The idea of God ...

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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Introduction

The Problem and its Eelations : Eeligion Differentiated from Speculative Thought. — Speculative Perversion of the Ontological Proof. — Eelated to Eeligious Experience. — Anselm's Identification of the Idea of a most Perfect Being with the God of Eeligion. — Analysis of Consciousness. — Internal Factors. — The Expression of the Eeligious Emotions. — The Emotions and their Eoots. The Work of Consciousness. The Idea. Its Purpose. — The three Factors of Consciousness. — The Historic Development of Eeligions. — The Construction of Proofs. — Outline of Discussion 1-9

Part I. The Ontological Proof And Epistemology

Chapter I. Historical Survey : Augustine on Truth. — Anselm's Discovery. — Emotions Described. — Key to the Argument. — Descartes' Appeal to Causality. — Leibnitz, the Principle of Non-contradiction. — Attitude of Different Schools of Philosophy. Kant's Criticism 10-14

Chapter II. Concept and Being: Anselm's Apparent per Salturn. — Eoyce's Analysis of the Concepts of Being. — Eealism, Mysticism, Critical Eationalism and Idealism Defined. — Eealism, Monistic and Pluralistic, Spinoza. — Locke and Hume. — Mysticism. — Critical Eationalism, Kant, Transcendental Idealism Combined with Empirical Eealism. — Isolating Single Faculties. — Phenomena and Things-in -themselves. — The Concept of Validity. Kant's Criticism of the a priori Proof. Value of Kant's Work. — Idealism. The Analysis of Consciousness. — Eelation of Idea and Object. Purpose of the Idea a Quest

for its Other. — Idealism and the Ontological Proof. 14-23

iii iv TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Part II. The Ontological Proof And Psychology Of

RELIGION.

Chapter I. The Relation of Religion to Psychology : The Spheres of Religion and Psychology. — Religion has a Psychology. — Description of Experience. — An Ulterior Value of the Ontological Proof. — Descartes' Discovery. Psychology Separated from Religion. — Efforts to Function Religion 24-28

Chapter II. Religious Experience: Kant's Criticism. — Anselm and Augustine. — The God-idea and Religious Emotion.

— The Ontological Proof Directs to Introspection. — Descartes.

— Religious Emotions Facts. — Finiteness and Limitation. — Rational and Material Self Distinguished in Consciousness. — Religion Involves all Faculties. — A Primary Religious Emotion. — Development of this Emotion. — Relation of Ontological Idea to. — The Infinite, Max Miiller. — Shamanism and Divination. — Relation of Animism. — Its Support to our Theory.

— Material and Mental Fields for Theogonic Material. — Development of Pantheism. It is a Philosophy. — Illustration from Religion of Romans. — Higher Forms of Religious Experience. Metanoia. — The Testimony of Psychology. — Worship. — Development of Saintliness. — Corrective Influence of Psychology. — Religious Experience a Part of the Totality of Experience 28-43

Chapter III. Experience as Knowledge : Credo ut Intellegam. — A Corrective to Mysticism. — Historic Revelation.

— Enthusiasm. — Methods of Dreams, Intoxications, Trance.

— Psychology's Treatment. — The Subconscious. — Tests of Enthusiasm, Truth and Value. — -The Founder of Christianity.

— Mysticism. — Buddhism. — Social Self Consciousness. — The Unfolding of the God-idea 43-52

Part III. The Ontological Proof And Ethics

Chapter I. Ethical Principles : Conflict of Theories. — Ethics Related to Religion. — Problem of Ethics. — Purpose in Act and Idea. — Meaning of Purpose and Idea. — Science of Ethics.

