Japan’s Arduous Rejuvenation as a Global Power

Front matter

Japan’s Arduous Rejuvenation as a Global Power

DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE AND THE US-CHINA CHALLENGE

Victor Teo

Preface

Japan’s Arduous Rejuvenation as a Global Power assesses the profound impact that Japan’s aspirations to become a great power have had for Japanese security and democracy. Rather than viewing the process of normalization and rejuvenation as two decades of remilitarization in the face of a rapidly changing strategic environment and domestic political circumstances, this volume contextualizes Japan’s contemporary international relations against the longer grain of Japanese historical interactions. It demonstrates that policies and statecraft in Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s era are a continuation of a long, unbroken and arduous effort by successive generations of leaders to preserve Japanese autonomy, enhance security and advance Japanese national interests. Arguing against the notion that Japan cannot work with China as long as the US-Japan alliance is in place, the book suggests that Tokyo could forge constructive relations with Beijing by engaging China in joint projects inside and outside of the Asia-Pacific, in issue areas such as infrastructure development or the provision of international public goods. An improvement in Japan-China relations would enhance rather than detract from Japan-US relations, as Washington is likely to become more sensitive to Japanese needs and interests. Tokyo will find that its new-found independence in the US-Japan alliance would not only accord it more political respect and strategic latitude, but also allow it to ameliorate the excesses of US foreign policy adventurism, paving the way for Japan to become a truly great “normal” power in time to come.

Pokfulam, Hong Kong Victor Teo vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book was inspired by the numerous student seminars the author has led at the University of Hong Kong’s Department of Japanese Studies on the International Relations of the Asia-Pacific over the last decade. The lively discussions and interactions with the students stimulated much of the author’s thinking and ideas on the subject matter. A great debt is owed to the School of Modern Languages and Cultures and the Faculty of Arts at the University of Hong Kong for support given to the author for this project. The author is also tremendously grateful to the following organizations for their kind support in the provision of fellowships and/or research grants that enabled the author to undertake extended leave to research for the various chapters in this publication: Hong Kong Research Council General Research Fund (Project HKU 753310H) for funding multiple research visits to Japan and a research fellowship at the University of Oxford; The Japan Foundation Short Term Fellowship Scheme for supporting a research stint at the University of Kyoto; the Harvard-Yenching Institute for fellowship as HYI Visiting Scholar at the Faculty of Arts and Sciences and Harvard Law School; the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2016-LAB-2250005) for funding a research associateship at the Harvard Program on US-Japan Relations at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and at Harvard Law School. A special note of acknowledgment must also go to the Doris Zimmern HKU-Cambridge Hughes Hall Fellowship for funding a stint at the University of Cambridge’s Department of Politics and International Studies (POLIS). The author is also tremendously grateful to the University of Hong Kong Small Project Fund for funding the OA component of this project.

xX ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author is also particularly grateful to the referees, scholars and colleagues who have read and commented on various chapters of the book. Special thanks must be conveyed to all the esteemed learned scholars in the US, the UK, Japan, China and Singapore for all the intellectual exchange, camaraderie, advice and encouragement. The author owes a great intellectual and professional debt to Professors Ezra Vogel, Susan Pharr, Michael Yahuda, Arne Westad, Heonik Kwon, Ian Nish, Khong Yuen-Foong, Antony Best and Lam Peng-Er for all the advice and mentorship over the years. Special thanks must also be given to learned colleagues and friends who have taken the time to speak to or engage the author on one occasion or more on Japanese foreign policy: Professors Thomas Berger, Sheila Smith, Andrew Oros, Yoshihide Soeya, Rosemary Foot, Caroline Rose, Akihiko Tanaka, Akio Takahara, Hitomi Koyama, Haruko Satoh, Yoneyuki Sugita, General Koichi Isobe and Shinju Fujihira among others. The author is grateful to Miss Man-Wai Lam, Miss Natalie Dabkowski, Miss Bea T.S. Leung, Ms Sudha Soundarrajan, Mr Tikoji Rao Mega Rao, Ms Linda Haylock, Ms Connie Li and Mr Brian Halm for their editorial assistance. The book was written over the course of many months while the author was at Cambridge (Massachusetts), Singapore and Hong Kong. Special thanks must be given to the following colleagues and friends for making the author’s life in Cambridge so much more interesting and enjoyable: Susan Scott, Lindsay Strogatz, Francesca Coppola, James Flaherty, Li Ruohong, Edward Baker, Kendal Kelly, Jenni Ting, Nina Coomes, Melissa Smith and Mike Zaisser. The author is extremely grateful to the editors and staff at Palgrave Macmillan, particularly Miss Sara Crowley-Vigneau for her confidence in the author and for making this book possible. Last but not least, the author is grateful to his loving family for their support, without which his academic career would not have gone so far. Needless to say, the author is solely responsible for all errors in this book.

