germany, the Japanese Empire faced these tensions by creating a regional empire that could be used as a resource base for capitalist expansion. In this context, imperialism mediated between the territorializing impulses of the modern state and the de-territorializing impulses of capitalism? Rather than drawing firm boundaries between empire and nation, Japan and other new empires were what we might consider “imperial nation-states"* The result was a hybrid form of empire in which the state territorialized a sphere of influence that exceeded the boundaries of the nation but could nevertheless be made available for capitalist exploitation. On the one hand, the idea that the territory of the state was the patrimony of the nation legitimated the state's sovereignty over colonized land. On the other, the need to maintain colonized lands as territories to be exploited in the name of national strength authorized the creation of uneven forms of citizenship and the treatment of the colonies as spaces of exception to national norms.”

Over the course of the early twentieth century, the economic, administrative, and discursive structure of empire and nation in the Japanese imperium shifted in such a way that it is difficult, even now, to draw a firm line between the institutions and discourses of the Japanese nation and those of the empire. As scholars working on the history of modern Japan and the Japanese Empire have no doubt encountered, imperial discourse described the space of empire in terms of its places— Korea, Manchuria, Taiwan; Japan; the inner and outer territories. Yet these places did not generally correspond to distinct territorial or institutional jurisdictions; place names appeared as indices to a geographical structure of empire that was itself a chimera.* Such is the case, for example, with the term naichi, "inner territory? Scholarship on the Japanese Empire routinely uses naichi to signify the imperial metropole in contrast to the colonies, or "outer territories? Yet this description implies a concrete-ness of reference that did not exist in practice. The term gaichi, "outer territories; only came into official use in 1929, some thirty-five years after the colonization of Taiwan. The term naichi was used in a number of ways that were neither geographically nor conceptually overlapping. Naichi first appeared as the territorial opposite of the foreign settlements in Japanese treaty ports in the 1850s— ports that the unequal treaties with Western powers had opened to foreign trade. “Inner territory" simply meant “places that foreigners cannot live.” Yet in the 1910s the Government General of Korea used "Japanification" (naichika, literally, "becoming like the inner territory") to refer to the industrialization of Korean urban areas, while in the 1930s, travelers used "like the naichi" (naichi no yo) to describe Japanese-language speech that approximated that of a Japanese native, in contrast to the "textbook speech" of colonized subjects. Throughout the history of the Japanese Empire, "inner territory" was a territory, a relative location on a universal trajectory of development, and an essentialized sensibility.

Recent research shows that imperial legal, educational, and political institutions did not create wholly distinct metropolitan and colonial territories. Prestigious metropolitan secondary schools enrolled elite colonized subjects, who had formative political experiences in Tokyo dormitories. The "colonial" legal system was actually at least two in Korea (one for ethnic Japanese and one for colonized subjects) but perhaps three in Taiwan (with separate treatments for Taiwanese Chinese, Japanese, and indigenous inhabitants). Penal systems in the colonies deployed spatial referents to justify treating "people of the inner territory" (naichijin) less harshly than “people of this island" (hontojin)—a reference to Taiwanese Chinese— "savages" (banjin), and Koreans (Senjin). In the case of Taiwan, we must also consider what Hiroko Matsuda has termed the "everyday politics of distinction,” which shaped the self-representation of and encounters between migrant laborers from Okinawa, Japanese settlers from the main islands, and Taiwanese Chinese. Unskilled Okinawan migrants to Taiwan, for example, were categorized as Japanese, but Taiwanese Chinese often referred to them as "Japanese aborigines,’ and Japanese settlers informally excluded them from the elite institutions of settler society, such as the most prestigious schools.’

