Contributions to the science of education

Introduction

Of the three phases of educational study, the historical, the practical, and the scientific, it is the last which I propose to discuss in the papers composing this volume. The question of method is of very high importance, but the final test of method is doctrine. The history of education, or of the manifold attempts that have been made to solve the educational problem, is of supreme importance, but experiences and experiments can be interpreted and estimated only by the light of science. The question of educational doctrine is therefore fundamental.

It is a hopeful sign of progress in education that we are now fairly entering upon the discussion of principles and doctrines. Hitherto there has been a discussion of methods, often without a criterion, and even when a standard of values has been proposed, the final test has been success or failure; but reflection shows that the only absolute criterion is principle or law. And so we observe that in the press and in the convention there is a growing disposition to carry an appeal to the court of last resort, educational science.

Every author who records his serious convictions and the results of his deliberate thinking doubtless owes it to his v i INTRODUCTION.

readers to forewarn them of the main ideas that inspire his efforts. Such a clew is the more necessary in a volume of detached essays like those which follow, and I bespeak the attention of the reader to the following statements, both as an aid to himself and as an act of courteous justice to me.

I am in nowise disposed to break with the past and to dream of an approaching revolution in educational theory and practice. A better future for the schools is doubtless foreordained, but this is to be a growth, slow and halting, like all higher forms of growth, and a growth out of past conditions and products. The institutions of a people, to be serviceable and helpful, cannot be far in advance of their actual condition ; and if the dream of the educational utopist could be realized in form, it would be inoperative with men and things as they are. It is well that our previsions are only relative. We need to aspire in order that we may grow ; but the roots of all true growth in civilization reach far back into the soil of the past.

Since the human mind has been studied by the acutest thinkers of all ages and countries, and since the wisest and the best of men have been working at the educational problem under all conceivable conditions, ethnic, social, civil, and religious, I find it impossible to believe that all this mighty effort must go for naught, and that educational science must be constructed de novo. That the main data for the establishment of a rational art of educating are now to be found in the current systems of philosophy and psychology seems to me the most probable of infer-

INTRODUCTION. v ji

ences; and that there really exist a sufficient number of such data to lay the foundations of a science of education seems to me the most palpable of truths. For these reasons may we not think that the present duty of the educational thinker is to select and collate data already established, and to draw from them the rules for practice ? It is within this field that I have attempted to work, and in the discussions that follow I have tried to do scarcely more than to illustrate and enforce what appear to be well-established and fundamental truths.

Perhaps the term tacking will best describe the current mode of educational progress ; in his recoil from what seems to be a serious error in schoolroom practice, the reformer catches hold of some neglected truth, concentrates his whole soul on his new discovery, denounces the whole existing order of things as irretrievably bad, and by his declamation incites the unthinking and the malcontent to a revolution in methods. Finally the grain of wheat is winnowed from the bushel of chaff, and the pendulum of opinion swings back towards the abandoned truth. In the absence of well -settled principles these epidemics will always be imminent; but with even a few fundamental doctrines distinctly recognized, it would be possible to make progress in an orderly and rational manner. Any mode of reform that feels obliged to appeal to popular prejudice rather than to the reflective reason is open to suspicion and distrust. Nearly every one of the so-called "basic principles" bears the ear-mark of some infatuation. Each of them expresses the half of a truth, but with such distortion and exaggeration as to be a virviii INTRODUCTION.

tual untruth. It is a safe rule to suspect every aphorism that proceeds from the mouth of an over-ardent reformer.

Methodical teaching, even if it be mechanical, is much superior to aimless teaching; and so there was an undeniable gain when exact method was made an essential part of a teacher's professional preparation. But we incur a grave danger when we impose on a teacher a specific rule of action divorced from the principle that is its justification. Contrasted with a principle, a rule is undiscriminating, narrowing, unfruitful ; and it must be confessed that systematic training in method has a tendency to rob the teacher of his freedom, his versatility, and his personal power. Method has an incomparable value when it directs capitalized energy, wisdom, and culture; but method is taught at some sacrifice of scholarship and culture when it accompanies a teacher's instruction in subjects and is made a characteristic element in his course of study.

Freedom and power must come from a much higher source. Teaching is a purely spiritual art, and the higher manifestations of this power are as dependent on inspiration as poetry, eloquence, and art are. I have seen teaching that was artistic in the same sense that music and painting are artistic. The sources of such power doubtless lie in large measure in a happy constitution of soul that is quite independent of school training; in innate benevolence and sympathy and quick intuitions; but there are also the added elements of wide scholarship, accurate mental training, and professional knowledge of the scientific type, as distinguished from the formal rules of

INTRODUCTION. i x

method. In writing these papers I have had in mind such teaching as I have just tried to indicate. Perhaps, under existing conditions, the most of the work done in the schoolroom must be mechanical in order to utilize slender teaching ability ; but this only makes apparent the supreme need of encouraging those who purpose to teach to covet the best gifts.

