The pangerman plot unmasked; Berlin's formidable peace-trap of "the drawn war"

Front matter

THE unmaske:

ANDRE CHERADA

U

Chapter II

I. Why the Treaty of Bukarest suddenly raised a formidable obstacle to the Pangerman plan, p. 26.— II. How it was that the internal state of Austria-Himgary drove Germany to let loose the dogs of war, p. 31.— HI. General view of the causes of the war, p. 37.

CHAPTER in

How far the Pangerman plan was carried out at the beginning OF 1916 ---------45

I. German pretensions in the West, p. 45-— H- German pretensions in the East, p. 52. — III. German pretensions in the South and South-East, p. 56.— IV. General view of the execution of the Pangerman plan from 1911 to the beginning of 1916, p. 62. vii viii PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED

Chapter IV Page

Special features given to the war by the Pangerman plan 66

I. All the great political questions of the old world are raised and must be solved, p. 67. — II. As the war is made by Germany in order to achieve a gigantic scheme of slavery, it follows that it is waged by her in flagrant violation of international law, p. 69. — III. A struggle of tenacity and of duplicity on the side of Berlin versus constancy and solidarity on the side of the Allies, p. 71.

CHAPTER V The Dodge of the "Drawn Game" and the scheme "from

HAMBtniG TO the PERSIAN GtJLF" ----- 77

I. What would really be the outcome of the dodge called the "Drawn Game," p. 78. — II. The financial consequences for the Allies of this so-called "Drawn Game," p. 83. — III. The Allies and the scheme "from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf," p. 88. — IV. Panislamic and Asiatic consequences of the achievement of the scheme "from Hamburg to the Persian Giilf," p. 94. — V. Consequences for the world of the achievement of the scheme "from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf," p. 100.

CHAPTER VI The crucial point of the whole problem . - . - io8

I. The obligation which the threat of the scheme "from Hambiu-g to the Persian Gulf," imposes on the Allies, p. 108. — II. The capital importance of the question of Austria-Hvmgary, p. 114. — III. AH the racial elements necessary for the destruction of the Pangerman plan exist in Central Europe, p. 121.

CHAPTER VII The Balkans and the Pangerman Plan - - - - - 131

I. The connexion between the Pangerman plan and the plan, of Bulgarian supremacy, p. 132. — II. Greece and Pangerman ambitions, p. 146. — III. Roumania and the Pangerman plan, p. 152.

TABLE OF CONTENTS ix

Chapter VIII Page

Geeman manceuvres to play the Allies the trick of the "Drawn Game," that is, to secure the accomplishment OF THE "Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" scheme as the minimum result of the war - - - - - -158

I. The exceptional importance of the economic union of the Central Empires, and the danger for the Allies of estabhshing a connexion between that union and their own economic measures after the war, p. 159. — II. Reasons for the Turko-German dodge of making a separate peace between the Ottoman empire and the Allies, p. 167. — III. Why a separate and premature peace with Bulgaria would play the Pangerman game, p. 174-

Chapter IX

The still neutral States whose independence would be directly threatened by the achievement of the "Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" scheme and therefore by Germany's capture of Austria-Hungary - - - -

I. The example of Portugal, p. 183. — II. Holland, p. 187. — III. Switzerland, p. 191. — IV. The States of South America, p. 193. — V. The United States, p. 198.

What has been set forth in the preceding nine chapters appears to justify the following conclusions ------ 213

MAPS

PAGE

The Poles in the East of Germany ______ i

The Danes in Prussia - - - - - - -- -2

The Germans and the non-Germans in Austria-Hungary - - -3

The Pangerman plan of 1911 ------- 12

The Antigermanic barrier in the Balkans after the treaty of Bu-

karest (loth August, 1913) -------28

The nationalities in Austria-Hungary - - - - - -32

The three barriers of Antigermanic peoples in the Balkans and in

Austria-Hungary ---------43

The German claims in the West (beginning of 1916) - - - 46

The German claims in the East -------53

The German claims in the South and South-East - - - - 57

The plan of 191 1 and the extent of its execution at the beginning of

1916 ---------__ 64

The great political questions raised by the war - - - - 68

The German fortress at the beginning of 1916 - - - - 72

The consequences of the dodge called "The Drawn Game" - - 79

Asiatic consequences of the accomplishment of the scheme "From

Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" ------ 95

World-wide consequences of the "Hamburg to the Persian Gulf"

