A guide to the study of moral evidence...

Front matter

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

"^ GUIDE

TO THE

Chapter I

ON THE NATURE OF MORAL EVIDENCE, WHEREIN IT DIFFERS FROM DEMONSTRATION.

Moral Evidence defined 55

Differs from Demonstration 3

1. As to its Subjects . 56

2. As to tlie Method in which it is conducted ..... 56

3. Because the Arguments on both Sides of a duestion

should be considered ^ . . 56

4. Because Propositions in Moral Evidence, though false,

are not absurd 57

5. As to the Kind of Assent which it produces .... 57

6. Because it affords no Rule forjudging with Certainty , 58

7. Because it admits of Degrees 58

8. Because it admits an Accumulation of Proofs ... 59

9. Because you cannot reason safely farther than one Step 59

10. Because it does not compel the Assent 60

11. Because it does not admit of as great precision in language 61 Is inferior to Demonstration, yet not to be rejected, and why 62 Two Extremes from not attending to the Difference between

Moral Evidence and Demonstration 64

1. Calling probable Proof Demonstration * 64

2. Disputing probable Proof, because not demonstrative . 66

IV CONTENTS,

Chapter II

ON THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF MORAL EVIDENCE^ WITH OBSERVATIONS ON THE WEIGHT OF E4.CH.

I. Personal Observation . , ♦ 67

1. Of Things uniform 70

2. Of Things various ..,♦».. ,k .. ^ . . 7S

II. Testimony 79

Remote Testimony S9

III. Observation of others 90

IV. General Notoriety ..."...»...,». 99

V. Report 101

Yl. Tradition . . 102

Internal Evidence. Analogy . 103

Inferences from Facts or Premises. Presumptions . , . 105

Consistency of the Parts of a Relation « . . 109

Chapter III. General Directions Relating To Morai* Reasoning

I. Previous Qualifications 112

1. Acquire fixed Principles of Evidence . . . ^ . . 112

2. A Habit of inquiring after a Standard ...... 113

3. A Habit of referring every Thing to its End .... 114

4. Clear and precise Rules of Judgment ...... 115

II. To determine whether we should engage in the Discussion 116

1. Is the (Question worth investigating ....... 116

2. Will it admit of free Examination 117

3. Is it capable of a satisfactory Decision ...... 119

4. Are we competent to its Discussion 119

HI. When we have determined to investigate it, we should

1. Examine if it be fairly and clearly stated . . . , , 120

2. Form as clear Ideas of it as possible 120

3. Consider of what Kind of Evidence the Subject admits 121

4. Consider all the Arguments on both Sides 12^

5. Guard against the Fascinations of Expression . . . 122

CONTENTS. V

6. Guard against Mis-statement of Degrees ..... 123

7. Probability, not Possibility, is to decide 124

8. Force of Proof depends on Weight of Arguments, not

on Number 126

9. Determine the Weight of each Argument, sum up, and

balance 126

10. If both Sides be equal, suspend the Judgment, not

otherwise /. 127

IV. To determine the weight of an Argument, or the Probability of an Event 127

The Degree of Probability 129

Cautions

1. Make Observations on as large a Scale as possible . . 131

2. Take Care that the Circumstances are similar . . . 133 How to proceed in Cases of extraordinary Importance . . 134

Compound Probability 136

How to judge by the general Appearance of a (Question . . 138

How to regulate our Choice 140

1. State all Advantages and Disadvantages 140

2. Consider remote Consequences 141

3. See that all Advantages and Disadvantages are fairly

stated .142

4. On contingent Advantages and Disadvantages . . . 143

5. To determine on the Pursuit of an Object ..... 145 How to regulate our Advice to others ^ . , 148

Chapter IV. Special Directions Relating To Each Kind Of Moral Evidence

1. Personal Observation and the Observation of others . . 149

1. Are you qualified to observe the Subject ..... 149

2. Consider the Circumstances under which your Obser-

vations were made 150

3. Do not draw Conclusions from too few Subjects . . 151

4. In Subjects which are various, how to ascertain what

is probable, and the Degree 152

5. Subjects which are various, do not admit constant

conclusions 152

VI CONTENTS.