CONTENTS l1 The Rejuvenation of Japan

The Problem of Understanding Japan’s Rejuvenation Understanding Japan’s Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Survey Contradictory Tendencies, Democratic Resilience and Japan’s Difficult Rejuvenation

The Idea of Normalization and Rejuvenation

Beyond Zero-Sum Games and Binary Choices: Transcending the US-China Divide

Chapter Overview and Synopsis

Japan’s Rejuvenation: Origins, Debates and Concepts Japan’s Political and Philosophical Traditions: Equality, Hierarchy and Exceptionalism

The China Dilemma

Japan’s Exceptionalism The San Francisco System and the Making of an “Abnormal” Japan Mainstream Conservatism in Japanese Politics During the Cold War The Rise of Neo-Conservatism: From Normalization to the Rejuvenation of Japan The Contours of the Debate on Japan’s Rejuvenation xii CONTENTS

The Central Pillars of Rejuvenation 66 Theme One: Constitutional Revisionism 66 Theme Two: The Nature and Tone of the US-Japan Alliance 69 Theme Three: Pacifism, the Use of Force and Global — A 76

Neo-Conservatism yet the Paradoxes of Japanese Democracy 90 References 98

3 Japan’s Rejuvenation and the US-China Divide 107 Japan’s Asia Strategy and the US-China Challenge 108 Cautioning America’s Unilateralism 115 Is the “Anti-China” Position Necessarily Conducive to Japanese Interests? 122 The Contestation in Southeast Asia: Winning Hearts and Minds 124 References 130

4 Peacekeepers But Not Quite Peacebuilders: Japan’s Evolving Role in the Middle East Peace Process 133 Japan’s Foray into the Middle East 134 A Brief Synopsis of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 136 Japan's Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict 140 The Need to Revamp Japan’s Peacebuilding Strategy 144 Fostering Better Socio-Economic Conditions 145 Japan’s Undisputable Credentials as a Peacemaker 149 Losing Sight of the Forest for the Trees 153 The Neo-Conservatives’ Peacebuilding Efforts in the Trump Era 157 References 161

5 The Provision of International Public Goods: Japan’s Anti-Piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden 167 Piracy as a Security Challenge 167 Genesis of Japan’s Anti-Piracy Efforts 171 Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: An Overview 175 International Law and the Piracy Problem ea Japan’s Response to the Piracy Problems in the Gulf 180

CONTENTS xiii

Working with the Chinese PLAN and the Multilateral Provision

of International Public Goods 184 Conclusion 188 References 189

6 Recalibrating Japan’s Foreign Policy 195 jJapan’s Rejuvenation from the Perspective of the US and China 203 The US: The Preservation of Pre-Eminent Status 203 Between Revisionism and Realpolitik: China’s Japan Problem 206 Resistance from Below: Democratic Resilience and Rejuvenation 209 Challenges for the Future 211 Putting Japan’s Self-Interest First: Asia and Beyond 211 Pre-Requisites for Global Leadership: Gaining Respect of Asian Neighbors 215 Working with US in the Asia-Pacific and with China Beyond 219 References 222

Chapter 1

My core vision for a future Japan is a “beautiful country” that is open to the world, and ready to face the challenges that come our way. Under my guidance, Japan will continue to advance a program of reforms and initiatives to achieve this vision.