— Light from Anthropology. — Development of Ethics along

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

V with Keligion. — Limit to Ethical Force of Nature Religion, Fatalism. — The Fields of Religion and Ethics. — Light from Psychology. — Hume. — Functioning of Ethics. — Psychological Analysis of Conduct. — Failure of Hedonism. — Of Institutionalism. — The Norms of Ethics, that Discovered by Religion 53-63

Chapter II. The Ontological Method of Ethics : Our Attitude toward Metaphysics. — The Reality of Things, Ideas and Events. — Kant's Ethical Theory. — The Good Will, the Moral Law, Conception of Duty. — Origin of Moral Conceptions, Autonomy and Heteronomy. — The Radical Evil, Restoration. — Relation of our Theory to Kant's. — Criticism of Kant. — Autonomy in Saint Paul's Conception of His Relation to God. — <{ Is the Good Good because God Wills it? " — Calvinistic Determinism. — Our Agreement with Kant Concerning Autonomy and Heteronomy. — Service of the Ontological Proof. 63-69

Conclusion : The Ontological Proof a Guiding Principle. — Religion the Tangible Proof. 69-70

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Shedd, W. G. T. History of Christian Doctrine. 2 vols. Scribners. Flint, Robert. Theism and Agnosticism. 2 vols. Scribners. Windelband. A History of Philosophy. Trans, by Tufts. Macmillan.

Descartes. Discourse on Method, Meditations. Trans, by John Veitch. Blackwood.

Kant. Critique of Pure Eeason. Trans, by Max Muller. Macmillan. Locke. On the Human Understanding. Ward, Lock & Co. Leibnitz. New Essays on the Understanding. Trans, by Langley. Hume. Treatise of Human Nature. Selby-Bigge. Ed. Oxford. Hume. Essays, Greene and Grose. Longmans.

Royce, Josiah. The World and the Individual. 2 vols. Macmillan. Pfleiderer. Religions-philosophie auf geschichtlicher Grundlage. Ver-

Religionsphilosophie. Von H. Hoffding. Ubersetzt von F. Bendixen.

Leipzig.

Schleiermacher, F. On Religion. Speeches to its Cultured Despisers Trans, by J. Oman. Keagan Paul.

Tiele, C. P. Outlines of the History of Religion to the Spread of Universal Religions. Trans, by J. E. Carpenter. Keagan Paul.

Lotze, Hermann. The Philosophy of Religion. Trans, by Conybeare. Macmillan.

vii viii

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Max Miiller, F. The Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion. 4 vols- Longmans.

James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience. Longmans. Myers, F. W. H. Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death. Longmans.

Wallace, W. Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics. Oxford.

Martineau, James. Study of Religion. Macmillan. Rhys-Davids. Buddhism. Putnams.

Aristotle. The Nicomachian Ethics. Trans, by Williams. Longmans.

Martineau, James. Types of Ethical Theory. Macmillan.

Kant. Theory of Ethics including the Critique of the Practical Reason.

Trans, by T. K. Abbott. Longmans.

Sidgwick, Henry. The Method of Ethics. Macmillan. Taylor, A. E. The Problem of Conduct. Macmillan. Seth, James. Ethical Principles. Scribners. Ellinwood, F. F. Notes on Comparative Religion. Edwards, Jonathan. Works in 8 vols. , by Isaac Thomas, Jr. Paulsen, F. Immanuel Kant, His Life and Doctrine. Trans, by Creigh-

ton and Lefevre. Scribners.

INTRODUCTION.

THE PEOBLEM AND ITS RELATIONS.

Religion. — The differentiation of Religion from speculative thought took place in a process of historical development. To Schleiermacher belongs the distinction of being the first to point out that Religion has a sphere peculiarly its own. Speculative religious thought may take the form of Animism, Pantheism, Deism or Theism ; it may be dogmatical, skeptical or even atheistic, but in these ranges it diverges from Religion and is metaphysical rather than practical. It was to guard against the waste of energy in such dialectical performances that Kant thought out and gave to the world his Critique of Pure Reason. The " police duty," however, which he thought this work would serve, has not been and never can be successful. If life had no personal concern in the Object of pure reason's research, the human mind could well abandon its quest, settle down quietly to the humdrum of a routine life and content itself with empirical verities. This however is not the case. Religion is a vitally personal topic ; and, as an ever present experience, it keeps reason in touch with the Object of speculative inquiry on the practical side. Kant himself was aware of this fact and sought to develop it in the Critique of the Practical Reason but the relation is too manifold to be summed up in a Categorical Imperative.