Farther. On Observations of others ;

1. Do their Facts and Processes warrant their Conclusions 153

2. Do their Observations coincide with your own . . . 153

3. Are they likely to have related them fairly .... 154

II. Testimony 155

1. Is the Thing credible 155

2. Are the parts of the Relation consistent with each

other, and with known Circumstances .... 162

^ 3. Does it agree with subsequent Circumstances ... 163

4. Is the Witness competent to judge of the Fact , . . 165

5. Could he recollect it clearly 166

6. Is he a Man of general Veracity 167

7. Did he speak his real Judgment ........ 168

8. Is he a Man of general Integrity . . - 170

9. Is he interested in the Decision of the Question . .170

10. On a Testimony against the Interest of the Witness . 171

11. On the Manner of his giving his Evidence .... 172

12. On the Occasion on which the Testimony is given . 173

13. Does the Evidence rest on the Testimony of only one

Witness, or more 173

14. Would the Account be easily confuted, if false . . 174

15. A vague Account not as credible as a particular one . 176

16. When the Witness speaks positively of some Things,

and uncertainly of others 177

17. Of ancient Facts ; what Reception did they meet with

at first 177

18. On the Omission of a Thing pretended to have been

public . 186

19. On contradictory Testimonies * 186

20. On Testimonies agreeing in Part, and contradictory

in Part 187

Remote Testimony . 189

III. General Notoriety 189

IV. Report 191

V. Tradition . 192

VI. Analogy 492

VII. Inferences. Presumptive Evidence 193

CONTENTS. Vll

Chapter V. On The Kinds Of Evidence Of Which Different Subjects Admit

Mathematical Subjects 196^

Moral Maxims. and Proverbs 197

Properties and Effects of Subjects of Natural History . . . 197

Effects of Substances on Mankind ......... 198

Facts respecting the Constitution of Nature 200

Present Facts 201

Hand-Writing 201

Effects of Peace, War, &c .202

Knowledge of Men's Motives and Intentions ..... 203

Knowledge of Human Nature 206

Transactions with Men 207

Transient Facts 210

Recent Events, Subjects of Law-Suits 212

Recent Public Events 213

History .214

Memoirs 220

Ancient History 222

Parliamentary Reports 222

Authenticity of Books 225

Miracles . 229

Review of Chapter 232

Conclusion . 233

Appendix. On disputing for Victory, and not for Truth . 237

ON

MORAL, REASONING.

BY WILLIAM HAGUE, A. M.

The reasoning power, is one which g;ives to man a high pre-eminence in the scale of being. Jt is this which constitutes him the * prince of creatures ;' the lord of this lower world.

* All else is {)ror)e, irrational, and mute, And unaccoimtal)!ej by instinct led ; But uian was made of annuel form, erect, — With reason high to balance right and wrong,'

to judge of w^hat is true and what is false, and to make new discoveries in nature and in morals.

It is true, we have heard it questioned, whether brutes have not in some instances developed the faculty of reason. We have from our infancy been familiar with stories respecting the sagacity of the horse and the elephant, which have led us to doubt whether the opinion that brutes were governed only by instinct were founded in fact ; and w^hether the difference between the human and the 2 brute creation, does not consist in the degree of mental power, rather than in the nature of their facuUles. As says an old poet,

' Tell me why the ant, Midst summer's plenty, thinks of winter's want 1 Tjy constant journies careful to prepare Her stores, and bring home the corny ear ; By what instruction does she bite the grain, Lest hid in earth, and taking root again,

It might elude the foresight of her care?

Evil like us they shun, and covet good, Abhor the poison, and receive the food ; Like us they love or hate, like us they know To joy the friend, or grapple with the foe. With seeming thought their action they intend, And use the means proportion'd to the end. Then vainly the philosopher avers, That reason guides our deeds and instinct theirs. How can we justly different causes frame. Where the effects, entirely, are the same 1 Instinct and reason, how can we divide 1 'Tis the fool's ignorance, and the pedant's pride.'

Although we were to admit that the poet was right in this assertion, still we might with success insist on the distinction between the human and the brute creation, as to the nature of their faculties, particularly in regard to conscience, the power of abstraction, and the feeling of the mysterious.

