The evolution of beliefs

Contents

CHAPTER PAGE

I. Religion and Science .... 9 II. The Datum of Belief , ... 31

III. The Specialized Ideas of Supernat-

Preface

During our investigations of the religious subject for the past thirty years, we have successfully established a belief in every way satisfactory to us and the requirements of nature.

We have also determined, beyond all questions to the contrary, that the Bible was written by vulgar authority, similar to all other books, and is hence not a divine revelation.

However, our object is neither to prove the Bible true, nor yet to prove it untrue; but simply to show what it teaches.

If its teaching is divine, and necessarily true, it follows that a man created the universe.

Not being prepared to accept this proposition as a true statement of the facts, we have no hesitancy in saying that the Bible is not an inspired or divine revelation.

Did the Bible excel, in purity of ideas and expressions, all the books I know extant in the world, I could not accept it for my rule of faith as being the word of the Almighty Creator, because the possibility would still remain of my being imposed upon.

In our treatment of Evolution of Belief, the main object has been to bring us in closer touch with the true Creator and further from those of a spurious type.

And whether it be a Christian, pagan, or Jew ; gentile, theologian, philosopher, or theist; idolator, king, or artisan, it is immaterial who knocks at truth's door; her admissions are not Hmited to doctrine, wealth, position, nor title.

If the participant's spirit maintains, in its environments, honest, unprejudiced, impassionate principles, keeping, at the same time, in a mental condition of sincerity, he may perceive in Nature, whose bountiful store is ever overflowing with the realities of ex-

Pteface istence, a most exalted and perfect image of Truth, the agent to regulate his conduct on the journey of Eternity.

Hence, the honest, truth and justice-loving individual, who desires to obtain the facts from an unprejudiced investigation of such an all-important subject, we submit a part of our labor, contained in the pages of this book, to your careful perusal.

In the compilation of it, and in the original parts of its construction, to suit our purpose, we have consulted the following authors :

Herbert Spencer, A. J. Davis, the Christian Bible, the International Cyclopedia, the Universal Dictionary, Thomas Paine, Draper, Huxley, Webster, and Hull.

Very respectfully,

J. W. Gordon, M.D., M.E.

Bowerston, Ohio, Feb. 25, 191 1.

The Author,

Chapter I. Religion And Science

In the succeeding chapters of this volume the genesis of deities will be fully set forth by implication and by a chapter dealing specially with the subject. In these, we will notice those classes of deities in which human personalities have been greatly disguised. Again dealing with those classes of deities which arose by simple idealization and expansion of human personalities.

We have also noticed that some men, by misinterpretation of traditions, had their individualities merged into those of natural objects, while the individuahties of other men survived with manlike attributes. In addition to this it has further been demonstrated that the early traditions represent rulers as gods and fabulous heroes as demigods.

Primitive kings were regarded by their subjects as superhuman in origin and superhuman in power ; they possessed divine titles, received obeisances similar to those made before the altars of the deities, and in some instances they were actually worshipped.

If there needs proof that the divine and half divine characters originally ascribed to monarchs were ascribed literally, we have it in the fact that there are

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still existing savage races, among whom it is held that the chiefs and their kindred are of celestial origin, or, as elsewhere, that only the chiefs have souls. And it is not strange that along with beliefs of this nature there existed a belief in the unlimited power of the ruler over his subjects, which extended to an absolute possession of them, even to the taking of their lives at the will of the ruler, as we find yet in Fiji, where a victim stands unbound to be killed at the word of his chief, himself declaring, "Whatever the king says must be done."

However, among less barbarous races at other times, we have found these beliefs a little modified.

Instead of the monarch being literally thought god or demigod, he was conceived to be a man having divine authority, with perhaps more or less of divine nature. As in the East at the present day, he retained titles expressing his heavenly descent or relationships, and is saluted in forms and words as humble as those addressed to the Deity. While practically the lives and property, if not so completely at his mercy, are supposed to be his.

And we find during the middle ages, at a time later in the progress of civilization of Europe, the current opinions respecting the relationship of rulers and the ruled are further changed.

Now divine right becomes substituted for the theory of divine origin. There is no longer god or demigod, or even god descended; he is now only simply regarded as God's vice-gerent, an officer deputed to exercise the power of another.

His sacred titles now lose much of their meaning, while the obeisances made to him are not so extreme in their humility. Moreover, his authority ceases to be unlimited. Subjects yield allegiance only in the

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shape of obedience to his commands and deny his right to dispose of their Hves and properties.

