The United States and Pangermania

Front matter

ANDRE CHERADAME

Hamburg

'FROM HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF THE NET IS SPREAD."

Chapter II

The Pangerman Plan .--___ 10 I. Its extension from 1895 to 1911. II. The plan of 1911 regarding Europe and Turkey.

III. Its extension to Asia, Africa, America, and

Oceania.

IV. General view of the German plan of world-wide

domination.

V. The stages toward its fulfilment.

CHAPTER m.

The Immediate Causes of the War - _ . 31

I. Why the Treaty of Bucharest suddenly became a

formidable obstacle to the Pangerman plan. II. How political conditions in Austria-Hungary inclined Germany to bring on the war.

Chapter IV

I. The extent of the realization at the beginning of

1917 of the Pangerman plan of 1911. II. Economic Pangermany.

III. Military Pangermany.

viii UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA CHAPTER V.

FAOE

Pacifist Manceuvees to Keep the Hamburg-Peesian Gulf Scheme for Germany as a Minimum Result OF THE War - - - - - - - - 59

I. Strategic and economic conceptions of the German General Staff upon which all pacifist manoeuvres are based.

II. Separate peace to be made by Berlin with one of

the Entente. The trick of Alsace-Lorraine. HI. Separate peace to be made with the Entente by

Turkey, Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary. IV. The democratization of Germany. V. Peace by the "Internationale" or Socialist party. VI. The trick of an armistice.

VII. The "Drawn Game," or "Peace without annexations or indemnities."

VIII. What is Germany's word worth?

Chapter VI

The "Drawn Game"; the Insidious Snare of the Formula, "Peace without Annexations or Indemnities" ---------86

I. How the hypothesis is brought forward. II. Cost of the war much greater to the Allies than to the Germans.

III. The struggle has allowed Germany to obtain

enormous advantages in the present and for the future.

IV. The war has brought the Allies only losses.

V. Consequences of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan in regard to Russia and Asia.

VI. The blatant falsehood of the formula, "Peace without annexations or indemnities." Vn. The formidable danger of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan to the Allies.

TABLE OF CONTENTS ix

Chapter VII. Page

How TO Destroy Pangermany - - - - - 122 I. Why Austria-Hungary is the crucial point of the universal problem presented by the Hamburg- Persian Gulf plan. n. The thesis of the preservation of Austria-Hungary.

III. The application of the principle of nationalities

to Central Europe.

IV. A strong barrier of anti-Pangerman nations can be

established in Central Europe, and there only.

CHAPTER Vm.

The United States and the Pangerman Plot - - 139 I. The moral principles of the American people

make it their duty to take part in the war. n. The political interests of the United States oblige them to contribute toward a decisive victory for the Allies.

HI. The United States and the Austro-Himgarian question.

CONCLUSIONS.

I. Germany's responsibility for bringing on the war is inexcusable and crushing, since its premeditation by the Prussian Government antedates the outbreak of hostilities by at least twenty-one years _._-___ 150 rr. The Allies should constantly bear in mind not only the German occupations of Entente territory, but also the Pangerman seizures which have been made at the expense of their own allies -_.-_--_ 159

X UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

PAGE

III. The Allies should so conduct the war that Pangermany shall not only be destroyed, but replaced by territorial conditions which will prevent its recurrence, and which conform to the principles which the Allies have proclaimed - 162

MAPS AND FACSIMILES.

FAOE

The Poles in the east of Germany _ - _ _ l

The Danes in Prussia ------- Q

Germans and non-Germans in Austria-Hungary - - 3

The Pangerman plan of 1911 12

World-consequences of the Hamburg-to-the-Persian Gulf

project as forecast by the plan of 1911 - - - 15

Colonial Pangermanism and South America - - - 19

The anti-German barrier in the Balkans after the Treaty

of Bucharest August 10, 1913 _ . . - 33

The nationalities in Austria-Hungary _ - - - 35

The three barriers of anti-Germanic peoples in the Balkans and ia Austria-Hungary - - - - 38

Pangermany at the beginning of 1917 - - - - 43

The German fortress at the beginning of 1917 - - 63

Results of the move known as the "Drawn Game" - 91

The results in Asia of the realization of the Hamburg-tothe-Persian Gulf plan --.--_ 109