Speculative Religion. — It is the intention of this thesis to direct attention to the relation of the a 'priori proof of the existence of God, as it was formulated by Anselm, to Religion, as opposed to or different from, speculative religious thought. The Ontological Proof as a proof has been abundantly treated. It would take the space usually allotted to a monograph to sufficiently catalogue the discussion it has occasioned. But in all of this treatment by lead-

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ers of thought and men of less ability the argument has been given a speculative turn and the practical content, which is a matter of permanent value, has been overlooked. One needs only to turn to some books on Theism or treatises on Dogmatic Theology to verify the truth of this statement. It will be discovered there, that the discussion turns on necessary existence, perfection of being, existence as a part of the concept of a perfect being, causality, etc. Descartes was the first thus to use and abuse Anselm's discovery. By so doing he rescued this form of proof from its obscurity but at the same time diverted it from Religion to Philosophy. Leibnitz, Spinoza and Herbert of Cherbury agreed in following Descartes in this perversion. It thus entered into Theism, Deism, and Pantheism. And it was against these speculative forms of the argument that Kant hurled his powerful criticism.

The position here taken in the face of this speculative use of the Proof is that Anselm discovered the argument in devout meditation, that it is inseparably linked, even in its speculative parts, with religious experience, and, that it has a perennial force as an expression of the religious consciousness of mankind. And, while it may be true that only a few gifted minds grasp the significance of the words in which Anselm repeatedly expressed himself, nevertheless, the Ontological Idea has ever been a constitutive principle in the development of historic religions. Since the days of Amselm many new fields of knowledge have been explored, titanic efforts have been made to formulate a satisfactory theory of knowledge, the science of psychology has rendered definite service to the examination of all experimental phenomena, and anthropology has introduced new facts for the science of religion. The fruits of the labor in all these fields will be found to be of distinct service in our examination of the subject before us. With these preliminary remarks we will now enter upon the task of stating the Problem and its Relations.

Consciousness is the inner mystery of experience. The thought world stands on one side and the world of things stands over against it. Consciousness, in between, is the transformation point. When Religion turns to consciousness for a verification

INTRODUCTION.

of its facts, it has made its appeal to the highest court of human decisions. In its inception, preservation and continuation Eeligion is always related to conscious experience. The problem arises when religious experience relates itself to an Object. This is not remarkable since a problem always arises when reason attempts to show the relation of any idea to its object. There is a heterogeneousness of object and idea which consciousness alone serves to link together. It was this apparent chasm between the idea and its object which Anselm overleaped when he said : " Sic ergo vere est aliquid quo majus cogitari non potest, et nec cogitari possit non esse : et hoc es Tu, Domine Deus noster." 1 The transition from the " aliquid quo majus cogitari non potest " to the " hoc es Tu " constitutes the great problem of epistemology, and the reasoning by which this apparent per saltum was removed formed the Ontological argument in its most complete statement. It runs as follows : " Et certe id, quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re, quod majus est. . . . Existet ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et intellectu et in re." 2 The argument itself is not what chiefly concerns us. From our point of view we are most interested to observe the conscious effort which the argument expresses to pass from what is " in solo intellectu " to an " esse in intellectu et in re " or the " Hoc es Tu " of experience. We perceive in this effort an expression of the fact that consciousness in religious experience as in other experience recognizes internal facts with both internal and external meanings.

So long as attention is restricted to the internal facts, Religion is a psychic state in which feeling and need, fear and hope, enthusiasm and submission play a great part. 3 Nevertheless these experiences are not without ideas which constitute a relation between the conscious self and all that is beyond. For this reason while all consciousness is unquestionably internal, a purely inter-

1 Anselm, "Prc-slogion 2."

2 Anselm, " Proslogium II Opera," Minge ed. 3 H6ffding, " Religions-philosophie," I.

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nal Religion is excluded fiom the realm of possibility. Again these psychic states are composed of emotions which tend to express themselves either physically or intellectually. This brings Religion to the surface of life if it does not extend it further. It is the expression of the religious emotions rather than the emotions themselves and their roots which occupy a large part of the attention of students who devote themselves to the study of Religion. The books on Religion and the customs of Religion are full of them. The attitudes, forms and symbols of worship are either external representations of internal states or the imitation of persons in whom such states are a reality. The same emotions under differing conditions may find expression in music, in poetry, in artistic symbolism or in a creed, each of which represents life's reaction upon its own conscious experiences. And last of all and best of all the most perfect expression of the religious emotions is to be seen in a life, so ordered, that the inner experiences are brought into harmony with the Universal Will. This I would call the ethical expression of the religious emotions.

