Refutation of the argument a priori for the being and attributes of God ...

Front matter

I

REFUTATION

OF THE

Preface

The circumstance which has unexpectedly called forth the following refutation is somewhat remarkable. A gentleman who, in 1833, published a volume, entitled, " An Argument a priori for the Being and Attributes of God," sent a challenge, a few months ago, to a society of freethinkers in this city, " to refute the reasoning contained in the aforesaid work." The tone of the communication is rather fierce than gallant ; haughty and cavalier rather than courteous. Perhaps the author, in his zeal of God, does not conceive any great civility to be due to those who do not subscribe to his own creed. If so, it is only another instance among the many that occur, of men, even men of learning and talents, allowing a morose religion to hold the sway over their better nature.

Mr Gillespie, the author of the argument alluded to, had been disappointed, it seems, in finding an antagonist elsewhere, notwithstanding his anxious endeavours to provoke opposition. The gauntlet was thrown down, but no one was fully prepared to take it up. This may have been the ground of his confidence, and of his almost triumphant anticipations of submission in all against whom he might think proper to assume a hostile bearing. If, however, hearty and fair opposition be all that he desires, that object of his wishes is now offered him as some compensation for his former disappointments.

It may nevertheless of all this be mentioned, that the challenge was accepted — not exactly to gratify Mr Gillespie — nor because any of the individuals appealed to in the affair, held himself bound to lift the gage, or answer any call to refute opinions contrary to his own, — but because one of them had long since purposed to write some time or other upon the subject. This was at least the principal motive. Another might be to vindicate openly avowed freethinkers from the charge (implied in the gentleman's letter) of incomiv

petency to such a task. The letter itself indeed might here have been inserted verbatim, — only that a considerable proportion of it consists of irrelevant matter, besides containing passages which could by no means militate in favor of the writer, but of which his respondent wishes to take no advantage.

This article might have been restricted to the consideration of Mr. Gillespie's work, and to that alone. Indeed, in the note addressed to Mr. G. intimating that his argument would be replied to, nothing was stated of any other course being contemplated. But on second thoughts, it was conceived that this would be to narrow the thing too much. Other writers have signalized themselves in the treatment of the greatest question in theology by the argument a priori : — and it might have been said with justice, and without disparagement to any one, — that such a reply would have been very defective, as overlooking the first and greatest authority in the case. A supplementary answer, it is true, might have been made to follow; but this plan of publication is both awkward and inconvenient, and moreover, it would not have ' squared so well with the original intention already expressed.

It has further to be noticed, that in replying to the argument a priori, it would be unreasonable to expect every thing to be brought under consideration which the authors who have adopted this strain of reasoning, have chosen to introduce. In strict conformity with logical principle, perhaps, they ought not to be followed one step " out of the record," however far they may wander from it. I shall as seldom as possible deviate from this principle; yet, if on an occasion, a plausible argument be found thrust in, having no proper place in what is going forward, I trust I shall be excused for attending to it, on the ground that it is safer to do too much in this way than too little, — especially as it is too commonly apt to be supposed, that an argument unanswered is one that is unanswerable.

Glasgow, 15th Dec. 1837.

Chapter I. Character and Irrelevancy of the Argument Page 7

II. Fallacies of Dr Clarke's Demonstration 14

III. Same Subject, continued 26

IV. Fallacies of Mr Richard Jack 33

V. Fallaciousness of Mr Gillespie's " Argument" — The Intro-

duction , 38

VT. Fallacies of Mr Gillespie — The " Argument" 42

VII. Same Subject, continued.. 50

VIII. False Reasoning of Mr Gillespie — Second Part of his Work 55

IX. Fallaciousness of the Third Part of do 59

X. Mr Gillespie's Second Book — A Departure from his own

Argument... 65

XI. Fallacy of the Argument in favor of a Supreme Intelligence 69

XII. Impossibility of ascribing Moral Attributes to the Subject of

Mr Gillespie's Reasoning.... 77

CHAPTER L

Character and Irrelevancy of the Argument.

To hear of the existence of a god being made the subject of demonstration by argument, is altogether astounding. The announcement, on the other hand, sounds so oddly, as to mitigate the effect of the first impression, if not to excite ridicule at the wonderful discrepancy between the end in view, and the means laid out for the attainment of it. Habit, however, reconciles people to the greatest absurdities ; and the approval of the argument a priori by a considerable proportion — it might be added, the most erudite and enlightened — of the Christian world, compels us to regard it with more deference than its intrinsic merits deserve.