But a strict analysis of the operations of instinct and reason, may lead us to believe that Prior, whose words we have quoted, rashly leaped to his conclusion that they ' entirely are the same.' Instinct denotes the

TNiTRODtTCTORY ESSAY. M

^ataral, uniform tendency of a voluntary agentj to do any thing without previous deliberation. The efforts of the new-born infant to procure its food are instinctive. Such too^ are its attempts to facilitate the operation of cutting teeth, by pressing a hard substance against the gum. It knows nothing ^bout the nature of teeth, or the mode of quickening their growth ; but acts fn)m impulse, without the t^ontemplatioii of motives. Reason, how^ever, is that power by which the mind compai^s known truths, so as to ascertain their rolations, and reach those which were unknown. Thus, men saw the paper-shelted nautilus spreading its thin membrane to the breeze, and by the impulse of wind and the force of its arms, moving on the surface of the water ; and when a storm arose^ they saw it contract its membrane, fill its shell with water, and sink to the bottom. Hence reason inferred that a vessel, of less specific gravity than water, might by means of an expanded sheet, be made to move upon the surface of the ocean. After the first rude attempts were made, new ideas were obtained and compared, new principles developed, and so the art of navigation reached a lofty pitch of perfection. Reason could thus take a hint from instinct, and by its power of progressive improvement, reach some distant and unseen result. Man could thus become with profit the disciple of nature,

12 INTRQDUOTOIIY ESSAY.

His arts of bulletin g from the bee i^eceive,

Lreuni of the little nautilus to sail,,

But instinct can never ha improved. It is onlyadapted to the present exigencies of the creatures which act from its impulse. The present race of Nautili know no more of navigation than did the first parents of the species. So too, the present generation of bees and beavers, know no more about architecture than the first of their several races knew ; and unless their nature change, not one of their species ever will know more.

Here, then, is a strongly marked distinction between Instinct and Reason. The first is not susceptible of improvement, while the latter is infinitely progressive. From the most simple principles^ she ascends step by step to tbe most splendid results, till she herself stands amaz^ed at the extent and grandeur of her (Jiscoveries. From observing the fall of an apple. Sir Isaac Newton derived the law of gravitation, which extends from this to distant worlds. To the progress of reason, we can S:et no limits. Naught but eternity and an onbounded universe furnish full scope for her exercise.

Again, instinct needs no training, while reason is scarcely developed without cultivation. The bird that has been nurtured in a cage, and then permitted to fly forth, will construct its nest with an accuracy which human art cannot imitate ; — just as if it had . been reared under the tuition of its mother. But a man who had spent his early years in seclusion from society, would know nothing of the mode of providing for his own comfort. Thus Pope very justly asks.

Bay, where full instinct is the unerring guide. What Pope or Coimcil can they need beside 1 Reas )n however able-, cool at best, Cares not for service or but serves when prest y Stays till w-e call, aad then not often near. But honest instinct comes, a volunteer ; Sure ne'er to over«hoot, but just to hit, While still too wide or short is l)uma« wit.

This leads us to observe that instinct differs from reason in the superior accuracy of its results. An architect may err in adjusting the form and size of a building ; but the bee forms her cell with wondrous skill and unerring precision. McLaurin, a celebrated mathematician, calculated the exact angle at which the three planes which form the basis of the cell of a honey-comb must meet, in order to possess the greatest degree of strength, and make the best economy of labor and material. This problem he solved by a process in fluxions ; and when he came to measure the angle, found it to accord with his calculation most minutely. Now if this be the result of reason in the becj then she possesses

14 K^RODUCTORY ES^AY;

it in a greater degree than the majority of the human family. If it be instinct, then in her operations^ we must admire the handy -work of the Deity^

' For, reason raise o'er iastj»ct as we can, liQr this 'tis G:Od that works, in that 'tis man.'

