An introduction to philosophy...

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Preface

The chief purposes of this work are (a) to present the student with a method of studying problems of the type of those discussed in philosophy especially and in the social sciences generally, and (b) to acquaint him with the fundamental movements and problems of philosophy. The immature student usually leaves his early courses with the feeling that he has gained little of value and that everything is "up in the air." He has come from the study of the exact sciences and mathematics, and to tackle the problems of philosophy directly when there is no method in sight for handling them creates the feeling that he is beating thin air. The experience of the average student is seldom such as to render him sympathetic with the great problems of philosophy — he is too full of the concrete affairs of the world to stop to theorize and speculate ; and his past training in the exact sciences and mathematics renders him suspicious of any procedure that does not approximate the exactness that prevails in the world he knows. The problems themselves generally seem too far away and too indefinite. Consequently, both from the standpoint of method and problem, matters appear alien, and students are driven away from the further study of philosophy. Later in experience indefiniteness may be looked upon, and rightfully so possibly, as a thing to be desired.

With these two ideas uppermost, this text attempts to furnish a method, the genetico-inductive, not only in theory but in the actual handling of the subject matter of the book

8 Preface

itself; and to show that the problems of philosophy are not something far removed "from the crowd's ignoble strife," but that they grow out of the conditions of the actual life of the people. It is not at all claimed that these are new ideas, but it does seem that they have not been sufficiently emphasized in introductory courses, and, indeed, in the literature of certain "fixed" varieties of philosophy. If too much emphasis is placed on these ideas it is because of the lack of it in many other works.

It is also hoped that the linking up of philosophy with the affairs of life will aid in the direction of rendering it a more vital force in the affairs of this world — in the rendering of knowledge of philosophy power in man's world.

Acknowledgments are due to a large group of men whose lectures I have been fortunate enough to attend, to those patient students whose works I have frequently cited, and to my wife who has helped at every turn in the preparation of the manuscript.

Holly Estil Cunningham.

September 1, 1919.

Contents

CHAPTER PAGE

I. Method of Treatment 11

II. The Psychological Background of Philosophy 18

Chapter I Method Of Treatment

1. Introductory. — Every undertaking must follow some plan or method if it would be fruitful in results. The data which any science takes as its own must be handled in accordance with some well-conceived plan in order that any one who would follow the science might become possessed of the point of view of the author of it. In fact, the method which is employed is of the greatest importance in determining the value of any intellectual pursuit. If one were asked to indicate in what field intellectual efforts have made the most advance in recent years, one would not be far wrong in asserting that the most far-reaching and influential steps had been taken in the realm of scientific method, or the method of procedure. We may cite as examples the radical changes connected with the methods of present day economists in contrast with the earlier thinker in this field who worked on a few so-called axiomatic principles from which he deduced his system ; or the psychologist who formerly employed the "arm chair" method on the workings of his own consciousness, in contrast with the modern man of this science whose laboratory rivals in completeness that of the physicist or chemist. The method of deduction, so fruitful in many ways, has, until recently, been the method par excellence of science. It was thought that this method was the method of mathematics, and that, since mathematics is peculiarly certain and exact, the other sciences, in order to possess these same attributes, must also follow this method.

In the physical sciences, especially, the experimental method has won the day. Briefly, this method can be described as working under controlled conditions. With the historical and social sciences the case is somewhat different — the conditions can not well be controlled. This does not mean that no control whatever can be exercised, for if this were the case no movements of reform could be possible ; but it does mean that in the latter the control is more difficult to secure. We may say that the method to be pursued in dealing with social, political, economic, religious, and philosophical problems is the genetic method. It may be described as the treatment of problems from the standpoint of their origin and development, from the point of view of their genesis and history. This method which is not new, but which has not been applied consistently to all the problems of interest, has certain advantages which will now be pointed out.

2. Advantages of the Genetic Method. — Of the two methods of reasoning usually employed, the deductive and the inductive, the genetic method is more in harmony with the spirit of the latter. It has no general principles to reason from but it assists in the formulation of principles so that the deductive method may then be employed as a test of the genuineness of the principles reached genetically, historically, experimentally, and inductively.