The knot of the European problem - - - - 123

Map of the Martyrs 141 xii MAPS AND FACSIMILES

^ PAGE

Distribution and percentage of Germans born in Germany, now residing in the United States, in proportion to the population born in United States (1890) - - 143

Title-page of Kannenberg's book on Asia Minor - - 152

Facsimile of photograph from Kannenberg's book

facing page 154

"From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf the net is spread" - 158

Territory occupied by Pangermany at the opening of 1917 160

The Europe of the Peace ------ 165

THE UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

Chapter I. Pangermanism And William H

I. The Pangerman doctrine.

II. The Kaiser, originator of the Pangerman plan.

I

Pangermanism is a doctrine of purely Prussian origin, which aims at annexing, irrespec-

^*\Breslau

OPragueV- A .^' - \

A u grx R I A \

THE POLES IN THE EAST OF GERMANY tive of race or language, all the various regions of which the possession is deemed useful to the power of the Hohenzollerns.

It was in the name of Pangermanism, a theory of usefulness based on sheer cupidity and arbitrary will, that Germany formerly

THE DANES IN PRUSSIA took, and means to keep, the eastern provinces which should by right belong to the Slavs, since they still contain a population of about four million Poles.

PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM 11. 3

It was in the name of Pangermanism that in 1864 Prussia seized that part of Schleswig which was entirely Danish.

It is still in the name of Pangermanism that

I 1 Germans b%%3 Non Germans

GERMANS AND NONGERMANS IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Austria-Hungary has long been coveted by Germany, although their own figures show that Germans are in a very small minority there, having only 12 million against 38 million of non-Germans.

As far back as 1844 the future Marshal von Moltke wrote: "We hope that Austria will uphold the rights and protect the future of the Danubian countries, and that Germany will finally succeed in keeping open the mouths of her great rivers."* Inspired by this doctrine of rapine, the author of a pamphlet which was published in 1895, just twenty-two years ago, under the authority of the Alldeutscher Verband, a powerful Pangerman society which did its utmost to bring on the present war, after indicating the vast programme of future annexations, found it a natural conclusion that no doubt the newly constituted German Empire will not be peopled by Germans alone, but "they alone will govern; they alone will exercise political rights; they alone will serve in the army and navy; they alone will have the right to hold land; and they will thus be made to feel that they are a people of rulers, as they were in the Middle Ages. They will, however, allow inferior tasks to be carried out by the foreign subjects under their domination." f

Pangermanism means the absolute negation of the principle of nationalities, which was the noblest idea given to the world by the French Revolution. It may be summed up

*Von Moltke, Schriften, vol. II, p. 313.

t Gross Deutschland und Mitteleuropa urn das Jahr 1950, published by Thormann & Goetsch, Berlin, 1895, p. 48.

PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM II. 5

as a system of international burglary, and of slavery imposed by Prussianized Germans upon other races.

II

From this Pangerman doctrine sprang the military and political Pangerman plan, of which the originator and promoter is the Kaiser. Shortly after his accession in 1888 he made a speech which showed distinctly his Pangerman tendencies, and in his answer to a speech made by the burgomaster of Mayence, on August 28th, 1898, he said that he intended to keep inviolate the inheritance bequeathed to him by his "immortal grandfather," adding, "but this I can only do if our authority is firmly upheld in regard to our neighbors, and to this end there must he united co-operation from all of German blood.''' On the 28th of October, 1900, at a reunion of officers, he declared, ''My highest aim is to remove whatever separates our great German race/' and a month before, at Stettin, he said: "I have no fear of the future. I am convinced that my plan will succeed.'* In the Kaiser's mind this plan was summed up in the chief formula of the Pangerman doctrine, From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf; and to accomplish this object he was resolved to bind Austria-Hungary and Germany together by increasingly closer ties. In order to make sure of his supremacy over the Balkan peoples he counted on the co-operation of such of their Kings as were of Germanic origin, as in Bulgaria and Roumania, or who would feel strongly the Germanic influences which he could bring to bear. Thus, in 1889, he married his sister Sophia to the heir of the throne of Greece, later King Constantine, whose Germanophile role it has been easy to follow.

The Kaiser had scarcely come to the throne before he conceived the scheme of flattering the Turks and Mohammedans, in order that he might seize the Ottoman Empire later, and make use of Moslems throughout the world as a menace to other Powers.