Reasoning consists in a comparison of propositions. Commencing with those which we see to be true by intuition, that is, those which our constitution compels us to take for granted, we compare them with others which are related to them and those again with others, till we arrive at results which we could not have reached, without the intervention of these intermediate ideas. It is thus in both of the great departments of reasoning, the moral and the demonstrative. The demonstrative is that which respects oiily abstract subjects, and theiic^ necessary relations, such as the properties of numbers^of mathematical figures, extension, duration, weight, velocity and force. It is particularly valuable to every man, from its tendency to strengthen the mind, to impart to it habits of accurate discrimination, to inspire it with a love for truth, and thus to prepare it for suc-^ cessful operation in the great business of moral reasoning.

To this latter department, belong the sub-^ jects on which we are daily called to employ Qur thoughts ; the various relations, the duties;

and the rights of men, the important themes furnished by history, the constitution of society, politics, law, theology, political economy, and all that may be denominated matters of fact. Obviously, therefore, every man is obliged every day to carry forward in his mind processes of moral reasoning : and on the mode in which he habitually does it, will depend, in a great degree, his course of conduct, the complexion of his opinions, and the tone of his character.

While it must be admitted that an attention to mathematics greatly assists the mind in the conduct of moral reasoning, yet it is true that an exclusive attention to the former, unfits a man for the latter. The influence of mathematical studies on the habits of the mind has been often undervalued, and doubtless it has been sometimes overrated. There have been known men, who have devoted almost all their time and energy to mathematical pursuits, men who could hold distinctly before their minds the long details of a difficult demonstration, and commencing with axioms, go from step to step to some remote result with most marvellous precision, who in the ordinary affairs of life evinced a lack of common sense, which would have discredited an untutored peasant. The entire devotion of the mind to demonstrative reasoning, seems to be as effectual in debilitating the judgment as the taste ;

and the effect which it has upon the latter, may be learned from the well-known story of the mathematician, who, having read Milton's Paradise Lost, sagely asked in the tone of an objector, what the poem had proved !

The reason of this influence is obvious from the nature of the case. In demonstrative reasoning, a man becomes possessed of the most absolute certainty ; but in moral reasoning, he can reach only what is called moral certainty, or a commanding probability. Thus, in reasoning on the question whether the square of the hypothenase of a right angled triangle, is equal to the sum of the squares of the two sides, as he compares one idea with another, he sees the truth at every step by intuition ; and w^hen he reaches the result, he knows that it cannot possibly be otherwise ; that the opposite position would be absurd. But in reasoning on such questions as these, ' is the practice of war right or wrong ?' ' is a national tariff beneficial or injurious ?' ^ is the conduct of the United States towards the Indians just or unjust ?' much would depend on a man's early association of ideas, the state of his moral feelings, the degree in which his interests might be affected by the result of the inquiry ; and even when he had reached a correct decision, he could not say that the opposite were philosophically absurd, but only that the weight of evidence was on the other side. In order, therefore, to be a skilful moral reasoner, it is necessary that the judgment be trained to accuracy, in estimating the relative worth of different kinds of evidence ; to discern amidst intricate and distracting inquiries, where the commanding probability appears, and to submit to it as readily as to mathematical certainty.

From this view of the subject, it is obvious that in many instances, a man's opinions on moral subjects may be regarded as sure tests of his character. The reason is, that such opinions are greatly modified by the state of the moral feelings. This is a fact too often overlooked ; and thence, men have been led to plead for the innocence of error. ' To affect belief,' says one, ' you must affect the subject of it, by producing new arguments or considerations. The understanding being passive, as to the impressions made upon it, if you wish to change those impressions, you must change the cause which produces them. You can alter perceptions only by altering the thing perceived. Every man's consciousness will tell him, that the will can ao more modify the effect of an argument upon the understanding than it can change the taste of sugar to the palate, or the fragrance of a rose to the smell ; and that nothing can weaken its force as apprehended by the intellect, but another argument opposed to it.' Now all this is un« doubtedly true within the sphere of demonstrative reasoning. There the evidence is of such a nature, as to sway aUke all minds which contemplate it, whether rude or refined, whether vicious or virtuous. There, pride and prejudice, and passion and selfishness, are of no avail. But within the sphere of moral reasoning, these elements work wonders, in giving to opinions their colour and complexion. Suppose for instance, that you would fain persuade a man who is making a fortune by the traffic in ardent spirit, to abandon his pursuit, and take a decided stand under the banner of the Temperance Reform.