I believe it is important that we Japanese write a constitution for ourselves that would reflect the shape of the country we consider desirable in the 21st century.

Do not fall into a brain-dead state of not daring to even lay a finger on the constitution or even avoid debating it. We will create with our own hands a constitution appropriate for the times.

Shinzo Abe

THE PROBLEM OF UNDERSTANDING JAPAN’S REJUVENATION

In the aftermath of the 2018 June 12 summit between the US and North Korea, held in Singapore, there was vehement disagreement among experts and commentators over the question as to whether anything substantive had been established by President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un, or whether it was China, North Korea or the US that had emerged as a winner. The only consensus between various experts is that for the most part, Japan was the country that stood to lose most from this

© The Author(s) 2019 1 V. Teo, Japan’s Arduous Rejuvenation as a Global Power, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6190-6_1

2 V.TEO summit. However, this was not due to a lack of trying on Japan’s part. On June 5, 2018, just five days before the Singapore summit, Prime Minister Abe flew to Washington D.C. to meet President Trump. The purpose was to lobby his purported new friend and buddy, whom the prime minister had meticulously courted—even before Mr. Trump was sworn in as president— on the importance of the North Korean issue to Japan’s national interests.

The reaction of President Trump, in response to the overtures from the North Koreans to meet, is reminiscent of the Nixon shocks Japan suffered in 1972. This episode also raises questions for Prime Minister Abe’s strategy and political instincts, as like his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) predecessors (think Nakasone—Reagan or Koizumi—Bush), he strove to build good personal relations with his US counterpart. As the first prime minister of the G7 to personally call President-Elect Trump in New York, the prime minister ignored public and peer opinion in both Japan and the US, probably because he felt this gesture would ingratiate him as a true friend to the new US president and advance Japanese national interests. This strategy seemed to work out well, as President Trump has on various occasions called the prime minister his “good friend,” and reaffirmed the US-Japan alliance in a way that provided much support for the prime minister’s political agenda of normalizing Japan. Even though the optics and language changed, many analysts felt that the US-Japan alliance would climb to new heights under the new president. In other words, Prime Minister Abe had become the “Trump whisperer,” one of the rare few leaders to have a personal rapport with the US president, or so it seemed.

This rapport unfortunately did not translate into much influence on an issue of critical importance to Japan and the premier himself. Prime Minister Abe had burnished his political credentials and made his early career advocating for a tougher line against North Korea, for its abduction of Japanese nationals and present nuclear belligerence. This position had not changed since he was deputy chief and chief cabinet secretary (akin to the US chief of staff) to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in the early 2000s. The North Koreans have of course taken a hardline position against Prime Minister Abe. Yet, in characteristic Trumpian manner, the US president swiftly dealt three successive political blows to the Japanese prime minister in a short span of time.

On March 8, 2018, President Trump agreed to meet North Korea’s Chairman Kim via a request conveyed by the South Korean national security advisor to President Moon at the White House, by-passing any discussions with Japan—in theory their principal ally in the Asia-Pacific region

