A Table for One

Front matter

aa ĝ sar

RITICAL R

RAND TIME

Contents

Acknowledgements page vi 1 Introduction 1 2 The linear life-course imperative 26 3 Singlehood as an unscheduled status passage 40 4 Facing the horror: becoming an “old maid” 52 5 On commodification: from wasted time to damaged goods 66 6 Taking a break 81 7 Waiting and queuing ot 8 Time work: keeping up appearances 107 9 Discussion: another time 122 Bibliography 134

Index 151

Acknowledgements

Introduction

A few years ago a dear colleague of mine asked how it could be that a woman like me was still single. She simply couldn't “figure me out,” she said; her facial expression was one of genuine concern. To her, it seemed that I was neither actively looking for a male partner nor concerned by my overly extended singlehood. As a thirty-plus single woman at the time, I had become accustomed to this line of speculative questioning, one which expected me to justify my personal social circumstances. This time, however, rather than parrying the question, I decided to take a different route and turned the question back on her.

Rather than trying to justify my single existence—or, alternatively, refusing to answer to what I’ve often considered to be an intrusive and a non-dialogical form of interrogation—I asked her if she was happily married. I did have the advantage of prior knowledge, it should be said; my question arose from previous conversations, in which my colleague had freely discussed her martial difficulties. Because we were habitually frank with one another, I knew that she was unhappily married, and that she and her husband had been living separate lives for some years. With this knowledge in mind, Iasked her what stopped her from separating from her husband. “It’s complicated,” she replied. “Well, single life can be quite complicated too,” I retorted.

A recurring experience for many single women is the need to account for their singlehood. This demand is articulated in different ways—blatant and subtle, explicit and implicit—but seems to lead to the same end. Why are you still single? What's wrong with you? Why aren't you trying hard enough? Shouldn't you lower your standards? This set of statements—part speculative, part unprompted advice, at times a blend of pity, alarm, and scorn—is a constant scourge for many single women. The forms of interactions in which single women are constantly required to account for their status are ubiquitous. It happens during family dinners, encounters with friends (and their friends), conversations with neighbors and even interactions with total strangers. Researching female singlehood for almost a decade has shown that many people are perplexed by what they consider to be a disturbing enigma: a woman in her “prime years,” who has not entered matrimony and is yet to embrace the familial way of life. And so, otherwise banal questions have become the anchor for popular romantic comedies, matchmaking reality shows, catchy newspaper article headlines, and the titles of bestselling self-help books worldwide.

Scholars and social commentators have extensively analyzed the growing population of single women worldwide, in an attempt both to understand the phenomenon and to propose alternatives to the popular portrayal of female singlehood. In 2014, the percentage of single-person households in England and Wales was 28.4%; in Israel, in 2013, it was 18.7%. In 2014, single women were 30.7% of the female population of England and Wales (6.45 million; Office for National Statistics 2015), while in Israel in 2013, they were 28.1% of the female population (830 thousand; Central Bureau of Statistics 2015), compared to the 54.6% who were married.’ Similar percentages of single women have also been seen in other countries in recent years, such as the United States and Denmark, where singles are also almost 30% of the female population (40 million and 850 thousand, respectively; United States Census Bureau 2016; Statistics Denmark 2016).

This significant demographic shift has produced new conceptualizations of singlehood: “leftover women” in China; “parasite women” in Japan; “late singlehood” in Israel; the “singletons” of Australia, the US, and the UK. Whatever the name, the intent is to capture both the cause and the effect of singlehood on society. What is clear is that the phenomenon stirs public debate on a global scale—a debate that considers extended female singlehood as both a disturbing and an exciting new phenomenon.

Drawing on a wide range of cultural resources—including web columns, blogs, advice columns, popular clichés, advertisements, and references from television and cinema—I will attempt to outline some of the meaning-making processes of singlehood and time in Israel. The case study of Israel carries broader implications for contemporary discussions about singlehood and time in general, because it presents, in particular, the opportunity to raise questions about processes of continuity and change, transition, and tradition. These are all highly relevant concepts for societies undergoing dramatic shifts in personal relationships and the way new forms of femininity are regulated (Budgeon 2015).