(a) It gives simpler material to work with. When we look about us to-day, we find that our methods of action are so complex that we are likely to become confused and lose

Method of Treatment 13

our way. Our political life calls here, our economic there, our religious yonder. On every side we find conflicting claims which demand attention.

In the last few decades we have so changed our methods of living that it is almost impossible to get outside of the demands of the present to investigate the principle which runs through all our actions. We have become so specialized that it is with great difficulty that we can see the claims of our opponents. It is within the last century that most of the great inventions which have changed our methods of getting a living have been made. Each one of us is able no longer to carry on all the activities necessary to the demands of modern life, and the result is that each must do some one thing well and leave the rest to some one else. A scholar now is one who has become a specialist in some one line of interest. He is not the man he once was, namely, one who knew everything. We sometimes wonder how it could be possible for a man to be so learned as were some of the ancients, but we must remember that there was not so much to be known in those days. A man might know all about physics, chemistry, medicine, astronomy, and mathematics, but there was not so much to be known about each of these in the earlier days. For example, when the treatment of diseases centered about bleeding the patient and giving him much hot water to drink, one soon could become a physician. Consequently, if we begin genetically we shall find our material greatly simplified. We shall see the same principle at work throughout, but it will be more easily witnessed when the details are not so numerous.

(b) The genetic method illustrates a great principle for the interpretation of intellectual activity, namely, that theories are the child of the age in which they have flourished. It is often thought that certain theories are true universally, i.e., regardless of time, place, or circumstance; but the genetic method shows us that theories, principles, truths, axioms, et cetera, are merely methods of meeting certain problems which arose in the experience of the people who projected the theory or principle. This principle that theories, truths, and axioms are the child of the age in which they have flourished will be employed by us in our discussions of the various philosophical systems which we shall consider farther on. We find it difficult on any other principle to account for various practices which we know to occur in primitive society. It also assists us in interpreting customs of ancient peoples, which to us appear even immoral. Such theories, for example, as "natural rights" the "Ptolemaic astronomy," the "contract" theory of the state, the "divine right of kings" have been fruitful and indeed have met the conditions against which they were set ; but they have served their day and possess for us an historical interest only.

(c) The genetic method makes possible a statement of the principle of progress. It is by a treatment of matters in their historical development that we discover the conditions that make the development possible. Should we take things as they are with us to-day we should experience great difficulty in making evident the principles which are implicit in the chaos of life ; we should have no means of discovering the method by which progress is made for we should know none of the difficulties against which past theories and principles have been set. The genetic method, however, renders less difficult the task of accounting for progress by showing just what factors were present in the experience of any period which made necessary a reconstruction of the theories of that period. The method makes it possible to indicate the relation between the physical environment and the thought of the period ; the influence of wars ; the significance

Method of Treatment 15

of the mingling of different races ; the influence of newer methods of securing food and clothing; and, in short, it provides for the introduction of all matters which are influential in shaping the intellectual attitudes of a people. From an examination of these facts we discover a principle which is valuable as a means of reform, a principle which makes it possible to predict with reasonable accuracy the possible outcome of any given set of conditions. From the standpoint of reform, we observe that this can occur only when the proper conditions underlying it are present. It makes evident the fact that great reforms can not occur in a night, that revolutions are the result of a continuous growth along social, political, economic, religious, and intellectual lines, and are not, as is sometimes thought by the demagogue, and even by the "social reformer," the result of sudden and sporadic outbreak along some particular line of interest.

(d) The genetic method acquaints us xuith survivals. Should we begin our investigation of problems such as are present with us to-day, we should shut ourselves out from one of the fruitful means of interpretation of facts. Facts as they exist with us have a history; they did not spring full grown from the head of Zeus, but each one is steeped in the dew of the past. Facts are neither true nor false — they just are; and since this is the case we should have no means of evaluating them unless we had recourse to a method which gives light on how the facts came to be as they are and what they are. A vestigial fact might, to all intents and purposes, masquerade as a valid, valuable, or genuine fact unless we possess means of knowing that it is indeed a survival. The human body possesses a great number of organs which, as far as we can determine, have ceased to function in the vital processes of the organism. These are vestigial organs which have served their purposes in the economy of the organism in some remote past, but which are now of no discernible value in the processes which are essential to the welfare of the individual. Just so it is with certain facts — some are survivals, and we have no other method of knowing this than by a study of how things came to be what they are. When we once know that a custom is a survival, be it a matter of morality or of science or of philosophy or what not, we are able to behave intelligently in the presence of the fact ; we are able to evaluate it ; and the business of evaluating facts is the highest achievement of the species ; it is this which differentiates man from the other animals. The results of more elaborate intellectual efforts, such as theories, hypotheses, standpoints, methods of interpretation, are also matters of history. These frequently survive in an age which is unsuited for them just as clothing in certain sections is out of style. The change from the old to the new has not been so radical but that the older theory answers certain demands and for this reason it remains over beyond its full usefulness and in general serves as a check to further progress.