On November 8th, 1898, at Damascus, William II. pronounced the famous words of which the significance is fully apparent now that we have seen the German policy developed in Russia, in Turkey, in Persia, and in China, and have witnessed its efforts to stir up agitation among the Moslem populations: "May His Majesty the Sultan, as well as the 300 millions of Moslems who venerate him as their Khalifa, rest assured that the German

PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM IL 7

Emperor is their friend forever." In consequence of this adulation of the Red Sultan, Abdul Hamid, the Kaiser obtained, on the 27th of November, 1899, the first concession of the Bagdad railway, which, now that it is nearly finished, is an instrument of the German military offensive against Russia and England. The German naval and military leagues, which count their members by millions throughout the Empire, have always been encouraged by the Kaiser, and in return they have backed up his incessant demands for a larger army and navy. He also encouraged the formation of the AUdeutscher Verband, or Pangerman Union. This association has many important and influential persons among its members, and upon it rests an overwhelming responsibility for the outbreak of the present war. Since its foundation in 1894 it has organized thousands of lectures, and scattered millions of pamphlets spreading the Pangerman doctrine, with its lust of aggrandizement, among the German people. It was also through the AUdeutscher Verband that, with a view to the present conflagration, all Germans living outside the Empire were systematically organized; this was especially the case in Austria and in the United States.

As for the time of the outbreak of war, it was the Kaiser who determined it. After the Treaty of Bucharest, August 10th, 1913, the situation in the Balkan States and the pohtical conditions in Austria, for reasons which I shall show in my third chapter, made him decide that the time had come to strike. From November, 1913, he was busy preparing for early hostilities; he knew that the widening of the Kiel Canal would be finished by July, 1914, and made his arrangements to fit that date. He dazzled the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria- Hungary, by visions of the great advantages which action in common would give to the Central Powers; he made the archduke a visit at Miramar, near Trieste, in April, 1914, and followed it up by another in June, at the castle of Konopischt. This time he had for his companion Von Tirpitz, since so conspicuous as the chief of German submarine piracy, and it was then that the main outlines of the combined action of the German and Austrian forces, by land and sea, were drafted.

The assassination of the archduke on the 28th of June made no difference to the Kaiser's plans; on the contrary, this murder was an excellent excuse for intervention against Serbia;

PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM 11. 9

it precipitated events. War was declared on the 1st of August, just a few days after the completion of the Kiel Canal.

The criminal action of the Kaiser in fostering the Pangerman plan for twenty-five years, was thus revealed to the world. Moreover — and let there be no mistake about this — thanks to the Pangerman propaganda carried on by his express orders, when he came out for war he was supported in his decision not only by the leaders of German opinion, but by a very large majority of the German people.

Maximilian Harden explicitly acknowledged this when he wrote in the Zukunft of November, 1914:* "This war has not been forced on us by surprise; we desired it, and were right to do so. Germany goes into it because of her immutable conviction that what she has accomplished gives her the right to wider outlets for her activities and more room in the world."

* Le Temps, November 20th, 1914.

Chapter II. The Pangerman Plan

I. Its extension from 1895 to 1911.

n. The plan of 1911 regarding Europe and Turkey.

III. Its extension to Asia, Africa, America, and Oceania.

IV. General view of the German plan of world-wide

domination.

V. The stages toward its fulfilment.

I.

The Pangerman plan was fundamentally established in 1895, but after that date events happened in the world which induced the Pangermanists to extend it further. Chief among these were: the tension between France and England because of Fashoda, in 1898; the defeat of Russia by the Japanese, in 1905; the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria with the approval of Berlin, in 1900; the agreement at Potsdam by which the Czar of Russia abandoned all opposition to the completion of the Bagdad railway, in 1910; and finally the Franco-German treaty of November 4th, 1911, by which France ceded 275,000 square kilometres of the Congo to the Germans, while allowing them to hold heavy economic mortgages on Moroccan territory. All these were interpreted by the Pangermanists as signs that Russia, France, and England desired peace so much that they would keep it on any terms; and the Pangermanists concluded that their most ambitious hopes might soon be fulfilled. Thus the basic plan of 1895, revamped and considerably increased, became the plan of 1911.

II.

