Stalin’s Constitution

Front matter

Stalin’s Constitution: Soviet Participatory Politics and the Discussion of the 1936 Draft Constitution

Samantha Lomb

Stalin’s Constitution: Soviet Participatory Politics and the Discussion of the 1936 Draft Constitution

Contents

Acknowledgments viii Archival abbreviations x List of Russian terms xi Introduction 1

1 Citizenship and a social contract: The drafting of the 1936 Constitution 12

3 Local realities: The implementation of the discussion of the draft Constitution 62 4 Validators of socialist victory: The discussion in the local press 84 5 Popular voices: Interpreting citizens’ rights and duties 92 6 Integration, exclusion, and accountability 110 7 The Constitution, the 1937 elections, and repression 123 Conclusion 139 Notes on sources 142 The draft Constitution of the USSR 146 Bibliography 164

Introduction

We, the workers of the Regional Forest Administration, noted during the discussion of the draft Constitution that the very fact the draft Constitution was handed over for popular discussion is evidence of our union’s powerfully developed might. The historically unprecedented fact that the people developed the Constitution for themselves speaks to the people’s energy and [to] our government’s strength and stability. from the Kirov Regional Forest Administration’s report on the discussion

Soviet leaders reached out to their citizens from what they believed to be a position of strength, seeking to harness popular enthusiasm and participation to further strengthen and stabilize the Soviet state. In 1935, in response to changing socioeconomic conditions in the USSR, the Party and state elite formed a Constitutional Drafting Commission to revise and then later rewrite the Constitution of the USSR. The committee worked on the new Constitution through June 12, 1936, when a finished draft was submitted to the public for discussion. The discussion of the draft Constitution took place over a period of six months, from June to December 1936. In this six-month span, an estimated 42,372,990 people participated in meetings and discussions across the whole USSR,” during which Soviet citizens made over 43,000 suggested changes to the draft Constitution.’

While the six-month-long public discussion did not result in substantive changes to the draft Constitution, it did involve Soviet citizens in a public dialogue unlike any since the revolution. This book examines the discourse between the central state leadership and citizens about the new Soviet social contract, which delineated what roles the state and the citizens should play in developing socialism and what the responsibilities of each were. For the central leadership, mobilizing its citizenry in a variety of state-building campaigns was the main goal of the discussion of the draft Constitution. Central state actors tried to develop enduring institutional forms for territorial administration, military-coercive power, revenue extraction, and other socioeconomic functions through such campaigns.* However, the goals of the central leadership at times stood in stark contrast with the people’s expressed interpretation of that social contract. Citizens of the USSR focused on securing rights and privileges, often related to improving their daily lives, from the central government, but also made known their support of and opposition to aspects of the draft Constitution.

Stalin’s Constitution shifts the focus from Moscow and explores broader issues of state building and state-citizen relations by recognizing the agency of local actors and decentralizing the historical narrative. The scope of the all-Union discussion, with over 40 million participants, makes it impossible to study it as a national campaign in any meaningful way. A focused case study enables an examination and contextualization of the often-conflicting agendas of the national government, local and regional officials, and of the populace. This book uses the Kirov region, which is located about 550 miles northeast of Moscow, to examine this campaign. Kirov is ideal for a regional study because the debate there was animated and wide-ranging, and the regional archives are exceptionally rich in materials. As the Kirov region was beyond the line of German occupation, the archives were never damaged or evacuated. Therefore, documents not found elsewhere, such as letters and district-level reports, exist in abundance in Kirov’s two main archives: the State Archive of the Kirov Region (GAKO), the main state archive for the region, and the State Archive of the Social and Political History of the Kirov Region (GASPI KO), the archive of the region’s Communist Party.

Utilizing these archival sources, this work provides ample evidence that Soviet citizens, particularly collective farm workers, engaged with the state and pressed for some resolution of their local and larger concerns and voiced their complaints about local governance. Regional studies such as this one demonstrate that the Soviet citizens were not without agency and, in fact, often shrewdly sought to manipulate state goals, rhetoric, and campaigns to their own ends. But as this book argues, the people did not always speak with one voice. Urban residents and rural residents, and at times different generations, often had divergent views on various issues, as did local elites and the mass population. Such differences should not be surprising given that the individual experiences of the region’s population differed. This study sheds insight into the different perspectives expressed by the residents of the Kirov region and argues that where one worked, one’s life experience, and one’s personal values influenced citizens’ views on the draft Constitution. As such, it provides a counterpoint to the work of historians who have written about aspects of the discussion of the draft Constitution and the implementation of Stalinist campaigns and policies in general, but have done so on a national scale and from the perspective of the central leadership in Moscow.