(Landler 2018). On March 23, 2018, Japan was not exempted by the Trump administration from stiff tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, with one report gleefully announcing “for Japan, the hits keeps on coming.” (New York Times, March 23, 2018). Brazil, Mexico, Australia and South Korea (the last two being allies in the region) were left off the list. Barely three weeks later, the US president gave his “good friend,” the Japanese premier, a rather unpleasant surprise when he told him, on his visit to Mar-a-Lago, that Secretary of State Pompeo had met with Kim Jong-un over the Easter weekend in Pyongyang. He reiterated this again to the White House press corps with the Japanese premier standing by his side, and in his characteristic fashion tweeted about this on April 18, 2018. Prime Minister Abe’s June 5 visit certainly did not secure what he needed from President Trump—namely an assurance that the US would not cut a deal with North Korea until a united position with regards to North Korea could be worked out. This saga of dealing with North Korea attracted much attention and commentary. Even though domestic opinion was relatively muted in Japan, critics of Prime Minister Abe had a field day and derided him on his choice of strategy (or lack thereof) and the ineffectiveness of his personal diplomacy. Others ridiculed President Trump, suggesting that he was as mad as the North Korean leader, unschooled in diplomacy and international politics. The most important questions, however, have little to do with President Trump’s alleged recklessness and/or negligence, nor with Abe’s effectiveness.

The escalating North Korean nuclear threat, from the waning years of the Obama administration to the present, represents one of the gravest periods in Japanese security since the Second World War. It raises certain questions about the basic long-held assumptions that Japan’s policymakers and its people have cherished since the US-Japan security alliance was promulgated in 1951. The recent developments detailed above raise more questions than answers for those looking to “normalize” Japanese foreign policy.

The North Korea related events of 2017-2018 shocked many Japanese nationals. The world watched in awe as the combative rhetoric between the US and North Korea escalated between President Trump and Chairman Kim, fanning fears of an imminent war between the two nations. Situated at the frontlines of the US alliance network, and as host of US forces in Asia, Japan would definitely be targeted if hostilities were to break out between North Korea and the US. The escalation and war of words did not involve the Japanese leaders in a major way, but the US-Japan alliance could

4 V.TEO chain-gang Japan into a conflict that Japan was not prepared to fight. In initiating contact with North Korea and agreeing to meet its leader, the US exercised an autonomy within its rights as a sovereign nation, but from the perspective of Tokyo, two offensive elements stand out. First, the US had not given the proper consideration and reciprocity to Tokyo interests on this sensitive issue. Japan’s primary concern was that the US might strike a deal with North Korea to decommission North Korea’s long-range missiles only, leaving Japan well within the sights of its short- and medium-range missiles, even if North Korea stopped her missile and nuclear tests. Second, by arranging the summit without prior consultation with Japan, the US had taken steps to deviate from a united front on an issue that was critical to Japanese interests. This might be construed as a case of “abandonment,” as Japan finds out after the fact, and certainly conveyed a particular message to Japan policymakers that the alliance might privilege American security and interests over Japan’s.

The North Korea episodes raise broader and more important questions for Japanese foreign policy in general and for the US-Japan alliance in particular. First, it would appear that Japan as a significant economic power in the region is exasperated and helpless against a belligerent North Korea (USD 28.5 billion GDP in 2016—a fraction of Japan’s USD 4.939 trillion GDP in the same year). Even with the militarization program and Japan’s tightening of the alliance, Tokyo has little political or economic sway against Pyongyang’s missile or nuclear threats. Second, it raises questions about the autonomy of Japan when its political elites bet Japan’s security entirely on the US, particularly on a leader that both the US and Japanese public have little confidence in. This begs the question: are the solutions to US security problems necessarily suited to Japan all the time; and in the same light, can Japan reasonably expect that their interests would necessarily coincide with Washington’s most, if not all of the time?

Third, is it acceptable for the Japanese people to continually accede to the US, even if requests to support the alliance are often at odds with, or at great expense to, Japan’s national interests? The costs are not just defined in financial calculations, but also in terms of diplomatic flexibility, political opportunities, national pride and democratic progress. Japan’s political loyalty to the US, and its perception of the alliance as a panacea to all its security and foreign problems, is problematic in a rapidly changing strategic environment where security issues might not be so clear-cut after all. How has the reaffirmation of the US-Japan security alliance affected Japan’s relations with its closest neighbors in the long run, particularly if Japan is adamant on maintaining a lock-step diplomatic approach toward all others in order to remain a staunch ally of the US? (Magosaki 2009)