It should be highlighted that the academic literature on singlehood often tends to group together different forms of non-marriage. However, singlehood is not a homogenous category of membership and social relations. Indeed, widowhood, divorce, and single parenthood are sometimes all conceptualized under the general umbrella of singlehood. Although there are undoubtedly many shared discursive patterns binding these categories, nonetheless some of the fundamental disparities between them are regularly overlooked. My working definition of singlehood throughout this study refers to long-term singles, whom according to socially constructed parameters are considered as “aging single women” and are ascribed with the category of “late singlehood.” These are women who are not in a committed long-term relationship, and do not have children. I also include divorced women, who did not remarry, nor subsequently feel the inclination to remarry. It is important to stress that I do not include in this research the social categories of single mothers, or widows, and neither do I include women who share their lives with a permanent partner.

The term “late singlehood” has evolved in the Israeli public discourse since around the year 2000. The term designates men and women whose single status is no longer regarded as socially acceptable, and mirrors terms used elsewhere, such as “always single” (Maeda and Hecht 2012) or “extended singlehood” (Sharp and Ganong 2011). By referring to the term I will specifically deal with representations of the socio-temporal phase wherein singlehood becomes a “problem in the eyes of society,” or, in other words, when it ceases to be considered as a “normative stage” preceding marriage and parenthood.

Ihave decided to use the term “late singlehood” throughout this study as it emerges from the Jewish Israeli public discourse about single persons, across both religious and secular populations. It is interesting to note how the term has also been adopted in both lay discourse as well as the language of psychological and popular therapeutic treatment offering “cures” for late singlehood. By using the term “late singlehood,” I aim to reflect and to be attuned to contemporary discourses which reveal how “late singlehood” and “aging single women” defy the hegemonic temporal norms, thus creating what Diane Negra describes as a “feminized temporal crisis” (Negra 2009, 54). My definition of “late singlehood” in this study (ranging from the mid-late twenties onwards) is somewhat arbitrary but non-arbitrary at the same time. My contention is that late singlehood is a non-scheduled, non-institutionalized transition process; therefore it does not entail precise entry or exit passages which can be defined, mandated, or celebrated. Nonetheless, although these processes are individualized, they are socially synchronized with collective schedules.

With this in mind, I stress that singlehood is a contingent notion which varies according to gender, age, class, religion, ethnicity, ableness, sexual orientation, or other axes of social differentiation. This definition, then, takes into account a feminist intersectional methodological approach as it recognizes that singlehood is not a homogenized category of one identity and is formed through different positionalities and distinctive structures of oppression (Collins 2000).’

Thus, this analysis also seeks to contribute towards conceptualizing a more complex gender intersectional analysis, by adding singlism (DePaulo 2006; DePaulo and Morris 2005)—namely the discrimination and mistreatment of single persons—as a category for analysis. In other words, there is thus a necessity for future studies to incorporate singlehood and relationship status in feminist theorizing of intersectionality. Therefore, my interest here is in considering how patriarchy and heteronormativity overlap and intersect with other structures of domination such as singlism and ageism, and are carried out through gendered configurations of time. It is important to stress that singlism is a socially shared belief, one that impacts upon multiple facets of life including housing, wages, and unequal access to services and benefits (DePaulo 2006). As DePaulo (2006) and Hacker (2001) point out, single persons are often excluded from discounted health benefits, greater social security options, lower tax bills, and higher salaries. This point will be further developed in the last chapter of this study.

To put it another way, the experience of singlehood intersects with various factors which manifest themselves in varying social contexts and are therefore subject to different forms of exclusions, privileges, and discrimination. Moreover, Israel is a society characterized by various cleavages, such as the Jewish-Arab cleavage, the secularreligious cleavage, the ethnic cleavage, and class cleavage (Ben-Porat 2006; Horowitz and Lissak 1989). Thus, when I refer here to the concept of singlehood I do not include “all” single women, but rather refer mainly to heterosexual, cisgender, white, Jewish (in the Israeli context), middle-upper-class, able-bodied single women. Given these parameters, I do not analyze experiences of women who identify themselves as religious, as lesbians, or as having a disability, for example. In that respect, this book is also a call for future studies that can examine the nuanced influences of religious beliefs, homophobia, or ableism upon the experience of singlehood.’