You present before him, perhaps, a cloud of witnesses composed of the most reputable physicians in the world, all attesting that alcohol is a poison, and that any quantity taken by a man in health, does him injury rather than good ; you prove from official documents, that it is the cause of three fourths of the pauperism and crime that exist in the land, that it is the most powerful of all temptations in leading youth astray from the path of virtue, that it is the great bane of domestic happinctss ; and you urge him by all that is endearing in his relation to his family, to his country, and to society around him, by all that is affecting in the tears and groans and woes of the more than widowed mother weeping over her helpless children, of the fond sister lamenting the ruin of a once lovely brother, and of the yet youthful wife mourning over the wreck of her most sacred hopes, you urge him by all that is ennobling in philanthropy, and all that is imperious in moral obligation, to forsake at once and forever, a business so fraught with death and destruction. The argument is to you most convincing ; and so it seems to every unbiassed mind. Yes, to such it is not merely convincing ; it sheds a blaze of light, intense and overpowering. But this man perchance will calmly reply, that he is not convinced ; that you have a right to your opinion ; but for his own part, he believes that ^ a little will do a man good,' that he means to use it moderately himself as long as he lives, and to manufacture it as a proper article of trade. Now why is not this man convinced ? Is there any want of light, any defect of evidence ? Must a new array of arguments be brought forward to sustain your position ? No. Change now, the man's circumstances. Suppose that instead of acquiring wealth by the traffic in alcohol, he were sure of making a fortune by an alliance with the cause of Temperance. Then the first argument you presented would be sufficient to convince him. Then, not only would his opinion accord with yours, but he would probably express his wonder that any man of sane mind and common humanity could come to a different conclusion. From the very nature of mor^l reasonings therefore, it is well adapted to man's present condition as a state of probation. It does furnish a test of character. The light which irradiates the path of duty, may seem to the man of honest heart as clear as that of the unclouded sun, while to the man of another spirit, it may appear as dim and feeble as ' the pale moon-beam's sickly ray.' *

The modes of moral reasoning are three ; analogy, induction, deduction.

I. Analogy. By this is meant a similitude in the relations of things. It supposes a harmonious uniformity in the laws of nature, which w^e are all. led to admit, not so much from deliberately weighing the results of past experience, as from the dictates of our mental constitution. We all believe that the sun will rise to-morrow, not so much from estimating the worth of our experience on the subject, or the testimony of history that it always was so, as from the natural tendency of our minds to confide in the constancy of nature. We are conscious of just such a tendency to trust in reasoning from analogy, which supposes that any general principle which pervades one part of the natural or moral universe, which

* The cause of the difficulty lies not in the thincrs, but in ourselves. For as the e3'es of bats to day-light, so is the human mind to objects which are in their own liature the clearest of all.— »^r«>^ Metaph. lib, 2, cap 1.

INTRODtrcTORY ESSAY. 21

falls within the sphere of our observation, pervades also those parts which are beyond that sphere, where the circumstances are similar. Thus, as we look over the earth, we perceive a most wise and beneficent adaptation of the laws of nature to promote the happiness of animated beings hke ourselves. Then, as we look up to the heavens, and contemplate the planets Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn, we are struck with the view of just such an adaptation there. Like the earth, they revolve around the sun, and receive their light from him ; like the earth, several of them are known to turn around their axis, and thence have the alternations of day and night ; hke the earth, they receive lunar light in the absence of the solar, and all are subject to the same law of gravitation. Thence to a mind conversant with the laws of the universe, the inference is natural and almost resistless, that they are the abodes of rational beings.

We reason analogically, from the natural to the moral world thus. When we see that the Author of the universe acts upon a general principle in the natural world, we take it for granted that he acts upon the same principle in the moral world, wliere the nature of the case will admit its application. For instance, w^e see in the natural world, an adaptation of means to ends, and an inseparable connexion established between them, so that if a man

S2 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY.

would gain any physical blessing, such a^ health, strength or wealth, he must use the appointed means; exercise and temperance, industry and economy. So in the intellectual and moral world, if a man would advance in knowledge and virtue, and enjoy peace of mind, he must use the appropriate means ; decision of purpose, persevering effort, self* denial, the disciphne of the passions, and obe* dience to the dictates of conscience.