The genetic method is valuable just here in that it makes known those survivals in fact and in theory. It assists us in giving due consideration to, and full appreciation of, the merits of the system in question.

It makes us tolerant; we are less prone to throw aside a method of thought as useless or worthless, less likely to dismiss a system of morality as foolish or absurd, less likely to dismiss a religious system as false, if we know the conditions and circumstances surrounding its origin and development. When we know these conditions it is probable that we shall feel that the system of religion, or of morality, or of philosophy which was born of them is the only system in the

Method of Treatment 17

presence of the circumstances which would do justice to them; or at least we shall see that the system is plausible and is consistent with the circumstances which it attempted to meet.

Chapter II

1. The Meaning and Place of Psychology.— When we speak of psychology as a background of philosophy we do not mean to employ the term as it is ordinarily used in the text books on that subject. Psychologists generally are dealing with the individual consciousness and this is the psychologist's own. The traditional method of that science is introspection, and this tends to narrow the view of the scope of psychology. This method is least effective in a realm of behavior which is of greatest importance for the understanding of many of the problems of politics, economics, sociology, religion, and philosophy. That realm is our emotional and instinctive behavior. Introspection yields results in the field of the cognitive processes which are especially amenable to description, analysis, and classification, but man is more than a thinking being; he is a feeling being as well. Man thinks only when he must do so. If he is able to meet the demands of the situation on any other level of conduct than the cognitive, thinking will not take place.

Writers on the various philosophical disciplines have generally recognized the value of psychology as a foundation for their efforts, but, because of a narrow conception of the scope of psychology, they have been compelled to assume a set of psychological principles, and from these they deduce their system. For example, the older political economy worked on the false assumption that man is a "reasonable being" who always seeks his own good. From this assumption was deduced the principle that free competition in the open world markets would secure goods at the lowest possible cost. But such theorists failed to take into account another aspect of man's make-up, namely, the feeling or emotional side. They overlooked the fact that man is moved to act on other levels and bases than the intellectual; that he is open to suggestion, a fact which is daily demonstrated in the principles of advertising.

Psychology, as we mean to use it in this connection, does not deal -with a strictly individual human mind, for such mind is an abstraction and has no significance for our purposes. But in keeping with our statements in the first chapter, the mind itself is a product of the ages. It is the result of the play of innumerable social and environmental factors. In this sense we may speak of mind as social consciousness and of the self as a social self. The mind, as we shall view it, is possessed of certain tendencies to action, which determine the more elaborate and complex forms of behavior. These tendencies we call the instincts which are the fountains from which more elaborate types of action flow. It is to be understood that the instincts themselves have a history, and are not ultimate "givens" in the sense that they were planted in man once for all at some early period of his existence. They may be described as race habits, methods of meeting certain crises in the battle that man had to wage against the competitors in the world, and against the world itself.

2. The Origin of the Instincts. — As to the origin of the instincts we have not time to inquire at any length, though several theories have been advanced. One is the theory of lapsed intelligence which briefly is that consciousness was present at the beginning of organic life and that the first movements of the organism were conscious; but when the movements became fixed, consciousness lapsed and the forms of behavior were inherited by later generations. Another theory is that of Herbert Spencer, who holds that consciousness appeared after actions at some moment of stress in the nervous system. For our purposes we may say that instincts represent variations which have proved successful in meeting the demands which nature made for survival. These variations have been handed down along with many others such as eyes, ears, and hands, and all 'represent means of meeting the demands of the environment'. All the instincts are not of equal strength, and they vary even in different individuals ; but the higher types of behavior such as our most recondite intellectual efforts are founded ultimately on these simple modes of action.