The literature on the popular discussion of the 1936 Constitution is sparse. Some historians, such as Robert Tucker and Sarah Davies, write about the Constitution in passing and focus on the failure of the state to honor the promises made in the Constitution. Davies in particular focuses on the dissonance created when Soviet citizens compared the promises made in the Constitution with the realities of their lives. Others, such as Ellen Wimberg, focus on how Soviet leaders used the Constitution to promote their own agenda, investigating the formulation of the draft Constitution and the discussion of that draft in the Soviet press as a way to examine tensions between various Party leaders at the time, particularly focusing on Bukharin.” J. Arch Getty, G. I. Tret’iakov, and Andrei Sokolov provide good overviews on the development of the drafting commission and the discussion on a national scale, including the most popular additions, corrections, and suggestions, and how these suggestions influenced the final draft of the Constitution.’ Both Getty and Sokolov note that many Soviet citizens took advantage of this open forum to agitate for personal and local issues. This study makes the same point. However, because these published studies’ examination of suggestions relies on Central Executive Committee archival materials, their evidence is akin to snapshots from throughout the USSR and is difficult to interpret except in broad terms. Getty himself admits that, “without detailed studies of the Soviet countryside in the 1930’s, it is difficult to interpret such data.”? This is where a case study like this one provides the much-needed context by framing the discussion within the setting of Stalinist state-building projects and the patterns and concerns of everyday life in the regions.!°

New regional studies, which allow historians to view how campaigns were implemented on the ground and how local and personal factors affected this implementation, have served to drastically change the way Stalinism and its state-building projects are viewed in Western historiography. Older generations of Western historians often had access only to central publications or, beginning in the early 1990s, to central archival documents and tended to portray Stalinism as a totalitarian and command-style society in which any opening up of society was merely a ploy to mask the Soviet leadership’s (or Stalin’s) true intentions. For example, Robert Tucker argues that Stalin’s main expedient for camouflaging the terror operation in the late 1930s was his rewriting of the Constitution.'! Tucker reduces the discussion of the Constitution to a propaganda exercise aggrandizing Stalin, who “was a master of deceit who was making use of the public discussion of the ‘most democratic’ Constitution as a smokescreen for moves to transform the Soviet regime into something approximating a fascist one.”

Stalin’s Constitution joins a growing list of works which demonstrate that the structure of the state and Party did not guarantee the fulfillment of directives as formulated. In fact, seemingly more often than not, Moscow was frustrated by the less than satisfactory fulfillment of central policies. During the discussion of the draft Constitution, various Central Committee members were frustrated by the improper implementation of the discussion and the casual attitude of many local officials towards having meaningful discussions and recording popular suggestions, as well as the local and personal nature of many suggestions. After the Constitution had been ratified, many Soviet leaders were concerned about former class enemies’ misuse of new constitutional rights. This constant friction between the goals of the central leadership and the goals of Soviet citizens is reflective of their differing interpretations of the rights and duties of the state and citizens in a socialist society.

The sense of the population as embattled by the state pervades many of the historical studies of the USSR in the 1930s. Lewis Siegelbaum and Andrei Sokolov use the diverse collection of documents presented in Stalinism as a Way of Life to demonstrate how the challenges of building socialism confronted people, often in life-threatening ways, in their daily life. They focus on how citizens negotiated the disruptions that collectivization and rapid industrialization created, but Siegelbaum and Sokolov demonstrate how citizens learned to “speak Bolshevik” and advocate for their own interests within the framework of rhetoric created by the state." In reference to the draft Constitution, they note,

Seizing the opportunity presented by the Constitution’s incorporation of a language of rights, letter writers and participants in formal discussions projected their own ideas, hopes, and resentments onto the document. Their comments and suggestions thus provide an unusual, though not entirely transparent, glimpse into popular mentalities."