The legitimate mode of effecting any demonstration relative to the real existence of things, is by an exhibition of the thing itself whose existence is the subject of proof. Now, a god, in as far as this point is concerned, must be held as a real being ; that is, his votaries, as a matter of course, maintain this to be the fact. This granted, argument appears quite out of place. It would never do to talk of proving the existence of the man in the moon by argument ; neither would it be of any avail to employ a syllogism or a sorites to demonstrate the existence of a navigable channel between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, through the arctic regions of America : yet if the reasoning under review be relevant, these must be so too. If an a priori argument be capable of proving the existence of one thing, another may be proved by the same, or any other logical process.

It may be accounted indecorous, perhaps, to refer such similes to the being of a god. But the tenderness of parties upon certain points whereabout they are apt to feel sore, is not to be taken as a reason why they should not be touched, even in attempting a cure. It is convenient, I dare say, to affect being pained, and to express dislike with respect to the idea of — reducing, I was going to say, but it really is — bringing up, the evidence to be admitted in proving the existence of a deity, to the level of that which is alone admissible in other cases of the same kind. It is even highly serviceable to the interests of religion, for its more acute and sensitive adherents to appear shocked themselves, and excite similar feelings in others, and the passions consequent upon them, at any such proposal as that now hinted at. Why people should be shocked, however, why they should either be disgusted or pained, I cannot well perceive, unless it be merely from prejudice; for the nature of the subject of probation certainly requires some small support from the evidence of the senses.

This kind of demonstration, all the theology of all the religions in the world, cannot afford. But if a god is never to be seen now-a-days, as is pretended to have been the case in former times, we are told to look to Nature, where we may see God in his works. This is the common and more fashionable way of discussing the great question before us, which has prevailed from Philo's time to the present. It is called the argument a posteriori: it relies on experience, and deduces causes from their effects. This process, however, is quite illogical, and, although it were otherwise, is of no great utility in its operation. It takes for granted the existence of an agent capable of producing the effects contemplated as the source of the argument — which of course is begging the principle — and only attempts to make out pow r er, and wisdom, and goodness, and so forth, to be proper attributes of that agent. As Mr Gillespie himself has well observed, it cannot prove wisdom, goodness, power, or any other divine attribute to be unlimited. Assuming the existence of a god, it cannot demonstrate that he has always existed; it cannot demonstrate that he must exist eternally, nor even prove that that existence may not have already terminated. A clock continues to indicate the lapse of time, although the hand that set it in motion has ceased to be animate.

The idea of so grievous a defect inherently attaching to evidence so much relied upon, was not to be endured, and some of the consequences, although barely glanced at, were too horrid for contemplation. Up starts the logician of the new school, therefore, with a remedy for this great evil. A scheme is devised of making every point at issue a matter of rigid demonstration. The most exalted view of the divine character is to be taken. All the attributes of deity are to be drawn to the largest scale — nay, magnified to infinitude itself, and borne out in a manner the most absolute, as well as his eternity both past and future. It is irrefragably to be proved, not only that a god does exist, but that he must exist, and that too as necessarily as that two and two make four ; — that his non-existence, in short, cannot even be conceived !

A vast project this is, most undoubtedly : demanding powers and ingenuity equally vast to execute. Like the dogma of all things being created out of nothing, to which, indeed, this argument is strongly allied, the thing seems impossible. Maugre every impediment, however, the attempt is boldly made. A being existing by necessity is sought for ; that is (according to the new logic) one whose non-existence it is not in the power of man to imagine; simple in its essence ; indivisible : everywhere present, and without which nothing else can be supposed to exist. To seek in nature for such a being ; to ransack the whole universe for it were vain. Among real and known existences it was nowhere to be found. But the brain of the theologue, like the lanthorn of Diogenes, was set to discover what the sun could not reveal ; and if equally honest with the cynic, his imitator would have been every whit as unsuccessful. Those who contrive an object for search, however, know precisely where to find it. Hence, the reasoner of the anti-experimental sect having laid up the thing cut and dry, in his own conceptions, brought it forth with an air of triumph due to a great discovery.

It could not escape observation among minds of an abstract and reflective turn, that space possesses some of the attributes commonly ascribed to deity, such as infinity, and, of course, omnipresence ; immateriality, and so forth : that duration cannot be supposed to have had a beginning, or to be within the possibility of ever coming to an end. It must thus have appeared to the metaphysical theist, exceedingly desirable to bring these idle and unappropriated attributes into more useful play, and in a manner the most advantageous to the. common faith. Clarke and Butler, and all their followers, have accordingly talked much of these matters, and evinced a strong predilection for them in selecting examples wherewithal to illustrate the absolute and infinite perfections of the divine nature. These metaphysicians, in short, have made space and duration usurp the station and dignity of a divine being. They have taken this empty and inanimate fabrication, and set it up in a newly-erected shrine of curiously mathematical construction, and fallen down to it as the god of their idolatry.