This leads to a further question: how has the development in Japanese foreign policy over the last two decades since the mid-1990s helped or hindered Japan’s security? Such developments do not take place in a vacuum. From the perspective of planners in Tokyo, Japan’s external environment has deteriorated rapidly and correspondingly, these changes have stoked changes in domestic political narratives and processes to adapt to these new challenges. Since the late 1990s, the neo-conservatives have seen their political fortunes rise, and their political agenda has come to define the mainstream political narratives. There are three key ideas behind neo-conservatism. The first idea is that Japan should bring to the fore of public discussions and consideration previously tabooed topics on security, particularly on how Japan could do more in order to fend for itself and also contribute to global concerns (Shinyo 1994; Nakanishi 2003; Ishizu 2006; Morimoto 2008). With the rise of China, much of this national conversation involves discussion on how to handle the “China threat,” and related to this, the balance that needs to be struck between a strategy of an autonomous Japan and changes needed in the US-Japan alliance. The second key strand of conversation relates to the first. In their discussions about Japanese security, neo-conservatives in Japan perceive a key need to explain the necessity for having a national conversation on security in order to drag Japan out of a state of “peace senility or idiocy” (PHR).

Pacifism, a key institution of postwar Japan, needs to therefore contend with strands of new thinking that the neo-conservatives regard as necessary for the younger generation in Japan. The neo-conservatives perceive the need for the Japanese people to reconsider how war history in its current form has created a stranglehold on the ability of the younger generation to take pride in their own country, and presents essentially a “victor’s view” of justice, thereby taking away the necessary nationalistic gel for Japan to unite in the face of the precarious challenges ahead. Pacifism also allegedly provides an opportunity for Japan’s neighbors to hold the moral high ground in their bilateral encounters, allowing history to be used in an instrumental manner to gain the upper hand in political negotiations, extract economic concessions or claim cultural and social superiority. The neo-conservatives therefore deem this a weakness, and that Japan needs to undertake normalization to rid itself of the abnormal status that it inherited as a legacy of the Second World War, and strive for a strategic-political

6 V.TEO status that is commensurate with its economic status (Singh 2002; Hughes 2009; Abe 2006; Aso 2007; Maslow 2015; Katada 2016). As the third largest economy in the world, Japan’s quest for a political status that matches the influence of its economy suggests that normalization is essentially a rejuvenation that would restore Japan as one of the great powers in the world.

The third important element is the formal manifestation of the previous two elements in legal terms. Should the Japanese people codify changes in their thinking about security and Japan’s world role, as well as their changing attitude toward the US-Japan security treaty, by making revisions to Japan’s postwar peace constitution? Should Article 9 of the constitution be amended or revised to accommodate the necessary changes? An amendment to the peace constitution might be also be a bold identity statement that Japan is to be recognized not only as a “normal” power in all senses of the word, but also politically, and be accorded with an eminent status commensurate with her economic power and global contributions.

The processes of normalization and rejuvenation are essentially two sides of the same coin. The author argues that the processes involved are two dimensional—normalization being restorative, while rejuvenation allows Japan to become the nation-state par excellence. The overall process is of an ascendant trajectory, but faces resistance and obstacles both inside and outside of Japan. Despite this, the strategic direction in which Japan under the neo-conservatives is heading is clear, but the road ahead is not without pitfalls and challenges. This book seeks to explain and locate the difficulties that Japan faces in its rejuvenation process by examining the contradictory forces that drive Japan’s foreign policy, and the challenges that lie ahead of the possible trajectories of its rejuvenation. One of the biggest challenges for Japan in its quest for rejuvenation is the prospect of eroding its democratic institutions, and falling into the trap of a hegemonic struggle between China and the US, where Japan faces a lose-lose prospect of either being entrapped in a conflict it has no desire to enter or being sidelined (abandoned) in the case of a grand bargain being struck between China and the US. Rejuvenation should have the overall effect of enhancing Japanese security, reducing the cost of defense and allowing Japan to build a conducive external security environment. Yet, after two decades of neo-conservative maneuvers, Japan is nowhere near establishing a better external security environment, and the costs of its remilitarization have increased. Relations with North Korea and China have grown increasingly tense. In the following section, a general survey of the conceptual literature on Japanese foreign policy is undertaken, before the chapter moves on to discuss the major challenge that Japanese democracy faces vis-a-vis the processes of normalization and rejuvenation.