scheme, as provided for by the plan of 191 1 - - - - loi

The crucial point of the European problem - - - - -113

Great Bulgaria -----_--_- 133

Serbian Macedonia _________ 137

Greece after the treaty of Bukarest ______ 147

Great Roumania -----____- 153

The nationalities in Turkey - - - - - - - -170

Encroachments planned by Bulgaria on neighbouring States - - 181

Portugal and Colonial Pangermanism ------ 185

PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED xi

PAGE

The Neutral States of Europe and Pangermanism _ - _ i88

Colonial Pangermanism and South America ----- 194

Distribution of German-bom Germans in the United States - - 201

Relation between the Pangerman plan of 191 1 and the Pangerman gains at the beginning of 1916 ------ 217

The Pangerman gains at the beginning of 1916 - - - - 223

European States interested in the solution of the Austro-Hungarian question --.---.... 231

The States of Asia and America, interested in the solution of the Austro-Hungarian question - - - - - - - 23,3

Introduction

By the Earl of Cromer, O.M.

My reasons for commending M. Cheradame's most instructive work to the earnest attention of my countrymen and countrywomen are three-fold.

In the first place, M. Cheradame stands conspicuous amongst that very small body of politicians who warned Europe betimes of the German danger. The fact that in the past he proved a true prophet gives him a special claim to be heard when he states his views as regards the present and the future.

In the second place, I entertain a strong opinion that M. Cheradame's diagnosis of the present situation is, in all its main features, correct.

In the third place, in spite of the voluminous war literature which already exists, I greatly doubt whether the special aspect of the case which M,. Cheradame wishes to present to the public is fully understood in this country; neither should I be surprised to hear from those who are more qualified than myself to speak on the subject that the same remark applies, though possibly in a less degree, to the public opinion of France.

It is essential that, before the terms of peace are discussed, a clear idea should be formed of the reasons which led the German Government to provoke this war. It is well that, if such a course be at xiv PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED

all possible, those who are personally responsible for the numerous acts of barbarity committed by the Germans should receive adequate punishment. But attention to points of this sort, however rational and meritorious, should not in any degree be allowed to obscure the vital importance of the permanent political issues which call loudly for settlement. Otherwise, it is quite conceivable that a peace may be patched up, which may have some specious appearance of being favourable to the Allies, but which would at the same time virtually concede to the Germans all they require in order, after time had been allowed for recuperation, to renew, with increased hope of success, their attempts to shatter modern civilization and to secure the domination of the world.

M. Cheradame explains — and I believe with perfect accuracy — the nature of the German objective. It is, in his opinion, to lay secure and stable foundations for the system known as Pan- Germanism. What is Pan- Germanism ? It may be doubted whether all that is implied in that term is fully realized in this country. One interpretation may be given to the word, which is not merely innocuous, but which may even reasonably appeal to the sympathies of those who approve of the new map of Europe being constituted with a view to applying that nationalist principle, which finds almost universal favour in all democratic countries. It cannot be too distinctly understood that the political programme now advocated by Germany has no sort of affinity with a plan of this sort. The Germans contend not only that all those who are generally denominated Germans by the rest of the world should be united, but that all who are of what is termed ''German origin" should be brought into the German fold. Moreover, they give to this latter phrase an expansion and a signification

INTRODUCTION xv

which Is condemned and derided by all who have paid serious attention to ethnological studies. This, however, is far from stating the whole case. The object of the German Government is to effect the whole or partial Germanization of countries inhabited by races which cannot, by any conceivable ethnological process of reasoning, be held to be of German stock. In fact, M. Cheradame very correctly describes Pan- Germanism when he says that its object is to disregard all questions of racial and linguistic affinity and to absorb huge tracts of country the possession of which is considered useful to advance Hohenzollern interests. In. other words, what they wish is to establish, under the name of Pan- Germanism, a world system whose leading and most immediate feature is the creation of an empire stretching from the Persian Gulf to the North Sea.