This plan of 1911 provided, in Europe and western Asia, for:

1. The establishment, under German rule, of a vast Confederation of Central Europe, comprising in the west Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Switzerland, and the northern departments of France to the northeast of a line drawn from the south of Belfort to the mouth of the Somme; to the east Russian Poland, the Baltic provinces of Esthonia, Livonia, and Courland, and the three Russian governments of Kovno, Vilna, and Grodno; to the southeast, Austria-Hungary. These three groups form a total of 1,182,113 square kilometres, with 94,323,000 inhabitants. In this Confederation the territory actually belonging to the German Empire only comprised 540,858 kilometres, with about 68 million inhabitants, and out of a total of 162 million inhabitants only 77 million were Germans, the other 85 million being of other nationalities.

2. The absolute submission of all the Balkan States (containing 499,275 square kilometres, and 22 millions of non-Germans) to the Central European Confederation, thus making them mere satellites of Berlin.

3. The political and military seizure of Turkey, which was to be compelled afterward to add to its dominions by the annexation of Egypt and Persia, the object being to put Turkey, with her 1,792,000 square kilometres, and her 20 millions of non-German inhabitants (to say nothing of those in Egypt and Persia), under a strict German protectorate.

This Germanic Confederation of Central Europe was to form a huge Zollverein or Customs Union. Treaties of commerce of a special character imposed on the Balkan States and on subjugated Turkey would have provided Great Germany with an economic outlet, and reserved those vast regions for her exclusively.

The Pangerman plan of 1911 may be summed up in four formulas: Berlin — Calais; Berlin — Riga; Hamburg — Salonika; Hamburg — ^Persian Gulf. The union of the three groupings —

Central Europe, the Balkan States, and Turkey — would have made Berlin the predominating influence over 4,015,146 square kilometres of territory, inhabited by 204 millions of men, of whom 127 million were to be ruled, directly or indirectly, by only 77 millions of Germans.

III

It was intended that the Pangerman plan of 1911 should be made still more effective by important seizures of territory in all the other parts of the world. These forcible annexations shown on the map (p. 15) were set forth in Otto Tannenberg's work. Greater Germany, the Work of the 20th Century, published at Leipsic. The exceptional importance of this book cannot be disputed since it bears the date of 1911 and contains the exact programme of seizures to be effected in Europe and Turkey, just as they have already been carried out by the German General Staff. The territorial acquisitions in Asia, Africa, America, and Oceania, which Tannenberg proclaims would be the logical sequence of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, would most certainly be realized if the Allies should abandon the struggle before their victory was decisive.

Supposing them to do so, it is certain that after a treacherous peace the Allied peoples, exhausted morally and physically, facing the formidable armies of Pangermany, would be unable to oppose the colonial expansion of Great Germany (to which the Hamburg- Persian Gulf plan would inevitably lead) because they had already given way on an issue even more vital to them — that of the independence of Europe.

It must be added that this programme, of which the details are given below, was laid down by Tannenberg on the supposition, counted on by the Berlin Government^ that England would not go into the war. In order to make sure of her neutrality, Tannenberg advocated dividing the colonies of the other European Powers between London and Berlin. Now, however, that England is fully in the struggle it is certain that in case of defeat the colonies Tannenberg assigned her would be taken from her, since she would be powerless to resist.

A summary of Tannenberg's predictions follows, and it is well to remember that the world-wide acquisitions which he assigned to Germany in 1911 are less than she will be able to attain if she succeeds in establishing her scheme of domination from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf; if she does that, no organized force on earth will be able to curb the boundless ambition of Berlin.