If the theory be vague and visionary which the argument a priori is introduced to support, it is not to be expected that the argument itself should be of a different character. A false principle cannot well be maintained by reasoning which is true. The truth is, the argument in question is nothing else than an attempt to establish the application of mathematical reasoning to what it has nothing in earth or heaven to do with, — namely, real existences ; at least what is held to be real by those who employ such argument. But how vain and preposterous the attempt ! As well might it be maintained, that as the whole is in the abstract a perfect quantity, it must contain within itself all the qualities of the different parts of which it is composed ; that as some of these parts are small and some large, some round and some square, some black and some white ; it must be white and black, and square and round, and large and small at the same time ! Aristotelians inform us, that every sound argument is capable of being reduced to the syllogistic form. If so, I should be glad to hear from their own lips an exemplification in the present case. To my own untrained thinking, it should run somewhat thus : — Whatever necessarily possesses absolute perfections is God ;

Metaphysical abstractions possess absolute perfections ; — Therefore, metaphysical abstractions are God. If this be not a fair statement of the whole argument in the most logical form, I am at a loss to know what is. Should it be any way wrongs and should some ardent disciple of the metaphysical school of theology deign hereafter to take a part in this discussion, it would be well were he to consult the Stagyrite and correct it. In any event, our reasoners a priori have either to acknowledge the absurdity here set forth in mood and figure, or deny that they appropriate abstract reasoning to questions of ontological science. If their god be a real being — an agent, he cannot be a heap of abstractions : if made up of abstractions, he cannot be an agent. No reasoning imaginable can make him both : yet to nothing short of working out this impossibility does the argument aim.

It must be granted, indeed, that such parts of the process as have a bearing upon the divine actions, as well as those which go to establish the moral and intellectual character of deity, do not properly belong to the argument a priori. These things are either boldly thrust in where they are out of all keeping, or humbly introduced in forma pauperis, and so made to pass off with the rest. But after all, and with every advantage, fair and foul, that can be claimed for it, it is at best but a sorry piece of patch work. Restricted to its own province, it can prove nothing, demonstrate nothing to be either true or false but what is necessarily so, in the most abstract and mathematical sense of the terms.

Here, indeed, the grand secret in managing the argument before us lies. It affixes a partial and out-of-the-way meaning to words, especially those upon which the whole question turns, and so, misconstrues and misapplies general language. Necessity, for instance, which by the way is the keystone of the structure, is different from what it is found to be anywhere else, except, perhaps, in some other region of mere speculation. In the premises, it is attenuated to the utmost fineness of its mathematical acceptation, although the weight of its common and real meaning is essential to the

B validity of the conclusion. Substance, in like manner, is totally dissimilar to any thing known by that name. It seems an evanescent, or rather imperceptible — nothing; yet, lo ! it is found in the end that something substantial was after all to be understood.

These things, however, will be more clearly apprehended when we come to discuss the logic of this strange argument in detail. In the meantime it may not be amiss to show, that the character of irrelevancy here laid at the door of the a priori argument, is not unwarranted by the authority of good judges among the religious themselves. Abundance of quotations might be adduced, but I shall content myself with an extract from the Edinburgh Review for October 1830, (vol. Hi. p. 113,) in an article upon Dr Morehead's " Dialouges on Natural and Revealed Religion." That the reviewer reasons upon theistical principles is evident from the allusion he makes to " the will of the creator," to which, I may remark in passing, he allows the most orthodox latitude. Relative to our argument a priori he observes : — " The truth is, it involves a radical fallacy which not only renders it useless but dangerous to the cause it is intended to support. The question as to the being of a god, is purely a question of fact: he either exists or he does not exist. But there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by argument a priori ; because nothing is demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradiction, and this can never be predicated of the negative of any proposition which merely affirms or asserts a matter of fact. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent, and consequently there is no being whose non-existence implies a contradiction, or, in other words, whose existence is a priori demonstrable. This must be evident to every one who knows what demonstration really means. It is a universal law, that all heavy bodies descend to the earth in a line directed towards its centre. But the contrary of this may easily be conceived, because it involves no contradiction ; for bodies might have fallen upward, if we may so express it, as well as downward,

IS had such been the will of the creator. But we cannot conceive the opposite of one of the demonstrated truths of geometry, as, for example, that the three angles of a triangle should be either greater or less than two right angles, because this implies a contradiction. The distinction, therefore, between necessary or demonstrable truths and matters of fact, consists in this,—- that the contrary of the former involves a contradiction, whereas that of the latter does not. But there is no contradiction implied in conceiving the nonexistence of the deity; and therefore his existence is not a necessary truth, a priori demonstrable."