That this project has for a long while past been in course of preparation by the Kaiser and his megalomaniac advisers cannot for a moment be doubted. When, in November, 1898, William II. pronounced his famous speech at Damascus, in which he stated that all the three hundred millions of Mohammedans in the world could rely upon him as their true friend, the world was inclined to regard the utterance as mere rhodomontade. It was nothing of the sort. It involved the declaration of a definite and far-reaching policy, the execution of which was delayed until a favourable moment occurred and, notably, until the Kiel Canal was' completed. The whole conspiracy very nearly succeeded. In spite of their careful attention to detail, their talent for organization, and their elaborate preparations to meet what appears to them every contingency which may occur, the Germans seem to have a constitutional inability to grasp the motives which guide the inhabitants of xvi PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED

other countries. A very close analogy to the mistake made by the Kaiser is to be found in an incident of recent English history. It is alleged, I know not with what truth, that when, in 1886, Lord Randolph Churchill resigned his position as Chancellor of the Exchequer in Lord Salisbury's administration, he ''forgot Goschen," who, as it will be remembered, was speedily nominated to succeed him. The Kaiser forgot England. For various reasons, which are too well-known to require repetition, he and his advisers were firmly convinced that England would not join in the war. The programme was, first, to destroy the power of France and Russia, and then, after that had been done, to fall upon England. In one sense it was fortunate that the Germans committed the gross international crime of invading Belgium. Had they not done so, it is quite possible that the English nation would not have woke up to the realities of the situation. As it was, however, it became clear, even to the most extreme pacificists, that honour and interest alike pointed to the necessity of decisive action. Thus as M. Cheradame indicates, the original German plan was completely upset. The advance on Paris had to be stayed. But the programme, which was the result of long and deliberate contemplation, has by no means been abandoned. On the contrary, with the adhesion of the Bulgarians, who will eventually, unless the Allies secure a decisive victory, become the victims of Pan- Germanism, and also that of the Turks, who were manoeuvred into the war by an adroit and absolutely unscrupulous diplomacy, a very considerable portion of the plan has already been put into execution.

M. Cheradame states with great reason that France, Italy, Russia, England, and all the minor Powers are vitally interested in frustrating the

INTRODUCTION xvii

German project of establishing their dominion from the Persian Gulf to the North Sea. He also warns us against making a separate peace with either Austria-Hungary or Turkey, both of these Powers being merely vassals of Germany. He is very clearly of opinion that the mere cession of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the rehabilitation of Belgium cannot form the foundations of a durable peace. If peace were concluded on this basis, the Germans would have achieved their main object, and, as Herr Harden pointed out last February, even if Germany was obliged, under pressure, to cede Alsace-Lorraine, there would still be seventy millions of Germans firmly determined to regain possession of those provinces at the first suitable opportunity. In fact, the realization of the German project, although accompanied by certain temporary disabilities from the German point of view, would eventually enable Germany to strangle Europe.

I need not dwell upon all the proposals set forth by M. Cheradame with a view to the frustration of this plan, but the corner-stone of his programme is similar to that advocated with great ability in this country by Mr. Wickham Steed and Mr. Seton Watson. It is to create a Southern Slav State, which will afford an effectual barrier to German advance towards the East. It is essential that the immense importance of dealing with the territories of the Hapsburgs as a prehminary to a final settlement of all the larger aspects of the Eastern question should be fully realized. It constitutes the key of the whole situation.

For these reasons, I hope that M. Cheradame's work, which develops more fully the arguments which I have very briefly stated above, will receive in this country the attention which it certainly merits. I should add that the book is written in a xviii PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED

popular style, and that M. Cheradame's arguments can be easily followed by those who have no special acquaintance either with Eastern policy or with the tortuous windings of Austrian and German diplomacy during the last quarter of a century.