With the advancement of civiHzation poHtical opinion has caused a still greater restriction of imperial power.

A belief in the supernatural character of the ruler, which by us long ago was repudiated, has left nothing more than a popular tendency to ascribe unusual goodness, wisdom, and beauty to the monarch.

Originally, loyalty meant implicit submission to the king's will, but now it means merely a profession of subordination and the fulfilment of certain forms of respect. And those regal prerogatives which were once possessed unquestioned, our political theory and practice to-day, similarly, reject them.

By putting some men in their places and deposing others, we have not only denied the divine rights of certain ones to rule, but have denied their rights beyond those originating in the assent of the nation.

Though our state documents and our forms of speech still assert the subjection of the people to the ruler, our actual beliefs, with our daily practices, impHcitly assert the opposite.

We obey no laws except those of our own making ; the monarch has been entirely divested of legislative power; and we should immediately rebel against his exercise of such power, even in matters of the smallest concern.

In ancient times, the individuals existed for the benefit of the State, whether the governments were popular or despotic ; they had unlimited authority over their subjects, but now the State exists for the benefit of the people. In brief, the aboriginal doctrine is all but extinct among us.

The views entertained respecting governments in II

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general, of whatever form, are now widely different from those once entertained.

Laws regulating dress and modes of living, ages since, have fallen into disuse, and any attempt to revive them would prove the current opinion to be that such matters lie beyond the sphere of legal control.

For some centuries the people have been asserting in practice, and now have established the theory, that every man has a right to choose his own religious beliefs, instead of having to receive such beliefs on State authority.

Within the last few generations, we have inaugurated complete liberty of speech, and urge that the sole function of the State is the protection of persons against each other, and against a foreign foe. It is also further asserted, throughout civilization, that a manifest tendency has been to continually extend the liberties of the subject, and restrict the functions of the State, so that the ultimate political condition must be one in which personal freedom is the greatest while governmental power is the least possible. This means, namely, that in which the freedom of each has no Hmit but the like freedom of all, while the Hke governmental duty is the maintenance of this limit.

Here, then, in different times and places, we find concerning the origin, authority, and functions of the government, a great variety of opinions.

But now what must be said about the truth or falsity of these opinions? Save among a few tjarbarous tribes, the notion that a monarch is a god or demigod is regarded throughout the world as an absurdity almost passing the bounds of human credulity. The belief that there is anything sacred in legislative regulations is dying out; laws are coming to be considered as conventional only. In most civilized communities, that still admit the divine right of govern-

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ments, they have long since repudiated the divine right of kings. And now it is only in a few places that there survives a vague notion ascribing supernatural attributes to their ruler.

Hence of all antagonisms of belief, the oldest, the widest, the most profound, the most important, and about which the unprejudiced thinking mind of the world desires to know the truth, is the controversy between Religion and Science.

The question here will not be the value or novelty of some particular truth arrived at, but to exhibit the more general truth, which we are apt to overlook : that between the most opposite beliefs there is usually something in common. In all these conflicts something must be taken for granted by each, and if this something cannot be set down as an unquestionable verity, it may yet be considered to have the highest degree of probability.

Such involves a postulate, which, similar to the one above instanced, is not consciously asserted but unconsciously involved, not consciously by one man or body of men whose beliefs diverge in countless ways and degrees, but by numerous bodies of men who have a warrant for transcending any that usually can be shown. But in this case when the postulate is abstract and is not based on some one concrete experience common to all mankind, but implies an induction from a great variety of experiences, we may say that it ranks next in certainty to the postulates of exact science.

But in our research for the elements of truth contained in the things erroneous, we hope to bring home clearly the fact that in opinions appearing absolutely and supremely wrong, there is something to be found which should indicate our method in obtaining that which is right. This method will be to compare all

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opinions of the same genus; to set aside all those various special and concrete elements discrediting one another in which such opinions disagree ; to observe what remains after the discordant constituents have been eliminated; and then to find for this remaining constituent that abstract expression which holds true throughout its divergent modifications.

This general principle being accepted and the course it indicates having been adopted, will greatly aid us while dealing with those chronic antagonisms wherein men are at variance.

By applying such a measure not only to the current ideas with which we are unconcerned, but also to our own ideas and those of our opponents, we will be enabled to form far more correct judgments.