To add any thing to the foregoing reasoning of the reviewer were perhaps superfluous. It is clear and satisfactory. Yet I cannot well refrain from taking notice of a single circumstance by way of illustration. Men have often been made to suffer severely — on some occasions to the loss of life — for denying the being of a god, while the great mass of the people, so far from regarding these occurrences as either absurd or unjust, have looked on them as well-merited punishments. But was ever any one put to death, or sent to the pillory, for denying that twice two make four? The idea, indeed, is ridiculous ; but wherefore should it be so ? Simply because it is not possible there should be any difference of opinion about the matter. If, however, the dogmas of theology, or even say the primary one, were capable of demonstration as mathematical doctrines are, there could be no difference in the respect due to doubts and denials in either case ; or rather, it would be impossible to find doubters and deniers in the one more than in the other. I do not mention the horrid penalties awarded in our barbarous laws to certain kinds of unbelief, in proof of the real importance of the articles of faith they have been enacted to maintain by brute force. Statutes of this description are a proof of nothing but legislative ignorance and the persecuting nature of the religions they have been made to defend. Their very existence, however, as well as that of the stupid prejudices, alas ! but too prevalent, upon which they are founded, are totally incompatible with the validity of that mode of argument which would demonstrate the being of a god upon abstract principles.

But the propositions and reasonings of the different authors who have adopted the mode of procedure now shown to be directed so wide of the mark, must not be passed over without special notice. It is more easy to censure an argument in general terms, than to meet all its particular parts on fair and open grounds. Even this labour, therefore, I cheerfully undertake, that there may be nothing left to suppose on the score of disingenuousness or pretended want of interest in the matter. No one can be more fully aware than I am, of how nearly this discussion approaches in some points to a verbal dispute. But what of that? If the religious world choose to peril their cause on grounds so insecure, upon themselves let the dishonour of perverting things from their right purposes, and all its consequences, fall. Be it always remembered, too, that this argument of theirs, has repeatedly been put forth as invulnerable, and that according to their own showing, the' mighty problem of the being of a god depends upon the result.

CHAP. II. Fallacies of Dr Clarke's Demonstration

In examining the reasonings of the theologians who have advocated the fundamental articles of their creed upon a priori principles, the "Demonstration of the being and attributes of God," by Dr Samuel Clarke,, demands our first attention. This much is due to the reverend divine on account of his acknowledged talents and great reputation, as well as the early appearance of his work. His Demonstration has been too long before the public, and ranks too high as a standard theological production, to require particular description here. This celebrated treatise is stated in twelve propositions, supported severally by such arguments as the author must have deemed best calculated for that purpose.

He introduces his subject by^assigning certain causes for the existence of atheism. These he specifies to be excessive ignorance and stupidity ; or vicious habits ; or, at best, false philosophy.

It is perhaps hardly worth while to contend about these matters ; yet it may be observed, that if some savage tribes, as inferior in intelligence as they are represented, have no notion or belief of the being of a god ; a greater number, to the full as ignorant and stupid, possess abundance of credulity upon the subject ; and if we go to what is called civilised life, the most ignorant and debased are not only religious, but generally the most firmly fixed in their faith. The second class of persons mentioned, — men who from their evil practices have been led to scoff at every thing religious — are not atheists at all. Such characters always show, in the hour of suffering and in the prospect of death, that they had never been thoroughly convinced of the falsehood of religion, but only that it marred their merriment and discountenanced their wickedness. The form and profession of faith thrown aside recklessly and without consideration, the essence remains. It lies dormant for a time, till the storm of passion which crushed it to a certain extent has subsided, when it springs into activity more powerfully than ever. Slavishness to the appetites can never convince the understanding. It may drive men to disregard religion, as well as every thingelse of a serious nature, but it cannot make them disbelievers. Disregarders and disbelievers, however, are very different characters.