Cromer.

September 4, 1916.

Preface

The Pangerman plot is the only cause of the war. It is, in fact, the cause at once of its outbreak and of its prolongation till that victory of the Allies has been won which is indispensable to the liberty of the world. In this book I propose to demonstrate this truth by a series of documents, precise, clear, and intelligible to all. The fate of every man in the allied countries, and even in some of the countries which are still neutral, really depends on the issue of the formidable war now being waged. This cataclysm, unprecedented in history, let loose by Prussianized Germany, will have infinite reverberations in every sphere, reverberations which will affect every one of us individually for good or, alas ! too often for ill. Every one, therefore, has a direct interest in knowing clearly why these inevitable reverberations of the immense struggle will be produced, and on what fundamental conditions those of them which bode ill for the Allies, and are yet but imperfectly understood, can and must be avoided. Hence every one of the Allies should acquire an exact notion of the present realities. Once fortified by the evidence, his opinion will become a force for the Allied Governments; it will then contribute to the victory and to the imposition of the conditions necessary for the peace.

In writing this popular book my aim has been to bring home, even to those who are least versed in foreign affairs, the formidable problems raised by the war. In my opinion this work is addressed to women

XX PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED

quite as much as to men. The reading of it may perhaps bring not only instruction but consolation to those whose affections have been so cruelly wounded. When they comprehend better by what an atrocious plan of slavery the world is threatened, they will understand more fully for what a sublime, what a stupendous cause their husbands, their sons, their plighted lovers, are fighting or dying with such heroic self-sacrifice. May that larger understanding of the formidable events now occurring yield to the women of the Allies at least some alleviation of their sufferings.

But if this book is a popular work, I beg my readers to remark that it is not the result of a hasty effort, vamped up by a mere desire to treat of the moving, the tragic subject of the hour. The book is, indeed, the logical conclusion of a labour on which I have been engaged for twenty-one years. As my readers have an interest in knowing how far they may trust me, they will allow me to explain to them how I was led to concentrate my studies on the Pangerman policy of Germany, what has been the result of my efforts, and how they are linked together.

* *

In former days I was the pupil of Albert Sorel at the Free School of Political Science. That great master was good enough to admit me to his intimacy; and he brought to light and maturity the latent and instinctive propensity which I had for foreign politics. My practical studies abroad led me to Germany in 1894, just at the time when the Pangerman movement had begun. As the movement was manifestly the modern development of the Prussianism of the Hohenzollerns, I was then extremely struck by its importance. The movement appeared to me so threatening for the future that I resolved to follow all the developments of

PREFACE xxi

the Pangerman plot, which was already the consequence of the movement, and which from 1895 onward had taken definite shape. The task which I thus laid on myself was at once arduous, vast, and thrilling, for from that time it was certain that the Germans based their political and military Pangerman plan on a study of all the political, ethnographical, economic, social, military and naval problems not only of Europe but of the whole world. In truth, the intense labour accomplished in the cause of Pangermanism by the Germans in the last twenty-one years has been colossal. They have carried it out everywhere with a formidable tenacity and a methodical thoroughness which will be the astonishment of history. Indisputably, the Pangerman plan, which is the result of this gigantic effort, is the most extraordinary plot which the world has ever witnessed.

I made the study of that plot for twenty-one years the work of my life, convinced as I was, in spite of the scepticism which long greeted my efforts to give warning of the peril, that the study would serve a useful purpose one day.

The study has necessitated very many and very long journeys of inquiry. I was obliged in fact to go and learn, on the spot, at least the essential elements of the complex problems mentioned above, which have been the base of the Pangerman plan, in order that I might be able to grasp the most distant ramifications of the Prussian programme for dominating the world.