3. Classification of the Instincts. — The student who has given some attention to the study of instincts as they are treated by various psychologists will have noticed that the list varies from author to author. This is sometimes due to the different points of view from which the subject is attacked, and sometimes from the purposes of the author. We shall group the instincts under two great headings, namely, those that have to do with the getting of food, and those that have to deal with the reproduction of the species. Certain of the instincts might profitably be considered under either heading, for example, the instinct of pugnacity. The instinct to fight is aroused when another of the species attempts to block the satisfaction of hunger which is connected with the food processes, or the same tendency may be stimulated when another encroaches upon the sex interests of any member of the species. The instinct of curiosity also may be considered as falling under both headings. The headings themselves are selected as comprehending all the instincts for at least two reasons: (a) food and sex are two elemental necessities for any survival whatever; (b) in the concrete experiences of primitive tribes and from our knowledge of early man, and from the study of survivals in the various aspects of experience, such as in religion, art, literature, and science, we find the activities of life, the ceremonials, the myths, magic, et cetera, centering around these two prime necessities. The second of these reasons will be elaborated as we proceed, but we shall offer no arguments for or against the first one further than to say that in the absence of these two necessities there would be no occasion for the study of philosophy or of anything else.

4. The Principal Instincts of Man. — We have now to enumerate the chief instincts of man and to show how they function in his social and physical environment. It is understood that the instincts discussed in this connection fall under the two general headings mentioned above, some under one, some probably under both.

It is highly probable that all the instincts are derived from the two primary needs, and that in the last analysis these two springs are the feeders of all our elaborate and complex modes of action, that they are the motors which keep the organism at work. But we shall speak of instincts more in keeping with present psychological usage rather than to enter into controversies over the matter.

(a) Of the general instinct of the reproduction of the species we may note the following divisions :

(1) The Parental Instinct. — This is sometimes called the maternal instinct because it is more pronounced in the female of the species. It is the instinct which drives the mother to protect and care for her young and is common not only in the human family but in the lower animal world as well. It is one of the most powerful of the instincts as one can readily see, who has beheld the mother in the presence of danger sacrifice herself for her young. Even among the apes the mother carries her young for many months, seldom permitting a separation even for a short time. Often the emotional aspects of the instinct are extended through association to the objects which are intimately associated with the child. Clothes and toys elicit the same type of response that the original object, the child, did. This transfer to other objects is highly important and will be considered in due time. Here we may say that extension of the emotional life to other objects is at the bottom of what we know as moral indignation which is the root of public law.

(2) The Instinct of Self -display. — This instinct is peculiarly connected with sex life, not only in man, but in the lower animals. It is primarily social in its nature, as indeed are all instincts connected with sex. Among the lower animals the instinct is best in evidence during the mating season. Among young children it is noticed in such expressions as, "See what I can do," when some display of physical ability is made. In the period of adolescence it takes the form of elaborate dress, vanity in girls, peculiarities in speech, bravado in boys, and numerous other interesting variations which every one knows.

On the other hand we have the instinct of subjection, the correlate of display, which is present also in the lower forms of organism. The little dog crawls in the presence of the big one as though apologizing for being alive; the young child expresses itself along these lines in the side glances it casts at visitors and strangers ; the adolescent, in the presence of parents and older people ; and primitive and even civilized people, in the presence of superiors. We shall later see the connection of this instinct with religion and social life.

(3) The Pugnacious Instinct. — This is not only connected with sex, but is also related to the food getting processes. The stimulus which calls it into play is the thwarting or obstructing of the free activity which is called out by any other instinct. In the animal world the greatest excitement is provoked when the sex impulse is thwarted, and it is a matter of common observation that it is stimulated when food is taken from a hungry animal. These elemental tendencies to attack an opponent when another tendency to act is thwarted become highly elaborated in more advanced social and economic life, but the root of all these elaborations is to be found in this primordial disposition.

It has been pointed out that peoples of regions in which the food supply is abundant possess a weakened pugnacious instinct.

(b) The instincts which group themselves about the food getting process and which are probably derived from this prime necessity will be enumerated at this point, and will be further considered in another connection.