In regard to western Asia, Tannenberg explains that Asiia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, western Persia, and the greater part of Arabia would be put under the protectorate of the German Empire — that disposes of 3,200,000 square kilometres, with 16,500,- 000 inhabitants. Once masters of the shores of the Adriatic, of the ^Egean, of the Dardanelles, and of Aden (and here they would be helped by their Panislamic propaganda), the seizure of Egypt, and therefore of the Suez Canal, would be inevitable. Germany, if she commanded these essential strategic points, would obviously be able to retake her colonies in Africa and Oceania: Togo, Kameroon, southwest Africa, eastern Africa, Kaiser Wilhelm Land, Bismarck Archipelago, the Caroline Islands, Marshall Islands, the Marianes and Samoa, making a total of 2,952,000 square kilometres, with 11,787,000 inhabitants. If the Allies should give way in Europe they could not prevent Great Germany from snatching — still according to Tannenberg's programme — the Belgian, Portuguese, and Dutch colonies, namely, the Belgian Congo, Portuguese Angola, and the Dutch East Indies, with their 5,680,000 square kilometres and 57,306,- 000 inhabitants. Next would come the turn of the French colonies, the cession of which to Great Germany is foreseen by Tannenberg. These are Morocco, the French Congo, Madagascar, Mayotta and the Comores Islands, Reunion, Obok and its dependencies in east Africa, Indo-China, and the French islands of Oceania, making a total of 3,391,000 square kilometres, with 33,588,000 inhabitants. Tannenberg also informs us that the aim of German politics in China was the establishment of a zone of solely German influence on the whole lower course of the Yang-tse-Kiang and the Hoang-ho; that is to say, over that vast portion of China which forms the hinterland of Kiao-chau, with its total of about 750,000 square kilometres and 50 millions of inhabitants. He finally gives an exact enumeration of the various German protectorates which would be established in the southern part of South America, which is largely settled by Germans. A glance at the map will show these protectorates, as planned in 1911.

"Germany," says Tannenberg, "will take under her protection the republics of Argentina, Chili, Uruguay and Paraguay, the southern third of Bohvia, so far as it belongs to the basin of the Rio de la Plata, and also that part

COLONIAL PANGERMANISM AND SOUTH AMERICA of southern Brazil in which German culture prevails." That is to say, about 6,347,000 square kilometres, with 18,197,000 inhabitants.

"German South America," he concludes, "will provide for us, in the temperate zone, a colonial region where our emigrants will be able to settle as farmers. Chili and Argentina will preserve their language and their autonomy, but we shall require that German be taught in the schools as a second language. Southern Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay are countries of German culture, and there German will be the national tongue."

As in every other country, the preparations for carrying out the Pangerman plan in South America were conducted by the organizers of the movement most methodically.

In 1895, when Germany had decided what she wanted, she proceeded to make a list of all Germans on the face of the globe, in order to pick out from among them those who were most likely to prove useful tools for carrying out the Pangerman plan. The result of this registration of the German element throughout the world may be found in the Pangerman Atlas of Paul Langhans, published by Justus Perthes, at Gotha, in 1909.

These are the figures relative to South America: In Peru, in 1890, there were two thousand Germans; in Paraguay, in the same year, three thousand; in Colombia also three thousand, and in Brazil four hundred thousand. In 1894 there were five thousand in Venezuela; in 1895 there were fifteen thousand in Chili and sixty thousand in Argentina; and in 1897 there were five thousand in Uruguay.

The Pangerman societies have carried on a vigorous propaganda among all these Germans, especially since 1900, and in Argentina and Brazil, which were intended to be the principal German protectorates, they were organized with particular care. The German law of July 22d, 1913, known as Delbriick's, which deals with nationality under the Empire and under the State, has greatly favored German organization in America, and it is important to know at least the gist of it, since it is full of significance, and marks the last stage of Pangerman organization prior to the war.

The second part of its article 25 runs as follows: "If any person before acquiring nationality in a foreign State shall have received the written permission of a competent authority of his native State to retain his nationality of that State, he shall not lose his nationality of the said native State. The German consul shall be consulted before this permission is granted."

From these words we can measure the depth of German astuteness. According to this provision, a German may become a citizen of a foreign State, but if he obtains a written permission "from a competent authority of his native State," he still continues to enjoy, for himself and his descendants, all the rights of a German citizen, and may claim the protection of the German Empire.