As to the philosophy which leads to atheism being false, that is the very question to be tried in the sequel. Of those, however, who take philosophy as the basis of their unbelief, the Doctor has a preliminary concession to demand ; namely, that the being of a god is very desirable. The demand is made that they should " be very willing, nay, desirous above all things to be convinced that their present opinion is an error." But what opinion must be formed of the goodness of a cause or the soundness of an argument, when it is found necessary either to beg or demand a predisposition in its favor ? The frame of mind most proper and most adequate to judge of any matter, is to be without desire or predisposition of any kind, whether for or against it. Any other, indeed, is prejudicial. Let us hear, however, what his reverence has to urge for the necessity of this concession.

" Man of himself," says he, " is infinitely insufficient for his own happiness ; he is liable to many evils and miseries, which he can neither prevent nor redress ; he is full of wants which he cannot supply, and compassed about with infirmities which he cannot remove, and obnoxious to dangers which he can never sufficiently provide against, &c. Under which evil circumstances it is evident there can be no sufficient support but in the belief of a wise and good God."

To make this case worth a rush, it ought to have been shewn that the faithful are exempted, and none else, from the calamities here complained of. If the belief of a god, or even the real existence of such a being, is not to relieve me of my infirmities and wretchedness, why should either the one or the other be any way desirable to me ? What earthly good can it do a man environed with woes and worn down with misery, to be assured that a god exists who either cannot or will not afford him relief? Has it not rather a strong tendency to excite his chagrin ? A god so poor and useless as to be unable to afford him relief, could only be an object of reproach and contempt ; and one who could, but would not, must appear too odious and malevolent in character to be regarded with other feelings than fear — if not hatred and aversion. The incredulous man is, on the contrary, much more comfortably situated. If he suffers, — he estimates the causes, whether moral or physical, according to their own character, without looking into the terra incognito for some supposed agency to account for them. He is not like the child who beats the floor for hurting him when he falls, or kisses for not breaking his bones.

If ever Dr Clarke studied the interesting subject of the origin of evil, or even thought or read upon it, he seems to have forgotten all ; for the above argument is given with the most admirable simplicity, although it evidently militates directly against himself. It is as much as to say, There is a dreadful deal of evil in the world, and we cannot get quit of it by any efforts of our own ; but these very circumstances render it imperative on the athiest to wish that the doctrine he is opposed to were true, since in that case he would have a god disinclined to remedy the evil, or as incapable of doing it as himself. — What ! says the unbeliever, convince us by our sufferings that we should like to have a god upon whom to father them ! This is certainly a new-fashioned way of paying compliment to deity. The author, to be sure, afterwards talks about the happiness of a hereafter, but to allude to a matter as admitted, which does not even follow as a consequence upon what he has yet to prove, is preposterous in the extreme ; more especially when, with regard to the primary point, he is only pleading for a favorable reception of what he has to offer in evidence. — But we must now recur to Dr Clarke's propositions.

His first, that " something has existed from eternity" no one can object to. It carries its evidence along with it, and must indeed be as cordially agreed to by the antitheist as the most devout christian. The second, however, does not stand in the same predicament. It is this, " There must have existed from eternity some one unchangeable and independent being."

I need say nothing of the alteration of the subject in the present proposition from that of the preceding. It is perhaps of little consequence any farther than indicating a certain leaning, for which there ought to have been shewn some sort of warrant. Was the mere something in the one case, not sufficiently pregnant in meaning to sustain the weight of dignity awaiting the being in the other ? So at least it would appear. What I particularly object to, however, is, that the two terms in the predicate, " unchangeable and independent," are linked together as inseparable. The author does not say one word in favor of this conjunction, and certainly there is no necessity for it in the nature of things. In his subsequent reasoning, he aims at establishing independence alone, yet his conclusions are afterwards and all along drawn as if both had been demonstrated. What are we to think of such a beginning ? Precisely this, — that the reverend theorist was so intent upon making out his case in some sort, that an. obstruction is overleaped with surprising facility, and a hiatus in his reasoning regarded as of no account.

With respect to the independence of the something which has always existed, the author's argument amounts to this : there must either be one being only of independent existence, or an infinite series of beings of dependent existence. But there cannot be an infinite series of the latter description. Therefore, there can only be one being of independent existence. — In support of his minor premiss, as here stated, Dr Clarke maintains that as no individual in the series can be the cause of itself, every one must have a cause, and if so, the whole must have a cause as well as the different parts. " If we consider," says he, " such an infinite progression as one entire endless series of dependent beings, it is plain this whole series of beings can have no cause from without^ of its existence ; because in it are supposed to be included all things that are or ever were in the universe : and it is plain it can have no reason within itself of its existence; because no one being in this infinite succession is supposed to be self-existent or necessary, but every one dependent on the foregoing ; and where no part is necessary, it is manifest the whole cannot be necessary."