The practice of medicine and law is attractive to men of talent because there is so wide a field for the exercise of their versatility and skill. The succession of new and interesting problems awakens and sustains a noble passion for triumphing over difficulties, which gives keen enjoyment to professional life. These victories and delights are due to the previsions of science ; the delicious sense of power comes from fruitful knowledge. But perhaps even a keener enjoyment comes from the consciousness of growth, and of taking progressive steps in an honorable career.

All these avenues to enjoyment are open to the teacher provided he has professional competence and skill — provided he has that kind of knowledge which can give him power over the remote and the difficult — provided he has that versatility and freedom which come from the comprehension of general truths. To the teacher who has gained a real insight into educational principles there is presented a field for the exercise of his highest intellectual gifts, for there is a constant succession of varied and interesting problems which hourly challenge his professional skill. And he may enjoy that grateful sense of growth to which allusion has been made, and he may be x INTRODUCTION.

inspired by the hope of an honorable career. All these things are possible, provided the teacher has formed a love for thinking and has made himself capable of scientific prevision.

If I interpret my own thoughts aright, my dominant purpose in the composition of these essays has been to encourage among teachers the habit of serious reflection upon some of the greater problems in education, to the end that they may find a new delight in an occupation otherwise monotonous and uninspiring. The first need of the teacher is to be reasonably happy in his work, and I feel sure that the source of this happiness is in the direction I have tried to indicate. I wish I might gain the ear of young men who are ambitious to rise in the world through the doing of good. To those who can treat grave questions with judicial seriousness and fairness there is no field of activity more inviting than that of the educational thinker.

Need I remind the reader that the questions discussed in these essays are "open questions"? On no one of them has the last word been said ; and any one whose thinking has been patient, catholic, and candid has the right to be heard. The most thoughtful and fruitful book on education since the "Emile" is undoubtedly Spencer's " Education," and by common consent it is the most authoritative expression of the doctrine that is now in the ascendant among educational reformers. It may be doubted whether any thinker since Aristotle has been endowed with such powers of analysis and comprehension as are conspicuous in Mr. Spencer's philosophical writings;

INTRODUCTION. x j

bat this vast power of generalizing is the source of error whenever, as in Mr. Spencer's case, studies are not " bounded in by experience." Indeed, this is a very conspicuous case in which " studies do give forth directions too much at large." It is a notable fact that the men who, like Rousseau, Locke, and Spencer, have written the most absolutely on education have been men of little or no experience in actual teaching. I trust the reader will not think it presumption, then, that I have ventured to call in question some of Mr. Spencer's broadest generalizations. For many years I have been compelled to study educational questions on their purely practical side, and the attempt to convert Mr. Spencer's formulas into working rules first suggested to me the probability that this love for generalizations had betrayed him into error. In bringing these essays together into a volume I have tried to cancel repetitions that almost involuntarily appear in such a series of detached papers ; but after all my care some such repetitions of thought, expression, and illustration remain to tax the indulgence of the reader.

W. H. Payne, University of Michigan.

Contents

Page I. IS THERE A SCIENCE OF PEDAGOGICS ? 1

II. THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION, ITS NATURE, ITS

METHOD, AND SOME OF ITS PROBLEMS 7

Appendix

THE STUDY OF EDUCATION IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICH- IGAN 335

"Know and then act." — Bias.

" Studies perfect nature and are perfected by experience." — Bacon.

"Progress is not a force that acts spasmodically, but is a logical and graduated evolution in which the idea of to-day is connected with that of yesterday, as the latter is to a still more remote past." — Joseph Simon.

" It may perhaps seem to be better, and indeed necessary to the salvation of truth, to subvert the opinions even of our friends. For both being our friends (Plato and truth), it is holy to give the preference to truth." — Aristotle.

SCIENCE OF EDUCATION.

Chapter I. Is There A Science Of Pedagogics?

This question is ambiguous, the two queries involved in it being, (1) Is there a science of pedagogics in posse? Or, (2) Is there such a science in esse f I shall attempt to answer these queries in the order stated.

I. Is there, from the very constitution of things, a science of human training as distinguished from the art of human training?