My choice to focus on single women and not single men derives from my attempt to understand how patriarchy and heteronormativity affects women’s lives. From this vantage point, I seek to re-examine the effects of what Adrienne Rich (1980), in her seminal article, termed compulsory heterosexuality. By this, I refer to the cultural, social, financial, and other mechanisms that direct women into being sexually involved with men and deny the possibility of sexual, as well as emotional, intimacy with other women. Or, in other words, the social forces or structures which maintain women as sexually, emotionally, and reproductively available to men. This is one of the reasons why long-term singlehood is still seen by many as not representing a viable option for women, because it does not conform to gendered expectations and defies gender socialization in general. Moreover, the fact that long-term singlehood is not perceived as a feasible possibility may be one reason why some women remain in unhappy and even abusive relationships. In this manner, my work corresponds with feminist criticism which has long sought to debunk the traditional discourse of feminine ideals. For example, I want to challenge the assumption that the status and social worth of women is dependent upon and defined in terms of their relationships to men, or the prevailing conviction that the primary role of a woman is to care for her family members.

Putting singlehood on the critical desktop

An inspiring number of critical works about single women have been published since 2000.* One key research direction underlying these works is the attempt to scrutinize and debunk the widespread myths and stereotypes attached to single women. To a large extent, these studies confirm the impression that single women in different parts of the world are regularly typecast as desperate, hysterical, childish, irresponsible, or lazy.”

Certainly, these studies have succeeded in promoting the voices and experiences of single women, as well as introducing a more diversified picture of their everyday lives. This book joins these significant endeavors in establishing singlehood as a field of study that warrants separate consideration on its own terms ( Byrne 2009). As such, it stresses that the study of singlehood should take into consideration not just the prevalence of these ideologies, but also the need to direct its attention to the paradigms and strict categorization which constantly define and limit what singlehood means and stands for. Undoubtedly, this is a significant challenge. My claim is that in order to understand what infuses these pejorative interpretations of female singlehood with such discursive force, we need to deepen our understandings of their sources, social mechanisms, and consequences.

The groundwork for understanding the social meaning of singlehood, I argue, can be drawn from one of the central arguments of this book: the concept and comprehension of Time plays a crucial role in the discursive formation of traditional conventions about female singlehood, and in the production of single women’s subjectivities. It is a premise of my study that our understanding of singlehood is dominated by unquestioned temporal models, premises, and concepts. This is one reason why one cannot understand these everyday dynamics, as well as the natural and authoritative tone through which they are conveyed, without understanding how over-determined frameworks of temporal categories are constituted. This might also be why it can be so difficult to resist and challenge many of the convictions about singlehood, because they are articulated through the language of time, a language characterized by its normative self-evident positions and regimes of truth.

This study seeks to locate singlehood within a broader critical theory and context. To achieve this goal, I juxtapose two theoretical subfields that are rarely linked: the social study of Time, and the study of Singlehood.° This conjunction of two supposedly separate bodies of knowledge can be of benefit to one another. For one thing, temporality plays a crucial role in the formation of singlehood; at the same time, analyzing singlehood can shed fresh light on how temporal orders are constructed and maintained. Indeed, this integration demands the rethinking and the reconfiguration of the categories and cultural forces that create the framework through which singlehood and temporal orders are constituted.

The socially related studies of Time can offer us both a new analytical framework and the innovative conceptual vocabulary from which we can reassess some of our dominant taken-for-granted conceptual frameworks. They give us the opportunity to explore and theorize singlehood through temporal concepts such as Ageism and accelerated aging (Chapter 4), Temporal economy (Chapter 5), and Waiting (Chapter 7). Other temporal categories which are examined throughout this book, such as age, the life course, linearity, and heteronormativity, enable a fresh consideration of our dominant perceptions about collective clocks, schedules, time tables, and the temporal organization of social life in general. By proposing this new analytical direction, this book seeks to rework some of our common conceptions of singlehood, and presents a new theoretical arsenal with which the temporal paradigms that devalue and marginalize single women can be reinterpreted.

We give little thought to the everyday workings of socio-temporal templates, and how these underpin most of our thought habits, social practices, and everyday interactions. However, the interpretation of these socio-temporal constructs—as I will attempt to show in the subsequent chapters—will reconfigure our understanding of the ways by which temporal knowledge is constructed, and will question the very terms upon which this is based. In this context, central to my study is the fundamental sociological question about how meaning is produced, as well as how temporal assumptions about singlehood are consolidated through interactions with others. From this perspective, neither singlehood nor time can be fixed and neutral categories, as they are constituted through changing social contexts, discourses, and human interactions. In this vein, I import some of the basic ideas advanced by discourse analysis, social constructionists, and symbolic interaction approaches, as well as ideas taken from feminist and queer scholarship.