Being ever ready to suspect that the convictions we may entertain will not be wholly right and that the adverse convictions will not be wholly wrong, we will not on the one hand, in common with the great mass of the unthinking, let our beliefs be determined by the mere accidents of birth in a particular age, or on a particular part of the earth's surface; and on the other hand, we shall be saved from the error of entire and contemptuous negation, which is fallen into by most all who take up an independent attitude of criticism.

As we shall now notice, antagonism of belief commenced when the recognition of the simplest uniformities in surrounding things set a limit to the once universal superstition.

It has shown itself everywhere throughout the domain of human knowledge, affecting men*s interpretations alike of even the simplest mechanical accidents and of the most complicated events in the histories of nations.

In the different orders of minds, it has its roots deep

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down in the diverse habits of thought. And these diverse habits of thought severally, generating conflicting conceptions of nature and life, influence for good, or evil, the tone of life and feeling prompting conduct.

This unceasing battle in the antagonism of opinion, carried on through ages, under the banners of Religion and Science, has of necessity generated an animosity fatal to the estimate of either party to the other.

But the time has come when an increasing catholicity of feeling is displayed, which we expect to carry as far as our natures deem valuable for the benefit of humanity.

In proportion as we love the truth more, and victory less, we shall be prepared to know what leads our opponents to think as they do.

Suspecting that the pertinacity of belief exhibited by them must result from a perception of something we have not perceived, our aim will be to supplement the portion of truth found by us by the portion furnished by them. In our more rational estimate of human authority we shall equally avoid the extremes of undue submission and undue rebellion.

In doing this it will not become necessary for us to regard some men's judgments as wholly good and others as wholly bad; but will prefer to lean to the more defensible opinion that none are completely right and none are completely wrong. This impartial attitude being as far as possible preserved, we will then contemplate two sides to this great controversy. Shutting out the bias of education and the whisperings of sectarian feeling, let us conscientiously contemplate what are the a priori probabilities in favor of each party.

If we duly realize the general principle above illustrated, it will lead us to anticipate that the existing

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diverse forms of belief have had and still remain to have a bias in some ultimate fact.

Should we judge by analogy, the inference would be that not any of them is altogether right, but that in each there must be something more or less wrong.

It may be that the element of truth contained in the erroneous creeds is very much dissimilar to the several embodiments, and as we have good reason to suspect, it is much more abstract, wherein the unlikeness necessarily follows.

But however this element differs from its concrete expressions, some essential verity must be looked for. Should we suppose that all these multiform conceptions are absolutely groundless, would discredit too profoundly that average human intelligence from which we inherit all our individual intelligence.

The more general reasons here are, we shall find, enforced by other more special ones. To the presumption that a number of diverse beliefs of the same class have some common foundation in fact, we must add a further presumption derived from the omnipresence of the beliefs. We must in the start admit that religious ideas of one variety or another are almost universal, and then seek to find the reasons for each.

We know that in places there are tribes who have no theory for creation, no word for deity, no propitiatory acts, no idea of another Hfe. We have further learned, also, that it is only when a certain phase of intelligence is reached that the most rudimentary of such theories make their appearance; but when they do, the imiplication is practically the same.

We will grant that among all races, who have passed a certain stage of development, that there are found vague notions concerning the origin and hidden nature of surrounding things; and here arises the in-

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ference that such ideas must be necessary products of progressing intelligence.

The endless variety of such notions serves to strengthen this conclusion, which shows a more or less independent genesis, indicating in different places and times that similar conditions have generated the same trains of thought ending in analogous results.

That these different and yet countless allied phenomena presented by all religions, are accidental or factitious, is an untenable supposition.

The doctrine maintained by some, that creeds are priestly inventions, is quite negatived by a candid examination of the evidence.

This, as a mere question of probability, cannot rationally be concluded, that in each past, present, savage, and civilized society certain members of the community have combined to delude the others in ways so nearly similar.

If it is alleged that a primitive fiction was devised by some original and primary priesthood, previous to the dispersion of mankind from the common center, the answer is furnished by philology, which proves that the dispersion of mankind took place before the existence of a language sufficient to express religious ideas. But should we grant it otherwise tenable the hypothesis of artificial origin does not account for the facts.

Why certain elements of religious belief remain constant under all changes of form, it does not explain.

Neither does it show us how it happens that, while adverse criticism has from age to age gone on destroying particular theological dogmas, the fundamental conception underlying these dogmas has not been destroyed.