To build on the words of Barbara Brooks, the Japanese Empire was “profoundly conflicted” not only about the status of non-Japanese subjects but also about the status of colonized and metropolitan land.” In fact, the spatial politics of the Japanese Empire parallel much more closely the complicated and contradictory history of defining “Japanese” ethnicity and citizenship than they do the history of the expansion and contraction of the Japanese state's territory. It is often argued that, although some rights and responsibilities were divided based on one's place of residence, the household registration system (koseki seido) created a "clear dividing line between ‘Japanese proper’ and ‘colonial subjects" For example, white-collar workers whose households were registered within the main islands, Okinawa, or Hokkaido received a "colonial bonus" when they worked in Taiwan." The location of ones household registry also determined ones eligibility for military service (until 1938, when, in the first years of total war, colonized subjects were allowed to enlist). And yet, ethnicity and gender also profoundly influenced the location of one’s household registry. A 1921 law formally recognized the intermarriage of Japanese and Korean subjects, for example, but mandated that the location of the household registry be determined by the ethnicity of the male half of the household. A Japanese woman who married a Korean man was entered into the man’s Korean household registration, thus legally transforming her into a Korean woman. Korean women who married Japanese men, however, were entered into the Japanese registration. They became Japanese women. A different set of rules applied to children of mixed unions. A child born to a married Korean man and Japanese woman would be entered into the Korean household registry. But if the parents were unwed, the mother could enter the child in her Japanese registry as an illegitimate child, thus conferring upon her offspring the privileges of Japanese classification.“

The blurry lines between the space of the nation and the space of empire were not accidental. Rather, the instability of spatial and social boundaries was an essential component of the operation of early twentieth-century imperialism in the Japanese imperium and elsewhere. The present study examines this aspect of the Japanese Empire’s spatial formation, the fixing and refixing of colonized lands within the space of the Japanese nation and the concomitant fixing of the Japanese nation on colonized land. For despite this instability, people did talk about places—indeed, an entire industry, tourism, emerged to produce the experience of place, which, as this book argues, became the spatial foundation for the practices of exclusion and dispossession that sustained imperialism after World War I.

TOURISM AND THE SPATIAL POLITICS OF EMPIRE

One way to understand the history of tourism is to see it as an attempt to stabilize and standardize understandings of place—to produce, in other words, a hegemonic socio-spatial order anchored in specific understandings of place.” As an industry, tourism emerged in concert with the expansion of railways and the industrialization of labor.'* Yet it also emerged during a time of intense geopolitical turmoil, which saw the shocking destruction of the First World War, the reorganization of empires, and the establishment of an organization (the League of Nations) that would, in theory, allow self-determining nations to protect the peace by agreeing upon practices of global imperialism and capitalism that could be imposed upon other, non-self-determining nations." In other words, tourism—an industry devoted to selling experiences of places—was born at precisely the moment when the determination of boundaries, location, and essence was imbued with concrete and intensely debated political stakes. In this sense, tourism and the places it sold were an argument about the global social and geopolitical order.

There is a rich and diverse literature on the subject of tourism and empire. Much of it focuses on how the tropes of touristic literature facilitated and justified formal and informal conquests of colonized lands and on how colonial settlers deployed tourism to articulate their own place within their imperial nations, however geographically distant from the imperial center they were.” I am indebted to this literature, particularly to the works of Christine Skwiot, Vernadette Vicufia-Gonzalez, and Jason Ruiz, whose studies of U.S. tourism to Hawai'i, Cuba, the Philippines, and Mexico have laid bare the ways in which particular representations of these destinations and their peoples were—and are—embedded in much broader and long-running attempts by settlers and national governments to sustain claims to colonized lands.” Likewise, the works of Ellen Furlough and Inderpal Grewal expose how imperial tourism served as a vehicle for consolidating ideals of national citizenship while at the same time reinforcing the boundaries between metropolitan and colonial territories and between metropolitan and colonized subjects.” Together, these works show that the territorialization of the nation did not occur in the empty space of ferra nullius—territory that colonial states claimed was not under the sovereignty of any state and was therefore available for colonization—but rather through a mutually constitutive process of displacement and appropriation, of possession by dispossession.”

This book contributes the first comprehensive study of tourism in the Japanese Empire to the growing field of tourism and empire studies. Earlier studies have illuminated how imperial tourism functioned as "self-administered citizenship training" and as a *nemory industry" that encouraged the production of nationalist sentiment toward and the romanticization of colonized lands.” Yet the field as a whole has focused on studies of single colonies, and often only in the 1930s. As a result, the striking similarities between touristic representations of Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan—and the stark contrasts between earlier and later practices of placing—have been overlooked. To explore the significance of these similarities, this book deploys a unique, transcolonial archive of tourist materials from 1906, when the first tours left for Manchuria and Korea, to the late 1930s, when the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the rise of the total war ideology led to a narrowing of tourist discourses and an increased emphasis on the imperial house. The conclusion carries the analysis forward into the early postwar period, when former imperial officials, the Ministry of Education, and the U.S. Occupation worked to reterritorialize the Japanese nation in Asia after the end of formal empire.