Siegelbaum and Sokolov are among the first historians to recognize the bilateral nature of the discussion and central state officials’ deep interest in what the people were saying, as well as the plethora of opinions that lay beneath a thin veneer of all-out support for the Party’s ideas.‘

As the centerpiece of Stalin’s state-building policies, the drafting, discussion, ratification, and implementation of the 1936 Constitution weaves together many threads: the political course the central leadership wished to set for the country, its ability to mobilize the population, and the ability of the people to engage the state using its own language and to agitate for their own interests and desires. Such negotiations were taking place in the many places where official state policy and citizens’ lives intersected. Siegelbaum notes in his study of Stakhanovism that the state was not able to implement Stakhanovism by fiat, but rather the state and its citizens engaged in a sort of dialogue interpreting how Stakhanovism would be enacted through interpenetration of state and personal interests and mutual interdependence.'® Stephen Kotkin similarly notes in his groundbreaking micro-history of Magnitogorsk: “it is possible to see—without denying the heavy coercive force of the Communist project—a two-way struggle, however unequal the terms, over the drawing of lines of authority.” 17 In these participatory and collaborative aspects, the designing, drafting, and discussion of the 1936 Constitution mirrors the development of other experimental social endeavors, such as Stakhanovism and the construction of Magnitogorsk. Not only are they contemporaneous state-building projects, but also they were all intended to completely reshape the foundations of society.

For many historians, there seems to be a contradiction between the fact that the USSR in the 1930s was a one-party dictatorship, aspiring towards strong central control, and the popular participation of the citizenry in actually shaping the parameters of the state. This work argues that there was no contradiction. While the Bolsheviks and the Soviet state had no desire to yield power, both also viewed popular participation in state-sanctioned campaigns as essential. And in fact, the Party sought to mobilize citizens for such campaigns, whether they were in service of collectivization (e.g., the 25,000ers)'® or greater worker productivity (e.g., Stakhanovism). As these campaigns demonstrate, the Party and state did not disdain popular participation. On the contrary, they embraced it, albeit within prescribed limits. Popular participation was a way for the Party and state to communicate certain goals and values to the population, as well as a way for the population to help the central state to identify problems with the implementation of these campaigns and local governance. While central authorities deliberately structured such participation, participants often used the opportunity for involvement to convey their own concerns and demands.

As historians begin to examine these campaigns in depth, they have found much negotiating and maneuvering on the part of the cadres charged with implementing state initiatives and the citizens charged with their fulfillment. Siegelbaum notes that the Stakhanovite initiatives of the central leadership were often dramatically transformed as they were interpreted and implemented at the regional and local level. He observes that as initiatives came down from above, they were transformed such that the campaign came to be something less and also something more than was originally foreseen or officially sanctioned. It was not that the central state and Party initiatives stopped at the factory gates, but that what went on beyond them had a profound effect on the formulation and modification of those initiatives, as the management and workers tried to maneuver, accommodate, participate enthusiastically, or resist orders that made their lives more difficult.!”

Such negotiations are also seen in the other major mass social and economic campaign of the 1930s: collectivization. In his pioneering study on collectivization in Siberia, James Hughes argues that the Soviet leadership employed mass mobilization and materialistic incentives to fracture the peasants as a class and prevent resistance to the regime. Hughes concludes that the “Ural-Siberian method” of collectivization was more successful in part because it relied on the mobilization and organization of poor peasant support.” The Ural-Siberian strategy focused on organizing small groups of poor and middle peasants to act as caucuses to wrest the village assembly from the control of kulaks (prosperous peasants) and then use the legitimacy of said assembly as the governing peasant institution to vote approval for Party policies. Hughes notes that participation in both collectivization and these peasant caucuses was secured by providing selective material incentives, including excludable benefits (from grain bounties, to free goods from cooperative stores, and to a share of looted kulak property) for poor peasants who supported the state.?! According to Hughes,

“the implementation of the social influence (Ural-Siberian) method also had entrenched the ‘state building’ organizational foundations, bureaucratic structures and institutional procedures which gave the Party powerful levers to control the countryside.”