The hypothesis of an artificial fiction for the origin

of the many religions leaves us without any solution of the more striking circumstance, that when absurdities and corruptions accumulate around them, national creeds have fallen into discredit, ending in diflferentisms or positive denial, which has always been followed sooner or later by a reassertion of them. It may not be the same in form, but still the same in essence.

Thus the independent evolution among primitive races of religious ideas and the general universality of them among most all races, with their great vital tenacity, combine to show that their origin must have been deeply seated and not superficial.

If they have not been supernaturally derived as the majority contend, we are obliged to admit in other words that they must have been derived out of human experiences slowly accumulated and organized.

Should it be asserted that religious sentiment originated religious ideas, to satisfy merely the demands, which afterward projected imagination into the external world to be mistaken for realities, does not yet solve the problem, but only removes it further back.

If it should be asserted that sentiment and idea have a common genesis, we desire to know who is the father of the sentiment idea.

That the sentiment is a constituent of man's nature is implied in the hypothesis and cannot be denied by any other.

But the religious sentiment which is displayed habitually by the majority of mankind cannot be ignored, because it may be classed among the human emotions occasionally in those who are seemingly devoid of it.

Here, as elsewhere, we are forced to ask its origin and function. To say the least, it is an attribute of enormous influence, which has played a conspicuous

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part throughout the past as far back as the records of history; it is at present the stimulus to perpetual controversies, the life of many institutions, and the prompter of countless daily actions.

Now we may say that whatever does not take account of this attribute must be a very defective theory. Were there no other view, here, than a question of philosophy, and we should be called on to say what this attribute means, the task cannot be declined without an acknowledgment that the philosophy is incompetent.

In this two suppositions present themselves, namely, first, that the feeHng which responds to religious ideas resulted in union with all other human faculties, from an act of special creation; the other one, that the sentiment, in common with the rest, arose by a process of evolution.

If we adopt the first theory, which was the one universally accepted by our ancestors and now by the immense majority of our co-temporaries, the matter is at once settled that man has been naturally endowed by a religious feeling from his creator, and to this creator his feeling naturally responds.

But should the second theory be adopted, then the question comes, to what is the circumstances of the genesis. What is its office?

The circumstances force the entertainment of these questions, to which answers must be furnished.

On this supposition all the faculties must be considered to result from the intercourse of the organism with its environment. Again obliging us to admit that in the environment there exists certain phenomena or conditions which have developed the feeling now in question ; but this causes us to admit that the feeling is as normal as any other of our faculties. But should the hypothesis be a development of the lower

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forms into the higher, the end to which the changes directly or indirectly tend, which are the adaptation of the requirements of existence, we are yet confronted with the notion that these feelings are conducive to our welfare. Thus both theories contain a similar ultimate implication.

In either case, then, we are obliged to conclude that the religious sentiment is directly created or else created by the slow action of natural causes; and whichever of these conclusions we adopt requires that the religious sentiment be treated with due respect.

And there is one other consideration which should not be overlooked, which should be more especially pointed out to students of science, and that is this : While they are occupied with established truths, and are accustomed to regard things not already known as things to be discovered, they are liable to forget the truth that information, however extensive, can never satisfy inquiry. Possible knowledge, no matter how extensive it may be, does not, and never can, fill the region of possible thought. Whatever the field of utmost discovery may be, there must ever arise in the infinite the question: What lies beyond?

In all scientific problems there is presented to us the same difficulties that we find in thinking of a limit to space in a manner to exclude the idea of space lying outside of that limit, so that, on the other hand, no explanation can be sufficiently propounded to exclude the question : "What is the explanation of that explanation?"

But we do understand that if science is regarded as a gradually increasing sphere, every addition tends only to bring it in a wider contact with nescience.

From these conceptions we perceive that there must always remain two antithetical modes of mental action. In all future time, as at present, the human

C6e Ctjolutfon of TStlittg mind may occupy itself not only with ascertained phenomena and their relations, but also with that unascertained something which phenomena and their relations denote. Hence, we see that knowledge cannot monopolize consciousness. Then, if it must always be possible for the mind to dwell upon that which transcends knowledge, there will never cease to be in the minds of men a place for something in the nature of religion, since under all its forms religion is distinguished from everything else in the fact that its subject matter is the thing which passes the sphere of experience.

It does not matter how imtenable all the religious creeds may be, or how great the absurdities associated with them, nor however irrational the argument rendered in their defense, the verity which lies hidden in them should not be ignored.

The omnipresence of religious beliefs, of one kind or other, forces the other probability that widely spread beliefs are not absolutely baseless.