UNDERSTANDING JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLicy: A CONCEPTUAL SURVEY

Scholars and policymakers concerned with Japan’s foreign policy have long debated the peculiarities, strengths and weaknesses of Japan’s foreign policy, the study of which has been deeply influenced by developments in international history, international relations, political economy, and development studies. Given Japan’s unique foreign policy position since the end of the Pacific War, it is no surprise that the literature on Japanese politics and foreign policy has taken on a unique characteristic too.

The first generation of literature mostly focused on the historical sources and the institutional structure that emerged in postwar Japan and its relation to Japanese politics and foreign policy. Scholars have written numerous volumes on how the Pacific War and its aftermath have influenced the making of contemporary Japan (Dower 1986, 1999; Barnhart 1987; Beasley 1987; Crowley 1966; Morley 1983; Nish 1966, 1972). Most of the literature outlined Japan’s perceptions of and aspirations and expectations for their relations with China (Iriye 1982, 1999), Britain (Nish 1966, 1972) and the US (Morley 1983), illuminating how these relations were critical in driving imperial policies prior to the war. The influence of the US became all the more dominant in the postwar period as Japan’s foreign policy was dictated (Agawa 1998) and influenced by the US (Schaller 1985; Dower 1979; Auer 1973; Weinstein 1971) as the Cold War set in.

As Japan’s economy rises, the importance of cultural factors in explaining why and how Japan’s policymaking began to help is important. In particular, the importance of nihonjinron ( H Æ Acie) and how this uniqueness tended to underlie much of Japan’s success (or not) (Befu 2001; Katzenstein 1996, 1998; Davis and Ikeno 2002; Dale 2011). Other than the uniqueness of Japanese culture, much of the scholarly focus has been on the party and the state in Japan as the principal drivers of policy. Johnson (1982) has written on the importance of understanding how Japanese bureaucracy operates, in particular how the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the state have taken on a special dimension in planning Japanese economic activity and are instru-

8 V.TEO mental in its success (Johnson 1982, 2001). Japan’s political and economic model has therefore become the focal point of many scholars’ efforts to understand and explain what lessons could be drawn it. This trend continued with Ezra Vogel’s Japan as Number One: Lessons for America. This book was one of the bestselling English books in Japan since its publication in 1979, only to be followed about a decade later by Ishihara Shintaro’s The Japan that can say No, another bestseller in Japan. Both books analyzed aspects of Japan’s phenomenal success. The former discussed the strengths of the Japanese model that were instrumental to its rise, and the latter suggested that Tokyo should rethink and re-manage its relations with the US as a result of its newfound strength. The “Japan threat” period in the 1980s was fueled in part by xenophobia, in part by Japan’s ascendant economy, where Japanese corporations were buying up large chunks of real estate in New York and Los Angeles. This naturally was deemed a threat by many US scholars and politicians, particularly when everyone felt that Japan was in fact free-riding on the US for defense. This trend of books advocating the ascendance of Japan took a respite in the 1990s when Japan’s economy fell into deflationary growth.

However, this did not deter scholars working in development studies and political economy from trying to expound on Japan’s relations to a new model of capitalism in East Asia. Japan is seen to be the inspiration for a new form of state-society relationship—not only for the greater East Asian “Tiger” economies of South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, but also for Southeast Asian economies and China. The “developmental state” model promises to provide an alternative to Western-based liberal capitalism (Woo-Cummings 1999) which could be a formula that countries outside Asia could emulate. There is therefore a widespread interest in the special role of the state and the party-system in Japan, as many perceive the key ingredient of success is the stability experienced by the voters in Japan. There is also much research interest in electoral systems and the dominance of the LDP in Japanese national politics (Curtis 1988, 1999, 2009). Factional politics was weakened by changes in electoral reform to a single-seat system. There are other reasons of course: US interference in the early years, the LDP’s successful strategy of playing on the insecurities of the electorate, and the increasing marginalization of the leftist parties have also been attributed to why Japan’s one dominant party state has lasted such a long time.