The idea of an active citizenry that embraced various aspects of these participatory state-building campaigns is a relatively new idea in Soviet historiography, but it should not be a surprise. In recent years, many good regional studies like Hughes’ have allowed historians to investigate the implementation of campaigns at a local level and the negotiations that took place between local and regional state and Party officials and the masses. Charles Hier argues in his study of collectivization campaigns in Sechevka raion, Western Oblast’ that local Party and state officials were often lax in implementing collectivization because they were the ones with the most personal property to lose. He documents how local poor peasants worked with regional officials to collectivize the land because of the benefits the state offered to collective farms, such as tractors and high-quality seed. Hier found that many peasants not only embraced collectivization in this region, but also had to actively struggle against local Party and state officials to implement central directives.” In his study of the Kirov region, Aaron Retish likewise notes that peasants embraced and utilized state programs to strengthen their socioeconomic position and to improve their daily lives. He notes that Viatka/Kirov~4 had a strong tradition of local self-government and advocacy, as peasants were well-represented in the pre-revolutionary zemstvos. During the Civil War, when committees of the poor and other collective organizations were formed, the peasants of the Kirov region embraced them as a way to improve landholdings and gain access to agricultural supplies. While these committees failed quickly in other regions, Retish notes that they endured in the Kirov region and formed the basis for some of the first collective farms here.” The citizens of the Kirov region continually showed great skill in adapting state campaign forms and language to suit their needs. In his study of regional bureaucracy in Kirov in the 1930s, Larry Holmes notes that the regional and local educational bureaucracy adopted the rhetoric of failure and escalating negativity to account for the material and professional failures that plagued the region’s schools. Doing so, he argues, helps to explain their use of the language of victimhood to petition for rights and privileges. These administrators were not just passively trying to weather the wrath of the state, but rather used the state’s own rhetoric and institutions to settle personal scores and to agitate for personal rights and privileges.*°

This study uses the discussion of the draft Constitution as a springboard to explore how the state sought to advance its state-building goals by redefining social relations through the use of a social contract, the new Constitution. The state crafted this social contract to help create a stable legal base for society and to promote participation at local and regional levels, as well as a way to make Party and state officials accountable. Like other

Stalinist campaigns, the discussion of the draft Constitution was often reinterpreted during implementation, making it a forum for negotiating how the state would look at the local level. However, unlike Stakhanovism and other economic campaigns, the discussion of the draft Constitution was designed to solicit citizens’ opinions. While the regime’s leaders had no doubt anticipated outspoken support for their vision of socialism, this was not always the case, as the participants used the discussion and the state’s language to bring local and personal issues to the forefront, and in the process, create a decidedly different interpretation of what the Soviet Union should be. The drafting and discussion of the Constitution provides a unique opportunity to study these negotiations, as the state specifically solicited and meticulously recorded citizen answers and opinions about how the actual legal and theoretical foundations of the state should be formed.

Chapter 1 demonstrates how the draft Constitution highlights the state’s attempt to create a new social contract with its citizens and what it expected from them in return. This chapter sets the context for the public discussion, providing an overview of select constitutional thought and theory, which played a role in the drafting of the 1936 Constitution. To this end, this chapter concentrates on the development and evolution of specific articles, which focus on the redefinition of citizens, and citizenship rights, including the re-enfranchisement of former priests and kulaks. It illustrates those aspects of the Constitution, such as increased material benefits, that the central leadership sought to highlight, and how it hoped that the discussion of the draft Constitution would be instrumental in generating enthusiasm for state-building projects.

The second chapter emphasizes the complex realities that shaped daily life and concerns in the primarily rural region by focusing on the demographic, social, and economic situation in post-revolutionary Kirov. Due to the underdeveloped and principally agrarian nature of the region, many of these concerns focused on land, foodstuffs, and material goods needed to survive. Local power struggles, often over access to these daily necessities, were a part of everyday life. These realities significantly shaped the perceptions of its citizens and the complaints and suggestions that they made during the discussion. This chapter makes clear that the citizens of the Kirov region were politically savvy, petitioning for personal interests through the existing channels, such as the local press and local organizations, and using the political language of state campaigns to give these local problems more political significance. This chapter reveals a populace capable of using the discussion of the draft Constitution to agitate for their own interests, and as such, it offers a contrast to the view that Soviet peasants in the 1930s were sullen but apolitical.