So fitted is the human mind to be swayed by analogical reasoning, that often it will be effectual, where every other kind of argument will fail. Especially, is this the case, among the less informed classes of society. Suppose that in travelling through some of the ruder parts of our country, you should find an honest yeoman, prejudiced against the education of children ; saying that they would become better men and citizens, if they v/ere permitted to grow up under the simple tuition of nature and common sense, than they would if their characters were moulded by any of your artificial systems of education now in vogue : if you should endeavour to convince him of his error by explaining the nature of education, and the various benefits which it is thence adapted to impart, you would probably not succeed. But if you should point him to his corn-field, his orchard, or his garden, and ask him whether he could derive any fruit from

INTRODtfCTORY ESSAY. 23

them without cultivation, whether, if left to itself, the soil would not be overrun with weeds and briars, he w^ould doubtless give you a correct answer. Then reply, if such be the law of nature, is it possible that the human mind can yield its riches, and present to view such a scene of beauty and order as it is capable of exhibiting without cultivation and without care ? And he would probably acknowledge by words or by silence, the force of your appeal.

Hence, we can easily perceive, how well adapted were the instructions of onr Saviour to the wants of the common people. For these, he felt a special care. These ' heard him gladly.' To these he chiefly addressed himself, not merely in apothegms and precepts, but also in parables, which were marked by the most beautiful simplicity, and which derived much of their force from the analogy between the material and the spiritual world.

The object of analogical reasoning is twofold ; 1st. to lead the way in the discovery of new truths ; 2d. to establish those already known.

The principle on which it leads to the discovery of truth we have already stated ; namely, that the Author of the universe governs it by general laws, so that if we discover a law which governs one part of the universe, we may suppose it to exist every where in like circumstances. Analogy thus becomes the pioneer of science. We see this illustrated in the train of thought, which led the mind of Sir Isaac Newton to one of the grandest results it ever reached. * As he sat alone in his garden, he fell into a speculation on the power of gravity ; that as this power sensibly diminished, at the remotest distances from the centre of the earth, to w^hich we can rise, it appeared to him that this power must extend much further than is usually thought. Why not as high as the moon, said he to himself: and if so, her motion must be influenced by it ; perhaps she is retained in her orbit thereby ; and if the moon be retained in her orbit by the force of gravity, no doubt the primary planets are carried round the sun by the like power.'* Thus was he enabled, by the aid of a farreaching analogy, to strike out a brilliant path of discovery, and to give to the world an interpretation of nature's laws so lucid and so wonderful, that it seemed almost like a revelation from heaven.

Not only is analogical reasoning, a guide to the discovery of physical, but also of moral truths. This it was which led Socrates and his disciples to confide so strongly in the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. They saw that every object in the world around them

* Dr. Pemberton's preface to the acconnt of Sir Isaac Newton's discoveries ; as quoted in Dr. Wayland's discourse on the Philosophy of Analogy.

was made perfect in its nature ; every blade of grass,

* And herb and flower, With numerous beasts of every kind, and fowl Of every wing, and every tuneful note, And all the fish that in the multitude Of waters swam,'

the whole animate creation seemed to have upon it the impress of perfection, and to attain in its present state of existence the end for which it had been formed. But man, endowed with far nobler powers than any of God's creatures on the earth, capable of boundless progression in knowledge and moral excellence, during his present state of being just begins to expand. His soul develops itself just enough to give some faint idea of its vast capacities, and then it is summoned away from this theatre of action. It does not come nigh the high and glorious end, for which from its nature it seems to have been designed. Now it would be against all analogy to suppose that the Creator hath made man so much in vain as he must have done if there be no future state, where the faculties of the human spirit can be devel-^ oped to their full extent. ' Made in the divine image, man must be immortal, or else, the noblest of all the Creator's works must be more imperfectly formed than the meanest reptile ; an incredible anomaly in a universe which is all order and regularity,'