The surge in singlehood literature published from around 2000 onwards undoubtedly contributes to a more critical reading of prevalent representations of single women. It also challenges widespread hegemonic assumptions about them. The literature responds to what is now a well-established fact, namely that more and more people are living on their own. Scholars like Shelly Budgeon (2008; 2015) Michael Cobb (2012), Bella DePaulo (2006), Lyn Jamieson and Roona Simpson (2013), Lyne Nakano (2011, 2014), Jill Reynolds (2008), Jesook Song (2014), and Anthea Taylor (2012) point out that despite the global growth of single-person households, late singlehood is still commonly perceived in terms of negations: a lack, an absence, a deficient identity. Questions like “Why are you single?” and “What is wrong with you?” (as my colleague asked me), and the dominant image of single women as lonely, desperate “cat ladies” embody this view.

Underpinning these attitudes is also a fear of female singlehood, which has been allowed to exceed its temporal boundaries. For many, long-term singlehood represents a threat to social order, and to subjectivity, thus demanding increased scrutiny and control. Central to this perspective is the assumption that singlehood can only be a temporal, liminal transitory status, during which single women can only hope to unsingle (DePaulo 2008) themselves and get married.

Consequently, long-term singlehood cannot possibly be a desired or chosen position. Implicit in this is the assumption that singlehood, when chosen at a younger age, will slowly and inevitably degrade into the miserable, vulnerable, lonely life of an “aging old maid.” As I have argued elsewhere (Lahad 2013; 2014), chosen spinsterhood, or the notion of an “old maid” by choice appears to be a contradiction in terms, as though no one could possibly wish to grow older as a single woman. These well-worn stereotypes have a powerful presence in popular imagery, associating the category of the old maid with an unfortunate sequence of events and an empty and lonely form of existence.

The new scholarship on singlehood shows that there are increasing numbers of single women who report high levels of life satisfaction, and others who refuse to compromise and marry men who have not met their marriage expectations.’ Singlehood is not, by any stretch of the imagination, automatically a catastrophe. Eric Klinenberg’s (2012) Going Solo: The Extraordinary Rise and Surprising Appeal of Living Alone, which received significant media exposure in the US, dismisses the widespread assumption that living alone necessary leads to isolation, misery, and loneliness. He notes that many single persons enthusiastically embrace singular forms of living, and are content with their single status.

However, being single does not always necessarily imply living alone. First, it is worth noting that the capacity for living alone may depend upon one’s material resources. Second, a different perspective on singlehood and prevailing living arrangements may also take into consideration more varied household compositions, such as co-housing and community housing, which do not necessarily subscribe to the conception of the nuclear family household unit. These issues are beyond the scope of the current discussion, but is it important to note that these alternative living arrangements can promote other forms of economic and emotional exchanges, and encourage a more ecological and environmentally friendly mindset.

Further studies also disclose diverse responses to solo living. Interviews with single women conducted by scholars like Tuula Gordon (1994), Jill Reynolds (2008), and Lyne Nakano (2011) reveal that some of their respondents fluctuate between choosing and non-choosing singlehood, or occupy the subject position of singlehood by chance. And yet, despite what appears to be a dramatic demographic shift, it seems that the stereotypes and mythical narratives of single women as desperate, lonely, and miserable remain as prevalent as ever.

My approach to understanding singlehood is very much influenced by Haim Hazan’s (2002) approach to the study of old age. Hazan suggests that the aged should be seen as carriers of the cultural tag of old age (ibid., 232). Based upon this theoretical formulation, I would like to suggest that conceptualizing single women as carriers of the cultural tag of singlehood can illuminate more discursive dimensions and open up new avenues for the analysis of social life.

Another important source ofinspiration is the work of Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (2002), a feminist disability scholar. In a study calling for the integration of feminist and disability theory, Garland-Thomson claims that:

There has been no archive, no template for understanding disability as a category of analysis and knowledge, as a cultural trope, and an historical community. So just as the now widely recognized centrality of gender and race analyses to all knowledge was unthinkable thirty years ago, disability is still not an icon on many critical desktop.