The fact is to be noted, in this connection, that it is the nature of the religious emotions to express themselves and that it is within the sphere of consciousness, when attention is directed thereto, not only to be aware of the outward facts of experience, but also, to know the emotions themselves from which these facts arise. It is also to be observed that the same emotions such as fear, faith and love which compel certain physical attitudes will, under changed conditions, constrain to ethical conduct. In this truth the hope of culture is enshrined. The dynamic is given. It is simply a question of how a present energy is to be directed. The power lies back of the emotions.

It is when we turn our attention to these emotions themselves and their roots that we meet with the Problem which the Ontological Proof thrusts upon us. Here is a force which is known in consciousness which produces something in a matter of fact world. How can we get at it ? First of all it is to be asserted that consciousness is that function of intelligence whereby facts and ideas are combined. There is no consciousness without both

INTRODUCTION.

of these elements and, in the case in hand, emotions would be simple facts or events which consciousness could not grasp if they were not linked inseparably with their corresponding ideas. Fear, faith and love are nothing without an object, however ideal that object may be. And it is the idea of an object, linked with them which constitutes them conscious emotions. This idea which the understanding involves with these simple emotions is the object or Other of which they are correlates. We are, therefore, in experience never conscious of a pure emotion alone, or of an object alone, but of an emotion combined with the idea of an object. Thus in the Ontological Argument the emotion expressed in the words " Hoc es Tu " is not pure ecstasy but ecstasy combined with the idea of an object whose best description is " id quo majus cogitari nequit."

So much then for consciousness. It reveals in an experience, a fact, that is, in the present case, an emotion and also an idea which represents, in the case under consideration, an Other — " than which a greater cannot be conceived." Our entire theory depends on these two factors of consciousness. Neither can be taken up or abandoned without the other. The reality of the emotions is part and parcel with the reality of self. The idea, on the other hand, without which the emotions amount to zero so far as consciousness is concerned is the counterpart of the Other of the universe to which the self is related in various ways. In fact the relationship is so manifold that an infinite variety of objects and events is involved in the development of Religion. But since the individual self, as known in consciousness, makes use of an understanding, subject to the forms of thought, its relation to the Other must be an historical relation, in so much as the relation of every idea to its object is successive and therefore historical.

Idea. — The next step after observing this inseparable union of emotion and idea in a living consciousness is to make a further analysis of our concept of an idea. The division of ideas according to their simplicity or complexity must ever be a relative division since the simplest idea is both sensory and motor, cog-

THE IDEA OP GOD.

nitive and conative. Neither does the Cartesian notion of vividness nor the Spinozistic determination of adequacy help us. Hume was nearer to our point of view when he spoke of the force and liveliness of ideas. Professor Royce in his GifFord lectures on the World and the Individual says : u An idea is any state of mind that has a conscious meaning." In another place he says : " Your intelligent ideas of things never consist in mere images of those things, but always involve a purpose of how you intend to act toward the things of which you have ideas." This use of the term he abundantly defends and makes the basis of his theory of knowledge. An idea without a purpose, an intention, a meaning is as little an idea as the image in a mirror.

Holding fast then to this definition of an idea and returning to what we have already observed in consciousness we are prepared to assert that a state of consciousness containing an emotion with its idea involves the three possible psychical factors — feeling, knowing and willing. In other words the act of consciousness involves the entire personality. And the fact that a religious consciousness has for its content an emotion directed to or awakened by a Supernatural Being does not isolate it from these psychical conditions. Thus our analysis has supplied us with a guiding principal whose significance will appear as the discussion proceeds ; for we find that speculative religious thought is ever tending to connect itself with one or other mental faculty and thus present an abnormal development. Deism and theistic systems are predominantly intellectual. Schleiermacher and the mystics give too much prominence to the emotions or feelings. And Kant followed by Schopenhauer and von Hartmann has given undue prominence to the will. The only corrective for such one sidedness is a return to the religious consciousness. And it is the Ontological proof alone, as an expression of the religious consciousness, which gives due emphasis to the internal and external meanings of the religious life.