Toward the late 1980s and 1990s, Japan’s related research blossomed for three reasons. First, Japan has stood out due to its exceptionalism, particularly in terms of the disparity between its economic prowess and its reliance on the US—in short because of its “abnormal” status created after the Second World War. Compared with the US, the term “exceptionalism” when applied to Japan has more of a cultural connotation. Second, by this time there has been considerable evidence for the buildup of empirical examples for theoretical innovation in terms of international relations theory, particularly for Japan’s foreign policy making—in particular in the literature focusing on ideational influences in Japan’s foreign policy. Third, empirical developments in circumstances prompted Japan’s foreign policy community to embark on greater discussions and debates over the question of the “burden of history,” as well as Japan’s relations with its neighbors in Asia. To say the least, the difficulties Japan has had with its neighbors prompted much research on historical issues.

This is also accompanied by the emergence of a more assertive Japan, evidenced by increasing friction with its neighbors, notably with China and also with South Korea over a host of “history” related problems (Yoshibumi 1998; Midford 2011; Maslow 2015; Auslin 2016). From the 1980s’ textbook problems to the comfort women issue with the South Koreans, the literature concerning what many scholars would call the “burden of history” blossomed. Buruma’s (1994) The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan is probably one of the most recommended texts on Japan’s war guilt alongside Berger’s (2012) War Guilt and World Politics. This growing trend of literature attests to the perceived recalcitrant attitude of Japan over a host of political issues such as the Nanjing Massacre (Chang 1997; Fogel 2000; Igarashi 2000); the issue of apologies and atonement for its wartime transgressions, and its relationship with Japanese national identity (Lind 2008; Dudden 2008; Heine and Selden 2000; Hashimoto 2015); and the question of selective remembering (Dudden 2008; Seraphim 2008; Orr 2001; Gong and Teo 2010).

In terms of foreign policy, scholars debate the primary drivers of Japan’s foreign policy from different perspectives in international relations theory. While it is not wrong to say that Japanese diplomats, like their counterparts elsewhere, are hard-nosed neo-realists, the scholarship on Japanese foreign policy is dominated by pieces pertaining to the impact of pacifism in particular, referring to the influence of anti-militaristic norms and how they have been the dominant guiding principles in Japanese identity, politics and foreign policy (Katzenstein 1996, 1998; Berger 1998, 2012). This category of writing fits squarely into the theoretical work done in

10 v.TEO international relations theory on constructivism in general and other ideational influences, such as techno-nationalism, on Japan’s foreign policy mechanisms (Samuels 1994, 2007).

Even though there is discussion on how ideational factors influence Japan’s foreign policy (Berger 1998, 2012; Cha 2000; Katzenstein 1998), structural realism cannot be discounted. Many scholars have argued that ideational matters play an important role in postwar Japan, but this does not negate the fact that the decisions undertaken by postwar prime ministers could be born out of neo-realist considerations rather than anything else. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida’s decision to implement the Yoshida Doctrine, where Japan agreed to follow the US lead in foreign and strategic affairs, could be construed as a reasonable neo-realist move as it was the best play Japan had under the postwar circumstances, as he himself noted in his memoirs. To this day, many in Japan regard him as an old school liberal. The end of the Cold War ushered in more research on how various countries responded to the demise of the USSR and correspondingly to the possibility of a US retreat in the face of China’s rise. These systemic changes have proved unsettling for most countries in the region, and held various implications for Japan’s foreign policy. There are a few strands of research here.