Chapter 3 focuses on the implementation of the popular discussion in the Kirov region. This chapter addresses many of the tensions within the Soviet system as revealed by the debate. The central Party and state leadership had a specific vision of how the campaign should unfold. It wanted to enhance the process of state building (i.e., the development of enduring institutional forms of administration, military power, and revenue extraction). The new Constitution represented that effort and the Stalinist vision of the state. But unlike past state-building efforts, the Soviet leadership urged citizens to appreciate and discuss the new citizenship rights that the central state leadership had written into the Constitution. This focus was evident in lesson plans created for local Party organizations, which dictated the topics to be covered during the deliberation of the draft. However, the implementation of the discussion was left primarily to local district officials, who tried to balance the debate with the demands of their day-to-day tasks. As a result, many of the local organizers treated the discussion like just another campaign, simply reading the draft Constitution aloud instead of encouraging deliberation. Such treatment drew the ire of the central leadership and then, in turn, of regional officials, who blamed local organizers for a number of “inappropriate suggestions” to the draft. These inappropriate suggestions are revealing, as they focused on individual needs rather than state-building goals. Among them were suggestions to grant collective farmers the same rights as workers and urbanites, and to create peasant unions. This chapter argues that such suggestions were not the result of poor preparatory work, although that was a significant problem, but were a reflection of popular, especially peasant, concerns and demands.

The fourth chapter analyzes the coverage of the popular discussion in Kirovskaia Pravda, the regional newspaper, and several local district newspapers. These newspapers often relied on letters and materials from privileged groups, such as Party members, Stakhanovites, collective farm chair-people, and urban workers, whose ebullient accounts served to validate claims of socialist victory. These materials make clear the stark divide between this small, yet active, relatively educated and privileged population, which had been successfully integrated into the Soviet society, and the peasants who comprised the vast majority of the region’s population. This chapter demonstrates that the better-educated and more politically integrated urban dwellers were much more likely to embrace the central government’s state-building narrative than were their rural counterparts. Those urban dwellers who wrote letters to newspapers focused on how they were working to create a strong socialist state; many often pledged to work harder in gratitude for their new rights and privileges. Peasants focused much more on local political and economic issues; they had their own ideas about how state power should be used. This chapter makes clear that the well-publicized state-building goals of Party and state leaders were internalized by only a small stratum of citizens, most of whom were members of the urban and working elite, and conveys rural dwellers’ hopes and complaints.

Chapter 5 examines the popular suggestions to the draft Constitution put forth by Kirov’s citizens. These suggestions provide insight into the issues that preoccupied Kirovites, as well as how they interpreted socialism based on their daily experiences and interactions with the Party and state. This chapter focuses in particular on how the reframing of citizenship to include all inhabitants of the USSR, and the expansion of citizens’ rights and privileges, became a touchstone for many of the debate’s participants. In Kirov, the participants in the discussion focused on including or excluding people from citizenship rights and/or corresponding benefits, while stressing issues that would create safe, stable, and materially secure lives for themselves. Many of the popular suggestions to the draft Constitution focused on vacations, material or monetary aid for collective farmers, land ownership, and access to educational resources. The participants used the rhetorical and political tools that the state had given them to agitate for their interests in order to change state policy. They often cited state policies or their contributions to state-building efforts, such as collectivization, to justify increased material benefits and political equality for themselves or their community. The evidence in this chapter makes clear that many discussants were politically active and engaged in a dialogue with the state so as to promote their interests, which were often drastically different than the needs and expectations that the state had been promoting through its managed discussion of the draft Constitution.

Chapter 6 examines two major aspects of the new draft Constitution: the expansion of electoral and citizenship rights to all people in the USSR, including former kulaks and religious sect members who had been previously stripped of their rights and systematically discriminated against, and the establishment of habeas corpus protections for the accused. This chapter focuses on how, at the local level, citizens accepted what they deemed useful aspects of these policies, while core aspects of these policies, which threatened local stability, were met with much resistance and hostility. Kirovites embraced Stalin’s mandate that democracy be a tool for making local officials accountable for their behavior and failures. They had many suggestions to increase their ability to hold local officeholders accountable and demonstrated their willingness to remove incompetent or corrupt officials during the 1936 local elections, which this chapter also discusses. But, Kirovites prized safety and stability, particularly in the countryside where the state was the weakest. As a result, they overwhelmingly rejected habeas corpus protections and the re-enfranchisement of those stripped of their rights, and proposed counter-suggestions that would make it easier for the police and citizens themselves to apprehend criminals.