As this provision is contrary to all general principles of international law concerning nationality, a German citizen who takes advantage of it is careful not to inform the foreign State whose nationality he has acquired of the highly pecuUar situation in which he stands. Thus Germany was able to have, in every State, agents devoted to her aggressive policy, while these States were unaware of the danger to which this secret service exposed them. Apparently they had only to do with fellow citizens whom they had no right to suspect. It was only after many months of war, when their criminal actions compelled them to take off their disguise, that the power of these Germans masquerading under other nationalities appeared in all its formidable importance. In South America the German effort at colonization has for a long time been concentrated upon three Bazilian States: Parana, which has sixty thousand Germans, Santa Catarina, where there are one hundred and seventy thousand, and Rio Grande do Sul, with two hundred and twenty thousand. In these rich provinces they preserve the language, the traditions, and the prejudices of the Fatherland, and are almost absolute masters. Only fortyseven thousand of them are_ still openly citizens of the German Empire; about four hundred thousand are apparently Brazilian citizens, but in virtue of the Delbrlick law a large number have remained or become once more liegemen of the Kaiser. It may be noted that the budget of the German Empire included a sum of 500,000 marks for the establishment and maintenance of German schools in Brazil, and in 1912 Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of William II., landed at the port of Itajahy in the course of his cruise, to visit his fellow countrymen in Santa Catarina. Since the outbreak of the war the German game in Brazil has gradually been revealed; numerous rifle clubs were, in fact, societies for military drill, and dangerous enough to ^necessitate their disarmament.

Outside the three provinces mentioned above Germans are not numerous in Brazil, but they fill most of the principal posts in business

M UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

houses and banks. In the first period of the war these men, having estabHshed Germanophile newspapers pubhshed in Portuguese, were able to prevent Brazil from getting accurate information as to the origin aijd development of the conflict.

To sum up, the result of the Pangerman programme for countries outside of Europe would assure to Germany, under the form of colonies, protectorates, or zones of special influence, in Asia, 4,753,000 square kilometres, with a population of 83,490,000; in Africa, 8,906,000 kilometres, with a population of 46,850,000; in Oceania, 2,314,000 kilometres, with a population of 38,840,000, and in America 6,347,000, with a population of 18,197,000, making a total of 22,320,000 kilometres, having a population of 187,378,000.

IV

If to these figures we add the 4,015,000 kilometres, with 204 million inhabitants which the Pangerman plan of 1911 intended to cover in Europe and Turkey, we find that the German project of universal dominion looks for a total, in round numbers, of 26 million square kilometres, with 390 million inhabitants.

These figures include at the utmost only 90 millions of Germans, properly speaking, who would thus exercise supremacy over 257 million belonging to other races. It must be clearly understood that the enormous possessions of Pangermany in both hemispheres would be strictly controlled from Berlin. A glance at the map on p. 15 will show that all the essential strategic points which command the seas of the world are included; besides the Adriatic, the ^gean and the Dardanelles, the Straits of Gibraltar from the side of Morocco would be controlled, the Strait of Malacca, also Cape Horn, Madagascar, and the naval bases of Oceania.

William II. was well aware that such a project could only become an enduring reality through the disappearance of all other great Powers. When he had finally decided on the Pangerman plan he was deliberately resolved on the destruction of five of these Powers. This essential truth must be kept firmly in our minds if we wish to understand the present war. Austria-Hungary was to disappear through absorption, disguised at its entry into the German Zollverein. A fierce aggressive war was to annihilate the military forces of France and Russia. To cripple England later would be an easy job with France and Russia dismembered and impotent. As for Italy, it was intended that she should be a vassal State, and she was not considered capable of offering even a slight resistance to Pangerman ambition. It must be added that the plan of 1911 did not include war with England. When the Kaiser forced it on France and Russia in 1914 he did not believe that Great Britain would come in, or at least not immediately.

The initial German plan was upset by English intervention following on the respite gained by the splendid resistance of armed Belgium. But Germans are stubborn and crafty; by adapting themselves to new conditions thrust upon them, they have almost succeeded in carrying out, even now, their plan of 1911.

To sum up, the complete Pangerman plan aims at procuring for Germany all the means of domination by land and sea which would enable her to hold the entire world in the crushing grip of Prussian militarism brought to the highest point of efficiency. Not for a moment do the Pangermans pause to reflect on the criminality of this programme of universal slavery. "War," says Tannenberg with his monstrous cynicism, "must leave nothing to the vanquished but their eyes to weep with. Modesty on our part would be only madness."

It Is a fundamental truth, of which I wish to convince my readers, that the Pangerman plan is solely and entirely based on the achievement of the scheme "from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf," which forms its backbone. If this is broken it falls to the ground, and the projects for German domination are frustrated forever. The principal problem which the Allies must solve, if they would insure their liberty and that of the whole world, is that of making the plan of "from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" impossible.