This obligation led me to sojourn in very different countries. That the reader may have an idea of at least the material extent of my inquiries, I will indicate the number of the towns in which I have been led to work for the purpose of discovering the constituent elements, direct and indirect, of the Pangerman plan.

xxii PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED

The United States, 14 ; Canada, 11 ; Japan, 11 ; Corea, 4 ; China, 11 ; Indo- China, 19; British India, 24 ; Spain, i ; Italy, 4 ; Belgium, 6 ; Luxemburg, i ; Holland, 5 ; Switzerland, 4 ; England, 8; Greece, 2; Bulgaria,' 4; Roumania, 3; Serbia, 8 ; Turkey, 3 ; Germany, 16 ; Austro- Hungary, 18.

In these towns, according to the requirement of my studies, I passed days, weeks, or months, often on repeated occasions. I endeavoured, so far as the opportunities and the time admitted of it, to enter into direct relations with the acting ministers, the leaders of the various political parties, the diplomatists and the consuls, both French and foreign, some heads of states, influential journalists, officers of repute, military and naval attaches, well-informed merchaiLts and manufacturers. It was thus that, by means of information of many sorts drawn from the most diverse sources, and checked by ccrmparison with each other, I have attempted to set forth the Pangerman political and military plan.

Since 1898 I have endeavoured to draw the attention of the public to the immense danger which that plan was laying up for the world, as my former works testify, particularly VEurope et la Question d' Autriche au seuil du XXe Siecle, which appeared in 1901, therefore fifteen years ago, and contained an exposition, as precise as it was then possible to make it, of the Pangerman plan of 1895, summed up in the formula "Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" ; also Le Chemin de fer de Bagdad, published in 1903, wherein I set forth the danger of that co-operation between Germany and Turkey, which was then only nascent, but which we see full-fledged to-day.

I attempted also by numerous lectures to diffuse among the public some notion of the Pangerman

PREFACE

XXlll peril. I did not content myself with warning my countrymen. I am proud to have been one of the first Frenchmen to preach a cordial understanding between France and England at a time when there was perhaps some merit in doing so. I deemed it, therefore, a duty to inform the British public, so far as it lay in my power, that the Pangerman peril concerned Great Britain quite as much as France. In 1909 the Franco-Scottish Society kindly invited me to lecture to its members at Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen. I seized the opportunity, and took for the subject of my lectures, "The problem of Central Europe and universal politics."

The Aberdeen Free Press, of May 8th, 1909, summed up very exactly as follows the substance of what I said, seven years ago, to my British hearers:

" . . . . The lecturer attached enormous importance to the Pan- German movement, which he regarded as the decisive factor in the situation, and he pointed out that the propaganda which had gone on in Germany and in Austria was part of a great policy to extend the boundaries of the German State and dominate middle and south-eastern Europe. The rapport personnel established in recent years between Berlin and Vienna pointed, he said, to the conclusion that Germany and Austria were working hand in hand. In the recent Balkan crisis he described Aehrenthal as playing a partie de poker, in which his bluff had been crowned with success. The off-set to the Pan-German movement was to be found in the Triple Entente between England, France and Russia, and it followed from a consideration of European poHtics that the questions confronting England with regard to the supremacy of the sea were intimately bound up with the question which concerned the land powers of Europe. In particular, the speaker thought that xxiv PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED

the Pan- German aspirations would be effectually combatted by the growing social and political development of the various minor Slav peoples in the south-east of Europe. The development of these peoples was a thing which it was with the interests of England, France and Russia to encourage to the utmost."

My Scottish hearers gave me a very kind reception, of which I have preserved a lively recollection. But truth compels me to declare that I had the impression that the great majority of them did not believe me. I strongly suspect that they then saw in me simply a Frenchman, who, moved by the spirit of revenge, tried above all to stir up the British public against Germany. The impression did not discourage me any more than many similar instances of want of success. In 191 1 the Central Asian Society did me the honour of inviting me to express my views in London (22nd March) on the Bagdad railway. I used this fresh opportunity to expound a method of Franco-English co-operation which seemed to me necessary to parry the dangers of the near future.