I would like to make a similar claim with regard to singlehood. Singlehood has no archive, and does not act as a category of analysis and knowledge. Borrowing Garland- Thomson's formulation, I argue that singlehood lends a new perspective to critical theory and possesses the potential to enrich sociological, feminist, disability, and queer theory.

Queer theory provides a significant conceptual lens to this study. In his reassessment of queer politics, Michael Warner contends that many of the “environments in which lesbian and gay politics arises have not been adequately theorized and continue to act as unrecognized constraints” (Warner 1993, xi). Notably, he stresses that these concepts embed a heteronormative understanding of society. In a similar vein, I employ Warner's insights to explore the unrecognized constraints to our understandings of the normative force of our couple-familial oriented social models. Warner claims that queer politics must address the broader questions related to views of “social institutions and norms of the most basic sort” (ibid.). My line of thinking here builds on Lauren Berlant and Warner Warner’s analysis of heteronormativity:

A whole field of social relations become intelligible as heterosexuality, and this privatised sexual culture bestows on its sexual practices a tacit sense of rightness and normalcy. This sense of rightness embedded in things and not just in sex is what we call heteronormativity. Heteronormativity is more than ideology, or prejudice, or phobia against gays and lesbians; it is produced in almost every aspect of the forms and arrangements of social life: nationality, the state and the law, commerce, medicine and education, as well as in the conventions and affects of narrativity, romance and other protected spaces of culture. (Berlant and Warner 1998, 548)

This important theoretical orientation presents us with the opportunity to think about singlehood in broader social and political terms, and prompts the consideration of issues related to social membership, identities, and normativity. Beyond this, it creates a new agenda for singlehood studies, one which highlights singlehood as a significant and unacknowledged aspect of social positioning. So, my argument is that the study of singlehood provides us with novel and significant tools to explore not only “What does it mean not to be in a couple?” (Budgeon 2008, 302), but—by extending Warner's observations—creates the framework within which we can ask what singlehood can tell us about subjectivity and the categories of the social and the human.

Within this context, it is important to refer to Rachel Moran’s (2004) argument that the feminist movement has left singlehood off the feminist agenda. In a fascinating historical analysis, Moran observes that “second wave feminism has failed to give full recognition to single women as a distinct constituency with unique needs” (ibid., 224-225). Feminism, she continues, has indeed lobbied for economic and political equality and independence for women, yet seems never to have come to grips with the possibilities of emotional individuality that are not incorporated within family and marriage structures (ibid., 225).

I find Moran's observation applicable also to feminist theory and activism in general. To a large extent, most feminist struggles take parental and conjugal ties as their points of reference. Accordingly, in the final section of this book, I will revisit the political and theoretical aims of this study. I do not merely call for acceptance or tolerance of single women within a heteronormative, couple-oriented society but highlight new modes of thinking, in which women can resist the narrow definitions of what is considered as women’s appropriate conduct.

By adopting an interdisciplinary approach and integrating different theoretical realms and perspectives, this book paves way for a new theorization of singlehood. To accomplish this, a new conceptual groundwork is needed, within which singlehood is moved from its simplistic temporary location and is understood in a wider social cultural context. That is to say, I conceptualize singlehood not merely as a troubling/ fascinating demographic phenomenon, a crisis, a social problem, or as anther subcategory of family studies, but rather as a social phenomenon worthy of inquiry in its own right.

Moreover, as a feminist sociologist, my interests are not confined to singlehood alone. I think of singlehood as sociologically important, because it touches upon some of the key questions in social thinking and raises pertinent questions about how people make sense of their lives and organize their lives with others. A politicized analysis of single living can open up and serve as a basis for advancing new visions of possible subjectivities, communality, and sociability. A temporal reading of singlehood is an important step in this direction, and the next section will develop the merits of this theoretical intersection further.

Theorizing singlehood and time

My first encounter with the sociology of time evolved, interestingly enough, from an attempt to collate different kinds of clichés ascribed to singlehood. Whilst doing so, I could not help but notice that one of the salient aspects of those clichés was time: “In the end she will die alone” was one, for instance; “What is she waiting for?” was another. People often comment that the single woman is about to “miss her train” or that she is “wasting her time.” We ask single women if they are still single—and why; we also wish for them to get married next or soon. “Still; eventually; ever-after; waste of time; waiting; how long; when’—all these form part of the rich language of time.