And we here, further find, a general fact of similar implication, that wherein nescience must always remain the antithesis of science, there is a sphere for the exercise of this sentiment.

In other words, where ignorance is the opposer of knowledge, there must always be a field for religious sentiment. Now we may be sure that religions, though none of them may be virtually true, they are all adumbrations of truth.

Should we attempt to set forth any justification to the religious for religion would seem absurd, so, too, it would seem absurd to the scientific to undertake to defend science.

Yet, it is just as necessary to do the last, as it is needful to do the first. If there are those who have contracted a repugnance toward religion from con-

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tempt of its follies and disgust of its corruptions, which causes them to overlook the verity contained in it; so, too, there is a class offended, to such a degree, by the destructive criticisms men of science make on religious tenets, which they have regarded essential, that the latter have, in general, acquired a stout prejudice against science. And these are unprepared with any avowed reasons for their dislike.

Having a faint remembrance of the rude shakes science has given to many of their cherished convictions, they suspicion that perhaps it may eventually uproot all that has been regarded as sacred, and hence this produces in their conceptions a certain inarticulate dread.

What is science?

To the absurdity of the prejudiced against it, there need only be remarked that science is simply a higher development of common knowledge; and to repudiate science would have the same ultimate effect as to repudiate all knowledge along with it.

Certainly the extremest bigot would not suspect the least harm to come from his observation that the sun rises earlier and sets later in summer than in winter; but he would sooner incline to think such an observation a useful aid in the fulfilment of the necessary duties of life.

But astronomy made with greater nicety is an organized body of similar observations, extended to a larger number of the celestial objects, being so analyzed in their real arrangement that they disclose a true relation of the heavenly bodies, dispelling any false conceptions we might otherwise entertain about them. And again that iron will rust when left in contact with moisture, that wood will burn, that longkept viands may become putrid, the most timid sectarian will teach without alarm accruing to his relig-

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ious principles, believing that they are useful truths to be known.

But these are truths derived from a knowledge of chemistry, a systematized collection of such facts are ascertained with precision, and then classified and generalized in such a system that we are enabled to say with certainty concerning each simple or compound substance what change will occur in it under given conditions. And thus it is with all the sciences.

Germinating out of the experiences of daily life, insensibly as they grow, they severally draw in remoter, more numerous, and more complex experiences, among which they ascertain laws of dependence similar to those which make up our knowledge of the most familiar objects.

It is impossible to draw a boundary line and then say here is where science begins.

And as the field of common observation has for its function the guidance of conduct, so, too, the guidance of conduct has for its office the most abstract and recondite inquiries of science.

Through the various modes of locomotion and the countless industrial processes which it has given to us, a knowledge of physics regulates more completely our social life than does the meagre acquaintance with the properties of surrounding bodies regulate the life of the savage.

Through the effects of a knowledge of anatomy and physiology, on the practice of medicine and hygiene, our actions have been modified almost as much as they have been by a knowledge and acquaintance of the evils and benefits produced on our bodies by the environing agencies.

It is to be remembered, or at least should, that all science is prevision, and all foreknowledge ultimately

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aids us in greater or less degree to achieve the good and avoid the bad.

Just as certainly as an object lying in our path warns us against stumbling over it, just so certainly does those complicated and subtle perceptions, which constitute science, warn us against stumbling over the obstacles intervening in the pursuit of our distant ends. So, that the simplest as well as the most complex cognitions in form, being one in origin and function, must be dealt with in the same manner.

Our mental faculties, consistently, require that we receive the highest possible knowledge, limited in extent only by our capabilities, or else reject that knowledge possessed by all of narrow compass.

Between accepting our intelligence in its entirety, or repudiating the lowest intelligence which may be even possessed in common with brutes, there is no alternative.

Should it be asked if the laws governing science are true — a question which more immediately concerns our argument — would be much like asking whether the sun gives light.

Because the theological party are conscious of how undeniably valid are most of the propositions of science, they regard it with much secret alarm.

They know that mathematics, physics, astronomy, some of its larger divisions, have been for two thousand years of their growth subjected to the most rigorous criticisms of successive generations; and for all this have become even more firmly established.

Dissimilar to their own doctrines, which were once universally received, but have, age by age, been more frequently called into question, the theologians know that the doctrines of science, at first confined to a few scattered inquiries, have been slowly growing

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into general acceptance, which, now, in great part, are beyond dispute.