"Such is," I then said, "broadly speaking, the affair of Bagdad. The most moderate conclusion which, in my judgment, inevitably follows is that from beginning to end the logical and methodical spirit of Germany has got the better of the French, English, and Russian interests, which have been compromised by our slowness to grasp the importance of the problem confronting us, and by the lamentable want of cohesion between the diplomacies of the three countries.

"The lesson apparently to be drawn from these considerations is, that for the future we ought no longer to be satisfied with a hand-to-mouth policy and with seeking solutions only when the difficulties take an acute form.

PREFACE XXV

"If we wish to serve and defend our interests effectually, we must, as Talleyrand said, keep the future in mind, and learn something of that German method of which the good results are incontestable.

"So far as the eye can range to the visible political horizon, the essential interests of England, France, and Russia are in agreement; it is, therefore, to all appearance, absolutely necessary that the men who exercise an influence on public opinion in this country, in France, and in Russia, should enter into personal relations in order to discuss the great national interests which they have in common, and to adopt a useful line of conduct, while there is yet time. Such a course would be effectual, because it would be determined before the decisive events instead of after them, that is to say, when it is too late."

"Were we to adopt this method, which after all is very simple, the future attempts of our adversaries against our interests would encounter effectual obstacles, and we should no longer have to regret miscarriages such as those of which the Bagdad affair is an example."

Has the method thus recommended been followed? Apparently not; otherwise could France and England have been surprised by the war?

My propaganda having had little practical result, I endeavoured at least to keep myself well informed of the events that were happening.

In December, 1913, and January, February, and March, 1914, I made new and minute inquiries in Central Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey, and these inquiries were of particular value to me. The truth is, that the treaty of Bukarest of August loth, 1913, by reason of its far-reaching and important consequences, had completely upset the former state of affairs, so much so that without my journey of 1914, I should certainly have been xxvi PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED

unable to understand the new situation. In the course of my journey I set myself to apply, with great rigour, my method of research, which consists essentially in trying to see the situations as they are, without preconceived ideas, while listening to all opinions in order to compare them afterwards and extract, if possible, the average truth. In Serbia, in Greece, in Turkey, in Roumania, in Bulgaria, where for a long time I had been in personal relations with people of many different sorts, I was able to have long talks with persons in the most diverse walks of life. In particular, I had the good fortune to be graciously received by the sovereigns and princes of the Balkans: King Peter of Serbia (23rd December, 1913), Prince Alexander, heir of Serbia (December, 19 13), King Constantine (25th January, 1914), Prince Nicholas of Greece (28th January), King Charles of Roumania (i8th February), Tsar Ferdinand (28th February), Prince Boris, heir of Bulgaria (29th February). If I record the audiences which these high personages were so good as to grant me, it is because they were really not commonplace. These sovereigns and princes knew that I had long studied their country impartially, and they consented to speak with me of the great interests which guided their policies. During these various audiences, which lasted from half an hour to two hours, I heard many points of view of real importance set forth. No doubt each of my various interlocutors only said to me what he wished to say; but, thanks to the multiplicity of the opinions expressed and to the variety of my sources of information, I was able at least to construct a general picture of the true Balkan situation, and to connect it afterwards with the problem of Central Europe and the general policy of Germany.

PREFACE xxvii

This inquiry, which in returning I completed in Hungary and Austria, convinced me that, contrary to the opinion which has been held down to quite recent times in many Allied circles, the treaty of Bukarest by no means constituted an injustice, as the Allies have supposed — a belief which has been the source of most of their mistakes in the Balkans in 191 5. On the contrary, the treaty of Bukarest, particularly because it for the first time drew Roumania out of the German orbit, appeared to me the most astonishingly favourable event which had happened on the Continent since 1870, and which was entirely in accordance with the interests of France, England, and Russia. The consequences of this treaty formed in fact, as we shall see, the most effectual arrangement that could be conceived for arresting the Pangerman danger and maintaining peace in Europe. But this pacific dam to keep back the Pangerman flood was only possible on condition that the Entente powers held themselves ready for war, which would probably have sufficed to prevent it, and that at the same time they resolutely and unanimously supported Greece, Roumania, and Serbia.