Public Religion. — Thus far, we have not gone beyond, the personal and private limits of religious experience. We have been concerned with it as a psychological and internal affair. It is clear,

INTRODUCTION.

however, that the expression of the religious emotions must be external, and, to a certain extent, public. It is also evident that the religious idea, in going beyond self to find its Other, must also discover new relationships in a world or universe. The mind accepts what it finds and reacts upon it, but, in so doing, it gives up its private character and recognizes self as one of many. The world is discovered to be full of things and events which either help or hinder the religious life in its progress.

Historical Development of Religions. — If our account, up to this point is accepted as a true analysis of the content of a religious consciousness, we need have no difficulty in accounting for the historic development of religions. In a very general description these may be grouped under three heads, as follows : (1) Fetishism and Animism, (2) Polytheism and Pantheism, (3) Henotheism and Theism. These groups each combine practical and theoretical elements. In each of them a religious emotion, combined with its idea, is found seeking its object or Other ; and the Keligion is named according to the object seized upon. Taking the first group first, one can easily understand, how the mind of the primitive nature worshiper, not satisfied with the limited nature of his fetish, would seek to satisfy his idea, by increasing the number of his fetishes and philosophizing concerning their occult powers. Thus animism, which spiritualizes the objects of worship, would form a kind of philosophy of fetishism. In fact, Tiele takes the position, that no Religion is to be found, in which this process has not taken place. From this position, the transition is not great, after the mind has discovered that single objects of worship whether small or great however multiplied and idealized are not sufficient to satisfy the purpose of its idea, the transition is not great, I say, from Polytheism to Pantheism. It is readily seen, if we follow this line of thought, that Monotheism is not possible for any other than a spiritual Religion. Any or all material objects could not fulfill the Ontological Idea. The mind is constantly asserting its superiority to material things ; how then, could it indefinitely look to them as masters ? " By an instinct earlier than any history can trace man sets the power in and behind

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phenomena on his side. " 1 This is reason's reaction upon experience. We may expect, therefore, and the facts of anthropology do not disappoint our expectations, that we shall find in Religion certain internal emotions with their ideas and a constant effort on the part of the intellect to adjust the rest of experience to harmonize with these ideas. It is the effort to adjust the rest of experience which gives rise to the theoretical elements of Religion and causes it to halt in halfway places. A Theodicy is needed at almost every turn of life.

Construction of Proofs. — The events which call for a Theodicy also point to Atheism as a possibility. This fact may have given an impulse to the construction of proofs, which does not begin until a late stage has been reached in the development of religious thought. The basis of the proofs is found, either, in the nature of the universe, yielding the Cosmological and Teleological arguments, the nature of the soul, giving the Psycho-physical proof, or the the nature of Being leading to the Ontological idea. Our interest in this latter form of proof arises, from its internal and immediate nature, and the fact that it directs attention inward, thus preparing the way for the discovery of consciousness with its contents. We also find that " it expresses that impulse which we experience toward the supersensuous, and that faith in its truth which is the starting point of all religion." 2 This impulse toward the supersensuous is such a practical element of life that it puts the mind always on the alert to verify its experiences, and, whatever other things experience may discover in the world of facts, reason continues its search for the Object of Religion.

In the following chapters some attention will be paid to the Theories of Knowledge which recognize the chasm between thought and things ; and, it will also be necessary to inquire further concerning the nature of ideas and their relation to Reality. In this connection the speculative religious ideas which have grown up in connection with various concepts of being w T ill serve as illustrations of our theme. In the second part the Psychology

Wallace, "Gifford Lectures," p. 193.

2 Lotze, " Outlines of a Philosophy of Eeligion," p. 12.

INTRODUCTION.

of the Eeligious Emotions will be drawn upon to support that part of the proof which connects with experience. And a third part will indicate the relation of the Ontological Idea to action and show the bearing of the entire discussion upon the Problem of Conduct and Life.

I. Historical Survey

A brief historical sketch will be useful, in setting our topic in its connection with other methods of knowledge. The analysis of consciousness, in the preceding chapter, revealed the subjects to which an a priori proof stands related. The idea must be supported by a theory of knowledge, the emotion demands a psychological support and the intention of the idea belongs to a theory of motives or ethics. Let us see, now, what the actual fate of the argument has been.