The final chapter discusses how the subsequent 1937 national elections, based on the new Constitution, contributed to the repression that began that year in Kirov and nationwide. Reports of anti-Soviet activities in the region and instances of formerly disenfranchised people (lishentsy, kulaks) nominating their own candidates for local offices were sent to Moscow. These reports amplified the anxieties that the central leadership had about the perceived increase in enemy activity throughout the country. The local NKVD Party cell minutes, from which many materials are drawn, demonstrated this increased anxiety within the police and the community at large.

As 1937 progressed, participants at those meetings stopped referring to the infiltration of Soviet organs of power by class enemies as a possibility but rather as a reality that needed to be aggressively confronted. This chapter explores how such reports and pressure from the regions contributed to the onset of mass repression in 1937 and its evolution. As this study examines one region of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), the purpose of this chapter is not to make overstated claims about the mass repression, but to show ways in which local issues and state concerns overlapped. In this way, it contributes to the recent literature on the repression, while also raising questions about popular involvement.

Stalin’s Constitution concludes that the opening up of the electoral franchise combined with the open forum of the discussion encouraged many Soviet citizens to engage the state in a dialogue about their needs and responsibilities. The locally and personally oriented needs and suggestions of the citizenry were contrary to the suggestions that the state had expected. When citizens, particularly those from already suspect groups, began using their rights to agitate for these personal interests, it heightened central anxieties to the point that it contributed to mass repression in 1937. This step back from the centralized focus of the other historical works on the constitutional discussion sheds light on how citizens understood the roles they and the state should play in developing socialism and what the responsibilities of each were.

2 This is the number provided by Andrei Sokolov in “Konstitutsiia 1936 goda i kulturnoe nasledie stalinskogo sotsializma,” Sotsial’naia istortia: ezhegodnik (St. Petersburg: 2008), 140. A higher number (51.5 million people, or 55 percent of the country’s adult population) is provided by G. I. Tret’iakov, “Soobshcheniia. Vsenarodnoe obsuzhdenie proekta konstitusii SSSR,” Voprosy istorii, No. 9 (September 1953), 98. Both authors cite Central Executive Committee files from GARF as their sources.

4 Gerald M. Easter, “Personal Networks and Postrevolutionary State Building: Soviet Russia Reexamined,” World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Jul. 1996), 551- 578.

5 This study draws extensively on both archives as well as on the region’s newspapers, and the materials relating to the Central Drafting Commission that are housed in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF).

6 Robert Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1992); Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent 1931-1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

7 Ellen Wimberg, “Socialism, Democratism and Criticism: The Soviet Press and the National Discussion of the 1936 Draft Constitution,” Soviet Studies, Vol. 44, No. 2 (1992), 313-332.

8 J. Arch Getty, “State and Society Under Stalin: Constitutions and Elections in the 1930s,” Slavic Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring 1991), 18-35; Tretiakov,

97-102; Sokolov, “Konstitutsiia 1936 goda i kul’turnoe nasledie stalinskogo sotsializma,” 137-163.

Getty, “State and Society Under Stalin: Constitutions and Elections in the 1930s,” 27.

Elena Aleksandrovna Shershneva defended a dissertation entitled “Sozdanie Konstitutsiia SSSR 1936 goda” on the process behind the formulation of the draft Constitution in 2011. While it does appear that she addresses the discussion of the Constitution, she does it from the perspective of the central leadership, focusing on the decrees that they issued. She uses only central archival material. An overview of her dissertation can be found at http://www.dissercat. com/content/sozdanie-konstitutsii-sssr-1936-goda accessed 8/20/2013.

Tucker, 360.

For a discussion of “speaking Bolshevik,” see Stephan Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

Lewis Siegelbaum and Andrei Sokolov, Stalinism as a Way of Life: A Narrative in Documents (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 26.