1. Presumptively there is ; for the established use of the terms science of education, science of pedagogics, and science of teaching, by the leading thinkers of the age, almost necessarily carries with it the implication that the art of human training lias its correlated science. At least, the current use of this term by men addicted to habits of exact thinking establishes a very strong probability that such a science exists potentially, if not actually.

2. The existence of such a science in posse is established beyond question by the doctrine of two orders of knowledge, a higher and a lower, each of which is the complement of the other.

These two orders of knowledge may be called the speculative and the practical; the speculative resulting from the examination of the established constitution or nature of things, and held bj the mind as matter for simple contemplation ; and the practical resulting from the production of effects bj the use of means. For example, the attentive examination of a new substance may end in the discovery of certain properties or sets of uniformities in relation or behavior; and as long as this knowledge remains in the mind as matter for mere contemplation, and is not employed in the way of producing results, it is speculative. But when the knowledge of these uniformities is employed for direction in the working out of results, it becomes practical. The knowledge of astronomy is chiefly of the speculative order; man has but little opportunity to employ the observed uniformities in the production of results. The knowledge of agriculture, on the other hand, is chiefly practical, consisting in mere methods for the attainment of results. The baker's knowledge of his own art is practical ; he can perform all its processes, but can explain none of them. On the other hand, the chemist's knowledge of the baker's art is speculative; he can explain all its processes, but can perform none of them. These contrasted phases of knowledge are universal; and, by general consent, the terms science and art have been used to mark this discrimination. Every art thus implies a science; and, in turn, every science implies an art, actual or possible.

A summary answer to the first query is this : By universal consent there is an art of pedagogics, said art consisting in certain processes for the attainment of results. But these processes necessarily imply certain uniformities, and these uniformities, when ascertained and put in order, constitute a science of pedagogics.

II. Is there a science of pedagogics in esse f

IS THERE A SCIENCE OF PEDAGOGICS? 3

The answer to this question depends somewhat on the definition of science. If science be an orderly and exhaustive deduction of minor truths from a few first principles that are axiomatic, then there is but one science — mathematics ; but if the term science be construed in the sense explained above, the number of possible sciences is indeterminate, and the number of actual sciences very large. This conception of science does not require that the enumeration of its first principles shall be complete, or that they be arranged in a strictly logical order, or that the series of deductions shall be complete. Sciences may be incomplete in matter and imperfect in form, and still be sciences in the accepted and legitimate use of this term.

The science of pedagogics stands in the case last described; it is still incomplete in its matter, all its first principles not having been formulated; and it is imperfect in form, its admitted principles not having been arranged, and deductions from them not having been made with the required completeness and order. "Whoever takes an established psychological law and draws from it legitimate deductions that can be employed for guidance in educational work, has made a contribution to the science of pedagogics; and works like Bain's "Education as a Science," and Rosenkranz's " Pedagogics as a System," that discuss, in a comprehensive way, the doctrines of education, are actual treatises on the science of pedagogics.

The answer to the second query, then, briefly stated, is this : A science of pedagogics exists as an actual fact, but it is still incomplete in matter and imperfect in form. The need of the hour is a systematic rearrangement of the old material, and the addition of omitted principles and their deductions.

Though not strictly "belonging to the above inquiry, I add a paragraph on the general nature of educational science from my own point of view.

The material composing a science of pedagogics is logically distributed as follows :

1. The being to be educated is susceptible of three orders of growth : first, physical ; second, mental ; third, moral. A rational art of education must be based on the laws that regulate these three orders of growth. The science of pedagogics must therefore borrow principles from physiology, psychology, and ethics.

2. All instruction presupposes a medium of communication. This medium is language ; and the laws of language, as employed in the communication of knowledge, are expounded in the science of logic. The science of pedagogics will therefore borrow other principles from logic.

3. Growth presupposes aliment ; and this aliment, in the present case, is represented by the various subjects of human knowledge. A necessary element in the science of pedagogics is a determination of education values; but, as there is no independent science for determining these values, this is an inductive inquiry, falling within the domain of the science of pedagogics itself.

4. In passing from the single child to aggregates of children, there arises the need of the organization of schools and school-systems ; and so the science of pedagogics must borrow other material from history, sociology, political science, and legislation.

5. It must be that much valid educational truth is embodied in current methods. The analytical examination of results is therefore a necessary part of the science of

IS THERE A SCIENCE OF PEDAGOGICS? 5

pedagogics; and the truths thus elicited will -serve to verify the deductions drawn from assumed principles.