When Augustine said : " There must be a truth. For if you deny there is a truth, you affirm there is no truth ; and thus you contradict yourself. The sum total of truth, conceived as a unity, is, however, the very essence of God," he was evidently preparing the way for Anselm' s discovery. The preparation, however, was purely in method, not in substance. Augustine might be called the father of the introspective method. It was he who first forced doubt to pay tribute to certainty. And, by directing attention to the immediacy of consciousness, he furnished a method which, in the hands of Anselm and Descartes, prepared the way for valuable discoveries.

The relation of the Ontological Proof to consciousness is made very clear in the preface to the Proslogion. 1 There the author declares : " I began to inquire whether it might not be possible to find in a single argument, which being complete in itself, would

1 Anselm, " Proslogion Preface," translated by Maginnis, Bibliotheca Sacra, 1851.

need the aid of no other for its confirmation, and which alone would suffice to prove that there is indeed a God, that He is the supreme good and that He is in need of nothing — an argument sufficient to prove all that we are accustomed to believe concerning the Divine nature. . . . But when I endeavored to banish this thought entirely, lest, by occupying my mind in fruitless search, it might detain me from my other studies in which I might make some useful progress, then it began to press itself upon me the more with a kind of importunity. In the very conflict of my thought, that presented itself to me which I had despaired of finding."

The point of interest in this rather long quotation is the likeness it shows to what might be found in the expression of any scientific consciousness. The same restlessness and sense of compulsion is apparent which frequently anticipates discovery. It is true that Anselm 1 himself regarded his discovery as an " illumination.'' He said : " Thanks be unto Thee, O Lord, thanks be unto Thee, that which I at first believed through thine own endowment, I now understand through thine illumination, even were I unwilling to believe that Thou art, I cannot remain ignorant of thine existence." We are not concerned, however, with his interpretation of his experience. The term religious consciousness was unknown to him and belongs to a more fully developed psychology. But his description of his inner experience is exceedingly interesting. It shows that to him at least the Proof had an emotional and religious as well as a logical significance.

Without repeating the argument as stated in the Proslogion and expounded in the reply to Gaunilo, let us note that the judgment " existet ergo ... in re," is analytic. Iu other words existence is a part of the content of the concept of the most perfect being. This statement is not introduced here for the sake of discussion, disputed as it is, but as a point of contrast in making the transition from Anselm to Descartes. For while it is true that Descartes asserts : 2 " That we may validly infer the existence of God

1 Anselm, " Proslogion," C. 2, end.

2 Descartes, " Principles of Philosophy," trans. hyJ. Vietch, p. 199.

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from necessary existence being comprised in the concept we have of Him," he still regards it as an inference and proceeds to follow the clue of causality. He says : 1 " The greater objective perfection there is in our idea of a thing the greater also must be the perfection of its cause." The bald realism of the cartesian dualism here begins to shine through. In the third Meditation, also, after stating what the idea of God includes, he adds : 2 " The more attentively I consider them the less I feel persuaded that the idea I have of them owes its origin to myself alone." Thus in Descartes' hands the Ontological Proof began to assume an a posteriori character.

This fact is the more remarkable when we consider the Cartesian method. He was the philosopher par excettans of consciousness. In this he may have been guided by Anselm and Augustine but the important fact is " that he reached by way of doubt the principle of self consciousness and made it the starting point of his system." 3 The value of this principle we will have occasion to note later in this connection ; we may simply remark here that it at first lent itself to Rational Psychology rather than Religion. It was Descartes, then, who began the preparation for the study of the psychological relations of religion, who, also, perverted the Ontological Proof to the channel of Speculative Religious thought.

The three philosophers who directly succeeded Descartes were Locke, Spinoza and Leibnitz, the great representatives of empiricism, Pantheism and individualism. Locke gave up the Ontological Proof along with innate ideas, Spinoza turned it to the service of speculative Pantheism, and Leibnitz alone made any useful contribution to it. He said : 4 "It proves that assuming that God is possible He exists." In other words he introduced the principle of non-contradiction. " Being," according to Leibnitz, 5 " is that the concept of which, involves something positive, or that which can by us be conceived, provided that which we conceive is