As far as single women are concerned, time ever so often is perceived to be “on hold,” “wasted,” “empty,” or “frozen.” One can easily find cultural expressions that mock single women, characterizing them as overly selective, unable to make timely choices, and/or uptight and obsessed about getting married—an obsession which supposedly intensifies once they realize that “time is running out.’ When one compares the temporal notions of singlehood to those related to conventional discourses of couplehood, parenthood, and family life, a temporal hierarchy is revealed, one which distinguishes between those who are on time/off time, investing time/losing time, spending meaningful time/empty time, or controlling time/being controlled by time.

We often neglect to acknowledge that time is a socially constructed concept. However, social time is gradually becoming a significant conceptual category in critical thinking. Sociologists like Norbert Elias (1992) and Eviatar Zerubavel (1981) have studied how the invention of the clock and the calendar became a collective tool for time measurement imposing a secular time order.

As anthropologist Edmund Leach (1971) has noted, the regularity of time is not an intrinsic part of nature but rather a man-made notion which we project onto our environment for our own particular purposes. These devices endow society with different rhythms and measurements by dividing time into minutes, hours, days, weeks, and years. In this connection, Zerubavel notes that the socio-temporal order is “a socially constructed artifact which rests upon rather arbitrary social conventions” (Zerubavel 1981, xii). These symbols, according to time scholars, are significant tools for orientation, interaction, coordination, and regulation with which people establish orientation points along a continuum of change (Elias 1992; Zerubavel 1981).

As Emile Durkheim has pointed out, “a calendar expresses the rhythms of the collective activities, while at the same time its function is to assure their regularity” (Durkheim 2008, 10-11). For Elias (1992), time is not a personal reality but a collective one and, as he crucially asserts, although time feels private it is dictated by collective norms and forms. By the same token, Zerubavel has stated that “given its considerable temporal regularity, our social environment can easily function as the most reliable clock or calendar” (Zerubavel 1985, 14). Incorporating these important conceptual observations, I will challenge this seemingly private language of time, as well as its socially situated trajectories and identities.

Another significant point that should be made is that time is not singular, but multiple and heterogeneous (Adam 1990; Nowotny 1992). As Helga Nowotny notes, time “has many faces and assumes various shapes and forms of expression” (Nowotny 1992, 499). The temporal discourse of singlehood corroborates this assumption. It relies upon an abundance of metaphors, clichés, narratives, temporal concepts, and orientations, in which time moves quickly and slowly; is subjected to pauses and delays; or suddenly accelerates or takes unexpected turns, backwards and sideways. Often, single women have the experience of their time both running out and standing still at precisely the same time. Their time can simultaneously be perceived as empty, wasted, lost, and frozen. The different chapters in this book seek to problematize and contextualize these different temporal modes, and in that respect delve into the rich and multilayered temporalities which are reflected and produced by the category of singlehood.

Taking this into consideration, this discussion cannot limit itself to one, singular timescale which regularly evaluates women’s social worth in accordance with normative prescriptions of linear trajectories embedded in heteronormative and reproduction regimes. As substantial feminist scholarship has shown, gendered perceptions of time are chiefly constructed by the biological deterministic arguments which perceive marriage and motherhood as women’s primary life goals. Within this context, the discourse of the biological clock—so prominent in western societies today—reduces women’s existence to features mainly articulated in biological and evolutionary terms.

Exemplifying this point, Merav Amir (2007) points out that the metaphor of the biological clock has become a new regulatory mechanism for producing gendered differences, and for disciplining single women to behave as timely feminine subjects. For Amir, the notion of the biological clock is embedded in essentialist assumptions of linear, goal-oriented, clock-driven temporal patterns, which individually and collectively impose fundamental constraints on women's lives. Evidently, this line of inquiry coheres with a long tradition of feminist criticism, which argues that women’s subordination to men is sustained by beliefs of biological determinism. Clearly, one can easily detect the metaphor of the biological clock as having a hovering effect in single women's lives. However, my argument here is that a deconstructive study of singlehood and time must address the multilayered aspects of time, rather than a singular one. That is, stressing the role of the biological clock is merely a partial dimension of a complex phenomenon. Moreover, it is impossible to challenge the multi-layered and multiformed temporal disciplining of single women by merely referring to the biological clock mythology as the only ideological order.