6. Education, in its ideal or formal aspect, aims at the realization of the typical man, and comprises all the agencies that can be brought under human control for the attainment of this end. The principles that are involved in this whole complex process, when systematically arranged, constitute the science of pedagogics. This I believe to be the authorized use of the term by German, French, and Italian writers on education.

7. The term pedagogy should be used to designate the art of education, or, rather, so much of this art as falls within ths province of the school. This distinction is made by the Italian educator, E. Latino,* and seems to me worthy of being accepted by educational writers.

8. The current use of the term pedagogics (Fr. pddagogie ; It. pedagogica, pedagogia ; Ger. padagogik) in French, Italian, and German literature, is a sufficient warrant for the respectability of the term. To affect a dislike for the word on etymological or historical grounds is childish. f

* "Thus pedagogics (pedagogica), or the science of education, is connected with pedagogy (pedagogia), or the art of education; for science has need of art in order to be useful to life, and to direct the conduct of human affairs; and art has need of science in order to be enlightened and made conscious of its own scope and power." — Emanuele Latino, " Delia Pedagogica" (Palermo, 1876), p. 114.

t " Pedagogy is the science of education. The word pedagogue is of Greek origin, and signifies a conductor of children. A pedagogue was a slave charged with the duty of conducting children to school. From this wholly material sense the word has been raised to a nobler sense. To-day a pedagogue is he who directs the young intellectually and morally. Can there be a grander mission?" — Marion, "Le- 90ns de Psychologic AppliquSe a TlMucation" (Paris, 1884), p. 13.

Ill his "Histoire de la Pedagogie," M. Compayre* takes pains to distinguish the term pedagogy from the term education, using the former in a limited or technical sense, and the latter in a comprehensive or liberal sense.*

. * See the Introduction to Compayrg's " History of Pedagogy " (Boston, 1886).

Chapter II

THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION. — ITS NATURE, ITS METHOD, AND SOME OP ITS PROBLEMS.

One of the curiosities of current educational history is the fact that English teachers are still discussing the question, whether there is a science of education. The cause of this phenomenon is said to be the low state of philosophical studies among the English. This conjecture is confirmed by the fact that in Germany and in Scotland, where philosophy has long been in high repute, this question is as far above discussion as an axiom in mathematics. It is probable that, in this country, philosophical culture has not yet attained a depth and a breadth that will make the existence of a science of education a postulate. It is much more probable that when this subject has become of sufficient importance to be talked about, there will be sceptics and disbelievers here, as in England. On this subject, our present intellectual state is the unanimity of the ignorant. There are yet to come the disagreements of the inquiring, to be followed, let us hope, by the unanimity of the wise.*

In human societies there are advanced stages of opinion that seem to come in the fulness of time. That is, they do not seem to come as the results of deliberate thinking, but rather to be evolved out of unconscious or spontaneous thought. In this state, these intellectual advances are growths ; and, as such, they escape special

* Spencer, "Education" (New York, 1861), p. 101.

notice on their first appearance, but by and by they become the subject of critical analysis, and in the end they are helped forward by deliberate effort. As examples of this law we may observe the three progressive phases of public opinion as to fitness for teaching :

1. The primitive phase of opinion identifies teaching ability with general scholarship. It is assumed that a good scholar will be a good teacher, if he chooses to adopt this vocation. This mode of thought is still embodied in the legal requirements for obtaining a license to teach. The current modes of examining teachers are apparently based on the assumption that mere scholarship is the test of a candidate's fitness and worth.

2. Within the last one hundred years there have been the outcroppings of an advanced opinion. After centuries of experience, the fact had become impressed on some minds that something besides scholarship was needed for success in teaching. This something turned out to be trained skill. To be a teacher, one must know not only the subjects he is to teach, but as well the best ways by which these subjects are to be taught. This discovery is, by implication, at least twenty-two centuries old. The world had to wait for the genius of Socrates to formulate this general truth : That whatever a man proposes to do, that thing he should learn before the doing is attempted. This incident from the "Memorabilia of Socrates," by Xenophon, is worthy of repetition : Euthydemus, surnamed the Handsome, was an ambitious and conceited young man of Athens. He aspired to take part in the government of the city ; and, to create the impression that he was wise above the young men of his time, he had made a large collection of books, and on these he relied as an evidence that he was qualified to become a ruler of Athens,