(1) The Gregarious Instinct. This, as is practically the case with all the other instincts, is found in the life and activities of the lower animals. The instinct is probably derived from the necessity of cooperation in securing an ample food supply. It is certain that this instinct is of first importance in the building of social institutions, and is fundamental in family life. Anthropologists disagree as to the particular form primitive human society took, whether horde or group of blood relatives, but they agree as to the social or gregarious nature of man. It is this indigenous tendency which is at the bottom of the growth of cities and the problems that grow out of them. We can readily see how those animals which by chance roamed in groups were able to survive against their less fortunate competitors who struggled singly. The latter perished while the former passed on their tendency to the future generations. After a long time the tendency became a race habit, an instinct, which, in many cases, would actually work to the disadvantage of the species, for many more might congregate in one place than could be supplied with food.

(2) The Instinct of Acquisition grows out of the food getting process. Those species which developed these tendencies survived while others perished in the struggle for existence. The instinct is expressed in children who collect and guard carefully all sorts of odds and ends. In exaggerated or perverted form it is seen in men who collect great fortunes far beyond their food or shelter needs.

(3) The Instinct of Construction is developed from the primal necessity, food. Man's first tools were constructed in response to the food need; his snares, his bows and arrows, his spears and lances, are expressions of the need to eat. His implements of warfare are for the supreme purpose of depriving an enemy tribe of its means of living and of its women. It was Aristotle who said that man is a social animal, but, it well may be added, man is a constructive animal. A glance at the large vessels, railroads, et cetera, of modern civilization will convince one that the constructive instinct is all-powerful in the development of society. While in many ways the primitive desire for food seems lost in the maze of details, a little thought will reveal that after all these wonderful elaborations are for the purposes of rendering less difficult the gratification of the hunger demands.

(4) The Instinct of Curiosity is the tendency to approach and examine an object which excites the organism. The unfamiliar, the non-habitual, is usually the stimulus. It is of importance in such activities as the trying out of new foods, new methods of capture, new plans of meeting problems, and, finally, is a driving force in all our intellectual achievements. It is the radex of science. Of course it is quite difficult to connect the efforts of science in every case with the prime needs of life, but, as James says, all theories must sooner or later "cash in" in terms of the practical needs of life.

There are many other innate tendencies to action which we shall not discuss here but which may be employed as occasion demands as we advance. Such, for example, are fear, play, imitation, jealousy, et cetera. All these, however, are modes of the great necessities for survival. For example, the most generally accepted theory of play, that of Groos, is that it is a preparation for the more strenuous duties and activities of life. Tarde and Baldwin have seen fit to make imitation the chief instinct, and to group all activity about it. Jealousy is primarily connected with sex and illustrates the power of one of our primal needs, reproduction of the species.

5. How the Instincts Function in Man's Environment. — Thus far we have spoken of the instincts as if they occur in their pure, unmixed form. Such, however, is rarely the case. An analogous case is seen in the psychological treatment of the phenomena of sensation. There, it will be remembered, the qualities of sensation are considered, the end organs which receive the stimulus, the attributes of the elemental fact of consciousness, and many other details regarded as necessary to a complete understanding of the subject are diligently presented. After all this has been done the student is informed of the fact that there are no such things as pure sensations, but they are supposed elements out of which higher individual conscious processes are made, and that they are means for the interpretation of the facts of cognitive consciousness. We may say that sensations occupy somewhat the same place in the cognitive processes that the instincts do in the higher mental and social life of the species. As we never experience a pure sensation, a pure quality, but always a quality belonging to something; so it is that we seldom if ever witness the operation of a pure instinct or experience a pure emotion, the latter being the conscious concomitant of the former, especially when the instinct fails in its functioning. Our instinctive and emotional life become organized about objects in the same manner in which sensations become organized into objects in perception. For example, the tender emotion so noticeable in the attitude of the mother towards her child does not exist at large, but it is organized with other emotions about an object, namely, the child. Neither does jealousy exist on "general principles," but it always has reference to an object, usually a member of the opposite sex. In the absence of objects about which our life is organized, we should behave in a chaotic, irregular, and wholly irresponsible manner. Following Shand and others we may call this organization of our mental and social life about things, the sentiments, in the absence of which our emotional life would lack consistency, coherence and order; and our conduct which is based on these springs of action, would be correspondingly chaotic and disorderly.