ITS NATURE, ITS METHOD, AND SOME OF ITS PROBLEM3. 9

and to give counsel on public affairs. Now Socrates thought it his duty to take the conceit out of this superficial and ambitious young man. An opportunity was soon found ; for he surprised Euthydemus in a company of admiring friends, in a bridle-maker's shop near the Agora — a place to which the young man was accustomed to resort when his political prospects were to be looked after. This is what Socrates said : " I imagine that Euthydemus here has already framed an exordium for his public oration * * * and that when he begins to speak he will make his opening thus : i I, O men of Athens, have never learned anything from any person, nor, though I have heard of some that were skilled in speaking and acting, have I sought to converse with them, nor have I been anxious that any one of the learned should become my master; but I have done the exact contrary; for I have constantly avoided not only learning anything from any one, but even the appearance of learning anything ; nevertheless I will offer you such advice as may occur to me without premeditation.' " Thereupon Socrates proceeds to parody this supposed speech as follows : " I, O men of Athens, have never learned the medical art from any one, nor have been desirous that any physician should be my instructor; for I have constantly been on my guard, not only against learning any thing of the art from any one, but even against appearing to have learned anything; nevertheless confer on me this medical appointment ; for I will endeavor to learn by making experiments upon you." " At this mode of opening a speech," Xenophon slyly observes, "all who were present burst out into laughter."* I was led into this digression by remarking that the

* "Memorabilia of Socrates" (Watson's translation, New York, 1869), IX., ii., 3-5.

1* doctrine is ancient, that men should learn their art before they venture to practise it. Euthydemus held the very modern doctrine, that " we learn to do by doing ;" and had he been an applicant for a position in a public school, he would doubtless have urged his claims in this wise : " I, O members of the board, have never learned the art of teaching from any one, nor have I been desirous that any teacher should be my instructor; for I have constantly been on my guard, not only against learning anything of the art of teaching from any one, but even against appearing to have learned anything ; nevertheless confer on me this scholastic appointment ; for I will endeavor to learn by making experiments on your children."

I think it a curious fact that this Socratic doctrine, so fruitful in its suggestions, did not affect the teacher's calling from this time forward. But the fact remains, that it was not till within about a hundred years that a knowledge of method began to be regarded as an essential element in a teacher's qualification. This second phase of opinion respecting fitness for teaching is embodied in the Normal School, whose original intent was to give a sound academic training in subjects, and at the same time to communicate the best-known methods of doing school work.

3. But the slow evolution of opinion has brought forward a still higher ideal of fitness for teaching. According to this conception, the teacher should not only have a broad knowledge of subjects, supplemented by a knowledge of the best methods, but should know the general principles and laws that underlie methods, and thus give them their validity. In this progress of opinion, the sequence has been this : (1) knowledge ; (2) knowledge and method ; (3) knowledge, method, and doctrine. Or the successive steps may be stated in another form, as follows : At first, the teacher was not differentiated from the scholar, there was no preparatory training; next, the teacher was differentiated from the scholar by method, the preparatory training was empirical; now, this preparatory training is to be rational, — method must be the outgrowth of known physiological, psychological, and ethical laws ; the ideal teacher must be a man of science in the same sense that the reputable physician is a man of science ; teaching is no longer to be a trade, a mere calling, or an empirical art, but a rational art, an art deriving its inspiration from science, and basing its practice on established laws. All this amounts to saying that, in the slow but sure evolution of human opinion, a science of education is beginning to emerge from the art of education : and so the purpose of this chapter is to define, in outline, the nature of this new science, the method of its cultivation, and some of the problems that it must solve. Throughout this chapter I use the term science as distinguished from art, science denoting a higher order of knowledge, and art, a correlated, but lower order, of knowledge. To make my use of these contrasted terms as clear as possible, I discriminate two orders of knowledge as follows : We may suppose a farmer to know the mere processes or rules of his art, but to be in absolute ignorance of the physical and chemical laws that are involved in the art ; he can do, but cannot explain what he does. On the other hand, we may suppose a scholar to know all the physical and chemical laws that are involved in agriculture, but to be absolutely unable to succeed in a single branch of this art. He can explain all its processes, but can perform none of them. In the first case, there is art without science; and in the second, science without art. This contrast runs through all forms

SCIENCE OF EDUCATION.

of human labor. There is no art that does not imply a science, for there is no effect without a cause.* There may be sciences, however, without correlative arts, because there may be laws that human skill has not employed.

The contrast now pointed out has been expressed as follows: "Science consists in knowing, art in doing ;" "the principles which art involves, science evolves." The contrast is broadly expressed by the terms theory and practice, as the theory and practice of teaching. Some of the relations of science to art, or of theory to practice, are the following: 1. The ideal knowledge comprehends both doing and knowing — it is theory embodied in practice, or practice guided and inspired by theory. 2. The largest element in trades is practical knowledge; the largest element in professions is theoretical knowledge.